

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

•

PART 29

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



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**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

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[3126] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 8:30 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL MORRILL W. MARSTON, GENERAL STAFF,
G-4, U. S. ARMY FORCES, POA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

Colonel MARSTON. Morrill W. Marston, Colonel, General Staff, G-4; headquarters, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Area.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, what was your assignment in the latter part of 1941 and during the attack?

Colonel MARSTON. I was assigned as G-4, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, on the 19th of October, 1941, and I remained in that or the corresponding assignment ever since.

3. General GRUNERT. Prior to that assignment what duty were [3127] you on over here?

Colonel MARSTON. I was G-2, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, from the 14th of September, 1939, until the 21st of July, 1941, at which time I went in as Assistant G-4 in the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, and remained there from that time until assigned as G-4, as previously stated.

4. General GRUNERT. Then you were with the Hawaiian Department, on the Hawaiian Department General Staff, from September, 1939, until after the attack, were you?

Colonel MARSTON. Yes.

5. General GRUNERT. As Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, presumably you knew about the matériel pertaining to the command. Do you know what deficiencies existed, in general terms, what was short and not on hand?

Colonel MARSTON. In very general terms, the antiaircraft defense was still not up to the desired standard but was being brought so by

the arrival of additional regiments just prior to and at about the time of the attack.

6. General GRUNERT. Meaning there was a deficiency in personnel?

Colonel MARSTON. There was a deficiency in personnel, which was being made up and was made up by the arrival of the 98th Coast Artillery antiaircraft, and there was one other unit came in at about that time. We were engaged in an expensive housing program for these units at the time that the attack came.

7. General GRUNERT. The antiaircraft organizations that were here, how were they equipped? Well equipped, partially equipped, lacking certain things, or what?

[3128] Colonel MARSTON. Compared to other such organizations in the American Army, they were very well equipped. Compared to modern standards, they were not well equipped. The armament was the 3-inch antiaircraft, which has since proved to be too light, but was the best available at that time.

8. General GRUNERT. They had no 90s at that time, did they?

Colonel MARSTON. There were none available at that time. However, as an illustration of the relative importance placed on antiaircraft defense in this Department, at the time that I came over in 1939 there were more active antiaircraft guns in this department in the hands of the 64th Coast Artillery Regiment, I believe, than there were in the entire continental United States.

9. General GRUNERT. Relatively speaking, they were relatively well equipped at that time with what was available?

Colonel MARSTON. They were, and that equipment was being brought up just as fast as the War Department, at the instigation of the Department Commander, could bring it.

10. General GRUNERT. When you went in as G-4, did you become aware of the Secretary of War's reply of the 7th of February to a letter the Secretary of the Navy wrote on the 24th of January wherein he, the Secretary of War, states, in effect, that all material for the air warning service would be there, meaning Hawaii, not later than June 1941. Did you know of that letter?

Colonel MARSTON. I did not know of that letter at the time that I took over the G-4 office.

11. General GRUNERT. You know of it now, do you?

Colonel MARSTON. I have recently looked over back correspondence and I believe that that was included in the back correspondence.

12. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is that the Secretary of War said that air warning service material would be here by June of 1941. Do you as G-4 know when that material got here?

Colonel MARSTON. I do not know the exact date. I do know that a substantial amount of material did arrive during the summer of 1941 and that this material was being installed at the time of the attack and temporary installations had been effected on several stations, particularly the station at Kokee on Kauai, and one or two stations on Oahu. I am not sure of the exact location of the stations which were in operation or being installed but preliminary work had been initiated for the station planned on, on the top of Mount Kaala and the station on Haleakala on Maui.

13. General GRUNERT. These were all permanent stations, were they?

Colonel MARSTON. These were all to be permanent stations. There was an argument or a difference of opinion as to whether the stations should be installed as mobile stations or as permanent stations. I did not personally get into the technical features of that discussion, as the work was handled by the Engineer, the Signal Officer, and the antiaircraft—

14. General GRUNERT. Who can give us the best information on that? Colonel Powell?

Colonel MARSTON. Colonel Powell can give you the best technical information from the Signal Corps standpoint. The actual work at the time was handled by Colonel Murphy of the [3130] Signal Corps, who later was killed in the Orient, but Colonel Powell was Signal Officer at the time. Colonel Fleming, Robert J. Fleming, of the Engineer Corps, first as representative of the Department Engineer and later as an assistant to G-4, handled the technical details from the G-4 and engineering standpoint. The District Engineer's office, Mr. Perliter, who is still present, is familiar with the details of design, and Mr. Sisson of that office, the principal engineer of that office, was more directly connected with the work.

15. General GRUNERT. We have those witnesses on our list. Tell me about what you know, if anything, about the supervision of construction for the Commanding General. Who did the supervising? Did you as G-4 or did Fleming as the representative?

Colonel MARSTON. I exercised a general supervision, with Fleming handling the exact details of the work.

16. General GRUNERT. Can you testify as to any delays or the reason for such delays, who was responsible and so forth, if there were such delays? Can you testify as to that?

Colonel MARSTON. I was aware that there was delay in the discussion of the aircraft warning stations, due to a difference of opinion over the technical features of the installations, which, being new, was not fully developed. As I stated before, there was some difference of opinion on the question of the fixed and the mobile stations. There was a very decided difference of opinion as to whether the station should be on the highest point on the various islands or down near the shore line or at an intermediate location.

17. General GRUNERT. Who was this difference of opinion between?

[3131] Colonel MARSTON. So far as my knowledge goes it was between experts in general in the Signal Corps who had developed this material. The fact that there was a definite difference of opinion is shown by the fact that the high stations, with the exception of the one at Kokee on Kauai, have proven not of use since they were installed. The one on Kaala has had to be abandoned for use as a radar station and has been used entirely for radio communication.

18. General GRUNERT. Where did the delays come in? You may have a difference of opinion, but if there was something decided, who made the decision as to what to do? Was there any delay caused by discussion or was there a delay by argument to put it there or put it somewhere else or not put it up at all, or what?

Colonel MARSTON. There was a delay in construction due to the lack of adequate construction personnel to execute this work simultane-

ously with the other work which was going on at the time. The Army expansion here did not get under way in force as soon as the Navy expansion did. There was a shortage of skilled personnel for the amount of work which was approved. Then there were delays due to the fact that all details of construction had to be approved from the War Department, even to the extent of very minor changes, before they could be effected. This type of delay is illustrated in the delays incident to the installation of the underground field storage.

19. General GRUNERT. Is all of this prior to December 7th that you are talking about?

Colonel MARSTON. There was a delay prior to December 7th due to the lack of adequate qualified construction personnel.

20. General GRUNERT. Tell us about the staff meetings that [3132] were held by the Chief of Staff, and how often they were held, and what happened at these staff meetings.

Colonel MARSTON. Well, as a general thing there would be a staff meeting on an average of about once a week, in which the General and Special Staffs would be represented. At these meetings the Chief of Staff would bring out any new developments or policies. There would be a discussion by each staff representative concerning the problems which were under solution by his staff section and general discussion of the operation of the staff with a view to coordinating its activity.

21. General GRUNERT. Did you have any such meeting between November 27th and December 7th, realizing that December 6th was on a Saturday? When did you usually have these staff meetings?

Colonel MARSTON. They usually came on Saturday morning.

22. General GRUNERT. Did you have any on or about November 27th?

Colonel MARSTON. I do not know of my own knowledge whether they did, or not. I understand that one was held, but I was personally on an inspection trip on the Island of Hawaii at the time.

23. General GRUNERT. Then if they held one on November 27th, you were not present?

Colonel MARSTON. I was not present.

24. General GRUNERT. Then you were not present when the question came up on which the Commanding General decided to alert the command on what is known as Alert No. 1?

Colonel MARSTON. I was not present at that time and my knowledge of the details of how the decision was arrived at it hearsay and not personal knowledge.

[3133] 25. General GRUNERT. Any questions?

26. General FRANK. You stated there were certain delays due to differences of opinion about these radar stations. As a matter of fact, was it not rather a matter of unforeseen operating difficulties, which difficulties were matters of fact rather than differences of opinion?

Colonel MARSTON. That might be a better description of it, because the actual experience with each location did not always bear out the previous conception, the theoretical conception of the operation of that station. As I have already stated, the high stations, with one exception, proved inoperable, due to echoes, and the intermediate stations or the stations of intermediate elevation later were

found to be more effective. That, I would say, would be a question of fact. As the stations were established I know that tests were made in each position and as far as possible with mobile equipment.

27. General FRANK. What I am getting at is this: You should not condone a delay in vital construction due to a squabble because of difference of opinion, whereas if there were technical difficulties of operation which were unforeseen those were things that had to be tested and handled.

[3134] Colonel MARSTON. Well, the differences of opinion, I gained that impression from the reports which I received on this construction, and I did not personally talk to the various experts who were handling this construction; but I do know that, first, there was an opinion that the high stations would be the best places to put them. There was also a question of the use of mobile stations.

28. General FRANK. That was theory?

Colonel MARSTON. That was theory; and then the actual installations developed the opinion on the part of the people engaged in its execution that the theory was not correct. It is true and probably better to state that the difficulty was a matter of factors developed by experience as against the theoretical opinion before the fact was determined. I think that would be a better way to state it.

29. General FRANK. Did you know Colonel Wyman?

Colonel MARSTON. Yes; I knew Colonel Wyman.

30. General FRANK. How closely did you work with him?

Colonel MARSTON. I didn't have a great deal of close contact prior to the 7th of December. I had a great deal of contact after that time. I did have a fairly frequent contact prior to the 7th of December. I did not know Colonel Wyman prior to his arrival in the Hawaiian Department.

31. General FRANK. Did you have any difficulties with him?

Colonel MARSTON. Not prior to the time of the attack.

32. General FRANK. Was construction progressing satisfactorily with no delays prior to the attack?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, that, of course, is a matter of opinion. I believe that the construction was progressing as [3135] fast as was physically possible under the conditions at the time.

33. General FRANK. What were the conditions?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, the conditions were that details of design, frequently, and of modification in the projects, had to be cleared to the minutest detail with the War Department, in accordance with the standard peacetime procedure. This did cause very serious delays in the progress of work on some of the projects.

That is particularly illustrated on the underground gasoline storage project; and then there was difficulty in the obtaining of high enough priorities for the critical materials involved. We found that the Navy in many cases was able to get much higher priority than we could, for the equivalent material, and that relative priority meant that the construction work was delayed, due to the non-arrival of construction material with which to execute it.

34. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract?

Colonel MARSTON. Yes, I know the general features of such contracts, and the fact that there was such a contract in existence.

35. General FRANK. Was it not possible through that contract for the district engineer to give decisions on the details of construction?

Colonel MARSTON. It may have been so for the district engineer, for the details of construction, but that it did not affect his relationship with the War Department, on which decisions had to be based.

[3136] 36. General GRUNERT. What were some of those decisions? I do not understand; if there was a cost-plus contract, then the details of that contract were made locally; what had to go to Washington, that delayed these things?

Colonel MARSTON. The plan for the work which was to be executed by that contract, which would have had to go to Washington, whether there was such a contract or not, or whether the work was being done by purchase-and-hire with district personnel.

37. General FRANK. Are you sure about this?

Colonel MARSTON. I can give you an illustration specifically in the case of the underground fuel storage. This will be brought out chronologically in later testimony from the district engineer's office.

38. General FRANK. How do you know?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, I know that he was directed to prepare a chronological account of all the correspondence and of the activity on certain projects, and that he has prepared that account.

39. General FRANK. By whom was he directed to prepare that?

Colonel MARSTON. By the Chief of Engineers.

40. General FRANK. And to present it to this Board?

Colonel MARSTON. I presume, to have it available in case the Board should ask for it.

41. General FRANK. Go ahead.

Colonel MARSTON. I don't remember whether the presentation to the Board was specifically covered or not in the "radio."

Well, in the case of the underground fuel storage, the general project was approved by the Secretary of War, 3 January [3137] 1941, and preliminary surveys were authorized. Then, on 3 April, the correspondence acknowledges the visit of a representative of the Office of Chief of Air Corps to select the site. Then, also, at about the same time, on 5 April, the district engineer is advised that negotiations had been opened for the priorities for the steel, before the Army-Navy Priority Committee, but that the priority for the steel could not be obtained, until the contract for the tanks is made.

The storage was increased. On the 19th of May, directions were received to increase the storage from 100,000 barrels to 250,000 barrels. We got the priority rating on the 13th of June. The allotment of funds was made on 17 June, but stated that they had to be utilized before 1 July.

42. General FRANK. That means "obligated," does it not?

Colonel MARSTON. Yes. Well, it is stated "utilized," but that meant "obligated"; that is, the contract let.

43. General FRANK. Was there any difficulty in that?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, the contract was let to cover this, but there could be no details of course included in the contract, because the design had not yet been approved by the War Department. That would be by the Chief of Engineers, acting for the Secretary of War.

Well, there were several other things happened in between, but on 23 July there was a "radio" from the division engineer to the Chief

of Engineers, requesting an authorization to proceed with the excavation, that the sites and general layout are satisfactory. On 26 July the reply was received from the division engineer in San Francisco to the district engineer, stating that the Chief of Engineers advises the excavation [3138] should not be started until the proposed installation has been approved.

44. General FRANK. By whom?

Colonel MARSTON. By the Chief of Engineers, I presume; by the War Department at least; and on 7 August, another "radio" was received from the division engineer advising that we were not to start work, since plans are being materially changed.

45. General FRANK. By whom?

Colonel MARSTON. By the War Department.

46. General FRANK. By whom, in the War Department?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, that would be the Chief of Engineers, working in conjunction with the Chief of Air Forces, as to the aviation-gasoline features of the plan.

Then there was a letter from the Adjutant General to the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, of the Navy, on 12 August, requesting that the plans be reviewed and concurrence or further recommendations be given by the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy.

47. General FRANK. What has the Navy to do with Army construction?

Colonel MARSTON. It was a joint Army-Navy war-reserve fuel system.

Concurrence was received on 18 August through the Adjutant General of the Army, and then the Chief of Engineers was directed on 3 September, requested that plans be revised to conform to established policy worked out by the Chief of Engineers for other locations with reference to the protection, concealment, and dispersion.

[3139] 48. General FRANK. How long have you been conversant with these details that you are reading off, there?

Colonel MARSTON. I have been conversant with the development of the system since the time that I went into the G-4 office. The rest of it I get from the file.

49. General FRANK. When did you get this from the files?

Colonel MARSTON. I got it within the—reviewed the files, or went over the files and this summary of them, at the office of the engineer, here, about a week ago.

50. General FRANK. And have you had any help in that, during the last two or three days?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, this is the same review which I stated that the engineer was preparing under the direction of the Chief of Engineers.

51. General FRANK. Have you had any help in this within the last two or three days?

Colonel MARSTON. In the last two or three days?

52. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel MARSTON. No. Let's see, it was Sunday morning that I went over this with the engineer office.

53. General FRANK. Has General Bragdon consulted you?

Colonel MARSTON. I have not seen General Bragdon; no.

54. General FRANK. Have you seen Major Lozier?

Colonel MARSTON. No, I have not seen him, either.

55. General FRANK. Have you seen Major Powell?

Colonel MARSTON. I don't believe that I have seen any of these gentlemen; I certainly have not seen them to confer with them.

56. General FRANK. Who gave you this information in the office [3140] of the engineer?

Colonel MARSTON. Mr. Perliter.

57. General FRANK. In summing up, what would you say was the reason for the delays that occurred, generally?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, I would say that the reason for the delay which occurred, generally, on these storage tanks, was the necessity of clearing everything with the War Department, before the tanks were installed, first; second, the delay in getting the delivery of steel for the tanks, after the final design was approved. We did not have the detailed plans for these tanks until 22 December 1941; which was some time after the attack was started. We had no authority to start construction until 31 October 1941, when a "radio" was received from the division engineer to the district engineer, informing him that the Chief of Engineers authorizes procedure with construction based on their report of Board of Petroleum Consultants, who had reported on 9 October 1941.

Now, actually what happened then, it was in the following April, 14 April 1942, I held a conference at Hickam Field with representatives of the Air Force, of the engineer, and of the Navy, at which time the view of the Chief of Air Forces that the system should be a hydrolic or aqua system was presented by representatives of the Air Force, and at that meeting I insisted, and finally was able to obtain an agreement, that the system should be installed as designed, regardless of the views of the Chief of Air Forces or of any other individual, because otherwise it would not have been completed up to the present time. The system was installed as originally designed, and has been in use for some time.

[3141-3142] 58. General FRANK. Obviously, the system must have been designed in the Corps of Engineers, rather than in the Air Force?

Colonel MARSTON. It was.

59. General FRANK. Because, had the Air Force designed it, they would have designed an aqua system.

Colonel MARSTON. That is probably so. However, the Chief of Engineers did obtain the recommendation of a board of experts from the petroleum industry in the design of the system, and the final decision to go ahead with the system as designed was based upon the fact that gasoline was actually delivered to the planes at the two main fields, Hickam Field and Wheeler Field, through an aqua system.

60. General FRANK. In what department in the War Department would you say was the responsibility for most of these delays?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, I can't say that any one department of the War Department was responsible for them. I would say that it is the peacetime system of centralized control by the War Department of all details of construction in the field that was to blame for the delay.

61. General FRANK. Who handles construction in the field, in the War Department?

Colonel MARSTON. At the time, prior to the war, that this took place, the construction of fixed fortifications, construction at airfields, and the river and harbors construction work was handled by the Chief of Engineers. All other construction for the Army at that time was still handled by the construction branch of the Quartermaster General's office. That has since been consolidated, all have been consolidated, under the Chief of Engineers.

[3143] 62. General BANK. As a matter of fact, in the beginning of 1941 all air force construction went over to the Engineer Corps, didn't it?

Colonel MARSTON. It was about that time that it went over, yes, sir.

63. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel MARSTON. It formerly had been done by the construction branch of the Office of Quartermaster General.

64. General FRANK. You seem to think that the delays in the construction of the A. W. S. system were due in the main to delays caused in trying to overcome the difficulties of technical operation of the radar.

Colonel MARSTON. That is a correct statement. And those difficulties have continued for a considerable time after the war broke out, as illustrated by the fact that we have had to abandon two of the most expensive stations for radar operation.

65. General FRANK. Namely?

Colonel MARSTON. Namely Mount Kaala on Oahu and Haleakala on Maui.

66. General FRANK. Did you ever go down to Colonel Wyman's office?

Colonel MARSTON. Yes.

67. General FRANK. How often?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, I would say an increasing number of times, about two or—well, starting in with once or twice a month to I should say an average of approaching once a week toward the—as the—

68. General FRANK. Starting when?

Colonel MARSTON. Starting in November.

[3144] 69. General FRANK. Were you always able to find him?

Colonel MARSTON. I was always able to find him. He wasn't there every time, but I was able to find him the majority of the time.

70. General FRANK. Could you always do business with him?

Colonel MARSTON. Yes, I could always do business with him.

71. General FRANK. Did you ever find him incapacitated?

Colonel MARSTON. I have never found Colonel Wyman incapacitated, either before or after the war, but I know that there have been charges made that he was not always in shape to carry out his duties, but that was not my observation, my personal observation.

72. General FRANK. How would you size him up?

Colonel MARSTON. I would size him up as a very energetic and competent engineer whose methods of operation, however, were frequently lacking in tact. In other words, if he had a job to do he would go ahead and issue instructions to get that job done, without any regard to the feelings of the people with whom he dealt.

73. General FRANK. Did you have any occasion to come in contact with the organization of his office?

Colonel MARSTON. Yes, I had occasion to come in contact with the organization of his office, but did not go into the detailed organization.

74. General FRANK. Did you ever know a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel MARSTON. I have met him, and as far as I can recollect I have seen him either present when I was dealing with Colonel Wyman or when I was making inspections of [3145] activities, a total of about maybe six or eight times.

75. General FRANK. I see.

Colonel MARSTON. I have had no personal contact with him at all.

76. General FRANK. Did you ever talk to him?

Colonel MARSTON. Not directly. He has been present at other—when I visited Colonel Wyman, but I haven't talked to him directly as an individual.

77. General FRANK. Do you know what his position was over here?

Colonel MARSTON. He was the head of the Hawaiian Constructors, which was a fixed-fee contractor for executing the engineer construction work.

78. General FRANK. Did you ever see him in a condition in which you believed he was unfit to take care of himself?

Colonel MARSTON. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, I haven't seen anyone in the office of the Engineer or connected with his construction work who was under the influence of liquor and incapacitated for work.

79. General FRANK. Were your contacts with the District Engineer Office always entirely satisfactory?

Colonel MARSTON. They were not always satisfactory after the—in the early days of the war, to the extent that there was considerable friction due to arbitrary acts on the part of the Engineer Office. There was also some friction between that office and the Department Engineer due to personal differences of opinion.

80. General FRANK. Did you hold up construction?

Colonel MARSTON. I don't know of its having held up any [3146] construction. I think it was merely a personal clash of opinion.

81. General FRANK. Did your difficulties with the District Engineer Office that you just mentioned ever hold up construction or impair the war effort?

Colonel MARSTON. No, they did not.

82. General FRANK. Have you anything?

83. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Do you want met to ask questions?

84. General GRUNERT. Go ahead. But if you have every witness covering the same thing, we are using up twice as much time as you figured on, but if you want the stuff go after it.

85. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Sir, do I understand that the testimony that you gave when you read that paper was based upon information you received from the office of the District Engineer?

Colonel MARSTON. That is correct. We has the files, however, upon which this is a summary, were present at the time I picked this up.

86. Major CLAUSEN. Did you consult any other source, Colonel?

Colonel MARSTON. I did not consult any other source other than my own memory, and I verified some of the entries in here from the records of my own office.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you knew, when you consulted the Engineers, that they were the ones under charges, according to the rumors that you have testified to; isn't that correct?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, if the question is a question of Colonel Wyman's connection with Mr. Rohl, and the effect of that on the war effort, that is correct. If it is a question of the actual conditions here before the attack came, the [3147] Engineer records are the official records—those and the Adjutant General's files are the official records of the headquarters.

88. Major CLAUSEN. Well, sir, you know that the I. G. here maintained a section for the purpose of reviewing the activities of the Engineering Department.

Colonel MARSTON. I should have stated that I have talked to the Inspector General here, who made a detailed investigation of the activities of the Engineer, and that I was informed by the Inspector General that there was no evidence of fraud developed as a result of his investigation.

89. Major CLAUSEN. Well, were you informed by the Inspector General as to the reasons for the relief of Colonel Wyman from his assignment here as District Engineer?

Colonel MARSTON. No, I wasn't informed of the reasons for his relief. It was my impression from discussion in General Emmons' office that he was relieved because of friction in the conduct of his operations, arbitrary acts, and which had caused friction in the community, and that General Emmons still felt that he had done an excellent job in getting the work done. That was evidenced by General Emmons' signing a letter of commendation for him when he was relieved, at the time that he was relieved.

90. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see the I. G. report which immediately preceded that relief, Colonel?

Colonel MARSTON. No, I have not.

91. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever ask to see it?

Colonel MARSTON. No, I haven't asked to see it. I perhaps should have, but I have not.

[3148] 92. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever know of it, sir?

Colonel MARSTON. I knew there was an investigation report, but I understood that no fraud was shown in this report.

93. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you stated something regarding delays and your assigned reasons for the delays. Can you tell the Board whether you are familiar with the completion dates that were required under the job orders and the contract?

Colonel MARSTON. I am not familiar with those now, no.

94. Major CLAUSEN. Can you tell the Board whether you are familiar with any derogatory comments, rumors, at all, concerning the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel MARSTON. I am not familiar from my own knowledge with those.

95. General FRANK. Weren't you in charge of general supervision of those for the Department Commander?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, in what way? With the general supervision of the—the checking on the contracts is done by—the sufficiency of the contract, by the finance officer. The checking on the—on our—

any reports of illegal transaction is investigated by the Inspector General.

96. General FRANK. Well, just what do you do as a supervisor?

Colonel MARSTON. What I do as supervisor is to coordinate the construction with the—requirements of the construction with the other activities of the headquarters as to the necessity for the construction, its coordination between the construction of one branch with another and with the general check on the sufficiency of the construction, but not a check as to its technical—technical features of its execution.

97. General FRANK. You didn't care when it got done?

[3149] Colonel MARSTON. I certainly did.

98. General FRANK. Well, then why didn't you check on the limitation dates and the job orders?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, there was a check made in the office, but I did not personally make that, and I don't know—I don't remember what the completion dates were. I do know, however, that, for instance,—

99. General FRANK. Then you really don't know whether there was any delay in the contracts or not?

Colonel MARSTON. I would have to get the record to determine that. I do know that the contract on this underground gasoline storage could not have been completed prior to the time that the authority for going ahead was given.

100. General FRANK. That is because you have looked that up recently?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, but I knew that that delay was taking place at the time and that we could not go ahead until the approval was received from the Chief of Engineers.

101. General FRANK. But you didn't know anything about how the other job orders were coming?

Colonel MARSTON. We got a—we did get a—we got a report: a periodic report of all of the construction jobs was received at our office, and we had on that report a list of every job, the estimated date of completion, and the progress, and the expected date of completion. That report was put in and was initiated just after I took over the office in the fall of 1941, but I don't remember the dates of that—which were shown on that report. I think that copies of the report can be obtained, although I am not sure whether I still have in the [3150] files of the G-4 office those particular reports. I know that copies of them can be obtained. They probably are in the Engineer files at the present time.

102. General FRANK. Well, the point about it is, if the reports were made and stuck away in a file, and delinquencies not followed up so as to hasten the work, the reports were useless.

Colonel MARSTON. Well, but I think that—I don't think that I have given the right impression there. Those reports were presented to General Short when they came in, and the progress on each—on these jobs was discussed. In the case, for instance, of the Quartermaster construction there were bar charts showing the progress of construction as against the actual—the expected date of completion; and I believe that I can get the—those were checked at the time, but the completion date of the contract—I don't remember what those dates were. And I do know that when a sufficient reason showed

for delay in attaining the completion date of a contract, such as a failure to receive up to that time the authority to go ahead with the job, that other pressure was not brought on the Engineer to go ahead with the job prior to the time that he received the authority to do so.

103. General FRANK. That is all.

104. General GRUNERT. Now, as to deficiency of means, as to delays, and as to the status on December 7, what did they have to do with the taking of appropriate defense measures with the means available? Anything?

Colonel MARSTON. I don't think that they had anything to do with that.

[3151] 105. General GRUNERT. Any questions? General Russell?

Colonel MARSTON. There is one thing that I might offer, and that is that a thirty-minute warning, which is all that can be expected from a pick-up from the radar plot, is not sufficient to deploy the garrison unless it is in at least the Class 2 Alert, as was given at that time.

106. General GRUNERT. Have you anything that you want to offer to the Board on any subject that has not been brought up nor questions asked on it, anything that you have that you think will assist the Board in coming to conclusions on this matter?

Colonel MARSTON. Well, I can offer that General Short did take a very definite interest in the modernization of the defenses and that he held very frequent conferences with the Engineer, with the Signal Officer, with all concerned in the modernization of the defenses and that he held very frequent conferences with the Engineer, with the Signal Officer, with all concerned in the modernization of the defenses; that he on his own responsibility pushed the construction of the various airfields. I believe that he did all that was physically possible to do in pushing the preparations prior to the time of the attack.

107. General GRUNERT. You mean his organization locally? Do you know whether or not he represented conditions to Washington frequently or at times to show what delays were taking place?

Colonel MARSTON. I believe that he did. I can't cite the specific instances right now. I do know that the deficiencies in anti-aircraft armament were represented, and in seacoast armament, and that steps were being taken to remedy those at the time that the attack came.

108. General GRUNERT. Anything else anyone wants to bring up?

109. Major CLAUSEN. Were these deficiencies in this armament [3152] on the seacoast part of the construction program?

Colonel MARSTON. They were part of the long-term construction program, yes.

110. Major CLAUSEN. Being?

Colonel MARSTON. For instance, there were not enough 155 millimeter guns available. Those were being furnished with the troops coming over in the fall of 1941.

111. General GRUNERT. You have nothing else you want to bring up?

Colonel MARSTON. No. I would like to state further on the question of the checkup on these construction jobs, when I first got the question I didn't connect it with the periodic construction reports which we got in and which did show the actual progress on each

job. Those reports were gone over with the Engineer and with the Department Commander at the time they came in. It is now my recollection and I believe, but I cannot be absolutely sure, that the completion contract date did show on those reports and that any delay in the meeting of that date was discussed at the time. But if there was a question of priority or of—in materials, delivery of materials, or the detailed approval of construction plans, while all steps were taken to expedite the overcoming of those difficulties, after those steps were taken they were accepted as being a justification for the contract not being completed.

112. General GRUNERT. There appears to be nothing else. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[3153] **TESTIMONY OF GOVERNOR JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,
4585 KAHALA AVENUE, HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Governor, will you please give the Board your name and address?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Joseph B. Poindexter. My home address is 4585 Kahala Avenue, Honolulu.

2. General GRUNERT. Governor, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December '41. We are after facts or leads to where we can find facts. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who he says may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have some facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so we leave it up to you to open the subject, and then may ask some questions regarding it.

Now, do you recall anything that you think may be of assistance to the Board or why General Short referred to you particularly as a witness who might be able to furnish the Board with some facts?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, my information in regard to the military situation here in Hawaii at that time, of course, came largely from others. Of course, I talked with General Short and had many conferences with General Short.

3. General GRUNERT. You at that time were Governor of the Territory?

[3154] Mr. POINDEXTER. I was Governor of the Territory at that time. I became Governor of the Territory on the first day of March, 1934, and I went out of office the latter part of August in '42; and during that time, of course, the Territory had considerable business with the War Department. That was always, of course, through the Commanding General. And during General Short's term of service here I talked with him many times about the situation; and incidentally, of course, we talked about the war situation. So that so far as the military end of it is concerned my knowledge would be largely, what we would say in court, hearsay, because it came from other people.

I had no direct knowledge, for instance, of what General Short's orders were or what the Army was supposed to do or what the Navy was supposed to do.

4. General GRUNERT. The Board can hardly expect you to testify on those military matters, but if you will give us what your impressions were and what you know of your own accord and from your position as the Governor here, I think that will be about what we can expect. Suppose I ask a few questions that will open up the subject.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I would much prefer to have you ask questions.

5. General GRUNERT. Now, how did General Short cooperate with the Territory authorities in building up his defense or preparing the civil population for any eventuality?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, his cooperation was complete, and it was, I might say, constant. He was greatly concerned about the situation here with reference to the civilian population and the community. We built up an organization which finally ended in what we called the O. C. D. General Short was very largely responsible for that organization and was very largely responsible for the results that we accomplished through that [3155] organization at the time of the attack, and I am confident that, if it were not for the interest that he showed in developing this organization, that our situation so far as the civil end of it was concerned would have been very much worse than it was.

The result was that when the attack came, while there was some confusion early in the day in this organization, they did a magnificent job so far as the civilian casualties were concerned and so far as the caring for the situation as it presented itself; and I have no hesitancy in saying, whatever, that I attribute that result very largely to General Short and the officers under him who cooperated with the civilian population in our efforts to perfect this organization.

[3156] 6. General GRUNERT. Then I gather from your testimony that you had complete confidence in General Short's ability and his desire to improve the entire situation to meet most any eventuality?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Absolutely, and I doubt if you would find an individual in this community who knew the situation who would say otherwise, because he was constantly at it, he and his officers were constantly developing this thing, telling us how it ought to be organized and what should be done. Of course, we got many directives from Washington and other places on the organization, but I think it was largely through his efforts that he made the people conscious of the situation which we were in and the response of the public was splendid, everybody got in. It was all a voluntary organization at that time. Of course, nobody was being paid. We did not have much money to pay with. They built up a fine organization, which was operated, I think, very efficiently under the circumstances. I repeat, I think it was largely due to General Short's interest and efforts that we accomplished what we did.

7. General GRUNERT. Having that confidence in General Short and then the attack taking place, do you or your people feel that the military let you down because of what I may call lack of means to meet such an attack?

Mr. POINDEXTER. I cannot speak for the people generally, but I can speak for myself, and I would say very definitely that that thought at that time never entered my mind. I felt then and I feel now that General Short and his officers with whom I came in contact did everything that could possibly have been done to prepare us for what happened. We had complete confidence [3157] in him and still have. I think that he did a fine job here.

8. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any handicaps that he had in doing that job, as far as anybody in the Territory was concerned, or any group or any interests in the Territory, that handicapped him in any way in preparing for the defense or in meeting the attack?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Of course prior to the attack, we, like every other community, had people with differences of opinion. We had a very large Japanese population, as you know. There were many people who felt we were going too far in these preparations, that it was unnecessary.

9. General GRUNERT. Why was that? Because it affected the pocketbook or the morale or disturbed their comforts, or what?

Mr. POINDEXTER. That is difficult to say just what caused it. My own impression is that sentiment of that kind arose from several reasons. One, of course, was the apparent desire of Washington to do nothing that would disturb relations with the Japanese Government. Then, of course, there was another thought that it was unnecessary, that we were too far from Japan, and there was no danger of any attack on Hawaii.

10. General GRUNERT. Was that generally the state of mind of the civilian population or the military population, as far as you know?

Mr. POINDEXTER. I don't think so.

11. General GRUNERT. What brought it to you mind now to mention that, if that was not the state of mind?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I was just saying there was an element of the population that had that view.

12. General GRUNERT. An element?

[3158] Mr. POINDEXTER. That is right. Now, I want to say there was some justice for that point of view. I did not carry it. But I think some of these people here were influenced by the attitude of the mainland with regard to the possibility of war with Japan.

I visited Washington every year. I was in Washington—I believe it was during my visit in 1941, at least the incident I am about to relate was during the time the President was meeting Prime Minister Churchill on the Atlantic. Was that in 1941? Can you gentlemen tell me when the Atlantic Charter, so-called, was promulgated?

13. Major CLAUSEN. 1940, sir.

Mr. POINDEXTER. Was that 1940?

14. Colonel WEST. I thought it was about May of 1941.

Mr. POINDEXTER. It was in July and August that I was in Washington, and it was at that time.

15. General RUSSELL. It was 1941, August.

Mr. POINDEXTER. In 1941, was it? Well, that was my recollection. Prior to that time we had all the fleet in the waters out here, and they began to move them out. Of course, there was no publicity given to it, but I knew it and a great many people here knew that the ships were being taken away from us. Personally, I was considerably

alarmed about it, because I felt we were being left without any defense if the Japs should come in.

When I went to Washington I took that up with the Secretary of the Interior, who was the liaison agent for the Territory with other Departments of the government, and complained to him about their taking these ships away from us and leaving us [3159] possibly defenseless in the event of an attack. "Oh," he said, "you people need not be alarmed whatever. There is going to be no attack on Hawaii. It is too far away. The battle is on the Atlantic."

Now, I do not quote him exactly, but when he said "The battle is on the Atlantic" those are his exact words.

I intended to take it up with the President, but I never got the opportunity, because in the meantime he may have gotten back before I left but, anyhow, I was unable to see him, but I took it that that was the attitude of Washington and I dropped the matter. I think that same feeling was here to some extent. His idea was that our concern out here was with sabotage, that we should guard against the possibility of sabotage.

16. General GRUNERT. Was that the Secretary of the Interior speaking?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, sir, Mr. Ickes. As I say, I did not go to the War Department, because in the first place, he is our liaison agency and, in the second place, I felt that if a member of the cabinet felt that way probably all the members of the cabinet felt that way and it was useless for me to speak of it, and I dropped that subject, but I felt then and I do feel to this day very keenly that that attitude was very largely responsible for conditions out here.

17. General GRUNERT. Did you happen to discuss the matter with General Short and Admiral Kimmel after you got back and expressed the sentiments you found in Washington?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Oh, yes. I discussed it more with General Short. I do not recall ever discussing it with Admiral Kimmel. I was very well acquainted with Admiral Kimmel and frequently saw [3160] him, but our business in the Territory was more with Short. I would say that Admiral Kimmel was very much interested also in developing our organizations, the O. C. D., and I recall one time he appeared before the Chamber of Commerce meeting and was rather critical of the situation, he felt that we had not been doing enough, and some of the people were critical of the Admiral, thinking that he was getting out of his—we say kuliana here. Kuliana is a small holding of land. It is the native way of saying where you live. You sometimes talk about "That is my kuliana". That means that is my jurisdiction, that is my province.

18. General GRUNERT. Do you know if anybody else in Washington outside of Secretary Ickes had that belief that sabotage was about the only thing to be feared here in the islands?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Well, I was thinking about that, General, and I was trying to recall. I cannot conscientiously say that any particular individual did. I talked with a number of people there about it. It seemed to be a rather general impression that Hawaii was safe, too far away.

Then, of course, there was this attitude that I spoke about a while ago, of soft-peddling anything that might give offense to the Japa-

nese Government. These negotiations were going on some time during 1941. It may have been after that particular time. I do not recall just when the Japanese envoy went to Washington.

19. General GRUNERT. If you came back and talked to General Short about what you found the attitude in Washington to be, is it natural to conclude that that may have influenced him somewhat in his attitude also?

[3161] Mr. POINDEXTER. Undoubtedly. General Short told me that his orders stressed sabotage, that is, warning against sabotage. We had 140,000 Japanese here, a great many of them citizens, but nobody knew what their real attitude was toward the government or their loyalty in the event we should come to blows.

20. General GRUNERT. What did you think it was going to be?

Mr. POINDEXTER. I beg your pardon?

21. General GRUNERT. What did you think it was going to be, when and if?

Mr. POINDEXTER. I did not know. I will be frank with you. I did not know. I knew there were some bad ones among them and I knew, on the other hand, there were some of them loyal. I knew that a great many of them were loyal. I know that the F. B. I. and the Army Intelligence and Navy Intelligence, as well as the Territorial Intelligence, had Japanese young people who reported instances where they heard this man making remarks and that man making remarks. As a result of this intelligence work we had a list, the F. B. I. and the Army had a list and the Territory had a list—we knew some of them—whom we considered bad actors or would be bad actors. When the thing broke, those were all gathered right in.

Now, I am of the belief that the precautions taken against sabotage and the picking up of these men put the fear of God into the hearts of those who might have attempted it or otherwise would have attempted it. General Short was very much concerned with this sabotage business.

22. General GRUNERT. What was the number that were picked up, do you recall?

Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I could not tell you that.

[3162] 23. General GRUNERT. 300, a thousand?

Mr. POINDEXTER. I think it exceeded 300; perhaps not on that day or the second day, but there was a large number taken up. I do not know.

24. General GRUNERT. 300 out of how many thousand?

Mr. POINDEXTER. As I say, there were about 140,000, but that included Germans and Italians as well, although there were not as many of them, but there were some Germans picked up and some Italians.

25. General GRUNERT. Then you think that that act of itself deterred others from committing acts of sabotage?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Undoubtedly. General Short was so much concerned about this sabotage business that some time prior to December 1941, he came into the office and we discussed the matter of protection to the personnel who were on guard duty on these facilities, on the bridges and on the electric light and water works. You see, we were not at war then, and these men were off the reservation,

and the question arose as to whether, if anything should happen, somebody would fail to heed the challenge and somebody might get bayoneted or shot, if the individual would not be personally liable, and he was very much concerned about it and he was very much concerned with the guarding particularly of the bridges and the public utilities.

So under the Organic Act I made a request on him that he take over, not particularly the guarding, but that he use his forces to protect the Territory against possible invasion and against sabotage.

26. General GRUNERT. That made it legal, did it?

Mr. POINDEXTER. We concluded that would protect the private [3163] who was out there on duty at this particular bridge or wherever he might be. Now, that was some months before Pearl Harbor. It just illustrates, I thought, and I believe, his great interest in an effort to protect this community in the event that anything happened.

27. General GRUNERT. Do you think that on account of that he went all out for sabotage and did not go all out in defense against an air attack?

Mr. POINDEXTER. You see, General, I do not know what preparations the General made in regard to an attack. That was a military matter that did not come to my attention.

28. General GRUNERT. While you were talking to Secretary Ickes did he talk about any soft-peddalling as to the Japanese?

Mr. POINDEXTER. No, I do not recall that he did.

29. General GRUNERT. Or where did you get that impression?

Mr. POINDEXTER. I do not recall that he did.

30. General GRUNERT. Where did you get that impression?

Mr. POINDEXTER. But I am quite sure that General Short told me that he was cautioned in that regard.

31. General GRUNERT. Did you get anything from the press or radio in that line?

Mr. POINDEXTER. It was a matter of comment, I think, in the newspapers that we should be very careful about the attitude and the government should be careful of its attitude while these negotiations were going on, not to bring on an attack or to give Japan an excuse for some attack.

32. General GRUNERT. Any questions?

33. Major CLAUSEN. I have just one, sir.

Sir, were you the Territorial Governor on December 7th, [3164] 1941?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, sir.

34. Major CLAUSEN. And were you the Territorial Governor when you gave this information that you received in Washington to General Short?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Oh, yes. I was Governor during all the time General Short was here.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Who is the Territorial Governor now?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Stainback, Ingram W. Stainback. He took office in August of 1942.

36. General GRUNERT. Is there anything, Governor, that you think of that we have not brought up that you might tell the Board, that might be of material value to the Board in coming to a conclusion as to its mission, anything you want to add?

Mr. POINDEXTER. Yes, I would like to say this, General: General Short talked to me about the attitude of the War Department in supplying his needs, in honoring his requisitions. I gathered from him that he would ask for planes and personnel and guns and things and he was turned down, until finally they told him to make no more requests, because they could not be honored. I don't know whether it was because of lack of means or what not, but he definitely told me that, and I must say he was very much disappointed that he could not get the means out here that he thought he ought to have and that were needed in the defense of these islands.

37. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether he made full use of what means he had on December 7th?

Mr. POINDEXTER. From what knowledge I have of military matters, I would say he did. I think that General Short was a [3165] very efficient officer. I had contact with all of them during the period that I was governor and of course my contact with him was rather frequent, and while comparisons are odious I would say that I think he was as efficient and able an officer as any we had here during that time. And I think the public generally felt that way. I know the public had great confidence in General Short. He was actually very popular with the civilian population.

38. General GRUNERT. We thank you very much for coming up and helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[3166] **TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND S. COLL, EDITOR, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Coll, will you state to the Board your name and address, please.

Mr. COLL. Raymond S. Coll. My home address is at the Halekulani Hotel; business address, The Advertiser.

2. Colonel WEST. You are the editor of the Honolulu Advertiser?

Mr. COLL. I am.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Coll, this Board is after facts about what happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack. We asked you to come here because there is one point particularly that I would like to clear up your testimony. I believe you were quoted by a Washington newspaper, shortly after the submission of the Roberts Commission's report, January 24, 1942, in substance, that "General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7 the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date." Do you recall anything about that?

Mr. COLL. I don't recall any statement of that sort. After the Roberts report was printed, we expressed ourselves editorially on the matter, but that language is not used in that editorial. I don't recall talking to anyone, there was no agent of the government that I recall, whatever, who ever asked me for a statement about it; and not in those terms.

4. General GRUNERT. Have you any knowledge whether or not General Short and Admiral Kimmel did make such remarks as to

[3167] lead anyone to believe that they thought an attack was imminent?

Mr. COLL. Not directly from either one of them, although I knew General Short, and met him at different times, and on two occasions had conversations with him, prior to December 7, 1941; and I think that was in the spring of that year, when he was distressed because he was not able to get and make as much progress as he would like to have done for airfields and planes and defenses of Oahu; and of course in that same conversation as we all knew at that time and were perfectly aware, at least we were, in our own opinion, that war was to come, and come shortly, with Japan, and as time progressed up to and immediately preceding that, as early as the spring, when the M-Day Act was in process of passage in the session of the legislature at that time, why, of course, we were all reconciled that war was coming, and it just progressed in its intensity, as you might see from the first editions of our newspaper, starting on the 28th, and those are the only ones that I have, there, from the 28th to the 5th, in which our sense of approaching events was very clearly indicated in our headlines, and we seemed to be certain of what was about to take place.

5. General GRUNERT. Do you recall a speech or talk made by General Short, I believe it was at a Chamber of Commerce meeting, in which he in attempting to assist in preparing the public for a possible future attack made remarks that might have been interpreted to mean that he thought war was in the offing?

Mr. COLL. I don't recall any such a speech of General Short, although that's entirely probable that he did. The one that caused the greatest comment was one that Admiral Kimmel made at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, in which he took the community [3168] to task very severely for their lack of preparation, and stressed the importance of it and the possibility of attack in the immediate future, or words to that effect.

Now, General Short might have and undoubtedly did speak, although I couldn't state at this time and swear that I recall that specific speech by him, although it was customary to have both the commandant of the Navy and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department make such addresses on it; and I am certain that he would have stated that.

6. General GRUNERT. How did you citizens feel about the matter? Did you think your public needed a little waking up, or not?

Mr. COLL. At that time, we did. After December 8, we thought that the community was better prepared right at the moment than what the services might have been.

7. General GRUNERT. You at that time were editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, were you?

Mr. COLL. I was.

8. General GRUNERT. Do you recall these headlines as having appeared in your paper on the dates mentioned, or on approximately the dates mentioned:

(Items appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser:)

Headline of Sunday, 30 November, 1941:

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend.

Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle.

Headline of Monday, 1 December 1941:

Hull, Kurusu In Crucial Meeting Today.

Headline of Tuesday, 2 December 1941:

Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S.

[3169] Headline, again, of Tuesday, 2 December 1941:

Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations.

Headline of Wednesday, 3 December 1941:

Huge Pincer Attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted.

Headline of Friday, 5 December 1941:

Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.

Headline of Saturday, 6 December 1941:

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China.

Headline, also of Saturday, 6 December 1941:

Japanese Navy Moving South.

Headline, again, of Saturday, 6 December 1941:

Detailed Plans Completed For M-Day Setup.

Headline of Sunday, 7 December, 1941:

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis.

Do you recall those headlines?

Mr. COLL. Yes; I recall them all, generally, of course.

9. General GRUNERT. I would like to ask you about this one of November 30:

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend.

In view of what happened, that was a pretty clear or a pretty accurate prediction?

Mr. COLL. That was based purely on following the war news, as you do in a newspaper office, when we are following the trend. The headlines there that you have just read of course were based on the United Press and other services that we had that came each night from the mainland, some from Washington, and other places. That headline in a newspaper office was just following [3170] a trend of thought, that so far as we were concerned there in our office, we felt certain that things were about to happen. I didn't have any specific information from anyone in Honolulu, except to follow the trend, which is frequently done in newspaper offices, a sort of sixth sense that something is about to happen; and the percentage of it quite frequently is almost as accurate as calculations could be in something mathematical.

10. General GRUNERT. When that headline appeared, or when you put it in there, did you have any idea that the Japanese might strike Hawaii early in the game?

Mr. COLL. Not specifically, at that time, although as early as July 29 I think it was we printed with my permission a feature story in our magazine section, which is illustrated with planes attacking, and the first three or four paragraphs of it started with the introduction that Japan would attack overnight, and that everything would be perfectly peaceful and people in their homes, and all of that, and then suddenly

the crash would come and there would be death and desolation in their wake. That is in there. That was on July 29. Now, that was based on and written by a man who had been in China for seven years, and who was a member of our staff, and who simply wrote what he had seen there, and which was likely, here.

11. General GRUNERT. Did you have confidence in the military and naval commanders and their preparedness to meet any eventuality?

Mr. COLL. I had great confidence in General Short. I couldn't say that I knew him intimately. I knew him as well as I had every commanding general of the Hawaiian Department since General Summerall's time, going back to 1922. My observation [3171] and the comment, both civilian and army acquaintances, were of the highest character of his ability as a soldier and as a working General.

12. General GRUNERT. Do you know that in preparation to meet any eventuality at that time, or about November 27, the Army was alerted against sabotage only? Was that common knowledge here, or not?

Mr. COLL. I knew it, that the order of the 27th, I believe, of November. Naturally I heard that through my acquaintances. I do not know that I could recall the names. I knew that the order had come, and my understanding was it had been discussed at considerable length as to just what interpretation to place upon it, and then that the alert against sabotage of course was the decision that was made; and my understanding at that time was that that was to keep the community quiet, and evidently with the fear of Japanese uprising, which I personally did not think much of; but unquestionably there was a very great effort both in the community itself and by the Army and the Navy at that time.

13. General GRUNERT. You, having confidence in General Short, and then knowing what happened November 7, do you feel that the Army, as such, commanded by General Short, let you and the public down?

Mr. COLL. Well. I wouldn't go that far, because in a conversation I had with General Short at the Willows, I think it was, when some sort of an entertainment was given by a distinguished party, or something of that sort, at the Willows, which was a popular place for affairs of that sort, and he discussed with me there, or rather made the comment that he was [3172] distressed because he was not able to get what he wanted and make as much progress as he certainly wanted to do, in air, airfields, and aircraft, and defenses, both anti-aircraft and all of the strengthening equipment that he needed for the islands. I distinctly recall that conversation.

14. General GRUNERT. When was that conversation, do you recall?

Mr. COLL. That I think was along in the spring of 1941, because I am certain it was the time the legislature was in session, which must have been along in February or March, I would say.

15. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not he made full use of what he did have, when the time came?

Mr. COLL. I couldn't say that, General. Only one instance, if you will permit me to go on, was the only incident that I know, was rather a confused state of affairs at Schofield at that time, where orders were not given immediately, and some immediate sections of the community were taken over by subordinate officers without any order, and the

order not being issued for some time afterwards, notwithstanding the fact that they took complete control and issued orders.

16. General GRUNERT. Was this during the "blitz"?

Mr. COLL. That was the morning of the "blitz," and the day; and they took over, I think; in one instance I heard of some four days that lasted before any order was issued. When this officer who took that over went to Schofield, he was not able to get any order from the commanding officer, and then, on his own initiative, he took over.

17. General GRUNERT. What is the general impression here, [3173] whether the sabotage alert was General Short's decision under the information he had, or whether that order came from Washington?

Mr. COLL. Oh, I think the community as a whole believes in nothing else on it, that it was from Washington.

18. General GRUNERT. That the order to go on a sabotage alert came from Washington?

Mr. COLL. As they interpreted it.

19. General RUSSELL. Exactly what do you mean by that statement, "as they interpreted it"?

Mr. COLL. Well, my understanding, General, was that the staff, itself, General Short's staff, was not able to decide immediately what to do. In other words, that the directive or orders or whatever came through from Washington on that date were not very clear, and that there was no specific order. That really is the feeling, if I may go on, on that, that I had on that, that Washington, at that time—and I have no desire whatever to criticize the administration or the War or Navy Departments, but rather that nothing decisive was done. If they knew what was going to happen, it seemed to us that it ought to have been there, either to have sent an order or a directive of just exactly what to do.

20. General RUSSELL. Then the impression is not so much that there was a direct order for an antisabotage alert here, but that confusion arose because of the data which reached the department from Washington; and to that extent, Washington was responsible for what did happen?

Mr. COLL. I think that's right.

[3174] 21. General RUSSELL. That is a more accurate description of what occurred?

Mr. COLL. Yes.

22. General RUSSELL. Now, in the summer of 1941, do you remember the transfer of a part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean?

Mr. COLL. Yes.

23. General RUSSELL. Do you recall the impact on the thinking of this community that that action on the part of the Navy had?

Mr. COLL. Didn't like it.

24. General RUSSELL. Could you elaborate on that a bit, as to whether or not it indicated Washington's thinking as to possible and probable trouble?

Mr. COLL. Well, that has been a discussion from that time, and that was the first that it became acute in the community. Honolulu, and, of course, Hawaii, were closer to the war, in any area of the globe, I might say, so far as America was concerned. This was America's war, out here, and Honolulu was closest to it, and I think that we felt closer

to it here, and knew more accurately the whole situation, and after December 7, and even before that time, I think, were conscious of what might happen to us, because of all these preparations that were being made. The medical outfits were all arranged and organized, and all of that, and of course that very clearly indicated that there were going to be casualties and wounded and killed, and all that, on it. That could not help but make an impression upon the community; and of course, when any strength was drawn from the Pacific, naturally, we thought out here we ought to protect America, rather than to go along and help out in the [3175] European area. That went right along, of course, and the grand strategy of course on what happened afterwards, of course, was just as critically discussed out here as it was in other parts of the country, and by other officers, in high command, as to what they ought to have in the Pacific. Certainly we felt that we ought to have everything that was here at that time, and more.

25. General RUSSELL. Earlier in your evidence, you indicated that you had brought along with you certain papers, I assume, from the Advertiser's files. Is that true? Is that the package?

Mr. COLL. Will you repeat that.

26. General RUSSELL. Does that package you have in front of you, there, contain papers from your files?

Mr. COLL. Yes; it indicates.

27. General RUSSELL. We have everything up to and through the 7th of December.

Mr. COLL. Yes; I am quite certain that you do not have this. At least, I understand that that file is not there, because it did not go back. This was an early edition that we printed early and circulated in the afternoon. It came out on it. It was what was called a "blue streak" edition. I doubt whether there are any files of this, or this; I am not sure. That is on that feature story. But there is, up from the 28th to the 5th, is what we thought was about to happen.

28. General RUSSELL. I think we have had access to these in the Washington files. I was just wondering if you had with you anything after December 7; but this is through the 5th, I believe.

[3176] Mr. COLL. No; the file of the 8th is not available, and I wouldn't permit it to be taken, unless, accompanying that issue, for the records back there, was the source of the information on which our headline was based; and they didn't seem—the Army or the Navy, or whoever asked for it at that time, wasn't willing to guarantee that an official statement, or a statement from me, stating where the information came from on which we based the headline, which was written early in the evening of Sunday the 7th, and then our press broke down, and had broken down at 8 o'clock the night before, and that edition went over to the afternoon newspaper; we never were able to go to press with it until very late on Monday morning, and just almost for the records of our files on it; and it carried this sensational headline.

29. General RUSSELL. What was that headline, do you recall?

Mr. COLL. It said that saboteurs had landed, or rather, parachute—the enemy, describing their armed vans, and so forth and so on; and that if that was going to be made a matter of record in Washington, I wanted a statement there by myself explaining how that came; that

it was not an individual statement; at any rate, the authority of it was just as authoritative as it could have been at that time.

30. General GRUNERT. Are you required as a newspaper publisher, or is your publisher required to send a copy of each one of your publications to the Library of Congress?

Mr. COLL. No; they subscribe for it.

31. General GRUNERT. They subscribe? Then, except for that one that you referred to, these are in the Library of Congress?

[3177] Mr. COLL. I don't know where those are, because those are a special edition, and we even did not keep any regular bound volume of that.

32. General RUSSELL. I have nothing else, sir.

33. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions by the advisors of the Board?

34. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

35. General FRANK. Colonel Toulmin?

36. Colonel TOULMIN. No.

37. General GRUNERT. Mr. Coll, is there anything else that you would like to tell the Board, that may assist it in coming to conclusions, or in getting the complete story?

Mr. COLL. Well, I don't know whether you have the editorial that we carried after the Roberts report; you perhaps have, and that expressed our opinion; and that opinion still stands.

38. General GRUNERT. I do not recall having seen that, now. If you have it there, will you read it into the record, or will you turn it over to the Recorder, and let him read it into the record?

(Editorial, the Honolulu Advertiser, January 27, 1942:)

Colonel WEST. This is from the editorial page of 'The Honolulu Advertiser of January 27, 1942. It is the leading editorial, reading as follows:

THE ROBERTS' REPORT

Errors in judgment and laxity in finding a true understanding of the seriousness of the danger that confronted the United States were not alone those of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieut.-Gen. Walter C. Short.

They belonged to all America, and, thus, all America [3178] must share in the national complacency that found us unprepared.

This is not to excuse Admiral Kimmel and General Short. If, however, the Roberts' commission report can be taken as essentially correct, then it must be accepted as a page in American history now permanently relegated to the past.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short were two Americans whose misfortune found them in command while America slowly awakened from slumber. How much different were they from the congressman who time and again blocked this or that military appropriation or voted against conscription? The congressman is an American, you know. How much different were they from the labor leaders who called senseless, damaging strikes and the worker who wanted more and more money, and t'hell with production? They are Americans, too. How much different were they from the men and women who headed the hyphenated organizations whose preachings created disunity and confusion of thought? They were Americans. Were they any different than the millions who said that it couldn't happen here?

Yet, beyond all this, there are questions which appear to defy answers. Why was it when an enemy submarine was sunk off Pearl Harbor one hour and ten minutes before the attack began, that an alert was not sounded for both army and navy? Why was Pearl Harbor not emptied and its great fleet dispatched to sea and why did not squadrons of planes roar into the air? Why was the detector report of approaching (enemy) planes ignored? Why was [3179] the sub gate in the channel left open until after the first attack and why had not previous navy or war department orders been carried out?

Such questions and answers belong to another era. They are of the past. So is the America that created the thinking that dwelled in the GHQ's and wardrooms.

39. General GRUNERT. Now, is there anything else that you think of?

Mr. COLL. Only that I would just like to leave this with you; that is, that what would impress a person such as I am, sitting in a newspaper office, at the head of its editorial paper, and in entire control of its news and the assignments on it, that there was a feeling; of course, there was an unseen hand, for the bigger part of a year, in soft-pedaling and "shushing" incidents that came up that were aggravating and which we were particularly active in publishing, because we were rated of course as being anti-Japanese, and because we had made a consistent fight against the foreign-language schools, against the foreign-language newspapers, which had threatened to boycott us, and did take action through their Chamber of Commerce; in such instances as occurred, where speeches were made, and one was at the Central Union Church, the largest congregation of course of people that are prominent in the community, by a representative of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, which was alien-controlled, and its membership was largely that, almost exclusively; he made a sensational speech, in which a reporter named Harry Albright, who now is a Major I think at Presidio, and went into the service. He was a Reserve Officer at that time. That night, of course, very strong pressure was brought [3180] to bear on The ADVERTISER to not print any report of that meeting. I denied that report, and it was published, maybe not in just frank terms, as it might have been otherwise, but I gave no orders to color it in any way.

The incident appeared, too, where cameras were taken from civilian men in the Army and not restored to them until they got down to the police station, and force was used there by officers, and others, of Japanese tankers, and Navy vessels, appeared in Hilo, where the famous picture which we printed of the sentry compelling visitors to bow to the sentry in the name of the emperor. On another series of stories which Albright wrote, of course, exposing the Japanese consul general's office, here, in sending, through tankers and Japanese express liners, large quantities of goods that should have gone through the customs, and they were clearing it through the consul general's office. The collector of customs, who has now passed away, of course, called on me personally to apologize to the consul general, which I didn't, of course, and refused to do; and that request had come to him from the consul general. And incidents of that sort, there was a disposition of the part of the community; and in one other instance where there were labor troubles with the two newspapers, and the Labor Board, through its office manager here, was bringing action against the newspapers from what they called "unfair labor practices"; they were adjusted. The Nippu Jiji newspaper, of course, the conditions were infinitely worse, there, and they had, as everyone believed, and Wills, the agent; that was of course outstandingly bad. That was called off without any reason why it should have been called off, at all; and those were the [3181] sorts of things that at that time of course impressed me as indicative, that I don't question but what they were sparring for time, and all that, but there certainly was a disposition from high sources somewhere, and of course that came, in my

estimation, from Washington; and I didn't have any doubt but what that was true.

I was sentenced 60 days to jail, and it was suspended, for contempt of court in the United States Court, here, for permitting a headline writer at night, although I was out of the office, to carry a line which was not exactly in accordance with the proceedings that were going on at Kewalo Basin, where the Sampans had been seized by the United States District Attorney's office, because they had been placed in the names of domestics who had no connection or relationship to those who owned them, and all of that; and that headline stated that further investigation, or words to that effect, would be carried on in the south Pacific, on the operations of these Sampans. It was purely a technical question, but nevertheless, the judge, who is now the Governor of the Territory, appointed a friend of court, and I was summarily brought in and cited for contempt of court.

[3182] That, of course, was rather technical, I thought, on his part, because I had been in the Naval Reserve as a reserve officer for a number of years just prior to the outbreak of the war and had been retired on age; and naturally I had attended for a number of years meetings in the Naval Intelligence and was quite familiar with what was being investigated at that time.

At that time I also, of course, was in close contact, beginning with General Patton's time and General Twitty, who then was a Captain, in dealing with both the Intelligence of the Army and the Navy, and worked closely with them. Frequently we were asked to get pictures of Japanese officials or officers in civilian clothes, that they asked us to do on that, and to help them in checking tanker crew lists which would leave San Diego with a certain number aboard and wind up in Honolulu with 20 or 30, or whatever it was, more than were the actual crew. It seemed to be common knowledge, of course, or was with us in there, and the understanding, that Japanese agents were being consistently put into the Territory.

There were so many things, General, that led up to all of this that, so far as I was concerned and the newspaper was concerned on it, there wasn't any question whatever in our mind that war was liable to break out at any minute. We also had the same opinion that prevailed in some sources of the Army and the Navy that Pearl Harbor and Honolulu could not be attacked very successfully. That was the general impression. As the months went on I think that changed, particularly with high ranking officers in the Navy and the Army both, on it, but it was the general impression that had prevailed for some [3183] time, and that the Japanese fleet would be a setup.

Of course, others knew better than that on it, but for that reason there wasn't any question why we predicted these things, because we felt that it was coming. Newspaper instinct tells you that, without just having the fact. All you need to know is to see what is happening. You saw the clouds there and you knew it was going to rain; that is all.

40. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

41. Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask a question, General?

42. General GRUNERT. Just one more, just one question.

43. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you communicate these things to General Short in person that you have just expressed here this morning?

Mr. COLL. No, I never discussed it after that meeting. I didn't see him after December 7 on it, and if that was not—I think I attended one dinner at which he was present, but I never discussed it with him.

44. Colonel TOULMIN. Any more than prior to December 7th?

Mr. COLL. No. What brought the remark up at that time was that the other paper was not in sympathy with the M-day Act, and as strong as it was on that, and we were supporting the Army in its preparation of the M-day Act giving the Governor the great power that he had under that on it; and the afternoon paper, of course, didn't agree with that, and they were fighting that, and for that reason, of course. General Short was sympathetic with us, and I think that is how the conversation arose. I don't know just how it came up, but I know that the General at that time—his first greeting on that evening was to thank me for what we had said.

[3184] **45. General GRUNERT.** Thank you very much for assisting us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF GEORGE H. MOODY, OLD PALI ROAD,
HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Moody, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. MOODY. George H. Moody, Old Pali Road, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation, Mr. Moody?

Mr. MOODY. I am manager of Grossman-Moody, Limited.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Moody, the Board is after facts or leads that will produce such facts. Now, the amount of territory and the subject that the Board has to cover is so broad that we parcel this out somewhat. General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will take over this particular part, and the rest of the Board will ask such questions to fill it out as they see fit.

Mr. MOODY. Yes, sir.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Moody, you said you are a member of the firm of Grossman-Moody. Were you a member of that firm during 1941, sir?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, sir.

5. Major CLAUSEN. 1942?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And did you at one time become an employee, a civilian employee, of the Engineering Corps?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, sir.

[3185] **7. Major CLAUSEN.** Of the United States Army?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And in the course of your activities as an employee of the Engineering Corps and also prior to that time, did you become acquainted with the activities of Colonel Wyman?

Mr. MOODY. No, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. MOODY. Not at all. I met Colonel Wyman once when I was sent to his office by Colonel Lyman to see about opening some camouflage

factories. After the blitz I went down to Davies to handle the feeding for the Red Cross, which I did for about, oh, I think seven or eight or ten days. Then Colonel Lyman phoned me and asked me to come here to Shafter, and I came here, and he said he wanted camouflage factories started and started that day, and to hurry up. And I asked him how to do it, and he said, "Well, I will send you in to Colonel Wyman, and he will tell you the procedure of how to do it." And that was the only time I met Colonel Wyman.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever meet a Hans Wilhelm Rohl, Mr. Moody?

Mr. MOODY. No.

11. Major CLAUSEN. When you were a civilian employee of the Engineering Corps you were working under Colonel H. B. Nurse; is that correct?

Mr. MOODY. Not while I was in the camouflage department. I worked under Colonel Nurse later, in a division that was set up that was called the B. B. Division, which was supposed to be an investigation division on all the activities of the Engineers.

[3186] 12. Major CLAUSEN. And this B. B. stood for Bottleneck Busting; is that correct?

Mr. MOODY. That is correct, yes.

13. Major CLAUSEN. So in the course of your activities as an employee in this Bottleneck Busting Division did you investigate the activities of the Engineering Corps with respect to delays and deficiencies?

Mr. MOODY. Any problem which came up that Colonel Nurse wanted to send us on, he sent us, if it was a truck delay or if it was why a warehouse wasn't finished, or almost any other problem that came up in any of the Engineer activities, whether it was trouble with a contract or what it might be.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically, Mr. Moody, when did your activities as an employee of the Bottleneck Busting Division commence?

Mr. MOODY. It was around Christmas.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Of what year, sir?

Mr. MOODY. It must have been '43.

16. Major CLAUSEN. '43?

Mr. MOODY. Or '42. It was around Christmas, and I was there for a year; I mean, for—until summer. Six months I was in there with Colonel Nurse.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall an occasion when Colonel John E. Hunt of the Inspector General's Department of the Army came to the Islands in connection with an investigation of the affairs of Colonel Wyman?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, I was in Colonel Nurse's office at that time. That will set the date of it.

18. Major CLAUSEN. I believe you have already testified before [3187] the House Military Affairs Committee that at that time Colonel Hunt did not go over the records in detail.

Mr. MOODY. Not that I know of, no, sir.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And you also said that Colonel Hunt was out to prove that nobody was willing to testify that Colonel Wyman was crooked.

Could you give us the basis for your assumption in that regard, sir?

Mr. MOODY. Only from discussion in Colonel Nurse's office.

20. Major CLAUSEN. And what was that, Mr. Moody?

Mr. MOODY. Just discussion between Colonel Nurse and Colonel—
and General Hunt.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Yes?

Mr. MOODY. In which General Hunt said that he didn't think that—
while people were willing to gossip about things, they were not willing
to get up and make a sworn statement as to what was right and wrong,
and that he felt it as so hard to get anybody to go on record that a man
was dishonest or that anything was wrong, that they would talk about
it but that they wouldn't give any proof. That was it.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with regard to Colonel Hunt not going
over the records in detail, what records did he fail to go over?

Mr. MOODY. Oh, I said that as far as I knew he did not go over Col-
onel Nurse's records in detail on his investigation, group that were
turned in by Colonel Nurse, into the office there. Colonel Nurse has
all those records still in his private file in San Francisco, or had last
March when I was there.

23. Major CLAUSEN. You also stated you had some records which
[3188] would be pertinent to the general inquiry on which Colonel
John E. Hunt was engaged at the time?

Mr. MOODY. I don't think so, no. I don't know. Of course, I don't
know all that—I don't know whether General Hunt—was it General
or Colonel?

24. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Hunt, sir.

Mr. MOODY. —was here to investigate the whole Engineer setup or
whether he was put here to investigate Colonel Wyman. Now, I
have no records on Colonel Wyman. My records are only copies of
the reports that I turned in, everything, to Colonel Nurse, but whether
some of those things might be on things that were started by Colonel
Wyman or not, I wouldn't know.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have any information, Mr. Moody,
which in your opinion may be of interest and value to this Board?

Mr. MOODY. I have my records of the reports that were turned in.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Would you make those available to me?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, if you want them. They are pretty hard to read,
I think.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Well, if you just turn them over to me some-
time soon, in the next few days.

Mr. MOODY. May I have them back?

28. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. MOODY. Now, I think the best place to look is in Colonel Nurse's
records, and I am sure he will make them available to you.

29. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

[3189] Mr. MOODY. Now, those will have—I don't know whether
he kept the men's daily reports or not, but I know that he kept a
record of his reports to General Kramer or to whoever was in charge
at that time.

30. Major CLAUSEN. That is General Hans Kramer?

Mr. MOODY. Yes.

31. Major CLAUSEN. I see. I have no further questions, sir.

32. General GRUNERT. Apparently you have nothing else to offer
the Board. I don't know what to ask questions on. What has been
brought up there is nothing to be questioned about.

These records that you are going to turn over to Major Clauson, what are they about?

Mr. MOODY. Activities of the Engineer Department at that time, sir.

33. General GRUNERT. Reports on those things that you went out to "B. B."?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, sir. And some of them are ridiculous: whether a man goes to work, whether—small details, a great many of them.

34. General GRUNERT. They were negative as well as positive, were they?

Mr. MOODY. Yes, sir; both types of things.

35. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

Mr. MOODY. I really think, sir, that Colonel Nurse's records would be of great value to you.

36. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

37. General GRUNERT. We shall take a five-minute recess.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[3190-91] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RAY E. DINGEMAN, COMMANDING OFFICER, 144TH GROUP COAST ARTILLERY, FORT RUGER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Colonel R. E. Dingeman, Commanding Officer of the 144th Group, Fort Ruger, Territory of Hawaii.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, what was your position or assignment in the latter part of 1941, including that held at the time of the attack?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I was Army liaison officer with the 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor.

3. General GRUNERT. As such were you an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the Department?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I was.

4. General GRUNERT. Who was he?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Colonel Donegon.

5. General GRUNERT. Colonel Donegon in his testimony before the Board stated that you were the liaison officer or was the liaison officer between the G-3 Section of Department Headquarters and the 14th Naval District; is that right?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. Will you tell us what your duties were as liaison officer with the District?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I was detailed primarily to handle the harbor control post. We were setting up a harbor control post by order of the War Department and we were installing that [3192] facility at Pearl Harbor, Pearl Harbor itself, getting the communications set up and working out joint exercises to test it out. In addition to that, I had as my duty the arranging of trips on battleships and arranging for clearing the field of fire and high-speed towing missions and also we did quite a lot of calibrating of the Navy range

finders, which was handled through me, used to have stereo points on the range finder, and we did a lot of that for the task forces when they came into Honolulu.

7. General GRUNERT. Where was your post of duty, as you might call it? Were you with the 14th Naval District or at Fort Shafter and went to the District, or what?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I was on duty at the 14th Naval District. I had my office and desk in Admiral Bloch's headquarters.

8. General GRUNERT. Then you were the counterpart of what Lieutenant Burr was for the Navy?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

9. General GRUNERT. For the District?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. Now, as I understand it, your duties were primarily concerned with what we might call training?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That is right, yes, sir.

11. General GRUNERT. Making the necessary arrangements so the training could be coordinated?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Did you have any duties with respect to getting information from the District and transmitting it to the Department, and vice versa?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Prior to the war, practically none; after [3193] the war that was my principal job. Prior to the war I had practically none. As a matter of fact, part of the time I helped Colonel Lawton in organizing a task force for taking over Canton, Christmas and Midway. He and I worked that out, the details of that.

13. General GRUNERT. If the District wanted to do business with the Department, was that business arranged through you, or not?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Very little, if any, sir. Major Fleming at the time was the Engineer Officer and most of the things that were being done were rights to go into Canton and Christmas and those advance bases and practically all of it was handled direct through Captain Earl, who was then Chief of Staff for the 14th Naval District, and Admiral Bloch himself. I was rarely in on that at all.

14. General GRUNERT. Then, as I understand it, you were sort of a leg man between the two?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That is right.

15. General GRUNERT. But when it came to any particular subject they wanted to talk about, they talked directly?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That is right, practically always. I transmitted messages sometimes, an officer-to-officer message, but it was enclosed in envelopes. I never knew the contents.

16. General GRUNERT. If there was any intelligence information transmitted from the District to the Department, that would or would not go through you?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Not necessarily through me. Very often the individual that was handling that activity went direct. I started this job on the 17th of October, September or October, [3194] I cannot just recall the month, but it was in the latter part of the year 1941.

17. General GRUNERT. Colonel Donegon left the impression with the Board that you could give us a lot of information that he did

not have. Apparently you have not much of such information; or what have you that you can tell the Board that may assist us?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Of course, up to now I have been talking about up to the 7th. After the 7th—

18. General GRUNERT. Suppose you limit yourself, first, to what you think would be of interest to the Board during the period prior to and including December 7th.

Colonel DINGEMAN. Well, I do not believe I have anything more than I have told you, sir, prior to the 7th. It was a new job and I was just detailed to see—it was up to me to make the job.

19. General GRUNERT. Then the information you have pertains primarily to after the 7th?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That is right.

20. General GRUNERT. The Board is interested only to the extent to which that may have a bearing on what happened prior to and including the 7th.

Colonel DINGEMAN. I am afraid I do not have a great deal that can help you on that. As to information, much of that stuff was more or less hearsay, because I was not in on it. General Short handled through Fleming lots of things very direct.

21. General GRUNERT. And Fleming was concerned primarily with construction?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That is right. That was the biggest [3194-A] thing. I was just trying to recall one incident where I did know something about it, about the bases in the South Pacific, but I do not know that it is of particular interest. It was in regard to some sovereignty rights of the British. Other than that I cannot recollect anything, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the messages that came to the Navy which the Navy transmitted to the Army?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Not prior to the 7th. I handled all of them after the 7th, but none prior to the 7th.

23. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the message of November 27th from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Department which resulted in the adoption of Alert No. 1?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir, I saw that some time after we had been in an alert condition.

24. General GRUNERT. Then you know of the message?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

25. General GRUNERT. But you know it only after the decision was made to go on Alert No. 1?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That is right. We were on more or less of an antisabotage alert.

26. General GRUNERT. That is Alert No. 1, is it not?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir. That was the way it was being executed.

27. General GRUNERT. Was the decision regarding that alert or the message which apparently caused the adoption of that alert discussed in G-3, do you know?

Colonel DINGEMAN. To a very small extent, so far as I am personally concerned, and not at all with the Navy. I know we [3195] did discuss it some.

28. General GRUNERT. Did you discuss the question of whether or not that alert covered what you thought was necessary to cover because of the message received, or not?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, I thought that came up as part of the situation.

29. General GRUNERT. What was the discussion like? How did it run?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Well, there is a little background in connection with that. In 1940 we put in alert conditions here. I have been here since 1939. At that time I had a battery. We went on and on without much information to the line troops. It was sort of considered a phoney war. We did get armed and had all our ammunition out and we spread out very thin over everything. So with that as sort of a background we wondered if this was kind of the same thing, after being in an alert condition, after a while.

30. General GRUNERT. But you were not in the same alert, were you? What was that 1940 alert?

Colonel DINGEMAN. No, sir. That was a real alert.

31. General GRUNERT. An all out?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes. We were ordered in the field ready to shoot with ammunition and everything.

32. General GRUNERT. And this Alert No. 1 was sabotage, antisabotage?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Antisabotage, yes, sir.

33. General GRUNERT. Did that cause discussion?

Colonel DINGEMAN. No. I think we rather accepted that as more or less a normal thing. Of course, as I say, I had no [3196] further information than the telegram that we were not to unnecessarily alarm the populace here.

34. General GRUNERT. That seems to stick in all your minds, not to alarm the public. Do you remember any of the other parts of that message, outside of not alarming the public?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Well, it said to take full precautions as to local security. It seems like the local security stood out. Local security was interpreted then as antisabotage, because of the preponderance of Jap population here.

35. General GRUNERT. Just give us the gist of what you recall about that message. You mentioned that you were not to alarm the public and take care of local security.

Colonel DINGEMAN. As I recall, there was something about that an attack or a war was imminent, and I have forgotten now whether it stated in there that negotiations were proceeding. As you say, it does stand out in my mind that we were to take care of local security and not unnecessarily arouse the populace.

36. General GRUNERT. This message has often been read, but I think we will have to read it again.

Colonel DINGEMAN. I suppose so, as I have not seen it since then.

37. General GRUNERT. To refresh your memory, I will have the Recorder read it again, and then I want to find out, as you listen to this, why the other parts of that message did not stand out the way the question of alarming the public stood out. Just have it in mind when he reads, will you?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

[3197] 38. Colonel WEST. This is a radiogram dated November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., signed "Marshall", for body of which reads as follows: (Message of November 27, 1941, from War Department to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue period Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment period If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense period Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent period Report measure taken period Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan period Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

39. General GRUNERT. No you see there that does not refer in any way to local security. It does refer to not alarming the public. But in that it says to the effect that whatever you do, do not jeopardize your defense. That does not stand out in your memory, does it?

Colonel DINGEMAN. It does not seem to, no, sir, in contrast to the message received in the one prior to that. It said you will immediately go into a condition of active defense and not unnecessarily alarm the public. This is a very liberal paraphrase of it. But you will go into the field and be prepared for an air attack.

40. General GRUNERT. Now you are talking about 1940?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir. It was very positive.

41. General GRUNERT. That was a positive message?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

42. General GRUNERT. This was just an informational message?

Colonel DINGEMAN. No. Of course, I did not study that at the time. The thing is, on this island you cannot move unless they know it. You can hardly do anything on this island unless everybody can see it and know it. Perhaps we did, I did or anybody else, give a little more weight to that fact of not unnecessarily alarming the public. You could not move trucks or anything.

43. General GRUNERT. You had former alerts, did you not?

Colonel DINGEMAN. We had them on an average of once a month, I would say.

44. General GRUNERT. Did any of those alerts alarm the public?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I don't think so.

45. General GRUNERT. Then what about taking Alert No. 2, which was protection or preparedness to meet an air attack, and Alert No. 3, which was an all-out alert? What would you do there that you had not been doing in your practice alerts that would alarm the public?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Well, I don't think there would have been much more. There were quite a few changes in antiaircraft gun positions that we would not take up, because we had to go [3199] into private fields here, rather than just go on the beach line and simulate field conditions. There was quite a change in the setup for a war condition. The searchlights, for instance, and antiaircraft guns.

46. General GRUNERT. Then this message did not alarm G-3 to the extent where they thought they ought to have gone on an all-out alert?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I do not think it did, no, sir.

47. General GRUNERT. The thing that stood out in all your minds was the antisabotage measures?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

48. General GRUNERT. Because of the state of mind that had been built up from the past?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That seems to be it. And we depended on the Navy to give us information of any fact like that being imminent. I do not know where they got the information for the 1940 alert, but they evidently got it.

49. General GRUNERT. Had you been getting information from the Navy that assured you that when and if the time came you could depend upon them to get information?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I cannot answer that, sir, because I do not know what they were getting, but I know that I have been on joint boards here, on which there have been search missions for the islands and which was the Navy's responsibility.

50. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not they were carrying out that responsibility at the time?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I do not, no, sir. I knew there were a lot of difficulties about having insufficient planes and things like that. Of course, Admiral Bellinger often in these discussions [3200] would indicate the shortage of planes and personnel.

51. General GRUNERT. Then you had confidence in the Navy?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

52. General GRUNERT. To the extent that you thought you were secure with an antisabotage alert, unless you got additional information for doing something else?

Colonel DINGEMAN. That is right, and coupled with the Navy intelligence agencies which we knew to exist.

53. General GRUNERT. But did you know what they had given you, or were they keeping you informed, so far as you know?

Colonel DINGEMAN. No, sir, I could not answer that.

54. General GRUNERT. Any other questions from the Board?

55. General FRANK. What element of the population were you fearful about?

Colonel DINGEMAN. I think the Japanese, sir. I personally was fearful of all the Japanese population. I did not trust them at all.

56. General FRANK. In other words, this message, you thought, applied particularly to the Japanese?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Yes, sir.

57. General FRANK. Suppose you disturbed the Japanese; so what?

Colonel DINGEMAN. To my own personal opinion, I would not care whether it disturbed them or not.

58. General FRANK. Had there not been any evidence of an actual attack from without by Japan, do you believe that the Japs on the islands could have been handled, so far as any disturbing of them was concerned, by peacetime measures?

Colonel DINGEMAN. Oh, yes, I think so. I do not think [3201] that was any problem at all.

59. General GRUNERT. Have you anything in the back of your mind, or the forward part of it, as to anything that you know that might assist the Board? If so, this is the opportunity to discuss it.

Colonel DINGEMAN. I would like to ask what you mean by assistance? In what phase? As to responsibilities?

60. General GRUNERT. As to anything that led up to the attack and during the attack. We are here to ascertain the facts as to the attack on Hawaii. Anything that is pertinent to that may be of assistance to us. A great many witnesses have something they want to tell when they get up and they don't get an opportunity to tell it by the questions asked, so we are giving you this opportunity in case you have any such thing in your mind.

Colonel DINGEMAN. No, I cannot think of anything now. Maybe my mind stopped trying to think of all the things I might go on and tell you and will think of later.

61. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, 4775 AUKAI STREET, HONOLULU, TERRI-
TORY OF HAWAII**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name and address, Mr. Shivers?

Mr. SHIVERS. Robert L. Shivers, 4775 Aukai Street, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your present assignment, Mr. Shivers? You are no longer with the F. B. I., are you?

[3202] Mr. SHIVERS. I am at present Collector of Customs for the Hawaiian Islands.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Shivers, this Board is appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941. We hope that you will be able to give us some of those facts, or give us leads to where we can get such facts. The breadth of the investigation is such that we have divided phases of this among the Board members, although all the members are interested and will ask questions as they occur to them. But I have asked General Russell to conduct this part of the investigation, so he will lead in the questioning.

4. General RUSSELL. Mr. Shivers, you and I had a conversation a little while ago in which we discussed the relation of the F. B. I. to the Hawaiian Department of the Army and the naval operations here on the Island of Oahu, is that true?

Mr. SHIVERS. That is right, yes, sir.

5. General RUSSELL. In that conversation it developed that the office memorandum which had been submitted to this Board by the Washington office of the F. B. I., that you had received a copy of that memorandum.

Mr. SHIVERS. I have seen a copy of it, yes, sir.

6. General RUSSELL. We want to preface the evidence which you may give the Board by stating that the F. B. I. in the Washington office

did furnish us with this memorandum and the memorandum covers in some detail the greater parts of the evidence which you gave before the Roberts Commission during its earlier investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster, dealing with the [3203] subject of jurisdiction and many other subjects, and since this data is available to us from the memorandum submitted, we can limit your examination considerably. In other words, there are many details here that we won't cover with you. Have you read this memorandum?

Mr. SHIVERS. I have, yes, sir. I prepared most of the information that is contained in the memorandum myself.

7. General RUSSELL. Do you regard it as an accurate statement of the facts relating to the subjects covered by the memorandum?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir, it is.

8. General RUSSELL. Now, there are two or three subjects, however, that we would be pleased to discuss with you. Do you recall the messages or the information which you had given to the military and naval authorities here touching possible activities of the Japanese prior to December 7th? I do not in that question refer to such data as you may have furnished them on individual Japanese or Japanese organizations, but more definitely as to combat intelligence, if that statement is clear to you.

Mr. SHIVERS. It is clear, yes.

9. General RUSSELL. Would you tell the Board what information of that type you had furnished to the military and naval authorities prior to December 7th, 1941?

Mr. SHIVERS. The only information that I recall which could be related to combat intelligence which was furnished to the military and naval intelligence services in Honolulu by the F. B. I. were two messages. One message was intercepted by a telephone tap which we had placed or the F. B. I. had placed on [3204] the telephone at the Japanese consulate which was used by the Japanese consulate cook. The naval intelligence had all of the other telephones going into the consulate tapped at that time. They did not tap this one telephone. I suppose they did not know it was there. We did tap that phone about some time in November, and there was one message or one telephone conversation which we intercepted on December 3rd.

The cook at the consulate had telephoned to somebody out in town and told this person that the Japanese consul general was burning and destroying all of his important papers. I immediately furnished that information to Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, who was then Assistant Chief of Staff and assigned to the G-2 office under Colonel Fielder. I also furnished that information to Captain I. H. Mayfield, who was the District Intelligence Officer of the 14th Naval District.

10. General RUSSELL. Were any steps taken to verify this telephone conversation from the cook of the Japanese consulate, whether you could discover evidences of the actual burning of those papers?

Mr. SHIVERS. We made no attempt to discover any visual evidence of that fact. We assumed it to be true.

11. General RUSSELL. Was there any other message or data which you gave to the military and naval authorities prior to December 7th.

Mr. SHIVERS. There was a telephone intercept between a Doctor

Mori, a Japanese agent who resides in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo. This individual, I do not recall his name, but I think he was connected with some newspaper in Tokyo, or some press association in Tokyo. This conversation occurred at [3205] 5 o'clock or approximately 5 o'clock on the afternoon of December 5th. We got the message translated at about noon on December 6th. I furnished a complete translation of that message to Lieutenant Colonel George Bicknell and to Captain I. H. Mayfield at about 6 o'clock Saturday afternoon, December the 6th. I did not give it to them earlier, because I was unable to contact either of them until 5 o'clock that afternoon. As soon as they got to the office, after I got in touch with them, they came to my office and copied this message.

12. General RUSSELL. Was not Bicknell in an office adjacent to your office in downtown Honolulu?

Mr. SHIVERS. He was, yes, sir.

13. General RUSSELL. Did not he have any representative in his office during the afternoon of December 5th to whom you could have delivered that message for transmission to General Short?

Mr. SHIVERS. He did, yes, sir.

14. General RUSSELL. Do you know now why the message was not delivered to whoever may have been in Bicknell's office?

Mr. SHIVERS. I considered the message of such importance or such consequence that I did not want to give it to a subordinate officer.

15. General RUSSELL. Tell us what, if any, construction you placed on this intercepted telephone message?

Mr. SHIVERS. I knew or at least I thought I knew that there was military significance in the message. What it was I did not know. I pointed out to Colonel Bicknell and to Captain Mayfield certain things in the conversation that struck me as being significant. One I recall was the question about the patrol planes [3206] that were flying out of Honolulu at that time. Another was the question about the flowers that were in bloom at that time. Personally I thought that that information would probably be used for the purpose of locating the islands and so pointed out to Mayfield and Bicknell.

16. General RUSSELL. Did you have any authority for tapping these telephones?

Mr. SHIVERS. I had authority from the Attorney General to tap the overseas telephone.

17. General RUSSELL. I believe that appears in this memorandum.

Mr. SHIVERS. That does; yes, sir.

18. General RUSSELL. There has come to the attention of the Board elsewhere information about a system of signals which apparently has been instituted here on the Island of Oahu to convey information to Japanese forces off the coast of Oahu. Do you know how that information was developed?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, after the attack on December the 7th my office, the F. B. I., immediately asked the police department to place a guard at the Japanese consulate, which was done. In the course of the operations of that police guard they ran across certain material at the consulate which had not been burned. Among that material was the telegraph file of the Japanese consulate. They brought that telegraph file to my office. I sent the telegraph file to the Navy Intelligence Office and asked the District Intelligence Officer if he could get

the messages translated. They were all in code. One of the messages that was translated was this radiogram that was sent by the Japanese consul general in Hawaii to the Foreign Office in Tokyo which outlined an alternate system for the one [3207] that had been previously furnished to him by a man, by a German by the name of Otto Kuhn. That system of signals provided for certain signals to be—are you acquainted with that telegraph file?

19. General RUSSELL. Yes, I think we put it in evidence. I think we have the details of it. The reason for bringing it up was to ask what if any thinking the F. B. I. did to reconcile the telephone conversation of December 3rd to the effect that documents were being burned with the existence of these documents which were discovered after December 7th? Why weren't they burned?

Mr. SHIVERS. As I recall, one of those telegrams that we found in the consulate instructed the Japanese consul general to hold on to his code book up until the last before destroying it. We know now that he held on to his telegraph file too long. Why he did not burn it in the beginning, I do not know.

20. General RUSSELL. This message which you discovered in the seizure of December 7th relating to the system of signals to offshore Japanese forces, were you able to identify any of the parties here on the island who may have been charged with responsibility in connection with furnishing those signals?

Mr. SHIVERS. We were, yes, sir.

21. General RUSSELL. What did you do with those people?

Mr. SHIVERS. One of the individuals was Otto Kuhn himself who prepared the system. He was later prosecuted before a military commission and sentenced to death by the commission. The sentence was later commuted to 50 years in prison.

22. General RUSSELL. Any others?

Mr. SHIVERS. No others prosecuted.

[3208] 23. General RUSSELL. But you did discover the existence of others who had definite functions in connection with these signals?

Mr. SHIVERS. We did not discover any other people who had any definite function in connection with carrying out that system.

[3209] 24. General RUSSELL. While we are on this subject, do you recall the prosecution by federal authorities, either civil or military, of any of the Japanese who were interned following the attack on December 7, 1941?

Mr. SHIVERS. So far as I know, none was prosecuted. Let me qualify that by saying the matter of the prosecution of Doctor Mori and his wife was presented to the then Military Governor's office. The Military Governor had some member of his staff consult with Angus Taylor, who was at that time the Acting United States Attorney, and for some reason which is not clear to me now they were never brought to trial before the Military Commission or in the United States Courts. They could not be brought to trial in the United States Courts at that time, because under the proclamation declaring martial law here the operation of those courts was suspended.

25. General RUSSELL. Did the FBI make an investigation to determine Japanese activities prior to December 7 which might have had as their mission the discovery of facts relating to the presence of the Navy at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. SHIVERS. I do not understand that question.

26. General RUSSELL. I say, did the FBI make an investigation following December 7, to determine or to discover activities of Japanese agencies prior to December 7, which agencies were seeking information about the presence of the fleet at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. SHIVERS. We did; yes, sir.

27. General RUSSELL. In connection with that investigation were you furnished captured documents or maps which had been taken from Japanese submarines?

[3210] Mr. SHIVERS. We were; yes, sir.

28. General RUSSELL. Would you tell the Board about the map which you exhibited to me a little while ago, entries on which indicated to you as you stated to me that a Japanese submarine had been in Pearl Harbor, had gone through Pearl Harbor, rather in detail, and had entered on the map data as to the location of ships of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. SHIVERS. Some time after the attack, we were able to, or rather we tried jointly with the naval intelligence to get access to some of the captured material, that was captured on December 7, or shortly thereafter, for the purpose of trying to reconstruct the intelligence operations of any agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack. We felt if we had access to some of the maps, which we had heard were in existence, we might probably be able to identify some of the people in Hawaii who may have furnished information, that was reported to us to have been on the map. We were able to get from naval intelligence two maps which were reported to me as having been found on one of the Japanese submarines.

We examined those maps and translated all of the Japanese characters and writing appearing on the maps. Some of the writing on the map had been printed, as though it had been made up some time before. There were other characters on the map which had been written in by someone, and appeared to have been written in very recently.

An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack.

29. General RUSSELL. Will you tell the Board what that [3211] information was that indicated the presence of this submarine in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, I have the map, which I can show to the Board.

30. General RUSSELL. Could you read from that map this data?

Mr. SHIVERS. And mind you, this is purely my interpretation. It is not an official interpretation of the Navy, nor is it an official interpretation of the Army, although the Army intelligence did see these two maps I have.

These two maps have been designated "Map No. 1" and "Map No. 2." There are some 210 items appearing on the map which were translated by the FBI. I don't know whether you want me to read those or not.

31. General RUSSELL. No. I think it would be interesting to the Board to know the places where this submarine was, and at what times—just as you showed to me the course of the submarine through the harbor.

Mr. SHIVERS. There is one notation on this map here which has been designated "No. 36." There are Japanese characters written on the map which, translated, reads:

Enter harbor (written in dark letters) leave harbor (written in light letters).

There are other Japanese characters appearing on the map, designated as "No. 40," which read:

Course taken in entering harbor, 331 degrees (nearly certain) 335 degrees (assumed).

Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places.

[3212] There is also on the map, which was written in Japanese characters, designated as "9," a code, which was undoubtedly to be used by the submarine commanders in communicating with their mother ship or the Japanese task force that was en route to Hawaii.

32. General RUSSELL. For example?

Mr. SHIVERS. For example, one of the code words is "Ito" or "(Kito)." That word would mean "indication strong that enemy fleet will put out to sea."

There is another code word, "Kaki," which would indicate, "Enemy fleet put out to sea from or through"; then the other code words to describe the movement of the fleet.

Now, it is believed that this map shows the course of the Japanese submarine that went into Pearl Harbor. A course is charted, and it shows that this submarine reached a certain point at 12:40 a. m., going into the harbor. Another point, going in, at 12:45; another point, at 1 o'clock; another point, at 1:15. The point it reached at 1:15 is the place where the submarine gate stretched across the harbor.

The next entry is just a fraction of an inch from the 1:15 entry, and is "4:10." We learned from the Navy that the submarine net opened at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, at 4 o'clock, to permit the garbage scow to go out.

33. General RUSSELL. Indicating, therefore, what?

Mr. SHIVERS. Indicating, therefore, that this submarine arrived at the gate at 1:15 a. m., and remained there until the gate was opened, at 4:10 a. m. The course is then plotted around the harbor, and shows that he came out at the point where he entered, at 6 o'clock; and there is plotted on the map [3213] presumably by the submarine commander the location of the *Arizona*, the *Pennsylvania*, *Maryland*, *West Virginia*, *Tennessee*, *California*, *Wyoming*, and *Saratoga*; we learned, also, the *San Francisco*, *Omaha*, and *Trenton*.

34. General FRANK. When was this submarine supposed to have made this trip?

Mr. SHIVERS. That, I wouldn't know, sir.

35. General FRANK. About?

Mr. SHIVERS. I wouldn't know that.

36. General FRANK. I thought you stated, just before you started to describe this, that it was just prior to the attack some time.

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say, although there is nothing on the map to indicate when the submarine went in there, that it had to be at some time when the ships plotted were actually in the harbor.

37. General FRANK. But some of those ships were not in the harbor?

Mr. SHIVERS. Some of those ships were not in the harbor. As I understand it, there were no cruisers in the harbor at that time.

38. General FRANK. And no aircraft carriers?

Mr. SHIVERS. And no aircraft carriers. Apparently, from what happened; the *Utah* was mistaken for the *Saratoga*.

39. General RUSSELL. Was the *Utah* shown, and the *Saratoga* was in? Is that the way, or was the *Saratoga* shown?

Mr. SHIVERS. The UTAH was in, and the SARATOGA was shown as being at the mooring where the UTAH was moored.

40. General RUSSELL. And the SARATOGA was pretty badly [3214] destroyed by the enemy?

Mr. SHIVERS. The UTAH was badly destroyed.

41. General RUSSELL. The UTAH was badly destroyed by the enemy? Now, does the other mark which you have indicated show the submarine departed, which entered the harbor?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The other map was also translated by the FBI, and circle No. 73, there has been written on the map in Japanese characters the word "start"; 74, the words "leave tube"; 72, there are apparently some words that could not be deciphered, but those that could be deciphered read, "that I found the mouth of the harbor."

I may not be able to give you an exact statement; what I am going to say now may not be exact, but you can have it properly translated, and it will indicate the exact status about which I am going to relate now. It appears that there was a rendezvous between two of the Japanese submarines at a certain point on the map indicated as "Map No. 1," and that each of the submarines went into Pearl Harbor on a different course.

42. General RUSSELL. Following a question asked by General Frank, has the FBI made any effort to determine on what day the ships as shown on Map No. 2 were actually in the harbor?

Mr. SHIVERS. The FBI didn't consider that any of its business. It felt that it was purely a matter for naval intelligence.

43. General RUSSELL. Is there anything else that you want to tell us about those two maps?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, there is nothing else that I can tell you [3215] about them. The maps speak for themselves.

44. General RUSSELL. Would you make those available to us?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would have to get permission, sir.

45. General RUSSELL. From FBI, in Washington?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. Are copies of those maps in Washington?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

47. General RUSSELL. With the entries that you have discussed with us this morning on them?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, Sir.

48. General GRUNERT. Where did those maps come from?

Mr. SHIVERS. These maps were delivered to me by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

49. General GRUNERT. Do you know where they got them?

Mr. SHIVERS. They said they came from the Japanese submarines.

50. General GRUNERT. From a destroyed or captured submarine?

Mr. SHIVERS. Submarine; yes, sir.

51. General GRUNERT. And that was destroyed or captured on 7 December, do you know?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

52. General GRUNERT. In your deductions, you presumed then they kept these maps after they made a reconnaissance, and probably kept them too long, or did not expect to be captured; or, if they had all the information thereon, and it was gotten subsequent to the attack, or prior to the attack, then if they feared if they took any more action they might expect them to be destroyed or captured, they should have destroyed their maps; hence, would it be a reasonable deduction that [3216] this happened on 7 December, or shortly prior thereto?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think the reasonable deduction is that these submarines were supposed to have either been inside the harbor at the time of the attack or out sufficiently close so that they could observe the results of the attack, because that is provided for in this code, here. One of the code words reads "Tora," which would mean, "Surprise attack successful." Another is "Tsui," which would mean "Number enemy B (battleships seriously damaged)," and the other words which would indicate the extent of the damage that was done by the attacking planes, "enemy aircraft carriers, ships seriously damaged," "number of enemy cruisers, ships seriously damaged," "enemy ships sunk," and so forth.

53. General GRUNERT. Then if they had remained in the harbor, how could they have gotten this information to the task force without detection?

Mr. SHIVERS. I don't suppose they could have gotten it to the task force if they had remained in the harbor, without being detected, because certainly the harbor would have been blocked after the attack, and the only way they could have gotten that to the task force would have been to have surfaced and tried to get ashore.

54. General GRUNERT. In view of what happened, this information would not be of much value to the submarine, unless they got it to that attacking task force, would it?

Mr. SHIVERS. I wouldn't think so.

55. General GRUNERT. All right.

56. General RUSSELL. I am going into something else, now, as a finale. Is there anything that anybody wants to bring up on [3217] this?

57. General GRUNERT. I have a few questions on something, but you may cover it.

58. General RUSSELL. You are no longer with the FBI?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

59. General RUSSELL. You had a number of years to observe the working of the plan by which the duties of the FBI, the Military Intelligence Division, and the ONI were all delineated by these agreements and whatnot?

Mr. SHIVERS. I was with the FBI for 23½ years.

60. General RUSSELL. And you were here on the island for some time?

Mr. SHIVERS. I was here from August 24, 1939, to May 6, 1943, in charge of the FBI office in Honolulu.

61. General RUSSELL. Is it your opinion that with the proper organization, properly guided, information and data were available here on the island which might have indicated the possibility or probability of Japanese attacks on the island?

Mr. SHIVERS. Will you repeat that?

62. General RUSSELL. Based on your experience, do you now think that data was available here on the island, if it could have been obtained, which would have indicated the probability or possibility of the Japanese attacks on the island, and about the time that they would be made? In other words, if we had had the proper agencies operating along independent lines, could we have discovered something here that would have given away the Japs' hand on this attack? That is the practical question.

Mr. SHIVERS. I don't think you would have discovered [3218] anything that would have indicated that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor. If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japanese consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7; because, if you recall, this system of signals that was devised by the Otto Kuhn for the Japanese consul general simply included the period from December 1 to December 6.

63. General RUSSELL. Suppose this submarine which went into Pearl Harbor and came out and prepared this map had been destroyed prior to December 7 and the map obtained, wouldn't that have been a rather fruitful source of information as to the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. SHIVERS. If this map could have been obtained any time before December 7, why, I certainly would think it would have been very indicative of that fact.

64. General RUSSELL. This final question: Based on your experience here and your observation of the functioning of this cooperative plan between the three agencies that we have described already, and having in mind the necessity for the development of "combat intelligence," to use a rough term, what would be your recommendation as to future procedure along that line here in the Territory of Hawaii?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, I would prefer, sir, not to answer that question off-hand. I think that I would have to give it some thought.

65. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

66. General GRUNERT. During your incumbency in the office of the FBI, here, did you have any information that might have [3219] been of value to the Army and the Navy, which you were not permitted to disclose to the Army or the Navy?

Mr. SHIVERS. On the contrary, sir, I was directed to furnish the Army and the Navy with any and all information that came into my possession; and I did.

67. General GRUNERT. As to the alleged or suspected Japanese agents that were functioning in and about the Island of Oahu, do you attach any importance to the fact that they were not prosecuted under the Alien Registration Act?

Mr. SHIVERS. You mean the consular agents?

68. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. Do I attach any importance to the fact, in the light of subsequent events?

69. General GRUNERT. Yes; and if they had been prosecuted, what would have been the result in the line of causing any particular danger to the war effort—exciting the public, or whatnot?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, there are several schools of thought on that. My organization felt they should be prosecuted, and recommended their prosecution to the Attorney General.

70. General FRANK. Who stopped it?

Mr. SHIVERS. It was stopped by the War Department.

71. General GRUNERT. Did they advance any reason for their not concurring in your recommendation?

Mr. SHIVERS. They advanced the reasoning which General Short gave to the War Department for opposing their prosecution, and concurred in his recommendation.

72. General RUSSELL. All of that correspondence is in the files, here.

73. General GRUNERT. Do you think it had any effect on what [3220] happened, or would it have had any effect on what happened, if they had been prosecuted?

Mr. SHIVERS. I am satisfied the failure to prosecute had no effect whatsoever on what happened.

74. General GRUNERT. Now, going into a different field, did the FBI have any special means of communication with Washington that was faster in transmission than the Army or Navy or the RCA or other commercial lines?

Mr. SHIVERS. We did not have any faster means of transmission, I don't suppose. We had our own radio station.

[3221] 75. General GRUNERT. Approximately how long did it take you to get some of your messages through to Washington? Have you any estimate of that time?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say within—depending on the length of the message; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington by—could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of twenty minutes.

76. General GRUNERT. Were the channels jammed at any time? Was it better at night or day, early in the morning, late in the afternoon, or what?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, our channels were not jammed at any time.

77. General GRUNERT. What channels did you use? Your own radio?

Mr. SHIVERS. Our own radio, yes, sir.

78. General GRUNERT. And was most of your stuff coded?

Mr. SHIVERS. We used a frequency that was assigned to us by the F. C. C., and all of the—

79. General GRUNERT. What I mean, all of your stuff was sent in code?

Mr. SHIVERS. All of the stuff that went out from here to—that went out over that radio, was coded.

80. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not that was in working shape on the morning of December the 7th?

Mr. SHIVERS. It was, yes, sir.

81. General GRUNERT. And did you so use it?

Mr. SHIVERS. It was, yes, sir.

82. General GRUNERT. Then, any message that Washington wanted to get to you during that morning or just prior to the attack [3222] on that morning you think could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour?

Mr. SHIVERS. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes, sir.

83. General GRUNERT. Was there an interchange of those facilities between the Army and Navy and the F. B. I.? Could they use one another's equipment or frequency, or whatnot, if they so desired?

Mr. SHIVERS. There had been no provisions worked out for such, but I had understood that after the F. B. I. radio was put up here, that in the event of war the Army might want to use it, and there would have been no objections interposed.

84. General GRUNERT. But they hadn't used it up to that time?

Mr. SHIVERS. They had not, no, sir.

85. General GRUNERT. Nor had Washington used your facilities for either the Army or Navy?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

86. General GRUNERT. I have no other questions.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Shivers, you conducted, under your supervision, investigation of one Hans Wilhelm Rohl, did you, sir?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

88. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, were you in charge during the rendition of reports by Mr. John I. Condon commencing October 29, 1942, and down to April 3, 1944?

Mr. SHIVERS. I was not in charge after May 6, 1943.

89. Major CLAUSEN. I see. Well, now, I have here nine reports rendered by the F. B. I. at Honolulu, which include some that were rendered by Mr. Condon during the time that you were in [3223] charge. Do you know of any facts concerning this Hans Wilhelm Rohl, the subject of investigation, which would not be contained in these reports, Mr. Shivers?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir, I do not.

90. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know of any facts concerning the related subject of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., that would not be in these reports?

Mr. SHIVERS. I don't know what is in those reports subsequent to the time I left here, but I am satisfied that I wouldn't know anything additional to what appears in the reports.

91. Major CLAUSEN. I have nothing further.

92. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him one question. What other means of communication did the Japanese consul have with the homeland and other than a telephone connection.

Mr. SHIVERS. He had commercial communication system.

93. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines?

Mr. SHIVERS. Off of the lines themselves.

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

95. Colonel TOULMIN. So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication over those lines?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

96. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

97. General GRUNERT. Mr. Shivers, do you think of anything else that hasn't been brought up that you think might be of assistance to this Board in carrying out its mission?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir, I don't, General.

[3224] 98. General GRUNERT. We thank you for coming.

Mr. SHIVERS. I would like to add one thing and make it distinctly understood that I did not present these maps and the information contained in them with any attempt to place the responsibility for what appears to me the maps indicate, on either the Navy or the Army. They were to some extent involuntarily produced, and I am satisfied the Navy has the originals of the maps, and certainly they have translated the information appearing on the maps, and I assume that that information will be made available to the Naval Board if they want it.

99. General RUSSELL. Probably this statement should be made on the record. I was advised by G-2 of the Department that these maps were in the possession of Mr. Shivers, and when I contacted him I insisted that he make them available to the Board. He did not volunteer, to voluntarily produce them; I discovered that he had them, and asked for them.

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, the Military Intelligence office here has known that we have had these maps ever since the day we got them, and as a matter of fact the maps were examined by Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, who was at that time Colonel Fielder's assistant, on the day the maps were turned over to us, which was sometime in January 1942.

Shall I ask for permission to file these maps with you?

100. General RUSSELL. I wish you would. Will they be delivered to us before we leave here, or will you want us to procure them from the office in Washington?

Mr. SHIVERS. I am satisfied that they can be made available to you within six hours.

[3225] 101. General RUSSELL. From now?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

102. General RUSSELL. We would appreciate it if you would.

Mr. SHIVERS. Will you be here tomorrow?

103. General GRUNERT. Yes.

104. General RUSSELL. Oh, yes, we shall be here tomorrow.

105. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming. We appreciate your assistance.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:38 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[3226]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 1 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General GRUNERT. The Board will please come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GEORGE ROBERT LUMSDEN, INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND, FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Major, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

Major LUMSDEN. Major George R. Lumsden, Inspector General's Department, Central Pacific Base Command, Fort Shafter.

2. General GRUNERT. Major, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop this part of the investigation, so I will turn it over to them.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Major Lumsden, your present assignment is in the office of the Inspector General?

Major LUMSDEN. Yes. I am the executive officer of the Base Command, Inspector General's office.

4. Major CLAUSEN. And you have been assigned to that office now and are on duty there for what period of time?

Major LUMSDEN. Since December 26th, 1941.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Did you at my request produce inspection reports from the official files of your office relating to the Hawaiian Constructors, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, Colonel Theodore Wyman and related subjects?

Major LUMSDEN. I did.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Are those reports represented by that stack sitting alongside your elbow?

[3227] Major LUMSDEN. This is the pile that I brought to you.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And you are able to give certain information as to some of those reports, some being those on which you worked and some being merely those of which you may have some information which has come to you since, from other sources; is that correct?

Major LUMSDEN. That is correct.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Those are all official records, are they?

Major LUMSDEN. They are.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Just indicate to the Board the one you hold in your hand, which you have just taken from the top.

Major LUMSDEN. This first report classified "SECRET" is the report of inspection of Station X, Christmas Island. The inspection date was the 27th to the 30th of January, 1942 and the inspecting officer was a member of the Corps of Engineers, Captain W. E. Wilhelm.

10. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it, please. I would like to read a portion of this for the record. This is the only one in which I am going to follow this practice, but I would like to read a portion of the report contained in the record referred to by the witness, which was submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Leard, I. G. D. Will you tell me who Lieutenant Colonel Leard was on the 19th of February, 1942?

Major LUMSDEN. As I recall, Colonel Leard was sent to our office on an attached basis, I believe, for a short period. I think he remained there perhaps from four to six weeks. Subsequent to that I believe he became post commander at Fort Shafter.

11. Major Clausen. This is the portion that I am reading:

[3228] (Analysis of Report of Inspection of Station X, dated February 19, 1942, from the files of Fort Shafter Inspector General's Department, is as follows:)

19 FEBRUARY, 1942

Memorandum for Colonel Lathe B. Row.

Subject: Analysis of Report of Inspection of Station X.

1. An analysis of the report of inspection of Station "X", made by Captain W. E. Wilhelm, C. E. shows:

a. That conditions at Station "X" are very bad.

b. That these conditions are entirely due to the fault of the District Engineer.

2. The following specific failures of the District Engineer are indicated:

a. Material for assembling various types of tanks were sent, but no hardware, valve fittings, etc.

b. A ship load of lumber was sent, but no door jambs, window jambs, door screens, etc.

c. Insufficient laundry facilities have been provided.

d. Insufficient motor transportation has been provided.

e. Insufficient heavy machinery has been provided.

f. Insufficient messing and cooking equipment has been provided for personnel.
g. Necessary quantities of asphalt, plumbing material, electrical material, hardware, sinks, showers, lights, fans, and furniture have not been provided.

[3229] 3. The following conditions have been permitted to exist without apparent remedial action:

a. Sanitary conditions are very bad.

b. No effort has been made to provide adequate living conditions for personnel.

c. Apparently no effort has been made to provide recreation and comforts.

d. The Navy has been permitted to take over Pan-Air facilities and Hotel, and the engineers operate a mess for the Navy and perform all their chores.

e. The medical officer has not been required to fully perform his duties.

f. The following indicates that the work of the engineers has not been satisfactory:

a. Too much time is required for the construction of runways.

b. Runways and bays are not properly completed.

c. Radio equipment is left unpacked and untried, and some equipment is out of order.

d. One laundry is not in operating condition.

e. No effort has been made to provide the work camp with water.

f. No apparent effort has been made to utilize the filters and purifying apparatus of the Pan-Air Station.

5. The above résumé taken from the report submitted by Captain Wilhelm to the office of the District Engineer indicates that a very bad state of affairs exists at Station X, and that this state of affairs can be attributed [3230] only to lack of proper supervision and competent personnel from the office of the District Engineer.

E. W. LEARD,
Lt. Col. I. G. D.

What was Station X, Major Lumsden?

Major LUMSDEN. I assume it was Christmas Island from the notation on the fact of the report.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And who was Colonel Lathe B. Row on the 19th of February, 1942?

Major LUMSDEN. Colonel Lathe B. Row was the Inspector General of the Hawaiian Department at that time.

13. Major CLAUSEN. And who was the District Engineer on that date?

Major LUMSDEN. The District Engineer was Colonel Wyman.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Theodore Wyman, Junior?

Major LUMSDEN. Theodore Wyman, Junior.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Now, will you take the next report and tell me what that is?

16. General GRUNERT. Just a minute. Was the Commanding Officer responsible, or the District Engineer, who apparently is alleged to be responsible for those conditions? Did he have a chance to reply to this sort of accusation about inefficiency and so forth?

Major LUMSDEN. Sir, I have no record or any knowledge of what happened to that particular report.

17. General GRUNERT. Is not that the usual case of an inspector's report, that it goes to the man in question, who explains why and tells them what has taken place to remedy things?

Major LUMSDEN. Yes, sir; that is true.

[3231] 18. General GRUNERT. But you do not know if that record shows that that went to Colonel Wyman and his answer to these things appears therein?

Major LUMSDEN. No, sir, there is no indorsement on that record to show that Colonel Wyman replied, sir, to the basic communication of Colonel Leard.

19. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not Colonel Wyman was acquainted with the things found and did he have recourse of any kind?

Major LUMSDEN. His own officer, Captain Wilhelm, made the inspection, and I presume that that inspection report was first given to Colonel Wyman, since it was one of his own men. I presume he was a Corps of Engineers officer who made the report.

20. General GRUNERT. But you do not know?

Major LUMSDEN. No, sir, I do not know. May I clarify that, sir? Captain Wilhelm, later Major Wilhelm, remained with the District Engineers' headquarters. That is why I cannot understand just how that report first came out, what record, because I am certain at that time he was one of Colonel Wyman's own officers.

21. General GRUNERT. It seems strange to me that an accusation or an indictment of that sort should be contained in the record without any comeback from the man who is indicted. As far as that record shows there was no comeback from Wyman, and nobody appears to know whether he knows anything about that particular report.

Major LUMSDEN. Yes, sir; that was completely unfamiliar to me. I merely got it from the records.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, the evidence before the Board already [3232] contains evidence by Colonel Row to the effect that he did make inspections and present them to Colonel Wyman, and Colonel Wyman promised to make corrections of irregularities and deficiencies. That report was the report produced before the Board at San Francisco.

23. General GRUNERT. But you do not know whether Colonel Row referred to this particular report?

24. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir. He suggested, sir, if you recall, that he did not have the reports there, that we could get them at Honolulu. So I have asked Major Lumsden to bring over to the Board whatever reports he had. These are now the reports we are having presented.

25. General RUSSELL. This file appears to me to be a lot of statements of fact, opinion, or whatnot, over the signature of a Captain Wilhelm, and Colonel Leard has taken that and digested it.

Major LUMSDEN. Yes, sir, I believe that is right.

26. General RUSSELL. Leard did not go down there and make these inspections at all?

Major LUMSDEN. To my knowledge, sir, he did not leave on any trips during the short stay he had with us.

27. General RUSSELL. As I recall, Leard is the man who made some inspection of the operation here on the island.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, I think he made the inspection of February 14th, 1942.

May I suggest to the Board that I mark this Lumsden A and I will mark the others with the succeeding alphabetical letters.

What is the next report you hold in your hands, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. The next one is a confidential report, which

[3233] is a memorandum dated 14 February, 1942, to the Chief of Staff from Colonel Lathe B. Row, I. G. D., Department Inspector General on that date.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Could you tell the Board exactly what you recall concerning the circumstances of the rendition of that report?

Major LUMSDEN. There is very little that I personally know of it, except that I do recall Colonel Row calling us in the office, in his office, and the matter appeared quite important to him, because he made a list of the number of copies of the report that was typed and made an inquiry around the office to ascertain whether there were any loose copies about, and when he had us in his office he discussed this report which was made by Colonel Leard, and then the report, as I recall, was personally taken by Colonel Row to the Chief of Staff; possibly he saw General Emmons on that occasion.

30. Major CLAUSEN. For the record, that is a report which was introduced in evidence at San Francisco, copy of which was set forth in the F. B. I. file, which I have authenticated with the evidence of Colonel Row.

31. General GRUNERT. That does not identify it to me. What is it about?

32. Major CLAUSEN. Shall I read it?

33. General GRUNERT. I want the gist of it.

34. Major CLAUSEN. The gist of it was highly derogatory to Colonel Wyman. It stated some conditions that existed with respect to his office and wound up by recommending that Colonel Wyman be relieved as District Engineer at once.

35. General GRUNERT. I recall it now.

[3234] 36. Major CLAUSEN. And coincident, sir, with the date of this report, which is February 14th, 1942, the Board may recall a letter was introduced in evidence, bearing the same date, from Colonel Lyman to the Chief of Engineers as suggesting that Colonel Wyman be relieved. That letter was then followed by a subsequent letter to the same effect, but in more affirmative language.

If the Board has no objection I will mark this Lumsden B.

[3235] 37. Major CLAUSEN. What is the next report, sir?

Major LUMSDEN. This next is a compilation of all matters pertaining to the Engineers and Hawaiian Constructors which we had in our files shortly before the departure of Colonel Row in March of 1943 from this area. I compiled these data for Colonel Row at his request.

38. Major CLAUSEN. That was compiled under your supervision, was it?

Major LUMSDEN. Yes, it was. In fact, I think I did it, all of it.

39. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it, please? I will mark this volume Lumsden C.

40. General FRANK. What about it?

41. Major CLAUSEN. It is a compilation of various data that is from the I. G. office, that I haven't had a chance to read.

Now, what is the next report that you have there, sir?

Major LUMSDEN. This report is entitled, "Transfer of activities from the CQM to USED, request for Inspector General."

42. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that, Major Lumsden?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

43. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden D.

Tell me what the next report is, Major.

Major LUMSDEN. This next is a confidential file: "Correspondence and papers relating to report of investigation of construction activities, Hawaiian Department, made by Colonel John E. Hunt, IGD, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D. C., relative to activities of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., CE, formerly District Engineer, Hawaiian Department."

[3236] 44. Major CLAUSEN. And did you have anything to do with that, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. I gave Colonel Hunt several bits of information during his stay here while he was conducting the investigation. Colonel Hunt saw several of our reports.

45. Major CLAUSEN. You also, did you not, in addition to assisting Colonel Hunt, assisted the local Bureau of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in some of their activities and reports on these same subjects.

Major LUMSDEN. I did.

46. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? I will mark that Lumsden E.

Will you take the next and explain what that is?

Major LUMSDEN. This next is a report of investigation and allied papers, the subject of the investigation being, "Report of investigation of allegations charging slow-down on defense construction work performed by the USED." The date of the investigation report is 18 November 1942. It was addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. It was made by Lieutenant Colonel Edward H. O'Rourke, IGD, then Assistant Department Inspector General.

47. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden F.

And explain what the next one is, please.

Major LUMSDEN. This next file is titled, "Investigation of accounts of Zone Constructing Quartermaster, Hawaii, and the Office of the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H." Also appearing on the cover of this report or this file is, "Complaint of Lieutenant Colonel C. J. Harold, QMC."

48. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that, Major?

[3237] Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

49. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it, please? And I will mark that Lumsden G.

Will you explain what the next one is, please?

Major LUMSDEN. This next is sworn testimony of Clinton J. Harold, Lieutenant Colonel, Quartermaster Corps, and I believe is testimony which is also in the file just previously handed to you.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with this?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

51. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark it Lumsden H.

Explain what the next one is, please.

Major LUMSDEN. This next file I believe is a copy of the one I previously handed to you, which was the report of investigation into the allegations charging slow-down of defense construction work

performed by the USED, which investigation was made by Lieutenant Colonel O'Rourke, IGD.

52. Major CLAUSEN. If that is a copy, just put that to one side, and we won't put that in the record.

Did you have anything to do with that inspection?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

53. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Will you explain what the next one is?

Major LUMSDEN. This is a copy [indicating]. This next file is titled, "Investigation relative to Mr. H. W. Rohl, member of joint venture as contractor for Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu," and there are allied papers appended to it.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that investigation, Major?

[32-38] Major LUMSDEN. I did.

55. Major CLAUSEN. Explain to the Board what part you played in the preparation of the report and also the investigation.

Major LUMSDEN. May I clarify that? As far as investigation concerning Mr. Rohl, I assisted in securing data pertaining to the sale of his equipment to the Government while he was a member of Hawaiian Constructors. That is the extent—and also one other investigation wherein certain members of Hawaiian Constructors and the USED secured Government gasoline for their own private vehicles. This report that I have just mentioned consists of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Nurse, Corps of Engineers, dated April 2, 1942, wherein Colonel Nurse transmitted certain copies of correspondence which I had requested of him, in the District Engineer's office. This correspondence consisted of—do you want all that? Would you like all of that, Major?

56. Major CLAUSEN. You might briefly just state to the Board what it consists of.

Major LUMSDEN. It consisted of a letter or several letters pertaining to the status of citizenship of Mr. H. W. Rohl.

57. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? I will mark this Lumsden I.

Would you explain what the next report is, please?

Major LUMSDEN. This next file is an additional copy of testimony of Colonel Harold.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Well, if we already have it, just put it to one side.

Major LUMSDEN. I don't have to state it?

[32-39] 59. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Major LUMSDEN. This next file pertains to the Precision Grinding case.

60. Major CLAUSEN. Tell the Board, in a few words, if you had anything to do with that and, if so, just what you know about that case.

Major LUMSDEN. I recall its being discussed in the office, but I don't recall any positive action being taken. I believe the F. B. I. had something to do with this inasmuch as there is a letter in this file dated 9 July 1943 to Colonel Millard Pierson, Department Inspector General, Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H., from Mr. J. E. Thornton, Special Agent in charge of the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

61. Major CLAUSEN. What was the controversy there? What was the point involved, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. The point involved, as I recall it, was that the Engineers paid far too much for this business. There were several appraisals made. One was exceedingly low, which was made by Mr. Mahoney, who was still affiliated with the USED as a shop superintendent. The whole question involved the price that the USED was paying for this.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Paying whom, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. Paying the owners of the business, the president and director of which was Mr. Henry H. Gaylord of Honolulu.

63. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it, please? I will mark that Lumsden J.

Tell the Board what the next file is, please.

[3240] Major LUMSDEN. This next file pertains to the reported questionable business practices of Mr. Harry A. Hart and contains a newspaper clipping from the Honolulu Advertiser dated 12 February 1942, the title of the clipping being "Fraudulent Pay Claim Charged."

64. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? I will mark that Lumsden K.

What is the next file?

Major LUMSDEN. This next file is titled, "Report of investigation of employee's complaint, 13th field area," and in parentheses, "Mr. Fred M. Lewis."

65. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. I had nothing to do with this.

66. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it, please? Mark that Lumsden L. Tell the Board what the next one is, please.

Major LUMSDEN. This next file contains data pertaining to the complaints of a Mr. John H. Paluszak who, at the time he made the complaint, was a civil service employee of the District Engineer. I know nothing of the circumstances surrounding this complaint.

67. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? I will mark this Lumsden M.

Tell the Board about the next one.

Major LUMSDEN. This next is a special report on the Pleasanton Hotel, Honolulu, T. H. The report is dated 7 January 1943. It was addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., through the District [3241] Engineer and Hawaiian Constructors, Punahou Campus, Honolulu, T. H.

68. Major CLAUSEN. In a few words, Major, what was the point of that investigation concerning the Pleasanton Hotel?

Major LUMSDEN. There had been much discussion as to the need for the continued lease of this hotel. We had made several preliminary inspections, the first of which, soon after the hotel was occupied by Engineer and Hawaiian Constructor personnel, revealed the hotel to be operating at a decided loss, and it appeared at that time that it was unnecessary, as the main occupants were Colonel Wyman and his wife, and several other officers and their wives and families.

69. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Rohl? Do you remember?

Major LUMSDEN. I remember later, and perhaps it was at this time, when Mr. Rohl had his name on the hotel list as having six rooms.

70. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that report, please? Mark it Lumsden N.

Tell the Board, please, what the next is.

Let me first ask you, though, whether you had anything to do with this investigation of the Pleasanton Hotel.

Major LUMSDEN. I believe I made that one.

This next file contains miscellaneous complaints and investigations. It is File No. IG 333.5.

Is that all?

71. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with the complaints that refer to any of the matters that we are investigating?

Major LUMSDEN. I don't believe there would be anything [3242] in here that I had to do with that would assist you.

72. Major CLAUSEN. All right. May I have that, please? I will mark that Lumsden O.

What is the next, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next is entitled, "Report of investigation re irregularities in office of 14th Field Area, USED, Pearl City, T. H., 23 May 1942."

73. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. I had nothing to do with this particular transaction.

74. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it, please? Mark that Lumsden P.

Major LUMSDEN. This next file is a report of an investigating officer appointed to investigate lost secret drawings at Hilo, Hawaii.

75. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that?

Major LUMSDEN. I had nothing to do with this.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Let me have that, please. Mark that Lumsden Q.

Explain what the next is, please.

Major LUMSDEN. This next file contains reports of inspection made by the Inspector General's Department in this area for the fiscal year 1942.

77. Major CLAUSEN. Fiscal year 1942 covers what period, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. From 1941, July, to June 30, 1942.

78. Major CLAUSEN. And did you have something to do with those inspections?

[3243] Major LUMSDEN. I see here that several of my inspections are contained in this file, one of them being the report of annual general inspection of the transportation section, USED; another one the report of annual general inspection of the reproduction plant, USED, and a special report of the District Engineer's real estate section. The other officers listed on this index to this file, and who made the reports, are 1st Lieutenant Elmer Cook, Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Whisner, Colonel Row, Lieutenant Colonel Millard Pierson, Captain A. G. Fisher, and Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Newell.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Mark that Lumsden R.

Tell the Board what the next is, please.

Major LUMSDEN. The next file is a report of investigation relative to the illegal issue of gasoline by Hawaiian Constructors. The report of investigation dated 3 May 1942 was addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

80. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that, Major? Major LUMSDEN. I materially assisted Lieutenant Colonel Newell with this investigation.

81. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? Mark that Lumsden S.

Tell the Board what the next is, please.

Major LUMSDEN. This next file is titled, "Alleged improper conduct of a Government employee by misappropriation of meal tickets." It is a report of investigation dated 2 August 1942, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. The investigation was conducted by Edward H. O'Rourke, Lieutenant Colonel, IGD, and was based on [3244] a memorandum from me to the Inspector General, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

82. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? I will mark this Lumsden T.

Will you tell the Board what the next is?

Major LUMSDEN. The next file is a report—is relative to the use of passenger cars by the Area Engineer on the Island of Hawaii.

83. Major CLAUSEN. Did you make that or have anything to do with the report?

Major LUMSDEN. I had nothing to do with this.

84. Major CLAUSEN. May I have it, please? I will mark it Lumsden U.

Tell the Board, please, what the next is.

Major LUMSDEN. The next document I have appears to be a letter to Hawaiian Constructors from J. Russell Cades of the law firm of Smith, Wild, Beebe & Cades, who was justifying the pay he received from the Government for the lost services he rendered Hawaiian Constructors.

85. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? I will mark that Lumsden V.

What is the next, Major Lumsden?

860. Major CLAUSEN. From whom is the letter, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. This next document appears to be another letter to Hawaiian Constructors setting forth the exact amount of time applied to duties with Hawaiian Constructors.

Major LUMSDEN. From Mr. J. Russell Cades of Smith, Wild, Beebe & Cades.

87. Major CLAUSEN. All right. I will attach that to Lumsden V. [3245] What is the next folder you have there?

Major LUMSDEN. The next folder is entitled, "Routing slip endorsement relative to change in procedure in approving construction contract and changes thereto."

88. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that?

Major LUMSDEN. I had nothing to do with it.

89. Major CLAUSEN. I shall mark that Lumsden W.

What is the next, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next is entitled, "City and County contract," and appears to be a contract entered into by the City and County of Honolulu with the U. S. Department Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

90. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden X.

What is the next folder, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next folder contains testimony of Robert J. Fleming, Jr., Major, GSC, Corps of Engineers.

91. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with getting that?

Major LUMSDEN. I had nothing to do with this. Also included in this folder is district circular No. 104, the United States Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H., appended to which is a letter the subject of which is authorizations for emergency projects, which was signed by Walter C. Short, Major General, U. S. Army, then Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. Also appended to the first letter of General Short is a second one with the same subject. Both letters are addressed to the District Engineer, United States Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

92. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden Y.

[3246] What is the next folder, Major?

Major LUMSDEN. It is another one of those duplicates.

93. Major CLAUSEN. Just put that to one side, then. What is the next folder?

Major LUMSDEN. The next folder is titled, "Payment of salaries to administrative personnel of Hawaiian Constructors by the USED."

94. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with its preparation?

Major LUMSDEN. I believe I was in on several discussions concerning whether or not the local office of the Hawaiian Constructors was a branch office of the parent concern on the mainland. I did not write any of the notes in that folder.

95. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark this Lumsden Z.

What is the next folder, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next folder is entitled, "Complaints by employees of the Hawaiian Constructors."

96. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with its preparation?

Major LUMSDEN. I had nothing to do with that.

97. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden AA.

What is the next one, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next folder is entitled, "Report of investigation from contact office, Honolulu, relative to conditions in Hawaii with reference to Government contractors, Big Five Naval Contractors; Thomas L. Fowler, complainant." I had nothing to do with the material in this folder.

98. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden BB.

What is the next, please?

[3247] Major LUMSDEN. The next one is entitled, "Conduct of employers, Hawaiian Constructors." I had nothing to do with the material in this folder.

99. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden CC.

What is the next, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next file is a special report on the Department Engineer's 4th Field Area, Waimea, Kauai, T. H.

100. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with that?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

101. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden DD.

Major LUMSDEN. This is a duplicate, Kauai.

102. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Major LUMSDEN. The next folder contains information relative to the inspection of priority work being performed at Kaneohe Bay area and Kuhuku under the supervision of the District Engineer.

Inspection conducted by the Department Inspector General on 14, 15 December 1941.

103. Major CLAUSEN. May I have that, please? Did you have anything to do with this?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

104. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden EE.

Major LUMSDEN. The next file contains the complaint of Mr. Robert Hoffman, who was, at the time he made the complaint, an area superintendent on the pay roll of Hawaiian Constructors.

105. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden FF.

Did you have anything to do with that?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

106. Major CLAUSEN. What is the next, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next contains the report of informal [3248] investigation relative to the absence of Major J. A. Ostrand, Corps of Engineers, from Christmas Island.

107. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with the preparation of that?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

108. Major CLAUSEN. I will mark that Lumsden GG.

What is the next, please?

Major LUMSDEN. The next is a compilation of notes which I personally made and which is not included in the official files of our section. This is a bunch of notes which I retained for my own personal file, pertaining to the sale to the Government of Rohl-Connolly Company equipment. I assisted the Federal Bureau of Investigation in obtaining certain data pertaining to this transaction.

109. Major CLAUSEN. Is that the report that involves Mr. Parker as an appraiser? Maurice Parker? Do you recall?

Major LUMSDEN. I believe that is the report.

110. Major CLAUSEN. All right. We will mark this Lumsden HH. Do you have any more, sir?

Major LUMSDEN. This one is District Engineer classified documents. I don't know whether you want that or not. It is just a list of—it may assist you in knowing the type of work they had.

111. Major CLAUSEN. Well, just let me have it, then, and I will mark that Lumsden II.

Major LUMSDEN. And these are copies (indicating).

112. Major CLAUSEN. Major, were you at my request asked to ascertain the basis of a report which the Board received that Colonel Wyman in the spring of 1942 was supposed to have stated, [3249] in the presence of three other officers, after an evening of drinking,

There are probably a great many things that I have done during my life that are not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is to sell out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl did to his German friends. I should never have trusted him, and what I should do now is to take this service revolver, go out and shoot him, and then blow my own brains out.

Did you ever find any records concerning that statement?

Major LUMSDEN. I did not.

113. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you told me something about the Moana Hotel. Did you have reports concerning the Moana Hotel and drinking by Colonel Wyman?

Major LUMSDEN. There was much hearsay about the campus at Punahou which came to my attention to the effect that Mr. Rohl,

who maintained, as I am told, an apartment at the Moana Hotel in addition to his room at the Pleasanton Hotel, had frequent parties where he became quite intoxicated, and it was also rumored that Colonel Wyman occasionally attended those parties.

[3250] 114. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything concerning the letter that was sent from Colonel Lyman, dated February 14, 1942, to General Reybold, suggesting that Colonel Wyman be relieved?

Major LUMSDEN. I know nothing of that letter.

115. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

116. General GRUNERT. Major, have you anything else that you think would be of value to the Board in its determination or conclusions, as to its mission? Is there anything else you want to tell the Board?

Major LUMSDEN. Sir, I have nothing.

117. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

Major LUMSDEN. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF ANGUS M. TAYLOR, JUNIOR, CAPTAIN, COAST ARTILLERY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Captain, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Captain TAYLOR. Angus M. Taylor, Junior; Captain, Coast Artillery; and I am presently stationed at the Office of Internal Security, in Honolulu, T. H., as part of the Pacific Ocean Area Staff.

2. General GRUNERT. Captain, I am going to turn you over to General Russell, who has this particular, special part of the investigation, that we think you may be able to offer some facts on, or leads to facts, to the Board.

Captain TAYLOR. Very well, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. General Russell.

[3251] 4. General RUSSELL. Captain, we have just discussed your testimony before the Roberts Commission, and attempted to bring the material parts of it in line with present-day conditions, is that true?

Captain TAYLOR. That is correct, sir.

5. General RUSSELL. In that conversation, you stated to me that in your opinion the prosecution or failure to prosecute the consular agents played no part in what happened here on December 7, 1941?

Captain TAYLOR. That is correct, sir; and may I make one additional statement?

6. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Captain TAYLOR. That we did not have those facts available on December 7 or immediately subsequent to that time; only a few of those consular agents had been investigated, so that the remaining number were unknown quantities, and their loyalty was also unknown. We didn't know to what extent they had engaged in activities for the consul.

7. General RUSSELL. That is, subsequent investigations convinced you that the activities of this large number of consular agents, in so far as they related to military operations, were harmless?

Captain TAYLOR. That is correct, sir. With the exception of one, there was nothing found to indicate that any of these 234 sub-consular-agents had collected any data that had even tended to relate to military activities or naval activities in the territory.

8. General RUSSELL. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission, as I recall, there was some rather pointed criticism of the then cooperative plan existing between the FBI, the ONI, [3252] and the MID. Have you had occasion to observe the functioning of those agencies since that time?

Captain TAYLOR. I have, General; and up until September 16, 1943, I was the United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii and was closely connected with the district intelligence office of the Navy, the G-2 counter-intelligence office, working out there, and the FBI, that was working in a limited capacity as far as investigative work was concerned. They were assisting him more or less after February or March 1942.

9. General RUSSELL. Have you any suggestions to make as to the plan which should be in effect here, which would have for its purpose obtaining combat information?

Captain TAYLOR. Well, I don't know just to what extent we would be able to collect—that is, when I say “we,” any of the agencies—would be able to collect combat information, but in counter-intelligence work in the territory, I think it is only basic and sound that one organization should be the central clearing house for all information, and the main responsibility put on the head of that organization, so that there would not be a duplication of effort, and so that if anything were in the air it would be known by all agencies and could be worked out.

We should not have to stop because something was committed on the naval reserve or a military reserve or down-town, or be limited in any way; and we had peculiar things happening back in the old days, because the Navy would investigate their difficulties within the yard and handle Japanese suspects in the yard and outside, the Army would handle their own personnel and certain problems, the FBI at first were not equipped, in 1939 and 1940. Later on them became equipped, and assumed, if they were not designated, the principal agency as far as [3253] espionage and sabotage work is concerned.

10. General RUSSELL. What do you think of a civil agency and its equipment to collect information for the Navy or the Army, without the immediate supervision of military or naval personnel?

Captain TAYLOR. Well, it is a very difficult question to answer, General; but I will endeavor to do it, because it covers an enormous field. I might go back. When I first came to Honolulu in 1935, I was with the FBI, and in those days the district intelligence officer of the Navy was one commander and a yeoman, and the G-2 office, in those days General Patton was over here as G-2. Colonel Patton was G-2, and I think he had two officers and three or four enlisted men, and naturally they leaned toward the civil agencies, that had already gone into the field of fingerprinting, crime detection, and preventing crime, and other scientific methods of handling things. They wanted that background, so they would lean on the civilian agencies, and as we come along we find that even up as late as 1939 and 1940, the naval and Army investigative agencies were in serious cases leaning on a civil agency which had a great deal more experience, although the Army

and the Navy both at that time were enlarging their investigative personnel, and establishing sound, experienced men in positions to carry on investigative work, but whether or not a civilian investigative outfit similar to the FBI should function independently of the Army or Navy in an area, and especially a theater of war—well, there is certainly a great question in my mind.

As I remember it, early in March 1942, under a state of martial law, and after we were well in the war, here, the FBI was relieved of all responsibility; that is, of being the main [3254] organization to handle espionage, sabotage, and related investigations; and it was put on the Army and Navy, and they were assisted by the FBI, but only in that manner.

11. General RUSSELL. General Grunert, I think those are the only subjects that the Captain and I agreed would be material for us to discuss at this time, unless some other Members of the Board have questions on something.

12. General GRUNERT. I have one or two. Referring to this lack of prosecution of these Japanese agents for failure to register under the Alien Registration Act, was any of that due to politics or so-called "diplomacy"?

Captain TAYLOR. I think it would be well—and probably it never did get in the Roberts Commission record—to tell this Board just how the thing terminated.

13. General GRUNERT. Good. Go ahead.

Captain TAYLOR. And it was not because of General Short's recommendation solely that these sub consular agents were not prosecuted, but it was bickered back and forth, and it is true that General Short did make a recommendation against prosecution, because it was inconsistent with his propaganda program that was then under way to win over the Japanese—a kind of an Americanization program in the territory—but when the General, through the Secretary of War, advised the Attorney General of the United States that he would recommend strongly against prosecution of these sub consular agents and recommended a warning, the Department of Justice then wrote to me and suggested four or five different ways that they might be handled. Among the ways that they might be handled was, that no action be taken at this particular time, no warning be [3255] given, and that we make further investigations to determine whether or not there were any more serious crimes connected with their activities which we didn't know at that time. As I have already testified, that seemed to appeal to me more than any of the rest of the suggested plans. Some of the other plans were, to give them a warning, on 30 days, to register; if they didn't, at that time, to prosecute them; and other plans; so that was along in October.

In view of the seriousness of the whole situation then in existence in the Pacific I asked the Attorney General if I might come to Washington and discuss the matter with him, and when the war broke out on the 7th, the matter was still being held in abeyance by the Department of Justice and by my office and the criminal division of the Department of Justice, and it was out of the hands—true, there was a recommendation against prosecution, by the War Department, but had the Department of Justice decided to go ahead, even over the objections of the Secretary of War, it could have been done. It was not done,

but on the 7th of December this was being held in abeyance, due to departmental desires of the Department of Justice.

14. General GRUNERT. You do not know whether there was any request on the part of the State Department to hold that in abeyance, to avoid any controversy, or any ill feeling on the part of the Japanese?

Captain TAYLOR. I do, sir. When I originally made my recommendation that these sub consular agents be prosecuted, I made it contingent on the approval of the State Department, and inquiries were made in early June 1941 of the State Department as to whether or not they had any objection to a prosecution [3256] and second, whether or not any of these men had been notified to the Secretary of State by the consul general of the empire of Japan at Honolulu, and he replied that they had not, and that he had no objection, it would not conflict with any policies or plans of the Department of State, and so we readily had the "green light" to go ahead, except over the objection of the War Department, and it was the Department of Justice's own decision to hold them in abeyance and complete the investigation of all the sub consular agents prior to making its final decision as to whether or not prosecution would be instituted.

15. General GRUNERT. Have you knowledge of any facts or any leads to facts that may be of assistance to the Board. I will read to you a statement of our mission, so you can judge whether or not you have any. We are here to ascertain and report on the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941, and in addition thereto, to consider phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report made by the House Military Affairs Committee. The latter concerns itself more with the question of the conduct of certain individuals, and construction, over here.

Now, knowing what our mission is, have you, of your own knowledge, any facts, or any leads to facts, that you think might be of assistance to the Board?

Captain TAYLOR. The only thing, sir, that I would like to state is this—that in my official capacity as United States Attorney, it was my duty to confer with high officials of the Army and the Navy, during the year 1941, prior to the [3257] war, and I found that the relationship between the two was very cordial. We had condemnation suits and other matters of mutual interest that came up from time to time, and the conferences on this particular matter we have just been discussing—that is, whether or not the consular agents should be prosecuted or not—I had the pleasure of going out and talking with General Short and talking with his Chief of Staff of Military Intelligence, talked with Captain Mayfield, and they were friendly relations. We sat down together, and there was nothing strained, everything was friendly and cordial, and when there was something to get done, or to be attended to, I saw nothing that led me to feel that there was not perfect cooperation between the forces at that time, although I was not too closely related.

16. General GRUNERT. Now, aside from the cordiality and the good feeling, and so forth, was this cooperation effective?

Captain TAYLOR. Well, that I cannot say, sir, because as far as I was concerned, the condemnation suits, acquiring land for the official use of the Army and the Navy, is where I came in contact with

them to the largest extent, and I might say, from that standpoint, was effective; from a military standpoint, that is, from a defense standpoint, a tactical standpoint, I cannot, because I was not acquainted with the work at that time.

17. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else in the back of your mind?

Captain TAYLOR. No, sir; I have nothing else that I would like to say.

18. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming.

Captain TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

[3258] **TESTIMONY OF PHILIP CHEW CHUN, 1453 ALANCASTER STREET, HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Chew Chun, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. CHUN. My name is Philip Chun, address 1453 Alancaster Street, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation, Mr. Chun?

Mr. CHUN. I am at present in business for myself.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Chun, this particular part of our investigation will be conducted by the Assistant Recorder, Major Clausen, so you answer his questions and if we have any more we will propound them later on.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Your name is Philip Chew Chun, is it not, sir?

Mr. CHUN. Yes.

5. Major CLAUSEN. You were formerly administrative head of the United States Engineering Department here?

Mr. CHUN. I was.

6. Major CLAUSEN. For what period of time?

Mr. CHUN. Approximately ten years. I cannot give the exact date when I was promoted to the head of the Administrative Division. Around 1935 to 1944.

7. Major CLAUSEN. During the years 1940 and 1941, Mr. Chun, were you the administrative head?

Mr. CHUN. I was the administrative head.

8. Major CLAUSEN. You are the one across whose desk there would normally come correspondence, papers and other documents?

[3259] Mr. CHUN. Yes, sir.

9. Major CAUSEN. Do you recall when a Colonel John Hunt was out here conducting an investigation involving Colonel Wyman and the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. CHUN. I recall that.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember Colonel Hunt asked you to produce for him papers that had to do with negotiations and conferences leading up to a contract dated December 20th, 1940 with the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. CHUN. Yes, sir.

11. Major CLAUSEN. And you said to him at that time that you were unable to find any such papers or documents?

Mr. CHUN. He asked specifically for letters, certain letters, that Colonel Wyman is said to have received from headquarters. There was a big project coming up. I did produce several letters, which is not the letter he wanted.

12. Major CLAUSEN. I have the testimony right here and I will read it to you:

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report is as follows):

Q. Now, with reference to the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, W-414-Eng-602, Colonel Wyman has testified that he proposed doing the work that was outlined in and covered by the basic contract without entrance into any contract, but by the hiring of labor directly by his office, and the purchase of materials by his office. Presumably at the time of the work covered by the basic contract was in consideration, there was some correspondence as to the manner in which the work would be performed. Do you recall any such correspondence?

[3260] A. No, I do not recall that part of it. That question was asked of me several times, and the only reply I could have given to that few persons that asked me was that he made the trip to Washington, to the Division Engineer's office, and my understanding was that the whole thing was consummated in the Division and the Chief's office. I do not recall prior to the contract was made that negotiations or correspondence, or seeing such correspondence up to that.

[3261] Now, you had several more questions and answers on the same subject. Did you find any correspondence at all on that subject, Mr. Chun?

Mr. CHUN. I did not.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Did you look for any?

Mr. CHUN. I looked for it, yes. I went through the file. After Colonel Hunt asked me, I went back to the file and spent several days over there and I could not find that letter. I think I did tell him afterwards, subsequent to the testimony I gave, that I could not find the letter.

14. Major CLAUSEN. You were the person to whom Colonel Hunt was supposed to go; you were head of the administrative division?

Mr. CHUN. Yes.

15. Major CLAUSEN. You said here:

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:)

Q. (By Colonel Hunt:) What I am trying to get at here is to establish by inquiry the identity of the person to whom I should look for documents that would indicate preliminary action with respect to the work that was started in late 1940 under that contract, and I understand from your statement that you are the person who is in effect the custodian of such records and documents.

A. Yes, all files come under the Administrative Division. I am responsible for them.

Q. Then, in addition to the original papers relating to the work on the contract 602, I am going to ask you to secure for my review any other documents bearing upon the question why that work was done under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.

A. Yes, sir; that will be included in this list that you are going to give me?

[3262] Q. That's right.

Now, after these questions and answers you looked and could find nothing; is that correct?

Mr. CHUN. That is right.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Hunt also asked you about the yacht VEGA. Do you recall that?

Mr. CHUN. I do.

17. Major CLAUSEN. What did you find about that?

Mr. CHUN. I told him I didn't have any records or any knowledge of that.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Yet you were the head of the administrative division?

Mr. CHUN. Yes, sir.

19. Major CLAUSEN. After you talked to Colonel Hunt here at this time, did you look for those papers concerning the yacht VEGA?

Mr. CHUN. I did.

20. Major CLAUSEN. What did you find? Did you find any papers?

Mr. CHUN. I did not find any papers about the negotiations for the VEGA and the renting of the VEGA.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know anything about either one of these two things?

Mr. CHUN. The only knowledge I have is that the VEGA was in port one time. That is the only thing I know. And its proposed use by contracts with the different divisions, one by a conservation party.

22. Major CLAUSEN. The lack of papers in your files was certainly out of the ordinary, so far as administrative routine was concerned, though, was it not?

Mr. CHUN. Probably so, yes, sir.

[3263] 23. Major CLAUSEN. Do you account for that in any way?

Mr. CHUN. You mean, my method of filing papers?

24. Major CLAUSEN. No, the fact that you had these papers, you say, involving the District Engineer's office and you could find no records or correspondence concerning them.

Mr. CHUN. Figures were never put in black or white or in writing.

25. Major CLAUSEN. I don't think I have any more questions.

26. General GRUNERT. Does anyone have any questions? Do you know whether there were ever any papers on that subject or those subjects that might have been removed from the files before you looked for them?

Mr. CHUN. No, I don't. I don't have any reason to doubt it.

27. General GRUNERT. As far as you know, there were never any papers on that subject in the file?

Mr. CHUN. As far as I know, yes, sir.

28. General GRUNERT. Have you any other statement you wish to make on this subject to the Board that may help the Board?

Mr. CHUN. No; I don't believe I have.

29. Major CLAUSEN. I have one further question.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chun, Colonel Wyman was very careless in his paper work, wasn't he?

Mr. CHUN. In some respects, yes.

30. Major CLAUSEN. He was very lax in administrative details, was he not?

Mr. CHUN. That is a matter of opinion. I don't know, really.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Let me read you your opinion that you gave [3264] to Colonel Hunt, on page 370:

Q. If there had been any such record, do you feel that you would have known it?

A. That's right.

Q. Well, looking from the inside point of view, what would it mean?

A. Well, I always think that Colonel Wyman was very careless in his paper work. I felt there was nothing that I could do about him. He was very lax in administrative details, and it was awfully hard to keep up with him.

Do you recall giving that testimony?

Mr. CHUN. I do, yes.

32. Major CLAUSEN. Is that a correct statement; did you tell the truth there?

Mr. CHUN. That is my opinion of it.

33. Major CLAUSEN. You told the truth there, did you?

Mr. CHUN. I did.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know anything about the purchase of equipment?

Mr. CHUN. No.

35. Major CLAUSEN. From the Rohl-Connolly Company of Los Angeles at a cost of about \$166,000?

Mr. CHUN. No, that don't come across my desk at all. That would be a matter of the supply division.

36. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

[3265] 37. General GRUNERT. All right, thank you for coming. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE A. SISSON, CIVIL ENGINEER, 1545 DOMONIS STREET, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name and address, sir?

Mr. SISSON. George A. Sisson, 1545 Domonis Street, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation, Mr. Sisson?

Mr. SISSON. Civil Engineer.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Sisson, I am going to ask Major Clausen to lead in this particular part of our investigation, and the members of the Board will ask any questions that appear pertinent after that.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Your occupation, Mr. Sisson, during the years 1940 and 1941, was what?

Mr. SISSON. In 1940 I had charge of the Engineering Section of the District Engineer's Office at Pier 2. That is where the office was at that time. In 1939 I transferred here from the Huntington District, West Virginia.

5. Major CLAUSEN. This was as a civilian employee of the United States Engineering Department?

Mr. SISSON. Right.

6. Major CLAUSEN. You were at one time principal engineer, were you, or area engineer, at the Hickam Field area?

Mr. SISSON. Yes, sir, in 1942.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And in connection with your duties at that time, that position and that work extended over what period?

Mr. SISSON. I went out there, if I remember correctly, on the 13th of January, 1941, and stayed there until February, 1943, as area engineer.

8. Major CLAUSEN. The Hawaiian Constructors was the contractor on that job, was it not?

Mr. SISSON. Well, they were one of the contractors. At that time there was quite a little other work being done in that area.

9. Major CLAUSEN. They did, though, a considerable amount of frame building construction under supervision, did they not?

Mr. Sisson. That is right.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And what was the nature of that construction work, Mr. Sisson?

Mr. Sisson. Well, they built a lot of barracks there at Hickam Field, mess halls, latrines, and put in a water and sewer system, and also they started, as I recall, before that building the casemates of Battery Clausen at Fort Kam.

11. Major CLAUSEN. How did they do the work on Battery Clausen?

Mr. Sisson. Well, they did the work as any contractor would do it.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Let me ask you your opinion of the manner in which they did all this work to which you are testifying.

Mr. Sisson. Well, frankly, all of the work here at that time was badly handled.

13. Major CLAUSEN. That, Mr. Sisson, is not my question. I am asking you your opinion of the work done by the Hawaiian Constructors under your supervision.

Mr. Sisson. I think they did as well as any contractor [3267] could have done at that time under the conditions.

14. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, it was not handled in an efficient manner, isn't that correct?

Mr. Sisson. As efficiently, I would say, as it was possible under the conditions.

15. Major CLAUSEN. With whom, Mr. Sisson, did you talk before you came here to testify, just recently?

Mr. Sisson. I did not talk to anyone. I have been gathering data for General Bragdon and others. I have been doing that for the last two weeks, getting data in connection with some of the work, particularly A. W. S. work.

16. Major CLAUSEN. For General Bragdon?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir. Well, Colonel Gesler is the one that gave the instructions to get up the information.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having been interviewed and giving certain testimony before Colonel John E. Hunt of the Inspector General's Department, sir?

Mr. Sisson. Yes.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember having given this testimony, at page 391:

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:)

Q. Did they as the Hawaiian Constructors do any considerable amount of frame building construction under your supervision?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the nature of it?

A. Oh, it varies at Hickam Field, the mess halls, the warehouses—as a matter of fact, I would say the bulk of their work was construction in the Sector Field area and also the other areas, as far as I know.

Q. What was your opinion of the manner in which they did their work?

[3268] A. Well, it wasn't handled in an efficient manner. I don't think really any of their work handled in a highly efficient manner due to, well, having poor workmen, and generally speaking, not efficient management. I know for a fact that some of the, well, say, tournapul operators, were brought over here, hired on the coast as tournapul operators, and had to be trained after they got over here, and some of them didn't know anything about a tournapul. That was also true of some of their crane operators. I was told that one crane operator, a new man, came over and didn't even know how to operate the crane when he was put on it to operate it.

Do you recall having given that testimony, Mr. Sisson?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And did you state the truth at that time?

Mr. Sisson. I did.

20. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

Mr. Sisson. As I saw it.

21. Major CLAUSEN. No further questions.

22. General GRUNERT. Any questions.

23. General RUSSELL. Are you in the Engineering Department now?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. Have you been with them constantly since this time?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

25. General RUSSELL. What caused you to change your mind, Mr. Sisson?

Mr. Sisson. Well, I would like to explain it this way: In comparing the Hawaiian Constructors as contractors doing work, [3269] as they were on a fixed-fee basis, they were not as efficient as a contractor, for instance, other contractors we had at Hickam Field who had taken their work on a lump-sum basis and taken it several, or a considerable time earlier. That is, I mean, where they could. For instance, I am comparing Robert McKee, who took his contracts probably two years earlier, and who shipped his own material from the mainland, got plenty of material here in advance, was able to hire his men when he could get good experienced men. I understand the Hawaiian Constructors did not land here, did not get started, if I remember correctly, until in January, 1943.

26. General FRANK. What?

Mr. Sisson. January, 1942. January, 1941. Excuse me. At that time good help, good construction help, was scarce on the mainland. The other contractors here, like Tucker McClure and Robert McKee, who were doing work at Hickam Field, they had been over here a year and a half earlier when good construction men were plentiful on the mainland. They had an existing organization, but the Hawaiian Constructors had to form their organization when good help was scarce, when there was lots of work on the mainland.

27. General RUSSELL. When you were testifying before there was not a thing relative in your testimony. You stated that their supervision was, in effect, inefficient, or words to that effect.

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir, apparently did.

28. General RUSSELL. What?

Mr. Sisson. It was inefficient in comparison to the old contractors.

29. General RUSSELL. Don't you know that the Callahan Company, [3270] the Rohl-Connolly Company and Gunther-Shirley were old organizations in the States and were imported over here, so that the government might have the benefit of their old and experienced organizations?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, I understand they are capable men on the mainland. Frankly, I don't believe they sent their best team over here, putting it in football terms.

30. General RUSSELL. What you mean to testify now is that they had a second-rate outfit over here and did as well as a second-rate outfit could effectively do; is that true?

Mr. Sisson. Their main handicap over here—

31. General RUSSELL. Could you answer that question, since we are talking about football terms, and second teams?

Mr. Sisson. No, I would say they did not sent their first team over here.

32. General RUSSELL. In other words, you think they had a scrub outfit over here?

Mr. Sisson. I would say it was not their first team.

33. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the United States Government was paying them on the basis of sending a first-rate team over here?

Mr. Sisson. That, I cannot say.

34. General RUSSELL. If the government picked them out and sent them over here as a first-rate team and paid for first-rate service, it did not get what it was paying for, did it?

Mr. Sisson. No, they did not, if they were paying them for first-rate service.

35. General RUSSELL. In other words, it was a second-rate job that they were doing over here?

[3271] Mr. Sisson. I still stick to my statement.

36. General RUSSELL. Could you answer that question? It was a second-rate job that they were doing over here?

Mr. Sisson. They did as good a job—

37. General RUSSELL. Pardon me?

Mr. Sisson. They did as good a job, I think, as it was possible to do under existing circumstances.

38. General RUSSELL. Suppose they had had a first-rate team over here, could they have done a better job?

Mr. Sisson. If they could have gotten first-rate carpenters and top-notch foremen and top-notch machinists, and so forth, they could have done better work.

39. General RUSSELL. Did not they import a lot of that type of labor over here from the mainland?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, at a time when good help was scarce.

40. General RUSSELL. Were you cognizant of conditions on the mainland?

Mr. Sisson. Yes.

41. General RUSSELL. How?

Mr. Sisson. I take engineering papers and read them. I know there was a lot of construction work under way on the mainland. Frankly, our own organization brought a lot of men over in 1941 and 1942 that were really second-rate men.

42. General RUSSELL. You are an employee of the federal government, are you not?

Mr. Sisson. Yes.

43. General RUSSELL. And you have been for a long time?

Mr. Sisson. Yes.

44. General RUSSELL. And you have given testimony here to a [3272] government investigator to the effect that this was not an efficient operation out here, haven't you?

Mr. Sisson. Yes.

45. General RUSSELL. And you are in here giving testimony to another government body today that it was an efficient operation, aren't you?

Mr. Sisson. I am saying as efficient as it could be under existing circumstances in 1941 and 1942.

46. General RUSSELL. Why didn't you qualify that testimony in that way when you were testifying as Major Clausen has read to you?

Mr. Sisson. Well, frankly, I think I should have. I was comparing them with contractors in 1941 and 1942, contractors who had taken their work two years earlier.

47. General RUSSELL. Let us develop these recent occurrences here on the island. Do you know a General Bragdon?

48. Major CLAUSEN. He has testified that he has talked with him.

Mr. Sisson. I met him, yes, sir.

49. General RUSSELL. How long ago?

Mr. Sisson. About three days ago.

50. General RUSSELL. You had been back digging into these old records for some ten days when you met Bragdon, hadn't you?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, that is right, on one particular subject.

51. General RUSSELL. At whose instance did you go back and begin the investigation of these old documents and records?

Mr. Sisson. Colonel Gesler gave me the assignment to dig up that information. We had a cable from the Chief of Engineers to prepare certain data chronologically in connection with that.

[3273] 52. General RUSSELL. What did this Colonel that you are talking about, who sent you on this search, tell you he wanted evidence to prove?

Mr. Sisson. He didn't tell me. The cable was turned over to me and he told me to dig up that information requested on the A. W. S. installations, and I had to go through a number of files.

53. General RUSSELL. You have not made any recent investigation, then, relating to this construction work about which you are testifying to Major Clausen, have you?

Mr. Sisson. Not recently, no, sir.

54. General RUSSELL. Then you have changed your story without any rhyme or reason since you testified before?

Mr. Sisson. Well, I think, sir, that I have been able to see this whole picture in a broader light as to conditions that existed at that time.

55. General RUSSELL. Did you ever know anything about the Rohl-Connolly crowd?

Mr. Sisson. No. I have met Mr. Rohl, that is all. I know Connolly.

56. General RUSSELL. As you dealt with those people out there on the job, the supervisory personnel, did you know the difference between the supervisors of Callahan and Rohl-Connolly and the other units of that construction group?

Mr. Sisson. No, sir. I simply dealt with representatives of the Hawaiian Constructors, their general superintendent and their local superintendent.

57. General RUSSELL. They had supervisors extending all the way down to these workers, didn't they?

[3274] Mr. Sisson. Yes. I knew their general superintendent, a fellow named Ashlock. He visited the work periodically and I

would say this: that Ashlock, I considered him a very capable construction man.

58. General RUSSELL. And you considered him that way when you were testifying originally?

Mr. Sisson. Ashlock. The inefficiency that I testified to, they were inefficient further on down, due to a lack of good workmen, particularly good carpenters, good mechanics. In 1941, and it existed in 1942 and 1943, any man that could go out and buy a square and a saw and a hammer, he could get a job as a carpenter, just because the help was very scarce, but he is still a poor carpenter.

59. General RUSSELL. That was true in 1941 on the island?

Mr. Sisson. On the island, yes, sir.

60. General RUSSELL. And it was true in 1941 on the mainland?

Mr. Sisson. I believe good help was scarce over there.

61. General RUSSELL. And you believed that because you saw it in some paper?

Mr. Sisson. Well, I read technical journals and I read the papers also.

62. General RUSSELL. Do you know what the conditions were in Los Angeles where they were recruiting their common labor and carpenters?

Mr. Sisson. No, sir, I do not.

63. General RUSSELL. The testimony now, in order that we may light somewhere and know what to depend on when we are considering your testimony, Mr. Sisson, is that they brought a sorry crowd of supervisors, laborers and carpenters over here to do [3275] that job?

Mr. Sisson. Their carpenters and mechanics were not first-class men. Their general superintendents, I say, were good. Ashlock, I would say, was a very good man.

64. General RUSSELL. How about the intermediate supervisors between Ashlock and the laborers?

Mr. Sisson. I would say they were not quite as high a quality as Ashlock and the men further up.

65. General RUSSELL. Would you say the supervisory men were a second-grade lot, or a good lot, or if they belonged in one category?

Mr. Sisson. The supervisory, I would say, the men below the grade of the general men, below Ashlock—and Mr. Grafe was over here as supervisor. He was not here all the time. A very capable man. Their foremen down below them, I would say, were only fair.

66. General RUSSELL. With a poor crowd of foremen and a fair crowd of supervisors you got the results which you might expect, that is, unsatisfactory results, when regarded from the standpoint of normal standards, didn't you?

Mr. Sisson. Yes. We did not get the best results.

67. General RUSSELL. That is all.

Major CLAUSEN. I have another question.

68. General FRANK. Let me ask this first:

What did Major Powell say to you about this testimony?

Mr. Sisson. Major Powell?

69. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. Sisson. The only thing he told me was "You will probably be asked a lot of questions and" he said, "don't get [3276] rattled. If you don't understand the question, why, say so."

70. General FRANK. What did Major Lozier tell you?

Mr. Sisson. Nothing.

71. General FRANK. You were conversant with the McKee organization out at Hickam, weren't you?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

72. General FRANK. Was that a pretty good organization?

Mr. Sisson. I would say it was a good organization.

73. General FRANK. First class?

Mr. Sisson. The local organization of McKee's was good. Now, we had some trouble with McKee's. They had quite a lot of work at Hickam Field when I went out there. I inherited it from the construction Quartermaster.

74. General FRANK. He had an efficient operating organization, didn't he?

Mr. Sisson. An efficient local operation organization, yes.

75. General FRANK. He had good workmen?

Mr. Sisson. Yes.

76. General FRANK. They were here present with an organization and were equipped and ready to do work in the Hawaiian Islands before the Hawaiian Constructors were brought in here, weren't they?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, but at that time, I will say this: They were loaded up. They were loaded to their full capacity at that time. They were building a lot of quarters, officers quarters, and so forth, at Hickam Field, and other buildings.

77. General FRANK. Just as soon as the Hawaiian Constructors came in what happened to McKee?

[3277] Mr. Sisson. They finished up their work, but it took them several months. They were not done with all their work at the time of the blitz.

78. General FRANK. But their contracts were dependent upon completion of the work on which they were engaged?

Mr. Sisson. That is right.

79. General FRANK. And there was a good organization, with good workmen, that was turned loose, and this second-rate organization was brought in?

Mr. Sisson. Well, they were in here before McKee was turned loose.

80. General FRANK. What is that?

Mr. Sisson. They were brought in almost—I would say they were brought in a year before McKee finished up.

81. General FRANK. But they had a first-rate organization in here and they brought in a second-rate organization?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, but at the time when the District Engineer's force had to be increased, McKee with his local organization was loaded up to the hilt. I don't think they were in position to take on any more work.

[3278] 82. General FRANK. Was any use ever made of McKee's superintendents and supervisors?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

83. General FRANK. By the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Sisson. Well, let me qualify that in this way: Immediately after the blitz their superintendent came to me and said he wanted to help out any way he could, and we put them right away—see, their work was, I won't say stopped entirely, but it was cramped considerably due

to shortage of supplies and one thing another, and we put them to work at Hickam Field, remodeling that big barracks. You know the big barracks there of 3200. They rehabilitated that.

84. General FRANK. They built it in the first place.

Mr. Sisson. They built it in the first place. Consequently they were much better qualified to rehabilitate it, and we put them to work at rehabilitating that right away, and one or two other buildings, the fire station and some of the other buildings.

85. General FRANK. But they didn't do that as part of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Sisson. They were supposed to do that as subcontractors of the Hawaiian Constructors, and I understood that the Hawaiian Constructors and the District Engineer tried to get them to become a part of the Hawaiian Constructors, and McKee refused to. It is my understanding of it. I have never seen any correspondence on it.

86. General FRANK. McKee refused because he didn't like the manner in which the Hawaiian Constructors did business.

Mr. Sisson. That might be. I can't say. But I know [3279] they did quite a lot of work, as some of them—at that time we were carrying all of the contractors' pay rolls. We carried McKee's pay roll for his men that worked after the blitz on rehabilitating these various buildings.

87. General FRANK. Prior to that McKee carried his own pay roll?

Mr. Sisson. That is right. His work was lump-sum work.

88. Major CLAUSEN. How did Major Powell know what to tell you as to the manner that you should act before this Board? Did you go to him and tell him you were going to be a witness?

Mr. Sisson. I told him—I was working in the same room, preparing, digging up data—rather, tabulating data that I had dug up on his A. W. S. stations when the call came through, and I just mentioned that they knew that I was—would be called. I mentioned that I was supposed to go over here this afternoon.

89. Major CLAUSEN. Now, so the record is entirely clear, Mr. Sisson, you are not going to have General Russell believe that you believe other than that the Hawaiian Constructors sent over here what you considered their scrub team, are you?

Mr. Sisson. What I considered not their first team.

90. Major CLAUSEN. You thought they were a scrub team, to use football parlance, didn't you?

Mr. Sisson. No. I would say they were not their first team. They were probably the second team.

91. Major CLAUSEN. You deny that, do you?

Mr. Sisson. I would say they were probably their second or third team.

92. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Then let me follow that with this question: When you made this statement to Colonel Hunt, [3280] you thought then that not only they sent over a scrub team but that they had gypped the Government, didn't you?

Mr. Sisson. No, I don't think they gypped the Government. I didn't think so then, but I—in comparison I will say that they are not as capable, not as efficient contractors as Tucker-McClure or McKee.

93. Major CLAUSEN. Would you listen while I read your testimony?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

94. Major CLAUSEN. Reading from the top of page 396, question by Colonel Hunt:

Would you say that management by the Hawaiian Constructors was honest, even though it was inefficient?

ANSWER. As far as I know, yes, sir. I think their main fault was the inefficiency, sort of a don't care a darn what the costs were.

QUESTION. And I believe that at one time you made the remark that you felt that if the Rohl-Connolly outfit and the Callahan outfit were efficient builders, that they surely must have sent this "scrub team" over here to do it?

ANSWER. That's right.

QUESTION. Does that pretty accurately describe your judgment of the Rohl-Connolly and Callahan outfits?

ANSWER. Yes, it does.

QUESTION. Is there anything else you can think of that would be of value to this record?

ANSWER. Well, there is only one thing. I have thought that there was a laxity, or I would say that [3281] the Hawaiian Constructors or members of the Hawaiian Constructors have gipped the Government to a considerable extent in the renting of the equipment. I am thinking in particular of some of the equipment that Woolley rented. There was in particular one crane that I would say a contractor normally would hesitate to pay \$2,000 for, due to the fact that the crane was worn out, and yet that was rented from Mr. Woolley for record?

You gave that testimony, did you?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

95. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

96. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

97. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask the man a question. May I, General?

98. General GRUNERT. Yes.

99. Colonel TOULMIN. I was out of the room, Mr. Witness, when you testified that a General Bragdon had talked to you; is that correct? He did talk to you?

Mr. Sisson. I have talked—yes, sir, he talked—I talked to him some, and he's talked to me.

100. Colonel TOULMIN. What was the occasion for the conversation?

Mr. Sisson. Well, I was preparing data in the same room in connection with A. W. S. stations.

101. Colonel TOULMIN. Who else was in the room with you besides Bragdon and Powell, and yourself?

Mr. Sisson. Mr. Perliter, and Mr. Lozier.

[3282] 102. Colonel TOULMIN. Is Mr. Perliter working on this job of getting up evidence, too?

Mr. Sisson. He is working. Yes, sir, he is digging up data, going through the files, arranging it in chronological order.

103. Colonel TOULMIN. The whole group of you—

Mr. Sisson. The files.

104. Colonel TOULMIN. —were working on this same subject; is that it?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

105. Colonel TOULMIN. When did you first talk to General Bragdon?

Mr. Sisson. Monday, I believe.

106. Colonel TOULMIN. You talked to him every day since then?

Mr. Sisson. Very little. I have been working, working in the same room, but I have talked to him very little.

107. Colonel TOULMIN. What did he say to you?

Mr. Sisson. He's asked me questions, some questions in connection with A. W. S. work. About any conversation we had has been primarily in connection with the A. W. S. service.

108. Colonel TOULMIN. What did he say to you about coming over here and testifying before this Board?

Mr. Sisson. He didn't say anything to me about coming over here.

109. Colonel TOULMIN. Powell was the man—

Mr. Sisson. Powell is the man.

110. Colonel TOULMIN. —who prepared you for that?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir. I think—let me qualify that. I think Bragdon—I asked Bragdon. I had a folder of materials, [3283] copies of letters that I had dug out of the files, all in connection with A. W. S. stations, and had written up a memorandum on it and asked him if I should bring that along, and he said he didn't think so, because, for the reason that the work that I have been on, that I am personally acquainted with, had nothing to do—in other words, where I worked in the second—and had charge in the Second Field Area there were no A. W. S. stations built in that area; consequently I have—my information regarding A. W. S. stations is information that I dug out of the files. I have no personal information regarding those.

111. Colonel TOULMIN. So General Bragdon didn't want you to bring that testimony—

Mr. Sisson. No, sir.

112. Colonel TOULMIN. —over here before this Board; is that right?

Mr. Sisson. Well, it wasn't testimony, it was data.

113. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. He didn't want you to bring those data over before this Board; is that right?

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

114. Colonel TOULMIN. And General Bragdon is the man that made that request or gave you that instruction; is that it?

Mr. Sisson. I asked him if I should bring it, and he said he didn't think so, that you would—that I should only probably be questioned and should only deal with information that I had personal knowledge, as of my construction work in the Second Field Area.

115. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you discuss with General Bragdon your previous testimony before Colonel Hunt?

Mr. Sisson. No, sir.

[3284] 116. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you discuss that testimony with Major Powell?

Mr. Sisson. No, sir.

117. Colonel TOULMIN. Now, you are here, you know, Mr. Witness, under oath.

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

118. Colonel TOULMIN. And I would like to have you think very carefully before you answer this next question: Is there any other statement made by General Bragdon or Colonel Powell to you during the last three days, or by you to them, that you have not reported to this Board this afternoon?

Mr. Sisson. Well, I don't remember everything that we talked. We talked very little because it was in connection with the A. W. S. work.

119. Colonel TOULMIN. You don't remember everything that was said, then?

Mr. Sisson. No, sir.

120. Colonel TOULMIN. There may be a great many other things you haven't reported to this Board in your testimony this afternoon that was said between Bragdon, Powell and yourself; is that it?

Mr. Sisson. I don't think there is anything pertinent.

121. Colonel TOULMIN. No; I am asking you not whether there is anything pertinent or not; whether there was anything else that was said.

Mr. Sisson. There may have been, but I can't remember everything that has been—that we have talked about, but I think Bragdon has been a very busy man, and he has asked me questions about A. W. S. work where I have been digging up data, [3285] but that's all our conversation has been, just in connection with that; and, as I say, I asked him whether I should bring the folder I had.

122. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all. Thank you.

Mr. Sisson. Yes, sir.

123. Major CLAUSEN. I just have one further question: When you gave this testimony to Colonel Hunt, Mr. Sisson, did you tell the truth?

Mr. Sisson. I told the truth as I saw it. I always tell the truth.

124. Major CLAUSEN. At that time?

Mr. Sisson. As I saw it at that time.

125. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. That is all.

126. General GRUNERT. Have you anything else that you would like to tell the Board pertaining to the questions that have been asked you, as pertaining to this matter, now that your memory has been sort of refreshed by what they have said? This will be an opportunity for you to tell the Board anything that may be in the back of your mind.

Mr. Sisson. The only thing I could say in that way was that in '41 we were all working under severe handicaps, both the Engineers and the Hawaiian Constructors, due to the fact that good experienced construction help was scarce, due to the fact that we were very shy of materials, also shy of construction equipment. The District Engineer at that time could only buy materials for approved projects. He couldn't buy materials and stock them to have them on hand. We were also handicapped due to the fact that we had to follow pre-war procedure. That is, the District Engineer was working under the Division Engineer [3286] at San Francisco, under the Chief of Engineers in Washington. A set of plans had to be prepared here, sent to the Division Engineer, and then—for approval—and back. That sort of thing definitely delayed the work and was definitely a handicap, and at that time we had an enormous amount of work. We had airfields to build, gasoline storage at those airfields, barracks, quarters.

And I would like to bring out one point that has come to my mind, in studying over these records, that had there been in '41 a priority established on the most—setting up as a higher priority the most important jobs, those jobs could have been probably completed earlier. As it was, there was no priority. We had airfields to build, we had ammunition storage to build, war storage for gasoline on five different islands. Every damn thing was important, and one job would be hot today and probably another job hotter tomorrow, depending upon the using agency putting pressure on a certain job. Consequently, there was a certain amount of—considerable inefficiency and what I like to

term as fumbling of the ball, due to conditions. And I would say this: I think the whole cause of not being prepared there was just because we started about two years too late. We were trying to do three years' work in one year, under difficult circumstances, and I think everybody did their darndest.

127. General GRUNERT. Are there any more questions? (No response.)

Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. Sisson. You are welcome, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[3287] **TESTIMONY OF MISS HELEN SCHLESINGER, 254A LEWERS ROAD, HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of her rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Miss Schlesinger, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Miss Helen Schlesinger, 254A Lewers Road, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. And by whom are you employed, Miss Schlesinger?

Miss SCHLESINGER. The Engineer Office.

3. Colonel WEST. Is that the United States District Engineer office?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That is right. It is now officially known as the Office of the Engineer.

4. Colonel WEST. Major Clausen.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Miss Schlesinger, what was your occupation in the year 1940-1941?

Miss SCHLESINGER. In 1940 I was in Chicago, employed by the U. S. Engineers there, in charge of their contract section.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And you then later came here?

Miss SCHLESINGER. And in February, 1941, I came, transferred to Honolulu, to work for the Engineers.

7. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you recall having testified before Colonel John E. Hunt?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I do.

8. Major CLAUSEN. An Inspector General?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Right.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Before you came here today, Miss Schlesinger, did you talk this case over with anyone?

[3288] Miss SCHLESINGER. I didn't talk it over with anyone. General Bragdon and Colonel Wyman did call me over to the office. They asked me if I had any idea what I might be called to testify for or for what reason I might be called to testify, and I told them that I had no idea at all what I might be asked.

10. Major CLAUSEN. You knew Colonel Wyman out here, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Junior, did you not?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I worked while he was here in the District; right.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. You also met this party, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes.

12. Major CLAUSEN. You attended social functions at which Mr. Rohl was present?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I attended one social function at which Mr. Rohl was present.

13. Major CLAUSEN. You saw him drunk, did you not?

Miss SCHLESINGER. He had very definitely been drinking, and at the time I left there he indicated that he was having a heart attack, and I am not qualified to pass judgment on whether it was a case of drunkenness or the heart attack which Mr. Rohl maintained he had.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Where did this occur, Miss Schlesinger?

Miss SCHLESINGER. At the Pleasanton Hotel.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Pleasanton Hotel?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That is right.

16. Major CLAUSEN. You saw him in that same condition on other occasions?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No, I never did. There was only one [3289] other time that I was with him when there had been some drinking, and that was one night when I had been working very late, and he took me home in his car, and we stopped at his room at the Moana Hotel for about half an hour, and I think had one drink there, and I went on home from there, and he was not drunk at that time.

17. Major CLAUSEN. This occasion, this social function at the Pleasanton Hotel, who was present, Miss Schlesinger?

Miss SCHLESINGER. At the time I arrived there, which was very late in the evening, probably about 11 o'clock, when I had been called supposedly to come down to work, as had happened on many other occasions, and arrived down there I think about 11 o'clock, with Colonel Wyman's secretary, Elaine Heilman, and I believe Mr. Middleton of Hawaiian Constructors was there, and Colonel Robinson, and it wasn't until after I had been there quite a little while that I found out they had been having a farewell party for Colonel Wyman, but apparently by the time we got there everybody else had left.

18. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, this occasion at the Pleasanton was one for Colonel Wyman?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That is right.

19. Major CLAUSEN. You saw Colonel Wyman?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I didn't see him that night, no.

20. Major CLAUSEN. I think that is all.

21. General RUSSELL. When was it you had this conference with the General and the Colonel? Today?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No. Monday.

22. General RUSSELL. Monday. What time Monday?

Miss SCHLESINGER. About 4:30.

[3290-91] 23. General RUSSELL. Afternoon?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That's right.

24. General RUSSELL. Where was it that—he called you to some place, as I recall.

Miss SCHLESINGER. You are speaking of—

25. General RUSSELL. Colonel—General—

Miss SCHLESINGER. General Bragdon and Colonel Wyman?

26. General RUSSELL. And Colonel Wyman, yes. Monday of this week?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes.

27. General RUSSELL. And they called you to the headquarters or some official place?

Miss SCHLESINGER. They are stationed over on Punahou campus now. They have office quarters, have been made available for them there.

28. General RUSSELL. Wyman and General Bragdon have offices at the place you just described?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That's right.

29. General RUSSELL. And it is in headquarters?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That's the Engineer Office headquarters.

30. General RUSSELL. Are all engineering functions on this Island of Oahu supervised and controlled out of that office?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That is right.

31. General RUSSELL. The chief engineer officer on this island has his office there where these people were; is that right?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That is right.

32. General RUSSELL. And you are an employee of the Engineering Department here on the island?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes.

[3292] 33. General RUSSELL. Is your office over there where these gentlemen were, in that same building?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Not in the same building. There are a number of buildings on Punahou campus, and I am in one of the buildings on Punahou campus; in other words, Cook Library building. They are in Bishop Hall on Punahou campus.

34. General RUSSELL. Who was present in the room when these people were talking to you?

Miss SCHLESINGER. There were two other people present, and I don't know who they were.

35. General RUSSELL. Were they officers or were they civilians?

Miss SCHLESINGER. One was an officer and one was a civilian.

36. General RUSSELL. What rank did the officer have?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I don't recall. I was not facing him at the time.

37. General RUSSELL. You don't remember his——

Miss SCHLESINGER. He was on the other side of the room, and I paid very little attention. I was in there only a short time.

38. General RUSSELL. When did you first know that you were going to appear before this Board as a witness?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I believe it was about a week or a week and a half ago that an MP came in and notified me that I was to appear here.

39. General RUSSELL. Did these gentlemen tell you how they knew that you were going to come down here as a witness before this Board?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No, they did not.

40. General RUSSELL. Now, they asked you what the subject of [3293] your testimony might be; is that true, what you might testify about?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That's right.

41. General RUSSELL. And you expressed ignorance?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Definitely.

42. General RUSSELL. Then you got up and left?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Very shortly after that. Primarily Colonel Wyman called me over to see if I could locate a circular letter that he wanted, and during the time I was there in the office General Bragdon spoke to me, in very general terms.

43. General RUSSELL. They were very general terms?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Very general.

44. General RUSSELL. And to what general effect?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Principally cautioning me that, if I was asked questions that I didn't know the answers to, that I could say I didn't know, and just giving me some good advice.

45. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, let's see. The first piece of advice was, if you do not know the answer, say "I didn't know". That's the first piece of advice?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. You knew that already, didn't you?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That's right.

47. General RUSSELL. Do you know why he might have been insisting on your not telling us something that you did not know?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No.

48. General RUSSELL. Then, now, what is the second piece of advice he gave you?

Miss SCHLESINGER. He didn't give me any other advice.

49. General RUSSELL. Let's see. There were but three things [3294] talked about: A letter; the second,

What are you going to be questioned about?

I don't know.

And, third,

If you don't know, tell them you don't know.

That is the whole subject?

Miss SCHLESINGER. The sum and substance of it.

50. General FRANK. There was something else that the witness said. Would you go back and read her former answer, Mr. Reporter? (The record was read by the reporter, as above recorded.)

51. General RUSSELL. What good advice, now, was given you?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Well, I considered their telling me that if I didn't know the answers, that I didn't—I should say I didn't know, and that I would get the information if possible and furnish it to the Board later.

52. General RUSSELL. Did you get the impression that your adviser was attempting to convey to you the impression that it wouldn't be particularly bad if you didn't know a lot down here before this Board?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No, I did not.

53. General RUSSELL. You did not get that impression?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Definitely not.

54. General RUSSELL. Now let's see about the Rohl heart attack. What were the symptoms of that heart attack, as you recall it?

Miss SCHLESINGER. He put his hand over his heart, and he moaned and leaned back in the chair.

55. General RUSSELL. How long did that go on?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I left in about two or three minutes. Mr. Middleton stayed there with him.

56. General RUSSELL. Did you find that letter that they were [3295] looking for over there?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No.

57. General RUSSELL. Was that letter in that office where they were?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Not the circular letter that they were looking for.

58. General RUSSELL. Were there any files in that office at all, file cases in that office?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I think not.

59. General RUSSELL. Was there any reason for them to send for you to come into that room to look for that letter, circular letter?

Miss SCHLESINGER. The reason was, Colonel Wyman wanted to describe to me what the circular was, and see if I could locate it somewhere among the records at the Engineer Office.

60. General RUSSELL. What was this circular letter that he wanted?

Miss SCHLESINGER. A circular letter that came out in July or August, probably, of 1940, covering awards of contracts on a negotiated or cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis, and indicating the respective areas in which contracts would be awarded, that is, from which contractors would be selected for work in certain locations; in other words, that the country had been divided up into certain areas and that Honolulu, for example, would be required to pick its contractors from a certain geographical region.

61. General RUSSELL. Did that embrace any part of the West Coast of the United States?

Miss SCHLESINGER. From his description, it embraced the entire United States.

[3296] 62. General RUSSELL. Did you find that letter?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No, not yet.

63. General RUSSELL. Are you continuing to look for it?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I think there are several people on the track of it.

64. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

65. General GRUNERT. Did you ever know of the existence of such a circular letter?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I have never read the one that he referred to specifically.

66. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, Miss Schlesinger, this heart attack of Mr. Rohl was brought on by drinking, in your opinion, was it not?

Miss SCHLESINGER. In my opinion, yes.

67. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you had seen him consume and imbibe enough to think that the heart attack was the result of drinking?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Well, possibly not just when I was there, but I was under the impression that there had been some drinking going on before I got there.

68. Major CLAUSEN. What gave you that impression about Mr. Rohl?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Possibly reputation more than anything.

69. Major CLAUSEN. And that was what, Miss Schlesinger?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Well, I don't suppose that going on hearsay and reputation is very good testimony, is it, here?

70. Major CLAUSEN. We collect all kinds. We have had all kinds. Miss SCHLESINGER. I have heard that he did drink.

[3297] 71. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, he was reputed to be a confirmed drunkard, wasn't he?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That I don't know.

[3298] 72. Major CLAUSEN. Now, what about Colonel Wyman—you have seen him drunk, on occasion?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No, I didn't. Colonel Wyman did not associate with his employees, normally.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Miss Schlesinger, why did you hesitate between my question and your answer for such a long time?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I was trying to recall whether I had ever seen him drink.

74. Major CLAUSEN. I am going to read a portion of your testimony, given to Colonel Hunt, and ask you if you gave this testimony. It is on page 441:

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report:)

Question. Did you ever attend any social function at which Mr. Rohl was present?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Did you ever see him drunk?

Answer: Yes.

You gave that testimony?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That's right.

75. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

Miss SCHLESINGER. I believe I changed that later. Isn't there something farther down in there?

76. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, you have. You say, here, in another answer, concerning a question as to whether Colonel Wyman was present, that

it all depends on what you call "drunk,"

and then they say to you,

Mr. Rohl's idea of somebody being drunk is somebody that is so intoxicated that he can't stand up.

So they ask you if that is your definition of being drunk.

[3299] Miss SCHLESINGER. No, but I think I changed my testimony about Mr. Rohl, to bring out the point about the heart attack, a little bit later in my own testimony.

77. Major CLAUSEN. Oh, yes; you say here, at lines 30 and 31:

(Excerpt from Colonel Hunt's report:)

I just recall that one night he possibly had a heart attack brought on by drinking.

That is all.

78. General RUSSELL. When had you seen that testimony, Miss Schlesinger?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Well, I gave it.

79. General RUSSELL. How long ago?

Miss SCHLESINGER. And it has been quite a number of months ago; I have forgotten.

80. General RUSSELL. And you have not seen it recently?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes.

81. General RUSSELL. Last week?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No, I haven't seen it within, oh, three or four months. I did see it when the report was sent out here.

82. General RUSSELL. Now, do you think, if you would hesitate just a little minute, that you could remember some more of the good advice General Bragdon gave you, Monday afternoon?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes; I can remember one more thing, now.

83. General RUSSELL. What is it?

Miss SCHLESINGER. He told me, if the Board asked me if they had talked to me, that I was perfectly at liberty to say that they had.

84. General RUSSELL. That is all.

[3300] 85. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask this young lady a question; may I?

86. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

87. Colonel TOULMIN. When General Bragdon was kind enough to give you this advice, as I understood your testimony he said that if you didn't know, to say you didn't know but you would look up the information and get it; is that right?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That is right.

88. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you make an arrangement that you would report to him what information was asked for?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No, I did not.

89. Colonel TOULMIN. Did he offer to help you get the information?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No.

90. Colonel TOULMIN. Did he offer to have any of the organization over there, Colonel Wyman or Major Lozier or Major Powell, help you get the information?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No.

91. Colonel TOULMIN. Then what was the purpose of his making that suggestion?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Because he knows that I have access to the files there at the office.

92. Colonel TOULMIN. If you had, then why did you need any help by way of advice, if you already knew where to go to get it?

Miss SCHLESINGER. His advice was on my conduct before the Board.

93. Colonel TOULMIN. I see. He was worried about that?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Yes.

94. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

[3301] 95. Major CLAUSEN. If General Bragdon had not told you to tell the Board that he had talked with you, would you have told the Board?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I would have.

96. Major CLAUSEN. The advice then was really unnecessary, was it not?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Apparently so.

97. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

98. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

99. General FRANK. Yes, I have some, I would like to ask.

100. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

101. General FRANK. What was your position in the beginning of 1941?

Miss SCHLESINGER. When I came out here in February 1941, I organized a construction-contract section to handle the processing of the contract papers.

102. General FRANK. How long did you hold that?

Miss SCHLESINGER. At the end of about two months, they put a man in charge of the section, and I continued to operate under him.

103. General FRANK. And then?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I think that man lasted about—I am estimating now—six months, and he was transferred to another job, and they put another man in charge of the section, who remained in charge until Colonel Wyman left, and then I was given charge of the section again.

104. General FRANK. After Colonel Wyman left?

Miss SCHLESINGER. That's right.

105. General FRANK. You never were his secretary then, were you?

[3302] Miss SCHLESINGER. Never.

106. General FRANK. How did it happen that on this night that you saw Rohl with the heart attack, you happened to be asked down to the office to work in the contract section?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I was called down to the Pleasanton Hotel to get out contract documents on more than one occasion.

107. General FRANK. At 11 o'clock at night?

Miss SCHLESINGER. A telephone call, at 9, 9:30, thereabouts, to come down.

108. General FRANK. Did you get any papers that night?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Not that night, that I saw Mr. Rohl with the heart attack, or drunk, whichever it was.

109. General FRANK. Well, whose office was it—Mr. Rohl's office, or Colonel Wyman's office?

Miss SCHLESINGER. We went into Mr. Rohl's quarters that night, not into the office.

110. General FRANK. Was Colonel Wyman there?

Miss SCHLESINGER. No; he had left.

111. General FRANK. Did you get contracts out for Mr. Rohl, when he had called for them?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I never got contracts out for Mr. Rohl. I wasn't working for him.

112. General FRANK. Who sent for you this night?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Colonel Robinson called me; or, I believe he had somebody call me.

113. General FRANK. Was he there?

Miss SCHLESINGER. He was; yes.

114. General FRANK. Did he give you any duty?

Miss SCHLESINGER. Not that night.

115. General FRANK. That is all.

[3303] 116. Colonel TOULMIN. What contracts were they you were asked for?

Miss SCHLESINGER. You mean the times that I came down?

117. Colonel TOULMIN. No, the night you went down there; what contracts did he say he wanted you to get?

Miss SCHLESINGER. None whatsoever.

118. Colonel TOULMIN. You just went down there to get out contracts, is that right?

Miss SCHLESINGER. When the telephone call came, it was just simply a request that I come down to the Pleasanton, and as that had happened before, I thought I was going down to work.

119. Colonel TOULMIN. But you did not work?

Miss SCHLESINGER. I did not do any work; no.

120. Colonel TOULMIN. All right, that is all.

121. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

122. Major CLAUSEN. No.

123. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else you want to tell the Board? You have an opportunity, now, to get anything off of your chest or your mind, or whatnot, that you may want to inform the Board.

Miss SCHLESINGER. I don't think of anything.

124. General GRUNERT. I wish the Recorder would caution the witness, before the Board.

(Witness admonished.)

125. Colonel WEST. Yes, I will do that.

Miss Schlesinger, as these proceedings are confidential, it is required that you do not discuss with anyone, after you leave, any testimony given by you, or anything which took place here, while you were here, this afternoon. Are you fully aware of that requirement?

[3304] Miss SCHLESINGER. I am, now.

126. Colonel WEST. And you understand that nothing is to be discussed, with anyone?

127. General GRUNERT. Very well. Thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the above admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

**TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. ROBERT W. HAIN, GENERAL STAFF CORPS,
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. A. F. P. O., FT. SHAFTER, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel HAIN. Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Hain, General Staff Corps, Headquarters, U. S. A. F. P. O.; Ft. Shafter, T. H.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, I believe you are here at the request of a Member of the Board, to identify some documents, so he will lead you to those identifications.

3. General RUSSELL. I furnished you with a memorandum, requesting the production of certain documents from the Adjutant General's files of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

4. General RUSSELL. Later, I requested you to reply to that memorandum, telling me what documents you had found, and those that you had not been able to find?

Colonel HAIN. I have the endorsement written up on that, but I have not gotten it down here. I forgot to bring it with me, sir.

5. General RUSSELL. But it will be brought down?

[3305] Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

6. General RUSSELL. I wonder if you could make available to me, first, the personal file of General Short. Could you find in that, right

readily, Colonel, a memorandum or a message from the Navy, dated October 16, 1940?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir; I have it, here.

7. General RUSSELL. You have just handed me a file, described as "AG201, Short, Walter C. (Gen. O.)"?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

8. General RUSSELL. All of these documents which you give me have been taken from the Adjutant General's files of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel HAIN. That is correct.

9. General RUSSELL. These are official files, are they, Colonel?

Colonel HAIN. That is correct.

10. General RUSSELL. Here is the memorandum which is contained in the General Short file, just described, and which is headed, "Note for Commanding General, Hawaiian Department." I will read:

(Memorandum or message from the Navy, October 16, 1940:)

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you:

I wonder if you would read that to the Recorder, if you will, please, sir.

Colonel HAIN (reading):

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which [3306] will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

11. General GRUNERT. It is signed by whom?

Colonel HAIN. It is not signed, sir. It is on a U. S. Naval Communications service blank, and at the bottom it states:

Originator	OPNAV
Action	CINCLANT
	CINCPAC
	CINCAF

12. General GRUNERT. It is presumably outcoming from the Chief of Naval Operations. Does that "OPNAV", there, mean that?

Colonel HAIN. That is correct, sir.

13. General RUSSELL. Colonel Hain, I show you another file, a secret file taken from the Office of the Adjutant General, which is described as "HHD AG 091 JAPAN, BINDER NO. 1." In that there is another message, which seems to have come to the Commanding General from the Adjutant General of the Army. Will you read that, giving its dates, and so forth?

Colonel HAIN. This is a secret radiogram, headed "Washington, D. C., 12:34 p. m., October 20, 1941":

[3307] (Secret radiogram, headed "Washington, D. C., 12:30 PM, October 20, 1941":)

Following War Dept Estimate of Japanese situation for your information STOP Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

(Signed) ADAMS.
1087A.

14. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I show you, from the same file as that from which you have just read, another message, which was signed by the Chief of Staff, to the Commanding General, and ask you to identify that message.

15. General GRUNERT. I would like to ask whether it was signed by the Chief of Staff, or whether his name was appended to said message?

16. General RUSSELL. There may be a very technical difference; I do not know.

17. General GRUNERT. But the Chief of Staff's name appears on that message?

18. General RUSSELL. On the message; yes.

(Secret radiogram, dated Washington, D. C., Nov. 27, 1941:)

Colonel HAIN. This is a secret radiogram,

War Priority, Washington, D. C., 6:11 p. m., November 27, 1941; O. G. Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H., 472 27th:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue STOP Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment STOP If hostilities [3308] cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act STOP This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense STOP Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent STOP Report measures taken STOP Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan STOP Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

(Signed) MARSHALL.
116P/27.

[3309] 19. General RUSSELL. Now, is there anything on the records here which indicates the time that this message was received, Colonel?

Colonel HAIN. The only indication here which would indicate the time of receipt is that it was decoded at 2:22 p. m. November 27, 1941.

20. General RUSSELL. Is that the time that the decoding of the message was completed?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

21. General RUSSELL. In that connection, Colonel, I call your attention to a radiogram which apparently was sent by General Short, referring to that telegram, and ask you to read that into the record and tell us if there is indicated on it what time it was dispatched from the Hawaiian Department.

Colonel HAIN. This radiogram No. 959-27, dated 27 November, 1941, to the Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.:

(Radiogram No. 959-27, dated November 27, 1941, to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, from Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

Radiogram 472 to C/S, 27 Nov. 41 1-27.

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.

Signed "Short".

This message was encoded at 5:40 p. m., 27 November, 1941. There is nothing on here that indicates what time it was transmitted.

22. General RUSSELL. I did not recall this one when I was examining the records with you, but do you have any records which might indicate the time that that message was sent to the Signal people for encoding?

[3310] Colonel HAIN. I know of no record.

23. General RUSSELL. What does this "5:40" indicate? That the encoding of the message had been completed at that hour?

Colonel HAIN. That is correct, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. In other words, it was ready to go at 5:40?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

25. General RUSSELL. Do you know with a message of that length how long would be required to encode it after it was delivered to the Signal people?

Colonel HAIN. No, sir, I am not familiar with that.

26. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I call your attention to another file which you brought to the Board in response to the notice referred to before. It seems to be HHD AG 384-4, Espionage. I call your attention to a message in that file and ask you if you will be good enough to read that into the record.

Colonel HAIN. This is secret radiogram 114 War KR 189 WD Priority.

WASHINGTON, D. C., 8 42 P, Nov. 28, 1941.

CG, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

Fort Shafter, T. H.:

482-28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three MID SC thirty—dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of you establishments comma property comma and equipment [3311] against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

And that is signed "Adams" and it was decoded at 10:55 p. m. November 28th, 1941.

27. General RUSSELL. To complete the record, do you have a copy of any reply which was made to that radiogram which you have just read, in your records?

Colonel HAIN. I have a reply to that radiogram which I just read.

28. General RUSSELL. Would you read it to the Board, please.

Colonel HAIN. This is a radiogram: SECRET, PRIORITY, dated 29 November, 1941. It was sent as radiogram No. 986-29th to the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.:

Attention your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June [3312] nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the Organic Act which provides comma in effect, comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insur-

rection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest national defense stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop Relations with F. B. I. and all other federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters period

That is signed "Short" and was encoded at 2:45 p. m. 29 November, 1941.

[3313] 29. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I show you a file from the Adjutant General's office, Hawaiian Department, AG 370.2, in which a message from the Chief of Staff to the Hawaiian Department, dated December 7, appears. Will you please read that message to the Board?

Colonel HAIN. This is a secret radiogram, 1549 WS Washington, D. C. 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 12 18 P, to the CG, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication period

That is signed "Marshall". Decoded at 2:51 p. m. December 7, 1941.

30. General RUSSELL. Is that 2:51 Hawaiian time?

Colonel HAIN. That is local time, Hawaiian time.

31. General RUSSELL. Could you refer to that radiogram and tell the time that it was dispatched from Washington?

Colonel HAIN. This shows it as being dispatched from Washington at 12:18 p. m., December 7th, 1941.

32. General RUSSELL. Are you familiar enough with the differentiation in time here and in Washington to tell us what time in Honolulu it was when it was 12:18 p. m. in Washington?

Colonel HAIN. I do not recall whether the time differential was the same then as it is now, but if it was the same it would have been—by a rapid calculation I make it 7:43. I may be wrong. 7:42, something like that.

[3314] 33. General RUSSELL. That is about the time of the attack?

Colonel HAIN. A. M.

34. General RUSSELL. In connection with the last message which you have read to the Board, will you please state whether or not on the 9th of December there was received a message from the War Department requesting information on the message of December 7th, 1941?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir. This message I have here is headed "P 3 War L 54 WD 1 Extra Urgent".

1718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WASHINGTON, D. C., 2 19 P, December 9, 1941.

CG, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.:

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received period

That is signed "Colton Acting".

35. General RUSSELL. You do not know who Colton was?

Colonel HAIN. I believe he was Chief of the Signal Corps.

36. General RUSSELL. Have you any record to indicate what reply was made to that message, Colonel?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, I have a radio here.

Secret Extra Urgent Radiogram Number 1087-9th.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,

Washington, D. C.:

Re your five four nine radio five two nine received Honolulu by RCA seven thirty three morning seventh Stop [3315] This message delivered Signal Office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Headquarters Hawaiian Department two fifty eight afternoon seventh period

That is signed "Short", and reported as "Secret Extra Urgent 315 pm December 9, 1941."

37. General RUSSELL. I hand you a radiogram dated November 27, 1941, purporting to be sent from G-2, General Miles, at Washington, to G-2 Hawaiian Department, and ask you if you will read that to the Board?

Colonel HAIN. It is a secret radiogram and reads:

P 2 WAR WD Priority.

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 27, 1941.

G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

473-27th Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate Stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only

MILER.
144PM.

And over here in pencil are some other markings. It is marked To AG-file. Noted C/S 11/27/41 WCP", with a stamp "Walter C. Phillips," Colonel GAC, Chief of Staff.

This message I just read was decoded at 4 p. m. 27 November 1941.

38. General RUSSELL. May I ask a question or two on these SOP [3316] to clear it up?

Colonel, you have recently made a search of the records of the Hawaiian Department for the purpose of determining whether or not the SOP of that Department of November 5, 1941 had been received in the War Department, is that true?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

39. General RUSSELL. Did you discover, or not, any letter of transmittal of that SOP of November 5th to the War Department?

Colonel HAIN. No, sir. I discovered no such letter of transmittal.

40. General RUSSELL. What, if anything, did your investigation disclose as to that SOP of November 5th having been sent to the War Department?

Colonel HAIN. The only record which I found on the publication of the SOP separately was in the routing slip correspondence in the unclassified section of the Adjutant General. It merely shows this SOP as having been published by the A. G. on November 8th, 1941.

41. General FRANK. What A. G.?

Colonel HAIN. The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, on November 8th, 1941, but there is no distribution whatever shown. I find no record of that.

42. General RUSSELL. In the normal course of things in the Adjutant General's office or in its normal procedure would there have been a letter of transmittal of these SOPs to the War Department?

Colonel HAIN. I am not familiar enough with the Adjutant General's Department, sir, to give an answer to that.

43. General RUSSELL. Would you get this man Earl in readiness [3317] so at an opportune moment we may call him down here and question him on the distribution of those SOPs?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

44. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, I want to ask you a few questions about the records touching the alert of 1940. I show you the Adjutant General's file 354.2, Special Maneuver File-1940, and call your attention to a radiogram from the War Department, and ask that you identify that and read it to the Board and into the record.

Colonel HAIN. This is a secret radiogram:

20 WVY AB 89 WD Priority.

WASHINGTON, D. C., 11 4 P, June 17, 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.

Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

Four two eight seventeenth Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible transpacific raid comma to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents stop Suggest maneuver basis maintain alert until further orders Stop Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly stop Acknowledge Stop

ADAMS.
9 15 A.

[3318] 45. General RUSSELL. Have you a reply of General Heron's to that message which ordered the alert of June 17, 1940?

Colonel HAIN. I have here, in the handwriting of someone, a message—

46. General RUSSELL. Cable sent 11:30.

Colonel HAIN. Cablegram sent 11:30 p. m., June 17-40, and it is marked, "#1-17th, Secret."

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Chief of Staff:

All antiaircraft observation and security detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in defense of any essential installation Stop Some local interest in ammunition issue but no excitement Stop Navy inshore and offshore air patrol in operation.

HERRON.

47. General RUSSELL. Do you have another message there relating to this same alert, from the War Department?

1720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Colonel HAIN. I have here a secret radiogram headed:

23 War Jr 123 WD.

WASHINGTON, D. C., 658 PM, June 19, 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

Fort Shafter, T. H.:

Four three four nineteenth Concerning your one eight four eight June eighteenth period You are authorized to modify gradually measures ordered in our four two eight but adequate guards on a semipermanent basis will be maintained at all [3319] critical points period Guard detachments may be rotated at your discretion period In view of above resubmit your request for funds with concise explanation as to their application under each appropriation subhead period Every effort should be made to avoid publicity and to place maintenance of alert as modified herein on strictly a training basis period Acknowledge

Signed "Adams 241 PM".

48. General RUSSELL. When does that file show something else was sent from the Hawaiian Department to the War Department on this alert of 1940?

Colonel HAIN. A cablegram sent at 6:20 p. m., June 19, 1940, marked, "#2—19th, Secret," reads as follows:

CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT—cable code

Yours of — acknowledged:

Then crossed out but I can still read it:

Alert continues without incident.

That whole sentence is crossed out.

Stop Full aircraft and anti-aircraft precautions will be continued with easing in other lines Stop Local publicity on maneuvers favorable and not excited.

49. General RUSSELL. That is right interesting. Here is a radiogram from General Herron touching the relation of the Navy to that alert of 1940. Will you read that to the Board and into the record?

Colonel HAIN. This is cablegram, secret, marked, "#3 21st June," to "Chief of Staff W. D.":

In interpreting your cables consideration is [3320] given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding alert Stop Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement Stop Will not modify Army air and anti-air alert before Monday except on further advice from you.

Signed "Herron."

50. General RUSSELL. What is the date of that? 21?

Colonel HAIN. 21 June 1940.

51. General RUSSELL. Well, did the Chief of Staff reply to that message relating to the alert?

Colonel HAIN. I have a secret cablegram, Washington, D. C., 11:20 a. m., June 22, 1940, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu:

One 22nd reference to your number three June 21st in view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local naval forces have not been determined continue your alert in accordance with modifications directed in our 434.

Signed, "Marshall."

52. General RUSSELL. That was what date?

Colonel HAIN. That was the 22nd of June.

53. General RUSSELL. Did General Herron send a cablegram to Washington on the 1st of July?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

54. General RUSSELL. Would you read that cablegram into the record?

Colonel HAIN. This is a cable marked, "4—1st," was encoded at 8:40 a. m., July 1, 1940, and marked, "Transmitted [3321] 10:30 a. m., July 1, 1940":

Cable code to Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. Alert on two weeks today. All quiet locally. No ill effects on command except cumulative hours on plane engines and impaired overhaul facilities due to move from Ford Island.

Signed, "Herron."

55. General RUSSELL. Was there any response to this?

Did Herron send another radiogram to the War Department on the 8th of July about the conditions of the alert?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir. I have a cable here marked No. 5, the 8th of July. It is marked in handwriting, "Cable code to Chief of Staff 7-8-40 1:00 P. M.":

Three weeks of alert completed today with no unfavorable reactions on personnel but a good deal of wear on motor transportation. Stop No developments in local situation

Signed, "Herron."

56. General RUSSELL. I show you a radiogram of July, apparently July 10th, from the Chief of Staff to General Herron. Does it relate to this same alert of 1940?

Colonel HAIN. Yes.

57. General RUSSELL. Will you read that into the record?

Colonel HAIN. This is a secret cablegram:

WASHINGTON, D. C., 2:45 PM, 10 July 1940.

COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

Honolulu:

Two tenth can you not avoid undue wear on [3322] motor transportation by putting present alert stations on a permanent basis without unfavorable reaction on convenience or morale or personnel question If this meets your approval submit an estimate for the necessary construction of temporary types as to your shortage of transportation It is expected that one and one half ton types will be delivered by October first and other types by December first 1940 These vehicles will be placed at ports of embarkation and shipped as rapidly thereafter as transport space permits period This in reply to your cablegram number five

Signed, "Marshall."

I have one from Herron to Marshall on the 15th of July. You want that one?

58. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel HAIN. Cablegram marked No. 6—15th, cable code to Chief of Staff, War Department, dated 7-15-40:

Alert entering fifth week. Stop As now conducted is without undue strain on personnel or materiel including motors Stop New construction unnecessary Stop Navy continues cooperation by outer aerial patrol.

Signed "Herron."

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59. General RUSSELL. Any reply to that radiogram?

Colonel HAIN. Reply to that is a secret cablegram:

RE 29 WASHINGTON, D. C., USG 55/54 3.10 PM, 16 July 40.
COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT:

[3323] Three sixteenth of our number six you are authorized at your discretion to relax alert provisions except that first comma precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness and second comma aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice

Signed, "Marshall".

60. General RUSSELL. What is the date of that?

Colonel HAIN. 16 July.

61. General GRUNERT. The Board will take a five-minute recess.
(There was a brief informal recess.)

[3324] 62. General GRUNERT. All right; you may proceed. You can finish in half an hour, can't you?

63. General RUSSELL. I am going to let Colonel Toulmin put in the part of the orders which he has had a chance to check there, which he desires be made a part of the record; and so far as I am concerned I don't know that there is anything else that I have.

64. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. There is Field Order Number 1 (Mission Orders); Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, under date of 2 November '40, consisting of pages 1 to 8, inclusive. The record should show that the administrative annexes to this order are omitted because of their volume and lack of immediate pertinency. If the Board is agreeable, the reporter could copy this and leave the original document in the possession of the Department.

65. General GRUNERT. So be it.

(Field Order Number 1 (Mission Orders) is as follows:)

Secret
OPERATIONS ORDERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FIELD ORDERS
No. 1

SECRET
War Plans Section
Auth: C.G., Haw. Dept.
2 Nov. 40 R.C.T.
(Date) (AC of S, G-3)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,

(Date) (Hour)

Date and hour this Field Order becomes effective will be announced by orders from this headquarters.

[3325] MAPS: Topographic, Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (1940 Edition); Terrain Map, Island of Oahu, 1/20,000 (1940 Edition); Island of Oahu, 1/180,000 (1939 Edition); Hawaiian Islands, Eastern Part U. S. C&G.S. Chart No. 4102.

1. a. For information of the enemy see Current Summaries of Intelligence.

b. (1) The Army forces and the 14th Naval District, with attached U. S. Fleet units, are charged within the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and the Coastal Zone thereof with the joint mission of holding OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base and of controlling and protecting shipping in the Coastal Zone. The Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as are required for the defense of Oahu.

(2) The 14th Naval District with attached U. S. Fleet units, personnel, matériel and installations, will patrol the Coastal Zone, control and protect shipping therein and support the Army forces. It will protect all facilities and installations of the 14th Naval District against sabotage. For details of organization and Execution of Mission, see Annex No. 7, Naval Operations.

(3) For details of separate tasks, see paragraph 14-15, Section IV, JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER PLAN—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT (HCF 39).

2. a. The Hawaiian Department, supported by the 14th Naval District and such elements of the U. S. Fleet as may be available, will hold at all costs OAHU as a main outlying Naval Base, against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, by:

[3326] (1) Concentrating on OAHU a highly mobile defense of all arms, held in readiness to repulse any and all forms of attack, to suppress local uprisings, and to prevent sabotage.

(2) Establishing on the main outlying islands military and civil organizations and minimum defense to develop, control and utilize the military resources of those islands and to protect such areas and installations therein as are essential to the defense of OAHU.

b. The Hawaiian Department, in addition, will support the Naval forces.

c. **TROOPS:**

(1) *Beach and Land Defense Forces:*

Commanding General: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Division.

Troops: The Hawaiian Division—

(Less elements of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment manning 155mm armament (under tactical control of Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade), 3d Engineers (less 1st Battalion), Det 11th Ordnance Company (maintenance), Companies "A" and "B", 11th Quartermaster Regiment).

298th Infantry, Hawaii National Guard; Company "A" (less 1 platoon) 1st Separate Chemical Battalion.

72d Separate Quartermaster Company (Bakery).

[3327] 23d Quartermaster Company (Sep) (L. M.) Station Hospital, Schofield Barracks; Bakers and Cooks School, Farriers and Horseshoers School, Post Detachments, Schofield Barracks (less Ordnance personnel).

(2) *Seacoast and Antiaircraft Defense Forces:*

Commanding General: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

Troops: The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

Initially, elements of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment to man two

(2) 155mm GPF batteries, plus the required command supply and communication personnel for said batteries and selected personnel to augment specified Groupment headquarters.

Post Detachments:

FORT SHAFTER (64th CA (AA)).

FORT RUGER.

FORT DERUSSY.

FORT KAMEHAMEHA.

(All less Ordnance personnel.)

(3) *Hawaiian Air Force:*

Commanding General: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

Troops: Hawaiian Air Force (less 86th Observation Sq.), 18th Bombardment Wing (H), 58th Bomb. Sq. (1), 14th Pursuit Wing, 19th Trans. Sq., 17th AB Gp. (R), 18th AB Gp. (R), Post Detachments, Hickam and Wheeler Fields.

[3328] (4) *Department Observation Aviation:*

Commander: The Commanding Officer, 86th Observation Squadron.

Troops: 86th Observation Squadron (C & D).

(5) *Department Engineer Troops:*

Commander: Department Engineer Officer.

Troops: 3d Engineers (less 1st Battalion).

(6) *Department Chemical Troops:*

Commander: Department Chemical Officer.

Troops: Chemical Section, Department Headquarters Detachment.

Hawaiian Chemical Warfare Depot Detachment.

One Platoon, Company "A", 1st Separate Chemical Battalion (initially prior to assignment to Hawaiian Division).

(7) *Department Signal Corps Troops:*

Commander: Department Signal Officer.

Troops: Aircraft Warning Company, Hawaii. 9th Signal Service Company.

(8) *Department Military Police:*

Commander: Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department.

Troops: Military Police Company, Hawaiian Department.

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and 11th Tank Company when released to Provost Marshal by Hawaiian Division.

[3329] (9) *Oahu District, Department Service Command:*

Commander: Commanding Officer, Oahu District, Department Service Command.

Troops: To be determined later.

(10) *Hawaii District, Department Service Command:*

Commander: Commanding Officer, Hawaii District, Department Service Command.

Troops: Camp Detachment, Kilauea Military Camp.

2d Battalion, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard).

Howitzer Company, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard).

Civil organization.

(11) *Maui District, Department Service Command:*

Commander: Commanding Officer, Maui District, Department Service Command.

Troops: 1st Battalion, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard).

Company K, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard).

Civil organization.

(12) *Kauai District, Department Service Command:*

Commander: Commanding Officer, Kauai District, Department Service Command.

Troops: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 299th Infantry (Hawaii National Guard).

[3330] 3d Battalion, 299th Infantry (less companies K and L) (Hawaii National Guard).

Civil organization.

3. a. The Hawaiian Division will defend OAHU against air, naval and landing attacks and/or raids, and in addition thereto, will

(1) Protect all vital installations on OAHU against enemy sympathizers (including command and fire control cable system), except those located within Police District No. 1, City and County of HONOLULU, or on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations not under the control of the Division Commander and all observation and fire control stations of the seacoast and antiaircraft artillery defenses.

(2) Protect Hickam Field and Wheeler Field from raids by hostile sympathizers outside those reservations.

(3) Be prepared to exercise Police Control of persons on OAHU, except within Police District No. 1, City and County of HONOLULU and within garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations not under the control of the Division Commander, when so directed by the Department Commander.

(4) Regulate military traffic and circulation on OAHU, exclusive of the area AIEA JUNCTION-NUUANU PALI MAKAPUU HEAD.

(5) Furnish on call direct from Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the following troops:

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.

11th Tank Company.

b. The Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade will defend OAHU against attacks by aircraft, surface vessels and submarines and, in addition thereto, will

(1) Support the Beach and Land Defense Forces.

[3331] (2) Support Naval forces within the range of seacoast armament.

(3) Protect all vital installations on Army Reservations garrisoned by elements of the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade and all observation and fire control stations of the seacoast and antiaircraft defenses.

(4) Cooperate with Army and Navy Air forces in safeguarding friendly aircraft from fire of antiaircraft artillery troops.

(5) Coordinate the operations of all antiaircrafts and seacoast intelligence agencies and will take such action as is necessary to coordinate the seacoast defense with operations of the Inshore Patrol.

c. The Hawaiian Air Force will defend OAHU against attacks by aircraft, Naval vessels, expeditionary forces, and, in furtherance thereof, will conduct operations as follows:

(1) *Offensive Action.* Conduct air operations against hostile naval, air, and expeditionary forces.

(2) *Defensive action.* Reinforced by available ground forces, defend air stations, bases, and auxiliary fields on OAHU against air attack and sabotage. Provide antiaircraft machine gun defense for air planes on ground on all fields.

(3) *Reconnaissance.* Conduct reconnaissance essential to the combat efficiency of the Air Force and to supplement that of naval air forces in securing information of hostile fleet movements.

(4) *Cooperation.* In carrying out the above operations the Hawaiian Air Force may conduct independent [3332] operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under direction of the naval air force commander, as provided in Chapter 2, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of OAHU. Air Corps base detachments stationed at air fields on the outlying islands will cooperate with local ground forces in the defense of these fields.

d. The 86th Observation Squadron (C&D) will support the defense of OAHU, furnishing observation, liaison, and photographic missions for all echelons of the Command. Requests for missions will be received, coordinated and assigned by this headquarters. The Commanding Officer, 86th Observation Squadron will report to the Department Commander and will arrange for liaison and direct communication between this headquarters and the 86th Observation Squadron.

e. The Department Engineer, with such troops and labor as are assigned under Department control, will assist the Operations of the field forces by means of engineering works. For initial tasks see Annex IV, Engineer Plan, to Administrative Orders No. 1, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

f. The Department Chemical Officer is charged with the general planning, preparation for, and technical supervision of the use of chemicals, and with such troops as are assigned under Department control will execute the tasks as listed in Annex No. 4, Chemicals. For details relative to use of chemicals, see Annex No. 4, Chemicals.

g. The Department Signal Officer, with such troops and [3233] labor as are under Department control will operate the Department Aircraft Warning Service and will install, maintain and operate all Signal Communication Agencies under Department Control.

h. The Department Provost Marshal, in addition to his normal duties, will—

(1) Protect all vital installations within Police District No. 1, City and County of HONOLULU, exclusive of those located on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations.

(2) Communicate directly with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, when necessary to secure the reinforcements indicated in paragraph 3 a (5), above.

(3) Regulate military traffic and circulation within the area, AIEA JUNCTION-NUUANU PALI-MAKAPUU HEAD.

(4) Exercise such jurisdiction and supervision over all Military Police Forces within the Hawaiian Department as may be necessary to secure prompt action and coordinated effort in accordance with the instructions of the Department Commander.

(5) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions, including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas, when so directed by the Department Commander.

(6) Perform such additional duties as are indicated in Annex No. 5, Provost Marshal, attached hereto.

i. The Oahu District, Department Service Command, will be prepared to carry out its functions and duties as prescribed in the Mobilization Plan, H.D., and establish upon notice from this headquarters the following:

[3334] (1) A labor Procurement Service.

(2) A Food Administration.

j. The Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai Districts, Department Service Command, will carry out their functions and duties as prescribed in the Mobilization Plan, Hawaiian Department, prevent and suppress sabotage and civil disorders, protect loyal citizens, assist naval elements in protection of local installations, and delay and harass operations by an external enemy. Assisted by the Air Corps detachments stationed thereon, defend military airfields against acts of sabotage and raids by small hostile forces, paying particular attention to the defense of MORSE FIELD, BURNS FIELD, AND BARKING SANDS.

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k. In addition to his normal G-2 functions, the Department G-2 will—

(1) Establish a counterespionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend or thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Provost Marshal, with a view to:

(a) Furnishing the Provost Marshal with all information gained through the counterespionage service, of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

(b) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Provost Marshal [3335-3336] through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

(2) Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

(3) Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

x. (1) For Doctrines and Principles of the Defense see Part II, Operations Orders.

(2) For details concerning defense against hostile sympathizers, see Part II, Operations Orders, Annex No. 2, Intelligence, and Annex No. 5, Provost Marshal.

(3) All major units of the defense will cooperate with the 14th Naval District and with elements of the U. S. Fleet in all spheres of action compatible with their missions, armament, and equipment.

(4) For details as to use of Chemicals, see Annex No. 4, Chemicals.

(5) Elements of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment initially assigned to sea-coast defense missions under the tactical command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, will revert to the control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, upon orders from Department Headquarters.

4. See Administrative Orders No. 1, Hawaiian Department.

5. a. See Annex No. 3, Signal Communications.

b. Command Posts:

Hawaiian Department,

Forward Echelon, ALIAMANU.

Rear Echelon, FORT SHAFTER.

[3337-3338] Hawaiian Division,

Forward Echelon, WAIKAKALAUA GULCH, (98.3-92.2).

Rear Echelon, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade,

Forward Echelon, ALIAMANU.

Rear Echelon, FORT DERUSSY.

Hawaiian Fir Force,

Forward Echelon, ALIAMANU.

Rear Echelon, FORT SHAFTER.

Fourteenth Naval District,

PEARL HARBOR.

District Service Commands:

Oahu District, HONOLULU.

Hawaii District, HILO.

Maui District, WAILUKU.

Kauai District, LIHUE.

By command of Lieutenant General HERRON;

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

R. C. THROCKMORTON.

Lieut. Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Annexes:

No. 1, Operations Map.

No. 2, Intelligence.

No. 3, Signal Communications.

No. 4, Chemicals.

No. 5, Provost Marshal.

No. 6, Search of Alien Communities.

No. 7, Naval Operations.

[3339] Distribution	Copy No.
Custodian	
H.D., AG-----	1-3, 7-8, 11
G-2-----	4
G-3-----	5-6
G-4-----	9
Air O-----	13
Dept. Engr-----	14
C. G., Haw. Div-----	22-27
C. G., HSCAB-----	30-35
C. G., Haw. Air Force-----	38-42
Comdt., 14th Naval District-----	45
WPD, WD, Washington, D. C.-----	52

[3340] 66. General RUSSELL. I have here, on the subject of sabotage from the standpoint of the airforces, a special report that was prepared by Burwell. I am attempting to find out what he had to do with it now: H. S. Burwell, Colonel, Air Corps, Special Inspector. It touches this subject of sabotage as it was viewed by the Air Corps at the time, under date of 9th of July, 1941.

I will ask you, Colonel, to read this paragraph two, estimate of the situation.

Colonel HAIN. Paragraph two:

Estimate of the Situation:

a. In respect to the need for increased security for aircraft, supplies and installations, the undersigned has found from the viewpoint of the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department, Hawaiian Air Force, and Hickam Field, that the prevailing attitude of mind toward the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage does not fully reflect the priority and expressed policy of the responsible officers concerned and therefore must be reported as inadequate.

b. Investigation indicates that a few bold, ruthless and intelligent saboteurs, consisting of inside military operators or civilian employees, could incapacitate Hickam Field or a similar large post on any predetermined night. Also, that the controls now in effect are not and have not been responsible, primarily, for the previous excellent [3341] antisabotage record, but instead that the principal deterrents have resided in the fact that no lone agent or single fanatic has been operating on his own, while in the meantime no organized plan of concerted sabotage has as yet been ordered—

and the words, "as yet been ordered" are underscored.

or contrawise, that orders, without doubt are in effect forbidding premature acts of sabotage. In connection with the growing local union labor problem and the indication of the F. B. I., it should be taken for granted that Germany has prepared a subversive plan of action for Hawaii, similar to her invariable custom, although the existence of the plan may not have been discovered.

c. In view of the precipitous world events that have occurred subsequent to the recently declared unlimited emergency, and to the crucial test now confronting Germany in her war with Russia, it is found that a considerable portion of the command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theatres of war and our local sphere of action.

(1) Hence, the probability of a local reaction in the form of a quick movement order by the War Department, at the behest of the Navy, of heavy reinforcements from the mainland, or vice versa, of quick movement of all heavy bombardment from Hawaii to Panama or to Manila when land bases are prepared on Midway, Wake and Guam, has not been [3342] deduced from such incipient events as; —

67. General RUSSELL. I was attempting to get the Air Corps estimation on sabotage, which I just happened to see. Unless other members of the Board are interested in the remainder of the letter, I am not.

68. General GRUNERT. It is sufficient for me.

69. General RUSSELL. Now, off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

70. General RUSSELL. For the record, I am reading some extracts from Adjutant General's file 381. It is paper numbered 76, which is a letter, Rear Admiral Bloch to General Short, in which he discusses, among other things, the cooperation of the Air Forces of the Army and Navy, in which he says that they have had joint practices heretofore; he is certain that these exercises

have been most helpful to all concerned,

and he hopes that they may be continued.

Further,

continuing the quote,

if on certain occasions the Army desires to initiate similar exercises and would like the cooperation of the Navy, I am quite certain that a mutually satisfactory hour and date can be settled upon for such joint exercises.

In the same file are contained, as a part of the records of the Hawaiian Department, the joint agreements for the defense of the Island of Oahu.

I am reading a letter dated May 29, 1941, or the copy of a letter dated that day, from General Short to Admiral Bloch.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: In order that you may be acquainted with the steps taken by my command relative to the sabotage matter which you discussed with Colonel Throckmorton [3343] this morning I desire to inform you that during the holiday and week-end I have increased the guard over important installations, and have arranged for more detailed inspections of the guard during this period. Every attempt will be made not to bring this action into the limelight so that the community as a whole will not be aware of the increased surveillance.

I believe this will be sufficient to handle the situation as far as the Army is concerned.

With kindest personal regards,

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER O. SHORT.

[3344] 71. Colonel TOULMIN. This is a report to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, of August 20, 1941, under the title, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii," signed by General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, together with inclosures, consisting of eight sheets, inclusive of all the papers concerned.

(Study of the air situation in Hawaii is as follows:)

20 August 1941.

Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This

force is so small for the [3345] mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.

3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the Island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan.)

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support of the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft [3346] and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required.

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department which is being reorganized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the differences above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons [3347] as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (s) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the sites selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

Barking Sands-----	2
Morse Field-----	2
Hilo-----	1
Lanai-----	1
Parker Ranch-----	1

9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, an air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.

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12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes [3348] and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls—

Incl #1—Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu (In triplicate).

Incl #2—Personnel Requirement Recapitulation (In triplicate).

Incl #3—Air Force Housing Facilities (In triplicate).

Basic (Ltr HAF, 20 August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii")

AG 381/264 HDP

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., August 1941.

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

I concur in this study.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls (dup).

[3349-3350] *Strength of Hawaiian Air Force (Air Corps Troops Only)*

HICKAM FIELD

Units	Auth	Actual	Over	Short
Hq Haw'n Air Force:				
Hq & Hq Sq, Haw'n Air Force	200	203	3	
19th Transport Sq	161	158		3
Tow Target Det	139	4		135
Total Hq Haw'n Air Force	500	365	3	138
18th Bombardment Wing:				
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing	158	194	36	
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
23rd Bomb Sq (H)	206	219	13	
31st Bomb Sq (H)	206	217	11	
72nd Bomb Sq (H)	206	222	16	
4th Recon Sq (H)	233	238	5	
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (H)	232	237	5	
14th Bomb Sq (H)	206	217	11	
26th Bomb Sq (H)	206	215	9	
42nd Bomb Sq (H)	206	223	17	
50th Recon Sq (H)	233	232		1
Hq & Hq Sq 17th AB Gp (R)	131	216	85	
18th AB Sq	145	259	114	
22nd Mat Sq	203	291	88	
23rd Mat Sq	203	304	101	
58th Bomb Sq (L)	192	223	31	
Air Corps Det., Weather	20	28	8	
Air Corps Det., Communications	20	23	3	
Total 18th Bombardment Wing	3, 238	3, 795	558	1
Total Hickam Field	3, 738	4, 160	561	139

WHEELER FIELD

14th Pursuit Wing:				
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wg	158	142		16
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Gp (F)	204	202		2
45th Pur Sq (F)	175	174		1
46th Pur Sq (F)	175	171		4
47th Pur Sq (F)	175	169		6

[3349-3350] *Strength of Hawaiian Air Force (Air Corps Troops Only)*—Con.

WHEELER FIELD—Continued

Unit	Auth	Actual	Over	Short
[3351-3352] Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Gp (Int).....	204	187	-----	17
6th Pur Sq (Int).....	157	161	4	-----
19th Pur Sq (Int).....	157	155	-----	2
44th Pur Sq (Int).....	157	154	-----	3
78th Pur Sq (Int).....	157	170	13	-----
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Air Base Gp (R).....	131	358	227	-----
17th Air Base Sq.....	145	193	48	-----
24th Mat Sq.....	203	182	-----	21
26th Mat Sq.....	203	137	-----	66
Total 14th Pur Wg and Wheeler Field.....	2, 401	2, 555	292	138

BELLOWS FIELD

86th Obsn Sq (C & D).....	142	141	-----	1
Casual Detachment.....	-----	306	306	-----
Total Bellows Field.....	142	447	306	1
Total Hawaiian Air Force.....	6, 281	7, 162	1, 159	278
Net overage.....	-----	-----	881	-----
Auth. Strength of an Air Base Gp (s) (Hq & Hq Sq-AB Sq-Material Sq).....	479	-----	-----	-----
2 Air Base Groups (s) required.....	958	-----	-----	-----
1—Bellows Field.....	-----	-----	-----	-----
1—16th Pur Gp (f) at new station.....	-----	-----	-----	-----

[3353] *Strength requirements*

216 combat crews (less 70 now present).....	146
180 maintenance crews (less 70 now present).....	110
146 combat crews @ 5 men each.....	730
110 maintenance crews @ 14 men each.....	1,540
2 medium bombardment-torpedo squadrons @ 217 men each.....	434
5 air base squadrons @ 145 men each.....	725
1 observation squadron.....	155
1 dive bomber squadron.....	210
2 air base groups (s).....	958
Total.....	4, 752
Less present over-strength.....	881
Net total requirement.....	3, 871

[3354] *Air Force housing facilities*

Present strength of Air Force personnel.....	7, 192
Increase as result of this study.....	3, 871
Present strength other services.....	1, 500
Projected increase other services (Bellows & Kipapa).....	250
Total.....	12, 813

Housing Available

	Perma- nent	Mobiliza- tion	Total
Hickam Field.....	3, 278	1, 512	4, 790
Wheeler Field.....	1, 537	441	1, 978
Bellows Field.....	-----	1, 008	1, 008
New Air Base 15th Pursuit Group (Kipapa Gulch).....	-----	1, 294	1, 294
Outlying Fields (other islands) now being constructed or projected.....	-----	3, 218	3, 218
Grand Total.....	-----	-----	12, 288
(Difference) Housing to be provided.....	-----	-----	*525

Inclosure #3.

[3355] 72. General GRUNERT. All right. At this point the point the Board goes to other business.

(Whereupon, at 5: 40 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[3356]

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[3357] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 8:30 a. m., pursuant to recess on Wednesday, September 13, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, CHERBOURG BASE SECTION, FRANCE

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel WYMAN. The name is Theodore Wyman, Jr., Colonel, Corps of Engineers. Serial number is O7925. Organization is the Cherbourg Base Section, France, ETO. I am the commanding office of the Cherbourg Base Section.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by [3358] the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, '41, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, and the latter part is largely concerned with construction activities prior to the attack.

Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, has this part of the investigation, so he will propound the questions, and the Board will fill out where it sees fit. General Frank.

3. General FRANK. Where did you start your military career?

Colonel WYMAN. That is, with the United States Army?

4. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Washington, D. C.

5. General FRANK. In what capacity?

Colonel WYMAN. As a graduate of the first training camp, Officers Candidate School, and was commissioned a 1st lieutenant in the Engineer Reserve Section on August 15, 1917.

6. General FRANK. When did you get your regular commission?

Colonel WYMAN. After returning from the A. E. F., France, I was stationed in the Chief's office, and, as I recollect it, I was examined by a board of officers who were commissioned in the regular Army, over a period of about three or four days. written examination. The chairman of that board was General Pillsbury. And it seems to me in September 1919—no; that's wrong. Correction: September 1920. 1920, and was commissioned a captain in the regular Army, Corps of Engineers, as of July 1, 1920.

7. General FRANK. Where were you on duty from '35 to '39?

Colonel WYMAN. From '35—well, beginning the first of [3359] January I was on duty in the Missouri River Division, Kansas City, Assistant to the Division Engineer, who is now Major General R. C. Moore, and in July I was, with very little notice, transferred to Los Angeles, California, and appointed District Engineer on or about July 20, 1935, and served as District Engineer at Los Angeles until I departed from the United States on or about September—oh, I think I was relieved about August 25, 1939.

8. General FRANK. Did you ever meet Hans Wilhelm Rohl prior to going to Los Angeles?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir, I never knew him.

9. General FRANK. When and where did you first meet him?

Colonel WYMAN. The first time I knew Mr. Rohl, met Mr. Rohl, was in my office immediately after assuming duty as District Engineer at Los Angeles. A short time after I reported there bids were opened on a section of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater. Those bids, the advertisement, the specifications, and the entire matter had been handled by my predecessor, who was Major Stickney. The bids were opened a short time after I arrived there, and Rohl-Connolly was the low bidder, and immediately after that, as I recollect it, they called on me in my office relative to their bid for a section of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.

10. General FRANK. Did you later become friends with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. I knew Rohl while I was in Los Angeles, and I wouldn't say that I was ever a friend, but I was an acquaintance and met him several times.

11. General FRANK. The testimony has appeared which indicated that you spent some time in his company under rather intimate [3360] conditions.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't understand the question.

12. General FRANK. Read it.

(The pending question, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know what "intimate conditions" are. It will be necessary for you to explain that to me. Do you mean social conditions.

13. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Social? Oh, yes, I met Mr. Rohl socially.

14. General FRANK. And yet he was not a friend of yours?

Colonel WYMAN. No, no more so than other—other people with whom the District Engineer did business regularly from day to day, just the same as anyone else.

15. General FRANK. Did you carry on the same relations with all other contractors as you carried on with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. I met them in my office from time to time as they had business with me.

16. General FRANK. Answer my question, please.

Colonel WYMAN. Maybe I didn't understand it.

17. General FRANK. Did you carry on the same relation with all other contractors that you carried on with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. In general, yes, sir. Yes, sir.

18. General FRANK. Who were the other contractors?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, Standard Dredging Company had a job there. Guy Atkinson Company had a job.

19. General FRANK. Who is the head of the dredging company?

Colonel WYMAN. Standard Dredging? I don't know, now. I couldn't recollect his name. The Guy Atkinson Company—

[3361] 20. General FRANK. Did you know Mr. Atkinson?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes. Yes, indeed.

21. General FRANK. As intimately as you know Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I would say I knew Mr. Atkinson more intimately than I ever knew Rohl.

22. General FRANK. Did you go on as many social functions with Mr. Atkinson?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I met Mr. Atkinson on many occasions at dinners, public affairs, dinners of organizations, dinners of the associated contractors, annual dinners, and that sort of thing, from time to time; yes, I did.

23. General FRANK. Ever on drinking parties with Mr. Atkinson?

Colonel WYMAN. On a drinking party with Mr. Atkinson? Well, I take—a contractors' dinner was usually preceded with the usual cocktails and that sort of thing, and I think that on some occasions—I remember one distinctly where Mr. Atkinson and I had drinks together; yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. That's one?

Colonel WYMAN. That's one occasion.

25. General FRANK. That's all you remember?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I would have to recollect. There are other occasions when I was with Mr. Atkinson.

26. General FRANK. Besides Mr. Atkinson and the head of this dredging company?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, then I was—the Callahan Construction Company. Well, there were six or eight contractors concerned with the construction of the Prado Dam which I had charge of, which was a group of co-adventurers. I don't remember all their names. One of them was the Callahan Construction Company. [3362] They were the sort of a leading—leading outfit.

27. General FRANK. Who represented them?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, Mr. William Callahan represented them chiefly.

28. General FRANK. Did you know him intimately?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I knew Bill Callahan pretty well; yes, sir.

29. General FRANK. Did he always represent the Callahan Company?

Colonel WYMAN. No. The man on the job, right on the ground, was Mr. Paul Grafe, who was the project manager. He was a member of the Callahan Company; yes, sir.

30. General FRANK. How well did you know him?

Colonel WYMAN. I knew him quite well, used to meet him frequently along with business, met him socially with other people. I remember one occasion where Mr. Walter Douglas, the consulting engineer, gave a dinner; I was present and so was Mr. Grafe, Mrs. Grafe. I was a guest in his house on one occasion, with other officers; he entertained at dinner.

[3363] 31. General FRANK. Who are some of these other seven or eight contractors, with whom you were just as intimate as you were with Rohl and Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I have named—I said seven or eight. I don't know whom you mean.

32. General FRANK. Well, I do not know whom you mean.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I know there was Mr. Guy Atkinson. I don't remember the corporate structure of that outfit. There were quite a number of contractors who made up the Prado Constructors, the builders of the Prado dam. Yes, I do, too—I remember some. One was a company from Nebraska. It was headed up by a man named Cunningham—Mr. Cunningham. I knew Mr. Cunningham.

33. General FRANK. How well?

Colonel WYMAN. I knew him quite well. I knew him before he came to Los Angeles to work. I knew him when I was district engineer at Kansas City, Missouri. I think his name is Chetworth Cunningham. He is known as "Chet" Cunningham. He represented some contractors from Omaha, Nebraska.

34. General FRANK. How often did you see him?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I would see these people maybe once a month, something like that.

35. General FRANK. How often did you see Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, at different periods, at different times. In the early 1935, I would say I saw Mr. Rohl once—and '36, too—once every couple of months; '37, '38, very infrequently, except at the time of a disastrous flood in Los Angeles, in the Los Angeles River and the San Gabriel River, which was in March 1938. I remember Mr. Rohl came to my [3364] office and made available to the Government, if they wanted it, his men and his plant, to do emergency work, and I recollect we did purchase some rock from Rohl, which we needed to safeguard government work that was under construction at that time. I saw him quite frequently for a period of three or four weeks.

In 1939, I think I saw Rohl—Mr. Rohl—maybe once or twice during the year, as I recollect it.

36. General FRANK. Where did this rock come from?

Colonel WYMAN. The rock that we purchased from Rohl?

37. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Why, I don't remember; but it came from a quarry.

38. General FRANK. Obviously!

Colonel WYMAN. It was delivered by rail.

39. General FRANK. Not by boat?

Colonel WYMAN. No, by rail.

40. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, speaking of other contractors, I knew "Steve" Griffith, of the Griffith Company, very well. I also knew Connolly, of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I also knew Shirley, of the Shirley-Gunther Company. I also knew Foley, of the West Slope Construction Company, the builders of the San Gabriel dam.

41. General FRANK. Were your relations just as complete and cordial and intimate, from a social point of view, with Foley and Shirley and Connolly and Cunningham and Atkinson, as they were with Grafe and Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. They were just the same. The district engineer, doing great construction work, which we were, was [3365] bound to be cordial to people working for the engineer department; otherwise, he wouldn't be discharging his duty as district engineer. A cordial relationship existed between most outfits working for the engineer department, who performed faithfully their jobs.

42. General FRANK. So, you had no particular friendship for Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. No, no particular friendship; no, sir; no more so than I have for any other man with whom I do business.

43. General FRANK. Did you ever do business with Walter Dillingham?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir; I had many contacts with Walter Dillingham, of Honolulu, especially in connection with the construction of docks and some dredging in Honolulu harbor.

44. General FRANK. Were your relations with Walter Dillingham the same as your relations with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. I would say, in general, yes. I knew Mr. Dillingham, here. I was a guest at his home, if that is what you mean, and that sort of thing.

45. General FRANK. How many times were you ever in social contact with Mr. Dillingham?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, I was in social contact with Mr. Dillingham at his house on two occasions that I recollect, and once I was a luncheon guest at his farm over on the northwest corner of this island, where he had polo ponies.

46. General FRANK. When you were a guest at his farm, were you invited over there?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

47. General FRANK. Or did you go over there to see him about [3366] business?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir; I was invited there to have lunch with him and to see his polo ponies perform between the trees, there, on a bending exercise.

48. General FRANK. What was Rohl's professional background?

Colonel WYMAN. Rohl? I have that in writing, here, if you would like me to read it to you.

49. General FRANK. How long is it?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I would say a sheet of paper.

50. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel WYMAN. I would like to read it. I have prepared a statement here, which is as near as I could do, in the short time I have been

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here, concerning the allegations contained in House Report No. 1638, which I would like to introduce in evidence.

51. General GRUNERT. All right, go ahead and read your statement.

Colonel WYMAN. Read my statement? All right, sir.

First, I have a statement of my own qualifications and experience, because I note that my qualifications have been challenged as a district engineer and an officer of our Army.

52. General FRANK. By whom?

Colonel WYMAN. In this congressional document. And I can read this briefly, or just turn it in as an exhibit.

53. General FRANK. Read it.

Colonel WYMAN. Read it?

STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AS AN ENGINEER OFFICER.

1908 completed three (3) year civil engineering course at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N. J., class of 1908. During part of this time was employed [3367] with the Pennsylvania Railroad at Long Island as an inspector of construction.

1909, was employed by a contractor, MacArthur Brothers of New York City, as rodman and instrument man.

1910-1917, was employed by the Board of Water Supply, New York City, and the Catskill Water Supply Project. Was employed in various capacities as inspector, instrument man, line and grade parties, and later in charge of subsurface investigations for the Shandaken Tunnel. All on the Catskill Mountain Water Supply projects.

That is 1910 to 1917, seven years.

54. General FRANK. Did you know Douglas McKay?

Colonel WYMAN. Douglas McKay?

55. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know who Douglas McKay is.

56. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel WYMAN (reading).

1917, entered the Army. First, Officers' Training Camp; commissioned 1st Lieutenant, 15 August 1917; assigned to the Second Combat Engineer Regiment. Left the United States 10 September 1917 and arrived in France about 3 October 1917.

I was a company commander at that time.

Was engaged on military construction, chiefly construction of camps and housing for the American Army. Served with the Second Division from December 1917 until approximately 15 September 1919. Was present with the Second Engineers and the Division during all combatant periods. In October 1918 for about two weeks the Second Engineers were attached to the Thirty-Sixth Division after the Second Division was [3368] withdrawn from the Champagne battlefield.

I was present.

During this period, was promoted to Captain and later to Major. Received following decorations for services during World War I: Silver Star, Croix de Guerre with palm. Fourageur, French, War Department Orders. Battle record during World War I: Chateau Thierry, Belleau Woods, Battle of Soissons, Verdun Defense, Pontamousson Defense, St. Mihiel Offensive, Champagne Offensive, Champagne Defense, Argonne Offensive, March to Germany, Occupation of Rhine.

1919, upon return to the United States in September 1919 was placed in charge of construction of a bridge across the Republican River at Fort Riley, Kansas.

That is the Clock Bridge, that I presume is still there.

Late in October 1919, was detailed to the Office of the Chief of Engineers and was assigned to the Development of the Equipment Branch of the Supply Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, and served there until December 1920.

Transferred as Engineer Supply Officer to the Schenectady General Reserve Depot, Schenectady, New York, and was in charge of the development of engineer equipment for the Office of the Chief of Engineers at that place.

That included subaqueous sound ranging, search lights, various electrical gear, being developed specially by the General Electric Company at that place.

In 1923 to 1927, on duty with the Engineer School at Fort Humphries, Va., and was the working member of the Board on Engineer Equipment; developed various items of engineer equipment such as ponton bridges, search lights, water-purification units, and numerous other projects assigned to the Board on Engineer Equipment from time to [3369] time by the War Department.

1927 to 1928, attended the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and graduated with the class with the rating of Eligible for the General Staff duty and recommendation for further training in high command.

1928-1929, from 1 July 1928 until September 1929, Assistant to the District Engineer, Kansas City, Missouri.

1929-1933: September 1929 until September 1933, District Engineer in Kansas City in charge of the improvement of Missouri River for navigation, flood control, and development of power. [3370] During this period made "308" studies of the Missouri River and its tributaries and submitted some 23 "308" reports which were eventually submitted to Congress and printed as House Documents. During the period that I was District Engineer at Kansas City I supervised construction costing approximately 70 million dollars.

1933-1935: In 1933, the Kansas City District was divided into three districts consisting of the Kansas City District, the Omaha District and the Fort Peck District, and the Missouri River Division created with Lieutenant Colonel R. C. Moore as Division Engineer. Was assigned as the principal military assistant to Colonel Moore and served in that capacity as his assistant and was in charge of engineering for the Missouri River Division from 1933 to 1935.

1935-1939: Transferred to Los Angeles, California, and made District Engineer, Los Angeles District, and served until September 1939. During this period was in local charge of fortifications in that district, River and Harbor projects, and the flood control work for the Los Angeles County, for both the Los Angeles River and its tributaries and the San Gabriel River and its tributaries, especially the Santa Ana Branch and the building of the flood control dam known as Prado Dam. Was in immediate charge of construction of flood control works in the Los Angeles River and its tributaries including the Hanson Dam and the Sepulveda Dam and planned the entire flood control system which was later adopted as an approved War Department project. During this period, made numerous flood control studies as authorized by Act of Congress from time [3371] to time of the rivers flowing into the Great Salt Lake, rivers flowing into the Colorado River, the rivers of Arizona and New Mexico, and various rivers up and down the coast of California from the Mexican border to San Luis Obispo flowing into the Pacific Ocean. During this period I supervised construction costing approximately 70 million dollars.

1939-1942: In 1939, was transferred to the Hawaiian Department and served from September 1939 to July 1940 as Battalion Commander with the 3rd Engineers at Schofield Barracks. In July, 1940, was appointed District Engineer in Honolulu. While serving as District Engineer in Honolulu was charged with the following projects, among others:

a. Construction of ship channel and seaplane bases at Midway Island and disposition of dredgings for an airplane runway, that is, from the harbor to the island for the purpose of building an airfield.

b. Dredging project for development of Palmyra for Navy outpost.

c. I was Works Progress Administrator and had charge of activities involving principally Army and Navy projects, including repair work on posts, construction of military roads, operation of quarries, construction of airports, also construction of streets and boulevards in the city of Honolulu.

d. Civil works and Navy projects, including survey and construction of seaplane basin at Keshi Lagoon, additional harbor facilities including piers, warehouses, railroad trackage in Honolulu Harbor, [3372] widening and deepening of entrance to Pearl Harbor, dredging operations, and so forth.

e. Civil Aeronautics Authority Projects: This work involved the construction and enlarging of about seven airports to accommodate large commercial planes and large Army bombers.

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f. Maintenance of fortifications: This work consisted of repairs to military installations and supply of consumable materials.

g. Emergency defense projects: This work consisted of the construction of underground bombproof ammunition storage, military roads, railroad spurs for use by mobile railroad artillery, observation and fire-control stations, gasoline storage projects, aircraft warning system, and so forth.

h. Air Corps construction projects: These projects consisted of hangars, shops, engine testing buildings, housing, hospitals, landing strips, and so forth.

i. Airway Ferry Routes: This project consisted of making preparatory surveys of airway ferry routes from Honolulu to Australia and the construction of airfields, runways, buildings, gasoline storage facilities, and so forth.

j. Quartermaster Construction Projects: These projects included housing programs, underground storage for refrigerated stores, addition of Tripler Hospital, and so forth.

The Engineer Department was placed under the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. I was relieved as District Engineer, Honolulu, in March, 1942, and on the [3373] occasion of my relief I received the following letter of commendation from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"DEAR COLONEL WYMAN: On the occasion of your relief as District Engineer, Honolulu, and from further duty in this Department, I want to express to you my appreciation of the work which you have done for this Department. Many of the projects under your office were initiated prior to my arrival. The most important single one was opened for use after I arrived, and I am very familiar with the problems which you had to solve in accomplishing this work. The fact that this air route was done at all is remarkable; under peace-time conditions it would have been a very difficult job. Its completion and opening for air traffic under war-time difficulties just 78 days after orders to proceed were received and almost three weeks before the date which you had set yourself is outstanding. The accomplishment of this job required force and initiative of the highest degree, and these same qualities were also required for the excellent progress which has been made on the other projects prosecuted under your direction. I am writing this letter to express my official appreciation of your work. A copy of it is being forwarded to the Chief of Engineers, through the Division Engineer, for your official records.

"With best wishes for the future,

"Very sincerely yours,

"DELOS C. EMMONS,
"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army.
Commanding."

[3374] In 1943 I was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for services rendered while in Hawaii.

1944: Since the first of August, 1944, I have been in command of the Cherbourg Base Section, which included the Cherbourg Harbor and vicinity.

I left the United States in command of a General Service regiment in July, 1943, and was engaged in the construction of a housing project in West England and had under my command 12 Engineer General Service regiments. I was made the commanding officer of the 19th District of the Southern Base Section, ETO and while serving in that capacity I commanded about 60,000 troops. I was charged with conducting the exercise Duck 1, Duck 2, Beaver, Muskrat, Tiger, Fabius, which were the assault exercises in training the troops for the assault on the continent. Of course, as you know, we assaulted a beach in England, which was also prepared by me and under my charge during this period, and I devised a means of mounting troops and embarking troops which was new in England and adopted for the assault. I was in charge of mounting the 5th Corps, the 7th Corps, and 1st Army troops for the assault.

Immediately after the assault, when the follow-up commenced, I was made Commanding Officer of the 18th District and was in charge of the American buildup to the ports of Southampton, Weymouth and Portland, and in 30 days, from about June 16th to July 16th, I put through those ports 117,000 vehicles and 560,000 men.

About the 16th of July I was transferred to Cherbourg Base Section, which included the Cherbourg Harbor and vicinity. I was put in charge of reconstructing the port facilities of the [3375] port of Cherbourg and of course later charged with the supply of the armies, 1st and 3rd Armies. I was in charge of Omaha Beach, Utah Beach, five small French ports, Barfleur, Eseny, Careton, and Cherbourg.

When I arrived at Cherbourg the tonnage being delivered was zero and when I left France we had gotten the tonnage up to about 14,000 tons per day. We constructed 7,200 feet of wharfage for bridges and ships. At that time we were unloading on good days about 40,000 tons of supplies per day.

57. General FRANK. Did you take over from General Ross?

Colonel WYMAN. General Ross?

58. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. No, I did not serve under Ross at all. General Ross was in charge of transportation on the staff of the Commanding General of Zone Communications.

59. General FRANK. Who was your immediate chief?

Colonel WYMAN. General Lee.

For services in this connection I was awarded the Legion of Merit, the citation for which reads:

"Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Army Serial No. 07925, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service in connection with vast construction projects in the United Kingdom and on the Continent of Europe, during the period from 13 April, 1943, to 25 August, 1944. While serving as Commanding Officer of an Engineer General Service Regiment, Colonel Wyman displayed keen foresight and outstanding initiative in preparing accommodations for the tremendous [3376] troop buildup in the Southern Base Section, Communications Zone. Later, Colonel Wyman served as Commandant of the XIX District, and was charged with the responsibility of establishing and carrying out many of the numerous and detailed plans of the 'Duck' exercise. This exercise played a vital part in the amphibious training for the assault on occupied France. The leadership and ingenuity of Colonel Wyman is completely attested to by the successful completion of this exercise. Because of his outstanding performance of duty in former construction projects, Colonel Wyman was assigned as Commanding Officer of the Normandy Base Section, and was charged with the development of various ports, camps and other installations in that part of liberated Europe. His untiring efforts and endless devotion to duty were shown by the rapid manner in which these various ports and installations were restored to usable condition. The professional skill and thorough knowledge of technical problems displayed by Colonel Wyman in completing these many tasks reflects great credit upon himself and the armed forces of the United States. Entered military service from Washington, D. C."

I would like to submit this.

I would now like to introduce a statement of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., covering allegations contained in House Report—

60. General FRANK. Just a minute. I asked you what was Rohl's professional background. We have gotten off the track.

[3377] Colonel WYMAN. I have that in here.

61. General FRANK. Just read that for a moment.

Colonel WYMAN. Professional background?

62. General FRANK. What is this statement that you have there?

Colonel WYMAN. This is a statement covering the allegations contained in House Report No. 1638, 78th Congress, 2d Session, relating to his responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster.

63. General FRANK. It is a statement that you have prepared and would like to read into the record?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

64. General FRANK. Read it.

Colonel WYMAN (reading):

It has been alleged in House Report No. 1638, 78th Congress, Second Session, that my relations with Mr. H. W. Rohl were improper and impaired my effectiveness as District Engineer at Honolulu during the period immediately before the attack on Pearl Harbor when I was charged with the construction of various defense projects in the Hawaiian and South Pacific Area; and that I delayed and mismanaged these projects to the detriment of the United States, and to the advantage of Japan. (See pages 11, 25, 42 and 45 of the report.)

I was overseas when the House Committee called me as a witness so it withdrew its request. I never knew that I was called as a witness. The House Committee did not call for a single other witness from the War Department in its investigation of this matter. Accordingly, until now there has been no opportunity to answer these allegations which [3378] relate directly to the Pearl Harbor disaster and the alleged extent of my responsibility for this disaster. I offer the following testimony on these matters:

The Congressional report alleges that I developed improper social relations with Mr. H. W. Rohl. To the best of my recollection I met Mr. Rohl for the first time when bids were opened on the Long Beach-Los Angeles breakwater, which was about August, 1935, shortly after I took over the duties of District Engineer at Los Angeles. On that occasion Mr. Rohl came to my office on this business matter. The bid of the Rohl-Connolly Company was the low bid and this contract was awarded to the Rohl-Connolly Company, by the Engineers Department.

Please understand at that time we were operating in peace time conditions under orders and regulations of the Engineer Department, and the District Engineer had no authority to award a contract. The awarding of a contract was by the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army.

65. General FRANK. Who made the recommendation?

Colonel WYMAN. I made the recommendation, because he was the low bidder.

66. General FRANK. Did you have authority to make recommendation that the low bidder be not accepted?

Colonel WYMAN. The low bidder? Oh, no. It was required that he be accepted, by law.

67. General FRANK. Did you have authority to recommend that the low bidder be not accepted?

Colonel WYMAN. No. If a contractor qualified under the law, it was my duty to recommend the low bidder. That is required by the law.

[3379] 68. General FRANK. There is no way in which other than the low bidder can be awarded a contract?

Colonel WYMAN. If he had failed to qualify, if he had no bond, then it would have to go to the next bidder, because a bond is required. If he had had no experience, it would go to the next bidder. But the Rohl-Connolly Company at the time these bids were opened was already engaged in the construction of the first section of this breakwater and the contract was entered into by one of my predecessors as District Engineer at Los Angeles.

69. General FRANK. Proceed.

Colonel WYMAN (reading):

The following year, 1936, the Rohl-Connolly Company were also the low bidders for the balance of this project and were awarded the contract for continuing and

completing this work, on what was known as a continuing contract. They were, in that case, it is my recollection, \$200,000 lower than the next bidder. This work was completed in 1937. During the period from 1935—

70. General FRANK. Is it not a fact that the man on the job has an advantage over a man bidding on the same contract who has to set up for it?

Colonel WYMAN. You mean, an advantage in the bidding? It depends upon whether or not he has the right kind of plant to do the work.

71. General FRANK. He is already on the job and doing the contract. All he has to do is to bid on the continuation of it, whereas an outsider has to come in and set up for it. Therefore, the man on the job has an advantage in the bidding, [3380] does he not?

Colonel WYMAN. Not necessarily, no sir. Very frequently the bid of the man on the job is higher than a competitor, in construction.

72. General FRANK. That is your opinion?

Colonel WYMAN. No, that is a fact. There are many cases of that. Take in the Missouri River work, there are many cases where the man on the job is superseded by another contractor because his bid is lower.

73. General FRANK. That does not necessarily mean that the man on the job could not have afforded to put in a lower bid?

Colonel WYMAN. No. Frequently the man on the job has lost money and is glad to get out of the job, does not want it at all.

74. General FRANK. That is very true.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes.

75. General FRANK. There is an advantage, though, to the man being on the job and already set up to continue the work, is there not?

Colonel WYMAN. If the work would be the same, the advantage would be that he is already mobilized and the expense of mobilization would not be as large as in the case of a new contractor that had to bring his plant there. There would be that saving.

76. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel WYMAN (reading):

During the period from 1935 to 1937, I saw Mr. Rohl, to the best of my recollection, on business relating to these projects not more than once every two or three months.

[3381] In 1938 Rohl-Connolly was awarded a small contract for furnishing stone, amounting to about \$15,000, and in 1939 the Rohl-Connolly Company had no contract from my office. During the period including 1938 and the first nine months of 1939, up to the time I was relieved from duty in Los Angeles, I did not see Mr. Rohl on business more than four or five times.

To the best of my recollection my social contacts with Mr. Rohl consisted of the following:

a. In 1935 my family and I were overnight guests on the Rohl yacht, together with other Army officers. The occasion of this social contact was a pleasure cruise from the mainland to Catalina Island. Incidentally a quarry being operated by the Rohl-Connolly Company was inspected during the cruise of this trip, since the boat allowed an inspection from the water side.

b. In 1936 I was Mr. Rohl's guest on two overnight yachting trips, as I recollect them. One of these trips was a pleasure cruise with other friends. The second trip was from Newport Yacht Club to Los Angeles.

I would like to correct that. One of these trips was a pleasure cruise with other friends from Los Angeles overnight to Catalina Island and return. The second trip was from Newport Yacht Club to Los Angeles.

I had been associated with—

I had been in charge, rather, of—

the PWA project of constructing a yacht basin at Newport, California, and on the occasion of the formal opening of the yacht basin a regatta was [3382] held and I was invited as an honored guest because of my connection with the project as District Engineer. It was very late in the evening when the function was over and I was invited by Mr. Rohl, in view of the lateness of the hour, to return to Los Angeles aboard his boat.

The only other yachting trip I took with Mr. Rohl was an overnight trip on the VEGA, at which time Mrs. Wyman and other guests were present for a pleasure cruise.

There was no excessive drinking on the occasion of any of these yachting trips. In fact on some of these trips Mr. Rohl operated a "dry boat", that is, no liquor at all was served aboard.

To the best of my recollection during my tenure year of office as District Engineer at Los Angeles from 1935 to September 1939, I was entertained in Mr. Rohl's home only twice. On one occasion my wife and I were invited to a dinner party given by Mr. and Mrs. Rohl at their home at which other guests were present. On another occasion I was a guest in Mr. Rohl's home in company with another Army officer. While cocktails were served on these occasions there was no excessive drinking by anyone present.

Mrs. Wyman and I entertained Mr. and Mrs. Rohl in our home on one occasion, and Mr. Rohl was my guest at my club on several occasions together with other Army officers. The hospitality and courtesies that I extended Mr. Rohl through these invitations were in reciprocation of similar courtesies extended to me by him, and was no more extensive [3383] than called for under the circumstances. My social relations with Mr. Rohl were no more extensive or different in nature from my social relations with other contractors and business associates during that period.

Because of my position and functions as District Engineer in Los Angeles, I was frequently an official guest and speaker at a number of dinners and meetings held by professional societies, organizations, and so forth, at clubs and hotels in Los Angeles. On these occasions, while Mr. Rohl was frequently present—being one of the more prominent contractors and businessmen in that area—I was not his guest.

After my transfer to Hawaii I was a guest of Mr. and Mrs. Rohl on only one occasion, which was a small dinner party given by Mr. and Mrs. Rohl at their home. I was invited with my wife.

While I have taken social drinks with my friends and with Mr. Rohl on social occasions, I have never been a heavy drinker nor on any occasion been intoxicated either in the company of Mr. Rohl or other persons.

During the time that I have known Mr. Rohl, I have not received directly or indirectly any loan, gift or any emolument from Mr. Rohl or from any company or organization or person with whom he has been associated. During that period I have never received any present from Mr. Rohl. I have never had relations with Mr. Rohl, either business, professional or social which have in the slightest degree tended to interfere with or hamper in any way my full and proper discharge of my duties or which would normally give [3384] rise to a suspicion that such was the effect.

The Congressional Report contains an allegation that on the morning of the Pearl Harbor attack, I was at the home of Mr. Rohl, having spent the night there, and on being advised of the attack by radio telephone I rushed to my office in civilian clothes and in a drunken condition and then changed from civilian clothes to uniform in the presence of my entire office staff, women as well as men.

I spent the evening of December 6, 1941, at my home in the company of my wife. During the early part of the evening my assistant, Major Robinson and Mrs. Robinson had visited me at home and Robinson and I had engaged in a chess game. While we may have had a drink during the course of his visit, neither of us drank excessively or became intoxicated. I was not at the home of Mr. Rohl at any time on December 6 or December 7, 1941. My assistant, Major Robinson, is alleged in the Congressional Report (page 46) to be my brother-in-law. Major Robinson was not at that time my brother-in-law and is not now my brother-in-law, nor any relation whatsoever.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, I was telephoned by Mr. E. S. Griffith, who now, I believe, lives at Fort Ruger, on this island—who called from Hickam Field

and advised of the attack. I talked with him for some five minutes giving certain instructions. By virtue of War Department Orders in effect during the period of peace which had existed up to that time, I always wore civilian clothes when working at my office. That was a War Department order. With the attack on Pearl Harbor being in [3385] progress and a state of war existing, I felt it was my duty to change from civilian clothes to my military uniform. Because of the fact, however, that I had not been wearing the uniform it was necessary for it to be unpacked, the proper insignia attached thereto and to be otherwise prepared for wear. Wanting to get to my office at once I dressed in civilian clothes and requested my wife to prepare by uniform as soon as possible and send it to me at the office. Some time after arriving at the office my uniform was delivered to me and I changed into it in the privacy of my own private office. I did not change from civilian to military clothes in the presence of my office force of men and women. However, there was present in my office at that time Major Robinson, Lieutenant Butts and Mr. Perliter. It should be noted that other officers followed the same procedure as I did in this respect.

It is alleged in the Congressional report that although it was a general practice in the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu to record telephone conversations relating to the conduct of such activities as placing contracts, nevertheless when I found the girls had been placed in my office to make these recordings of my telephone conversations, I stopped them from doing so on the ground that it was not necessary for anybody to record my conversations.

The only practice that existed in the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu with reference to recording telephone conversations was to record overseas radio telephone calls. This was done principally because of [3386] occasional unsatisfactory reception due to interference, and so forth. There was no telephone recording machine in the office. The practice was for a stenographer to listen to the conversation on an extension and make shorthand notes of the conversation. Usually only one copy of these shorthand notes was transcribed by the stenographer and this copy was delivered to me for my own personal use and personal file. As a rule I destroyed these transcripts of conversation at the time they were no longer useful. However, I have located a few of these transcripts which are still in the file. During my period of service as District Engineer at Honolulu, I did not stop or in any way limit the existing practice of recording telephone conversations.

It is alleged that immediately upon my transfer to Hawaii, and after my appointment as District Engineer at Honolulu in June, 1940, I began planning to have contracts awarded to companies in which Rohl was the controlling factor and that I used every effort in favoring Rohl.

In connection with the allegation that I used every effort in favoring Rohl it should be noted that official records show that during the period of my services as District Engineer at Los Angeles I was charged with the responsibility for about 70 million dollars in construction projects, and that the Rohl-Connolly Company received contracts for less than 4 million dollars of this construction. Furthermore, in each instance in which the Rohl-Connolly Company received a contract it was the lowest competitive bidder.

[3387] While I was District Engineer at Los Angeles I assessed Rohl-Connolly Company some \$8,000 in liquidated damages in connection with delays in its performance of the breakwater contract. Rohl-Connolly contested this assessment, but I was sustained and the assessment was paid.

On becoming District Engineer at Honolulu I was charge with the construction of a number of large projects, including the construction of a ship channel and seaplane base at Midway Island, dredging for development of Palmyra Island as a Navy outpost, enlarging the entrance to Pearl Harbor, and the improvement of Kaneohe Bay. I made no attempt whatever to award contracts for this work to Rohl-Connolly Company or to any company in which Mr. Rohl was a factor. These construction projects involved several million dollars. I elected to perform this construction work directly by hired labor instead of by contractors.

At the inception of the plans for the Hawaiian and South Pacific Defense Construction projects, which were later covered by Contract W-414-Eng-602 with Hawaiian Constructors, I planned and took steps toward doing this work directly with hired labor instead of by having it done through contractors. My plan in this regard was changed, however, by virtue of the issuance of War Department directives adopting the policy of effecting such work through the use of contractors instead of by doing it directly with hired labor.

It should be pointed out that as District Engineer of Honolulu my maximum contracting authority was \$50,000. In view of this limitation I was not in posi-

tion, even if [3388] I had desired to do so, to place a large contract with any company with which Mr. Rohl was associated.

It is alleged in the Congressional Report that there is little doubt but that a substantial part of the defense construction work in the Hawaiian area could have been handled by local contractors or those who were there from the mainland and readily available, but that all other contractors were forced out by me so that Hawaiian Constructors could get the contract. It is further alleged that I apparently made no effort to call local contractors together in order to find out whether they were in position to handle additional work.

On being directed by the War Department directive to use contractors in effecting the Hawaiian defense construction work, I immediately conducted an investigation to determine what qualified contractors would be available for this work. As a result of this investigation, I concluded the Hawaiian Contracting Company was the only local company that could handle the job. I directed my assistant, Major Robinson, to interview Hawaiian Contracting Company in the latter part of November, 1940, on the question of whether they would be interested in undertaking a contract for this work. We were advised that this company could not undertake this work because of commitments they had made to the Navy Department.

Having determined that there were no contractors on the Islands of sufficient size, financial worth and experience, not otherwise engaged, who could undertake this construction, an investigation was made as to the availability [3389] of contractors on the mainland of the United States for this job.

I would like to introduce at this time various correspondence which is revealing and is during this period of negotiation.

It is my recollection that in October, 1940, General Hannum and I made an inspection of Midway Island and while at Midway Island we discussed ways and means of doing the work proposed by the War Department. General Hannum promised that upon his return to the United States he would take the matter up with the War Department, that is, with the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and advise me the results of his investigation.

I have here a letter which I would like to read:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, November 4, 1940.

Via air mail

Colonel WARREN T. HANNUM,

Div. Engr., South Pacific Division, San Francisco, Calif.

DEAR COLONEL HANNUM: Pursuant to our telephone conversation, I am forwarding two copies of the current Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Form.

Since this work is being done out of fortification money, I discussed the general policy of performing the work by contract with Colonel Mayo and he has just told me that General Kingman approves that method of performing the work. Colonel Mayo will call you.

The Finance Section is now working on a memorandum [3390] of instructions about the use of negotiated and cost-plus contracts. A copy of this will be sent to you as soon as ready. In the meantime, I suggest that you consult Public 703, 76th Congress for the general authority, as well as the current appropriation bills carrying National Defense Money, which you are using.

After you determine the type of contract you wish to use, authority of this office will be required for a negotiated contract in excess of \$50,000 and the approval of The Assistant Secretary of War will be required for a negotiated contract in excess of \$50,000.

That is an error; I think it is a larger sum of money.

The authority to negotiate a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract will be required from the Assistant Secretary of War regardless of the amount involved. Furthermore, the name of the contractor selected must be cleared through the Advisory Commission to the Council for National Defense. I therefore suggest that, as soon as you determine the type of contract to use, you submit the matter, with

the name of the contractor you propose dealing with, together with an alternate or two, to this office for the necessary clearance.

Sincerely yours,

E. E. GESLER,
*Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Finance Section.*

[3391] On November the 6th another letter from General Hannum to me:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION ENGINEER, SOUTH PACIFIC DIVISION,
351 California St., San Francisco, California, November 6, 1940.

Air mail—Clipper

Lt. Col. THEODORE WYMAN, JR., C. E.,
U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

Dear WYMAN: I inclose herewith a letter received from Colonel Gesler, Office, Chief of Engineers, in reference to negotiated contracts on the basis of fixed price and also cost-plus-fixed-fee. The form for cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is inclosed.

If you negotiate on the basis of a fixed price, it appears, since you will not have the plans and specifications ready until December 20, that you could not negotiate before that time. After arriving at an agreement, it would take some time to execute it and then an additional month or two before equipment could be placed in Honolulu on the job. On the other hand, if you use a cost-plus-fixed-fee form, negotiations could be conducted without waiting for the detailed plans. Since the contractors interested are mainly on the mainland, it seems to me it would be well for you to come to the mainland to conduct the negotiations [3392] with specified parties on specified dates. We will sit in with you on these negotiations.

Since the Navy contractors over there are on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, it occurred to me that a contractor working for you on a fixed price basis would be at a disadvantage since the Navy work is much larger in amount than you would have.

However, I prefer that you examine various methods in the light of existing conditions in Hawaii and come to your own conclusions as to methods and procedure.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Warren T. Hannum
WARREN T. HANNUM,
*Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.*

Pursuant to that letter I journeyed to the mainland and had an interview with Colonel Hannum in which he stated that it was necessary for me to interview at least three contractors, and that he had arranged for Colonel Kelton, the District Engineer at Los Angeles, to get up an itinerary for me to visit in Los Angeles and to interview contractors who would be interested in doing this work.

I stated here that I interviewed people from the West-Slope Contracting Company. They merely called me on the telephone and told me that they were not interested.

Guy Atkinson Company.
Griffith Construction Company.
Bressi Construction Company.
Rohl-Connolly Company.
[3293] West-Slope Contracting Company (Foley Brothers)
Gunther-Shirley Company.
Callahan Company.

I stated here that I interviewed people from the West-Slope Contracting Company. They merely called me on the telephone and told me that they were not interested.

At the time of these interviews, no plans, specifications, or details were available with respect to the proposed construction projects. It was proposed to use a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for this work, and this represented one of the first major construction projects handled on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. Consequently,

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very little was known by either the contractors or by the Government representatives as to the exact nature and scope of the contract.

The Guy Atkinson Company stated they would not be interested in the contract on a fee of less than 8%, which was more than could be allowed under regulations.

The Griffith Construction Company, Bressi Construction Company, and the West-Slope Construction Company indicated they were not in position to go to Hawaii or the South—

well, that is immaterial—

to go to Hawaii to undertake the construction of the projects.

The Rohl-Connolly Company, Gunther-Shirley Company, and Callahan Company were at that time associated in a joint venture for the construction [3394] of the Caddoa Dam. At first they indicated they were not interested in going to Hawaii in connection with the proposed construction projects, but on being advised of—

This happened in Washington. I would like to read back and read this later. It is a little garbled.

Prior to coming to California, and when I was thinking of contractors, I invited the Callahan Company to—or requested, rather; not invited—requested them whether or not they would have interest in coming to Hawaii; and they sent two engineers to Hawaii, a Mr. McCullough and a Mr. Wolfe, who went over the general character of the work to be done, and then reported back to their employer, the Callahan Construction Company, and I believe reported favorably.

In the office—later it was agreed that the—now, this is garbled. I'll have to redraft this.

On the first interview Mr. Rohl stated that he would have no interest in a job in Hawaii because he was fully engaged in work at the High Gate Dam at Parker, Arizona. Later he came back—he was present with Mr. Guy Atkinson. Later he came back and stated that he had spoken to Mr. Connolly of his company and that Mr. Connolly would probably be interested and would be glad to see me, and that Mr. Connolly would see me wherever I wanted to see him.

After these interviews, I was directed to go to Washington and to invite these three contractors who had indicated an interest to come to Washington to negotiate this contract. Mr. Paul Graft and Mr. Thomas E. Connolly accepted this invitation and came [3395-3396] to Washington for the purpose of negotiating this contract.

These three contractors were eminently qualified both by experience, financial backing, and size of organization to undertake this work. These companies had previously performed the following large construction contracts for the Government, among others:

Callahan Company:

Madden Dam, Canal Zone.....	\$4, 700, 000
All American Canal, Bureau of Reclamation.....	5, 242, 000
Casper Alcova Dam, Bureau of Reclamation.....	1, 808, 000
Casper Alcova Tunnels, Bureau of Reclamation.....	888, 200
Prado Dam, United States Engineer Department.....	4, 824, 000
New York Aqueduct Shafts, New York City.....	1, 784, 000
Shasta Dam (\$23,000,000) proportionate share.....	2, 000, 000
New York Tunnels, with Associates.....	10, 650, 000
Ft. Isabelle Jetty, U. S. E. D.....	2, 648, 000
Maverick County Irr. District.....	1, 796, 000
New York Barge Canal.....	1, 338, 000

Gunther-Shirley Company:

Mormon Flat Dam, U. S. E. D.....	400, 000
Roads—Wyoming.....	196, 000
Cochella Canal.....	500, 000

Rohl-Connolly Company:

El Capitan Dam, San Diego-----	\$2, 710, 000
Los Angeles Breakwater, U. S. E. D.-----	1, 484, 000
Newport Jetties, City of Newport-----	469, 700
Los Angeles Breakwater #2-----	950, 400
Los Angeles Breakwater #3-----	2, 219, 000
[3397] Seal Beach Jetty for Seal Beach-----	72, 600
Rock Dyke, City of Long Beach-----	199, 100
Headgate Dam, U. S. Indian Service-----	3, 446, 000
Supply Rock, U. S. Navy-----	77, 900
Pt Arguello Breakwater, U. S. Coast Guard-----	135, 000
Dredging & Rip Rap, City of Long Beach-----	60, 000
Redondo Breakwater, City of Redondo-----	457, 800
Hueneme Breakwater, District of Hueneme-----	472, 600
L. A. River Flood Control, U. S. E. D.-----	856, 500

That was done after my time.

Joint Venture:

John Martin Dam, U. S. E. D.-----	\$7, 160, 000
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Furthermore, it should be noted that under regulations in existence at that time, the contractors selected had to be cleared through the Advisory Commission to the Council for National Defense.

At the time I was negotiating for the letting of a contract covering the defense projects, it was very difficult to obtain the services of large, responsible, and experienced contracting organizations because of the greatly increased construction program that was being undertaken in this country. In awarding this contract, I did not in any way force out any contractor or group of contractors who indicated an interest and who possessed sufficient organization, finances, and experience to undertake a job of this magnitude.

The Congressional Report alleges that when I was in Washington with Mr. Paul Grafe and Mr. Thomas [3398] E. Connolly in connection with negotiating Contract W-414-eng-602 that I stayed at the Carlton Hotel from December 17th until December 21st, 1940, at the expense of Mr. Grafe. On inviting the Rohl-Connolly Company, Gunther-Shirley Company, and Callahan Company to send representatives to Washington for the purpose of negotiating this contract, I was advised that Mr. Paul Grafe and Mr. Thomas E. Connolly would come to Washington as representatives of these companies for this purpose. I made arrangements to meet these gentlemen at the Carlton Hotel. On arriving at the Carlton Hotel, I was advised no rooms were available and Mr. Connolly was also without a room. Later in the day it was discovered that Mr. Grafe had made a reservation at the hotel, and he agreed that both Mr. Connolly and myself could use his room until a room could be provided for us.

On completing our negotiations in Washington, Mr. Grafe and I were very anxious to get an airplane flight to the West Coast so that we could be at our homes for Christmas. However, the airline company advised us that no flights were being made from Washington to the West Coast at that time, but advised that we probably could get a flight from New York to the West Coast. Mr. Grafe telephoned me from the hotel while I was at the War Department and gave me this information, stating that he had reserved space on a flight to New York but that we [3399] would have to leave immediately in order to get to the airport in time. Accordingly, I requested Mr. Grafe to pack my things and check me out of the hotel. He did this for me, and I reimbursed him in full for these charges while on the plane en route to New York that same day.

The Congressional Report cites as an alleged illustration of mismanagement of the Hawaiian and South Pacific defense projects on my part the matter of the chartering of the yacht "Vega." The agreement covering the furnishing, operation, maintenance, and supply of the survey ship "Vega" is covered by a supplemental agreement No. 43 (Part I) of Contract No. W-414-eng-602. At the time we were in urgent need of a seaworthy sailing vessel for use in hauling supplies from Suva to the Nandi Airport in the Fiji Islands and for use as a survey vessel in surveying certain proposed air ferry routes in remote areas of the Pacific. It was necessary that the boat not only be of sufficient size and seaworthiness, but also that it be a sailing boat, because in the remote areas in which it would work there were not adequate facilities for refueling. The schooner yacht "Vega" was reasonably well suited for the purposes desired, being 138 feet in length with a beam of 28 feet, and a fast sailing vessel with auxiliary Diesel power. Further-

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more, it was known to be fully seaworthy, being constructed of steel and having sailed from the mainland to Hawaii on previous occasions. At that time ships [3400] of this character were very hard to secure because of the great demand for them both by the Army and Navy and other maritime interests.

I telephoned Mr. Rohl and sought to lease the vessel from him but he stated that he did not desire to do so because he thought he would sell the boat and that he had a prospective purchaser for it. Later, however, he agreed to lease the vessel at a rental of \$1.00 per year,"—

76A. General FRANK. Who owned the boat?

Colonel WYMAN. I assume that Mr. Rohl owned the boat. I have no proof that he owned the boat.

Later, however, he agreed to lease the vessel at a rental rate of \$1.00 per year, the Government to pay certain costs incidental to its use and operation. Accordingly Hawaiian Constructors on November 18, 1941, wrote the following letter concerning this matter:

NOVEMBER 18, 1941.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

Subject: Lease of Mr. H. W. Rohl's boat "Vega"

The DISTRICT ENGINEER,
U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H.

In confirmation of verbal authorization given to Mr. Grafe on November 17th,—

Mr. Grafe was the project manager here.

we request your authority for the rental of the subject boat "Vega" belonging to Mr. H. W. Rohl at a rental rate of \$1.00 [3401] per year, the government to pay the following costs incidental to its operation:

1. Preparation of boat for trip from Los Angeles, California, to Honolulu, T. H.
2. Cost of transportation of the boat from Los Angeles to Honolulu.
3. Removal of the present cabins and fixtures and outfitting the boat as a schooner.
4. Upon completion of its services, restoration of the boat to its original condition.
5. Return of the boat to Los Angeles.

The boat is to leave Los Angeles at once and the crew will be placed on the Hawaiian Constructors payroll.

The value of this boat as established and agreed to is \$100,000.00

Very truly yours,

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS.
By C. C. MIDDLETON.

I authorized the rental of the vessel by the following letter written November 25, 1941.

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

Refer to file No. ND 600.114-602 560 Vega

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Pier 2-A, Honolulu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: In reply to your letter dated November 18, [3402] 1941, and confirming verbal authority previously given, you are authorized to rent the yacht "Vega" from Mr. H. W. Rohl for use on Contract No. W-414-eng-602 at a rental rate of \$1.00 per year, subject to payment of the following costs by the Government:

1. Preparation of boat for trip from Los Angeles, California, to Honolulu, T. H.
2. Cost of transportation of the boat from Los Angeles to Honolulu.
3. Removal of the present cabins and fixtures and outfitting the boat as a schooner.
4. Upon completion of its services, restoration of the boat to its original condition.
5. Return of the boat to Los Angeles.

It is understood that the crew will be reimbursed by the Hawaiian Constructors and that the vessel, valued at \$100,000.00, will leave Los Angeles at once.

77. General FRANK. Who paid for provisioning the boat?

Colonel WYMAN. The operation of the boat?

78. General FRANK. Who paid for provisioning the boat at Los Angeles?

Colonel WYMAN. At Los Angeles? I believe a Colonel Matson, an assistant to the Division Engineer at Los Angeles, issued a purchase order on some outfit to supply the boat with suitable supplies. I know very little about that.

A thorough investigation was made by me to determine the value, ownership and fitness of the [3403] vessel for the work in which it was proposed to be used.

Before the "Vega" could sail from the West Coast to Hawaii it was necessary that the required crew be obtained for it and that it be supplied and otherwise readied for the trip. In addition to this it was necessary to obtain a clearance from the Navy Department for the sailing of the vessel.

The entire matter of taking over the boat, outfitting it for the trip to Honolulu, and putting stores aboard was handled by the Division Engineer of the South Pacific Division at San Francisco. However, I understand that the Division Engineer delegated the job to the District Engineer at Los Angeles.

Several attempts were made to obtain this clearance, and the Navy Department advised that owing to the importance of the safe arrival of this vessel in connection with naval defense projects in the Honolulu District, it was desired that the "Vega" sail with a convoy under escort. Because of these factors the sailing of the "Vega" was delayed until February 19, 1942, when it departed from the West Coast with a convoy. It arrived in Honolulu about March 9, 1942.

At no time during the period from the leasing of the "Vega" until it arrived in Honolulu about March 9, 1942, were plans for the use of the "Vega" abandoned. While other means were obtained during this period for conducting some of the survey work for which it had been planned to use the "Vega", it [3404] was still necessary to survey other air ferry routes and a vessel was still needed for hauling supplies in the remote areas of the Pacific. The "Vega" was to be used for these purposes. On February 11, 1942, in a telephone conversation between myself and Mr. Scheffauer of the Division Engineer's Office in San Francisco, the question of the use of the "Vega" was discussed. In that conversation Mr. Scheffauer advised that the "Vega" would probably be leaving very soon, and in response to this information I said:

This is from a recorded telephone conversation:

"Col. WYMAN. Yes. I wish they would. We'd like to get it down below on the survey work. I have lots of survey work that has been authorized for a new route south. I'd like to get it over because we could use it for a survey boat.

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. Yes. It will be leaving pretty soon.

"Col. WYMAN. I see.

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. Goodbye Colonel."

After the arrival of the boat in Honolulu it was outfitted and made ready to go as quickly as possible under the war conditions that existed in the Hawaiian Islands at that time. The survey crew was sent aboard, and we were waiting for the Navy to clear the departure of this vessel at the time I was relieved as District Engineer at Honolulu. The change in plans which rendered the use of the "Vega" unnecessary did not take place until after my departure [3405] from the Hawaiian Islands. This change in plans is reflected in the letter of April 4, 1942, from my successor to Hawaiian Constructors, which reads as follows:

APRIL 4, 1942.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

HAWAIIAN CAMPUS,
Panahou Campus,
Honolulu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: Reference is made to previous correspondence relative to the contemplated use of the auxiliary schooner "Vega" as covered by Supplemental Agreement No. 43 (Part one) to Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

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Due to a change in policy, it has been decided not to utilize the "Vega" as originally contemplated. It is requested, therefore, that the vessel be returned to its owner.

Authorization is granted for the necessary expenditures to return the vessel to the mainland and for restoration to its original condition in accordance with the terms of the charter as revised.
available convey.

You are directed to return the vessel to Wilmington, California, with the next available convey.

Very truly yours,

/S/ A. K. B. LYMAN,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Department Engineer.

Correspondence in the files of the Division Engineer at San Francisco indicates that after the [3406] vessel returned to the mainland it was accepted by the United States Coast Guard and later taken over by the Navy.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,
Eleventh Naval District,
Long Beach, California, 28 July 1942.

DIVISION ENGINEER, WAR DEPARTMENT,
South Pacific Division, 351 California Street, San Francisco, California.

(Attn: Legal Section.)

DEAR SIR: Re: YACHT VEGA.

This acknowledges receipt of your letter relative to the above subject.

This yacht was accepted by the U. S. Coast Guard on July 9, 1942, after having been offered by the owner upon Offer Form of the U. S. Coast Guard. The acquiring of the vessel in this respect by offer and acceptance is provided for by the U. S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Regulations.

This yacht, however, has since been taken by the Navy, and the Coast Guard does not have same any longer.

/S/ C. W. Thomas,
C. W. THOMAS,
Lt. Com., U. S. C. G.,
Chief of Staff.

79. General GRUNERT. When you get to a good stopping point we shall take a recess; that is, at the end of any particular topic you have there.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. This is the end of that subject, the VEGA.

[3407] 80. General GRUNERT. You are through with the VEGA for the time being?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

81. General GRUNERT. Ten-minute recess.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[3408] 82. General GRUNERT. Let us proceed.

Colonel WYMAN. In view of the question put to me about Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, I would like to introduce in evidence a letter from Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, written to me:

(Letter from Walter F. Dillingham to Colonel Theodore Wyman, April 13, 1942:)

WALTER F. DILLINGHAM
Honolulu, T. H.

Cable Address: Retlaw

APRIL 13, 1942.

Colonel THEODORE WYMAN,

In care of the War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR TED WYMAN: You were good to write me a good-bye letter on March 17. I was touched by the tribute which you pay to me.

I have thoroughly enjoyed my contacts and work with you during your tour of duty under the most unusual conditions which prevailed. I consider your

accomplishment in establishing and fortifying certain line bases on islands of the Pacific one of the greatest contributions to our war efforts. Perhaps because I was in a position to know what an impossible demand was made upon you, I appreciate how you surmounted the difficulties, secured the equipment, met an unbelievable time schedule, completed the job, and made possible the establishment of a flying service between the United States and Australia. I know of many other important jobs which were pushed through by you under stress of circumstances, and I feel that your [3409] above achievement is deserving of distinguished recognition, and I sincerely hope that this recognition will be given to you.

I trust that in your new assignment to duty you will be given the further opportunity of exercising your talents and ability. My every good wish goes with you, and if and when I can ever be of any assistance in the carrying out of any work in which you are interested, please give me the opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) WALTER F. DILLINGHAM.

Continuing my statement:

The congressional report also intimates mismanagement on my part in connection with the purchase of the yacht SOUTHERN SEAS. On the outbreak of the war, I was ordered to take over all of the property of Pan American Airways which had been abandoned by it in the South Pacific area. One item of this property was the yacht SOUTHERN SEAS. On January 9, 1942, I had the following telephone conversation with Colonel Hannum (now General) and Mr. Scheffauer of the Division Engineer Office at San Francisco.

"Colonel WYMAN. Down south, as you know, Panair had abandoned all the establishments, so I have taken them over. I have taken over the stations and also the supplies and whatnot, and of course later on there will have to be a settlement. I had trouble with the French, but no one else. They had down there as you know the SISTER (SOUTHERN SEAS)."

That was a name we adopted for communication purposes.

"Colonel HANNUM. Yes, I wanted to take that up [3410] with you.

"Colonel WYMAN. I'd like to tell you about it, first. They tried to seize that down there, and our people decided it could be used to facilitate our jobs to transport supplies between the various places. I authorized Sverdrup to go ahead and negotiate, either charter or a sale, and he apparently agreed with the people down south and the sale was the thing to do. They asked \$600,000, and I have my doubts that it is worth that much. Deal direct with Colonel Young"—who was a vice president of Pan Air—"whereby we will agree to buy and will agree to pay a substantial sum like \$300,000 and the final price to be subject to approval by qualified people to appraise the value. Don't you think that would be well?"

"Colonel HANNUM. Yes, that is all right. I'd like to have Scheffauer tell you what information he got from the Chief's office about that.

"Colonel WYMAN. All right, sir. I will be glad to talk with him."

The following was my conversation on the same date with Mr. Scheffauer:

"Colonel WYMAN. We took the gas and radio and then came the question of the boat. We want to use the boat from place to place. We have no transportation down there. It is the Panamanian Government"—

that means Pan American Airways.

"The deal was made in New Zealand. I merely gave authority to negotiate it in New Zealand and Australia. They sent in a price of \$600,000. I told the local people here that I would get in touch with San Francisco and the entire arrangement could be made there. I'd like to have this appraised. Don't think it is worth \$600,000 or anywhere near it. What I suggest is that you get authority to negotiate with Colonel Young, of Pan American Airways, [3411] with a view of purchasing. I would rather charter."

83. General FRANK. Is this—

Colonel WYMAN. A telephone conversation.

84. General FRANK. No, just a minute. Is this in the congressional report?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir; it is about—yes, sir, the SOUTHERN SEAS is in the report.

85. Major CLAUSEN. It is in the last pages, from page 47 on.
Colonel WYMAN. (reading):

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. We'll see if we can arrange charter.

"Colonel WYMAN. I'd rather enter into an agreement with them to purchase the ship at a down-payment of \$300,000 and to agree to a price to be determined by appraisal. You see what I mean?

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. Yes.

"Colonel WYMAN. You can do that best in San Francisco. Will you take over, and I will put what I know about it in a radio to you. I don't know very much more than you do about it. The communications down south have been bad, and secret messages have come through pretty badly garbled. You can get in touch with Colonel Young, and you can arrange the whole thing.

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. All right.

"Colonel WYMAN. What we first did was to take possession for the United States, and then the second thing was, we have no other transportation, and they have been very much handicapped down there. We are getting supplies from Australia, and the boat will do the trick.

[3412] "Mr. SCHEFFAUER. Should we get a crew? You have a crew there?

"Colonel WYMAN. They can get a crew right there. If you can arrange delivery with Colonel Young, and if they want it back, we'll return it to them.

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. I'll arrange the insurance and everything in case they are willing to charter it.

"Colonel WYMAN. All I know, now, it supplies for the people, and at one time it was a yacht,—"

I think that is garbled, "supplies for the people."

"and at one time it was a yacht, and it was converted, and you can take it up with the maritime people.

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. I'll find out all about it.

"Colonel WYMAN. Take it up with the Maritime Commission, and get the thing done in accordance with regulations.

"Mr. SCHEFFAUER. I'll get that all cleared up."

The transaction involving the purchase of the SOUTHERN SEAS was from that point on handled to conclusion exclusively by the Office of the Division Engineer at San Francisco, and the Office of the Chief of Engineers, in Washington.

The congressional report alleges that I rushed through the completion of the purchase of certain equipment at an excessive price from Rohl-Connolly Co., because of my expected departure from the Hawaiian Department. It was decided in October 1941 that the equipment in question was needed on Christmas and Canton Islands in connection with the construction work being done there by [3413] Hawaiian Constructors under contract No. W-414-eng-602. It was discovered that the Rohl-Connolly Co. had the needed equipment available at a project it had just completed in Arizona, at Highgate Dam, Parker, Arizona. The Government could either rent or buy this equipment. Since it was to be shipped to these remote islands, it was agreed that the equipment should be bought by the Government. In view of the stepped-up defense construction program under way at that time, equipment of this type was scarce and hard to procure, especially for work in such remote areas.

The equipment was shipped to Los Angeles and reconditioned by the Hawaiian Constructors.

This is wrong. It should read as follows:

The division engineer requested that the office of the district engineer at Los Angeles supervise and check the reconditioning of the equipment and the shipment of it by Army transport to Christmas and Canton Islands. The equipment was shipped by the Army Transport LUDINGTON, I believe. This vessel reached Christmas Island around the first part of December 1941, and part of the equipment was unloaded there. However, before the vessel reached Canton Island to deliver the balance of the equipment there, the attack on Pearl Harbor took place, and the ship was ordered back to the mainland of the United States. On reaching the mainland the balance of the equipment, which is the equipment in question here, was unloaded on the west coast, at San Francisco, I believe. The equipment was delayed on the west coast awaiting reshipment to [3414] Hawaii for use in connection with the defense construction projects being carried on by the Hawaiian Constructors under contract No. 602. While it was awaiting reshipment, additional reno-

vation work was done on the equipment by the Hawaiian Constructors. The equipment was finally reshipped by the Army to Hawaii, where it was put to work in the first part of February 1942.

Due to the extreme pressure of more urgent matters during the period immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, it was impossible to keep paper work up to date, and accordingly no settlement had been made with Hawaiian Constructors for this equipment up to the time it was known that I was to be relieved. At the time I was relieved, Colonel Lyman—that is, General Lyman, deceased—my successor, directed me to work with him for about a week before my departure in settling claims and other unfinished business of this kind that had been incurred during my administration. I did this, and one of the many claims that was settled during that period was the claim of Hawaiian Constructors for this equipment.

On March 11, 1942, the Hawaiian Constructors wrote a formal routine letter requesting written authority to purchase the equipment in question at stated prices. I had a conference with Colonel Lyman, Major Robinson, and the representatives of Hawaiian Constructors, on the question of the fair value of this equipment. In addition, I had an employee of my office appraise the equipment, and the equipment was actually inspected by me and by Colonel Lyman, together. On the basis of all of the information [3415] so obtained, we officially appraised the equipment and decided that under the circumstances its value was in excess of the prices which Hawaiian Constructors had requested authority to pay. Accordingly, I wrote Hawaiian Constructors a routine letter, formally authorizing the purchase of this equipment at the price stated by it. The statement in the congressional report that I disregarded "the official appraisal" in making this settlement is untrue.

The congressional report alleges that while I was District Engineer at Honolulu and supervising the construction of the defense projects under contract No. W-414-eng-602, I was guilty of mismanagement which contributed to the delay in the installation of vital defense projects, and particularly the aircraft warning system, which projects, it is alleged, lagged beyond any excuse. It is further alleged that because of my mismanagement, the necessary orders to proceed with construction work promptly after the approval of the original contract on 3 January 1941 were not issued, and that no efforts were made on my part to prevent delays, and no complaints were made against the contractor for delays. The report concludes that as a result of this inefficiency on my part, the most important item, the permanent aircraft warning stations, were not complete on 7 December 1941, to the advantage of the Japanese and to the detriment of the United States.

With respect to the general allegation of inefficiency on my part as District Engineer, I submit in rebuttal, as exhibit "A", the report of the Inspector General of the [3416] Hawaiian Department, dated 2 September 1941, three months before the Pearl Harbor disaster, and during the period when contract No. W 414-eng-602 was being administered by my office. This report covers the organization of the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu. The deficiencies noted in this report were minor and were summarized by the Inspector General as follows:

"General: This report on the organization of the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu, deals with the administrative framework which has been set up by that government agency for the supervision of the construction projects that are under its control. This report is informative in nature and is intended to serve as a background for a better understanding of the subsequent reports that will be submitted on the more detailed phases of the inspections of the cost-plus-fixed-fee construction projects in the Hawaiian Department.

"CONCLUSIONS

"27. After a study of the organization of the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu, and preliminary visits to the various construction projects under the supervision of the government agency, the following conclusions have been drawn:

"a. That the system of safeguards, for the protection of government funds, property, and plant (inspection, cost accounting, and auditing), as directed by the Chief of Engineers, have been established by the District Engineer.

"b. That deficiencies do exist within the [3417] organization, apparently caused by inadequate inter-office coordination and a lack of sufficiently-skilled clerical employees. These deficiencies have generally allowed clerical

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controls to lag behind the progression of actual construction, resulting in partial failure in the system of cost accounting, procurement, and storage-and-issue.

"c. That conscientious efforts, on the part of the District Engineer and his key assistants, are apparently being made to correct these deficiencies, as soon as they manifest themselves.

"d. That skilled clerical technicians for administrative duties are difficult to obtain because of the large number needed by other competing government agencies and because of higher wages offered by civilian firms for similar services.

"e. That the field areas, established for the prosecution of the construction projects under contract, appear to be well organized and to be working generally in an efficient manner.

"f. That progress on the construction of many projects has been delayed by the shortage of material, which in turn has been caused by (1) the shortage of transportation facilities from the mainland, (2) the inability of local firms to deliver materials on schedule, and (3) the status of defense priorities established for the District Engineer's office."

That is exhibit "A". I will just pile these up.

With respect to the efficiency and organization of Hawaiian Constructors, I submit in evidence a special report, exhibit "B", on the organization of the office of the Hawaiian Constructors, made by the Inspector [3418] General of the Hawaiian Department, dated 4 November 1941, or one month before the Pearl Harbor disaster. The report shows that irregularities and deficiencies were minor and concern chiefly the property and bookkeeping records, and that these deficiencies were caused principally by the need for additional personnel. The significant paragraphs from the conclusions of this report are:

"9. That the corporation executives are attempting to effect an organization that will insure completion of project construction with the greatest degree of efficiency.

"10. That shortages of building supplies, skilled clerical assistants and trained construction laborers are adversely affecting efficient operations; that these conditions will continue for some time due to the lack of adequate transportation and manufacturing facilities, and to the time required to train personnel properly."

This is "B".

Throughout the period from the signing of contract 602 for the construction of defense projects to the time of my being relieved as District Engineer at Honolulu, I was constantly putting pressure on Hawaiian Constructors, on my own organization, on the Office of the Division Engineer in San Francisco, and on other branches of the service, to expedite and speed up the construction involved. Most of the efforts on my part to expedite these projects were in the form of personal interviews, telephone conversations, and conferences, and there are no written records covering the majority of these instances. In some instances, however, I have been able to locate written records which furnish an example of such efforts [3419] on my part. I offer in evidence, as exhibit "C", a memorandum dated 20 April 1941, written by me to Hawaiian Constructors covering expediting of AWS projects.

It is a memorandum to the Hawaiian Constructors, and also to the area engineer, Third Field Area, Fourth Field Area, Operations Division, U. S. Engineer Office; Engineering Division, U. S. Engineer Office; Supply and Transportation Division, U. S. Engineer Office; subject, "A. W. S. Jobs":

(Letter by Colonel Wyman, 20 April 1941:)

1. The District Engineer has been notified that AWS materials will begin to arrive in the Hawaiian Islands about June 15.

2. It is incumbent upon all concerned to expedite AWS construction, with the view of early completion.

3. The following action will be taken:

a. The construction of the access road to Mt. Kaala will be double shifted as early as practicable.

b. A job order will be issued without delay for the construction of the access road to the fixed station on the Island of Kauai.

c. The necessary plant and personnel to construct the Kauai road will be mobilized either from plant owned by the Hawaiian Constructors, or rented plant, including operating personnel.

d. A job office under the Fourth Field Area will be opened at Port Allen, Kauai, and supervisory personnel detailed. The job engineer will exercise general supervision over AWS construction on the Island of Kauai, and the development of Barking Sands Airport, as an Army airfield, and the development of Burns Field, when and as [3420] authorized.

(Signed) THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

I offer in evidence, as exhibit "D" on this point, a letter dated 23 July 1941, written by me to the Hawaiian Constructors, urging the expediting of AWS projects.

(Letter of July 23, 1941, is as follows:)

JULY 23, 1941.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Pier 2-A, Foot of Channel Street,
Honolulu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is extremely anxious to have the AWS Stations at Kokee and Haleakala completed for early use.

You are requested to prosecute the work at those places with sufficient zeal to make them available to the Hawaiian Department for use in the early future.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

I also offer a document, "E," containing extracts from the minutes of the weekly meetings of the District Engineer Advisory Control Board which show examples of action taken by me to expedite these projects. This Advisory Control Board consisted of the heads of the [3421] divisions and field areas, and representatives of Hawaiian Constructors. At its weekly meetings, all problems of delay were considered. I have not had time to search the files to discover all written documents showing actions taken by me to expedite these projects, but these are offered as examples of such action.

I will read it.

(Extract from minutes of weekly meetings of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board:)

First meeting, 24 February, 1941:

"Colonel WYMAN. I desire that plans and specifications be prepared and job orders issued for all roads connected with the AWS Service both on the Island of Oahu and the outlying islands, with a view to early commencement of the actual work of construction of these roads. Contractor is ordered to organize the road construction force to construct these roads successively. If any problems relative to curvature and grading of these roads arise, I desire them brought to my attention without delay."

Fourth meeting, 17 March, 1941:

"Colonel WYMAN. Request approved. In view of the emergency existing in connection with the completion of the National Defense Program being conducted by this office, and in accordance with the desires of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the employment of labor on Sundays and legal holidays and during hours of darkness on authorized projects is approved, for all future operations. Whenever the contractor desires to work on Sundays, legal holidays or during hours of dark- [3422] ness, the Job Engineer or Area Engineer will be notified 48 hours prior to the time, in order that an inspection force may be furnished."

Ninth meeting, 21 April 1941:

"Colonel WYMAN. I have two memoranda here which I will read:" (Reads two memos addressed to Hawaiian Constructors dealing with immediate commencement of work on projects under their jurisdiction.)

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Tenth meeting, 5 May 1941:

"Colonel WYMAN. I desire the job orders and plans issued for the commencement of work on the AWS roads at Maui and Hawaii. Equipment for the AWS installations will arrive here about the 1st of July. The Commanding General wants it ready to be put to work without delay."

Eleventh meeting, 12 May 1941:

"Colonel WYMAN. There appears to be considerable confusion and delay in the receipt and distribution of materials from the mainland. I desire the Chief of the Transportation and Supply Division to make a study of this condition with a view to more orderly receipt and distribution of supplies and materials, and to submit his report and recommendations at the next meeting."

At this same meeting:

"Grafé. Hawaiian Constructors request authority from the District Engineer to have their men consult with the Engineer Department men in connection with this study and procedure."

"Colonel WYMAN. Request approved."

86. General FRANK. May I ask if you intend to read all [3423] those exhibits you have at your hand?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir; I do not; but I thought I would read this, because it is very important to me that I do have evidence that I did urge this construction.

87. General FRANK. Are those exhibits to be put in?

Colonel WYMAN. They are all exhibits; yes, sir.

88. General FRANK. Can you not, after stating the substance of them, submit them as exhibits and documentary testimony?

Colonel WYMAN. I would like to make one other. You see, we opened with those two, but I did not read them.

89. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel WYMAN (continuing):

Thirteenth Meeting, 2 June 1941:

"Colonel WYMAN. The Federal Government, under the terms of the contract, is obliged to furnish the camp, and pay for all installations for the camp; however, any loss in the operation of the camp due to poor management will be borne by the contractor."

"Grafé. The contractor wishes to protest against that decision."

"Colonel WYMAN. Hawaiian Constructors propose to protest; however, that is my decision and consequently an audit will be kept, and if the loss is due to poor management, it is not a proper charge against the United States."

* * * * *

[3424] "KESTLY. I should like to bring to your attention that there are quite a few jobs short of labor—Job 5.0 and Job for Mt. Kaala are both short 15 to 20 laborers."

"Colonel WYMAN. I have authorized verbally the employment of Filipino labor at both of these jobs."

An instance comes to mind on the subject of my expediting these projects. In the early summer of 1941, Mr. Grafé, of Hawaiian Constructors, Brigadier General Warren Hannum, the Division Engineer, and I inspected various jobs the Hawaiian Constructors were doing under contract #602. On this occasion I informed Mr. Grafé,

who was in charge for the contractors.

that it would be necessary for him to stay on these jobs continuously from that time on, in order to prevent any delays and deficiencies of work. He complied with my instructions in this regard. General Hannum, the Division Engineer, is a witness to this fact. By the very nature of things, the time of performance of this CPFF contract was not definitely stated, and no penalties were provided for failure to complete performance within any stated time. The reason for this is the large number of uncertainties that existed with reference to the jobs to be done under the contract at the time it was made and the supplemental agreements were executed. It is anticipated by the very terms of the agreement

that many changes would have to be made, both with respect to work to be done and time for completion of work, and in this connection it should be noted that the contract provided that the contractor should do all things necessary for the completion of the work in the shortest possible time and that no guarantee was made that the work would be [3425] completed in any stated period. Notwithstanding the fact that Hawaiian Constructors was constantly pressed for progress, some unavoidable delays did occur which were due primarily to circumstances attendant upon war conditions—such as deficiencies of material, labor, and transportation, which were beyond the control of both the contractor and the Government. There were no delays which could be ascribed to negligence or inaction on the part of either Hawaiian Constructors or the District Engineer's Office.

[3426] One cause of delay in effecting the completion of these defense projects was the difficulty experienced in getting relatively high priorities for this Hawaiian construction work. In this connection it should be noted that Engineer Department instructions to contracting officers directed that under the standard form of construction contract, where completion was delayed through the observance by the contractor of a voluntary preference obligation assumed at the instance of the government under the system of priorities established by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, contracting officers should grant such extensions of time of performance as were warranted by the facts in each case. In connection with the difficulties experienced in getting high priorities for Hawaiian construction work during this period, I offer in evidence, as Exhibit F, an exhaustive study prepared by the Office of the Chief of Engineers on this subject. It will be noted from this report that until June, 1941, constructions projects in Hawaii were rated on the same basis as similar projects in continental United States, and were not rated as projects in Panama, which were uniformly rated A-1-b. This study very significantly points out:

"The isolation location of Hawaii presented difficulties in procurement and transportation from the mainland which the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reported to the Adjutant General in letters dated 4 June, 1941, 3 July, 1941 and again in a letter dated 28 July, 1941. The Office of the Chief of Engineers, based upon a telephone request from the Division [3427] Engineer, South Pacific Division, dated 13 May, 1941, for a priorities rating on the aircraft warning service (Contract W-414-eng-784, for the cableway for Mount Kaala), received an A-1-f rating. This rating was not considered sufficiently high by the Division Engineer since the Commanding General considers it urgent and necessary that the aircraft warning system be completed and placed in operation without delay. A rating of A-1-c was obtained by the Office of the Chief of Engineers from the Army and Navy Munitions Board on 17 June, 1941.

"Individual requests for ratings and for assistance in obtaining equipment, material and supplies for Hawaii have been received from Hawaii directly or through the Division Engineer. The assistance the Office of the Chief of Engineers had been able to render was not spectacular because the Army and Navy Munitions Board had to be guided by the Priorities Directives. Since the Hawaiian construction projects were considered in the same defense category as domestic projects, the priorities ratings in the early part of 1941 were A-1-g. It was not until July, 1941, that certain projects were authorized ratings of A-1-c. The general authorization to assign a rating of A-1-c to all contracts in Hawaii, even though Panama was authorized an A-1-b, was not favorably considered. Each contract had to be submitted separately to the Army and Navy Munitions Board for a priorities rating and for a priorities certificate, [3428] even though it was known beforehand what ratings the priorities directive authorized. It was not until 8 August, 1941, that the Office of the Chief of Engineers could advise the Division Engineer by teletype that a rating of A-1-c could be applied to all contracts in Hawaii and to any critical list item. It was not until 20 August, 1941, that an Army and Navy Munitions Board directive was published containing this authorization."

Attention is particularly invited to the tabulation forming a part of this exhibit, pertaining to the aircraft warning system. This shows that a request was made for a highest possible rating for the aircraft warning system and that it was assigned a lower rating of A-1-c. It reveals, further, that a request was made for an A-1-b rating for the cableway needed for the Kaala Station, but that an A-1-c rating was obtained. This was followed up by other requests for still higher ratings for this particular job.

In the light of the shortage of critical materials and the assignment of higher priority ratings to projects in other areas, the foregoing demonstrates that delays in the construction of defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands were

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caused by the low priorities assigned and issued to the Hawaiian area. Every effort was made by all echelons in the Corps of Engineers and also by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to get better priorities but such requests were only partially granted. In addition to this, request was made for authority to stock-pile [3429] certain essential materials as lumber and cement in the Hawaiian Islands but this request was disapproved. Under regulations then existing, materials paid for by funds allocated for certain projects had to be earmarked and could be used only for such projects. These conditions greatly retarded the construction of these defense projects including the aircraft warning system.

Another cause of delay peculiar to the Haleakala aircraft warning site was involved in the necessity of securing the permission to use this site from the Interior Department. A discussion on the use of National Park land for this site took place between the War Department and the Department of the Interior prior to March, 1941. In January, 1941, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in a 5th Indorsement dated 3 January, 1941, to basic letter—subject: "Transfer to War Department of Haleakala and Maunaloa Sites, T. H.," which was directed to the Adjutant General—stated that careful consideration had been given to other sites suggested by the Parks Service but that they did not meet the necessary requirements. I offer in evidence as Exhibit G, showing the objection of the Department of the Interior to the transfer of land for the A. W. S. project, a wire from the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated March 3, 1941. In this connection I offer in evidence, as Exhibit H, a copy of a wire dated 4 March, 1941, from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to the Adjutant General, advising that the Haleakala site was a most important one and protesting the submission of the matter to the Interior Department because of the [3430] delay involved. In addition I offer in evidence, as Exhibit I, a wire to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department from the War Department, dated 12 March, 1941, which authorized the Commanding General to make final decision on design and layout and other details of construction for A. W. S. projects in Hawaii, but subject to the approval of the Department of the Interior of all such projects located in National Park sites. It should be noted from this telegram that the occupancy of the needed 40-acre tract was positively refused by the Interior Department at that time, but that the Park Service, with the concurrence of the Hawaiian Superintendent, would recommend approval of the Red Hill site for use by the War Department with the understanding that the Department of the Interior approve the installation and buildings. At that time the Commanding General still desired an area at the summit of Red Hill and an area of approximately 40 acres lower down on the mountain for the construction of a base camp. I offer in evidence, as Exhibit J, a letter from General Marshall, Chief of Staff, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 15 March, 1941, in which it is stated that the Commanding General should continue to seek the Park Commission's approval for the use of the desired land. I also offer in evidence, as Exhibits K and K-1, a letter dated 29 May, 1941 from the Adjutant General to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the National Park Service had finally approved the building designs, the layouts, and was issuing a special use permit for the camp site. I also offer in evidence, as Exhibit K-2, a [3431] copy of a 1st Indorsement dated June 11, 1941, from me to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that I planned to commence construction on the work at an early date.

Under the pre-war administrative procedures prescribed at that time in connection with the construction of these projects, it was necessary to clear a great many phases of this program with various government agencies and different branches of the military establishment. Demonstrating this point I have prepared and submit as evidence Exhibit L entitled "Necessary Principals, Decisions or Actions in Connection with AWS Station by Various Authorities." This exhibit shows that eight other agencies or authorities had to be consulted and gave their approvals at various stages in the development of the project; and that of the 12 principal steps listed, the District Engineer, as the contracting agency, had exclusive authority in only three.

In the Hawaiian Department it was necessary for these inter-departmental approvals, which resulted in a constant interchange of information, especially between the Signal Corps and the Department Engineer, representing G-4, and the District Engineer. The concurrences of the Signal Corps were necessary in every change made, and before any part of the work could be started. The Department Engineer, representing the Commanding General, also had to give

his approval. I have recently gone through the files and there are literally hundreds of staff memoranda illustrating this point.

As an example of the time-consuming process I introduce [3432] in evidence as Exhibit M a memorandum dated 14 February, 1941, written by me to the Department Engineer requesting the approval of certain preliminary sketches and plans. As a further Exhibit, M-1, I introduce in evidence the first indorsement of the Department Engineer showing a partial approval and partial disapproval, a change in the proposed work, and a direction that one item be delayed until further instructions. I give this merely as one example of hundreds of such instances.

It should be borne in mind that this tedious process was in effect not only with respect to the AWS construction projects, but also with reference to the some 148 other construction jobs underway at that time.

In considering delays in the completion of the AWS projects, it should be borne in mind that at that time both the designing agency and using service (which in both instances was the Signal Corps) was working with a project which was still in the development and experimental stage, and was new not only to the military establishment but to the scientific world. Of necessity progress was slow because of the fact that few people could be considered experts in this field.

I now propose to analyze the chronological history of the four elements of the AWS system which constituted the approved project for permanent stations when the Hawaiian Constructors Contract No. 802 was received by the District Engineer, as approved on 6 January, 1941. In this connection it should be noted that the expanded final AWS program was not approved until 4 December, 1941, [3433] three days before Pearl Harbor.

I offer in evidence as Exhibit N a study entitled "AWS Information Center, Fort Shafter, Oahu, J. O. 39.0." It will be noted from this exhibit that the actual location of the structure at Fort Shafter was not fixed until 9 April, 1941, and that the structure was expanded in extent, which necessitated a revised layout which was not approved by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department until 5 October, 1941.

I also offer in evidence as Exhibit O, a memorandum dated 18 April, 1941, from me to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, submitting the general plan and sections for the AWS information center, and Exhibit O-1, the first indorsement of the Hawaiian Department directing the holding in abeyance of the design in view of the instructions received that this station would be combined with the Command Post of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Antiaircraft Groupment. For this revised and enlarged project special tunnel equipment would be needed. However, the equipment on hand at that time would allow only the employment of hand methods. The nature of the job was such that the six months estimated for its construction was not excessive. This resulted in the estimated date of completion falling subsequent to the Pearl Harbor attack. The actual excavation on this project was finished 31 October, 1941, but at that time the using service had not yet decided on the interior arrangements with the result that the sidewalls could not be properly completed. For this reason the actual percentage of completion on 7 December, [3434] 1941, was 72 percent. During the period immediately after Pearl Harbor these tunnels were used as bomb shelters to protect the civilian population—

and the women and children of officers' families stationed in this area:

This further delayed their completion, which was not affected until some time in 1942.

The files revealed that the following dates are shown for the approval of layout plans covering the three fixed AWS stations: Mount Kaala, 6 March, 1941; Kokee on Kauai, 20 March, 1941, and Haleakala on Maui, 17 March, 1941. The time between the date of the receipt of the final approval of the contract, 6 January, 1941, and these approval dates had been consumed in making necessary detailed surveys and preparations of layout and plans for submission. During this period of time very little work could be started because necessary construction equipment was not available on the island and was being procured. In this connection I offer as Exhibit P a letter dated 6 January, 1941, to Hawaiian Constructors from the Division Engineer, granting authority to Hawaiian Constructors to purchase equipment needed for this project. This schedule of equipment had been worked up while I was in the United States in connection with the negotiation of the contract, and was released at San Francisco immediately after the receipt of the Under Secretary of War's approval of the

contract. It will be noted that the total amount of the needed equipment ordered under this authority is approximately \$275,000. At this time the contracting authority [3435] of the District Engineer was limited to \$50,000 in such cases.

I merely cite this as an illustration of the peacetime restrictions and limitations on my actions that were still in effect during the administration of Contract No. 602. It was not until after the attack on Pearl Harbor that contracting limitations and other restrictions upon the authority of the District Engineer were considerably relaxed.

In understanding the construction of the AWS installations at Mount Kaala, Halekala, and Kokee, it should be kept clearly in mind that the District Engineer was to design and build the access road, the utilities, buildings necessary for living quarters, and communications buildings. The using service, the Signal Corps, was to design and furnish the tower and detector stations and the power buildings at the station sites. The District Engineer was to erect the tower and detector stations and power buildings upon delivery of the components at the station sites. The District Engineer was also to install the power unit in the main power building and also to install the fuel oil tanks upon delivery of these items by the Signal Corps at the station sites. The Signal Corps was to furnish and install the equipment in the communications buildings and in the detector stations.

The construction of these facilities was rendered very difficult because of the fact that all of the sites were at very high elevations and base camps had to be established at convenient living locations some distance [3436] below the site of the AWS installations. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that some of these stations were at very remote and inaccessible locations.

Mauna Loa: The Congressional Report (pages 39 and 41) critically states that orders to proceed with an aircraft warning station, road, and so forth, were given on June 30, 1941, and that no progress towards completion was reported until September 1, 1941, the project being cancelled May 1, 1942. This was Job No. 46, or the Mobile AWS station at Mauna Loa. The fact in this situation was that plans were prepared and proceeding, but the project was actually cancelled on July 14, 1941, by orders of Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. The formal cancellation on May 1, 1942, was merely a confirmation of the actual cancellation for record purposes.

Haleakala: The Congressional Report (page 41) critically states that notice to proceed on Job 41, which was the Haleakala Fixed AWS Station, was not given until June 14, 1941. This was the station which was located on lands belonging to the National Park Service and under control of the Department of the Interior. I have already cited the delays experienced in getting authorization from the Department of the Interior to use this land for this purpose. Authorization for the use of this land was not received by the District Engineer until in June, 1941. The records indicate that this authorization was acknowledged by Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, only three days before this notice to proceed was given. In connection with this project, I offer in evidence as Exhibit Q-18a [3437] letter from Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, to the District Engineer, dated September 8, 1941, advising that the necessary metal buildings and towers for installation at Haleakala were on hand at the Signal Corps yard at Fort Shafter and stated that if the buildings were complete, shipments to the site should be expedited. I also offer in evidence as Exhibit Q-2 my reply dated September 23, 1941, advising that the buildings and towers had been shipped to the site and that erection would begin as soon as the Signal Corps employees arrived to supervise. This is another example of the coordination that had to be effected between the Signal Corps, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, and the District Engineer. At this time, a delay occurred inasmuch as no funds were locally available for the shipment of the buildings to the site of erection—

That is, shipping from this island to the other island by means of the inter-island steamboat company.

and under peace-time procedure Washington had to be consulted.

Because it was illegal to use funds appropriated by Congress for one purpose and divert them to another purpose.

It was finally decided that Engineer funds would be advanced and later repaid by the Quartermaster Corps.

The fixed stations site at Haleakala is located on top of Red Hill on the crest of Haleakala Crater, an elevation of about 10,000 feet. A single lane, tortuous road extended to within approximately 3,800 feet of this site. Work on the necessary access road to this site was started about July 7, 1941, and was completed about November 30, 1941. [3438] The transmitter detector was completed on December 6, 1941, and the radio powerhouse was about 99 percent complete at that time. It is not known when the equipment was finally furnished and installed by the Signal Corps. One of the principal reasons contributing to the impossibility of having these stations completed earlier was the fact that the District Engineer did not receive the necessary drawings and plans in time. However, it should be noted that the construction activities of the District Engineer at this site were practically finished on December 6, 1941. I have been advised that later developments have proven that this site was not a suitable one for the operation of an AWS station.

Mount Kaala: This fixed-station site is located at the highest point on Mount Kaala at an elevation of about 4,000 feet. The terrain at and around this site is swampy and covered with jungle growth. The annual rainfall in this area is approximately 100 inches. In order to gain access to this site for the construction and operation of an AWS station, it was necessary to construct a difficult access road some 9,000 feet long with grades extending in excess of 15 per cent, including numerous short radius curves and drainage structures. In addition, it was necessary to construct from the end of the access road to the station site a cableway some 7,360 feet long, arising from an elevation of 1,931 feet to an elevation of approximately 4,000 feet, up the sides of a rough and rugged steep mountainside. As an illustration of the difficulties encountered in constructing this project, it should be pointed out that the necessary [3439] aggregate for the concrete detector footing had to be transported over a narrow trail by pack animals in 100 pound bags.

Hawaiian Constructors was given notice to proceed on construction of this cableway on February 6, 1941. The cableway required a special design, and a contractor on the mainland, experienced in both cableway design and construction, was necessary. General plans and specifications were prepared by the District Engineer and the work was advertised by Hawaiian Constructors. The bid received was considered too high. The Division Engineer was then requested to advertise the work. In this connection, I offer as Exhibit R a radio dated March 7, 1941 sent by me to the Division Engineer urging that work be expedited. The Division Engineer—

at San Francisco—

advertised this work on March 31, 1941 and a contract was signed on April 30, 1941, with the low bidder, Interstate Equipment Company. The Interstate Equipment Company submitted a design with its bid and the equipment was to be fabricated and shipped within 128 days. During this period, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department made many efforts to secure higher priorities for this equipment. I have discussed this previously. Due to the low priorities assigned to this contract, the contractor experienced difficulties in getting necessary materials and the components arrived in Hawaii in dribs and drabs. On September 6, 1941, the construction work actually started in the field prior to the arrival of the cableway components. The last shipment [3440] of components left the factory of the Interstate Equipment Company—

at Elizabeth, New Jersey—

on November 21, 1941. Obviously, it was impossible to finish the construction of this station by December 7, 1941. One of the principal causes of delay on this project was the low priority rating assigned work in Hawaii. In addition, my office was not supplied with the necessary drawings in time for the completion of the construction work to have been effected prior to December 7, 1941. I have been advised that after the final completion of this station, the site was found unsuitable for operation of an AWS installation.

Kokee, Kauai: The site for this AWS installation was at an elevation of 4,230 feet. The terrain at and approaching this site is rugged, swampy and covered with heavy jungle growth. The annual rainfall at the site is approximately 100 inches, and the annual rainfall in the vicinity of the site has been measured as high as 600 inches, and it is regarded as one of the wettest spots in the world. An access road more than 12,000 feet long with grades exceeding 12 per cent had to be constructed. A base camp, consisting of barracks, mess-

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hall, recreation hall, radio shelter, water supply system, sewage system, and electrical system had to be provided for the operating personnel.

The layout plan for this station was approved March 20, 1941. Plans for the access road were not approved by higher authority until May, 1941. Construction work on the access road did not start until June 24, 1941. Great [3441] difficulties were experienced in making surveys through the jungle and swamps through which the road had to be constructed. Furthermore, my office was short of qualified personnel for making such surveys. However, the access road was about 86 per cent complete on December 7, 1941, the detector building and tower and tower building were about 50 per cent complete. It would have been impossible for the construction work involved in this project to have been completed by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor because of the late date on which my office received the necessary drawings and plans for erection.

I want to emphasize that one of the outstanding reasons why it would have been impossible to finish the major elements of the AWS stations before December 7, 1941, was the fact that my office did not receive essential plans for erection and drawings from the using service in time. By this I do not mean to criticize the using service because it was known that it was developing a design of a major item which was entirely new and still in an experimental stage. I offer in evidence as Exhibit S-1 a letter from the Chief of Engineers, dated August 5, 1940, to the Chief, Signal Office, urging that he be furnished with designs of AWS structures at as early a date as possible. I also offer in evidence as Exhibit S-2 a first indorsement to this letter giving certain general features. The files of the office of the Chief of Engineers show additional exchanges on this matters.

I offer in evidence as Exhibit T a communication dated October 23, 1941, from the office of the Chief of [3442] Engineers to the Division Engineer at San Francisco, entitled "Aircraft Warning Service, Foundation Drawings." I also offer in evidence as Exhibit T-1 a communication from the Division Engineer at San Francisco to the District Engineer at Honolulu, dated October 30, 1941, transmitting aircraft warning service foundation drawings. This communication transmitting these drawings was received in my office November 24, 1941, only 13 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The drawings received on November 24th which were essential to the erection of this work are right here in this folder.

I also offer in evidence as Exhibit U a communication to the Division Engineer, San Francisco, from the office of the Chief of Engineers, dated December 12, 1941, forwarding additional drawings and erection diagrams for aircraft warning service construction. It was necessary for my office to have these plans and drawings before it could undertake the completion of the construction involved in these projects.

A review of the file in my office reveals that actual receipt of drawings of various elements of the AWS installations was as follows:

May 12, 1941: Received foundation plans for the metal buildings and also for the detector.

September 11, 1941. Received some small details for transmitter building.

November 24, 1941, received floor plan for transmitter building with sketches of 100-foot tower and relative position of the detector and transmitter building. The [3443] sketch of the detector, however, gives no designations of the fabricated members, which was necessary for erection purposes.

December 24, 1941: Received the first set of drawings which could really be fully used for proceeding with the erection of the detector and transmitter building.

The detector for the Haleakala station was erected before the complete drawings were received. However, this was only a 34-foot tower whereas the tower at Kokee was 100 feet high, for which details were more complicated. Although the steel for the tower itself was shipped to Kokee in September, 1941, the pieces of steel were not marked with the fabrication marks which were necessary for erection, in accordance with the usual practice.

It is evident, therefore, that it would have been impossible to have completed prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster the erection of all the important elements of the AWS stations at their respective sites because indispensable plans and drawings were not available to the office of the District Engineer in time.

[3444] In conclusion it is obvious that:

1. Prompt steps were taken after receipt of the approved contract with Hawaiian Constructors on 6 January 1941, to put underway all work which

could be started by the District Engineer without plans and specifications and without the equipment and buildings to be furnished by the Using Service..

2. That continued pressure was applied by the District Engineer upon the contractor to keep his work on schedule.

3. That low priorities delayed the work, although continuous efforts were made to secure higher priorities.

4. That failure of the Interior Department to grant permission to use Park Lands delayed the Haleakala A. W. S. Station project.

5. That low priorities for critical material, notably steel, delayed execution of Contract W-414-eng-784 with Interstate Equipment Co. for the cableway for Mt. Kaala A. W. S. station; that the unusual, natural and difficult field conditions required a period of construction which was not abnormal for such difficulties and which threw completion after Pearl Harbor; that, however, even had this not been so, other factors, beyond the control of the District Engineer, were also present and would have prevented completion of the Mt. Kaala project before 7 December 1941.

6. That procedures necessary for coordination [3445] and cooperation, such as securing of approvals for layouts and of all other major features and of changes desired by higher authority or by the Using Service, caused the initiation of actual work to be at later dates than if only engineering considerations to be decided by the District Engineer had been involved.

7. That the foregoing factors made impracticable the issuance of notice to proceed before the dates such orders were in fact issued, namely, about in February for the cableway and June for A. W. S. Stations.

8. That the District Engineer could not proceed without plans and specifications; that the earliest complete set of those which were necessary in order to properly execute the work were received in the District Office on December 24, 1941, seventeen days after Pearl Harbor.

9. That had the fore-sight existed to have predicted the need of an emergency A. W. S. on or before 7 December 1941, the mobile sets which were received on the islands by August, 1941, could have been set up irrespective of the degree of completion of the three permanent projects from a construction standpoint. Roads were completed to two of the three sites.

[3446] (The following exhibits offered by the witness, which does not include those read entirely into the record, were received in evidence and marked as indicated below:)

(Wyman "A", special report dated September 2, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 27 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "B", special report dated November 4, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 28 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "F", priorities on Hawaiian Construction, dated August 29, 1944, was marked Exhibit No. 29 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "G", message dated March 3, 1941, Adams to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was marked Exhibit No. 30 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "H", message dated March 4, 1941, Short to Adjutant General, Washington, was marked Exhibit No. 31 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "I", message dated March 12, 1941, Adams to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was marked Exhibit No. 32 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "J", letter March 15, 1941, Marshall to Short, was marked Exhibit No. 33 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "K", letter May 29, 1941, McDole to District Engineer, Honolulu, was marked Exhibit No. 34 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "K-1", paraphrase, Adams to C. G., Hawaiian Department, was marked Exhibit No. 34-A and received in evidence.)

[3447] (Wyman "K-2", Wyman to C. G., Hawaiian Dept., dated June 11, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 34-B and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "L", AWS Stations, was marked Exhibit No. 35 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "M", Wyman to Dept. Engr., Hawn. Dept., dated February 14, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 36 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "M-1", Grosse to District Engineer, Honolulu, dated March 6, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 36-A and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "N", AWS Information Center, Fort Shafter, was marked Exhibit No. 37 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "O", Wyman to C. G. Fort Shafter, dated April 18, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 38 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "O-1", McDole to District Engineer, dated May 17, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 38-A and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "P", Hannum to Hawaiian Constructors, dated January 6, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 39 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "Q-1", Fleming to District Engineer, dated September 8, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 40 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "Q-2", Wyman to Dept. Engr., Ft. Shafter, dated September 23, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 40-A and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "R", Wyman to Division Engr., dated March 7, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 41 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "S-1", Adcock to Chief Signal Officer, dated August 5, 1940, was marked Exhibit No. 42 and received in evidence.)

[3448] (Wyman "S-2", Gripper to Chief of Engineers, dated August 16, 1940, was marked Exhibit No. 42-A and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "T", Person to Division Engineer, dated October 23, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 43 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "T-1", Matheson to Dist. Engrs., dated October 30, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 43-A and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "U", Person to Division Engineer, dated December 12, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 44 and received in evidence.)

(Wyman "V", Wyman statement, "Gasoline", was marked Exhibit No. 45 and received in evidence.)

90. General GRUNERT. We shall take a five-minute recess.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

91. General GRUNERT. Are you ready to proceed?

[3449] Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir, I am ready.

The work that I have been able to do during the few days that I have been here is pretty well covered. However, it is alleged in the Congressional document referred to that there was certain delay in the construction of some gas tanks at airfields under a job order, on which I can make a statement. It is my recollection that some of those gas tanks were at South Point on the big island of Hawaii, and some were at Barking Sands on the Island of Kauai, and some were at Bellows Field on this island. In the case of the airfield at South Point it was constructed with WPA labor under my jurisdiction. Some work was also done on the Barking Sands airport by WPA labor, and some work was done at Bellows Field by WPA labor under my jurisdiction, I being the WPA administrator for the Hawaiian Islands.

92. General FRANK. When? When was this work done by the WPA?

Colonel WYMAN. It was done in 1940 and carried through till the WPA was abolished, in about August 1941. When the District En-

gineer's office took over the construction of airfields early in '41, there was at Hickam Field a large amount of plate which had been stored there under the Construction Quartermaster and allowed to deteriorate due to the ravages of the weather.

93. General FRANK. What do you mean by "plate"?

Colonel WYMAN. Plate, sections of tanks.

94. General FRANK. Oh, yes.

Colonel WYMAN. They were molded plate, molded plate for tanks.

And it was decided by the Hawaiian Air Force, that is the [3450] Commanding General, that he would like to utilize those tanks on the outlying islands if possible; but when the activity was turned over to the Engineer Department, the entire amount of money available for the construction of such tanks was about twenty-nine hundred dollars, as I recollect it; and I have not consulted—had an opportunity to consult the records. And, of course, facts in the matter, the work of installing tanks in these islands was started in a big way after a large sum of money was appropriated by Act of Congress and allotted to this Hawaiian Department, as I remember it, in August 1941. Prior to that time there was no money available in an amount necessary to make extensive installations, with the exception of Hickam Field, which was being done by another contractor.

In the case of Bellows Field various schemes were proposed for the installation of the small tanks along the edge of the runways, for the servicing of airplanes. However, final decision as to their location and the method of construction was held off until the 19th of September, 1941, and I have to offer in evidence a correspondence setting forth this point, as follows. It is first a letter from me to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.:

Attached herewith are two (2) prints of drawings, File No. F-20/2, showing the General Plan of Bellows Field—

That is the whole plane of the proposed runways, the general development of the field.

and the location of the existing and proposed site for the gasoline storage tunnel. It had been decided to build a tunnel.

[3451] Your attention is directed to the site originally chosen for the gasoline storage tunnel as shown on the drawing. This site was inspected by this office and it was found that the tunnel will require considerable support during construction, and will be cause for considerable increase in cost.

The recommended site as shown on the attached drawing offers greater structural stability together with a lower initial construction cost. It is, therefore, recommended that this site be adopted for construction for the gasoline storage tunnel at Bellows Field.

1st Indorsement

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 16 August 1941.

To: District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

1. The location recommended for the gasoline storage at Bellows Field is approved.

For the Commanding General:

O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

1 Incl: 1 Drawing w/drawn.

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ND 033 Gas Stor. Tanks (7-16-41) 2nd Ind. 4-E

OFFICE, DISTRICT ENGINEER,
Honolulu, T. H., September 4, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The approved location of the gasoline storage tanks and dispensing system is shown on [3452] the attached drawing, File No. F-20/2. This system of storage and dispensing differs considerably from the scheme outlined in basic letter dated July 16, 1941, subject: Installation of gasoline tanks at Bellows Field. Under this basic letter certain requests were made regarding the installation of an oil storage tank and an overhead oil filling station to fill oil servicing trucks.

2. It is desired to know whether the items of work requested above and more specifically under paragraphs 1-g and 1-h, of basic letter are still required.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, District Engineer.

Third Indorsement

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 September 1941.

To: District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

1. The following additional information is submitted concerning the gasoline and oil storage systems to be installed at Bellows Field. Subparagraph numbers will correspond to those of the basic letter dated 16 July 1941, subject: "Installation of gasoline tanks at Bellows Field."

a. The location of the gasoline storage tanks as shown on your drawing, file No. F-20/2, has been approved by previous correspondence.

b. Gasoline tanks will be tunneled into the hill as previously agreed upon.

[3453] c. The aqua system is not to be installed. Since the tanks are located at an elevation of approximately 100 feet above sea level, flow to the dispensing pits can be by gravity.

d. The twelve pits along the taxi strip will not be installed.

They were the original 12 pits.

e. Nozzle flow should be sixty gallons per minute.

f. The overhead type gasoline filling station to fill gasoline servicing trucks is not desired. This type of installation has been found too difficult to camouflage. In place of the overhead system, it is requested that you install twelve pits in the approximate location indicated on the attached map. These pits should be spaced sixty feet apart along the edge of the proposed road. Each pit should contain two hoses thirty-five feet long for filling the gasoline servicing trucks. The pits should be made of reinforced concrete and provided with a heavy steel-plate cover with hasp and padlock. These pits should be similar to those now installed in the servicing mat at Hickam Field. The access road which you have shown to the gasoline servicing area should be made wide enough so that gasoline servicing trucks may be stopped along the road and filled without leaving the road. This road should be continued across the reservation to the officers' beach.

[3454] g. The 10,000-gallon oil storage tank previously requested is no longer required. The lubricating oil is delivered in 55 gallon drums. A corrugated iron oil storage shed has been included in the project for Bellows Field.

h. No overhead oil filling station will be required. The oil will be loaded into the servicing trucks directly from the drums.

1. Since no gasoline pits are to be provided in the servicing mat, this paragraph is no longer applicable.

2. It is requested that every effort be made to make the gasoline filling installation as inconspicuous as possible. The services of the Camouflage Officer at Department Headquarters will be made available to the District Engineer on call, in order that the detailed design of these installations can be made to accord with camouflage principles.

For the Commanding General:

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D., Adjutant General.

I offer that to show that the plans of the Air Corps for the development of Bellows Field were still in a process of change, and that before any moneys could be spent in construction it was necessary to have a complete meeting of minds between the construction agency, the District Engineer, and the using service, the Air Corps. I might state that it was my—I was urged by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian [3455] Islands, and also by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force at that time, to start the construction of Bellows Field, of the runways; and then, after considerable urging and taking it up with the Division Engineer, I diverted funds into the extent of \$1,000,000 from other projects, that is, other projects that were more or less where the money couldn't be spent right away, for the development of Bellows Field; and under a job order issued to the Hawaiian Constructors we built a runway which was about over 5,000 feet long and which was completed and ready for use on the 7th day of December and was used in the training of fighter command aircraft and aviators stationed at Bellows Field.

I merely state that to indicate my eagerness to make progress in the building of airfields, much-needed airfields, in the Hawaiian Department at that time, because both Hickam Field and Wheeler Field were being overcrowded with aircraft; and at one conference I attended the Commanding Officer of Wheeler Field stated that the number of aircraft thereat was so great that if they all took off the first one would be obliged to return to the field before the last one could get off.

Now, I have been unable to find—I thought I had it with me—a statement on the installation of the gas tanks and of the war reserve gasoline storage. I mislaid my prepared statement, but I would like the opportunity to submit that as evidence.

95. General FRANK. Mark that as the exhibit next in order.

[3456] Colonel WYMAN. I understand it is being sent over by messenger.

I would like to state at this time that I am at a great disadvantage of coming from France here on this short notice, with the short time I have had to examine into the files of my office here when I was District Engineer, and also to state to you that on about the 25th of July I was in a terrible automobile accident.

96. General FRANK. This year?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. I managed the visit of the Prime Minister of England, Mr. Churchill, to Cherbourg and Utah Beach; and immediately after Mr. Churchill left the car that I was in, within ten minutes, the car collided with a truck, head-on collision, and it was travelling perhaps as high as 40 miles an hour. This accident occurred without warning. I was in the back seat of the car alone, and I struck the front seat with my head and shoulder—that is, the back of the front seat with my head and shoulder—with such force that the front seat was broken into two pieces. Of course, I was knocked out and lay on the floor of the car, but after being picked up and revived, and whatnot, I continued to supervise the picking up of the wreck, the clearing away of the thing, and was taken to my station by General Lee and General Plank, who were witnesses to the accident, and put to bed, but the next day I was back on duty.

But every little while I do have pains in the back of my head, which are very distressing, and I have them right now, and I would like to be excused until I have a few minutes to rest.

[3457] 97. General GRUNERT. We shall have lunch, and after lunch the Recorder will find out if you are ready to continue; otherwise we shall go ahead with some other witness.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. I think I will be ready to continue, General; just a matter of a little rest; that is all.

98. General GRUNERT. If you want more time, just let us know, and we will go ahead with some other witnesses. That will be entirely up to you. The Recorder will ascertain how you feel.

Colonel WYMAN. What time will we reconvene?

99. General GRUNERT. At one o'clock. And if at that time you are not ready, why, we have other witnesses who will be here at that time.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. All right.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[3458]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 1 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will please come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CHERBOURG BASE SECTION, FRANCE—Resumed

101. General GRUNERT. Where were we? You had not finished your statement?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir. Continuing my statement, I would like to submit as evidence a statement of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., covering allegations contained in House Report No. 1638, 78th Congress, 2d Session, relating to his responsibility for Pearl Harbor disaster, with reference to war reserve aviation gasoline.

I will read the first part of this paper and just submit the other as an exhibit.

The Joint Board 314.—

That is the Army and Navy Joint Aviation Gasoline Board,

on the 5th of September 1940, contemplated storage for 250,000 barrels for the Army and 100,000 barrels for the Navy, on the basis of an estimated cost of \$2 per barrel in commercial tanks of 25,000 barrel capacity. The directive of 28 December 1940, raised the estimate of cost to \$4 per barrel, reduced the quota (Army) for Hawaii to 100,000 barrels, and authorized preliminary surveys to be made. In March, 1941, \$5,000 was made available to the District Engineer for these surveys.

The surveys were made in March, 1941, and during March a representative of Air Corps came to Hawaii, inspected sites and made recommendations. On 3 April, [3459] 1941, the Commanding General forwarded to the Adjutant General his recommendations (in which the District Engineer and the Naval Commandant concurred) for locations at two sites. By letter, 5 April, 1941, the Chief of Engineers notified the District Engineer that priority for steel for tanks could not be obtained until the contract for the tanks had been let.

By letter 9 April, 1941, the Chief of Engineers directed the District Engineer to prepare a definite project report for a total capacity of between 125,000 and 133,000 barrels, and by letter 21 April, 1941, to submit recommendations regarding protection at both sites. On 21 June, 1941, the District Engineer received notice

that the proposed Army storage had been increased from 100,000 to 250,000 barrels.

On 17 June, 1941, the District Engineer was notified that funds had been authorized (\$600,000 cash and \$1,400,000 contract authorization) and directed to commit the contract authorization before 1 July. On 24 June, 1941, the District Engineer forwarded his definite project report, stating that the construction for 200,000 barrels at Site "B" had been put under the Hawaiian Constructors contract, and that the estimated completion time would be eight months. The Chief of Engineers, in forwarding this report to the Adjutant General, recommended 25,000 barrel capacity tanks instead of 50,000.

On 23 July, 1941, the Division Engineer relayed to the Chief of Engineers the District Engineer's request to be permitted to proceed with excavation work, but on [3460] 26 July, 1941, the District Engineer was instructed not to start work as the plans were being materially changed.

On 3 September, 1941, the Adjutant General requested the Chief of Engineers to revise the plans. On 23 September, 1941, the District Engineer was directed to proceed with construction at Site "B" but not to start work at Site "A" pending arrival in Honolulu of the Engineer's Advisory Committee. On 27 September, 1941, the District Engineer was notified that installation of eight 40,000 barrel capacity tanks had been approved and that negotiations for procuring these eight tanks had been begun.

The tanks were procured by the District Engineer at Pittsburgh in the United States.

On 9 October, 1941, the District Engineer forwarded the report of the Advisory Committee (which had been in Honolulu in September) and concurred in its recommendations, and on 31 October, 1941, the District Engineer was directed to proceed with the work in accordance with the recommendation of the Advisory Committee. On November 15, 1941, the District Engineer informed the Division Engineer that he estimated the tanks and the pipe line could be installed sixty days after their arrival. Construction began 19 November, 1941, with a completion date of 1 June, 1942. On 23 November, 1941, the District Engineer wired the Division Engineer requesting immediate shipment of the channel anchors and bars. By letter 25 November, 1941, the Division Engineer forwarded to the District Engineer a copy of an indorsement for the Chief of Engineers to the Navy [3461] stating that four tanks would be shipped by 30 November and the steel for the other five by 15 January, 1942. On 28 November, 1941, the District Engineer was notified that the channel anchors and bars were shipped 26 November.

Plans and specifications for the 40,000 barrel tanks were received by the District Engineer 22 December, 1941.

The foregoing history is conclusive that it would have been impossible to have completed the war reserve gas storage by the date of Pearl Harbor.

I would like to state at this time—this is the end of my prepared statement—and due to lack of time these statements were made from memory, from events that occurred a long time ago. However, there may be many inaccuracies in the written report, either typographical errors or minor inaccuracies. Therefore, I would like the right to check some of this data that has been furnished, to make sure that it is correct and to submit any corrections by letter that I may find necessary.

102. General GRUNERT. You mean corrections to your statement to the Board?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. If there are any inaccuracies, small inaccuracies, or references.

103. General GRUNERT. You mean, take your retained copy and check it?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. That is, I will keep a copy and I will check it and make sure the references are correct and that sort of thing.

104. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no objections, except that the statement as given will be put in the record and any changes may be appended to that record.

[3467] Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

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105. General FRANK. Do the statements that you have made today contain all and everything that you would like to say to the Board?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no, sir. There are many allegations in the Congressional Record that I have not had an opportunity to even work on at all. However, due to the lack of time, this is the best I am able to do, even with the assistance of some people I have had assisting me.

106. General FRANK. Did General Hannum ever visit the line of airfields along the Christmas Island, Canton, Noumea route?

Colonel WYMAN. I have not the least idea. Not to my knowledge. I do not know.

107. General FRANK. Well, you were the—

Colonel WYMAN. You mean while I was here?

108. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. He visited Midway, because I was with him. I do not recollect any time that General Hannum visited the islands between here and Australia.

109. General FRANK. How many times did you visit them?

Colonel WYMAN. I did not visit them at all.

110. General FRANK. This line of airfields?

Colonel WYMAN. I never had the opportunity. Just at the time I was leaving here General Tinker and I and Colonel Mollison had made a plan to take off and visit these fields, and, as a matter of fact, they did take off to visit the fields shortly after I left.

111. General FRANK. General Hannum was in charge of supervising your work?

[3463] Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. He was the Division Engineer and acted in accordance with his official capacity as the Division Engineer and supervising work not only in my district but in the other districts.

112. General FRANK. How did he know the nature and satisfactoriness of your work, if he never visited it?

Colonel WYMAN. I would say he can answer that best himself. I do not know. He visited this island, visited Midway, visited the outer islands here, several times while I was here, inspected the work at Hickam Field, and had conferences with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

113. General FRANK. In your statement you made a comment with respect to the return of the VEGA to the United States. Was the VEGA ever used on any one single trip?

Colonel WYMAN. Not while it was in my charge.

114. General FRANK. What influence did General Emmons have on the return of the VEGA to its owner?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not know, but he had a great influence on the VEGA coming over here. There was a conference held with Admiral Nimitz, and General Emmons and General Collins—not General Collins—but the Chief of Staff, and a decision was made to make a survey of a second route, the eastern route, between Hawaii and Australia. Ways and means were discussed at great length as to how we could do things and we told them one of the things we needed was a survey boat, a sailing boat, and he directed that the boat be procured without delay and the survey start without delay.

115. General FRANK. How did he do that?

Colonel WYMAN. Verbally, right at the conference.

116. General FRANK. Who was there present at that time?

[3464] Colonel WYMAN. General Sverdrup was present as I recall. I was present.

117. General FRANK. Who else?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not remember. Several other people, however; I do not recollect.

118. General FRANK. Who selected the airfields at the places along the route at which you constructed these airfields?

Colonel WYMAN. When the first instructions came over that they might build an air route to Australia, and to prepare for it, we dispatched a destroyer with a reconnaissance party to Christmas Island. It was a naval destroyer. I have forgotten the engineer officer detailed. That will be a matter of record. In the case of Canton Island, the reconnaissance was made by General Sverdrup and Colonel Robinson, who landed there in a clipper and made a reconnaissance of the island.

In the case of Nandi airport, the reconnaissance was made by Sverdrup and Parcel. The Nandi airport had already had some work done by New Zealand forces.

In the case of Caledonia, Sverdrup and Parcel selected Plain des Gaiac as a site and also made plans for the extension of the Tontouta runway near Noumea.

In the case of the extension of the runways at Townsville in Australia, the entire reconnaissance was made by General Sverdrup.

119. General FRANK. What eliminated the necessity for the use of the VEGA?

Colonel WYMAN. At the time I was here there was a survey crew on the VEGA. At least, it was all prepared to leave. I do not know that they ate on the VEGA, but I think they slept on [3465] the VEGA. They were waiting for Navy concurrence to start south, with a view of making a survey of Tongareva Island. I think they were going there first, and then going to continue to Tahiti and then go over to Suva. Then one of the proposed uses of the boat was the hauling of small amounts of freight and personnel from Suva to Nandi airport.

When the plan was changed, as I recall it, Admiral Nimitz agreed to furnish some naval flying boats to make certain portions of the survey by means of naval aviation and agreed to furnish these flying boats to Sverdrup and Parcel.

120. General FRANK. You stated there were certain delays in building the access road to Kokee. What certain approvals were necessary? Who had to make those approvals?

Colonel WYMAN. There was a large number of approvals necessary. First, it was necessary to gain the approval of the Territory, because the road was located on Territorial property. It was also necessary to gain the approval of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or his representative, the Department Engineer. After the site or location of the road was approved and the type of road, then it was necessary to make drawings in detail and submit them to the Division Engineer at San Francisco for technical approval. Then after that came back approved, theoretically, a job order could be issued for the construction.

121. General FRANK. Could not some of these approval be obtained simultaneously?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir. Approvals were obtained in accordance with orders and regulations governing the District Engineer and the Engineers Department.

[3466] 122. General FRANK. What regulations prevent you from proceeding with getting the approval of the Territory and the Department Commander at the same time?

Colonel WYMAN. As a matter of fact, as I recollect it, the Department Engineer secured the approval of the Territory, and not the District Engineer, because the Department Engineer's office as a representative of G-4 made all of the arrangements for the acquirement of property. I had nothing to do at that time with the acquirement of property.

123. General FRANK. I asked you some time back, at the beginning of this testimony, what was Rohl's professional background.

Colonel WYMAN. I submitted in my written statement—

124. General FRANK. I would like an answer to that.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. I submit in my original statement a compilation of the work that had been performed by the Rohl-Connolly Company. Now, as to his personal background I have no knowledge whatsoever, except through the achievements of his company.

125. General FRANK. Who was the guiding spirit in the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not know what a guiding spirit is. Therefore, I cannot answer the question.

126. General FRANK. Do you know under what conditions Rohl came to the United States?

Colonel WYMAN. I read about in in the Congressional report. That is the first knowledge I ever had of any such entrance into the United States, what I have read in this House document I have referred to.

127. General FRANK. What contracts did Rohl have with the Engineers other than the breakwater contracts in Los Angeles?

[3467] Colonel WYMAN. Well, he had the breakwater contract in Los Angeles. It is in the statement. I could pick them out of that, because I have listed them all. The Caddoa Dam, which I think is called in that the John Martin Dam. But the same three contractors were associated in that, the Callahan Construction Company, Gunther-Shirley and the Rohl-Connolly Construction Company. They were associated together as coadventurers, and known as the Caddoa Constructors, building the great flood control dam at Caddoa, New Mexico.

After I left the Los Angeles district I notice in here that the Rohl-Connolly Company built a section of the Los Angeles River under my successor, Colonel Kelton.

128. General FRANK. What social relations did you have with Rohl in Los Angeles?

Colonel WYMAN. I have given that in my statement.

129. General FRANK. Will you state it now?

Colonel WYMAN. I would rather read it out of the statement.

130. General FRANK. Is that statement from your memory?

Colonel WYMAN. It is largely my memory, yes. I can try to review it from what is here.

I was on Rohl's yacht in 1935, with my family, in the company of other officers, and I took an overnight trip, which was a pleasure trip, from Los Angeles to Catalina and, incidentally, inspected a great

quarry over there that was being operated for the benefit of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.

Again, in 1936 I was aboard the Rohl yacht with two friends of mine, and there were some other guests aboard. That was also an overnight trip from Los Angeles to Catalina Island [3468] and return.

Again, I was on the boat on the occasion of the regatta at Newport Yacht Club, where I was an invited guest of the Newport Yacht Club, and Mr. Rohl invited me to return to Los Angeles on his boat, which I did, in company with other guests.

In 1939, I was on his yacht once with my wife, and I think there was Rohl and his wife, and there may have been one or two other people on the boat.

131. General FRANK. Did you see Rohl on your way over here on this trip?

Colonel WYMAN. No. You mean, to this Board?

132. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir.

133. General FRANK. Did you see Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir.

134. General FRANK. To what clubs did you belong in Los Angeles?

Colonel WYMAN. At Los Angeles I had an Army membership at the California Club. I had golf-playing privileges at the Los Angeles Country Club, which was extended to Army officers as is frequently done in the large cities of the United States.

135. General FRANK. Were there only two clubs to which you had membership?

Colonel WYMAN. At another time I had golf-playing privileges at the Bel-Air Country Club at one time.

It was more than that. They issued a ticket, a courtesy ticket, at the Los Angeles Athletic Club that included a whole chain of clubs. You could use your privileges at the Los Angeles Athletic Club to a dozen clubs throughout southern California. You could use the same membership ticket. The [3469] reason for that, as I recall, is that all these clubs were in a more or less state of bankruptcy due to the great depression, and in order to get some business at their golf courses and club houses these privileges were extended by the Los Angeles Athletic Club, and I had one of those memberships. I think the total cost for the card was just a minor sum of money, three or four dollars, something like that.

[3470] 136. General FRANK. Were you ever entertained by Rohl in Los Angeles at the Biltmore Hotel?

Colonel WYMAN. As his guest at the Biltmore?

137. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't recollect an occasion, not one, at any dinner or anything that Rohl gave. There might have been, but I can't recollect the occasion, if there was.

138. General FRANK. Do you think you could have been up there on quite a series of occasions without knowing anything about it?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I couldn't be, not a series of occasions, not parties and that sort of thing; I would certainly remember; but I do remember Rohl being present at other parties that I attended in the Biltmore Hotel.

139. General FRANK. If we had testimony to the effect that you had visited Rohl at the Biltmore Hotel on several occasions, at which there were parties, that testimony then would be in error?

Colonel WYMAN. If it is the testimony, that is, the statement that is in the congressional report, that I attended parties at the Biltmore Hotel, where, as I remember, "twenty cheap faced women" or something of that order are waltzed in and out, that is a pure fabrication. The answer to that is no, I wasn't there.

140. General FRANK. That is not the testimony.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, then, I don't—I was at parties at the Biltmore Hotel, at dinner parties in the Bowl and other rooms of that hotel, in the big banquet rooms, where I was a speaker at the table, the speaker's table—Chamber of [3471] Commerce, Engineering Societies, and others, and on some of those occasions Rohl was present, but I was not his guest.

141. General FRANK. I am talking about parties in apartments that were rented there by Rohl.

Colonel WYMAN. No. I do remember on one occasion where General Sverdrup gave a dinner party, a very large dinner party, in the Biltmore Hotel, in which there were a great many Army officers and Army ladies present, the wives of Army officers; and it is my recollection that the Rohls were at that party. He served cocktails in a room before the dinner and then later we went to dinner, and I am certain that, as I remember it, among the various large number of guests present, the Rohls were present.

142. General FRANK. Where was Rohl's office?

Colonel WYMAN. Rohl's office? Rohl's office was located as I remember it on Alhambra Boulevard, Los Angeles.

143. General FRANK. Did he have a home in Los Angeles?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, he had a home in Los Angeles. As I remember it, it is on Hollywood Boulevard, Hollywood.

144. General FRANK. Did he frequently rent an apartment at the Biltmore?

Colonel WYMAN. I haven't the least idea.

145. General FRANK. You have never been up to his apartment in the Biltmore?

Colonel WYMAN. You mean an apartment? What is an apartment?

146. General FRANK. You do not know what an apartment is?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I have lived in apartments.

147. General FRANK. A constructing engineer?

[3472] Colonel WYMAN. I have lived in apartments. You mean like a bed room?

148. General FRANK. I mean an apartment.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I was in a room, once, where Mr. Rohl was, in the company of General Sverdrup. Now, whether or not it was an apartment, I don't know, but it was a room.

149. General FRANK. You do not seem to know any more about an apartment than you did about a "guiding spirit" in an organization.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I know what an apartment is, in an apartment house, but I don't necessarily know what an apartment is at a hotel. I never lived in one, in my life.

150. General FRANK. According to your testimony, then, you received almost no entertainment from Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, except that that I stated I received. That, yes, sir; and I reciprocated, because I entertained him at my house, Mr. and Mrs. Rohl, on one or two occasions. I remember one, I entertained him at the California Club, at lunch with my officers who lunch with me there very, very frequently. We have a little luncheon table in the main dining room of the California Club, and I remember having him there for lunch and paying for his lunch, and I was very particular all my life, whenever I received entertainment from anybody, to return it with reasonable promptness, just as we of the Army always do.

151. General FRANK. Where did you meet Paul Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. I first met Paul Graft, he was introduced to be by a very eminent engineer, now deceased—Mr. Walter Douglas, of the great firm of engineers in New York, of which he was a member—Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Clapp & Douglas. Mr. [3473] Douglas had done work all over the world, a very eminent engineer, was employed by the Engineer Department, was a consultant on very large jobs, and one night, Mr. Douglas, who was a consultant on the Los Angeles River for the district engineer at Los Angeles, or for one Colonel Theodore Wyman, had a dinner party at the Ambassador Hotel, and among the guests present was Mr. and Mrs. Paul Grafe; Douglas having known Mr. Grafe when they built the Madden Dam at Panama, of which I believe he was a consultant.

152. General FRANK. Did he ever become a good friend of yours?

Colonel WYMAN. Grafe? Well, he was a business acquaintance of mine, and which I had many associations, due to the Prado Dam, due to his work over there. He was in charge of this work on this island from the beginning of the 602 contract until about January 1, 1942. He was here during the period of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

153. General FRANK. Was his work over here satisfactory?

Colonel WYMAN. At times his work was not satisfactory; at least his progress was not satisfactory, to me, and at other times it was very satisfactory. When they first came over here, the Callahan organization did the work, and they brought along as superintendent a man by the name of McCullough, and McCullough got off, as I thought, to a rather poor start, and later, he became ill, had to be relieved, and at that time I was greatly concerned about getting a job under way, especially the ammunition storage at Wheeler Field, which was a very large job, and I remonstrated with Grafe about progress, and he said that he would bring a new man over, and he did bring a new man. His name was Ashlock. He had been the [3474] superintendent of construction of the Prado Dam, and after Ashlock got here and got going, things picked up pretty fast, and for some considerable time the progress was satisfactory. Then, when it came time to build the work at Christmas Island and Canton Island and New Caledonia, and Nandi Airport in the Fiji Islands, the Hawaiian Constructors just did everything in the world they could possibly do to organize expeditions to those islands, equipped for maintaining them and keeping them going, in order to build the ferry route to Australia, and I couldn't criticize them for the work on that project, because they certainly put out.

154. General FRANK. Who inspected the work for acceptance on that line of airdromes?

Colonel WYMAN. All work was under the area-engineer system. That is, a district was divided into areas, and as I recollect, at one time there were as many as 14 or 15 areas. Each area had in charge of it a competent officer engineer, who was entirely responsible that the work be done in accordance with the specifications and the plans, and maintained a force of inspectors and accountants and clerks to keep track of the job.

In the case of Canton Island, there was an officer by the name of Captain Baker. In the case of Christmas Island, there was an officer by the name of Major Shields. Those officers were relieved from time to time by other officers who superseded them, and were charged with that responsibility.

155. General FRANK. Who was responsible for the efficiency of their operation?

Colonel WYMAN. The contractor is responsible for his efficiency.

[3475] 156. General FRANK. For the efficiency of the operation of those engineer representatives?

Colonel WYMAN. Who was responsible for their efficiency?

157. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I would say the engineer department, who trained them.

158. General FRANK. Well, who was their immediate superior?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, they reported to the district engineer.

159. General FRANK. They reported to you?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes.

160. General FRANK. Did you have any system of inspection on them?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, yes; we did, in the case of—"them"—any specific one that you have in mind?

161. General FRANK. Any one.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, you take on this island.

162. General FRANK. What island?

Colonel WYMAN. There were area engineers.

163. General FRANK. On which island?

Colonel WYMAN. On this Island of Oahu.

164. General FRANK. I am talking about the Canton, Christmas and Noumea.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, they were visited by people from time to time, not for the purpose of inspecting them, but for the purpose of learning what their problems were, and of trying to solve them. They had a very very difficult task to perform, especially after the commencement of hostilities. You see, at these islands there was also a military expedition [3476] along with it.

165. General FRANK. What supervision did they get from you?

Colonel WYMAN. They got it in terms of instructions, letters of instruction as to what to do; also, the supply, which was the big thing.

166. General FRANK. Is there any follow-up on that, letters of instruction?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes; there was a constant exchange of both correspondence and messages by radio.

167. General FRANK. Other than that, the man was out there by himself, and you depended upon his initiative and ability to put the job across?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes; we selected excellent men. They had already had jobs. For instance, Baker had already been the area engineer over in the Island of Hawaii, with headquarters at Hilo. Shields was a very fine engineer with excellent qualifications, who had been associated with my office.

168. General FRANK. Who was at Christmas?

Colonel WYMAN. At Christmas was Shields.

169. General FRANK. He was outstanding, was he?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, he finished his job. It is a matter of achievement. He opened his airport on the 18th day of January. He arrived there on about the 1st of November; or, in some 60 or 70 days, he built an airport that would accommodate a B-17 four-motored bomber. That had never been accomplished, in my knowledge, in the history of aviation, before, and I don't know whether it has been accomplished since. It is a matter of achievement. He accomplished his mission.

170. General FRANK. What was your social status with Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. Social status with Grafe? Well, on one [3477] occasion, Colonel and Mrs. Wyman were the guests of Mr. and Mrs. Grafe at their home in Los Angeles, and I think there were other guests present; yes, there were other guests present, because I remember that we played games after dinner. It is my recollection that on another occasion when the negro pugilist, the present champion, Joe Louis, fought a fight in Los Angeles, that Mr. Grafe invited all the district officers to attend that fight, and prior to the fight he gave a buffet dinner in, I think, the Biltmore Hotel. I am not certain; or it could have been the California Club; to a large group of officers he knew; not only from the district engineer's office but other officers on duty in Los Angeles that he knew; and then we attended the fight.

171. General FRANK. Were you ever present at the Biltmore Hotel in an apartment at an entertainment or at a social gathering with Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. I, with Grafe?

172. General FRANK. Yes; in an apartment.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't remember any such event, with Grafe.

173. General FRANK. When were you first advised of the possibilities of the basic Hawaiian contract 602?

Colonel WYMAN. Advised of the possibilities of it?

174. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. The first recollection I have of any proposal to go on a contract for this work was on the occasion of General Hanum's visit to Midway Island, and as I remember, we were on a dredge out there observing the work, when we had a discussion of the possibilities of an extensive [3478] program for the Hawaiian Department, and began to talk of ways and means of how we could do the job. I proposed to finish Midway at that time, by the 1st of December; which I did; and we did the work there by a hired-labor force, entirely government employees, and it was my idea that we would take our Midway force and bring them back as they came back and put them on this job, because it has always been customary to build light fire-control stations and that sort of thing with hired labor.

That was customary. That's not only here, but elsewhere. And we more or less played with our idea of doing the work, as I said, by hired labor, because we didn't know at that time the extensiveness of the program. We sighted it. After we got back to Honolulu I attempted to make plans for a hired-labor job, and I actually purchased the necessary lumber, cement, and steel for the ammunition storage at Wheeler Field, with the view of putting it in with our own labor.

175. General FRANK. This was about when?

Colonel WYMAN. This is in November; early November, 1940. I also approached various people regarding the hire of plant, and I remember discussing with a Mr. Hess, who was doing work in Hawaii near Hilo, the construction of a road, which had been stopped, I believe, due to lack of funds, or some other reason, as to whether or not he would hire his plant; and I also recollect that Robinson, my chief assistant, made inquiries about the place for the hire of plant, and made inquiries on the contracting, with the Hawaiian Contracting Company—that is the Dillingham outfit—as to whether they could help us, and they had no interest.

[3479] At about that time, I received a letter from Colonel Hannum, which I quoted, and I think that is one of my first exhibits, which I can read again.

176. General FRANK. No.

Colonel WYMAN. In which he sets forth that he had inquired of the Chief of Engineer's Office, Major Gesler, as to how this work should be done, and what the Chief's proposal was. That is shown in Gesler's letter to Hannum and Hannum's letter to me; and after receiving that letter, I personally called up Grafe, because I knew that they were finishing the Prado Dam and had an organization available, and I requested over the telephone whether he would be interested in work in Hawaii. He was probably reluctant to make any commitment at all, but he finally said that he would send to Hawaii some engineers to take a look at the job, who would report to him later, and he would act accordingly, he would act after receiving this information; and then at that time I received orders from the division engineer to proceed to the United States, and that he, General Hannum, would arrange for interviews with contractors, and he had Kelton, the district engineer at Los Angeles, make up a regular itinerary for me, to interview contractors, and made inquiry of many contractors as to their interests; some of them showed up, and some didn't.

177. General FRANK. What information at that time did you have with respect to speed for this contract?

Colonel WYMAN. Speed? The usual information we always have; that is, that funds must be spent or at least firmly obligated in the same year that they are appropriated by act of Congress; otherwise the funds are covered back into the Treasury of the United States, and lost.

[3480] 178. General FRANK. I am talking about it from the point of view of military requirements.

Colonel WYMAN. Of the military requirements?

179. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, we always build things with speed if we can, as fast as conditions will permit us. That is an engineer department

custom and directive. We never permit work to lag if we have the money to pay for it and the authority to go ahead with the work.

180. General FRANK. Did the Hawaiian Constructors, in the end, finish the work that was assigned to them?

Colonel WYMAN. You mean after I left?

181. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. I haven't the slightest idea. I never made inquiry. I don't know. I notice that in the files I find out that the reserve gasoline storage was ready for use in 1943, about a year after I left here.

182. General FRANK. What are the relative duties of the district, division, and the Chief of Engineers' offices on the award of a contract?

Colonel WYMAN. The relative duties?

183. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I can read that from Orders and Regulations.

184. General FRANK. I would like to have you tell me.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I can tell you. At what date? At this time?

185. General FRANK. On December 20, 1940.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, the relative duty? Under the ability to make a contract, at that time, the district engineer I think [3481] was \$50,000; anything above that had to go to a higher authority. The division engineer, as I recollect it, was probably \$100,000, and as I remember it, the Chief of Engineers was \$300,000; and above that, it had to go to the Secretary of War. Now, that is entirely from memory, and that has changed many times. There was a time prior to that when the district engineer's authority to make a contract was limited to \$10,000.

186. General FRANK. Did you conduct any investigation of the availability of contractors to take over this work, on your own initiative?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes. On my own initiative; yes. We took a look. When General Hannum was here, we took a look of the contractors in Hawaii, and decided that all of them that were here, both local contractors and contractors from the mainland were fully engaged, and that we would make no effort whatsoever to utilize a contractor who was working for the Navy at that time or working for the Construction Quartermaster; that is, we would not interfere with their activity in any way by trying to take one of their contractors away from them, on this work; and he and I had even at that time agreed, as you can see by this letter that I quote, that the only place we could expect to get any contractors was from the mainland.

187. Major CLAUSEN. Let the record show that I am handling Colonel Wyman what purports to be the Articles of Agreement dated 20 December 1940. Sir, is that a photostatic copy of the agreement, the basic contract, bearing that date? Would you take a look at it to see?

[3482] General FRANK. Between the Corps of Engineers and the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel WYMAN. What is the question?

189. Major CLAUSEN. Whether that is the contract.

Colonel WYMAN. No, that is not a contract.

190. General FRANK. That is the basic contract, isn't it?

Colonel WYMAN. No. Oh, this here? I haven't the least idea what this is—"Articles of Agreement, Office, Chief of Engineers."

191. Major CLAUSEN. If you keep turning the pages, sir, you will come to your signature.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, I see that.

192. Major CLAUSEN. Is that your signature?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes; that is my signature. That is a reproduction of it. It is not my writing. It looks like the contract; yes—a reproduction of the contract.

193. General FRANK. That copy of the contract has not been placed in the record, yet, as an exhibit, and I just wanted it identified and placed in the record as an exhibit.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, this appears to be a copy of the contract. I don't know that it is complete. It looks as though it might be.

194. General FRANK. It is taken from the records of the office of the Chief of Engineers.

195. Major CLAUSEN. The Engineers sent it over to us. Were there any papers in there that are missing that you can tell, Colonel?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I can't. Yes, this is signed by Theodore Wyman, and by Paul Grafe for the contractors, approved by J. L. Schley, Chief of Engineers; approved, 3 January 1941, by Robert Patterson, the Under Secretary of War.

[3483] 196. Major CLAUSEN. This contract refers to an exhibit "B", which is attached. There is no exhibit "A" attached. Can you tell me why that is?

Colonel WYMAN. I haven't the slightest idea. The contract was written by the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

197. Major CLAUSEN. We offer this in evidence, as exhibit 46.

(The document referred to, being the so-called "basic contract," dated 3 January 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 46, and was received in evidence.)

198. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I show you what purports to be a supplemental agreement between the contracting parties, dated March 22, 1941, and ask you to look at that and see if you can identify the signatures, and that contract, as being a supplement to the basic contract.

[3484] Colonel WYMAN. It is signed by Warren Hannum, Contracting Officer, Division Engineer; Hawaiian Constructors, Grafe; approved by Julian Schley, Chief of Engineers; approved by Robert Patterson, Under Secretary of War.

199. Major CLAUSEN. You identify those signatures, do you, Colonel, as being photostatic copies of the signatures of those persons?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I don't know. I know here is Hannum's. Yes, that looks like Hannum's, all right. It looks like Grafe, too. Schley, it look—I think so.

200. Major CLAUSEN. All right. We will offer that in evidence as the exhibit next in order.

(Supplemental agreement dated March 22, 1941, signed by Colonel Warren T. Hannum, Mr. Paul Grafe, and Robert P. Patterson, was marked Exhibit No. 46-A and received in evidence.)

201. General FRANK. You had something to do with the work that was covered by those contracts, didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes. Yes.

202. Major CLAUSEN. I will show you this supplemental agreement No. 2 and ask you whether you recognize this document, photostatic copy, dated the 5th day of May, 1941, as being a supplemental agreement to the basic contract of that date. It has no number. It is just called the supplemental agreement.

Colonel WYMAN. I think it was No. 3.

203. General GRUNERT. Look at it.

Colonel WYMAN. No. I mean the other one.

[3485] 204. General GRUNERT. I mean look at the other one. if there is anything on the record there, let's see.

Colonel WYMAN. Just a supplemental agreement.

205. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

206. General GRUNERT. It doesn't give any number, does it?

Colonel WYMAN. It doesn't give any number, no, sir.

207. General GRUNERT. What date?

Colonel WYMAN. 22nd day of March, 1941.

208. Major CLAUSEN. This is "3" here.

Colonel WYMAN. This is supplemental agreement No. 2.

209. Major CLAUSEN. All these documents were given to the Board by the Engineers.

Colonel WYMAN. This is signed by me, by Grafe, approved by General Kingman and Robert Patterson, the Under Secretary of War.

210. General FRANK. You are conversant with the work covered in the supplemental agreement?

Colonel WYMAN. I haven't read them. I could read them.

211. General FRANK. Any question about it?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir. I was just looking through. Yes, sir; some of these items I am familiar with. Some I don't remember so well.

212. General GRUNERT. Since the witness is testifying about it, he has the privilege of saying yes or no and examining it to make sure that he knows what he is testifying to.

213. General FRANK. That is true.

214. General GRUNERT. Although it takes time, it is necessary time and must be taken.

215. Major CLAUSEN. Have you looked it over, Colonel?

[3486] Colonel WYMAN. Well, I have just glanced at it.

216. Major CLAUSEN. Those signatures represent the signatures, do they, of the parties?

Colonel WYMAN. That is, the question asked me is whether I am familiar with all this work.

217. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, some I am and some I am not. I am not certain. The signatures appear to be authentic.

218. Major CLAUSEN. All right. We will offer that document—may I have it, please—in evidence as the exhibit next in order.

(Photostatic copy of supplemental agreement No. 2, dated May 5, 1941, was marked Exhibit 46-B, and received in evidence.)

219. Major CLAUSEN. I hand you supplemental agreement No. 3, dated May 22, 1941, and I ask you to take a look at this and see if you recognize the signatures as being those of the contracting parties.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, they appear to be authentic. Some of these signatures, like on this here, there is a set here signed by Robinson. Signatures to the contract are signed by Benson.

220. Major CLAUSEN. You recognize those signatures, sir?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, on the supplemental agreement I recognize them.

221. Major CLAUSEN. All right. We offer this in evidence as exhibit next in order.

(Supplemental agreement No. 3, dated May 22, 1941, was marked Exhibit 46-C, and received in evidence.)

[§487] 222. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I show you supplemental agreement No. 4, dated June 19, 1941, and invite your attention to the terms and the signatures, and ask you whether you can identify those signatures as being the ones of the contracting parties.

Colonel WYMAN. That is right.

223. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir. May I have it? We offer this in evidence as exhibit next in order. Those are the contracts, sir.

(Contract was marked Exhibit 46-D, and received in evidence.)

224. General FRANK. How did it happen that in selecting contractors to come to Hawaii you went only to Los Angeles? Why didn't you go to Seattle, Spokane, New York?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I consulted with the Division Engineer, General Hannum, and I interviewed contractors in San Francisco in his office and in Los Angeles. The requirements were, under this board that cleared the contractors I think that you submitted three names only. That was the War Department requirement. So just going around interviewing contractors would not have much sense to it unless they—or because of the expense attached to it it wouldn't be justified, and also it was desirable to find contractors as soon as we could.

Of course, you understand, I think, that—at least, I can tell you—that there was no contract made with this outfit or any other outfit except by the Engineer Department, in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. That's where the contract was made, and it was the—when Grafe and Connolly were there, it was brought to their attention that as Caddoa Builders the construction of the Caddoa Dam might be curtailed by Act of [§481] Congress and the amount of work cut down in the interests of getting contractors engaged on war contracts; and, they being the builders of the Caddoa Dam, it was suggested to them that they utilize their organization to do this work; and there was no meeting of minds, no agreement whatsoever, of any kind, until a conference was held in the office of General Schley, and the matter was discussed, and General Schley of course knew Grafe because Grafe had worked for him on the Madden Dam at Panama while General Schley was Governor of Panama, and knew him very well and was satisfied with the employment of the company.

225. General GRUNERT. Were there in existence at any time during that period any instructions, any division of the United States into territorial areas where contractors were selected from that area to do work within the area or nearby?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. There is a directive issued by the War Department announcing construction policy, and attached to that directive there was an appendix issued which divided the United States

into regions, and it directed district engineers, construction quartermasters, and other agencies employing contractors, would employ contractors from the region in which the work was located, or perhaps in some cases in the state in which the work was located; and in that document the region prescribed for Hawaii was the Pacific Coast in California.

Now, I have been unable to locate the appendix to that document; but it is a War Department publication. I cannot remember whether it was issued by the Under Secretary of War's office, the Army and Navy Production—Munitions Board, but one [3489] of the high ranking levels of our War Department issued that directive, and I have been unable to find it, but of course it can be found.

226. General FRANK. Did that prevent you from going any place on the West Coast?

Colonel WYMAN. I could only go on the West Coast as the Division Engineer directed me to. He issued my travel orders. I could not—have no authority to issue them to myself. And he did direct me to go to Los Angeles, and he directed Kelton to have ready an itinerary of contractors to be reviewed.

227. General FRANK. That eliminated all contracting talent, then, in the Northwest?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, unless—you see, he was out—we were in the South Pacific Division. The North Pacific Division was another division of the United States, and the Engineer Department at that time—I think the Division Engineer was General Lee. General Hannum was at San Francisco.

228. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. He could hardly go into another division engineer's area for contractors. But that is merely an observation of mine. But he did direct me to go to Los Angeles. When I reported back to him, he said that no contract could be made here, due to the special conditions obtaining, for a fixed fee, that is, a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, and it was necessary not only to make the contract in Washington but to get it cleared through this board that existed at that time, and also the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War's office.

229. General FRANK. Who initially determined on the contractors [3490] to be considered for this Hawaiian job?

Colonel WYMAN. The initial list that was gotten up for me was gotten up by General Hannum and Colonel Kelton, the District Engineer at Los Angeles.

230. General FRANK. I know, but who selected, who made the initial selection of the people to be offered the contract?

Colonel WYMAN. I just stated, Colonel Kelton, the District Engineer at Los Angeles, and General Hannum, the Division Engineer at San Francisco; and I in one case, as I said, had talked with Grafe of the Callahan Company, and he had sent some engineers out to take a look at the job, and they went back and reported. What they reported, I don't know.

231. General FRANK. Well, who determined that the Callahan Company, the Gunther-Shirley Company, and the Rohl-Connolly Company were to be considered as the co-adventurers?

Colonel WYMAN. The Chief of Engineers, the Assistant Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C., made the final decision, and they took

the same outfit that was known as the Caddoa Builders, the builders of the Caddoa Dam, co-adventurers on that project, known as Caddoa Builders.

232. General FRANK. Well, the Chief of Engineers didn't have much opportunity to select anybody else when you went to Washington with Grafe as the representative of that outfit.

Colonel WYMAN. I was sent to Washington by General Hannum and to assist the Chief of Engineers in negotiating the contract.

233. General FRANK. Somebody selected that group. Who was it that selected them? General Hannum?

Colonel WYMAN. General Hannum and I were satisfied with [3491] Grafe, and Connolly was showing interest in the job; and General Robins, now General Jim Newman, the Chief of Engineers General Schley, the head of the contract section in the Chief's office—I don't know who he was at that time—made the selection. Yes, sir.

234. General FRANK. However, there was one selection put up on a platter to them at that time, whether they took it or left it.

Colonel WYMAN. They could have rejected it and ordered other people in.

235. General FRANK. Yes, but they didn't do it.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I don't—

236. General FRANK. They accepted it?

Colonel WYMAN. They accepted it, yes, sir. But the whole negotiation was in the Office of Chief of Engineers.

237. General FRANK. And the next person below that who selected these people was General Hannum, from you?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, General Hannum and Colonel Wyman together.

238. General FRANK. I see.

Colonel WYMAN. Everything we did, we did after consultation with each other and jointly.

239. General FRANK. You did not, then, make the original recommendation to him that these people be the ones considered?

Colonel WYMAN. To General Hannum?

240. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. They were the only ones that showed any interest. We saw the Steve Griffith Company, the Bressi Company, Guy Atkinson, talked to Guy Atkinson for a long time right in the General's office, in which he was adamant in [3492] holding out for an 8 percent fee, and there were others, and the only ones that showed any interest at all was Grafe, the Callahan Company, and Gunther-Shirley, and then later Connolly showed some interest and agreed—he showed enough interest to agree to journey to Washington and to interview the Chief of Engineers regarding it. And the only meeting of minds that was ever agreed to prior to the approval of the award to these people was in General Robins' office when he said to them, "You are the Caddoa Builders. There is a possibility of the Caddoa Dam being curtailed as to size and magnitude, and therefore your outfit could take on this job." And they were the only ones who had agreed to show any interest in it, out of this whole crowd that I talked with, except Mr. Guy Atkinson, at a price, which we couldn't agree to, of course, had no authority to agree to any such thing, and—

241. General FRANK. Mr. Grafe, for the Callahan Company, had been interested in it from the start, hadn't he?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, he was interested in it, because he showed enough interest to send two engineers to Honolulu to look at the job, and to have them report to him as to the character of the work and the conditions of employment.

There was another thing at that time. The use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract and the so-called negotiated lump-sum contract was first coming into use, under an Act of Congress of July 1940, and contractors knew little about it, and regulations were coming out from time to time and being sent out to district engineers, so they could explain the conditions of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.

The contractors did not favor the idea because they [3493] thought when Congress was passing this Act that it was like the World War Acts or what is known as the cost-plus contract, where, whatever the work cost, they got a certain percentage, like 10 percent or 5 percent. But in the cost-plus-a-fixed fee the fee was agreed to beforehand, and it never changed. Regardless of what the work cost, the fee remained the same unless it was renegotiated due to being exorbitant, or that sort of thing. As, for instance, the fee on this Contract 602 of the total amount of work performed under the contract, I am informed that the fee was about 1 percent of the cost, which is a very cheap and probably one of the cheapest construction contracts we have had.

242. General FRANK. The Gunther-Shirley Company, according to the method that they operated with the Callahan Company, was sort of an allied corporation, wasn't it?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I think it was allied due to—I don't know the reason. The Gunther-Shirley Company is a Nebraska corporation, and one of—the head of the company is a man by the name of Phil Shirley. He was the acting head and has always been associated with work, I think, with Callahan, but, however, they take on independent work of their own.

243. General FRANK. All right. Now, how did the Rohl-Connolly outfit fit into this picture?

Colonel WYMAN. The Rohl-Connolly outfit were the co-adventurers with the Callahan Construction Company, the Gunther-Shirley Company, known as Caddoa Builders, who were building the Caddoa Dam in New Mexico. They were already co-adventurers on another project.

244. General FRANK. Who is the head of the Gunther-Shirley [3494] Company? Shirley?

Colonel WYMAN. Phil Shirley, as far as I know. Philip Shirley.

245. General FRANK. Was Mr. Callahan living at that time?

Colonel WYMAN. Bill Callahan? Oh, yes, he was living.

246. General FRANK. Who was the head of it, Callahan or Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. Head of what?

247. General FRANK. Head of the W. E. Callahan Company.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, Callahan. Callahan is the head of the company.

248. General FRANK. He was living at that time?

Colonel WYMAN. I think so, but I think he was sick, ill. I am not certain about that.

249. General FRANK. Yes. Who is the head of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I don't know who is head of it. I don't know.

250. General FRANK. Well, it must have had a head.

Colonel WYMAN. I would have to read their stock—their minutes of their last election as a corporation. They are a corporation, corporation of Nevada. I don't know who is the head of it; but in this deal that we are talking about, Mr. Connolly represented the Rohl-Connolly interests and was present in the Chief's office at Washington, D. C.

251. General FRANK. Why wasn't Mr. Rohl present?

Colonel WYMAN. I haven't the slightest idea.

252. General FRANK. Is there any question about the Rohl-Connolly Company coming into the contract? Did they want to come into the contract?

[3495] Colonel WYMAN. The first interview I had with Mr. Rohl in the office of the District Engineer at Los Angeles, he said no, he had no interest. Then he came back later in the day and stated that he had talked to Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Connolly had an interest in the job, and they would be glad to see me and discuss it, and he did journey to Washington and met me there in the War Department. That is, we went to the War Department together with Grafe, and the matter was discussed in the contract section of the Office of Chief of Engineers, in the office of the Assistant Chief of Engineers, in the office of the Chief of Engineers, before any meeting of minds was effected.

253. General FRANK. The contract was signed by this group on the 20th of December and finally signed by Mr. Patterson about the 3rd of January, wasn't it?

Colonel WYMAN. I think that's about correct.

254. General FRANK. Yes. Who represented the company in Hawaii at that time?

Colonel WYMAN. Mr. Grafe was attorney in fact for all three outfits.

255. General FRANK. Was he here present?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes, he was here. He came over in early January and was here until—of 1941, and was here until January 1942, but he did make one or two trips back to the United States.

256. General FRANK. Who represented the Rohl-Connolly interests over here?

Colonel WYMAN. Mr. Grafe. He was attorney in fact for the Rohl-Connolly Company.

[3496] 257. General FRANK. For all three outfits?

Colonel WYMAN. All three outfits.

258. General FRANK. When did you start to try to get Mr. Rohl over here?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, it is stated, I notice, that I wrote Rohl a letter, I think in February, and that was the time that we were having great difficulty with Mr. McCullough, who was the superintendent and who was not getting under way to our satisfaction; and I recollect talking to Mr. Grafe about it, and Mr. Grafe registered considerable anger and stated that we didn't pay enough to a superintendent to get a good superintendent, and that he could never get a good superintendent at the price that the United States permitted under this contract, which was \$9,000 a year; that his superintendents earned fifteen, twenty, twenty-five thousand dollars, depending on the job, and there-

fore I could never expect to get a good superintendent. So I said, "Well, let's"——

259. General FRANK. For whom was this superintendent working? For you or for the——

Colonel WYMAN. He was working for Mr. Grafe, the project manager, who was resident and on the job. And I took exception to that, to the fact that the United States of America couldn't have a good superintendent on a job because law and regulations permitted only the payment of \$9,000 a year as a maximum salary. And we had quite an argument about it, and the argument——

260. General FRANK. Well, if he was working for the contractors were they limited?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, yes, sir; they are limited by regulations. All the prices paid the men had to be approved [3497] under orders and regulations, and the maximum they could be reimbursed for the employment of any official in their company was \$750 a month; and he complained that he couldn't get any good superintendent, that a good superintendent in the United States could earn anything from \$1,500 to \$2,500 a month in any good contracting outfit.

And so as a result of that argument, and which I complained to General Hannum about it, I wrote a letter to Rohl and requested him to come over here for the purpose of seeing if we couldn't get a better superintendent to succeed McCullough, and as a result of that——

261. General FRANK. What was his reply?

Colonel WYMAN. How?

262. General FRANK. What was his reply?

Colonel WYMAN. I got his answer—his letter reply?

263. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know that I ever got a letter. However, I do know——

264. General FRANK. Well, whatever his reply was, what was it?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know. I don't know that I got a letter. The only reason—I have not seen the letter. The only reason I recollect this is because it's in this document, but the point is that——

[3498] 265. General FRANK. Did you ever get a reply of any kind from him?

Colonel WYMAN. From Rohl?

266. General FRANK. Yes. I am just asking about a reply to this letter.

Colonel WYMAN. I do not recollect any reply at all.

267. General FRANK. What happened?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I think I wrote some letters to the Hawaiian Constructors, and finally Mr. McCullough was taken ill. He had, I believe, a slight heart disorder, or something, and then Grafe agreed to send over here Mr. Ashlock, who had been the superintendent of the New Prado Dam, and I believe the Hawaiian Constructors paid Mr. Ashlock out of their own pockets, the difference between what was a reimbursement item of \$9,000 a year and whatever salary they paid him. I don't know what they paid him.

268. General FRANK. Did these corporations that you had have working organizations or did they have a working organization to represent the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel WYMAN. You mean here at this place?

263. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. They had just one great working organization.

270. General FRANK. From where did they collect that? Did they bring that over from this dam, Martin Dam?

Colonel WYMAN. No, they brought them from Prado Dam in California, and some of them from Caddoa Dam in Arizona. Mr. McCullough—I don't know where he comes from, but he was a Callahan man. In the early part of the job the Callahan [3499] Construction Company took over the management of the work on the pier in Honolulu.

271. General FRANK. How did you work with that outfit? Did you give them the job orders and then let them proceed with the work in accordance with the organization over which they had control?

Colonel WYMAN. They had to do more than that. After a project was authorized and the plans were all made and an estimate of cost had been made, a job order was issued, and that job order had to be approved by the Division Engineer at San Francisco before it was authorized for construction. You will notice the job orders went to San Francisco and came back approved.

When a job order was approved, then field construction and the expenditure of money was authorized. In other words, that is the document that authorizes the expenditure of money. We were operating in peace time, where the expenditure of money was a very serious matter and had to be accounted for dollar for dollar by the District Engineer and his subordinates.

With the job order there was an estimate of materials needed, an estimate of man-hours of labor, an estimate of machinery that should be employed, to guide the contractor. Now, he might agree or disagree with that. In many cases he would disagree, and he with his force would consult with the District Engineer, until they had a meeting of the minds on what the job should cost.

Also the time, the time was always under dispute, because the contractor had to buy his stuff in the United States largely, was dependent upon the transportation in getting ships to haul it. He had to buy his equipment in the United States and bring [3500] it over here, and he had to bring his labor over here, because we entered into an agreement, which was largely brought about by the Navy Department, who had great activity on this island, that one agency of the government would not solicit the labor of other agencies by offering them higher wages. As far as I know, the Hawaiian Constructors religiously paid attention to that requirement and never tried to proselyte labor from any other contractor. They brought their labor in from the United States, which all takes time.

272. General FRANK. How much did the District Engineer influence the operation of the contractor, once he had been given the job order and plans?

Colonel WYMAN. The District Engineer maintained an advisory control board, which met once a week, and which consisted of the heads of all divisions, all area engineers in charge of the field work, and representatives of the constructor, that is the Hawaiian Constructors, and at these meetings every subject was discussed, that is, the engineering, the preparation of drawings, the purchase of equipment, the procurement of men, the progress being made on the work, the

hours of labor, difficulties with labor. That is all in the minutes of these meetings.

273. General FRANK. You assumed a supervisory capacity over the contractor?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, the contractor administered—the work in the field is administered by the area engineer in whose area the work is being done. That is the job and duty of the area engineer. He in turn has job engineers over each separate job.

[3501] 374. General FRANK. To what extent was the contractor's organization allowed to function as an independent unit?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, they were permitted to function as an independent unit as far as they could. There was no interference except for things that they could not do. For instance, they could not get transportation sometimes and we would assist them. Very frequently they were unable to procure things on account of priorities, priorities established by the government, and our people would assist them. Frequently they could not get labor, and even the District Engineer at Los Angeles and other places assisted them in getting labor. They also assisted them in getting transportation for their labor from the United States to Honolulu. In this San Francisco office of General Hannum's they had an employment agency there both for the physical examination of people that came over here and also for the furnishing them their transportation.

275. General FRANK. How many talks did you have with Rohl before you got him over here?

Colonel WYMAN. Talks?

276. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. I do not know.

277. General FRANK. Did you call him on the phone?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't think I ever called Rohl on the phone, except once, that I recollect, and at that time I called him on the phone the subject matter was whether or not he would rent the VEGA to either the United States or to the Hawaiian Constructors.

278. General FRANK. Did he ever call you on the phone?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, he did.

[3502] 279. General FRANK. For what purpose?

Colonel WYMAN. In the calls that were made in late 1941, while he was in the United States, it was chiefly regarding the equipment that was going to Canton Island and Christmas, that is, what equipment he could furnish and how long it would take him to get it ready and that sort of thing, and also the extent of the work as to the number of gangs of men, concrete workers, cat operators, and so forth, that we would work. That was in late—that was in, I should say, late October and November of 1941.

Beyond that I cannot recall any subject matter discussed by Rohl with me. I do know that on one occasion he got me up—I think it was either he or someone else—got me up early in the morning. It was one of these telephonic parties where they call up people throughout the country, and it made me very angry. I believe that call came from—I think Washington or some point in the Eastern part of our United States. It was not California. But there were other calls of the same nature, telephonic calls, where people were gathered together and they would call you on the telephone. Why, I do not know. Of course, anybody can call you on the telephone.

280. General FRANK. How many of these telephonitis calls, as you term them, did you get from Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. I had several. Oh, he called me once—I can tell you another occasion he called me. I designed and wrote the specifications for the Sepulveda Dam in the Los Angeles flood control system at Los Angeles, in which I created my flood control plan for Los Angeles County, which is now approved as a national plan. The bids for the building of that [3503] dam were advertised while I was in Los Angeles. I had a great interest in this dam, because it was something new, where you could build a dam and reservoir right in the heart of a city, which that is. I recall I was on duty at Scofield Barracks. I was playing golf in the afternoon. I was called from the golf links and told there was an important call for me on the transpacific telephone.

I got to my house, and it turned out it was Mr. Rohl, and the information he gave me was that he had attended the bidding, the opening of bids that day for the Sepulevda Dam and that the low bidder was the Bressi Construction Company, who would probably be awarded the job, and he said "Hello" and he also informed me of the death of Mr. Thaddeus Merriman, who was a very eminent engineer in the United States and who died just about the time that I got into Hawaii. He informed me of that. I recall that very distinctly.

281. General FRANK. Do you think that this series of transpacific calls evidenced just a casual interest and acquaintance between you and Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know what to think. I would say it was a very silly idea to spend money calling me up on the telephone from parties under the spell of telephonitis. It was very, very silly to do. Especially I was amazed when I saw in the Congressional report the amount of money that was spent on some of those calls. I think in some cases he probably talked to more than one person, not only to me.

282. General FRANK. When did you first learn that Rohl was an alien?

Colonel WYMAN. I first learned that Rohl was an alien from [3504] Mr. Grafe in June, 1941, when Mr. Grafe informed me that Rohl was an alien, and I immediately sat down without delay and wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers, announcing that I had been informed by Mr. Grafe of the Hawaiian Contractors that Mr. Rohl was an alien, also that Mr. Rohl had applied for citizenship. I do not recollect what else in the letter, I have forgotten, but I sent that through channels. It went to the Division Engineer, thence to the Chief of Engineers. That was in June, I am certain—the date of the letter is whatever the date of that letter is, that is the date Grafe told me that Rohl was an alien.

283. General FRANK. Did you meet John Martin in Washington while you were negotiating that contract?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I remember a person came there while I was in Grafe's room whose name was John Martin, a lawyer. He talked with—well, the group there, and I remember he stated that he was engaged on the claims of a contractor who, due to changer, by orders, what we call orders, had accumulated a lot of claims on the Pennsylvania turnpike, and he discussed in some detail in

my hearing the arguments for and against the claims of the contractor. He was there for a little while and then he departed. That was the only occasion I think I have ever seen Mr. John Martin.

284. General FRANK. You did not know that Marin told Grafe in Washington that Rohl was an alien?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I did not know that. I did not know whether he did, or not. I do not know.

285. General FRANK. Don't you think it was rather queer, when there was some question about a defense contract being in the [3505] hands of an alien, that they should not have told you about it?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not know. If they told me about it I would merely have told the Chief of Engineers right on the spot.

286. General GRUNERT. What was the occasion of Grafe informing you of Rohl's status as an alien; what brought it up?

Colonel WYMAN. You see, there was an act of Congress came out about employing aliens on defense work, and we wrote letters to everybody inquiring whether or not they had any aliens in their employ, and it came up as a result of that inquiry.

287. General GRUNERT. This was the date you wrote the letter?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir, that he informed me that he was an alien.

288. General GRUNERT. Was this the time the War Department put this out?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. I put the inquiry out some time before that. I don't know. That is a matter of record. The records show the date. You see, at this time Mr. Rohl was in the United States. He never had been in Honolulu as far as I know, he had never taken any part in the contract.

289. General FRANK. In these telephone conversations where you were discussing work on the Hawaiian Islands with Rohl, the Hawaiian Islands airdromes were defense contracts, were they not?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, but he was a citizen when I talked to him. That was after he became a citizen. You see he came to Honolulu after he became a citizen. Then he immediately went back to the United States to get plant and men to go to Canton and Christmas Islands, and he went back to the United States and [3506] got plant from his job at Highgate Dam, brought it to Los Angeles, rehabilitated it, put it in good shape. He got men and organized them into gangs, superintendents, and put some aboard the transport LUDINGTON. It was during that period that I recall talking to him about the plant for the Canton and Christmas Islands.

290. General FRANK. You say you took steps to get him naturalized?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I did not take any steps at all to get him naturalized. I suggested to the Chief of Engineers that something had to be done about it; he had to be, in my opinion, either taken off the job or—he complained, I believe, to Grafe that he was unable to get a hearing in a court, in a regular court, and I think in my letter, which I have not seen since I wrote it—I don't know what it says—it says that he had applied for citizenship, and Mr. Grafe told me he had applied for citizenship and was unable to get a hearing, or whatever you get when you are applying for citizenship.

That letter went to the Chief of Engineers, just as a routine matter. The idea was that the Chief of Engineers would do something about it. That is, it would take a court order or something to order him off the job or to dissolve himself from the company or to get citizenship. Of course, as I recall it, that was a matter more for the Secretary of War's office than any other office to handle, because they had the right of approval.

291. General FRANK. We have some testimony from some witnesses from the Office of the Chief of Engineers relative to the fact that either a letter or telephone conversation from you asked [3507] that his naturalization be expedited.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. No, I did not. I asked that it be expedited?

292. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. No. I wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers through channels. That went through General Hannum over to the Chief of Engineers and, I understand, the Acting Chief of Engineers, General Kingman, wrote a letter to the Attorney General of the United States in which he suggested that Rohl be given a hearing, or whatever was required to get citizenship, and I understand he was given a hearing and was granted citizenship.

293. General FRANK. Did you say you sent out letters to the different contractors calling attention to this provision of the law by virtue of which an alien could not participate in a defense contract?

Colonel WYMAN. I think my office sent out letters, yes.

294. General FRANK. Will you furnish the Board a copy of one of those letters?

Colonel WYMAN. I would have to go into the files to find it.

295. General FRANK. Would you do that?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, I will be glad to. It is a letter to the contractors requesting whether or not they employ any aliens.

296. General FRANK. And at the same time will you see if you can get a copy of the letter that you wrote to the Chief of Engineers about Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. If I can find it, yes, sir.

[3508] 297. General FRANK. Rohl was associated with you more or less directly from the signing of that contract of December 20th on through to June, when you learned he was an alien?

Colonel WYMAN. Associated with me?

298. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. I never saw Rohl.

299. General FRANK. You might not have seen him, but you talked to him?

Colonel WYMAN. He talked to me over the telephone, as I have suggested. He talked to me on some occasions. I gave you the substance of it.

300. General FRANK. Some of these conversations were official and some of them were personal?

Colonel WYMAN. No, they were chiefly—some of them were what I call telephonic, as I said before, people at parties calling their friends throughout the country, people they are associated with, but I remember the one that I told you about, about the Sepulveda open-

ing of bids, when I was at Schofield Barracks, and another one that I remember that came in very early in the morning, I think about 5 o'clock, that aroused my anger and then there were some others where they were just "Hello, how are you?" and that kind of stuff. Then in November I did talk to him or he did call me about how many shovels, how many this and how many that we needed to send to Canton Island and Christmas Island.

[3509] 301. General FRANK. In these telephone conversations, however, between December and June, some of which were official in their nature, what official information did you discuss with him?

Colonel WYMAN. From December to June?

302. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't think they were official and I cannot recollect anything that was discussed, not a thing. As I said before, anybody can call you on the telephone, unless you have a means of preventing it, which I do not have.

303. General FRANK. How many times did you initiate calls to Rohl officially?

Colonel WYMAN. I have a recollection of one, and that was the time when we decided to start the surveys for the airfields projected from here to Australia, which was first to the Philippines, and then later a route up, I think, to the Ellice Islands, where we needed a sail boat for Sverdrup, and survey parties to make those trips, and it occurred to me that Rohl did own—I didn't know that he still owned it at the time—a sail boat which was seaworthy and had crossed the Pacific and would be suitable for the work. I called him on the telephone at that time and, as I said before, he was quite reluctant about letting us have the boat, because he said he had a probable buyer and he was anxious to get rid of the boat.

304. General FRANK. To whom did the boat belong?

Colonel WYMAN. I assumed it belonged to Mr. Rohl. I do not know to whom it belonged.

305. General FRANK. Do you know in whose name it was registered?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I did not, not until later on. I think it was claimed it was registered in the name of his wife.

[3510] 306. General FRANK. When did Rohl finally arrive in Hawaii?

Colonel WYMAN. He came here, as I recall it, early in October, and then he left within a few days.

307. General FRANK. How long did he stay?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know. Not very long. He went back as soon as he could get transportation for the purpose of getting this equipment off the Highgate Dam, getting it down to Los Angeles, rehabilitating it and loading it out on a ship, a government ship, for Canton Island and Christmas Island, and to organize a force to go out there. He didn't come back here until the last Luriline, the Wednesday before Pearl Harbor. Sunday is the 7th. The 3rd of December.

308. General FRANK. What position did Rohl have after he arrived over here?

Colonel WYMAN. They had at that time a Board of Directors or executive committee—I have forgotten what it was called—with Mr.

Grafe at the head and Rohl was a member of that operating committee, the other members being Woolley and Benson.

303. General FRANK. Who was the head of the group, Rohl or Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. Grafe, Mr. Grafe.

310. General FRANK. Grafe finally went back to the States, didn't he?

Colonel WYMAN. He went back some time about the middle of January in 1942. He was at the head until he went back. He was at the head of the company until he sold part of his stock, which is a matter of record, to the Hawaiian Contracting Company.

[3511] 311. General FRANK. Was Rohl's service over here satisfactory to you?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. He built the Kahuku, that big one way out here. He built Kapapa. He built that long runway out at Dillingham's farm there. He paved those runways, and those runways were all in use before I left here on March the 20th, 1942, which is probably a record in airfield construction.

312. General FRANK. Was Rohl a pretty reliable sort of engineer?

Colonel WYMAN. Rohl, is a very, very competent constructor, builder of things, especially the movement of rock, breakwaters, heavy construction, concrete, earth grading, or what is ordinarily—where we used heavy construction machinery. For instance, he built the El Capitan Dam across the San Diego River, which is a very big project. He built the Highgate Dam across the Colorado River at Parker, and he built other dams. He built the Long Beach-Los Angeles breakwater at a very cheap price. He built some very difficult highways along the coast of—

313. General FRANK. What were your social relations in Hawaii with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. In Hawaii?

314. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Prior to Pearl Harbor I recollect that I had dinner in his house, Mrs. Wyman and I and other guests, among others Army officers and their wives. That is the only time I ever recollect having dinner with him at his house. Another time, at the house of another person here in Honolulu, a [3512] rather prominent man, where Rohl and I were guests, when I was a guest there.

Another time I remember someone gave a party at the Royal Hawaiian and among other guests there were Mr. and Mrs. Rohl.

On one occasion I had Mr. and Mrs. Rohl at my house for dinner, in return for the courtesy they extended to me. That is all that I recollect.

Oh, I met him at Schofield, at a party one night, in some officer's house. He and she were there. You see, the Rohls were well known in Honolulu, because they won with their boat the Honolulu race, which in the Pacific Ocean is considered quite a feat, and they knew a great many people here.

315. General FRANK. Where did they live?

Colonel WYMAN. They lived, as I recall it, when I first came here, in what they call a beach house somewhere in the vicinity of Black Point, near Diamond Head. After the blitz, after Pearl Harbor, rather—please correct me on that—I think Mrs. Rohl moved with

friends, Rohl and Mrs. Rohl moved to somebody's house here with friends, and lived with friends, because their house was right under the guns of Ruger and they were advised to get out.

316. General FRANK. Did she go back to the States?

Colonel WYMAN. She was evacuated to the United States on a Navy transport, I think in February. I am not certain.

317. General FRANK. When did you leave?

Colonel WYMAN. I left the last week in March.

318. General FRANK. Was there any friction between the engineer and the contractors?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I think there were spots here and there [3513] where there would be some friction between a local superintendent, a foreman or inspector, and a local job engineer. There were many things we had to straighten out from time to time. However, that sort of thing did not come to my attention much. That was more up to the operations officers and area engineers. But, in general, up to the time of the assault on Pearl Harbor, I think in the last few months, the engineers, District Engineer's office, and the constructors were getting along pretty good.

319. General FRANK. Was there any friction between you and the Department Engineer?

Colonel WYMAN. The Department Engineer is dead. He was a great friend of mine. I would just as soon leave his name out of this discussion, if that is permissible.

320. General FRANK. It has to do with the matters at hand that we are discussing. I would like an answer to it.

Colonel WYMAN. There was friction between Colonel Lyman and Colonel Wyman at a conference held by Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department. The friction was over the authority of the Department Engineer to assign to me work and order me to do it. The matter was discussed over the telephone with the Division Engineer, who told me to take the matter up with the Department Commander and to do whatever the Department Commander told me to do.

321. General FRANK. Division Engineer?

Colonel WYMAN. Division Engineer told me to do, General Hannum. So I went to the Department Commander and discussed it with him, and as a result of the discussion there came an order out, at least instructions out, that all orders to the [3514] District Engineer from the Hawaiian Department would be issued by G-4 of the Hawaiian Department. From that time on there were no very cordial relations between Colonel Lyman and Colonel Wyman. However, we still ate together and the night before I left here he came down and had dinner with me at a hotel.

322. General FRANK. Who was G-4 at the time?

Colonel WYMAN. Colonel Marston, and his assistant was Colonel Fleming who formerly had been the assistant to the Department Engineer, Colonel Lyman.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[3515] Colonel WYMAN. General, I thought I could find a transcript of a telephone conversation, where I took up with General Hannum over the telephone this question of jurisdiction of the Department Engineer over the district engineer, and such a transcript

does exist. I had it, but I don't seem to have it here, and I would be glad to try to produce it and submit it; but the sense of it is that I requested General Hannum to take up with the Chief of Engineers and secure for me approving authority for work to be done, especially in connection with airfields, and that I was receiving many requests for work which in my opinion had no merit and which I would start working on this week and then be called off of the next week; or possibly would get an order today and we would go to a lot of trouble to organize, to carry out this order, where in a day or two the entire thing would be rescinded; and that sort of thing created great confusion not only in my office but also in the office of the constructor who would go to great trouble to organize a job and get it going and then someone would say to stop the job, and they just think that the people are gone crazy and are not capable of running the jobs under any such condition; so I complained, General, to General Hannum, and he told me to take the matter up with the Commanding General himself. Well, the Commanding General was not accessible to me, except when he sent for me. More frequently I might get to his Chief of Staff, General Collins or General Phillips—or Colonel Collins and Colonel Phillips; but as a result of this clash of personalities in this conference, over where he abused me verbally, Queen Lyman, in the presence of a lot of other officers present in a conference held in these headquarters, [3516] at which Colonel Phillips presided, and at which I am certain Colonel Marston was present, Colonel Fleming, and other staff officers of the Hawaiian Department; and Colonel Hannum told me in the telephone conversation if a project to me appeared absolutely worthless and had no merit at all to take it up with the Commanding General or to give it a low priority, or have the Commanding General give it a low priority. Well, as a result of all that it was agreed that all orders from the Hawaiian Department to the district engineer would come through G-4; and they did.

Since then I have been informed by competent authority that during this period that I was district engineer the Department Engineer by law exercised no jurisdiction over me whatsoever. However, I had played ball with the Commanding General and had carried out his orders, whatever they might be; which, of course, under martial law was correct.

As you know, in March, the district engineer's office and the Department Engineer's office were more or less consolidated and placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and on the occasion when that was done, General Emons sent for me. "Wyman," he says, "do you want to stay here with me, or would you rather go back to the United States, and I understand you can get a regiment and go overseas." And after thinking about it a few minutes, I told the General that I would be delighted to stay with him, but that I am a combat soldier, my entire training has been for that, and I would like to get a combat engineer outfit and go overseas to any theater where there were any prospects of action; and so he recommended on the strength of that that I be relieved from the Hawaiian Department; and I was, [3517] by order of the War Department; and Colonel Lyman succeeded me.

I might also state that during this period of difficulty due to misunderstandings, that Colonel Lyman did in my opinion unjustly

censure, reprimand officers under my command. He did it in a manner, at the lunch table, where I felt it my duty to protect these officers and to say something in their behalf, because they were patriotic young officers under the district engineer who were giving everything they had to carry out the will of their superiors; and which did result in a clash of personalities, and which did cause ill feelings.

However, it was my duty as a junior officer to make amends with Colonel Lyman, which I did, and he and I became very friendly again and we had been friends for years, and we had most cordial relations during the period of the turn-over and just before I departed from the Hawaiian Islands.

323. Major CLAUSEN. What do you mean by a "turn-over," Colonel?

Colonel WYMAN. The relief when Colonel Wyman took over my administration; that is, relieved me as district engineer.

324. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, this morning you mentioned something about the AWS, and you assigned certain reasons as being the causes for delays. You also stated in that connection that there were 148 other projects?

Colonel WYMAN. 148 other jobs.

325. Major CLAUSEN. Other jobs?

Colonel WYMAN. Somebody has counted them up for me, and I believe that is true.

326. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Now, that evidence you gave was in connection with the committee charges, as I understand it, [3518] that you failed to complete these AWS installations or facilities on time, prior to Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, nobody knew that Pearl Harbor was coming. I didn't know it. We were pushing the work as rapidly as we could under the conditions.

327. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. I say, your evidence was in connection with the charge contained in the committee report in that connection?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, not necessarily. It is in connection with any charge. I tried to answer these charges in this committee report as they occurred—these allegations rather, not charges. Most of them are allegations.

328. Major CLAUSEN. Well, all right. These 148 jobs were jobs that were in the process of construction or work prior to Pearl Harbor, were they?

Colonel WYMAN. They were; I understand there were about 148 jobs altogether.

329. Major CLAUSEN. Where did you get the basis for that testimony with respect to the 148 jobs?

Colonel WYMAN. I counted them up. You see we had, I think it is, 98 jobs over here for the Hawaiian Constructors, alone. I had numerous other contractors operating under me in the construction of projects at Hickam Field.

330. Major CLAUSEN. You say you had 98 of these 148?

Colonel WYMAN. I understand that there are 98, which I have been informed was the number of job orders issued to the Hawaiian Constructors prior to December 7. My authority for making that statement is the district engineer's office at Punahau Campus. I understand there is a map here that shows [3519] the locations of those 98, that is available to you right now.

Now, in addition to those 98 jobs there were many other jobs under contract at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field, and I had dredging jobs for the Navy at Palmyra and at Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe Bay. I had dredging jobs for Kalihi Lagoon, I had dredging jobs for improvement of the reserve channel in Honolulu harbor.

331. Major CLAUSEN. These latter that you mention are not part of the 98?

Colonel WYMAN. No, no; they are additional ones.

332. Major CLAUSEN. They are Hawaiian Constructors jobs?

Colonel WYMAN. I understand it is 98; yes; and they are all shown here on a map which can be brought here as an exhibit prepared by the district engineer's office at Punahou.

333. Major CLAUSEN. Now, these maps that you referred to this morning, or the plans that you put your hands on several times this morning—whose responsibility was it with respect to those plans, to furnish those to you?

Colonel WYMAN. The Signal Corps.

334. Major CLAUSEN. The Signal Corps?

Colonel WYMAN. The Chief Signal Officer.

335. Major CLAUSEN. And do I understand that the maps or plans that you have there were all furnished by the Signal Corps?

Colonel WYMAN. That is right. Would you like to see them?

336. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. I can show them to you. Some of them were delivered as late as December 4, 1942.

337. Major CLAUSEN. I do not want to see them. You also this morning made a rather elaborate statement of your military [3520] history prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, but you skipped the Canal project?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, someone deleted it for me. I told you that when I came here.

338. Major CLAUSEN. You failed to mention in particular, sir, did you not, that you were reprimanded under the 104th Article of War for your negligence on that job?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, no, sir; I didn't. I wrote it in, but the sheet, if it was there, was not in this file this morning.

339. Major CLAUSEN. Let me show you, Colonel, a letter dated May 5, 1943, to you, from General Somervell, administering you a reprimand under the 104th Article of War for your activities up in Canada, and ask you whether you received this document?

Colonel WYMAN. That is in connection with the fire at Dawson Creek.

340. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. That is right. I am quite sure I did. This has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor.

341. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Colonel WYMAN. I say it has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor.

342. Major CLAUSEN. What did your work at Cherbourg have to do with Pearl Harbor?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, it was in the interests of the United States for me to work at Cherbourg.

343. Major CLAUSEN. You recall this, do you not, Colonel?

Colonel WYMAN. I didn't have any more to do with that than you did.

[3521] 344. Major CLAUSEN. You recall this document that I showed you?

Colonel WYMAN. I have seen this before; yes.

345. Major CLAUSEN. Yes; and you accepted this reprimand without appeal?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, no. I had a long conversation with General Somervell regarding that reprimand.

346. Major CLAUSEN. It states on here:

On May 17, 1943, receipt acknowledged, no request or demand for trial is submitted.

Did you make that statement?

Colonel WYMAN. I did.

347. Major CLAUSEN. We offer this in evidence as the exhibit next in order.

(Letter dated 5 May 1943, to the Commanding General, 8th Service Command, signed by Brig. Gen. Madison Pearson, G. S. C., Deputy Chief of Administrative Services, was marked Exhibit 47 and was received in evidence.)

Colonel WYMAN. Well, may I have a chance to explain that?

348. Major CLAUSEN. Yes; I have no objection.

Colonel WYMAN. The reprimand that you mentioned was in connection with a very disastrous fire and explosion at Dawson Creek, Alberta. I was not present at the fire at Dawson Creek, at the time of this explosion. At the time of the explosion I was with a commanding general of the Northwest Service Command, General O'Connor, and I had nothing whatsoever to do with the cause of the explosion and the fire—not a thing to do with it. The only thing is that I was the division engineer of the Northwest Division; and the first sentence in the orders for [3522] the division engineer in Orders and Regulations is that the division engineer is responsible for every occurrence in his division. In other words, whatever happened in that division was my responsibility; and I accept that responsibility.

349. Major CLAUSEN. Now, so far as your statements are concerned regarding Rohl, you referred to this committee report, and I am going to ask you whether you have read this report over in connection with the allegations against Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. No; I didn't read it all over. I read parts of it, and about his personal conduct, I didn't read it, at all.

350. Major CLAUSEN. When did you get the report first, Colonel?

Colonel WYMAN. The first copy of the report was handed to me by the War Department at Washington, D. C.

351. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you made the statement before this Board this morning that the House Military Affairs Committee called for no other witnesses?

Colonel WYMAN. That is right. I was so informed by the War Department.

352. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ask the committee for the privilege of appearing before the committee?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. No. I was overseas, and I understand that they—this is all only understanding—that they requested me to appear before the committee, but when they were informed that I was overseas they withdrew the request. I had no knowledge of that request at all. I had no knowledge of this committee report until I arrived in the United States.

353. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever ask the committee, upon your return to the United States, to see the evidence that backed [3523] up this committee report?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I didn't ask the committee, at all.

354. Major CLAUSEN. You stated something about having met Hans Wilhelm Rohl in Los Angeles, I think, in the year 1935, and I believe you stated that the bids were opened for this breakwater. Did you meet Mr. Rohl before those bids were opened and the contract let?

Colonel WYMAN. I think it was at the same time. I arrived at Los Angeles on the 20th of July, and I think the bids were opened the last part of the month or the first part of August; and it was on that occasion that I met both Mr. Rohl and Mr. Connolly, as I remember it.

355. Major CLAUSEN. So, as a matter of fact, the contract for this breakwater in the amount of \$859,000 was approved by you with respect to the Rohl-Connolly Construction Company in August 1935, was it?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no; it was awarded to them by the Chief of Engineers. I had no authority to award a contract to them.

356. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I said, you approved the award of the contract?

Colonel WYMAN. I did not approve the award of the contract. The Chief of Engineers approved the award of the contract.

357. Major CLAUSEN. Just what did you do with regard to the contract, Colonel?

Colonel WYMAN. All I do is make an abstract of the bids, and then I send that forward through channels recommending that the bid of the low bidder complying with the specifications be accepted.

[3524] 358. Major CLAUSEN. Yes; and in this case you recommended, therefore, that the bid of the Rohl-Connolly Construction Company be accepted?

Colonel WYMAN. That is right; if they were the low bidders; and I think they were.

359. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with regard to the Long Beach-Los Angeles breakwater job in the amount of \$2,145,000, did you do the same thing, on August 6, 1936?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes; they were the low bidders, and they did qualify. They had already built some satisfactory breakwaters, and it was my duty to recommend them because they were the low bidders; and it was done so.

360. Major CLAUSEN. So far as this cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was concerned, was the Hawaiian job the first one that you had to administer and as to which you had anything to do?

Colonel WYMAN. Cost-plus-fixed-fee?

361. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. This is the first one; yes, sir.

362. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that prior to the time that that contract was made you had received from the Chief of Engineers or Assistant to the Chief of Engineers this letter, November 24, 1941, subject, "Conduct of Work under Cost-Plus-a-Fixed-Fee contracts," which I hand you, sir?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. You see, this is November 24, 1941. This letter came a year later. This contract was made in November 1940.

363. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you ever receive similar instructions?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, this is a circular I dare say came to my office; I don't know. This is a year later. This is just a few days before Pearl Harbor. This was issued just a [3525] few days before Pearl Harbor; probably got to my office probably the 1st of January.

364. Major CLAUSEN. That is correct.

Colonel WYMAN. Didn't get here, because we didn't have a mail for a long time.

365. Major CLAUSEN. But the statement of the policy in there to be followed with regard to cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts, did you receive such instructions from the Chief's office?

Colonel WYMAN. I would have to look in our files to see when this came.

366. Major CLAUSEN. Well, all right. Let me read you a part of it. It says here:

(Excerpt from instructions on cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts:)

When work is to be done under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract the Government exercises great care to select a contractor of outstanding ability and experience, and pays him a fee for the use of his organization.

Colonel WYMAN. Now, wait a minute.

367. Major CLAUSEN. Was that your concept of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor before you entered into or approved this one concerning the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Colonel WYMAN. I have told you several times that the meeting of minds to enter into this contract was in the office of the Chief of Engineers, with persons present like General Robins, the Assistant Chief of Engineers, the head of the contract section, General Schley, the Chief of Engineers; and there was no meeting of minds to make a contract with this outfit until that time.

368. Major CLAUSEN. That is not the question, Colonel.

[3529] Colonel WYMAN. Well, I say, that is when it was made.

369. Major CLAUSEN. No.

Colonel WYMAN. There were other minds in the picture besides mine.

370. Major CLAUSEN. My question, sir, is this—whether this is your concept of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, that—

The Government selects a contractor of outstanding ability and experience and pays him a fee for the use of his organization.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, please understand that I am a subordinate officer, I have no views of my own. I carry out the policy of the War Department as it is announced from time to time, whatever it may be.

371. Major CLAUSEN. Well, what was your understanding of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract?

Colonel WYMAN. I learned about it after I got to Washington, all about the features of it.

372. Major CLAUSEN. Had you never had one before?

Colonel WYMAN. I had none before; no; but I had a blank form which was sent out with a circular which gave us some idea about it.

373. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you said Rohl had done satisfactorily quite a few jobs for the Government. Was that work performed to your personal knowledge before you entered into this basic contract of December 1940?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes. You see, he did work for the Reclamation Service, work for the Indian Service, worked for the State of California, and had worked for the Engineer Department. I got that in the report, here.

374. Major CLAUSEN. Well, this is true, isn't it, Colonel [3527] Wyman, that Mr. Rohl was an essential part of that organization?

Colonel WYMAN. I have always understood that he was a stockholder in the organization, and he exercised considerable supervision over work that they did; yes.

375. Major CLAUSEN. And you mention that with regard to his work here in Hawaii; you told General Frank that he had performed various jobs about the island in a highly satisfactory manner?

Colonel WYMAN. He did that in 1942, and in the months of January, February, and March, when I was here; very satisfactory.

376. Major CLAUSEN. And he had done that before December 1940, according to your testimony?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, sure. Here is what he did.

377. Major CLAUSEN. I didn't ask you just exactly what he did. You can state it for the record if you want, but my question is this.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes; but he did the Los Angeles breakwater, U. S. E. D.; the Newport Jetties, City of Newport; Los Angeles breakwater No. 2; Los Angeles Breakwater No. 3; Seal Beach jetty; Rock Dyke, City of Long Beach; Headgate Dam, U. S. Indian Service; Point Arguello breakwater, U. S. Coast Guard; dredging and rip rap, City of Long Beach; Redondo breakwater, City of Redondo; Hueneme breakwater, District of Hueneme. I say he did all those things.

378. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you mentioned that to General Frank, before. My question now is, with regard to those various jobs, he, himself, personally—that is, Mr. Rohl—played an active part in the construction of those jobs, did he?

[3528] Colonel WYMAN. He did on the breakwater at Los Angeles.

379. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Well, all right. Now, in December 1940 when you entered into the contract or had these discussions at Washington, you expected that Mr. Rohl would do the same thing with the Hawaiian job, didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. No. He built concrete work. He has built the Hellgate Dam at—this is, his company was—at Parker, Arizona.

380. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, but you were entering into a contract here in Hawaii, and you expected Mr. Rohl himself personally to help with this work over here, didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no, he didn't have any interest in it when I first knew him. The only member of the outfit that had any interest was Connolly.

381. Major CLAUSEN. That isn't my question, Colonel Wyman. My question is: During the time in December 1940 when you had this contract approved in Washington, you expected Mr. Rohl personally to come over here to Hawaii and conduct the work?

Colonel WYMAN. No. We agreed in Washington; Mr. Grafe would conduct the work, and the Callahan outfit would furnish the supervisory help over here, at first.

382. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, in Washington in December 1940 you did not expect Mr. Rohl to come to Hawaii; is that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. No. Mr. Grafe—I didn't know whether he would come or not, but Mr. Grafe accepted the responsibility of being the project manager in Hawaii.

383. Major CLAUSEN. And so far as the Rohl-Connolly organization is concerned, your testimony is that in December 1940 you did [3529] not expect him to pay any part in it here in Hawaii?

Colonel WYMAN. I wouldn't know.

384. Major CLAUSEN. You wouldn't know?

Colonel WYMAN. How would I know?

385. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you said that you—

Colonel WYMAN. Except that it was agreed with Tommy Robins, General Tommy Robins, and General Schley, that Grafe and the Callahan Company would use their force from their supervisors, superintendents, from the Caddoa Dam and from the Prado Dam, to supervise the work here in Hawaii.

386. Major CLAUSEN. And where was Mr. Rohl? What part was he to play in this Hawaiian job?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know. He wasn't present at these conferences.

387. Major CLAUSEN. I didn't ask you that. What part was he to play—

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know.

388. Major CLAUSEN. —in the Hawaiian job?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, you would have to ask the company that. I don't know.

389. Major CLAUSEN. You had no comment or no discussion concerning that at all?

Colonel WYMAN. None at all in the offices of the Chief of Engineers or elsewhere.

390. Major CLAUSEN. Let me invite your attention, Colonel Wyman, to a letter which you wrote to Mr. Rohl in January, January 22, 1941, which you set forth as Exhibit I to this I. G. report of Colonel Hunt. Would you read that, please, and see if you wrote that letter to him on that date?

[3530] Colonel WYMAN (reading):

Mr. ROHL,

Rohl-Connolly Company, 4351 Alhambra, Los Angeles, California.

DEAR SIR: Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with the Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands.

As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will be allowed transportation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel allowance not to exceed \$6.00 per day while enroute in accordance with existing laws and regulations.

You will make application to either the District Engineer at Los Angeles or the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, for transportation.

Very truly yours,

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers.

January the 22nd. I state in here that this is a secret contract, but I think it had been reclassified as a restricted contract as of that date.

391. Major CLAUSEN. Now, my question, Colonel, is whether you [3531] wrote that letter to Mr. Rohl.

Colonel WYMAN. I believe that I wrote such a letter.

392. Major CLAUSEN. Is there any question about it in your mind?

Colonel WYMAN. Not any, except that I remember sending and asking him to come over.

393. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, what answer did you get from him?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know, and I don't remember that; whether or not I ever got any answer.

394. Major CLAUSEN. From that day, January 22, —

Colonel WYMAN. He did not come.

395. Major CLAUSEN. —1941, down to, as I believe you said to General Frank,—what date was it that he arrived here? September 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. I think it was in October.

396. Major CLAUSEN. Did you write him any other letters at all?

Colonel WYMAN. I have no recollection of any. I might have. I don't know. But I don't remember.

397. Major CLAUSEN. We have asked the Engineers to furnish us copies of all such letters. We have received none so far.

Did you have any telephone calls during that interim with Mr. Rohl concerning the subject matter of your letter of January 22, 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I didn't call Mr. Rohl. I didn't call him.

398. Major CLAUSEN. I didn't ask you whether you called him. Did you have any telephone calls with him?

[3532] Colonel WYMAN. Regarding this matter?

399. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't remember any telephone call regarding this matter.

400. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you testified also, to General Frank, that between certain dates you had certain telephone calls and that a lot of this was telephonitis. Did you indulge in this telephonitis on the mainland?

Colonel WYMAN. I never did.

401. Major CLAUSEN. Or did Mr. Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. I never indulged in telephonitis. I never had any money to pay for it.

402. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Did Mr. Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. But I notice that many, many contractors and I have even seen Army officers indulge in telephonitis and call in long-distance telephones, calls to their friends, from parties and places like that. I understand that Rohl is a person—I have been told so—who suffers terribly from telephonitis and calls people up throughout the United States at will.

403. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, he is also a person that charters planes, isn't he, at will?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know about that.

404. Major CLAUSEN. Or did.

Well, in any event, on page 34 of this House Committee report there are listed some thirteen telephone calls between yourself and Mr. Rohl, Mr. Rohl being on the mainland and you being here in Hawaii. What proportion—

Colonel WYMAN. Between me and Rohl?

[3533] 405. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Or between Rohl and me?

406. Major CLAUSEN. Well take it either way.

Colonel WYMAN. Rohl to me.

407. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Either way at all. What proportion of those do you put down as telephonic calls?

Colonel WYMAN. I would say that the calls here around October 30, October 31st, October 31st; there seems to be two; November 3rd, November 8, November 12, were all calls in relation to the preparation of equipment and the transportation of the equipment to Los Angeles for loading on the U. S. transport LUDINGTON. Also the organization of gangs of men for excavation crews, concrete crews, asphalt crews, for the building of the runways of the airports at Canton Island and Christmas Island. That's the telephone calls, because I can recollect that he did call me regarding the amount of equipment, the size of the gangs, details of getting them aboard transport, and that sort of thing.

408. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I am struck by the significance of the calls you have selected, of those which occurred after he was naturalized.

Colonel WYMAN. That's right.

409. Major CLAUSEN. Tell me about those that occurred—

Colonel WYMAN. I can remember back.

410. Major CLAUSEN. Tell me about those that occurred prior to that time.

Colonel WYMAN. In May 22, I do not know. March 19, I do not know. February 5th, I do not know. January, here's one I see that's—that is Robinson's to me; I don't know. [3534] January 17, I don't know. The 9th, the 4th, the 21st, July 15, 1940, I don't know. However, before this there was a call—

411. Major CLAUSEN. You mean in—

Colonel WYMAN. In addition to these.

412. Major CLAUSEN. In addition to these listed on this page?

Colonel WYMAN. I do remember one when I was on duty at Schofield when I got called off the golf course to answer a telephone call. It was from Mr. Rohl, and he was calling me up to tell me about the bids at the Sepulveda Dam.

413. Major CLAUSEN. The one you told us about?

Colonel WYMAN. I told you about that and the death of Thad Merriman.

414. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now that you have had your memory refreshed maybe a bit, tell me whether in connection with this letter where you asked Mr. Rohl to come over here, this letter of January 22, 1941, where you say, since he is actively interested in the venture, that you desire him to proceed to Honolulu at his earliest convenience—whether you did not discuss that on the telephone.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't recollect discussing it on the telephone.

415. Major CLAUSEN. You want the Board to understand that the first time that you knew that he was an alien was June?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes, absolutely. The first time that I knew that Rohl was an alien was on the occasion of Mr. Grafe coming to my office and informing me that Mr. Rohl was an alien and in—passed a letter to me setting—stating so, and also stating that Mr. Rohl had made application for citizenship; and immediately after that information was received I called in [3535] a stenographer

and dictated a letter to the Chief of Engineers setting forth the statements made in Rohl's—in Grafe's letter. Just what I said in that letter, I don't know. I have forgotten, because I haven't seen it since the day I wrote it, but I understand the letter is in existence and therefore can be read.

416. General GRUNERT. Do I understand that Grafe told you this in a letter?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, yes. He submitted a letter.

417. General GRUNERT. Have you got a copy of that letter?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't have a copy of it, no, sir. There is a copy, though.

418. Major CLAUSEN. Where are these copies?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, I suppose they are in the files of the District Engineer's office.

419. Major CLAUSEN. You mean here in Honolulu?

Colonel WYMAN. I think so, yes.

420. Major CLAUSEN. Well, we were informed that General Bragdon was going to get us certain letters.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

421. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Then let me ask you this, Colonel Wyman: Have you looked for such letters since you have arrived here in Honolulu?

Colonel WYMAN. I have just thumbed through files that were made available, and I have not come across those letters. However, I have not—

422. Major CLAUSEN. Now, so far as the question that you were asked by General Frank concerning this basic contract and the necessity for speed, you said something about the the Engineers [3536] always proceeding with speed. Isn't it true, though, that in this particular contract there was a need for greater speed than ordinary?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, we put on all the speed we could.

423. Major CLAUSEN. Well, what instructions as to this did you receive, and from whom?

Colonel WYMAN. Instructions about what?

424. Major CLAUSEN. This increased speed with respect to this contract.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I received a request from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in July, to try—

425. General FRANK. July?

Colonel WYMAN. July 1941, to try to finish the A. W. S. stations as quickly as possible, because the equipment was arriving. I read that letter this morning.

426. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, there were also instructions given you in Washington, weren't there, regarding the need for speed and the completion of this job?

Colonel WYMAN. In Washington?

427. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; in December of 1940.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't remember any specific instructions from the Chief of Engineers or General Robins except that we would make the same speed as we usually do in consummating work.

428. Major CLAUSEN. You know at that time, in December 1940, that this job would run over the one million and some-odd dollars mentioned, didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, only by hearsay.

429. Major CLAUSEN. And by hearsay you mean what, sir?

[3537] Colonel WYMAN. Well, we learned from General Hannum that there might be an increase in the size of the job due to the fact that large programs were being considered for the Hawaiian Islands, especially construction of airfields and that sort of thing. That was just hearsay, except that I can remember distinctly—I can't remember the exact occasion—where the General told me we should have very strong contractors, because we should organize somewhat like the Navy. The Navy had a combination of co-adventurers known as the Naval Constructors on their job; and that it might be a good thing for the Army to consider that arrangement too, and therefore for any work that came up, why, you would have the strength of organization to handle it as soon as you could get additional equipment, and that sort of thing.

430. Major CLAUSEN. When did Colonel Hannum tell you that, Colonel?

Colonel WYMAN. We talked about that, I think, the first day that I was in San Francisco, or it could have been earlier, or it might have been when we were at Midway. I don't know. It was in one of our conversations.

431. Major CLAUSEN. Well, when you went to Los Angeles then, sir, did you tell that to Mr. Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. No, I didn't tell him that.

432. Major CLAUSEN. You are sure you didn't tell him that?

Colonel WYMAN. I couldn't have any reason to tell him.

433. Major CLAUSEN. Did you tell any other contractors down there the fact that the contract might be blown up?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't think I told anybody, because I wouldn't have any just reason to tell them that.

[3538] 434. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you didn't tell these contractors, when you assembled them at Los Angeles, that this contract, while it was for \$1,000,000, might be for much more?

Colonel WYMAN. No, but I think they were told in Washington by—in the Chief's office that there would probably be more work which could be done under this contract, because these are pretty large contractors and they are interested in big work, and if there is any possibility of getting big work, why, they would be interested, of course.

435. Major CLAUSEN. So far as Atkinson is concerned, the only thing that he knew was that this was a million and some-odd dollar job, and he demanded a certain fee?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, he did most of his talking with General Hannum, and I couldn't tell you what General Hannum told him, but he did put in for 8 percent.

436. Major CLAUSEN. And is that the only time you told anybody about the fact that this contract would go higher?

Colonel WYMAN. I didn't tell it to them in Washington, and it was told to them by others.

437. Major CLAUSEN. And who told whom?

Colonel WYMAN. And I think I was present in the room. I don't know who told them that, but it could have been General Robins; it could have been General Schley. I don't know who told them, but I can remember that some such statement was made, and that was made at the time when they suggested that the Caddoa Constructors take this job, and the Caddoa Constructors were these three companies.

438. Major CLAUSEN. And this statement regarding the contract, this possibility of being increased, was told to whom?

[3539] Colonel WYMAN. I think it was told to Grafe and to Connolly in Washington. I am not certain, though, exactly about it. This happened—you know, you are asking me questions about hearsay stuff that happened four years ago.

439. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Well, you recall—

Colonel WYMAN. A long time ago.

440. Major CLAUSEN. At Los Angeles that you did have two specific talks with Mr. Rohl, once when he indicated no interest—

Colonel WYMAN. "No." He said, "No."

441. Major CLAUSEN. And once when he came back and indicated some interest?

Colonel WYMAN. And said Connolly would be interested, might be interested.

442. Major CLAUSEN. And then do you recall that you had also a talk with him in San Francisco in the Palace Hotel?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I don't remember that I did.

443. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having had a talk with Mr. Connolly when you returned from Washington, at his home?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, I believe I did. I got caught in Los Angeles—I mean in San Francisco over Christmas and couldn't be—could not get back to Honolulu, and I remember that Mr. Connolly took mercy on me and invited me out to his family house, with his family, to eat dinner one night. That's right.

444. Major CLAUSEN. And prior to that time you had met Mr. Connolly, hadn't you, en route to Washington from the West Coast?

Colonel WYMAN. When we went to Washington Mr. Connolly [3540] got on the same plane that I did at Chicago.

445. Major CLAUSEN. Now, before that time the man who had indicated the interest was Mr. Grafe; isn't that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, Mr.—well, not only Grafe but also Gunther and Shirley.

446. Major CLAUSEN. Well, Gunther and Shirley and Callahan Construction Company are represented by Mr. Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, no, no. No. At that time when they came in to Los Angeles I think there was Shirley came in to represent Gunther and Shirley for Mr. Grafe. Mr. Grafe wasn't there.

447. Major CLAUSEN. Well, Mr. Grafe is the man who in the East represented these two firms, isn't he, Gunther and Shirley and the Callahan Construction Company?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know, but he did—he was attorney in fact for these three companies on this 602 job.

448. Major CLAUSEN. But it was Mr. Connolly that came there representing the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Colonel WYMAN. That is right; or representing himself; I don't know which.

449. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you had these two men, then, representing these contractors?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, Grafe was an officer in the—I don't know what his capacity—in the Callahan Construction Company; and Connolly was an officer in the Rohl-Connolly Company and also in another company, which is the T. W. Connolly Company. The T.—that's a

large construction company too, just finished some very large work, and which Mr. Connolly is interested in. It is a separate company from [3541] the Rohl-Connolly outfit.

Now, whether he was going to be interested in this job representing Rohl-Connolly or representing his own company, T. Connolly Company, was unknown to me until the time it was suggested that this work be undertaken by the Caddoa Builders, and the Caddoa Builders consisted at that time of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Gunther-Shirley, Rohl-Connolly Company, or Construction Company, whatever it is.

450. Major CLAUSEN. Where did you meet Mr. Connolly going east?

Colonel WYMAN. I met him at—he got on the same plane that I did. I got off a plane, and I think I went into the station to get some sandwiches or something for breakfast, and as I came out, why, Connolly came walking across, and I told him to get on this same plane, and the plane went from Chicago to Cleveland. We got off the plane there and got on another plane and went to Washington.

451. Major CLAUSEN. You met Mr. Connolly and stopped off in Chicago?

Colonel WYMAN. He didn't stop off at Chicago. I went right through, but he got on at—

452. Major CLAUSEN. Where did you meet Mr. Grafe?

Colonel WYMAN. He got on, Grafe—Grafe came into the Carlton Hotel after we had been there, and I met him there.

453. Major CLAUSEN. Now, isn't it correct that Grafe was the man who had sent the engineers to the Islands here?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, that's right. That is the Callahan Construction Company.

[3542] 454. Major CLAUSEN. And you suggested to them back there that this same group take ahold of this contract?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I thought that Grafe would take that contract all by himself, the Callahan Construction Company. This wasn't too big a contract.

455. Major CLAUSEN. When was it that you met Mr. Martin?

Colonel WYMAN. Martin came into the hotel, I don't know whether it was the first day or the second day we were there, in the afternoon, late in the afternoon, and sat there and talked to people in Grafe's room. There were a roomful of people: that is, Grafe, and I was there, and Connolly was there, and John Martin was there. It seems to me that some other person was there, too, that I remember.

456. Major CLAUSEN. And you talked about this job out here?

Colonel WYMAN. No, we didn't—no, I didn't talk to Martin about this job. He was talking about the—claimed that he represented the contractor who was engaged in the contracts of the Pennsylvania turnpike across the State of Pennsylvania, and it was about the engineers issuing change orders, and without entering—having a meeting of minds with the contractors as to whether or not it would affect the price.

457. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see Rohl drunk in your life?

Colonel WYMAN. I never saw Rohl drunk in my life; no, sir.

458. Major CLAUSEN. Do you define drunkenness the same as Mr. Rohl does?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know how he defines it.

459. Major CLAUSEN. Well, he says a person is drunk only if he falls down.

[3543] Colonel WYMAN. No, I wouldn't define it—drunkenness is a state of intoxication where a man has lost the use of his mental and physical faculties.

460. Major CLAUSEN. You were very intimate, weren't you, with Mr. Dillingham?

Colonel WYMAN. No. Not very intimate, no. Just see him occasionally. He usually came to my office. I don't think I ever went to his.

461. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall having testified before Colonel Hunt?

Colonel WYMAN. I have never read that testimony before Colonel Hunt. I don't know what—anything that's in it.

462. Major CLAUSEN. I say, do you recall having testified before him?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I testified, yes. I was on a job, a flood job on the White River in the State of Arkansas.

463. Major CLAUSEN. Did you give this testimony on page 66:

The Hawaiian Contracting Company showed no interest that I recollect, and I was very intimate with Mr. Walter Dillingham, one of the principal persons in business in Honolulu and a part owner of that company?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, what time are you talking? When? What time does this refer to?

464. Major CLAUSEN. Well, that is the testimony that you are supposed to have given, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I know, but is that 1940 or 1941?

465. Major CLAUSEN. Well, I don't know. What did you mean when you said that?

[3544] Colonel WYMAN. I have not read it. I don't know.

466. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, did you give that testimony to Colonel Hunt?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't—if it is in his record, why, I probably did, but I don't recollect it, of course.

467. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you had certain contracts—rather, you had something to do with certain contracts in which the Hawaiian Contracting Company was involved prior to the basic contract and afterwards; isn't that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, we had—I had some contracts with the Hawaiian Contracting Company for paving over at Hickam Field, as I recollect, and I think there were some other jobs, small; small, not too big, at that time. They were also working for the Construction Quartermaster and the Navy.

468. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever get any equipment from Mr. Dillingham that was used in connection with the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel WYMAN. I never got a thing from Mr. Dillingham. I got it from Hawaiian Contracting Company. That is, I didn't, but the Hawaiian Constructors did.

469. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have anything to do with the Hawaiian Constructors' getting any equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I authorized it, yes, sir. We got equipment from everybody on these Islands after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and

the plantations and everybody else, and put it to work on the construction of airfields and other work in these Islands.

[3545] 470. Major CLAUSEN. Was Mr. Dillingham interested in the Hawaiian Constructors, to your knowledge?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, I think to this degree: that it—I think he is an officer in their company. He was not the president.

471. Major CLAUSEN. Did you receive any instructions from him, advice?

Colonel WYMAN. I'll tell you if you give me a chance. You see, the Hawaiian Contracting Company bought some of the interest in the Hawaiian Constructors held by the Callahan Company, the Gunther-Shirley Company, and the Rohl-Connolly Company; and in order to consummate that it was necessary to have the approval of the District Engineer, and that was written up in a supplemental agreement whereby the Hawaiian Contracting Company became part of the Hawaiian Constructors.

472. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever—it wasn't quite clear from what you testified to General Frank—did you ever, during the course of the construction of these airfields to the south, personally visit those fields?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I didn't. Which ones do you mean? Do you mean at Canton and Christmas?

473. Major CLAUSEN. Christmas, yes.

Colonel WYMAN. No, I never got there, because General Tinker and Colonel Mollison, his Chief of Staff, and I were going to make a trip all the way through to Australia and visit all the fields, and his plan was upset, as far as I am concerned, by the fact that I left the Hawaiian Department. However, General Tinker and Mollison did make the trip.

474. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have a Captain W. E. Wilhelm [3546] working down there for you, W-i-l-h-e-l-m?

Colonel WYMAN. We had a man in the District office by the name of Wilhelm that I recollect. I remember him.

475. Major CLAUSEN. You remember him?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes.

476. Major CLAUSEN. One of the men that worked for you?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I don't remember what duty he performed, except he did make a reconnaissance, a map reconnaissance, and he has charts and other information. He made a reconnaissance of possible routes, alternate routes to Australia east of the route—the first built. He did that.

477. Major CLAUSEN. Would you call him a good man or a bad man?

Colonel WYMAN. Wilhelm?

478. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I don't remember him very well. I couldn't pass judgment.

479. Major CLAUSEN. You mentioned several times to General Frank, "General Sverdrup."

Colonel WYMAN. Yes.

480. Major CLAUSEN. But the time to which General Frank was directing your attention was with regard to the VEGA and its acquisition by the Engineers out here. At that time it was Mr. Sverdrup; isn't that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, he was a—yes, he was an engineer of the firm of Sverdrup and Parcel, one of the high ranking bridge engineer outfits of the United States.

481. Major CLAUSEN. Later on commissioned, after these jobs were finished?

Colonel WYMAN. No. Right during while the jobs were [3547] going on he was commissioned a Colonel of Engineers, and I understand that—now a General; I understand that now he is the Engineer in charge of all the work in the South Pacific. He has been awarded the D. S. M., the Silver Star, for heroic action, and he has done a lot of other things to his credit, and therefore I feel that my faith in Mr. Sverdrup in the job that was assigned to the south was well placed.

482. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything about this statement on page 48 that Rohl was about to be made a General too?

Colonel WYMAN. Rohl was?

483. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. No, I haven't the least idea.

484. Major CLAUSEN. You don't have any knowledge as to that?

Colonel WYMAN. No.

485. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, concerning the VEGA, the value of that boat was established by you, was it, at a hundred thousand dollars?

Colonel WYMAN. No; I think that was established by the Division Engineer's office.

486. Major CLAUSEN. Now, it is correct, isn't it, that before the VEGA ever got to the Hawaiian Islands you had already agreed and had arranged to purchase the SOUTHERN SEAS to do the survey work that was contemplated for the VEGA?

Colonel WYMAN. No. The SOUTHERN SEAS was purchased because we had to take it over. I went through all that. I'll go through it again gladly.

487. Major CLAUSEN. Don't go through anything that you have been through, again. If you are all through, have gone through, you tell me. I will take your word.

[3548] Colonel WYMAN. I have gone through it. The SOUTHERN SEAS had belonged to Pan-American. I was ordered to take over all Pan-American property on all these islands because they abandoned it and requested our people to take it over. In that property was the yacht SOUTHERN SEAS, which is the yacht, as I understand it now, that cost over a million dollars to build, and they used it as a hotel in the harbor of Noumea, for their passengers when the clipper landed at Noumea. They were taken off the clipper and put on this boat for overnight accommodations. And we took it over. Well, the boat was a seaworthy—

488. General FRANK. Because there were not good hotel accommodations at Noumea.

Colonel WYMAN. The boat was in good seaworthy condition, so Sverdrup recommended that the boat be acquired and operated.

489. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, you recommended it be purchased for \$600,000?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I did not.

490. Major CLAUSEN. Didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I did not. I just gave you all the testimony, that I recommended to General Hannum that they pay \$300,000 and that an appraiser and surveyor be put on the job to determine its value, and, after its value was determined, to pay the difference between the price, whatever it was, and the \$300,000. As a matter of fact, I did not have authority to authorize anybody to pay \$600,000 for a boat. I had to seek the authority from the—the authority would have to come from the Chief of Engineers, and the entire arrangement for the SOUTHERN SEAS was made by the Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers, and not by me.

[3549] 491. Major CLAUSEN. Getting back to when Rohl's forces came over here right after the contract, some of these men were to work on the Hawaiian job?

Colonel WYMAN. Rohl's forces didn't come over. I told you several times that the men who came over came from the Callahan organization and not from the Rohl organization.

492. Major CLAUSEN. Do I understand, then, that no men from the Rohl organization came over here at all to Hawaii?

Colonel WYMAN. Not of the superintendents, no, sir. Mr. McCullough was a Callahan man and so was Mr. Ashlock.

493. Major CLAUSEN. Then the only part that the Rohl-Connolly Company played over here was to furnish equipment?

Colonel WYMAN. Played?

494. Major CLAUSEN: You say there came no men from the Rohl organization over here.

Colonel WYMAN. No. You say when they first came over. This job was Paul Grafe's and the superintendent from the Callahan Company. Later on I dare say they brought many people from the Rohl-Connolly outfit or from Caddoa Dam. You see, they were all together at the Caddoa Dam as co-adventurers. They had a big organization.

495. Major CLAUSEN. You told us that. Now, just take this period of time from the date of the basic contract, December, 1940, down to the time that Mr. Rohl himself came here, in September, 1941. Did any personnel of the Rohl-Connolly Company come over and work on this job in Hawaii?

Colonel WYMAN. I would not know that. You would get that information by consulting the records of the Hawaiian Constructors. [3550]

496. Major CLAUSEN. You do not know, then?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not, no.

497. Major CLAUSEN. With regard to the job orders, was it your statement in some testimony you gave General Frank that after the approvals, whatever approvals are required, are granted to you, the job order is issued?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes.

498. Major CLAUSEN. Is that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. After the approval of the site—what particular sort of a job would you like? Take an airfield, for instance, like the building of a runway. General Frank knows about that. They have a Board that goes about.

499. Major CLAUSEN. My question, Colonel, so we can save time,—there isn't very much to this.

Colonel WYMAN. It takes the approval of all the interests, everybody that is interested in the project, before you can commence any work or make any plans, and after the plans are made and specifications written, they are approved by the Chief of Engineers and the Division Engineer, and after that a job order is issued, and if that job order is in excess of \$10,000—it was in those days—it had to be approved by the Division Engineer before one cent could be spent on the job.

Now, that was peace-time procedure as outlined in orders and regulations which anybody can read, and it is very silly now, I will admit, but that was in effect in 1940 and 1941, up to the 7th day of December, or the day that war was declared I think was the 8th day of December, 1941.

500. Major CLAUSEN. So when you finally put your signature on a [3551] job order you had already received those approvals?

Colonel WYMAN. No, no.

501. Major CLAUSEN. What would you do? Give an order?

Colonel WYMAN. No, listen: I issued job orders in order to save the money. I was directed to obligate the money for the reserve gasoline storage by the Chief of Engineers prior to the 31st day of June 1941, in order to save that money and to keep it from going back into the Treasury of the United States, and we would be completely out of funds. I issued many job orders in June of 1941 for the sole purpose of reserving our money, so it was not going back in the Treasury by law, obligated funds.

502. Major CLAUSEN. With regard to your statement concerning Rohl's application for naturalization and this letter of General Kingman—you have read that, as set forth on page 5 of this committee report?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't believe I did. I just glanced at it, I believe. I don't know that I read it.

503. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know the source of the information that is set forth in that letter by General Kingman to Mr. Schofield?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not know because I did not know—I don't think I knew when he applied for citizenship, January 15, 1941. I don't know that. I don't know where it came from.

504. Major CLAUSEN. Did you write any letters, other than the one you said you wrote to the Chief of Engineers?

Colonel WYMAN. No. I only wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers announcing that Rohl was an alien, was so notified by Grafe; also the fact that Rohl had applied for citizenship. [3552] Whether I made any recommendation as to what action they take I do not recollect. I probably made a recommendation. I don't know what it is, though, because I haven't seen the letter.

505. Major CLAUSEN. Have you ever had, in addition to having written that letter, any talks with anybody connected with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization?

Colonel WYMAN. Nobody at all.

506. Major CLAUSEN. Concerning Rohl's naturalization?

Colonel WYMAN. No, nobody at all. No conversation at all.

507. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have any correspondence with anybody—

Colonel WYMAN. Nobody at all.

508. Major CLAUSEN. —in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization on that subject?

Colonel WYMAN. Nothing that I can recollect.

509. Major CLAUSEN. You say, nothing you recollect. Is there a possibility that you may have had some such communication?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I don't know. There is nothing that I recollect. I think that I did not write anybody any letter about anything. However, sometimes, as I remember, you get applications from Bureaus as to whether or not somebody who worked with you or for you was an honest, reliable person and what their experience is and so on. I know I get many letters from the American Society of Civil Engineers on that, where people offer your name as a sponsor, but I have no recollection of any letters in this case.

510. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have.

511. General RUSSELL. Just a couple of questions.

Colonel, this contract was finally approved about January 3rd, 1941, under which all the work was done that we have been [3553] discussing here?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, approved by the Assistant Secretary of War.

512. General GRUNERT. Assistant Secretary of War?

Colonel WYMAN. The Under Secretary of War, Mr. Patterson.

513. General RUSSELL. Now, about when did the Connolly Company or the Constructors begin to move their personnel and equipment out to Hawaii?

Colonel WYMAN. It is my recollection that the first act they made was the Division Engineer to grant them authority to buy around \$275,000 worth of plant on January 6th and ship it over here to start this work. It is also my recollection that Mr. Grafe and Mr. McCullough and quite a large number of people arrived here, both by clipper and boat, in the first week or so of January, 1941, and they opened up an office, I think, in the Young Hotel Building very soon after their arrival here.

514. General RUSSELL. Actually when did they begin work on some job out here?

Colonel WYMAN. They got going—the first job of any importance that I recollect they started was the road job leading up to Mount Kaala AWS station. They also broke into the ammunition storage at Wheeler, the field for Schofield Barracks ammunition, very promptly. They moved materials on that job very promptly. They also built a camp in the woods along the main highway without any delay at all, except they had considerable trouble getting water from the well opposite Wheeler Field, due to some controversy with the Water Department of the County.

515. General RUSSELL. Do you have records before you this [3554] morning from which you could determine the date of the initial work on this road, which you say is the first major project that they worked on?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. The records should show that. No work could be done until a job order was issued, except such work like setting up an office.

516. General RUSSELL. Preliminary work?

Colonel WYMAN. Preliminary work. The job order had to be approved by the Division Engineer at San Francisco, before, at least theoretically, any work could be done. However, assuming that the job order would be approved, the contractor could move plant onto the job, but he could not start the work until the job order and plans had been approved by the Division Engineer at San Francisco.

517. General RUSSELL. From the data now before you can you tell me when these people started their first work?

Colonel WYMAN. Here it is, here. On the Kaala job the layout plan was approved by the Commanding General on the 6th day of March, 1941; construction started on the access road on the 11th of March, 1941, or five days after the approval.

518. General RUSSELL. Now, would you say that was the first work of any importance done over here by the Hawaiian Constructors, and it began on the 11th day of March, 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. No, sir. There were other jobs—I don't have the date here, but I could dig it up. But take the big job, the one that cost a lot of money, was the ammunition storage job at Wheeler Field, and that is the one that theoretically could take the longest time.

519. General RUSSELL. Have you any data there from which you [3555] can tell me when the first work was done by those people out here, even on a little job?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I think they put up warehouses and camps and that sort of thing immediately.

520. General RUSSELL. You were not concerned with that, Colonel. I am talking about the work that they were doing that you were concerned with as a representative of the United States Government.

Colonel WYMAN. I was concerned with the camp, because that was a reimbursable item. The government had to pay the cost of it.

521. General RUSSELL. Do you want to tell me that you just don't know?

Colonel WYMAN. General, I think I should look up the records, and I can answer that question.

522. General RUSSELL. Would you say it was before the first day of February, 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. I do not know that.

523. General RUSSELL. You have no idea about it?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, it was very early, but the only way I could do it, between the time that elapsed and the things that occurred, is to look at the records and find out the day it started.

524. General RUSSELL. They had a man named McCullough out here?

Colonel WYMAN. That is right.

525. General RUSSELL. You objected to McCullough?

Colonel WYMAN. That is right.

526. General RUSSELL. When was he replaced by a man named Ashlock?

[3556] Colonel WYMAN. Ashlock, I think, came here in April or May. Mr. McCullough became ill and went home.

527. General RUSSELL. How long was it after you made your complaint to Paul Grafe before McCullough went home?

Colonel WYMAN. Not very long. Just a short time.

528. General RUSSELL. Would you say you made your complaint to Paul Grafe some time in March?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I complained way back in February, the way things were getting off to a slow start, and I kept complaining.

529. General RUSSELL. What time in February?

Colonel WYMAN. I think right in the beginning, the middle of February or early in February.

530. General RUSSELL. Was it in January?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I think the first was in February that I began to complain. I always give the man a fair chance to get a start.

531. General RUSSELL. Then if he did not get his contract approved by Washington until January 3rd, and they were moving in here in the month of January, there would have been no occasion for you to complain about McCullough in January?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I don't think they got any plant over here, sir, until February. The plant had to be shipped from the United States.

532. General RUSSELL. You wrote Rohl, though, on the 22nd of January and told him you wanted him to come over here, didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, I believe I did.

533. General RUSSELL. Didn't you tell General Frank this morning that the reason you wrote him to come over here is because you had a fuss with Grafe about this man McCullough?

Colonel WYMAN. I did have a fuss with Grafe.

[3557] 534. General RUSSELL. Now you say you did not have that fuss on the 22nd of January, when you wrote Rohl.

Colonel WYMAN. I think I had.

535. General RUSSELL. A moment ago didn't you tell me you were certain it was in February; it could not have been in January?

Colonel WYMAN. I am certain it was in February.

536. General RUSSELL. Therefore you did not write this letter to Rohl in January to come over here because of this row with McCullough?

Colonel WYMAN. I think I did. I did write it for that reason.

537. General RUSSELL. Therefore, you had a fuss with Grafe about McCullough before, in January?

Colonel WYMAN. It was not necessarily about McCullough. It was about other things, too.

538. General RUSSELL. Didn't you say very definitely this morning the reason you wanted Rohl over here was because you wanted McCullough replaced?

Colonel WYMAN. That was one of the reasons, yes, sir.

539. General RUSSELL. What were the others?

Colonel WYMAN. The other was hustling a plant over from the United States, which was not going along to my satisfaction; also the procurement of material and the procurement of men. The job got off to a very poor start.

540. General RUSSELL. You want this Board to believe now, do you, Colonel, that as early as January 22nd, 19 days after the Under Secretary of War had approved this contract, and only a few days after all of this stuff had been purchased, that you saw that Paul Grafe and the crowd he had here, before they even started to work, could not run this job, and you needed Rohl? Is that what you want us to believe?

Colonel WYMAN. All I am doing is to give you the facts [3558] as I recollect them.

541. General RUSSELL. Well, give me the facts on that.

Colonel WYMAN. I have told you all I know.

542. General RUSSELL. It is not a very satisfactory answer from my standpoint. It leaves me very much confused about that issue.

Colonel WYMAN. I can state, which is to the best of my recollection, that I had difficulty with Grafe. Grafe was spending more time trying to find out what his rights were under this contract than he was in getting work done, getting the equipment over, getting the materials, getting men and starting the job. You will find lots of correspondence in the files requesting interpretation of this and interpretation of that, and I remember that I wrote this letter to Rohl asking him to come over here, and in good faith, for the purpose of assisting in building up an organization for the Hawaiian Constructors to do this job, and one of the points that was in controversy was the feeble effort being made by Mr. McCullough as the superintendent of the work. That was one of the points.

543. General RUSSELL. And you had come to all of those conclusions before the 22nd day of January, 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. About that time, apparently, sir; yes, sir.

544. General RUSSELL. Now, soon thereafter you and this man Rohl began to have telephone conversations back and forth.

Colonel WYMAN. According to this record, we did.

545. General RUSSELL. And you have no recollection of that at all?

Colonel WYMAN. I cannot recall what they were about, only these that I mentioned, the one at Schofield and those when he [3559] was back—

546. General RUSSELL. In the fall?

Colonel WYMAN. In the fall, about the shipment of the equipment and the men on the LUDINGTON to Canton and Christmas, and those in this other period I do not recollect what they were about.

547. General RUSSELL. Notwithstanding the fact that you testified that in response to your letter to Rohl to come over here, he did not reply—

Colonel WYMAN. I would—

548. General RUSSELL. Wait a minute. You now testify that in some of those telephone calls which you had with him in the spring nothing about what was going on out here was discussed?

Colonel WYMAN. I would not say that, no, sir.

549. General RUSSELL. Wouldn't it have been a natural, normal assumption to think that if you had written him to come out here and you talked to him on the telephone five or six times in the next three or four months you would ask him "Why in the hell don't you reply to my letter or come out here?"

Colonel WYMAN. I may have done so. I don't know. I don't recollect it, sir. I may have done it. I don't know.

550. General RUSSELL. You were continuing to need Rohl out here during that period, however?

Colonel ROHL. When Grafe agreed that he would furnish Mr. Ashlock from the Prado Dam, who was the superintendent on the Prado Dam, as soon as he could be released, then I had no further objection or no difficulty with Grafe over the superintendent, because Ashlock, he was the superintendent at Prado under my charge, and he

did a good job, and I felt he would be [3560] satisfactory for this job, and he was satisfactory.

551. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, when it came to your attention in June that this man Rohl was a German alien, your testimony was to the effect that you called that to the attention of the Chief Engineer and forgot it?

Colonel WYMAN. No. In a letter.

552. General RUSSELL. In a letter?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes.

553. General RUSSELL. That they could do what they pleased about it, that you had discharged your duty when you told the Chief of Engineers that Rohl was an alien?

Colonel WYMAN. No, that was not all there was too it. I remember discussing the matter with General Hannum as to what action should be taken; either the Hawaiian Constructors should be notified that an alien would not be permitted to come on the job, would not be permitted to see any plans and specifications, or what action should be taken. In view of the fact that in accordance with the law, as I understood it, only the Secretary of War can handle those things, the thing had to go to him.

554. General RUSSELL. But now it made no difference with you whether Rohl came out here and operated, or not, did it?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. In June we were pretty well set up here and going, and Rohl's services were not needed at that time, as far as I was concerned, but they were needed in the fall, and very badly, when we were organizing the island work, because we got the use of his plant and his organization.

555. General RUSSELL. Did you think it was all right for Rohl, the German, to come out here and participate in this?

[3561] Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no, not after the Act of Congress prohibited an alien to be on a job, no, sir, except that the interpretation out here, about aliens, there were no aliens to be used on any of the fortification work.

556. General RUSSELL. That was the only objection you had to Rohl, the legal difficulties of his getting out here?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, so far as the person was concerned, as far as I know, Rohl was loyal to the United States. I never knew him to commit any act that he should not.

General RUSSELL. One more line of questions. I want this to get very definitely in the record, on an issue, the issue of your entertainment by Rohl. Is it your testimony that never at any time have you ever been in a hotel room which was rented by this man Rohl and had liquor served to you in that hotel room?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I think that would not be right. I have been in a hotel room with Rohl, with others. Whether it was he that paid for the room or someone else, I would not know. I have been there. That was when he was here at Hnolulu and also on the mainland.

557. General RUSSELL. How frequently were you in hotel rooms with Rohl and had drinks with him?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I would say maybe—I can remember on one occasion here in the Royal Hawaiian. I don't know whether it was his room or Grafe's or somebody else's room. I can remember in Los Angeles in a room with Connolly and Rohl and Sverdrup and others

in it. But they were just visits. I visited with other officers who were present with me. There was no dinner parties or grand parties or anything to it.

[3562] 558. General RUSSELL. How would you happen to get into these rooms? Did you just get in without invitation; you did not know whose room or whose liquor it was?

Colonel WYMAN. No. I recall on one occasion where an officer came down from San Francisco and we were going to an engineers' meeting at the University Club, and this officer said to me, "Mr. Tom Connolly is in the Biltmore Hotel and I have promised to go over and pay my respects. Won't you go along and then we will go to the University Club?" I remember that, which we did. We did go to the room of Tom Connolly and it was filled with people, many, many people, and they were serving drinks. Whether or not we got a drink, I do not recollect.

559. General RUSSELL. So those were the only two occasions which you recall?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. I was there for four years. There could have been other occasions. I do not recall them in any detail.

560. General RUSSELL. You only remember twice that you ever had drinks in a room with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I did here in the Hawaiian Hotel one night.

561. General RUSSELL. Once here and once in Los Angeles?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I would say twice I mentioned in Los Angeles.

562. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, in your written statement you say "Mr. Rohl was my guest at my club on several occasions, together with other Army officers."

Colonel WYMAN. Yes.

[3563] 563. General RUSSELL. "The hospitality and courtesies that I extended Mr. Rohl through these invitations was in reciprocation of similar courtesies extended to me by him."

Colonel WYMAN. That is right.

564. General RUSSELL. Do you mean you had gone to the club with him and had been entertained at his club?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. I had lunch with him and I remember a little restaurant we used to eat at near my office, and he had lunch with me and my officers in the California Club, where we had a table of our own and ate there from time to time, and we had guests.

565. General RUSSELL. Your testimony is that you took him to your club on several occasions to pay him back for these times—

Colonel WYMAN. That is right.

566. General RUSSELL. Wait a minute. —when you and he ate luncheon together in a little restaurant; is that your testimony?

Colonel WYMAN. No. My testimony is he ate at my club at lunches in return for obligations that I was under to him.

567. General RUSSELL. How did you get under obligation to him?

Colonel WYMAN. Because I had accepted his hospitality some place at lunch or dinner, I don't know.

568. General RUSSELL. You don't remember where?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I remember at his house on at least one occasion. I was on his yacht. I ate on his yacht. I also ate at a small

restaurant near my office. Then I would not be surprised that I ate in the grill room of the Biltmore Hotel with him at lunch.

[3564] 569. General RUSSELL. Now, you say that the social contacts you had with Rohl were just the same as the social contacts that you had with numerous other contractors?

Colonel WYMAN. That is correct.

570. General RUSSELL. Dictate into the record the names and addresses of these other contractors with whom you maintained the same social contacts that you did with Rohl and whom you had to eat with you at your club and whose homes you visited, as you did with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I was at Grafe's home, and also had dinner with him and lunch with him elsewhere.

571. General RUSSELL. That is Paul Grafe.

Colonel WYMAN. Paul Grafe.

572. General RUSSELL. Name another.

Colonel WYMAN. Another is Guy Atkinson.

573. General RUSSELL. That is another.

Colonel WYMAN. And George Atkinson, his son. I can't remember his name, but I had lunch with the president or at least the principal person in charge of the Standard Dredging Company in Los Angeles.

574. General RUSSELL. I am asking you about other contractors with whom you maintained the same social intercourse that you did with Rohl, not a man that you had lunch with once in a while.

Colonel WYMAN. The other contractors did not have any yacht. I could not go yachting with them because they did not have any.

575. General RUSSELL. Did you ever go to any night clubs with Mr. Rohl?

[3565] Colonel WYMAN. It is my recollection that Mr. Rohl was in a night-club party made up of officers of the Army and their families on January 1, 1936.

576. General RUSSELL. Is that the only time?

Colonel WYMAN. That's one time I can think of.

577. General RUSSELL. Do you remember you and Rohl ever going to night clubs in your automobile, driven by a man named Zucca, and Rohl's automobile coming along behind, driven by a man named Brown, on several occasions? Did that happen?

Colonel WYMAN. I can remember of one occasion where I went to a dinner of contractors, in—I thought it was the other way around, I don't know—in my car, with Mr. Rohl, at a dinner of contractors and some congressmen, in a restaurant, French restaurant in Beverly Hills. I don't remember the name of it. It is a night club.

578. General RUSSELL. And those are the only two times that you can remember that you ever went to night clubs with Rohl?

Colonel WYMAN. That's all I remember. I never went to night clubs with him, in any great number of times.

579. General RUSSELL. That is all.

580. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask a couple of questions, General, if I may.

581. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

582. Colonel TOULMIN. Colonel, I would like to get your assistance in clearing up some of the factual conditions that surrounded the execution of these contracts during 1941. Now, first, is the question of

priorities, which I understood was quite troublesome at that time; am I correct in that understanding?

[3566] Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir; very troublesome.

583. Colonel TOULMIN. And, of course, you had no authority here to issue priorities, or to change them; that is correct?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no; we had to make recommendations to higher authority.

584. Colonel TOULMIN. And it went to the Corps of Engineers then, is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. Eventually, it went to the Chief of Engineers.

585. Colonel TOULMIN. And the Chief of Engineers passed it on, to anyone beyond him, or did he assume final responsibility?

Colonel WYMAN. No, he had to pass it to the Army-Navy Munitions Board.

586. Colonel TOULMIN. And the representative of the Army-Navy Munitions Board was General Lucius Clay, is that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know.

587. Colonel TOULMIN. You do not know? Well, who was the representative of the Army on that board, who took care of these priorities?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know.

588. Colonel TOULMIN. You don't know? So, whoever that person was, he was the man who had the responsibility for getting the appropriate priorities, is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, I don't know that. I wasn't in on that phase of it, at all. All we could do, here, was urge to get a priority which we thought would get work done on time.

589. Colonel TOULMIN. All right, let us approach it from another view. Did you get priorities that were satisfactory?

Colonel WYMAN. No.

[3567] 590. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Then that can be settled, that you had unsatisfactory priorities, and that you passed that responsibility to the Chief of Engineers; is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. No; the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, also, through the Adjutant General, also made recommendations to increase the priorities for the Hawaiian work.

591. Colonel TOULMIN. So you and the Department Commander were in agreement you needed higher priorities to get the job done, is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. That is right, higher priorities to get materials in the United States, and to get materials manufactured.

592. Colonel TOULMIN. But there was no divergence of opinion between you and the Department Commander on the subject of priorities, was there?

Colonel WYMAN. No, except we needed higher priorities to get the work done. We wanted to be rated as high as Panama.

593. Colonel TOULMIN. So both you and the Department Commander were in agreement that you needed higher priorities, to get this job done, is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes; I agree to that.

594. Colonel TOULMIN. All right; and did you pass that responsibility on to the Chief of Engineers? Is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. That is the only thing we can do, that I can do, is to make a request to the Chief of Engineers.

595. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Very well. Now, that settles priorities. Now, on the subject of the approval of drawings, did you have the final authority here to approve the [3568] construction drawings and tell the contractor to go to work, or did you have to send those drawings that you proposed to use to higher authority for approval?

Colonel WYMAN. I had to send to both the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and to the division engineer at San Francisco all drawings for approval. That is, for our part of the work, of course.

596. Colonel TOULMIN. Did the division engineer have final authority in passing upon those drawings, or did he in turn have to pass those drawings to the Office of the Chief of Engineers for final initialing and approval?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know that. I would have to look it up.

597. Colonel TOULMIN. Will you look it up?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir; I will.

598. Colonel TOULMIN. And will you advise this Board of that fact?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

599. Colonel TOULMIN. So that you were not able here within the islands to finally pass upon the drawings; that is the sum and substance of it?

Colonel WYMAN. Not prior to this. That's prior to the 7th of December.

600. Colonel TOULMIN. I am talking now, prior to December 7, because that is the inquiry we are directing ourselves to.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, the drawings at that time had to go to the Commanding General for approval, and also to the division engineer at San Francisco.

601. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, so we may have one clear [3569] question and one clear answer, during the year 1941, up to December 7, the authority and responsibility for approving drawings finally did not rest in you but rested in the division engineer, or someone higher than the division engineer, is that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. That's right.

602. Colonel TOULMIN. Is that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

603. Colonel TOULMIN. All right.

Colonel WYMAN. Also, the Hawaiian Department.

604. Colonel TOULMIN. Now, who was responsible for what you said, the "tedious process" in connection with the 148 projects, in order to get them approved, coordinated, and put under way? Who were the people responsible for the "tedious process"?

Colonel WYMAN. The Orders and Regulations of peacetime is a very slow process. Ordinarily it takes from two to three months to make a contract and to get one going. Ordinarily, plans have got to be approved by higher authority, and no work can be commenced until they are approved. Yes, that is a tedious process. It doesn't make for speed.

605. Colonel TOULMIN. All right; and those rules of the game were rules promulgated by the Chief of Engineers, is that correct?

Colonel WYMAN. Most of them are acts of Congress.

606. Colonel TOULMIN. And also, the Chief of Engineers, in carrying them out?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, the Chief of Engineers writes, I suppose, the Orders and Regulations, but they are interpretations of the law.

[3570] 607. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. So your position is, the responsibility for the "tedious process" was the joint responsibility of Congress and the Corps of Engineers, is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I don't mean anything of the kind. It is not for me to tell Congress how to pass legislation or to run the country.

608. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, just answer my question.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I would say I don't agree with it, at all.

609. General FRANK. You don't agree with what?

Colonel WYMAN. How?

610. General FRANK. What is it you do not agree with?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I don't agree. He asked me, "You understand as follows." Well, I can't answer his question Yes or No, because I don't agree with it.

611. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, I am content to let the record show the witness's full understanding of my question and his inability to answer.

Colonel WYMAN. If you will reframe the question I will try to answer it. I don't understand it.

612. All right. I want to know—we will start all over again, now—I want to know who was responsible for the "tedious process" in the putting under way of the 148 projects during the year 1941 in this area?

Colonel WYMAN. I would like to look at it. That means we will have to give you all the "buck slips" of the Hawaiian Department, to check that.

613. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. I would like to have you [3571] answer that.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I say, the answer to that is to produce the exhibits, which will be in the nature of the entire staff of correspondence between the higher—

614. Colonel TOULMIN. I am asking now for those things outside of your control, and therefore, outside of the Hawaiian Department.

Colonel WYMAN. No; this is in the Hawaiian Department.

615. Colonel TOULMIN. I am limiting this, now, to who was responsible for the "tedious process" for the 148 projects in the year 1941 that were to be undertaken in this department, prior to December 7, 1941, as to those people outside of the Hawaiian Islands.

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I am referring chiefly to the "buck slip" process, which is right here in the Hawaiian Islands, and it is in the files.

616. Colonel TOULMIN. All right; will you produce the answer?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I can produce the "buck slips," but it means to get all the files from the district engineer—and there are plenty of them.

617. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, we want to know who it was that was responsible for what you, as a responsible officer, have testified was a "tedious process,"—

Colonel WYMAN. It is.

618. Colonel TOULMIN. —in getting this job done. That is the issue before this Board, and we would like to know, if you are not

responsible, who was responsible. If you cannot answer it now, we would like to have you give us an answer as soon as you can.

[3572] Colonel WYMAN. Well, I would like to answer it now.

619. Colonel TOULMIN. All right.

Colonel WYMAN. I will read again:

As an example of this time-consuming—

Well, put it this way:

In the Hawaiian Department it was necessary for these interdepartmental approvals, which resulted in a constant interchange of information, especially between the Signal Corps and the Department Engineers, representing G-4, and the District Engineer. The concurrences of the Signal Corps were necessary on every change made, and before any part of the work could be started. The Department Engineer, representing the Commanding General also had to give his approval. I have recently gone through the files and there are literally hundreds of staff memoranda illustrating this point.

As an example of this time-consuming process I introduce in evidence as Exhibit M a memorandum dated 14 February 1941, written by me to the Department Engineer requesting the approval of certain preliminary sketches and plans. As a further exhibit, M-1, I introduce in evidence the first indorsement of the Department Engineer showing a partial approval and partial disapproval, a change in the proposed work, and a direction that one item be delayed until further instructions. I give this merely as one example of hundreds of such instances.

Now, I can read the exhibit.

620. Colonel TOULMIN. Now, let me ask you this question—if you are through with that. Are you through?

[3573] Colonel WYMAN. Well, I was going to read the exhibit.

621. Colonel TOULMIN. Just refer to the exhibit by number, so we won't have to go through the details of that. It is already in evidence.

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know what the number is.

622. Colonel TOULMIN. Just identify it by the title, and we will get at it later.

Colonel WYMAN. I just want to indicate. I just gave this as a sample.

623. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, let me ask you this question, that will clear it up. We are interested of course in your responsibility, and the extent you had power to carry that responsibility. Now, as I understand it, these various "tedious process" steps were steps taken by others than yourself, and upon whom you had to await their action before you could go forward with the project, is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes. Oh, yes; I brought that out in another paper, here, that there are twelve agencies with whom I dealt, and of those 12, I only controlled three.

624. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, that is what I want to bring out, that as to this "tedious process," the major portion, nine out of 12 major steps, were outside of your control and were in higher authority's hands; is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. Other agencies; yes, sir.

625. Colonel TOULMIN. All right.

Did you, at any time, write any letter or send any communication to higher authority asking that these "tedious process" steps be changed and the system be revised so that expeditious work be done, to get this work done for the Government of the United States on time, in order to take care of the defense [3574] of these islands?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, in the case of the Chief of Engineers, it may not be within my prerogative to suggest that Orders and Regulations be changed in any way. That isn't done by district engineers.

626. Colonel TOULMIN. You wouldn't do that, then?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, no. I would not feel that I had authority to do that.

627. Colonel TOULMIN. All right.

Colonel WYMAN. In the case of the staff procedure of the Hawaiian Department, it would certainly not be in order for me to try to tell the Hawaiian Department how to conduct its business.

628. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Let me ask you this question, then: To what extent did the Chief of Engineers' Office, or representatives of that office, other than General Hannum, the Division Engineer, come to these islands to see your problems, inspect your operations, and to see what they could do to expedite matters, during the year 1941, prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. You say, except General Hannum?

629. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. General Hannum was my superior, as division engineer.

630. Colonel TOULMIN. I am excepting him, now. Just answer the question as I have it.

Colonel WYMAN. I have to recollect. I don't know who came. I really don't know.

631. Colonel TOULMIN. You don't remember?

[3575] Colonel WYMAN. No.

632. General FRANK. Did anybody come?

Colonel WYMAN. I couldn't—they certainly, undoubtedly did; but I don't remember.

633. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, let me ask one more question. Have you received any complaint, reprimand, or other adverse comment on your conduct, either from the Commanding General of the Army Service Force, or the Chief of Engineers, as to how you conducted this construction job, during the year 1941, up to December 7, 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. I haven't received any communication.

634. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all I have.

Who was in charge, as Chief of Engineers, during 1941? Who was Chief of Engineers during 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, let's see; 1940 was Julian Schley. He was succeeded by Reybold, I don't know the date—General Reybold.

635. Colonel TOULMIN. Who was the Chief of Engineering Construction? I presume you had that same position that General Bragdon now occupies, in 1941.

Colonel WYMAN. I haven't the least—

636. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you remember that?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, General Robins; yes; General Robins.

637. Colonel TOULMIN. And who was the Commanding General of the Army Service Force during this period of 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. There wasn't any.

638. Colonel TOULMIN. The Army Service Force did not come into the picture until after 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. No.

639. Colonel TOULMIN. Is that correct?

[3576] Colonel WYMAN. He wasn't in charge.

640. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, one final question. Whose responsibility was it to see that all these various organizations and agencies whose approval would have to be sought, and secured should be coordinated and their work expedited and the thing brought to some conclusion, or was the matter allowed to drift without any responsible head?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I would say the using service would be the greatest interest to push, would be the "spark plug" to push the work and urge it on. It was for them. Of course, we were merely the constructing agency to build it.

641. Colonel TOULMIN. You mean by that that the Air Corps, for these facilities, would demand expediting of the work?

Colonel WYMAN. The Air Corps certainly presses the engineer service to build their airfields and other things. They are right on their—oh, as far as the Hawaiian staff, why, of course, it was G-4 that was the coordinating agency.

642. Colonel TOULMIN. But, aside from G-4? Now, G-4 is the sole official coordinating agency, except that the using services pressed you for results, is that right?

Colonel WYMAN. Now, you ask me who would—who should. I would say, the using service.

643. Colonel TOULMIN. But I asked you who did, during 1941?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, the only one that pressed me was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, himself.

644. Colonel TOULMIN. The Army Air Force, here, did not press you?

Colonel WYMAN. Whom do you mean? For what job?

645. Colonel TOULMIN. To get their jobs done—the facilities.

[3577] Colonel WYMAN. Oh, General Martin was—yes, he was calling conferences every day or two.

646. Colonel TOULMIN. He was pressing you hard, wasn't he?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, he didn't have any money; that was the trouble. We planned, and we made our plans and got them all ready, but you see we didn't get any money for airfields in any quantity, until, oh, I guess it was after the "blitz."

647. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, was the Signal Corps pressing you in 1941 to get their establishments built so they could put their equipment in?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't recollect that they put any great pressure on. I can remember that General Short was greatly interested in getting this work done, and spoke to me from time to time.

648. Colonel TOULMIN. Did General Short press you to get this job done?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, he spoke about it, and he made inquiry, the progress we were making, and I know at one time I drafted a telegram for him to send to the United States about getting the cableway shipped over here, which is a matter of record, one of the exhibits here. Oh, yes, we also—some of the correspondence we drafted regarding the acquisition of land from the Department of the Interior, urging the transfer, you know, so we could get up on Haleakala.

649. Colonel TOULMIN. I am aware of that; but confining yourself now to the Army activities—strictly to the Army activities—who else, in 1941, other than the Signal Corps and General Short, were pressing you to get this construction done?

[3578] Colonel WYMAN. You mean, pressing me to get it done?

650. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, my own engineer department. General Hanum would show the greatest interest in it, and came over here and inspected it that year, in May 1941, and went back and did everything possible to get the materials over here, and plant over here, in order to get things done.

651. Colonel TOULMIN. Now, would it be fair to say, Colonel Wyman, that the situation, due to lack of priorities and lack of getting plans approved, and the other difficulties of the "tedious process," was made, to your mind, in 1941, an unsatisfactory one?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, very. We had the greatest difficulty of getting electrical goods; hardly procurable at all. For instance, you get a tank in a building, like a big kitchen, the hot water tank, and without a fitting, and try to find some fittings to put on it, and go to extreme measures in order to get things working. That went along in everything, and especially the greatest difficulty of all was getting gas fittings for gas tanks; that is, big gas tanks, which have got to be special, as you know, specially made; and it was very difficult to get them.

And here is a thing of interest. I found out from the district engineer's office, here—I was told by one of the engineers, that valves that we ordered in 1941 for the reserve storage built at Wheeler Field arrived here at Honolulu in 1944, and are now here.

652. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

Colonel WYMAN. He also told me that there were a great many orders that were placed by us, that the delivery was [3579] more than a year later.

653. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all. Thank you, sir.

654. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel, what did you do before the basic contract of December 1940 was signed, regarding checking to see the loyalty of the parties who would enter into this contract?

Colonel WYMAN. Why, hey had—what did I do?

655. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. I didn't do anything in particular.

656. Major CLAUSEN. Never?

Colonel WYMAN. These people had worked for the United States before. Rohl was a highly respected citizen, as far as I knew, of southern California, very popular with his—

657. Major CLAUSEN. —engineers?

Colonel WYMAN. —other contractors and his associates. Connolly was an officer in the World War. I know that, because I saw a photograph of him. Grafe was a highly respected citizen in the locality where he lived. He was highly thought of by other contractors and associates and engineers.

658. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel, I do not like to interrupt, but the time is running on, and you have answered my question.

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, excuse me.

659. Major CLAUSEN. Now, when you got this information, in June 1941, that Rohl was an alien, a German alien, what was your reaction?

Colonel WYMAN. Oh, I immediately wrote a letter to the Chief of Engineers in Washington.

660. Major CLAUSEN. I say, what was your reaction?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I just was surprised, that is all.

661. Major CLAUSEN. Just a sort of mild surprise?

[3580] Colonel WYMAN. No, not mild; mild enough to get immediate action and write a letter to the Chief of Engineers, so stating. That was my first reaction.

662. Major CLAUSEN. But you never followed that up?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I am not certain I did or didn't. I took it up with General Hannum. He probably called me on the telephone about it. I am not certain, but I do remember discussing it with General Hannum that there was action necessary. No, he never was an enemy alien, as far as I understand it.

663. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you concede, Colonel Wyman, concerning these interocean telephone calls that are mentioned on page 34, that you had numerous telephone calls back and forth between yourself and Rohl, or vice versa?

Colonel WYMAN. "Numerous telephone calls!" It records here eight calls over a period of about ten months of time.

664. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Now you said this morning to General Frank that interocean calls were recorded. Where are the recordings of what you were saying and what Mr. Rohl was saying on those eight calls?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know. I don't know where they are.

665. Major CLAUSEN. Well, where were they normally kept?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, they would be the same recordings. Some of these are in the night-time.

666. Major CLAUSEN. Some of them are in the night-time?

Colonel WYMAN. I say some are in the night-time.

667. Major CLAUSEN. All right, where are the recordings of them?

Colonel WYMAN. I would say there was no recording made, [3581] at this time, because the office was closed. Well, I have no recordings, I can't find any.

668. Major CLAUSEN. You say you have none, you can't find any?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I can't find any.

669. Major CLAUSEN. Did you look for some?

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, I look all through my files, all the files down in the office, for recordings.

670. Major CLAUSEN. There is a statement here, on page 38, by the War Department—

Colonel WYMAN. You understand we had no recording machines in our office at that time, like they have now.

671. Major CLAUSEN. You had stenographers, didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. I had, yes, Mr. Epton and Miss Heilman, were my stenographers for a long time.

672. Major CLAUSEN. There is a statement here, on page 38 of the committee report:

There is no record in this office (United States Engineers Office, Honolulu, T. H.) of any formal complaints registered by the Government concerning delays of the contractor during 1941.

Colonel LYMAN. I read you those, this morning, that I had found. I found three.

673. Major CLAUSEN. Do you say that this statement on page 38, purporting to be a representation by the War Department, is correct or incorrect?

Colonel WYMAN. By the War Department?

674. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel WYMAN. Let me read it.

675. Major CLAUSEN. Page 38, representation by the War [3582] Department to the Committee on Military Affairs, of the House.

Colonel WYMAN. This seems to be signed and notarized December 18, 1943. That is an affidavit made by Rea B. Wickiser.

676. Major CLAUSEN. Do you see page 38, Colonel Wyman?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I am reading right at the top, here.

677. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Well, the quotation is in small print.

Colonel WYMAN. "To confirm."

678. Major CLAUSEN. "There is no record in this office."

Colonel WYMAN. Well, I found some, myself, after I came out here, so the person who made this report made a defective report.

679. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you say the person who made the record—

Colonel WYMAN. No—made this report. It states, here:

There is no record in this office (United States Engineers Office, Honolulu T. H.) of any formal complaints registered by the Government concerning delays of the contractor during 1941.

What is a formal complaint? "Concerning delays of the contractor during 1941." Well, I found some. I introduced them as evidence.

680. Major CLAUSEN. Now, let me invite your attention to something else, just to get the record clear. Was this Colonel B. L. Robinson ever related to you, Colonel Wyman?

Colonel WYMAN. Not at all.

681. Major CLAUSEN. At no time?

Colonel WYMAN. By act of Congress, he is my brother-in-law. [3583]

682. Major CLAUSEN. What's that?

Colonel WYMAN. By act of Congress. By this document, he is my brother-in-law, but he was never my brother-in-law, and isn't now.

683. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you have occupied adjoining rooms with Mr. Rohl, at the Pleasanton Hotel, didn't you?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I occupied adjoining rooms with Bernard Robinson, Colonel Robinson and his wife, and he lived in one room, and I and my wife lived in the next one.

684. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever know a Bertha Andreen, in Washington?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I don't know.

685. Major CLAUSEN. Were you ever arrested here for drunkenness or any other cause?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I was never arrested for drunkenness.

686. Major CLAUSEN. Or any other cause?

Colonel WYMAN. No. I was never arrested in Honolulu. Now, wait a minute. I might have been for speeding, or something. No; I was never arrested in Honolulu.

687. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know a Werner Plack?

Colonel WYMAN. No, I don't know him.

688. Major CLAUSEN. This letter of November 24, 1941, to which I invited your attention, states, in paragraph 3:

It is directed that in the future each cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor submit to the district engineer on the 10th and 25th day of each month a brief report setting forth his views as to progress being made, difficulties encountered, anticipated difficulties, and [3584] recommendations for improving the conduct of the work. This report will be submitted through the project engineer, who will by endorsement thereon make such comments as are pertinent and then forward it within 24 hours to the district engineer.

Did you make such reports?

Colonel WYMAN. That paper was issued in November 1941, and probably received here after the Pearl Harbor disaster. Maybe it wasn't received until as late as January 20, because that is the first mail came over here, 1942; and none of that was—that is, that paper wasn't, couldn't have been complied with before the Pearl Harbor disaster.

689. Major CLAUSEN. Did you make such reports?

Colonel WYMAN. I don't know. You will have to look, consult the files of the district engineer.

690. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

691. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Colonel, have you anything else you want to bring up that may assist the Board?

Colonel WYMAN. Well, General, there are certain requests have been made to submit copies of letters from the files of the district engineer's office, if we can find them, and we will make a search, and we will have to quote Army orders, Army regulations and Army orders, or Engineer Orders and Regulations, to answer some of the questions of the Colonel as to the authorities of the Chief of Engineers, the division and the district, at that time. It can be done.

692. General GRUNERT. Do you wish a rehearing, or do you wish to submit an additional statement?

[3585] Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

693. General GRUNERT. Then the limit on time for submission of that additional statement, I will have to set as September 25.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir. Here, General, or elsewhere?

694. General GRUNERT. No, we will be in Washington then.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

695. General GRUNERT. You can submit it any time you have it ready, or submit it in Washington.

Colonel WYMAN. Will I have an opportunity to read my testimony with a view of making any corrections?

696. General GRUNERT. That has not been granted heretofore. I do not see why you shouldn't read it, but you cannot change anything therein.

Colonel WYMAN. Except by additional information?

697. General GRUNERT. Except by an addendum thereto.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

698. General GRUNERT. That has been granted to several others, and I see no reason why it should not be granted to you. It will have to

be done, though, in the presence of the Recorder or the Assistant Recorder.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

699. General GRUNERT. And as soon as it is typed. The Board expects to get away from here Monday or Tuesday, next week, and it should be done before that time, because we cannot leave a copy.

Colonel WYMAN. Will there be any occasion for me to come back to the Board again, here?

700. General GRUNERT. Not unless it is of your own desire.

Colonel WYMAN. Yes, sir.

[3586] 701. General GRUNERT. And if so, arrangements will have to be made, because our time is all taken up.

All right. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p. m., having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, the Board took up other business.)

[3587]

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[3588] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 8:00 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL BERNARD L. ROBINSON, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, 520 1ST ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION, HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel Robinson, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

Colonel ROBINSON. Bernard L. Robinson, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, 520 1st Engineers, Construction, Hollandia, New Guinea.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop this part of the investigation by which we hope to get some evidence from you.

3. General FRANK. Colonel Robinson, General Bragdon, who is counsel for Colonel Wyman, suggested you come here as a witness, and I assume there is some information you have to give [3589] that it is desired you give to the Board. Have you a statement to make?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, sir, I did not go over this thing in any detail with General Bragdon. About the only point I discussed with him was the fact that particularly prior to Pearl Harbor the District Engineer's authority was considerably limited, that the method of making contracts and the limitation of funds that the District Engineer could expend on his own authority was exceedingly limited, in accordance with orders and regulations of the Engineer Department, Army regulations and Congressional statute, and that was quite a different picture from the way we operate now or the way we operated down in the Southwest Pacific area, for instance. Also, certain approvals had to be obtained from the Division Engineer, Chief of Engineers and, in certain instances, from the Department Commander at a

later date. That was the only point I discussed at all with General Bragdon.

4. General FRANK. How did you get along with Paul Grafe?

Colonel ROBINSON. I got along fairly well with him. I did not have any direct dealings with him. I was present at a number of meetings that he had with Colonel Wyman.

5. General FRANK. On what duty were you from about July, 1941, through 1942?

Colonel ROBINSON. I was Chief of the Operations Division of the District office, directly under Colonel Wyman.

6. General FRANK. When did you take that position?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it was about the 1st of July, sir.

7. General FRANK. What did you do before then?

[3590] Colonel ROBINSON. I was Disbursing Officer, under Major Burnell. Wait a minute. I think I am a year off on that, sir.

8. General FRANK. How about 1941, then?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe I was Operations Officer throughout that period, sir. I believe I stopped disbursing some time before that, around the early part of the year.

9. General FRANK. Then you did not have much contact with Grafe?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not directly. I had more contact with his assistant, McCullough, than I did with Grafe.

10. General FRANK. How did you get along with McCullough?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I didn't like the way he was tackling the job. I so reported to Colonel Wyman. There was no friction between us particularly, except I felt at one stage of the game that the job was not moving fast enough, and I so reported.

11. General FRANK. He was not big enough to measure up to his responsibilities?

Colonel ROBINSON. In my opinion that was true, yes, sir.

12. General FRANK. Who took his place?

Colonel ROBINSON. As I recall, a chap by the name of Ashlock.

13. General FRANK. What was Rohl's job when he came over here?

Colonel ROBINSON. Rohl assumed the supervision of the work of the Hawaiian Constructors, general supervision, as he was the top man in the Hawaiian Constructors.

14. General FRANK. Was Grafe here at the time?

Colonel ROBINSON. He was during a portion of the time, [3591] yes, sir.

15. General FRANK. Who was in charge when Grafe and Rohl both were here?

Colonel ROBINSON. As I recall, they had a committee to determine matters of policy for the Hawaiian Constructors which, to the best of my memory, was Grafe and Rohl, Benson and Woolley.

16. General FRANK. Who headed up the group for the Hawaiian Constructors? Somebody must have been chairman of the group.

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe that Mr. Rohl had the over-all authority as to final decision. That is my recollection, sir.

17. General FRANK. How did he get that over-all authority? By an agreement among the Constructors or by designation by Colonel Wyman?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it was by agreement among the Constructors and it had probably to do with the amount of his financial interest in the joint venture.

18. General FRANK. Did you know Rohl?

Colonel ROBINSON. I knew him, yes, sir. I did not know him prior to this, until his coming to Hawaii.

19. General FRANK. Was his service entirely satisfactory while he was here?

Colonel ROBINSON. Up until about April—

20. General FRANK. What year?

Colonel ROBINSON. Of 1942, it was satisfactory. The last month or six weeks that he was here I did not consider that he was adding anything to the picture.

21. General FRANK. Why?

[3592] Colonel ROBINSON. He simply turned over his duties to his subordinates and took practically no active part in the administration of the contract during that month or six weeks.

22. General FRANK. Did his habits have anything to do with his lack of productiveness?

Colonel ROBINSON. You mean drinking, sir?

23. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. I suspected that they did, but I had no direct knowledge of that.

24. General FRANK. Did you ever have occasion to go see him?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

25. General FRANK. Where?

Colonel ROBINSON. I saw him on one or two occasions in the Moana Hotel, I believe it was.

26. General FRANK. Socially or on business?

Colonel ROBINSON. On business.

27. General FRANK. How did you come to go there to do business with him?

Colonel ROBINSON. He had reported that he was ill and, as I recall it, I called him on the phone and he asked me to come out, and I believe I did that on one or two occasions. He was not drinking at the time. He was ill.

28. General FRANK. From what, do you think?

Colonel ROBINSON. I do not know, sir.

29. General FRANK. What do you think?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, at that particular time I did not observe that it was due to liquor, but I think he had a heart condition and a general—he was not physically active and I think that his liquor habits probably contributed to his [3593] physical condition.

30. General FRANK. Was that the general impression around the camp, around headquarters?

Colonel ROBINSON. It was Colonel Wyman's impression. I do not recall discussing it with anyone else.

31. General FRANK. Well, you had a group of associates who knew what the topside organization among the contractors was, and you knew whether you had confidence in it, or not. Those are things that are discussed by a group that are in the know, is it not?

Colonel ROBINSON. I had confidence in his subordinates?

32. General FRANK. You had confidence in his subordinates?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes.

33. General FRANK. Did you have confidence in him?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not at that time. I did prior to that time, yes, sir.

34. General FRANK. Why didn't you?

Colonel ROBINSON. Because he was not on the job.

35. General FRANK. And why wasn't he on the job?

Colonel ROBINSON. I think I have stated that, sir.

36. General FRANK. In a different way you have stated it. Now, state it straight out, your opinion, baldly.

Colonel ROBINSON. In my opinion, Mr. Rohl was not able to do work because of the physical condition, to which his drinking probably contributed.

37. General FRANK. Did similar habits ever apply to Colonel Wyman?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

[3594] 38. Major CLAUSEN. You were Colonel Wyman's assistant, were you, sir?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

39. Major CLAUSEN. You had known Colonel Wyman quite some time?

Colonel ROBINSON. I have known him since about June of 1940.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Did you talk with him before you came to testify today, just a few days ago, yesterday?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, I talked with him last night.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall Maurice G. Parker, who was an employee of the U. S. E. D. at the time you were on duty as Colonel Wyman's assistant?

Colonel ROBINSON. I do not recall him personally, no. I took occasion to read the Congressional document last night, and I ran across his name in there in connection with my name.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall an incident when the Hawaiian Constructors, acting under Hans Wilhelm Rohl, wrote a letter to the U. S. E. D. here at Honolulu requesting that the U. S. E. D. buy from Rohl's company, the Rohl-Connolly Company of Los Angeles, California, certain equipment which was later appraised by Mr. Parker?

Colonel ROBINSON. I recall the incident, yes.

43. Major CLAUSEN. Let me just ask you whether or not the appraisal by Parker was lower than the amount which was afterwards paid?

Colonel ROBINSON. As I recall, his original appraisal was, yes, sir.

44. Major CLAUSEN. And you recall that the original appraisal—I don't want to hold you to exact figures—was in the [3595] neighborhood of \$131,000?

Colonel ROBINSON. The figure sounds substantially correct. I do not recall the exact figure.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Now, that appraisal was made under your direction, was it not?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that when Mr. Parker's appraisal came back at this figure that neither Rohl nor Colonel Wyman liked it. they objected to it?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I do not think that—that is not in accordance with my memory. As I recall the facts were that this

appraisal was made as of the date that Mr. Parker investigated the pieces of plant in question.

47. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, Mr. Parker was your man, employed by the government, who went out and made an appraisal and came back and said this property is worth \$131,000?

Colonel ROBINSON. The value of the property that I had to determine to make a recommendation to Colonel Wyman, who I believe made an independent appraisal, was the value at the time the government received it from the contractors. Now, to enable me to arrive at such a figure I had to work backwards on it, because no investigation of the equipment had been made when it had been initially received from the contractors. Therefore, I desired a figure of its present value in order that the value of its deterioration during the time the government had had it might be added to it. I did not look to Mr. Parker to determine the amount of that depreciation.

48. Major CLAUSEN. My question, Colonel, was this: Whether it is not correct that you sent Mr. Parker out to make an [3596] an appraisal, that he came back and said the property was worth \$131,000?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Now then, my next question is this: as to whether Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman objected that the price put upon the appraisal was too low?

Colonel ROBINSON. I do not recall that they did. I do not recall that that was the figure that I turned over to Colonel Wyman.

50. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that when Mr. Parker came back with this appraisal of \$131,000 you called a meeting of Mr. Middleton, Mr. Rohl, Mr. Wodley and Mr. Benson?

Colonel ROBINSON. I recall such a meeting was held, yes, sir.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that at this conference Mr. Parker was told that his appraisal was too low?

Colonel ROBINSON. I recall telling Mr. Parker that we would have to add to the appraisal the amount or the value that the government had gotten out of the plant in the several months that it had been in use prior to its appraisal. Whether that occurred at this conference, or not, I do not recall. It is my recollection that it was separately with Mr. Parker, but it may have come out at this conference.

52. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that at this conference Mr. Rohl said that the equipment had been overhauled in the States and that he had had his figures on the cost of the repairs and that he should be paid rent for the previous four months?

Colonel ROBINSON. I recall that some such statement was made by Mr. Rohl some time during the proceedings, whether at the conference or not.

[3596-A] 53. Major CLAUSEN. And do you remember that when Mr. Rohl said that Mr. Parker then said that whoever did the work of repairing it did a very good job of covering up defects, to which Mr. Rohl objected?

Colonel ROBINSON. I do not recall that now, sir.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that Mr. Parker said that so far as he was concerned the appraisal represented the actual worth of the equipment, but that if the difference between the two figures, that is, the amount asked by Mr. Rohl and the amount set upon the equipment as its value by Mr. Parker, was rent claimed, he would put in a

letter to that effect, and that he did put in such a letter on March 12, 1942?

Colonel ROBINSON. I recall some such discussion between Mr. Parker and myself. Whether it was at this conference or not, I do not recollect.

55. Major CLAUSEN. And that later in actuality there was paid to the Rohl-Connolly Company for this equipment \$166,423.17?

Colonel ROBINSON. I assume that whatever figure was agreed upon was paid, yes, sir.

56. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know that that sale represented a profit on the books of the Rohl-Connolly Company to the Rohl-Connolly Company of \$65,000?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I do not remember that.

57. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall a Mr. Tillman who used to work for you, Colonel?

Colonel ROBINSON. Tillman, yes, sir.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember a transaction where he made some appraisals?

Colonel ROBINSON. I do not recall; no, sir.

[3597] 59. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall an occurrence when he went out and looked up some equipment at your request and he came back and said it was a pile of junk and you said, "For God's sake, don't buy it then"?

Colonel ROBINSON. I would like to have my memory refreshed on that. I think if I knew the items of the equipment I could probably recall.

60. Major CLAUSEN. This equipment was equipment, I believe, that was owned by the company, the Hawaiian Contracting Company, over which Mr. Benson had something to say?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, I recall that incident.

61. Major CLAUSEN. You recall the incident of the equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Now, is it not a fact that Mr. Tillman was sent out to look at some equipment and he came back and told you that so far as the Government buying this equipment was concerned, it was a pile of junk?

Colonel ROBINSON. As to certain items of it, yes, sir, I recall that.

63. Major CLAUSEN. And that you said to him "Well, if that is the case, let's not buy it", or words to that effect?

Colonel ROBINSON. I probably made some such statement. I do not recall.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall later on you sent him back again to look at this equipment, after some intervening time?

Colonel ROBINSON. I may have. I do not recall the details at this time.

65. Major CLAUSEN. You cannot remember that?

Colonel ROBINSON. I probably did. I just do not recall [3598] that.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that that which was said to be a pile of junk was later bought by the Government?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

67. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

Colonel ROBINSON. May I add on that statement, rather than leave an erroneous impression in the record, that I recall the circumstances. There were a few pieces of equipment which the Hawaiian Contracting Company had which were not piles of junk and which were required due to shortage of equipment which existed in Hawaii at that time. Mr. Benson would not agree to sell us the satisfactory items of equipment, and we did agree to buy all of his equipment, his argument being that if we took only the satisfactory items of equipment it would put him out of business as a contractor, as he could not replace it and it was therefore necessary to buy all or none of his equipment.

68. General RUSSELL. In your earlier testimony, Colonel, you said that Mr. Rohl's experience here in 1942, some time before he left, was not satisfactory and you gave General Frank the reasons therefor. You recall that?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes.

69. General RUSSELL. In connection with that same testimony you stated that you knew that the impression which you had about Rohl was entertained also by Colonel Wyman.

Colonel ROBINSON. Colonel Lyman, sir, his successor.

70. General RUSSELL. Not Colonel Wyman?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not Colonel Wyman, no, sir. He had at that time.

[3599] 71. General RUSSELL. You did not talk to Wyman, then, prior to his departure about the effectiveness of Rohl as chairman of this executive board of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

72. General RUSSELL. That is all.

Colonel ROBINSON. It was Colonel Lyman. It was after Wyman's departure.

73. General RUSSELL. Just a minute. The relation between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl was rather cordial, was it not?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not any more so than any other contractors. I don't know what you mean by cordial.

74. General RUSSELL. They were together quite a bit when they were not working?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.

75. General RUSSELL. Don't you know whether they were together at night in a hotel prior to the time of the departure of Colonel Wyman from the islands?

Colonel ROBINSON. I was with him a good portion of that time. Mr. Rohl was there on some of those occasions, yes, sir.

76. General RUSSELL. At a hotel?

Colonel ROBINSON. At the Pleasanton Hotel.

77. General RUSSELL. At the Pleasanton Hotel?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes.

78. General RUSSELL. Were there offices in there used by Rohl and Wyman?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. Did any other contractors have offices in the hotel?

[3600] Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. Just the Hawaiian Constructors. All of the Hawaiian contractors used that as an office, that

is, Benson, Woolley and all of the joint adventurers, and Colonel Wyman and I had an office in there.

80. General RUSSELL. That is all.

81. General GRUNERT. Colonel Toulmin, any questions?

82. Colonel TOULMIN. No questions.

83. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know Miss Schlesinger?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

84. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember the night there was a party for Colonel Wyman on his leaving the islands?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

85. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that you phoned Miss Schlesinger to come down that night?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe I did, yes, sir.

86. Major CLAUSEN. To dig up some contracts?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Did she dig up some contracts for you?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. I think there were quite a number that we signed on that occasion.

88. Major CLAUSEN. Just tell the Board what they were.

Colonel ROBINSON. Supplemental agreements that had been typed during the day.

89. Major CLAUSEN. This was during what hours that she dug out these contracts on that day or that night?

Colonel ROBINSON. It was pretty late at night. I have forgotten. Probably around 11 or 12.

90. Major CLAUSEN. How long did it take you in the process of her digging out the contracts and you signing them?

[3601] Colonel ROBINSON. I do not recall that, sir.

91. Major CLAUSEN. About how long?

Colonel ROBINSON. Oh, I do not recall that, sir.

92. Major CLAUSEN. You are positive that on this night she came down and dug out these contracts for you?

Colonel ROBINSON. I am quite certain it was that night.

93. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

94. General GRUNERT. Colonel, I want to ask a few questions about this Mr. McCullough. He was what? The general superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors, or what?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir, he was general superintendent.

95. General GRUNERT. And he was not satisfactory?

Colonel ROBINSON. In my opinion he was not, no, sir.

96. General GRUNERT. When did you judge he was not satisfactory, about the month, do you recall? When did they start construction over here under the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel ROBINSON. It must have been in January or February because the contract was dated in December. January or February of 1941. I do not recall the exact month, but it was a month or so after that, as I call it.

97. General GRUNERT. On what did you judge him?

Colonel ROBINSON. On the initiation of the work, sir.

98. General GRUNERT. How long after they got over here was the work initiated? How long did it take them to set up to get the work started? We assume now the contract was signed by the Under Secre-

tary of War early in January. How long did it take them to get the thing set up to get started?

Colonel ROBINSON. That is a matter of record, I believe, sir.

[3602] 99. General GRUNERT. I want the matter of record out of you. I want you to testify to the best of your memory.

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. You were over here. You saw it started. Now, why cannot you tell me? Was it two months, one month, two weeks?

Colonel ROBINSON. To the best of my recollection it was about one month or six weeks, I believe, sir.

101. General GRUNERT. Then that would make it when, when the work went on, whereby you could judge McCullough?

Colonel ROBINSON. That would make it in March, sir.

102. General GRUNERT. March?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes.

103. General GRUNERT. February, at the earliest?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

104. General GRUNERT. March probably at the latest, when the work got underway?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes.

105. General GRUNERT. By that time you were able to size up McCullough?

Colonel ROBINSON. There was the questions of camps and things of that sort also that entered into it.

106. General GRUNERT. How much did you have to do with camps? The company set up their own camps, didn't they? The Engineers did not come into this until the contract started, did they?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes. We had the supervision of their camps and it was also on government property. We had to arrange for power and light installations and also we were under obligations to furnish certain material.

[3603] 107. General GRUNERT. All right. We will go to another point. You say that the plant material that the government purchased from the Hawaiian Constructors when received was not appraised, and therefore you had to allow some value later on when you bought it in order to make up for its use during that time?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

108. General GRUNERT. Why wasn't it appraised when you got it?

Colonel ROBINSON. That I could not answer, sir, except it was received in Los Angeles, loaded there, and was sent to Christmas and was supposed to go to Canton Island.

109. General GRUNERT. Whose business or duty was it to appraise this property upon its receipt by the Engineers?

Colonel ROBINSON. The responsibility was the District Engineer's.

110. General GRUNERT. Then there was a lack of good administration, or somebody failed to do their duty in not appraising it when the government took it over?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, I don't think that is so at all. I think it was the contention—

111. General GRUNERT. When you get something what do you do, in order to protect the government? Do you appraise its value so the government will get a fair deal, or do you wait three or four or

five months and use it and then appraise it and then practically sell it on the contractor's say so? Why is it not poor administration if they do not appraise it when they get it? Why is it not a lack of doing their duty when that occurs?

Colonel ROBINSON. General, in appraising items of plant we followed the A. G. C. schedule.

[3604] 112. General GRUNERT. What is that?

Colonel ROBINSON. It is a schedule which lists all items of engineering equipment new and its value after so many years of use and is generally accepted as a basis of rental in government contracts. That, as I recall it, was the original basis. The cost out here was, of necessity, of course, higher than that shown in the schedule.

113. General GRUNERT. Then you rented all of this property to start with; I mean that is used as a basis for computation. Did you rent it when they started?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe that is covered in the general terms of the contract. I am not quite sure of that.

114. General GRUNERT. I do not see how you can protect the government if you do not know the value of the property. Suppose it is destroyed; then how are you going to reimburse the ones who owned it, if you do not know the appraised value when you get it? Suppose it had been sunk by enemy action on the way to Christmas Island; how then would you have known what to reimburse a contractor, except on his own demand?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, under such a hypothetical case, if I were negotiating it I would go to the A. G. C. schedule and negotiate it with the contractor on that basis.

115. General FRANK. What is the A. G. C.?

Colonel ROBINSON. Associated General Contractors. They have gotten out this schedule and it has been generally recognized by the government.

116. General GRUNERT. It seems to me very loose administration and a lack of properly protecting the government, that sort of procedure, and I do not quite understand it. That is why I [3605] want you to explain it. Here apparently the property is purchased at beyond its appraised value by a government agent who is competent to appraise it. Then that appraised value is raised and it is sold at that raised value, presumably to pay for some of its use in the past, and you state that it was not appraised when received. Therefore, it had to be lifted so as to compensate the contractor. That is what I want to get out of you. Is that correct?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir, that is right.

117. General GRUNERT. Then I cannot quite understand why it is not poor administration, the lack of somebody doing their duty to start with, if that sort goes on or did go on in the Corps of Engineers. I do not expect you to admit that you did not do your duty or was a poor administrator, but I want it explained why the Corps of Engineers had such an apparent laxity in its methods of doing business on behalf of the government. Have you anything to add in explanation of it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Nothing, except that I think we got a very good price out of it at that, according to what it was worth to us. There was also a great rush to get this equipment. We were working on a very close deadline at Christmas and Canton Islands and that

may have had something to do with the fact that it was not appraised prior to sailing from Los Angeles.

118. General GRUNERT. Why do you suppose Mr. Parker would not give way and agree to appraise it at the value that this committee apparently wanted it appraised at? Why do you suppose he became bullheaded? Do you suppose he thought that he was not going to be a party to putting something over on the government? I wonder what was back of it.

[3606] Colonel ROBINSON. He only appraised it at the value at the time.

119. General GRUNERT. That is the value at which it should be purchased. A good administrator, I think, would have said, "Purchase it at that appraised value and pay the contractor for claims of rental for the time." Then it looks as if you would have been in the clear. Now it does not look good. Do you see what I mean?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. I don't think there would be very much difference in the money value.

120. General GRUNERT. Possibly there would not be any difference in the money value, but it does not look good on the record. Here a man appraises it and it is sold for something way beyond that appraised value, and naturally it looks suspicious. That is why I wanted to get what explanation there appeared to be.

[3607] 121. General GRUNERT. Now, about the Benson equipment. I believe you said Benson had some items that could be used and some items that couldn't be used or were unserviceable, we will call it, and he wouldn't sell the good items unless he sold the unserviceable items with it, because that would put him out of business; is that right?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir; that is correct.

122. General GRUNERT. Do you recall what percentage of the items were good and what percentage were unserviceable?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not offhand.

123. General GRUNERT. What was good equipment and what was unserviceable equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not offhand, but it was a high percentage of stuff which we felt we were getting our money's worth out of, somewhere around 80 or 90 percent, something of that kind. I have forgotten.

124. General GRUNERT. That was good or bad?

Colonel ROBINSON. That was serviceable, sir, that we expected to get our money's worth out of the over-all deal.

125. General GRUNERT. Well, it seems strange, then, that your representative went down there on two occasions and came back on both occasions and said the stuff was junk. If 90 percent of it was serviceable, it doesn't seem reasonable he would come back and say it was junk; the other, the 10 percent. It looks more to me as if it would be over 50 percent junk, or else he wouldn't have given you that sort of a report.

Colonel ROBINSON. Of course, in this connection, as I recall it, a lot of the equipment which we purchased was not [3608] delivered to us until May 1942, new equipment which we placed orders on some eight, ten, or twelve months before. I recall just before I left here that our first shipment—

126. General GRUNERT. And then there was some new equipment that was not on the ground at that time?

Colonel ROBINSON. This is not in connection with this contract, sir. This is in connection with equipment which we had ordered, Government purchase.

127. General GRUNERT. But this lot of Benson equipment that was appraised and called junk by the appraiser or the man who went to look at it—then you figured that that part that was usable to the Engineers was worth paying the total amount for the whole business?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. The point I was trying to make was that we were desperately in need of equipment. We were grasping at straws to get the work done at that time.

128. General GRUNERT. All I wanted to do was to have it explained. Who consummated these deals of purchasing these two sets of equipment, first the one that was appraised by Parker, and then the Benson equipment? Who consummated those deals? Who was District Engineer, and did the District Engineer consummate them by authorizing the purchase, or what, in both those deals?

Colonel ROBINSON. The District Engineer authorized them, yes, sir.

129. General GRUNERT. Who was he? Was he the same man for both deals?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't recall whether some of those went over, consummated after Wyman left, or not.

[3609] 130. General GRUNERT. Which was purchased first, the Parker-appraised equipment or what I call the Benson equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe that the Hawaiian Constructors equipment was purchased first.

131. General GRUNERT. And who was District Engineer at that time?

Colonel ROBINSON. Coloney Wyman.

132. General GRUNERT. And then you don't know, when the Benson equipment was purchased, whether Colonel Wyman—

Colonel ROBINSON. When the purchase was consummated; I know that Wyman was District Engineer during the preliminary negotiations at least, but whether it was consummated while he was still District Engineer or not, I do not recall, sir.

133. General GRUNERT. Anything else?

134. General FRANK. I would like to ask him a question.

135. General GRUNERT. Go ahead. I thought you had finished.

136. General FRANK. No, sir.

Colonel, there was a great deal of pressure on getting this construction of these airdromes down through the line of islands to Australia finished?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

137. General FRANK. It was imperative that those airdromes be constructed as rapidly as possible and finished with the least practicable delay?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

138. General FRANK. Therefore, where possible, short-cuts were supposed to have been taken?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

139. General FRANK. Now, it is traditional in the Army to [3610] handle Government funds and Government equipment with care, isn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

140. General FRANK. That is so in the Corps of Engineers, isn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

141. General FRANK. Yes. Now, notwithstanding the fact that there was a lot of pressure and the need for haste, wouldn't it have been possible, when that equipment was put on the LUDINGTON in Los Angeles, for arrangements to have been made, with a little foresight, to have had the equipment appraised there?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it would have been possible, yes, sir.

142. General FRANK. Yes. That would have been good administration, wouldn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Of course, I don't know the circumstances of where that equipment was—

143. General FRANK. I know, but—

Colonel ROBINSON. —or the rush, but I would say offhand—

144. General FRANK. Well, it doesn't make any difference.

Colonel ROBINSON. Hypothetical question; yes, sir, it was possible.

145. General FRANK. It doesn't make any difference where the equipment was nor how great the rush. The Corps of Engineers has an expensive organization, with a District Engineer in Los Angeles. It was a Government boat, the LUDINGTON, on which it was going. Therefore, with a little foresight and a little preliminary arrangement and good organization, arrangements [3611] could very easily have been made to have had it appraised in Los Angeles; is that correct?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe so, yes, sir.

146. General FRANK. Yes. Now let us get back to the fact that this equipment had been in use for some time before it was appraised. It was on a rental basis, wasn't it? Or was it?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe so, sir. I am not sure of that.

147. General FRANK. Well, if it was on a rental basis, then how long had it been in use when it was appraised by this Parker, about? I don't care for the exact dates.

Colonel ROBINSON. Just a few weeks, sir, because it was delayed quite a bit in getting to Hawaii. I would say a month, six weeks at the outside.

148. General FRANK. A month or six weeks?

Colonel ROBINSON. That is my guess at the moment.

149. General FRANK. Well, if Parker appraised it at \$131,000, and it was sold for how much?

150. Major CLAUSEN. \$166,000.

151. General FRANK. \$166,000; do you feel, do you think, just as a matter of common sense and good judgment, that it could have deteriorated one-third of its value in that length of time?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, if it worked anything like the equipment we get down in the Southwest Pacific area, it could deteriorate a great deal more than that just in handling aboard and off ship, on board ship.

152. General FRANK. Therefore, there is all the more reason [3612] for having had it appraised before it went on the boat at Los Angeles, isn't there?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, we didn't know that they were going to be turned around and have all of that time on the high seas, of course, at that time.

153. General FRANK. Well, it is a question of good management or poor, careless management. All right.

154. General GRUNERT. If there is deterioration of one-third in about a month, in 3 months the damn thing ought to be thrown overboard; is that the idea? It sounds exorbitant to me. I can't understand. But not being an engineer, possibly I can't get the idea.

155. General FRANK. I have a question.

156. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

157. General FRANK. Another thing, back to this property that was taken from the Hawaiian Contracting Company. How long have you been in the service?

Colonel ROBINSON. 26 years, sir.

158. General FRANK. All right. Do you know of any authority in the world that an officer in the Engineer Corps has for paying good Government money for worthless equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. Do I know of any authority for it?

159. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I know of no authority for paying Government money without getting value received.

160. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, when you buy equipment there is a certificate that it is in—generally the thought contained is that it is in condition for the purpose for which it is purchased; isn't that correct?

[3613] Colonel ROBINSON. I believe that appears on the vouchers, some general statement to that effect.

161. General FRANK. It appears on the vouchers some place, doesn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. I think so. Some such similar statement.

162. General FRANK. Therefore, if this equipment were purchased and it was junk and worthless, somebody signed a false statement?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, not if all the equipment was on that voucher.

163. General FRANK. What is that?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not if all of the equipment was on the voucher.

164. General FRANK. Well, if some of it, if the worthless equipment were on the voucher, all the equipment for which good Government money was paid was not in condition to be used for the purpose for which it was purchased, was it?

Colonel ROBINSON. I am not sure that there was any there that was absolutely unserviceable. I don't think we bought scrap metal, if that's what you mean. In other words, if you buy a brand-new car, you pay a high price. If you buy a car that may not run at the moment, with the idea of fixing it up, at a very low price, you are getting your money's value out of it.

165. General FRANK. But you yourself testified that Benson wouldn't sell the good equipment unless they included in it the purchase of the worthless equipment. So how, according to the Government system, did anybody have authority to buy [3614] the worthless equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I doubt if any of those items were—we described them as junk, but I doubt if any of them were in such shape that they could not be fixed up and gotten some use out of them.

166. General FRANK. Well, now, the other side of it is: In accord-

ance with this understanding that you have put out here, if the worthless equipment was not on the certificate, and they paid money for it,—

Colonel ROBINSON. You must have misunderstood me. I made no such statement as that, sir.

167. General FRANK. I know you didn't make any such statement. I said, there is the other side of it. If what I just got through discussing is not in accordance with the fact, the other side of it is that if they didn't take the worthless equipment, if it were not on the voucher, and compensation was paid, in accordance with Benson's demand, for all of it, then that is still worse, isn't it? It would have been, had that been the case?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I don't think there is any question that that was the case, sir. I am quite certain it was not.

168. General FRANK. All right.

169. Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask him a question?

170. General FRANK. Yes.

171. Colonel TOULMIN. As a matter of fact, this man Benson was working a strong-arm game on the Government by saying that you couldn't have the equipment you wanted unless you took the junk off of his hands with it; isn't that the truth?

[3615] Colonel ROBINSON. I wouldn't state it that way, no, sir.

172. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. You state it your way and see if you don't come out to the same conclusion.

Colonel ROBINSON. The way that Mr. Benson stated it, as I recall, was that if we took a portion of his equipment, took the major portion of his equipment, and then he was out of business as a contractor, we could use the other equipment, and therefore it was determined to buy it, both in the interests of the Government and in the interest of playing fair with the contractor with whom we were dealing.

173. Colonel TOULMIN. And playing fair, so-called, with the contractor at the Government's expense by taking the junk off his hands because he wouldn't sell you the good equipment without the junk; isn't that it? That's what you testified to.

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, your wording is different than mine, sir, but it's all right.

174. Colonel TOULMIN. That is the net result, isn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I have stated it my way, Colonel. I don't care to state it your way.

175. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, then do you want us to understand that all the equipment you bought was good equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. I have testified to the condition of the equipment.

176. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Some of it was good and some was worthless or substantially worthless; is that right?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

177. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Benson told you that he wouldn't let you have the good equipment unless you took the other stuff that wasn't so good or was worthless with it; that is right, isn't it?

[3616] Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

178. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. That is all I want.

179. General GRUNERT. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that you needed this equipment so badly that you had to take what you could get and practically pay the contractor's price to get what you actually needed?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

180. General GRUNERT. Isn't that about the game?

Colonel ROBINSON. We desperately needed equipment.

181. General FRANK. Isn't it also true that, notwithstanding all the need that you had for it, there is a requirement for doing it in accordance with standard practice?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it was so in this case, yes, sir.

182. General FRANK. Yes.

183. Major CLAUSEN. Let us pass from the junk of the Hawaiian Contracting Company to the equipment of the Rohl-Connolly Company for a moment. General Grunert asked you questions as to dates. Isn't it true, Colonel, that the sum mentioned in the letter from Mr. Rohl, signed on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors, suggesting that this property be bought by the Government, was the identical sum which was later paid, 166 some-odd thousand dollars?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't know that of my own knowledge. That must be a matter of record.

184. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. And that letter, sir, was dated March 11, 1942; the appraisal by Mr. Parker was made on March 12, 1942; the purchase was authorized by Colonel Wyman on March 13, 1942; and Colonel Wyman was relieved on March 15, 1942. That is correct, isn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Probably correct. I don't recall dates, sir.

[3617] 185. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, isn't it also true that all this equipment, this Rohl-Connolly equipment, was used equipment when it was shipped from Los Angeles on the LUDINGTON?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe that is true, yes, sir.

186. Major CLAUSEN. All right. And isn't it also true that one of the items that Mr. Parker discussed at this conference was the fact that there was no scrap of paper anywhere representing any kind of a deal whatsoever concerning this equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't recall that, no, sir.

187. Major CLAUSEN. Isn't it true that there was no written agreement entered into at any time before the Government got this equipment by this purchase on the—

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it is covered in the general terms of the contract, sir.

188. Major CLAUSEN. No, I am not asking you that.

Colonel ROBINSON. All right.

189. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I am asking you the question with the knowledge of what the contract says. I am asking you whether your memory isn't to the effect that it was discussed at this conference by Mr. Parker that there was no written document representing any such rent.

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't recall Mr. Parker making any such statement, no, sir.

190. Major CLAUSEN. Well, what is the fact as to whether there was any written document, any kind of a formality of a record of any kind,

regarding this equipment that the Government bought? What is the fact?

Colonel ROBINSON. I do not know the fact, sir.

191. General FRANK. He wouldn't know.

192. Major CLAUSEN. In addition to not appraising it at Los Angeles, would there be any excuse that you know of for not putting these things down in writing?

Colonel ROBINSON. There should be a record of it; yes, sir.

193. Major CLAUSEN. Now, who was the District Engineer in November 1941?

Colonel ROBINSON. Colonel Wyman was, sir.

194. General FRANK. Isn't this the equipment that Colonel Wyman sent Rohl back to the United States to get started on its way?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe so, sir. I am a little hazy on that.

195. General FRANK. All right. Then, since Rohl was sent back to the United States to get this equipment on its way, all that was necessary to get system and control injected into it was for the Division Engineer in San Francisco—to go back a little bit: all that was necessary was for Colonel Wyman to advise the Division Engineer in San Francisco, who in turn could work with the District Engineer in Los Angeles to accomplish the necessary check and procedure to have this done right; that's all that was necessary, wasn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. To have had it approved prior to shipment.

196. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe so, sir.

197. General FRANK. Yes. There is nothing complicated or difficult about it. All that was necessary was just a little foresight to have it done in accordance with some system; that is correct, isn't it?

[3619] Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

198. General FRANK. Do you think you would have done that had you been in charge of it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I might have, sir. It's hard to say under those circumstances of working.

199. General FRANK. All right.

200. General RUSSELL. Let me ask you: You were in the office of the District Engineer on those days of the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th of March, weren't you?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

201. General RUSSELL. You were very closely associated with the purchase of this equipment from Rohl-Connolly by Wyman representing the Government; is that true?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

202. General RUSSELL. You knew that the offer of sale was made on the 11th, and the appraisal on the 12th, and the contract on the 13th; is that true?

Colonel ROBINSON. I must have known it, yes, sir.

203. General RUSSELL. What impression did you get, Colonel, as to the haste in the negotiations for and the consummation of this sale? Did you think it was pretty much of a hurried-up job?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, I didn't get that impression at all.

204. General RUSSELL. It is common and ordinary, then, in the Engineers, and it was at that time, to buy \$166,000 worth of equip-

ment, second-hand equipment, on an offer and an appraisal and an acceptance in three days?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I think it had been given the [3620] consideration for some time before. Of course, the actual—that was winding up the paper work on it. The need for the equipment existed some time before that.

205. General RUSSELL. The need did?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

206. General RUSSELL. But it was necessary for the Division Engineer's office to send out and have it appraised after the 11th day of March? You didn't know the value, and had to fix a value, after the offer was made, didn't you?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. The paper had not been—

207. General RUSSELL. Not the paper work, Colonel.

Colonel ROBINSON. The value had not been fixed; I will say that.

208. General RUSSELL. That's right. You had to fix the value on \$166,000 worth of property and accept an offer for that amount, all in the course of three days. Now, my question is, Was that common and ordinary practice in the Corps of Engineers at that time?

Colonel ROBINSON. I think you will find numerous instances of that in the Corps of Engineers, yes, sir.

209. General RUSSELL. Then, your testimony is that that was simply a routine way of handling business in the Corps of Engineers at that time?

Colonel ROBINSON. I say there is nothing unusual in that—

210. General RUSSELL. Answer the question.

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

211. General RUSSELL. That was normal and routine in the Corps of Engineers in handling business at that time?

Colonel ROBINSON. I would say so, yes, sir.

[3621] 212. General RUSSELL. All right. That is all.

213. General FRANK. Would you say, in talking of delays that you had, would you say—

Colonel ROBINSON. I didn't understand, sir.

214. General FRANK. With respect to delays—

Colonel ROBINSON. Delays, yes, sir.

215. General FRANK. —in your projects, where your plans had to be submitted to the Division Engineer and to the Corps of Engineers before you could start work, what length of time was taken up in submitting projects and getting approval; first, those that went only to the Division Engineer's office, and those that went on into the Office of the Chief of Engineers, generally, in the period prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel ROBINSON. You are speaking of approved projects now, General?

216. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. For which money is available?

217. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes. Well, there was nothing unusual about the project. After the plans were drawn, submitted to the division, we would get them back within ten days, and to the Chief's office probably twice that long. If there was something unusual about it or something which required coordination with other agencies, it might take many times that length of time.

218. General FRANK. All right. I have no more questions.

219. General GRUNERT. Colonel, is there anything else that you think of that may be in the back of your head or the front part of it, or that you want to tell the Board, that will assist [3622] us in arriving at conclusions?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

220. General GRUNERT. Many times witnesses have something to say, and they say, "Well, I didn't get a chance to say it because they didn't ask me." I am asking you now whether you have anything you want to advance to the Board.

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, except that I wonder if I may read a copy of my testimony before it finally goes into the record, if that would be available to me.

221. General GRUNERT. Why, it just takes up a lot of time, unless you think you are an interested witness.

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. I just want to be sure what I have said is the truth; that's all, sir.

222. General GRUNERT. I don't see any objection to your reading it, but it takes up a lot of the Recorder's time. If you wish to read it you may come here and see the Recorder and read it, but you may make no changes therein, except that such changes as you suggest may be appended to your testimony.

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't know as it will be necessary, I am sure.

223. General GRUNERT. All right. It is up to you.

Colonel ROBINSON. All right.

224. General GRUNERT. You see what I mean: the testimony is given by you, is taken down and recorded. If you have made any mistake or want to change any wording, you may do so, but that change will be appended to the testimony.

Colonel ROBINSON. It stays in the record; yes, sir.

225. General GRUNERT. And the testimony will not be changed. See what I mean?

[3623] Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir; I understand.

226. General GRUNERT. That is fair to you, fair to everybody else. So if you want to, see the Recorder, and do it in his presence or the presence of the Assistant Recorder.

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

227. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming up.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF CHESTER R. CLARKE, 114 MERCHANT STREET, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state your name and address to the Board, Mr. Clarke?

Mr. CLARKE. Chester R. Clarke, 114 Merchant Street, Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation, Mr. Clarke?

Mr. CLARKE. I am a quarry operator.

3. General GRUNERT. Go ahead, Major Clausen.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Clarke, your business or occupation at the present time is what?

Mr. CLARKE. I am a quarry operator. I own and operate the Clarke-Halawa Rock Company.

5. Major CLAUSEN. You have been the operator of this quarry company for some time?

Mr. CLARKE. Since 1939.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And your familiarity with that type of business has extended to what period?

Mr. CLARKE. Approximately 15 years.

[3624] 7. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you have been 15 years in that type of business or some comparable building business?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. You are pretty well known here in-town, aren't you, Mr. Clarke, as an operator in that particular business?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. You have done some big jobs, little jobs?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And you are acquainted, are you, with other contractors in town that are engaged in the same type of business?

Mr. CLARKE. I am.

11. Major CLAUSEN. And you are also acquainted with other contractors that are engaged in allied businesses; is that correct?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Men like Mr. Black, Mr. Woolley; is that correct?

Mr. CLARKE. That is correct.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Now, based on your knowledge of that particular business and what you know, let me ask you, first: Are you acquainted with the work that was done here by the Hawaiian Constructors, the outfit that was composed of Rohl-Connolly Company, Gunther-Shirley Company, Callahan?

Mr. CLARKE. Considerable of it.

14. Major CLAUSEN. And your knowledge in that regard was acquired in what way, Mr. Clarke?

Mr. CLARKE. Mostly by personal contact and the supplying [3625] of materials for various projects under their control.

15. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, were you a sort of subcontractor to them at the time?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir. I was both subcontractor and material contractor.

16. Major CLAUSEN. And on the basis of efficiency, your knowledge of what efficiency is in the contracting business, and your knowledge of the way that the business was operated by the Hawaiian Constructors, can you tell me in general what your personal opinion is as to whether the Hawaiian Constructors were a highly organized organization or whether its work wasn't prosecuted with the utmost efficiency?

Mr. CLARKE. Well, in my opinion, the organization was not particularly efficient and, again in my opinion, I would say poorly organized.

17. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you are acquainted with Mr. McKee, the McKee Contracting Company?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

18. Major CLAUSEN. And just let me ask you this question. I want a frank answer from you. By the way, I think you have been interviewed already by Colonel John E. Hunt of our Inspector General's Office at Washington, haven't you?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir, I was.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Just tell the Board, Mr. Clarke, how the Hawaiian Constructors, this Rohl outfit, stacks up against, let us say, the outfit of Mr. McKee or Mr. Black or Mr. Woolley, or McClure.

[3626] Mr. CLARKE. Well, comparing with those contractors, I would say the Hawaiian Constructors would be placed at the bottom of the list. Their organization was rather lax in their pressing the work. They were lax in the planning of the work and coordination. In my opinion, at the time they were organized they were unable to secure the best of help, so they did the best they could. The work dragged a great deal, and when we offered assistance to them it did not always seem acceptable.

20. Major CLAUSEN. I believe you testified somewhat along this line to Colonel Hunt. Was that the observation of yourself, more or less, here on the island? I mean, did everybody on the island have the same sort of idea, that the Hawaiian Constructors were more or less scandalously or notoriously inefficient?

Mr. CLARKE. I would say yes.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with regard to the manner in which your organization was brought into this picture, that is, the company with which you are connected—I believe you testified with regard to this—do you believe that favoritism was shown by the Engineers under Colonel Wyman in charge of the work here with respect to allocating this work?

Mr. CLARKE. I do.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Tell the Board just how that favoritism was manifested?

Mr. CLARKE. I would like to go back to approximately April, 1941, when my first real contact with Colonel Wyman and the Hawaiian Constructors occurred in the calling for bids on the island airports, one to be built on Hawaii and one on [3627] Maui—two on Hawaii, one on Maui and one on Molokai. At that time our organization and others were called in and shown plans for these various airports and informed that bids would be called for on individual airfields, and on the total series of airfields; that is, one bid. We went over the plans very thoroughly and visited the islands, myself and my engineers, and when the bids were opened on the 12th of May, 1941, a group of contractors, local contractors, were the low bidders as individuals, on individual airfields, but the organization headed by Mr. Rohl, Gunther-Shirley and I think by Mr. Grafe, were the ones that had—and also a bid by McKee and Company—were high on the total for all the airfields. Adding up the individual bids we were several hundred thousand dollars low, and when I consulted with Colonel Wyman in regard to the saving to the government he informed me that all of the local bids were being thrown out and the contract would be awarded to the Rohl-Connolly organization. We thought that quite unfair at the time and wrote two letters to the Engineers in protest, and both of them were ignored.

23. General FRANK. To whom did you address those letters?

Mr. CLARKE. To Colonel Wyman, to the United States District Engineer, attention of Colonel Wyman. One I mailed and one I delivered personally. Both were ignored.

24. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, this job that you bid on was an open bid, on a lump-sum basis, competitive bids, supposedly, isn't that right?

Mr. CLARKE. Supposedly. The bids were publicly opened. We were present at the opening.

25. Major CLAUSEN. But after going through this formality, [3628] the result was that the mainland bidders, that is, this Rohl outfit, got the job?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir, they were awarded the job, but they never started. They did not get started on the work within the specified time limit. Had we been awarded these contracts, my own organization on the Molokai and the Akiona on the Hawaiian one, and the Hawaiian Constructors on the Maui field, all of us would have had those fields completed within the year 1941.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Before December 7th, 1941?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir. That was the idea, to get the fields in usable condition, and the bids specified that they should be within use within a hundred days. The plan was to put in one runway and then to complete the field, but to give the Army the use of the fields.

27. Major CLAUSEN. How much time did the Rohl outfit take to do the job?

Mr. CLARKE. I wrote a letter to the United States Engineers on the 100th day, asking them what was being done, and the letter was ignored, because we felt that we had a right to protest, owing to the fact that the jobs were being unduly hampered and not started.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Let me ask you this question: So far as the Rohl outfit was concerned, then, they did not have that job finished—or did they have these jobs finished by 7 December, 1941?

Mr. CLARKE. No, sir, they were nowhere near—they were hardly started.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Aside from the military aspects of the thing, how was the government affected from the standpoint of [3629] being gouged? What was the difference in price? How much would the government have saved had you people been awarded this contract?

Mr. CLARKE. I wrote that in the letter, and my guess at the moment is approximately \$300,000.

30. Major CLAUSEN. \$300,000; is that correct?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Can you give some other instances of this gouging?

Mr. CLARKE. No, not specifically. Most of the work after that time was never submitted to local contractors. That was the last opportunity we had to bid. Although we filed letters requesting permission to quote on various projects, based on the fact that we had the material, the men, the organization and equipment, we were thoroughly and always ignored.

32. Major CLAUSEN. Let me just invite your attention to the Schofield Barracks job. Do you recall that, Mr. Clarke, where there were

some 19,000 tons with respect to a bid on rock for delivery at Schofield Barracks, and there was a Mr. Kent? Who is Mr. Kent?

Mr. CLARKE. Mr. Kemp, K-e-m-p.

33. Major CLAUSEN. He was your rock superintendent?

Mr. CLARKE. He was my paving plant superintendent.

34. Major CLAUSEN. With regard to this 19,000 tons of rock aggregate, do you know, when the bids were opened, whether the prices were, in your opinion, exorbitant there?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, they were exorbitant, and we protested at that time.

35. Major CLAUSEN. What is your memory on that point?

[3630] Mr. CLARKE. I made a trip to Schofield in regard to that matter, but I cannot recall the details. I merely remember we also protested that in writing, and the bids were awarded at a considerably higher price to some other outfit, but I would have to refer to my files to give the actual information at this time. It has been two or three years ago.

36. Major CLAUSEN. You have referred in several instances to letters. Would you be able to furnish the Board, Mr. Clarke, copies of those letters?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir. I furnished them to Colonel Hunt before. I still have them. I can also furnish copies of those bids on the island airports. I have photostatic copies of those.

37. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir, if you will do that, furnish the Board copies, we will greatly appreciate it. We are going to be here but a few days. How much time will you need?

Mr. CLARKE. I can have them by tomorrow.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Thank you very much.

39. General FRANK. Mr. Clarke, what construction work had your organization accomplished prior to this time?

Mr. CLARKE. May I ask, do you mean in its entirety or just for the space of—

40. General FRANK. What I am trying to do and the reason for that question is to determine whether or not you had done any work to establish a basis for the reliability of your firm.

Mr. CLARKE. I built Malai Airport road on Maui for a federal aid organization.

41. General FRANK. What is that?

Mr. CLARKE. \$172,000, 7 miles of paved road. And I built the road from Pearl Harbor to Pearl City for \$158,000, also federal aid. I had three projects at Koko Head on this island, each totalling \$40,000, \$45,000 and \$40,000. Those were [3631] all road work.

Then I put in 32 acres of concrete at Hickam Field, that is, all the warming up aprons and the area around the hangars built by Mr. McKee.

I also was a sub-contractor on the Army hangars at Hickam Field for Mr. McKee.

I paved all of the runways at Hickman Field for Tucker McClure. I put in all of the streets at Hickam Field for Tucker McClure.

42. General FRANK. As a sub-contractor?

Mr. CLARKE. As a sub-contractor.

43. General FRANK. Do you know Walter Dillingham?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

44. General FRANK. Did you ever do any work for him?

Mr. CLARKE. Oh, yes, I have worked for Mr. Dillingham. In 1927 I put in the concrete for the last 9 miles of road on the Island of Hawaii as a sub-contractor.

45. General FRANK. How did you get along with Mr. Dillingham?

Mr. CLARKE. Very well.

46. General FRANK. Would you work for him now?

Mr. CLARKE. As a sub-contractor, yes, I would. In fact, I at the moment am supplying two of his organizations with crushed rock, the Hawaiian Bitumuls Company and the Hawaiian Hume Concrete Pipe Company.

47. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

48. Major CLAUSEN. So far as your capacity for supplying rock is concerned, in response to the question of General Frank, what was the capacity in tons per day? About a thousand tons a day?

[3632] Mr. CLARKE. At what time, sir?

49. Major CLAUSEN. During, say, 1941.

Mr. CLARKE. In 1941 my plant, in February, was turning out 600 tons a day.

50. Major CLAUSEN. You had control, did you, Mr. Clarke, of the only large rock deposit on the east side of the city at that time; isn't that right?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, I did. May I just add to that that on December 7th I was turning out about 1,200 tons a day.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever attempt work on Bellows Field and get turned down there, too?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes. We offered to do some work on Bellows Field.

52. Major CLAUSEN. What was that incident?

Mr. CLARKE. We had a large rock deposit at Kaneohe, maybe I better say Kuilua. We offered to open that deposit for the United States Engineers, with the idea of supplying rock to Bellows Field and also to take care of the Navy at Mokapu. We received a letter, of which I will give you a copy, from the Engineers, saying they were not interested.

53. Major CLAUSEN. If you will supply those letters we will appreciate it.

That is all I have, sir.

54. General GRUNERT. Any questions?

55. Colonel TOULMIN. No, sir.

56. General GRUNERT. Mr. Clarke, can you think of anything else or recall anything else that you think might be of value to the Board, that you might tell us?

Mr. CLARKE. I don't think so, General.

[3633] 57. Major CLAUSEN. With regard to Colonel Wyman, Mr. Clarke, will you give the Board some instances of his characteristics?

Mr. CLARKE. I had several conferences with him from time to time. Only once during the entire conversations with him was I invited to sit down. He always seemed entirely too arrogant. We wrote numerous letters and offered to cooperate. The fact is, upon Colonel Wyman's arrival in Hawaii, in my usual manner of taking care of previous District Engineers, I wrote him a letter offering him the services of the company and our organization, explained to him our

position in the community, and willingness to cooperate; also explained to him the condition of the rock situation on the island.

He answered the letter—I will give you a copy of it—telling me it was neither feasible—that was the word used—or necessary at this time to give out any information regarding Engineers operations. It kind of left us feeling that we did not amount to very much here.

Thinking he had misunderstood my letter, I wrote him a second letter, apologizing for the first letter, explaining conditions, and received a reply stating that if I would read his first letter it covered the entire subject.

He started out with a chip on his shoulder, which was an awkward condition for us, and of course we immediately took a dislike to him. I still tried to play ball, but was never able to get under his skin. I was never able to do anything for him that he seemed to think was useful. He was always very noisy in his statements to us. He would never make us feel at home, and he would walk up and down behind his desk, and one time he said "When I want the rock I will tell you about it and I will [3634] write the ticket."

So I left with the idea that we were not needed, and immediately entered into various contracts with the Navy, with the Navy rather than the Army.

58. Major CLAUSEN. How about his predecessor; was that typical of the treatment accorded contractors here by the Engineer, or was his predecessor different?

Mr. CLARKE. His predecessor and all of his predecessors were very different. They were fine people to work for. I worked with his immediate predecessor in putting in all of the concrete for the Alia-manu ammunition dump here on the side of Red Hill. We had very pleasant connections prior to his arrival and subsequent to his leaving with the Engineers, and at the moment we are doing a large business with the Engineers, under very satisfactory conditions.

59. Major CLAUSEN. How about Mr. Rohl; you knew him, did you?

Mr. CLARKE. I have known Mr. Rohl many years.

60. Major CLAUSEN. Tell the Board something of his characteristics that you observed.

Mr. CLARKE. I have known Mr. Rohl since 1935. I have met him several times in Los Angeles on business trips. Mr. Rohl is a good engineer. He understands his business, and I think has for many years been considered in the contracting industry as capable and efficient. He is a hard driver, but he also drinks heavily. He likes to entertain lavishly. I have been of the opinion many times that Mr. Rohl quite thoughtlessly took those he entertained along with him, in that he gets them into jams that it is hard for them to get out of. They accept his entertainment in the proper spirit and then [3635] Rohl seems to try to benefit by it. I think very often people who accept it do so thoughtlessly and find themselves in a little bit of a jam.

Down here I only saw Mr. Rohl three or four times in the time he was here—several months—and he was sober. He used to call my home at night and order materials for the following day, and was very profane over the telephone. It was easy to see that most times he was under the influence of liquor.

61. Major CLAUSEN. You mean, when he was here in Hawaii?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes.

62. Major CLAUSEN. From the way he talked you could tell he was probably obviously drunk?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes. Then I have seen him—I have called on him at the hotel, at the Moana. I have met him at his office and that was his condition. He did not seem particularly inclined to push the work here, and once or twice I went to Mr. Woolley or Mr. Benson with the idea of trying to get work done that I knew had to be done, that Rohl just was not capable of doing, on account of his condition.

63. Major CLAUSEN. That is while he was here in Hawaii?

Mr. CLARKE. Correct.

64. General FRANK. His condition being that of drunkenness?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes. He just made Hawaii one round of good times for Mr. Rohl. There isn't any doubt of that. I am sure others will bear me out on that.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Have you seen Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman together in Hawaii?

Mr. CLARKE. Oh, yes.

66. Major CLAUSEN. When they were both drunk?

[3636] Mr. CLARKE. No, I have never seen Colonel Wyman drunk; only Rohl. Of course, Rohl's statement was that he did not consider anyone drunk—and he made this statement in public—until they fell down. So it was just a case of what you consider drunk.

67. Major CLAUSEN. How did he appear to you, to be drunk; what symptoms did he evidence?

Mr. CLARKE. He staggered; he was rather maudlin in his conversation; there was no continuity to his statements; certainly not in his right mind.

68. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

Mr. CLARKE. I would say a very pitiful condition that that should occur when it did, because I frankly believe that had local contractors and mainland contractors like Mr. McClure and Mr. McKee and some of the others had this work, we would not have been in such a condition as we were when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. We were certainly far less progressed in our work than we should have been.

69. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL MILLARD PIERSON, INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, INSPECTOR GENERAL, PACIFIC OCEAN AREA, APO 958

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

Colonel PIERSON. Millard Pierson, Colonel, Inspector General's Department, Inspector General, Pacific Ocean Area, APO 958.

2. General GRUNERT. Major Clausen will start the questioning.

[3637] 3. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel, your name was given us as a lead in connection with a situation where a certain report of the Inspector General was supposed to have been suppressed. Are you

acquainted with a Captain King, formerly of the Judge Advocate General's Department on the island?

Colonel PIERSON. We had two Captains King here. I presume the one you refer to is Captain William A. C. King?

4. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Colonel PIERSON. I recall him. I knew him slightly.

5. Major CLAUSEN. I am pretty sure that the name given us was one with about three initials. That probably was the one. I talked to you some days ago and suggested you search your memory and the records for information concerning that incident. Would you tell the Board what you found and what you can recollect, Colonel?

Colonel PIERSON. You asked me at the time if I recalled an investigation or an opinion of the Hawaiian Constructors made by me which was suppressed. None of my reports has ever been suppressed. To my knowledge, I have never inspected the Hawaiian Constructors, nor did I ever personally conduct an investigation in which the Hawaiian Constructors was involved.

6. Major CLAUSEN. How about Colonel Wyman or Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel PIERSON. I never met Mr. Rohl. I met Colonel Wyman the day after I arrived here, on the 15th of February, 1942. I have never made any inspections, nor had I conducted any investigation of either Mr. Rohl or Colonel Wyman.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Were inspections of these individuals or the Hawaiian Constructors made under your direction and supervision, Colonel?

Colonel PIERSON. Colonel Wyman left here, as I recall, in the latter part of March, 1942. I took over the duties of Department Inspector General on the 20th of March, 1943. I arrived here on the 15th of February, 1942. At that time I was the fourth ranking officer in the office.

8. Major CLAUSEN. With regard to this Captain King, what can you recall regarding any instance concerning Captain King in relation to any inspections of the individuals in question and the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel PIERSON. No more than informal conversations. When he was on his way to the mess he would stop me on the street and we would discuss many matters. I might add here that the subject of the Engineer and the Hawaiian Constructors, as I recall, was the talk of the entire island. Now, what the nature of our discussions, or what we talked about in relation to the Hawaiian Constructors and the Engineer I am sorry I do not recall. It has been so long ago now and there has been so much taking place around here that I just do not feel that I could qualify to state just what my conversation with him was.

9. Major CLAUSEN. What was the trend of this conversation, Colonel?

Colonel PIERSON. The inefficiency, as I recall it, of the Hawaiian Constructors and the District Engineer's office.

10. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

11. General GRUNERT. Any more questions?

Is there anything that you can add to give the Board anything of value on which to reach a conclusion, anything else that is in your mind?

[3639-3640] Colonel PIERSON. I don't know what the Board is looking into, General.

12. General GRUNERT. This Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee. Is there anything on those two subjects that you think of that you would like to tell the Board, which you think would be of value to the Board?

Colonel PIERSON. I regret, General, I have no such information.

13. General GRUNERT. All right, thank you, Colonel.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(The following was dictated by Colonel Toulmin, Friday, September 15, 1944, at 10:30 a. m.):

General Bragdon called me at about 10:25 and stated that he wished to inquire as to exactly what was the information that we wanted, based upon the questions I asked Colonel Wyman, as to the responsibility for the delays, based upon Colonel Wyman's statement that the delays that occurred were due to two causes; first, the restrictions and regulations and difficulties he had with the Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers, and, second, as to the difficulties he had in getting coordination in the complicated system existing under General Short's administration.

I told him that the Board was utterly impartial as to Colonel Wyman and had authorized the asking of such questions for the purpose of bringing out Colonel Wyman's point of view as to what he thought was responsible for the delay, as that was a matter in issue in which he was concerned, and that any facts in particular that they could produce as to the approvals necessary on the mainland and by whom and under what regulations [3641] and conditions would of course throw light on the subject matter, and that as to the local coordination if he mentioned some typical specimens of the coordination necessary and then summarized the various types of coordination necessary under General Short's organization it would probably give the Board a complete statement of the facts; that the Board was interested in facts of any kind that would be pertinent and have a bearing on Colonel Wyman's activities, either in defense of him or otherwise.

After I made the statement I asked General Bragdon if this was clear to him and was satisfactory to his understanding, and he said it was and that he would so proceed and submit the statement.

[3642] **TESTIMONY OF FREDERICK M. EARLE, WARRANT OFFICER, JUNIOR GRADE, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Earle, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Mr. EARLE. Frederick M. Earle, Warrant Officer, Junior Grade, U. S. A.

2. Colonel WEST. You are stationed at POA Headquarters?

Mr. EARLE. I am. We do work for both. We publish both, POA and Base Command.

3. General RUSSELL. Mr. Earle, what were your duties in November and December of 1941?

Mr. EARLE. Distribution clerk.

4. General RUSSELL. In the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. EARLE. Adjutant General's Department.

5. General RUSSELL. As such clerk were part of your duties to see to the distribution of forms which were published by the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. EARLE. Unclassified, yes, sir.

6. General RUSSELL. Unclassified. Have you before you now a record from the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department showing the distribution of what is known as SOP Hawaiian Department, distributed as of November 5, 1941?

Mr. EARLE. Yes, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. Will you state into the record what that distribution was?

Mr. EARLE. Distribution B, L, and G, less 1, 2, 3, 5.

[3643] 8. General RUSSELL. Did that include the War Department?

Mr. EARLE. No, sir, it did not.

9. General RUSSELL. Then, according to those records, copies of SOP of November 5, 1941, were not sent to the War Department?

Mr. EARLE. Not from the Adjutant General's Office, no, sir.

10. General RUSSELL. That is all.

11. General GRUNERT. Any questions? (No response.)

Thank you for coming down.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

12. General RUSSELL. I want to tender in evidence two maps which were identified by Mr. Shivers, formerly of the F. B. I., which he identified and described to the Board. They purport to be copies of Map No. 1 and Map No. 2, purporting to have been captured from a Japanese submarine on or about the 7th day of December, 1941.

(Copy of Map No. 1, captured from Japanese submarine, was marked Exhibit No. 48 and received in evidence.)

(Copy of Map No. 2, captured from Japanese submarine, was marked Exhibit No. 49 and received in evidence.)

13. General RUSSELL. I want to tender in evidence a memorandum, 7th of September, 1944, from Lieutenant General Grunert, President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, to the Commanding General, USAFPOA, "Subject: Documentary evidence," and the 1st indorsement to said letter, dated 13th September 1944.

(Memorandum dated September 7, 1944, from Lt. Gen. Grunert to the Commanding General, USAFPOA, was marked Exhibit No. 50 and received in evidence.)

[3644] (1st indorsement, dated September 13, 1944, to memorandum marked Exhibit 50, was marked Exhibit No. 50-A and received in evidence.)

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR T. SHORT, PLEASANTON HOTEL, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Short, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. SHORT. Arthur T. Short, Pleasanton Hotel.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation, Mr. Short?

Mr. SHORT. I am manager of the hotel.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Short, I will ask General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, to develop this particular part of our investigation.

Mr. SHORT. All right, sir.

4. General GRUNERT. General Frank.

5. General FRANK. How long have you been manager of the Pleasanton Hotel, Mr. Short?

Mr. SHORT. About 11 years.

6. General FRANK. You were manager of this hotel in 1941?

Mr. SHORT. Yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. And when it was taken over by the Engineer Corps?

Mr. SHORT. I was manager at that time.

8. General FRANK. Did you continue as manager while the Engineer Corps had it?

Mr. SHORT. No. They took it away from us on, I think it was, the 14th of December. I think that was it.

[3645] General FRANK. What year?

Mr. SHORT. No. It was about the first of January.

10. General FRANK. What year?

Mr. SHORT. '42.

11. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. Colonel Wyman was there then, and he told me to stay there until they got somebody to take it over, and I stayed there until the 15th of January, under the military.

12. General FRANK. 15th of January, 1942?

Mr. SHORT. '42, yes.

13. General FRANK. From when? When did they take it over?

Mr. SHORT. They took it over, I think it was about the—well, they took it over on the 15th, the night of the 14th. 15th of January is when they took it over.

14. General FRANK. They took it over the 14th of January, 1942?

Mr. SHORT. Of January. That's when they came in.

15. General FRANK. In 1942?

Mr. SHORT. Nineteen forty—the blitz was what? '41?

16. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. Well, it was '41.

17. General FRANK. Well, they took it—

Mr. SHORT. No. It was December that the blitz was. December '41. Yes, it was '42.

18. General FRANK. They didn't take it over until after the blitz?

Mr. SHORT. No. Until after the 1st, no.

19. General FRANK. All right. Go ahead.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Short, you were acquainted with a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

[3646] Mr. SHORT. Very slightly. I talked to him probably once or twice. He and Colonel Wyman were always together when they—but they had very little to say. They had a man by the name of Dykes that did all the work, that is, about the stuff.

21. General FRANK. Made arrangements with you?

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

22. Major CLAUSEN. You say Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman were always together?

Mr. SHORT. They were always together.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Now, this Pleasanton Hotel, Mr. Short, is right directly across from the Punahou campus?

Mr. SHORT. Yes, sir.

24. Major CLAUSEN. The Punahou school; is that correct?

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

25. Major CLAUSEN. And that is where the United States Engineers had the offices?

Mr. SHORT. Yes, they have that. Yes, sir.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that Mr. Rohl had offices in the Pleasanton Hotel on the first floor and that he occupied two rooms on the second floor?

Mr. SHORT. Well, you mean the first bedroom floor?

27. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHORT. Yes. I don't know how many rooms he had himself. I think he had two, and Colonel Robinsons had a room or so, and Colonel——

28. Major CLAUSEN. Wyman?

Mr. SHORT. Wyman.

29. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, Colonel Wyman, Colonel Robinson, and Hans Wilhelm Rohl had bedrooms on the same floor?

[3647] Mr. SHORT. On the second floor.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Second floor?

Mr. SHORT. That was the bedroom. The other was the office floor.

31. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, you have already been interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, haven't you?

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

32. Major CLAUSEN. And you know that Mr. Rohl did a lot of drinking while living at the Pleasanton Hotel?

Mr. SHORT. Well, I know that he had the reputation for that, but I don't know personally, because by the time that he had moved in there he had taken over, with his outfit, the chef from the Royal Hawaiian Hotel to run the place, and I stepped out. I kept the apartments and stepped out from the—on the—I think I had ten days in there with him before they put the other man in.

33. Major CLAUSEN. And you had knowledge, Mr. Short, as to the reputation that Mr. Rohl had for this heavy drinking, based on what?

Mr. SHORT. It was based on just hearsay from the people in the hotel. That is, the manager's wife of the hotel was particularly active, and the cooks were all. You see, my house is right next to the office and the kitchen there.

34. Major CLAUSEN. And what would they tell you about that subject, Mr. Short?

Mr. SHORT. Well, just simply the parties that they had up there, and things like that.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Parties up where, Mr. Short?

[3648] Mr. SHORT. Up in the second floor.

36. Major CLAUSEN. And you say "they had." Who would be that?

Mr. SHORT. What?

37. Major CLAUSEN. I say, whom do you mean by "they"? Will you speak out real loud for the reporter to hear?

Mr. SHORT. I am speaking now of Mr. Rohl's party.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHORT. I don't know who was in it altogether.

39. Major CLAUSEN. And what would they do on those parties, Mr. Short?

Mr. SHORT. Well, just that they had more parties up there, dancing and drunks, and that is all. Don't you know, they would laugh about it.

40. Major CLAUSEN. I believe you mentioned the chef from the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

Mr. SHORT. Kina. He is now in charge of the Willard Inn Officers' Club. He and his wife are there.

41. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions, General.

42. General GRUNERT. Mr. Short, do you think of anything else that you think would be of value to the Board? If so, we would like to have you tell us now.

Mr. SHORT. No, I don't know; other than the way they came in and took the thing over, and this fellow Dykes was the head of it and threw all, practically—the first day they tore the whole thing to pieces and threw all our furniture from upstairs that was good enough for generals and admirals, and things—threw it all out of the windows and brought furniture from the Royal Hawaiian Hotel that they had borrowed. It was just thrown [3649] out.

43. General GRUNERT. Was this the contractors' bunch or the Engineers?

Mr. SHORT. Well, I don't know. I think it was—while the Engineers had it. The Engineers had it, I think, for about ten days before Rohl Constructors took it over.

44. General GRUNERT. Well, let's see. Then the Engineers took it over about January 14 of '42, and then the things that you told the Board happened after they took it over?

Mr. SHORT. After they had taken it over, yes.

45. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

46. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Was that a literal statement that you made, Mr. Short, that they threw the furniture out of the windows?

Mr. SHORT. Yes, they threw it out, the beds out. They had about thirty or forty—

47. General RUSSELL. Did they take them downstairs and throw them out in the yard, or throw them out through the window?

Mr. SHORT. Well, some of them went right through the window, the small things they got out, got stuff out. Everybody was laughing about it, the baggage, and people—you see, they gave me about 14 days to move about 150 people out of the hotel. "Colonel Wyman," I said, "how many—how long a time are you going to give me to move these guests that we have here?"

He said, "Move. Give you until the 15th." The 15th we had to have everybody out of there. We had Admiral Bagley and his family and wife and a bunch of prominent officers, captains and things in there; probably more Navy people in [3650] there than anything else.

48. General GRUNERT. Can you ascribe any reason for their throwing stuff out of the windows instead of carrying it downstairs?

Mr. SHORT. No. I think they probably thought it would look better to get the Royal Hawaiian furniture in there.

49. General GRUNERT. But that didn't account for their throwing it out of the window instead of carrying it downstairs.

Mr. SHORT. No. It was just that they had a bunch of youngsters there under this man Dykes, and they just—things went. I think that was the testimony I gave to the F. B. I., too, that they were throwing stuff out.

50. General GRUNERT. All right, sir. Thank you very much for coming up.

Mr. SHORT. All right, sir. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. ROBERT W. HAIN, GENERAL STAFF, HEAD-
QUARTERS U. S. A. F. P. O. A., FORT SHAFTER, T. H.—Recalled**

1. General RUSSELL. Colonel Hain, we are recalling you, and you remain under oath. That is, you are still under oath, and all the cautions that were given you the other day continue to apply to this testimony.

Colonel HAIN. I see.

2. General RUSSELL. I am going to show you Adjutant General's file, Hawaiian Department, 121.2, call your attention to a letter in that file which you have shown to me, dated 28th of July, 1941, and ask you to read that letter into the record.

[3651] Colonel HAIN. This is a letter, "Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H.," dated 28 July 1941:

(Letter dated July 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., is as follows:)

Subject: Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. .

1. Special Field Exercise Funds are now available for use in this Department as follows:

a. Carried over from fiscal year 1941-----	\$32, 437. 15
b. Recently allotted by War Department for combat training, small units, under P/A FD 1562 P 31-99 A 0310-2-----	133, 000. 00
c. Recently allotted by War Department for Department Ma- neuvers under P/A FD 1562 P5-99 A 0310-2-----	22, 165. 00

2. Under restrictions imposed by War Department letter, 16 April 1941, File AG 353 (4-7-41) M-C-M, subject "Special Field Exercise Funds", it has become increasingly difficult to expend these funds for the purpose intended. Under the special conditions existing in this Department, large sums are not required for rental of camp sites, trespass rights and additional tactical gasoline and lubricants. Training is necessarily restricted to well defined defensive areas of relatively limited extent.

3. In this connection, considerable sums are required for field fortification and camouflage materials. The War Department has granted authority [3652] to lease numerous small areas of unimproved land tactically located for beach and land defense purposes. These leases have been acquired and construction of field fortifications has been initiated. However, a minimum of \$100,000.00 is needed for the purchase of materials for revetment of trenches, construction of gun positions, machine gun emplacements, etc. An additional \$10,000.00 are required for the purchase of a trench-digging machine and other tools. Likewise, \$15,000.00 are required for purchase of camouflage materials.

4. Therefore it is requested that one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars (\$125,000.00) from the one hundred sixty-five thousand four hundred thirty-seven dollars and fifteen cents (\$165,437.15) available under paragraph 1 a

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and b, above, be reallocated to this Department under procurement authority purpose numbers which will permit the use of these funds for procurement of fortification and camouflage materials, including ten thousand dollars (\$10,000.00) for power equipment.

5. Request reply by priority radio.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

3. General RUSSELL. Do your records show what was done by the War Department to this request of General Short for those funds?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir. The next paper appearing on [3653] this is a confidential radiogram headed:

(Excerpts from Adjutant General's File 121, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, are as follows:)

10 WAR TG 61 WD
Washn DC 252P Aug 12 1941
CG Haw Dept Ft Shafter TH
31 12th

AGMC reurlet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject reallocation of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects Stop Special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested further information follows by mail

ADAMS.
1017A.

4. General RUSSELL. Have you got that letter that was referred to in the telegram in your file, that radiogram in your files?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir. I have the letter:

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON

File "AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D

ESA/LFL/gjw-1712
AUGUST 13, 1941.

Subject: Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department

1. The use of Special Field Exercise Funds for costs incident to the Hawaiian Defense Project [3654] is contrary to War Department intentions that the expenditure of such funds be limited strictly to training purposes and is therefore not favorably considered. Essential requirements for field fortifications are properly chargeable to other available funds in an appropriated and allotted status. Special allotment of such funds cannot be made at present for the Hawaiian Department for purpose requested in letter, your headquarters, July 28, 1941, AG 121.2, subject as above, in view of other priorities.

2. The War Department is taking definite action to secure additional supplies and funds for Engineer operations in the field by task forces and for other emergency projects. Further information will be furnished you when these become available.

3. In view of the contents of paragraph 2, letter referred to above, which indicates that Special Field Exercise funds now in an allotted status to the Hawaiian Department are in excess of actual training requirements, report is desired showing the amount available for withdrawal for urgent training requirements elsewhere. The interest of the Hawaiian Department in providing the field fortifications mentioned in letter referred to above, is appreciated by the War Department and a favorable reply is precluded only by other urgent requirements.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ E. S. ADAMS.
*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

[3655] I have the first indorsement to the letter which I just read:

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FT. SHAFTER, T.H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3, basic letter, report is hereby submitted that the sum of forty thousand dollars (\$40,000.00) of Special Field Exercise Funds allotted to this Department under P/A FD 1562 P 31-99 A 0310-2 may be withdrawn.

2. With reference to paragraph 1, basic letter, attention is again invited to statements contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of letter from this Headquarters 28 July 1941, AG 121.2, subject same as basic letter. In this connection, the War Department in classified radiograms Nos. 823-21 May and 838-29 May 1941, provided funds for the acquisition by lease of various small parcels of land on which field fortifications could be constructed. These leases have been acquired and the work of construction of field fortifications has been advanced as far as practicable with salvaged and other materials available locally. This work is now stalemated because of lack of funds to purchase necessary materials and tools. As previously stated, the sum of \$100,000.00 is required for the purchase of materials for revetment of trenches, construction of gun positions, machine gun emplacements, etc. An additional \$10,000.00 [3636] is required for purchase of a trench digging machine and other tools. Also, \$15,000.00 is required for purchase of camouflage material.

3. I feel that the importance of this work is such as to justify an immediate allotment of \$125,000.00 for this purpose.

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lt. General, U. S. Army.,
Commanding.

5. General RUSSELL. Colonel, apparently a couple of radiograms intervened before the War Department replied to General Short's indorsement. In order to develop it chronologically, can you find the radiogram from the Hawaiian Department to the War Department, No. 403, dated September 25, '41?

Colonel HAIN. I have a confidential radiogram from Headquarters Hawaiian Department, No. 403—25th September, to:

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

Reference your letter AG three five three paren seven dash two eight dash forty one paren MC dash D comma thirteen August forty one subject reallocation of special field exercise fund for field fortification and camouflage projects comma and my first indorsement thereto fourteen September Stop Strongly urge immediate favorable action on my request for one hundred twenty five thousand dollars for purchase of necessary materials and tools for execution of field fortifications [3657] and camouflage projects as requested in my first indorsement fourteen September Stop This work is now at a standstill pending receipt of funds for essential materials Stop Request radio advice of action taken.

Signed "Short."

6. General RUSSELL. Now, have you a reply to this radiogram which we have just read, from the War Department to General Short?

Colonel HAIN. I have a confidential radiogram.

7. General RUSSELL. Numbered 173?

Colonel HAIN. It is headed:

72 WAR

Washn DC 647P Sept 29 1941
C G Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH.

172 twenty ninth Your request for immediate allotment one hundred twenty five thousand dollars for materials for field fortifications is not repeat not favorably considered reurad four naught three Stop More complete information mailed you in reply to your first indorsement on subject.

ADAMS,
810P.

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8. General RUSSELL. Have you another indorsement to this basic letter, and will you read that, please?

Colonel HAIN. I have the second indorsement to the basic.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
September 26, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

[3658] 1. Action is being taken by the War Department to withdraw the sum of \$40,000 of Special Field Exercise Funds allotted to your Department under P/A FD 1562 P 31-99 A0310—. The cooperation extended in this matter by you, has been of material assistance in the conduct of the present Army field exercises.

2. In reference to Pars 2 and 3 of 1st Indorsement, it is necessary for the War Department to restrict allotments for "Engineer Operations in the Field" to the most urgent priorities at this time. You will be informed of any change which will make additional supplies and funds available for the purpose requested.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

9. General RUSSELL. That apparently concludes the correspondence and the radiograms between the War Department and the Hawaiian Department touching the subjects which have been discussed.

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir.

10. General RUSSELL. Colonel, do you have in the same file a couple of radiograms between the Hawaiian Department and the War Department in November of '41 relating to field fortifications, camouflage, and so forth? If so, will you please read those?

Colonel HAIN. I have one, a copy of a radio telegram [3659] No. 660—28th October, from this headquarters to the Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

11. General RUSSELL. What year was it?

Colonel HAIN. 1941. Quote:

Project letter being submitted requesting one million four hundred fifty five thousand five hundred forty two dollars for materials for field fortification works and camouflage Stop This is total requirement for structures to be erected by troops for field defense works in this department. Geological formation this island such as to require revetment materials x Local materials have proven unsuitable and works already completed within past six months have deteriorated to the point where reconstruction is necessary Stop Projects so extensive and requirements of material and manpower are so great that this work should be undertaken immediately Stop Recommend that funds in the amount of five hundred thousand dollars be made available immediately and remainder included in an early emergency appropriation bill

SHORT.

12. General RUSSELL. Was there a reply to this radiogram from the War Department? If so, please read that.

Colonel HAIN. I have a copy of the reply, headed:

74 WAR.

Washn DC November 4, 1941.

CG Hawaiian Department.

347 Fourth.

[3660] Necessary for War Department reurad six six naught to restrict allotments for engineer operations in field to most urgent priorities at this time Stop You will be informed of any change which will make any additional supplies and funds in this category available to you for purpose requested

ADAMS.

13. General RUSSELL. Have you a radiogram from the War Department touching this subject of the expenditure of funds, on the 7th of December?

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir; I have a copy of secret radiogram headed:

23 WAR.

Wash DC 7:00 P Dec 7 1941.

CG Hawn Dept.

531—7th You are authorized to incur all obligations necessary to meet urgent requirements of situation. Maintain record of over obligations so incurred.

ADAMS.

6:37P/7.

14. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I want to ask you if in reply to the memorandum which we furnished you, heretofore, and conferences that have been held between you and me since that time—if you have gotten from the files of the Hawaiian Department all documents and data along the lines which were described in that letter and which have been subsequently described in my oral talks with you.

Colonel HAIN. I did not find all of the documents which [3661] you requested in the basic letter.

15. General RUSSELL. You have indorsed that basic letter back to the Board, however, in which you have detailed all those documents requested by us which you did not find; is that true?

Colonel HAIN. That is correct, sir.

16. General RUSSELL. Colonel, I will repeat the question, therefore: that you have made available to the Board all of the records that you were able to find in the Adjutant General's office of the Hawaiian Department along the lines described in that memorandum and in my subsequent oral talks with you.

Colonel HAIN. Yes, sir; I have made available all records which had any bearing on the subject which I was requested to locate.

17. General RUSSELL. So far as I know, that completes a search of the records of the Adjutant General's department, a selection of the material which was submitted to me, and its introduction before the Board.

18. General GRUNERT. All right. The witness may then be excused.

19. General RUSSELL. You may be excused. Thank you for your help, Colonel.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

20. General RUSSELL. I will offer in evidence or introduce into evidence a memorandum dated 12 September 1944, confidential in its nature, on the stationery of the United States Pacific Fleet, Pacific Ocean Areas. This memorandum is signed by McMorris (I believe it is C. H.; we will have to check that), [3662] Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Joint Staff; and over the signature is, in handwriting, the language, "The foregoing supplements my testimony given on 11th September."

The subject of the memorandum is the Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, summary of information concerning, derived from prisoners of war and captured documents.

Attached to this memorandum is a map of the part of the Pacific area which purports to show a track of Japanese aircraft carriers from November '41 through April '42, reproduced from Japanese map of Pacific area, taken at New Georgia, early July, 1943.

I ask that these documents be marked exhibit next in order.

21. Colonel TOULMIN. That is going to be Exhibit No. 51.
(Memorandum of September 12, 1944, by Admiral McMorris, with map attached, was marked Exhibit No. 51 and received in evidence.)

[3663] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL BENJAMIN R. WIMER, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ENGINEER CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND, APO 958**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station.

Colonel WIMER. Colonel Benjamin R. Wimer, Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Engineer Central Pacific Base Command, stationed at APO 958.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, I will turn you over to General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, to develop this particular part of our investigation.

3. General FRANK. How long have you been out here, Colonel?

Colonel WIMER. I arrived on the 10th of January, 1942.

4. General FRANK. 1942?

Colonel WIMER. The 10th of January, 1942, yes, sir.

5. General FRANK. On what duty were you in 1941?

Colonel WIMER. In 1941, up to the 24th of November, I was assistant District Engineer in Galveston.

6. General FRANK. When you arrived here in 1942, what were your duties?

Colonel WIMER. I arrived here as the executive officer of the 47th Engineers, and remained on that job until the 1st of February, 1942, at which time I became Assistant Department Engineer under Colonel Lyman.

7. General FRANK. The 47th Engineers was the engineer regiment at Schofield?

Colonel WIMER. No, sir. The 47th Engineers was a general service regiment that I came out here with on the 10th of [3664] January.

8. General FRANK. What is your job now?

Colonel WIMER. I have three jobs. I am the District Engineer of the Honolulu Engineer District; I am Engineer of the Central Pacific Command, and I am in command of the construction service.

9. Major CLAUSEN. I have only a few questions which relate to the records, Colonel. I would like to get all copies in your office of letters or communications of any kind that were exchanged between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl, and Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, back and forth, in the year 1941. I asked the other day Major Lozier to get those copies for me, and he said he would get them, but as yet I have not received them.

Colonel WIMER. I will do that.

10. Major CLAUSEN. One other thing. I was in Washington talking with Mr. McKay and we discussed the preparation of a map in the local office here indicating the construction work. Yesterday I returned to the office here and found some maps on the desk. I don't know whether those are the maps you sent over or not.

Colonel WIMER. Major Lozier probably brought them over. I have been trying to have him be the only contact on that thing, to avoid confusion.

11. Major CLAUSEN. If Major Lozier will indicate to me that those are the maps, then I will know that it is a fact.

Colonel WIMER. The request for maps of all of the construction projects was more than we could handle in the time that was called for, but we did pick out the critical matters, [3665] the airfields, the gasoline, AWS and the large installations, because there were about 1,500 different jobs involved.

12. Major CLAUSEN. I might offer a suggestion, since we are pressed for time; that if Major Lozier would be here tomorrow morning at 8 o'clock I will meet him here and he at that time could bring over the copies of those communications and also explain to me just what maps he apparently has already brought here.

Now, certain items of information were also requested by the Board of different people, but it might be that some of the things that we have asked for have been brought here, but this was what I was particularly interested in; I have completed, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions? If not, then apparently this witness is just on the question of getting some records.

14. Major CLAUSEN. This was suggested by the Office of the Chief of Engineers, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. Have you any information that you would like to give the Board that may be pertinent to the issue?

Colonel WIMER. No, sir, I have no personal knowledge of anything of concern to the Board.

16. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:40 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[3666]

AFTERNOON SESSION

At 1 p. m., the Board reconvened and proceeded further with the hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. J. J. KESTLY, CORPS OF ENGINEERS; ENGINEER, BASE COMMAND

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel KESTLY. J. J. Kestly; Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers; Engineer, Base Command.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, General Frank will conduct this particular part of our investigation, so I will turn you over to General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen.

3. General FRANK. Colonel Kestley, on what duty were you, in 1941?

Colonel KESTLY. I was area engineer, of field area 3, with my headquarters at Wheeler Field.

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4. General FRANK. Did you have charge of the 9,000-foot access road from Kolekole Pass over to the cableway at Mt. Kaala?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

5. General FRANK. That was started on the 6th of March, was it not?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

6. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not it was completed on time?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, it was usable. That is, I mean usable—it wasn't paved, but you could use the road, during [3667] September. We started work on the cableway at that time.

7. General FRANK. Do you mean to say that it took from March until September to build 9,000 feet of road?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

8. General FRANK. Why?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, because of the amount of yardage. It was fairly heavy construction, and with the equipment that we had available and the personnel we had available, operating on the one shift; also, there were considerable heavy culverts which had to be constructed of reinforced concrete.

9. General FRANK. It was only two miles in length?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

10. General FRANK. And yet it took six months? What was your opinion of the progress of the work?

Colonel KESTLY. Fair, considering the weather and the culverts. You know, you had to put the culverts in before you could put the fill in.

11. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel KESTLY. And there were quite a few of those, and they were fairly large. That all took time. That is hand work. We had to get the aggregate in, reenforcing steel; we had to build temporary roads to do that. We had to mix concrete with a small mixer which we were able to get in there. It is a pretty rainy section of the island. We were hampered a lot by mud and rain.

12. General FRANK. This contract was being carried by Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

13. General FRANK. Do you think they did a pretty good piece [3668] of work, or were their delays in there excessive?

Colonel KESTLY. Considering the personnel, I don't think we had the superintendents and the foremen and the laborers and the reenforcing steel men; we didn't have the best, we couldn't get them.

14. General FRANK. But the Government was paying for a first-class job, was it not?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

15. General FRANK. What kind of work was it getting, "considering the personnel," to use your own words?

Colonel KESTLY. Fair.

16. General FRANK. Is "fair" a second-rate, third-rate, or a fourth-rate job, or what?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I would say excellent, good, and fair.

17. General FRANK. This would be a third-rate job?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, the job itself, General, as completed, was a good job. The progress is what I am saying was poor, considering the personnel and the equipment that we had on hand at that time.

18. General FRANK. Then so far as the amount that it cost the Government is concerned, you feel that as a result of its being only a fair job, the cost was excessive, because of the length of time that it took, is that correct?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I don't know that that affected the actual cost, as they were paid on an estimated cost, weren't they? That is as I understood it.

19. General FRANK. It was on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis.

Colonel KESTLY. Yes; of which the cost was estimated and set, wasn't it? That is the way I always understood that a job was estimated, and, if it cost more than that, why it was their loss.

20. General FRANK. No.

[3669] Colonel KESTLY. It wasn't? I always understood that.

21. General FRANK. It is actually cost-plus-fixed-fee; therefore, if it took an excessive length of time, it cost the Government an excessive amount of money?

Colonel KESTLY. It cost it more than if we had had first-class personnel and plenty of equipment; yes, sir.

22. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel KESTLY. And plenty of personnel; which we didn't have.

23. General FRANK. Were you the engineer on the cableway?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. That was held up through lack of equipment, wasn't it?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, the materials for the cableway; yes, sir—the towers and so forth.

25. General FRANK. Was the camp ever built on the top of Kaala?

Colonel KESTLY. Not while I was there, General. There was the underground work that was built while I was there.

26. General FRANK. That was finished?

Colonel KESTLY. It was finished, but later, due to a change in the type of equipment, why, I understood—I wasn't there on the change, but it was changed to a certain extent.

27. General FRANK. How much opportunity did you have to observe the work of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I was there seven days a week, 10 or 12 hours a day, and I was out in the field a great deal.

28. General FRANK. What other contractors in the Hawaiian Department had you been able to observe?

[3670] Colonel KESTLY. Well, none, sir, that I had had a chance to observe.

29. General FRANK. Where did you come from?

Colonel KESTLY. California and Oregon.

30. General FRANK. When did you come to the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel KESTLY. December 1939.

31. General FRANK. The Hawaiian Constructors were not operating in December 1939? They did not come on the job until December 1940.

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir. I was stationed at Midway for a year and two days, and I returned here and was area engineer on the 5th of February 1941.

32. General FRANK. And that was on the Hawaiian Constructors' contract?

Colonel KESTLEY. Yes, sir.

33. General FRANK. Who was the contractor at Midway?

Colonel KESTLEY. We did our own work, the United States Engineers.

34. General FRANK. They did their own work?

Colonel KESTLEY. Yes, sir.

35. General FRANK. What was the relative efficiency between the work at Midway and that done by the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel KESTLEY. Due to the class of personnel I got at Midway, it wasn't any better than it was here.

36. General FRANK. It was not satisfactory, then, according to good standards?

Colonel KESTLY. That is right. I would not consider it so. It was because of the class they would send from the mainland. They would send 60 or 70 or 80 or 90 men, and out of that many we would probably get 25 that were what you [3671] would consider good mechanics or laborers, or whatever you needed. The rest of them, some of them I would feel like shipping them back on the same boat; but we had to put up with those things. That is, I had to, any way, because that is all I got.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Kestly, whom did you talk to about your appearance before this Board, before you came here today to testify?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, about my appearance here?

38. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I talked to Colonel Wimer. That is, we didn't discuss what might be said, or anything, with anyone. I talked to Colonel Wyman. I said "hello" to him and just passed the time. He didn't say anything about what I might say at the Board.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Did you see and talk with General Bragdon?

Colonel KESTLY. A few minutes; yes, sir.

40. Major CLAUSEN. What did he tell you about your appearance before this Board?

Colonel KESTLY. He said that they were not going to talk with me about it, because they didn't want it to appear that they might influence me in my appearance before the Board.

41. Major CLAUSEN. What else did he say to you about your appearance?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, the only other thing that I heard of was that there would be an informal gathering, and that I shouldn't be afraid of anything.

42. Major CLAUSEN. He told you you didn't have to be afraid?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I mean, that I should feel perfectly at ease.

[3672] 43. Major CLAUSEN. Yes? What else did he say?

Colonel KESTLY. That is all.

44. Major CLAUSEN. Were they all in a group when the General told you this?

Colonel KESTLY. Colonel Wyman and the General.

45. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Colonel KESTLY. Colonel Wyman and the General were together.

46. Major CLAUSEN. When did you have this talk, Colonel?

Colonel KESTLY. Wednesday.

47. Major CLAUSEN. How did General Bragdon know that you were going to appear before this Board?

Colonel KESTLY. I don't know, sir.

48. Major CLAUSEN. You have no idea?

Colonel KESTLY. No, I don't know how. I just assumed he knew. because of a "radio" to the engineer, why, Colonel Wimer had given me the job of collecting data for General Bragdon when he arrived here.

49. General FRANK. Were you sent for, or did you report here to General Bragdon?

Colonel KESTLY. I just walked in there and asked about my appearance before the Board.

50. General FRANK. Why did you have to ask about it?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I didn't know just what I should know, whether I should look up and see how many laborers I had, and what dates certain jobs were started, and how much yardage, and so forth. If there was anything that I should refresh my memory on, I wanted to do it.

51. General FRANK. Did you talk to Major Powell?

[3673] Colonel KESTLY. No, sir.

52. General FRANK. Do you know who Major Powell is?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I just know that Major Powell is there with General Bragdon; yes, sir.

53. General FRANK. You did not have any conversation at all with Major Powell?

Colonel KESTLY. No, sir.

54. General FRANK. Did you have any conversation with Major Lozier?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes; Major Lozier, when he first arrived, came in my office and was helping us gather this information in the proper form, that was to be turned over to General Bragdon.

55. Major CLAUSEN. What did General Bragdon say? "Don't be afraid of the Board; just go up there, and be at ease"?

Colonel KESTLY. He didn't say, "Don't be afraid of the Board."

56. Major CLAUSEN. What did he say about "being at ease"? Did he say, "This is just a Board, don't pay"—

Colonel KESTLY. Oh, no!

57. Major CLAUSEN. "Don't let them give you the 'willies'?"

Colonel KESTLY. No, sir.

58. Major CLAUSEN. "Just go right there, and don't be afraid"? Is that what he said?

Colonel KESTLY. No, sir.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Well, what did he say? Tell the Board.

Colonel KESTLY. Well, just as I stated before, that the meetings were informal, and he was just putting me at ease, as I would state it in the easiest words.

[3674] 60. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, he was putting you at ease, on Wednesday, before your appearance before the Board, on Friday, is that right?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Are you at ease, now?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I don't know. Not entirely!

62. Major CLAUSEN. Well, he didn't do a very good job then, did he? Or did you think that I was going to ask you these questions?

Colonel KESTLY. No, sir; I didn't know you were going to ask.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Well, let me ask you this: Did he tell you also to tell the truth, here?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I didn't need to be told that, sir.

64. Major CLAUSEN. No. Well, did you have to be told that you should come up here and be at ease?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, not—never having appeared before a board of this kind, I didn't know just what I was supposed to do.

65. Major CLAUSEN. How long have you been in the Army, Colonel Kestly?

Colonel KESTLY. Two years, last August.

66. Major CLAUSEN. You never appeared before a Board, before, in your life?

Colonel KESTLY. Not a military board; no, sir.

67. Major CLAUSEN. Well, any kind of board?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, when I was with the Railroad Commission of California, I used to appear before the commission.

[3675] 68. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know Leon Winchell?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir.

69. Major CLAUSEN. Well, that is a fairly formal body, isn't it?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, no. Their proceeding was rather informal, I think.

70. Major CLAUSEN. Did he tell you that you should only answer what you knew, in answer to questions?

Colonel KESTLY. No, sir; he didn't say that.

71. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

72. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

73. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to know from this officer, if I may, General Grunert, why he should be disturbed. Have you got something on your mind, Colonel, that we probably might ask that would disturb you?

Colonel KESTLY. Not a thing.

74. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, when you sat down here, you seemed to be very much perturbed. I am just wondering what it was that might perturb a Lieutenant Colonel of the Engineers.

Colonel KESTLY. I seemed to be?

75. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes. You haven't got anything on your mind?

Colonel KESTLY. No, sir.

76. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. If you have, why, spit it out, now, and let these people know about it.

Colonel KESTLY. If there were, I certainly would; yes, sir.

77. Colonel TOULMIN. They want the facts.

78. General GRUNERT. Then I understand you have nothing [3676] else that you want to testify about or tell the Board?

Colonel KESTLY. No, sir.

79. General GRUNERT. There are many witnesses, you know, that have something that they want to get at, and they do not get the opportunity, and so I am giving you the opportunity.

Colonel KESTLY. No, the only thing I can say is that from the time I arrived and went to work at Midway, and then the month in be-

tween, and then started to work here as area engineer, I have been under pressure every bit of the time, making every effort to do as much work as we possibly could.

80. General GRUNERT. By "pressure," you mean the amount of work?

Colonel KESTLY. Yes, sir; and are trying to rush all the work we could. It has been quite a long period of it, and there hasn't been any let-up in it.

81. General FRANK. How many men were on this road job from Kolekole Pass over to the base at Kaala?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I couldn't say for sure, General.

82. General FRANK. If it took the length of time you state, that was 1,500 feet a month, or 50 feet a day.

Colonel KESTLY. The number of men, of course, when you had so many structures ahead of the grading, which you would have to get in, well, there would be a certain group up here on the excavation of this one, while on this one they would be pouring the footings, and this one, they would be pouring the arch, and then there would be the shovel crews and the truck drivers.

83. General FRANK. How long have you been in the engineering game?

[3677] Colonel KESTLY. Since 1911.

84. General FRANK. How did the progress of that work stack up in your opinion with the experience you had had in the past?

Colonel KESTLY. Well, I think I would say that it was fair, General.

85. General FRANK. All right, nothing further.

86. General GRUNERT. That is all? That appears to be all they want of you, Colonel. Thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF AHOON H. WONG, DEPUTY COUNTY ENGINEER; WAILUKU, MAUI

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Wong, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. WONG. Ahoon H. Wong. My present address is Wailuku, Maui.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. WONG. I am the deputy county engineer, now.

3. General FRANK. Mr. Wong, from June through December, 1941, what was your employment?

Mr. WONG. Area engineer of the Sixth Field Area of the U. S. Engineers Department.

4. General FRANK. Did the construction of the road on Haleakala come under your supervision?

Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.

5. General FRANK. What was the length of it?

Mr. WONG. It was approximately 4,000 feet, extending [3678] from the end of the then road to the very top of the mountain.

6. General FRANK. The copy of the job order indicates the commencement date as June 25, 1941.

Mr. WONG. That is approximately right, yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. That is correct, is it?
Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.
8. General FRANK. The estimated date for completion was September 25, 1941.
Mr. WONG. That is how it read.
9. General FRANK. That was the estimated date?
Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.
10. General FRANK. Then, a revised date for completion was November 30. Do you remember when it was completed?
Mr. WONG. The whole job, as first drawn out?
11. General FRANK. The road.
Mr. WONG. Oh, the road? The road was completed before that date, I am sure.
12. General FRANK. It was?
Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.
13. General FRANK. Was there some delay in the construction of the road?
Mr. WONG. There was no delay in the construction of the road.
14. General FRANK. It went along?
Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.
15. General FRANK. Where did the labor come from?
Mr. WONG. Local labor.
16. General FRANK. Who had the contract for the road?
Mr. WONG. The Hawaiian Constructors.
- [3679] 17. General FRANK. Who was their man in charge of the job?
Mr. WONG. Superintendent by the name of Sloan.
18. General FRANK. Was he a pretty good man?
Mr. WONG. Yes, sir; he was a good man.
19. General FRANK. What other project did you have over there?
Mr. WONG. We had only that project; that is, a straight contract project with the Hawaiian Constructors. We had other projects, the CAA airport, under CAA funds, which was also under my jurisdiction.
20. General FRANK. Who was in charge of building that?
Mr. WONG. That was the Territorial Airport Constructors, a separate company.
21. General FRANK. Was the progress of this work on this road satisfactory to you?
Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.
22. General FRANK. And when did you arrive on Oahu from Maui?
Mr. WONG. Yesterday evening.
23. General FRANK. And to whom did you report?
Mr. WONG. Well, I didn't report, until early this morning.
24. General FRANK. Where?
Mr. WONG. To Sergeant Montgomery.
25. General FRANK. Have you been to the district engineer's office?
Mr. WONG. I have.
26. General FRANK. Whom did you see?
Mr. WONG. I saw General Bragdon.
27. General FRANK. What conversation did you have with General Bragdon?
[3680] Mr. WONG. Well, he asked me what jobs were then under construction, prior to December 7.

28. General FRANK. And what was your comment?
 Mr. WONG. The same as I just stated.
29. General FRANK. What further advice if any did he give you?
 Mr. WONG. None at all.
30. General FRANK. He made no comment to you about your appearing before this Board?
 Mr. WONG. He made no comment; no, sir.
31. General FRANK. Not any?
 Mr. WONG. No, sir; I told him that I was coming.
32. General FRANK. Did you see anybody else?
 Mr. WONG. I saw Colonel Wyman.
33. General FRANK. Did you know him before?
 Mr. WONG. Yes, sir; he was my immediate boss.
34. General FRANK. Did you have any comment from him, on appearing before the Board?
 Mr. WONG. No, sir.
35. General FRANK. Did he mention the Board, at all?
 Mr. WONG. No, sir.
36. General FRANK. Did you tell him you were coming to appear before this Board?
 Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.
37. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Wong, this job that General Frank was asking you about, Mt. Haleakala, Maui, is job-order 41.0, and the order to proceed was given June 14, 1941, is that correct?
 Mr. WONG. That is right.
38. Major CLAUSEN. The job was only about 80 percent complete on [3681] December 1, 1941, is that correct?
 Mr. WONG. What was the date, please?
39. Major CLAUSEN. December 1, 1941.
 Mr. WONG. That was approximately right.
40. Major CLAUSEN. You are not employed by the United States Engineering Department at the present time, are you?
 Mr. WONG. No, sir; I left them about a year ago last May.
41. Major CLAUSEN. How did you come to talk with General Bragdon?
 Mr. WONG. Well, he called me over the long-distance telephone a few days ago; if I were coming to Honolulu, to drop in to see him.
42. Major CLAUSEN. What did he say he wanted to talk to you about?
 Mr. WONG. Well, he just wanted me to discuss construction jobs on Maui prior to December 7, what jobs were then in operation.
43. Major CLAUSEN. Well, how did he know that you had been notified to appear before the Board, and to call you?
 Mr. WONG. Well, he asked me if I were coming down, and I told him I was coming down to appear before this Board.
44. Major CLAUSEN. Did he tell you when you saw him and talked with him here in town to give correct testimony?
 Mr. WONG. Pardon?
45. Major CLAUSEN. I say, when he talked with you here in town did he tell you to give correct answers?
 Mr. WONG. He did not give me any instructions at all. He just asked me what jobs were then in operation.
- [3682] 46. Major CLAUSEN. What jobs were then in operation?
 Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.

47. Major CLAUSEN. You mean, were in operation in 1941?

Mr. WONG. That is right; in operation in 1941.

48. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did he tell you why he would have to ask you that question when he could just look at the records to find out, so simply?

Mr. WONG. Well, that is up to him. I don't know his reasons for asking me that.

49. Major CLAUSEN. No, I mean, did he tell you anything about that?

Mr. WONG. Oh, no; he didn't say.

50. Major CLAUSEN. I mean, did he say that for some special reason he didn't want to look at the records, he wanted to talk to you?

Mr. WONG. No; he didn't say that.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have connections, over there in your present job as deputy county engineer, with the U. S. Engineer Department?

Mr. WONG. No, sir; I am with the County of Maui, a local organization.

52. Major CLAUSEN. I think that is all.

53. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? Mr. Wong, do you think of anything that you could tell the Board which might be of help to it, as to the conditions prior to the attack and during the attack—anything that you have in mind that you think the Board ought to know?

Mr. WONG. I think, in so far as the County of Maui, in so far as the work on Maui, was concerned, and my observations [3683] in other areas, I think our work went along at a much more rapid rate.

54. General GRUNERT. In Maui?

Mr. WONG. Yes, sir.

55. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the delays or the slowness of the work elsewhere?

Mr. WONG. No, sir; I don't.

56. General GRUNERT. Then how do you make the comparison?

Mr. WONG. Well, just my observation. I just know that the work on our island was progressing much faster.

57. General GRUNERT. You had charge of that work over there, didn't you?

Mr. WONG. Well, I was the area engineer.

58. General GRUNERT. And you knew that your work was going faster than the other work; then the other work must have been going slower than yours.

Mr. WONG. Well, that is to be presumed.

59. General GRUNERT. Do you know the reason for the slowness?

Mr. WONG. I don't know that.

60. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that you might want to say?

Mr. WONG. No, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. All right; thank you for coming up.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

62. General GRUNERT. General Russell?

[3684] 63. General RUSSELL. I have been furnished by the G-2 office, Hawaiian Department, two estimate of the international Japanese situation. The issuing office was G-2, Hawaiian Department, Army Contact Office, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. One is dated the

17th of October, 1941, and signed by one George W. Bicknell, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps. It shows the distribution as follows: Chief of Staff, H. H. D., G-2, H. H. D., G-2, H. A. F., G-2 Schofield Barracks (3 copies), G-3, H. H. D., F. B. I. Honolulu (2 copies), O. N. I. Honolulu (2 copies).

(G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, October 17, 1941, is as follows:)

1. Summary of Situation

a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist element in Japan as a result of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of Japan by the ABCD group.

b. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is available as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the attitude of the cabinet as a whole will be.

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execu- [3685] tion of said policies—irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. Conclusions

According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary reasons for such a move or moves are believed to be as follows:

a. Capabilities.

1. Desperate economic conditions internally—making it perhaps preferable to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution.

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the Axis—for the time being.

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance—that is, when the strength of the Axis is at its maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilized.

4. A desire to break the so-called encirclement of the ABCD block.

b. *Probable Moves.* The most likely moves which Japan may make in the near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows:

1. Attack Russia from the east.

2. Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions in the way of military, naval, and [3686] air bases, and guarantees of economic co-operation.

3. Attack British possessions in the Far East.

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.

5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block at whichever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic and economic advantages.

c. *Reasons Justifying These Moves.* The basis for each of the above possible moves are considered to be as follows:

1. *Attack on Russia.*

(a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power.

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control eastward to the Pacific).

(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known to be in Siberia.

(d) To secure effective control over, or perhaps stamp out, communism in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine.

(e) A possibility that an attack on Russia at this time can be undertaken with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States; and that even the British might not [3687] resort to active military action in support of Russia in the Pacific, due to the fact that both the Americans and British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither power has any genuine desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again plague the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism.

(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer coordination and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against other Pacific powers.

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the south.

2. *Pressure French Indo-China and Thailand.*

Pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions of military, naval or air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia, in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the north is being achieved; and to afford her more and better strategic bases from which she can operate against Chungking's lines of communications in case it becomes necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also, to secure additional raw materials, food, etc.

3. *Attack on British Possessions in the Far East.*

Following the principle of defeating one [3688] opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler—it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possession, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

4. *Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.*

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points [3689] might gain for her the most strategic, tactical or economical advantages over her opponents.

3. In conclusion, barring unforeseen and untoward actions, which might set off a conflict in any quarter and invite measures and countermeasures never contemplated, it is believed that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take and the probable consequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will be, as generally predicted, 'strongly military' and will support the present demands of the 'rightists' elements which were largely responsible for the fall of Third Konoye Cabinet.

Then he has another one following that, dated the 25th of October, 1941, these being the only two G-2 estimates I was able to get. The first one was the 17th of October. The one I am going to read now is the 25th of October.

(G-2 estimate of international (Japanese) situation, dated October 25, 1941, is as follows:)

1. *Summary of Situation.* Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the International (Japanese) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no fundamental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan, since the time mentioned; and the estimate is still in almost complete accord with contemporary opinions of most high officials and reputable observers who are known to be in close touch with the various phases of the present fast-moving

situation. However, the following general summary is considered appropriate at this time:

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory [3689A] progress of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightist" elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate the cry for action on the side of the axis to such a degree that the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en bloc, and was almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister General Tojo.

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis, which automatically underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression"; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigilance, but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.

2. *Conclusions.* No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941. However, several important incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War Minister, General Tojo.

[3690] b. The decision of Premier Tojo to continue his predecessor's order to permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective homelands.

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

d. The order by the Navy Department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon Vladivostok as a part of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.

f. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new cabinet.

3. *Justifications for conclusions.* The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as conclusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:

a. *New Cabinet.* Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other noteworthy viewpoint received and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the *only* man considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and [3691] thus stave off any precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

b. *Japanese vessels to America.* The Japanese Government's decision to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove *all* Japanese nationals from America and American territories.

c. *Rapprochement Negotiations.* Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis—definitely our enemy—we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i. e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously considered.

d. *Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific.*

This action on the part of the Navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also appears [3692] fully justified, realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler.

e. *Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies.*

Two issues are here involved:

(1) *Military.* The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what would be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely rules out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.

(2) *Diplomatic.* Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok has been one of the major issues between America and Japan recently the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in case of an unforeseen major reserve for the Axis [3693] in Europe, might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a compromise with the democracies has become inevitable.

f. *Nomura's report to New Cabinet.* This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese Government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

REMARKS: Everyone is interested in the answer to the question, When will Japan move?—a question which no one dares to predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worthy of mentioning:

a. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month are:

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands.

(2) Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new cabinet.

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials [3694] that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.

(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian Army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to convoke a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.

b. In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.

Those are the only G-2 estimates dealing with the Japanese [3695] situation which I have been able to find in the War Department in Hawaii.

**TESTIMONY OF SIMON PERLITER, 1901 UALAKAA STREET,
HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Perliter, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. PERLITER. My name is Simon Perliter. I live at 1901 Ualakaa Street, Honolulu. My permanent home is in Los Angeles.

2. Colonel WEST. Where are you employed at the present time, Mr. Perliter?

Mr. PERLITER. With the United States Engineers at Punahou, Punahou campus.

3. General GRUNERT. General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will conduct this particular part of our investigation.

4. General FRANK. What is your present assignment?

Mr. PERLITER. My present assignment is design engineer, Chief Design Engineer, my civil service qualification is Head Engineer.

5. General FRANK. For whom?

Mr. PERLITER. U. S. Engineer's Office.

6. General FRANK. At?

Mr. PERLITER. At Punahou, Honolulu.

7. General FRANK. How long have you been there?

Mr. PERLITER. Approximately four years.

8. General FRANK. You were there, then, during 1941?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. Were you there when the Hawaiian Constructors' contract became effective?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

10. General FRANK. What position did you then hold?

Mr. PERLITER. Chief of the Engineering Division.

11. General FRANK. And your duties consisted of what?

Mr. PERLITER. In charge of all designing work in the Honolulu District for the U. S. Engineer.

12. General FRANK. And as that you did what?

Mr. PERLITER. Prepared plans and specifications for all work in connection with the U. S. Engineer in the Honolulu District.

13. General FRANK. Under whose direct supervision did you work?

Mr. PERLITER. Colonel Wyman.

14. General FRANK. There was no intermediary between you and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. PERLITER. There was an intermediate person later. He arrived at about February of 1941. He was Lieutenant Butz, D. C. Butz.

15. Major CLAUSEN. You said to me that General Bragdon has a message that you were to carry to me.

Mr. PERLITER. There were certain drawings which I prepared under the direction of General Bragdon that consisted of a series of maps and exhibits. I brought them here yesterday. They were to be used, I understood, by Colonel Wyman, but I understand they were not called for. They were made under my supervision and, therefore, if there is any explanation of them I can make it.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Are these the maps?

[3697] Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Suppose you take and explain them to the Board, give us a brief explanation of them.

Mr. PERLITER. This map, gentlemen, is a map of the Island of Oahu, and the circles indicate job orders that were issued for various jobs for the Hawaiian Constructors.

As to the colors, the solid blue circles show permanent AWS stations; the green circle shows mobile AWS stations; the red circle is gasoline storage; the brown circle is the information center, and the circle with no color whatsoever is all other jobs which pertained to the contract of the Hawaiian Constructors up to the 7th of December.

We have the same thing on the other islands, if you care to see them, the same type of exhibits.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Those are marked just P-1. Now, will you explain the others.

Mr. PERLITER. This is a map of the Island of Maui, with the same notations and indications I just explained to you for the Island of Oahu.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Mark this P-2.

Mr. PERLITER. The same thing for the Island of Molokai.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Mark that P-3.

Mr. PERLITER. The same thing for the Island of Hawaii.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Mark that P-4.

Mr. PERLITER. The same thing for the Island of Lanai.

22. Major CLAUSEN. That will be marked P-5.

Mr. PERLITER. And the same thing for the Island of Kauai.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Mark that P-6.

Mr. PERLITER. These maps were prepared on the basis of a [3698] wire that we received which stressed reserve aviation gasoline storage, gasoline storage and AWS, so instead of completing the plans, loading up with all the work, we prepared these maps stressing those three items.

24. General FRANK. But the other maps have all the work on them?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

25. General FRANK. Including those that you have here?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

26. General FRANK. Then I would say we do not want those.

Mr. PERLITER. This map is a map showing a chart of the airline distances and on it we have projected in blue the western ferry route that we constructed and in red the eastern ferry route, with one small alternate shown in dotted red, and the green are the routes we had understudy as possible other routes in the event those routes were knocked out by the enemy.

27. General FRANK. The only one you actually did any work on was the one in blue?

Mr. PERLITER. No, sir, we built both routes.

28. General FRANK. Built both the blue and the red?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Do you want those?

30. General FRANK. Yes, I think so.

31. Major CLAUSEN. All right, mark this P-7.

Mr. PERLITER. These drawings, gentlemen, are drawings which pertain to details on the AWS, they are site plans, and also the gasoline storage. They are actual working drawings, but they just show the site in detail. That is all as far as the exhibits are concerned.

[3699] 32. General GRUNERT. Can you reproduce those seven?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes. How many copies, sir?

33. Colonel WEST. Five copies.

Mr. PERLITER. We will have them for you Monday morning.

34. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions. These maps are the maps that were made after you received instructions from the Chief of Engineers; is that right?

Mr. PERLITER. I made those maps after General Bragdon got here, which was last Sunday, and we made them on Monday.

35. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

36. General FRANK. I have none.

37. General GRUNERT. I think I have one or two.

You had during 1941, I understood you to say, charge of preparing all of the specifications for various jobs?

Mr. PERLITER. Plans and specifications.

38. General GRUNERT. Were there many changes that were demanded on certain work drawings, for instance, that caused you to make repeated changes in the plans?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

39. General GRUNERT. What were the changes, such changes, and how much did that delay certain projects, generally speaking?

Mr. PERLITER. General speaking, I would say the changes were numerous. It would come in this manner: At the time this work was started, particularly in connection with war reserve gasoline and the AWS, neither the using agency or the designing engineer were acquainted nor experienced with the construction of such projects. As a result we worked with the using agency very closely. But they did not know what they [3700] wanted. We would make up a layout which they thought they wanted. We would present it to them. They would ask for changes. In one instance I made up a complete set of plans for AWS, which I have unsigned in my office, for camps, which were discarded and new sets started just for such a thing as I have mentioned.

As far as the gasoline storage is concerned—I am talking in terms of the war reserve—I have prepared, I think, chronological events from the time we first received instructions to prepare the first survey to the time we were told to go ahead with construction. There again the using agency would not be definite to any great extent, but no one seems to know exactly what they wanted. In the interest of standardization, they finally adopted a standard-sized tank, which, when you look at the over-all picture, no doubt saved time, but as far as this particular location was concerned it meant definite delay.

As an example, a definite project report which I prepared was transmitted to the Chief of Engineers, and in that report I recommended the use of 50,000-barrel tanks. After the report was reviewed by the Chief of Engineers, they felt that 50,000 barrels in one basket was too great. They recommended a smaller storage unit in the amount of 25,000 barrels. We immediately prepared designs of these tanks on the basis of 25,000 barrel capacity, transmitted the bill of materials to the Division Engineer, who was our procurement agency at the time. We no sooner completed those when we were instructed that the best type of tank was a 30,000 barrel tank. We proceeded with those designs and billed the material. Then I had further

instructions to go to a 40,000-barrel tank, which was the final tank that was used.

[3701] 40. General FRANK. From whom did you get these instructions?

Mr. PERLITER. From the Chief of Engineers.

41. General GRUNERT. As to these plans and specifications that you drew, how long in the matter of days, approximately, does it take to switch from one to the other and prepare new ones; approximately?

Mr. PERLITER. That would be very difficult to answer, but I believe I can answer that.

42. General GRUNERT. Give me an example of some of those you changed and the approximate time it took to do that.

Mr. PERLITER. To prepare the first design always takes the greatest time, and the first 50,000-barrel tank, the design of that took about 6 weeks, including the bill for the material; the ones after that only took about 2 weeks to prepare, to change the general design. To actually draw up the details took about 3 weeks.

43. General FRANK. How many baffles between tanks?

Mr. PERLITER. There are no baffles, sir. The present tank are 40,000-barrel tanks. They are a hundred feet in diameter, 30 feet high. They have a series of columns for supporting the slab, and they have stiffening around the periphery of the tank to keep the tank from collapsing due to lateral load.

44. General GRUNERT. During all this time that it took to change the plans could any work go forward on them? Could any ground-work go forward on them that the plan changes did not affect, or did everything have to wait until they got the blueprints in their hands?

Mr. PERLITER. No, sir. The work on the islands here is [3702] of such a nature that we never have a complete set of plans prepared before we start work. In this particular case we actually did break ground and received a radio from the Division office stating that we hold construction in abeyance until we heard from them, due to the fact that the plans were being materially changed.

As an example of what I mean, this building, which was done under the District Engineer, was started the second day after General Richardson had approved the sketch. I furnished him a foundation plan. There were 104 drawings on this building, and the building was completed in 45 days, the whole project. So you can see we are just one step ahead of the construction division.

45. General GRUNERT. Suppose the whole project falls through; then what the contractor has done on that work is so much waste?

Mr. PERLITER. In the case of the war reserve, we already had authority to go ahead with the project, but there was no definite approval of the plans. The amount of excavation we had was not wasted, for this reason: The initial excavation was clearing some of the pineapples and then we also stockpiled the top soil, so that when we finished the project we placed the same top soil back on top of the tanks so we would get a good growth of pineapples.

46. General GRUNERT. How was the delay in preparing these plans and specifications as compared to the delay it took to get approval of what was contemplated? Do you see what I mean? If the approval had to go from here to Washington, how much time could have been saved if the approval could have been local? Have you ever figured that out?

[3703] Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir. I had very little experience with government procedure until the time I arrived on the islands. I had been in private work. One of the things that used to gripe me was the red tape of getting a project started. I was always anxious to get a job going. However, we had to submit all our plans and specifications to the Division Engineer for approval, and if you got your plans back in one month you were fortunate.

47. General FRANK. That is, from the Division Engineer?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir. On this particular project, on the war reserve project, apparently the Chief's office, the A. G.'s office, the Air Corps, were all inter-related, and then there was a Board of Consultants on oil storage. They came into the picture later. So everyone seemed to have their finger in the pie as far as that particular project was concerned.

In connection with the AWS, that took a little different aspect, in that we worked with the Signal Corps. The drawings had to go, after the Signal Corps approved them, to the Division Engineer for approval, but there again it is my understanding that the Signal Corps work is centralized in one bureau rather than decentralized like a District Engineer. Most of their information today comes direct from the Chief Signal Officer in Washington, and many times I would ask the Signal Corps how about this information, and they would say "We don't have it here. We will have to write to the Chief Signal Officer." That tended to delay the project.

48. General GRUNERT. Can you tell me what the Division Engineer in his Division Engineer office could do to a plan or [3704] specification that could not be done on the ground?

Mr. PERLITER. Well, I always claimed this, as a practical practicing engineer, that the man on the ground knows more about the job than the man that is 2,000 miles away or even 300 miles away, if he does not see the job. We know the intimate local—

49. General GRUNERT. I have the answer to my question. Do you know how many plans and specifications that were sent to the Division Engineer were not approved by him and changes were made? If so, what was the line of changes?

[3705] Mr. PERLITER. In general the changes were very small, and we had to resubmit either the plan or by correspondence say that, "The changes requested have been made," and that is all.

50. General GRUNERT. What did they amount to? Something in the line of cost, or in what way did they change the plans? That is what I want to find out.

Mr. PERLITER. Well, their design engineer might have a different idea, which in some cases might even be better than I had suggested.

51. General GRUNERT. I see.

Mr. PERLITER. Usually that is the type of changes that you will get from a division office, because they are experienced personnel sitting there. They won't send in any arbitrary changes just to be arbitrary. They were constructive criticisms.

52. General GRUNERT. Then, there is a question of one designer passing upon another's design, possibly to get the best value out of Uncle Sam's money; is that it?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

53. General GRUNERT. I have no further questions.

54. General FRANK. When did you come here?

Mr. PERLITER. When did I come here, sir?

55. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. PERLITER. I came here October 13, 1940.

56. General FRANK. 1940. Did you have the same difficulty with changes in plans on a fixed-fee contract that you did in these cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts?

Mr. PERLITER. I don't believe I grasp that. I don't [3706] understand the question.

57. General FRANK. Well, a fixed-fee contract is a contract where you have open bids, the plans are presented to the contractors, and once he is given the contract he takes those plans and goes ahead with the construction without any changes unless the engineer requires some changes, and that requires a renegotiation of the contract. Do you understand what I mean now?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, I believe I do, sir. That type of contract—

58. General FRANK. Now, you had that kind of contract up until January of 1941?

Mr. PERLITER. That is correct, sir. In that type of contract you have less delay than you do in the type of contract we had after the 6th of January of '41, for this reason: When you ask a contractor or any group of contractors to submit a formal bid, you have to submit sufficient data and specifications so he can give you a bid on which you are getting the most for your money; whereas, with this other type of contract, that type of contract is drawn up for expediency. In other words, it is to get the work started right away, without going to a formal bid.

59. General FRANK. That is all.

60. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

61. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him one question, General.

Mr. Perliter, to what extent were the drawings on the contracts handled by Hawaiian Constructors distributed? That is, what was your distribution system, and to whom did the [3707] copies of the drawings go?

Mr. PERLITER. Distribution system on drawings changes from time to time in the interest of expediency. Originally, if I recollect, they were sent directly from my office to the Hawaiian Constructors. Later, at the request of the Operations Division of the District Engineer, we submitted the drawing to them, and they in turn submitted them to Hawaiian Constructors. And then still later, in the interest of getting things done, we sent one copy to the Operations Division, and the rest of the copies we transmitted to the Hawaiian Constructors direct, with a letter of transmittal.

62. Colonel TOULMIN. How many copies did the Hawaiian Constructors get?

Mr. PERLITER. That also varied.

63. Colonel TOULMIN. Just approximately?

Mr. PERLITER. I would say approximately five sets; four to five sets.

64. Colonel TOULMIN. Any restriction on distribution of these drawings? Any mark in any way to restrict them to certain people?

Mr. PERLITER. The distribution of these drawings was restricted only insofar as if they were secret, yes. If they were not secret, there were no restrictions.

65. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not copies of these drawings were sent direct to the main office of the contractors on the mainland?

Mr. PERLITER. I do not.

66. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

67. General FRANK. Would it have been possible to have sent [3708] them direct without your knowing anything about it?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

68. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Perliter, do I understand that it was normal that one month's delay would ensue between the time that you would send plans to the Division Engineer with respect to his acting on these plans?

Mr. PERLITER. Well, there is a normal period of delay in transmitting drawings. The shipments of the drawings were by boat, and he in turn had to check them and then send them back, and a month's time I don't believe is unusual.

69. Major CLAUSEN. And then where did the Chief of Engineers come into the picture? You said something about the approval of the Chief of Engineers being required.

Mr. PERLITER. The approval of the Chief of Engineers was required in the original work on the war reserve. That project was initiated in Washington. We were directed to prepare a survey, and later we were directed to prepare what is known as a definite project report, which is almost like a thesis, and that went back to the Chief of Engineers through the Division Engineer. A definite project report outlines the different methods you can do work—you can prepare this project, and method of design and the costs and your final recommendation.

70. Major CLAUSEN. What amount of delay did you have, then, from the standpoint of action that should have been taken by the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. PERLITER. If you allow me, I can read you from the chronological order of such a thing.

71. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you gave me one, rough.

[3709] Mr. PERLITER. Rough. Yes, I can tell you that. A definite project report was ordered about the—

72. General FRANK. Well, not a project report. We don't care about project reports.

Mr. PERLITER. Well, we didn't have to submit the final—once the report was approved—

73. General FRANK. What report is this?

Mr. PERLITER. Definite project report.

74. Major CLAUSEN. What time was taken in getting of this report so far as approval by the Chief was concerned?

Mr. PERLITER. It took—it left this office on the 24th of June of 1941, and on the 30th of October we received definite approval to go ahead.

75. Major CLAUSEN. General Frank wants to ask a question.

76. General FRANK. You said there was thirty days' delay when a project went from here to the Division Engineer and back?

Mr. PERLITER. Approximately thirty days.

77. General FRANK. Yes. Now, what delay was there, in general, when a project had to go to the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. PERLITER. I may not have made myself clear.

78. General FRANK. Well, just answer that question.

Mr. PERLITER. There was only one project I know of, and I will answer it on that basis.

79. General FRANK. All right.

Mr. PERLITER. And that was the war reserve aviation gasoline storage, and the delay—I'll have to figure: from the 24th of June, 1941, to the 30th of October, 1941; that was the delay.

[3710] 80. Major CLAUSEN. Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Perliter—

81. General FRANK. October. Four months, about?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

82. Major CLAUSEN. You have been in the Engineers long enough now to know that the Chief of Engineers certainly knew the normal routine processing of plans from Hawaii to San Francisco and the time it would take?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

83. Major CLAUSEN. Well, the Chief of Engineers, therefore, sets forth in a contract that a job is to be done within six months.

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

84. Major CLAUSEN. The time that it would take to process plans is all a matter of coordination, isn't it? In other words, you know that thirty days is going to take place, why, you coordinate your work, don't you?

Mr. PERLITER. Well, I would like to correct you on one point. I don't believe it is the Chief of Engineers that sets the construction period. I think the construction period is determined here on the spot.

85. Major CLAUSEN. Let me ask you about these plans. If we, the Board, should want plans, that is, detailed plan drawings of some of these installations that are marked on the seven maps that we have, Mr. Perliter, where would we get those?

Mr. PERLITER. Out of my office.

86. Major CLAUSEN. And do copies exist in the office of the Chief at Washington?

Mr. PERLITER. Some of them do and some don't.

[3711] 87. Major CLAUSEN. How much time, how much delay would ensue between our making a request of your office and getting them in Washington?

Mr. PERLITER. Delay of one day in printing and the time it would require by courier to go by mail—air mail from this station to Washington.

88. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, if we determine that we should want certain plans, we could get them, these plan drawings, within a matter of some days, from you?

Mr. PERLITER. If it was by courier and he was on a—well, say, a No. 3 priority, my guess would be three days.

89. Major CLAUSEN. All right. We may call on you for some.

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

90. Major CLAUSEN. No further questions.

91. General GRUNERT. Anything else you might want to add that you think of that might be of value to the Board?

Mr. PERLITER. Well, yes; I would like to add a few things.

I was through this whole thing from its very beginning, and I figure 1940 was the beginning. You gentlemen must recognize this:

that we were out here 2,000 miles away from the mainland. In 1940 a large war construction program was started on the mainland of the United States, and all technical men and skilled men were being gradually picked up in the mainland. Local help was not available. The Navy had gotten the jump on us and started work here, and naturally they picked up most of the local help. I had extreme difficulty in obtaining qualified technical men, and I imagine the same thing was experienced by the contractors. To me that is [3712] important because considerable work—

92. General FRANK. To whom? Important to whom?

Mr. PERLITER. It is important to getting the job done. I couldn't get enough technical help. My men used to work 12, 14, 16 hours a day because of a shortage of qualified help. And that has got to be recognized in a thing of this kind.

Another thing that should be recognized: prior to December 7th we had no authority to stock-pile materials in the Islands. In other words, a job would be authorized. We would start from scratch, and we would start from the bills of materials. It was extremely difficult to get materials over here. One of the things we had trouble with was in connection with gasoline storage, welding material, pipe, fittings, pumps. It was next to impossible to get that type of material.

Still another thing, there was a certain amount of confusion that existed in shipping for overseas projects. As an example, and this is after Pearl Harbor, on approximately the 8th of May of 1942 the Commanding General of—or General Farthing called me and asked me if I could expedite the construction of war reserves. That was in '42.

I said, "General, there is nothing I can do here."

He said, "Where is the plate for the tanks, and the pipe?"

I says, "It is on the mainland."

About two hours later he called me, and he said, "Would you be willing to go to the mainland to pick that stuff up and identify it?"

When I arrived at the Howard Street Terminal in Oakland, California, most of the material was there. I stayed there five days and identified most of the stuff. It was placed on [3713] board ship, and it was 12 days later it arrived here in Honolulu. However, when I arrived there, there wasn't a single person there that could identify the material.

Now, those things have to be recognized. They are an important part of the whole story.

93. General FRANK. Have to be recognized by whom, Mr. Perliter?

Mr. PERLITER. Well, by anyone that's weighing facts, that's gathering facts.

94. General FRANK. All of these things are in extenuation of what?

Mr. PERLITER. In extenuation of delaying construction. Take, for instance—

95. General GRUNERT. Then, you think that every big job needs a man like the Kaiser shipyards had? What did they call him? An expediter?

Mr. PERLITER. Well, I would say an expediter—

96. General GRUNERT. In Hawaii if you have a big problem over here, and you turn it out properly and you plan it properly, why don't they put an expediter on there if he is needed?

They used you once as an expediter, and you got results. Did they have any other such occasion?

Mr. PERLITER. I can't answer that question, because I don't know.

Here is something else that delayed work around here—

97. General FRANK. The fact of the absence of an expediter is a failure to provide proper organization, then, it would seem, in accordance with your own logic.

98. Major CLAUSEN. Coordination.

[3714] Mr. PERLITER. Well, that is a matter of opinion on the process of how a man runs his organization. One man feels he can get things done one way; another, another.

99. General FRANK. Yes, but you just got through telling what must be done by someone.

Mr. PERLITER. That is my opinion.

100. General FRANK. Or an organization.

Mr. PERLITER. That is my opinion on that.

101. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. PERLITER. Another thing that delayed this work over on the Island of Maui, on the A. W. S. station at Haleakala we had certain trouble getting real estate approval or getting right of access onto the grounds, because you were in park, national park property. That delayed the job.

Another thing that delayed the job, the information center at Shafter: a sketch was handed to me, and they said, "This is going to be the information center." There was no one that knew exactly what went into an information center. We literally had to grope in the dark to get this thing designed. So things like that just naturally delay jobs.

102. Major CLAUSEN. What was the total fee paid Hawaiian constructors on this job, Mr. Perliter?

Mr. PERLITER. I don't know, sir.

103. Major CLAUSEN. About \$800,000?

Mr. PERLITER. I am not familiar with that.

104. Major CLAUSEN. The more delay, the more the fee; isn't that right? The more the delay, the more the work; the more the work, the more the fee. Isn't that the way it works?

Mr. PERLITER. I don't think so. The fee is based upon [3715] the estimated cost prior to construction.

105. Major CLAUSEN. Surely. Well, if you hire men for two months instead of hiring them for one month, then you have more money to pay for the two months; isn't that right?

Mr. PERLITER. You are right, but that doesn't—that has nothing to do with the fee. The fee is the amount that goes to the contractor, and he gets one fee. The salary is paid by the Government.

106. Major CLAUSEN. But the total cost is the basis for determining the fee, isn't it?

Mr. PERLITER. No, sir. The total cost of that job was determined prior to start of construction, and it was determined based on a similar job or experience of a man that takes so long to do a job.

107. Major CLAUSEN. Well, your first cost was a million dollars, about, wasn't it?

Mr. PERLITER. Which job, sir?

108. Major CLAUSEN. This Hawaiian Constructors job.

Mr. PERLITER. Oh, the first?

109. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. The first contract was about a million dollars?

Mr. PERLITER. I don't know that. I don't know that.

110. Major CLAUSEN. You don't even know what the contract provided with regard to the time for completion, then, do you?

Mr. PERLITER. I wasn't concerned with that.

111. Major CLAUSEN. You are not concerned with that?

Mr. PERLITER. No, I am not.

112. Major CLAUSEN. All right. That is all.

[3716] 113. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him just one question.

Mr. Perliter, you followed usual engineering practice, that the last of a series of drawings on a given job indicate on their face the successive number of changes that were made, by date?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

114. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all. Thank you.

115. General FRANK. To whom did you talk about coming up here to testify?

Mr. PERLITER. Oh, I have been with General Bragdon most of the time. I have helped General Bragdon get these things together, because I am aware of the information in the District office.

116. General FRANK. What conversation did you have with General Bragdon about coming up here to testify?

Mr. PERLITER. None in regards to my testimony. In fact, when I was called I said, "I am going up to testify," and that's all.

117. General FRANK. You had no conversation whatever about being a witness up here?

Mr. PERLITER. Oh, yes; I told him I was being called as a witness. In fact, I informed him the very first day he arrived here; I told him, "For your information, I have been called as a witness." And I even showed him the first request to appear as a witness.

118. General FRANK. And he has made no comment whatever to you about being a witness up here?

Mr. PERLITER. No instructions, if that's what you mean; [3717] no, sir.

119. General FRANK. I said, comments.

Mr. PERLITER. Comments. Well, he said, "Go up there and tell 'em what you know," and that's all.

120. General FRANK. Did you talk to Major Powell?

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

121. General FRANK. What was the subject of your conversation with Major Powell?

Mr. PERLITER. I can't recollect it, but in a general sense I told him that I was called as a witness and that I was to appear, and he told me, "Just tell 'em everything you know, and answer the questions they ask you."

122. General FRANK. How do you happen to be making statements there of what "must be considered"?

Mr. PERLITER. I am making those statements just as an engineer and based upon approximately 20 years of my experience in this field.

1902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

123. General FRANK. Well, what does that have to do with general engineering practice, and why should you tell this Board of what must be considered about some particular phase of an engineering project?

Mr. PERLITER. The same thing must be considered in any other project, regardless whether it was over here, particularly when you are removed so far from the mainland.

124. General FRANK. Specifically, were the points that you mentioned there discussed by you with anybody in the office of the Engineers down at Punahou College?

Mr. PERLITER. With the office, any particular—

125. General FRANK. With anybody in that office.

[3718] Mr. PERLITER. No, sir, I never discussed that part of it.

126. General FRANK. How did you happen to be emphasizing those points here?

Mr. PERLITER. Because it has always been a very sore thing out here in the Islands, the inability to get materials here to do a project. I could quote many examples if you wish.

127. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

128. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Perliter, don't you have in your office the contracts and the amounts of money reflected on the contracts, and the amounts of fees that are paid to contractors?

129. General FRANK. Not in his part of the office.

Mr. PERLITER. Not in my own office; no, sir.

130. Major CLAUSEN. Well, there is some section down there that could get that for you, couldn't they?

Mr. PERLITER. Oh, yes, sir.

131. Major CLAUSEN. Well, could you get me, for the time when you bring back the maps, the total fees paid Hawaiian Constructors under the basic contract and all supplements, and the face value of the basic contract?

Mr. PERLITER. The total fees paid Hawaiian Constructors under the contract?

132. Major CLAUSEN. All supplements.

Mr. PERLITER. And all supplements. Up to 7th December?

133. Major CLAUSEN. Completion. No. To completion. Total completion of the contract. And the face value of the basic contract and all supplements. Just those two items.

Mr. PERLITER. Total fees paid Hawaiian Constructors under the contract and all supplements, and the face value of [3719] the basic contract?

134. Major CLAUSEN. And all supplements. Just those two figures.

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

135. Major CLAUSEN. Thank you.

136. General GRUNERT. That appears to be all. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. PERLITER. Yes, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[3720] **TESTIMONY OF HENRY P. BENSON, OF THE HAWAIIAN DREDGING COMPANY; HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major CLAUSEN. Will you state your name and where you reside, Mr. Benson.

Mr. BENSON. Henry P. Benson; Honolulu, T. H.

2. Major CLAUSEN. With what company are you connected at the present time?

Mr. BENSON. The Hawaiian Dredging Company.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Benson, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will cover this particular part of the investigation, so I will turn you over to their tender mercies.

4. General FRANK. Mr. Benson, in 1941, you were associated with the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. BENSON. Yes; I was president and manager.

5. General FRANK. Did you have any government contracts?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

6. General FRANK. Prior to the time that the Hawaiian Constructors came in here?

Mr. BENSON. I did. I had a job down at Kapalama, to build a wharf, and a number of air-raid housings and AA houses, and a tunnel at Shafter. It was a CPFF contract.

7. General FRANK. What is a CPFF contract?

Mr. BENSON. "Cost-plus-fixed-fee."

8. General FRANK. You had that?

Mr. BENSON. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. You had those contracts before the Hawaiian Constructors came in?

[3721] Mr. BENSON. Oh, no; not before. Before we entered the Hawaiian Constructors, as a company. I don't remember the date of those contracts, but it was, my remembrance is, about midsummer 1941 we started.

10. General FRANK. At that time, were you a member of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. BENSON. No.

11. General FRANK. You did that as an independent firm?

Mr. BENSON. Yes; we were associated with Pacific Bridge Company, in this particular contract.

12. General FRANK. Later you became associated with Hawaiian Constructors, did you?

Mr. BENSON. I did.

13. General FRANK. And they had a central council or a central group that acted on matters of policy, did they not?

Mr. BENSON. Well, we had what we called the "executive committee."

14. General FRANK. Were you a member of that executive committee?

Mr. BENSON. I was.

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15. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Benson, you were operating here as a contracting organization in the month of November or December, 1940, were you not?

Mr. BENSON. No; our firm was started in '18, and had been operating ever since then.

16. Major CLAUSEN. 1918?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

17. Major CLAUSEN. You were right here in Honolulu, ever since 1918?

[3722] Mr. BENSON. Yes.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Benson, did anyone from the district engineer's office, up to the time this contract was made between the Government and Hawaiian Constructors, ever come to you to ask whether you would be interested in the forthcoming work under that contract?

Mr. BENSON. No.

19. General RUSSELL. Before you go on, let us connect that up. Were you available to have taken part of that work in December, 1940, your company?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

20. General RUSSELL. Were you engaged at that time in any work for the Navy, in December 1940?

Mr. BENSON. I don't think so. I am pretty sure we were not. It would be a very small job, if we were.

21. General RUSSELL. But you were open for a contract, in 1940?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

22. Major CLAUSEN. This basic contract was in the sum of \$1,067,000. You were never given an opportunity to bid on that, were you?

Mr. BENSON. No.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Or on any part of it?

Mr. BENSON. No.

24. Major CLAUSEN. In the situation as it existed in 1940, Mr. Benson, do you know whether it was necessary to bring here this Rohl-Connolly, Shirley-Gunther, Callahan organization?

Mr. BENSON. That is a very hard question to answer. It [3723] depends. Of course, it was a million and how much, the first contract?

25. Major CLAUSEN. Well, that was a million dollars.

Mr. BENSON. Well, if it was a million dollars, of course, it wasn't; but if they had other large work in view, perhaps it was. I am just not prepared to answer that question.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Let us say, as of Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941; assume the contract at that time was something like \$11,000,000 worth of work to be performed: from what you know of the character of that work, the whole \$11,000,000 worth of it, do you believe that the local contractors would have handled it as expeditiously and as economically as it was handled by the Hawaiian Constructors.

Mr. BENSON. I would say Yes.

27. General FRANK. Do you think that the Hawaiian Contracting Company, Black, McKee, McClure, Woolley, and the Pacific Construction Company could have associated together as coadventurers and could have handled this thing?

Mr. BENSON. Well, of course, Black, I think, at that time had quite a lot of Navy work, and Woolley had quite a lot of Navy work. Now, it would require a good deal of study to answer that question properly and correctly.

28. General FRANK. But you had some pretty good organizations here?

Mr. BENSON. Oh, yes.

29. General FRANK. That is, in the Hawaiian Contracting Company, in McKee, and in the McClure Company?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

30. General FRANK. They were sound, reputable organizations and concerns with plenty of financial backing?

[3724] Mr. BENSON. That is right.

31. General FRANK. And is there any question about their ability to have handled an \$11,000,000 project?

Mr. BENSON. No.

32. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, Mr. Benson, you are of the opinion, or, rather, you were of the opinion, when Colonel John E. Hunt questioned you, that not only could these local men have done the job which existed as of Pearl Harbor, but they could have done it more expeditiously and more economically, isn't that correct?

Mr. BENSON. I am just trying to recollect just what I told Colonel Hunt.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Would you like me to read a portion of the testimony?

Mr. BENSON. I would.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Question. Well, from what you know of the situation as it was known to exist in 1940, do you have an opinion as to whether or not it was necessary to bring the Rohl-Connolly, Shirley-Gunther and Callahan organization over here?

Answer. Well, I think I have answered that as far as I am concerned in saying that it could have been done by the local contractors.

Question. All right. I will put it in a different way. As I understand it, between the time that that contract was awarded on December 20, 1940, and the date of the attack on Pearl Harbor, something like eleven million dollars' worth of work was performed?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Now, from what you know of the character [3725] of that work, the whole eleven million dollars' worth of it, do you believe that the local contractors would have handled it as expeditiously and as economically as it was done by the Hawaiian Constructors?

Answer. I do.

Question. Do you think they could have done it more expeditiously or more economically?

Answer. Well in my opinion, yes. (P. 464.)

Do you recall giving that testimony?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

35. Major CLAUSEN. And you think it is correct, is it?

Mr. BENSON. I think that is correct.

36. Major CLAUSEN. This Pacific Bridge Company that you mentioned—that was a mainland firm doing business over here, was it not?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

37. Major CLAUSEN. And that is a pretty good-sized outfit, in itself, isn't it?

Mr. BENSON. Yes. It was. They had a good deal of work at the time. I got them into the Kapalama job just to build up our organization, to help us, the truth told. They built a drydock at Pearl Harbor for all those, the three drydocks.

38. Major CLAUSEN. They had not only done that, but they built the piers of the Golden Gate Bridge, did they not, many of them?

Mr. BENSON. Yes. They had some very large work.

39. Major CLAUSEN. That was a mainland firm?

Mr. BENSON. In San Francisco.

[3726] 40. Major CLAUSEN. Now, how did you happen to get into this Hawaiian Constructors co-adventurer thing, then, if you were not invited in at the start, Mr. Benson?

Mr. BENSON. Well, the Kapalama contract had a recapture clause, and on December 7, the U. S. E. D. grabbed all our plant, wherever it was, in Maui and around here, and a little later they asserted the recapture clause and took over that; and I went to Colonel Wyman, some time in December, I think about the middle of December, and told him that he had our plant, that there didn't seem to be any chance of getting by, and he ought to make a clean sweep of it, and he agreed, and our plant was taken over.

41. General FRANK. What do you mean by "make a clean sweep"?

Mr. BENSON. Of our plant.

42. General FRANK. Taking it all?

Mr. BENSON. Of taking it all.

43. General FRANK. He had not taken it all, up to that time?

Mr. BENSON. He hadn't taken it all, up to that time.

44. General FRANK. What part had he not taken?

Mr. BENSON. Well, I just can't tell you that, off-hand. When we went into this job, we submitted to the Negotiating Office, in Washington, a full list of our plant with valuations. That was made a part of the Kapalama contract, and that is the basis on which we sold our plant, and the basis on which we took over.

45. General FRANK. Who made the valuation?

Mr. BENSON. We did; and it was subject of course to approval by the officer in charge.

46. General FRANK. Do you know whether a representative of the Corps of Engineers had an appraiser on it?

[3727] Mr. BENSON. It was appraised.

47. General FRANK. By whom?

Mr. BENSON. Robley, for the engineers; a man named Robley; Gentry, for the Hawaiian Constructors, though I do not see why that should have come into it; and a man named Ross, who was our shop foreman for us. They agreed on an appraisal, and the money was paid.

48. General FRANK. Was all the equipment completely serviceable?

Mr. BENSON. All was completely serviceable. There was some marginal equipment, and that fact was reflected in the price.

49. Major CLAUSEN. At any event, isn't it correct that Mr. Rohl came to you and said he would like you to join the Hawaiian Constructors on this Hawaiian job?

Mr. BENSON. That is correct.

50. Major CLAUSEN. You were not only not invited in at the initial stages, but when Mr. Rohl came to you and invited you in, he wanted you to buy a 20% interest?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

51. Major CLAUSEN. And did you buy a 20% interest?

Mr. BENSON. We did.

52. Major CLAUSEN. How much did you pay?

Mr. BENSON. We paid very close to \$100,000.

53. Major CLAUSEN. To whom?

Mr. BENSON. To Gunther & Shirley, Rohl-Connolly, and Callahan Construction, who all surrendered a portion of their holdings.

54. Major CLAUSEN. And that was when, Mr. Benson?

[3728] Mr. BENSON. I think that was effected about June 1941. Now, this is from memory, and I am not sure, but somewhere around mid year.

55. Major CLAUSEN. If you want, I could read a portion of the testimony you gave Colonel Hunt on that.

Mr. BENSON. If you would.

56. Major CLAUSEN. This is set forth on page 467:

Question. Do you happen to know whether it was at anybody's further request?

Answer. I do not. Towards the latter end of December, Mr. Rohl informed me that he would like to have us join his organization and that we could have a 20% interest. This we were supposed to buy, and this stayed in a very nebulous state until I think in May when we agreed to a price that was paid for the interest, and I believe it was made before the supplement was finally signed by the Chief of Engineers.

Does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. BENSON. Yes; I think that is right.

57. Major CLAUSEN. This testimony refers to December, Mr. Benson, of what year?

Mr. BENSON. 1941.

58. Major CLAUSEN. And was the Chief of Engineers advised of this payment by you to the Rohl outfit of \$100,000?

Mr. BENSON. I could not tell you.

59. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have any papers from which you could refresh your recollection on that?

Mr. BENSON. No; I wouldn't know whether he was. He was advised, of course. We had to have some supplemental agreement [3729] to get in under the contract; but whether he was ever advised of the price we paid, I didn't know.

60. Major CLAUSEN. But the agreement by which you entered into this deal was just simply a fact that you were being brought in by the Hawaiian Constructors, which did not represent on there any price as having been paid, at all?

Mr. BENSON. No.

61. Major CLAUSEN. But you remember that you did tell that to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. BENSON. No, I don't. I don't remember. I may have; I am not denying that, at all; but I don't remember that I did tell him.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember ever having any talk about that with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. BENSON. No, I don't. I may have, as I say; I am not denying that I did, but I have no recollection at this time, and I don't know whether I could refresh my memory on it.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember having mentioned it to any employee or officer in the U. S. E. D.?

Mr. BENSON. No.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Benson, are you familiar with a transaction whereby there was purchased from Rohl-Connolly Company equipment for a price of about \$166,000?

Mr. BENSON. I know of the transaction, but I am not familiar with it.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know at the time of the transaction that the original appraisal had been some \$131,000?

Mr. BENSON. I knew there was a difference.

66. Major CLAUSEN. What part did you play in that?

[3730] Mr. BENSON. No part.

67. General FRANK. Were you a member of the Hawaiian Constructors, Mr. Benson.

Mr. BENSON. Yes, I was.

68. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know anything about the yacht VEGA?

Mr. BENSON. Well, I have heard enough about it to know something about it, but it is mostly hearsay, except the chartering or subletting, of course. I have read all those, and I knew when she got here. I don't believe I ever saw her. I might have passed there, but I never was on board of her.

69. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, what office did you hold in the Hawaiian Contracting Company, during this time?

Mr. BENSON. President and manager.

70. Major CLAUSEN. And did Mr. Dillingham have an interest in it?

Mr. BENSON. He has an interest, but he isn't an officer or a director.

71. Major CLAUSEN. He had an interest at the time?

Mr. BENSON. Yes; he has always. He is one of the founders of the company.

72. Major CLAUSEN. What part of this \$100,000 did he pay?

Mr. BENSON. Who—Mr. Dillingham?

73. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir—if any.

Mr. BENSON. He didn't pay anything. The Hawaiian Contracting Company paid that. They are a corporation.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Was its treasury replenished by Mr. Dillingham to any extent to make up this \$100,000?

Mr. BENSON. No, no; a pure business transaction between the Hawaiian Contracting Company and these parties.

[3731] 75. Major CLAUSEN. The Hawaiian Contracting Company sold some equipment, did it not, to the Government, for a price something like \$156,000?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember quite a bit of discussion as to the fact that some of that was not usable?

Mr. BENSON. Yes; I do, very keenly.

77. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. BENSON. Very keenly.

78. Major CLAUSEN. Tell the Board about that.

Mr. BENSON. Well, you have got to go back to December 7, when we were woefully short of equipment down here; and remember that when December 7 came, why, they just grabbed plant wherever they could. A portion of that was under this recapture clause of our Kapalama contract. That has never been questioned; but that went in at the same price, it was taken from the same list that our final price went in on.

As I have stated, some of this plant was marginal, inasmuch as it wasn't up to date; but as things looked then, every piece of it could have been used, and a good deal could have been used that wasn't used, as a matter of fact.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you know there was discussion about certain outmoded equipment that was included in this equipment?

Mr. BENSON. Yes; I think Colonel North had something about "horse-drawn wagons." Well, there were no horse-drawn wagons, at all. There were some wagons at, I think, \$50 apiece, but they were planned to work on a chain drawn by a tractor. We bought those for grade work on Kauai, where a truck couldn't possibly go up; and we kept them. They were in good order, [3732] and I have photographs to show the order they were in.

80. Major CLAUSEN. The engineers did not take much of this equipment, though, when they bought it, did they?

Mr. BENSON. No; not all of it. It was an insignificant amount, as a matter of fact. The mighty crane was left in the yard, there, but was working for the engineers constantly in assembling their plant. Now, that is one of the pieces they brought out.

81. Major CLAUSEN. You feel it was a fair deal?

Mr. BENSON. I feel it was a fair deal, and I can tell you this fact, that if somebody had come in the office before this thing ever happened and offered us the total cash that we got for all our plant, they would have walked out without the plant. It ended up by putting us out of business; and we have been out of business ever since.

82. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you were part of the Hawaiian Constructors, through the Hawaiian Contracting Company, right up to the end, is that correct?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

83. Major CLAUSEN. What was the total fee, Mr. Benson, that was paid under the basic contract, and all supplements, to the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. BENSON. I just cannot tell you that exactly. I think the fee on the work was something like a million and 70 or 80 thousand dollars, and the work done was \$108,000,000, if I remember rightly. That was the work completed.

84. Major CLAUSEN. You say the total fee was only 70 or 80 thousand?

Mr. BENSON. One million 70 or 80 thousand.

85. Major CLAUSEN. You mean on the basic contract?

[3733] Mr. BENSON. Oh, on the basic contract.

86. Major CLAUSEN. And all the supplements?

Mr. BENSON. Yes; on the total thing, the total fee.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Oh, you mean the total fee was \$1,080,000?

Mr. BENSON. That's it.

88. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions, now.

89. General RUSSELL. Two or three questions, Mr. Benson.

You state that your company paid to the Hawaiian Constructors approximately \$100,000 for the privilege of becoming one of the joint adventurers?

Mr. BENSON. For a 20 percent interest.

90. General RUSSELL. Now, at the time that payment was made, what if any material rights did you acquire? By that I mean, did you get any material, or was it just an intangible interest in the right to make money thereafter?

Mr. BENSON. No, we got a 20 percent interest, which went back to the inception of the contract. In other words, we got a 20 percent interest, just as if we had been originally in the company.

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91. General RUSSELL. Now, let us assume, to be practical about it and in order that we may understand that deal, that they had earned \$200,000 of this over-all fee of \$1,070,000; then you would have gotten 20 percent of the \$200,000 in the eventual settlement; you got your 20 percent interest in whatever part of the fee had been earned up until the time your company went in?

Mr. BENSON. That is right; just as if we had started.

92. General RUSSELL. Were there any other assets of any sort which belonged to the Hawaiian Constructors, in which you acquired rights by virtue of this payment of about \$100,000?

Mr. BENSON. Nothing that I can think of. They didn't [3734] own anything.

93. General RUSSELL. Now, let us say the contract would have stopped the day after you gave them your \$100,000, and you had distributed the accumulated assets of the Hawaiian Constructors as of that date; about how much would the assets have amounted to?

Mr. BENSON. We paid, in May. I just cannot tell you that, because I would have to know how much of the fee was earned by May. You see when we took the 20 percent interest—just let me explain a minute—that was on December 31.

94. General RUSSELL. Of what year?

Mr. BENSON. 1941. There was no price set at that time. That price was to be adjudicated, and we argued back and forth over that. If the job had been terminated in January, we would not have agreed to pay in \$100,000, see?

95. General RUSSELL. So there were two elements of value in the rights which you acquired by virtue of a payment of this money; first, the fee which had been earned to the time of the payment; and second, the possibility of future earnings?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

96. General RUSSELL. And your \$100,000 was a consideration for both of those things?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

97. General RUSSELL. Now, could you tell us roughly how much of this \$100,000 purchase price would properly be allocated to the future earnings, and how much, to earnings already made?

Mr. BENSON. No; I couldn't, because I didn't pay this \$100,000 until I was sure that we were all right in paying that amount. We had about a thousand men on Kapalama. They came into the Hawaiian Constructors. They were Hawaiian Contracting Company men. We contributed those. We had a couple of what would have developed into several contracts, that we waived, and went in.

[3735] 98. General RUSSELL. Those rights were substantial, but intangible?

Mr. BENSON. But intangible, that is right.

99. General RUSSELL. Now then, at the time you went into this agreement and paid your \$100,000 and became a part of this venture, you had what you were then referring to as a plant, which, as a matter of fact, was largely equipment?

Mr. BENSON. No, not at that time. Our plant was all gone at that time when I paid the \$100,000.

100. General RUSSELL. You mean, you had sold out all the stuff that you had acquired for \$156,000, prior to the time that you acquired this interest?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

101. General RUSSELL. Therefore, when you made your sale to the government, the Engineers Department, you were no longer in business?

Mr. BENSON. Except that I had an organization of 1,000 men.

102. General RUSSELL. And you turned around and gave \$100,000 out of your \$156,000 for the right to go in with these people?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

103. General RUSSELL. And participate in the profits?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

104. General RUSSELL. Now then, thereafter you became a member of the executive committee, as I understand it?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

105. General RUSSELL. And that executive committee had the fixing of the policies of these Constructors, Hawaiian Constructors?

[3736] Mr. BENSON. That is yes and no.

106. General RUSSELL. Qualify it, if you want to.

Mr. BENSON. Our work was divided up to a certain extent. My job, because I came in late and was unacquainted with the organization itself, was principally in the office. Mr. Woolley took the outside islands, Mr. Rohl and Mr. Grafe out in the field.

107. General RUSSELL. You, Rohl and Woolley, after Grafe's departure, constituted this executive committee?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

108. General RUSSELL. When you first went into this association a man by the way of Wyman, Colonel Wyman, represented the Engineering Department, the United States Government, is that right?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

109. General RUSSELL. And he was there until late February or early March of 1942, when he was relieved, and a man by the name of Colonel Lyman became District Engineer?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

110. General RUSSELL. You worked under both of those?

Mr. BENSON. Under both of those.

111. General RUSSELL. Were you intimately associated with the two in a business way, would you say?

Mr. BENSON. Colonel Lyman, of course, I have known for a great many years, and I would say there was quite a friendly relationship, but Colonel Wyman was just mainly business. I would call him and he would call me. My relationship with him was business; that is the only time I saw him, unless just before he left.

[3737] 112. General RUSSELL. I want to ask you this question: The smoothness of the operation of the Hawaiian Constructors in their accomplishment of this contracting business here on the islands, was that affected by the Engineer's Office under which you operated or with which you operated?

Mr. BENSON. The period after the blitz was a period of great confusion. We blamed the Engineer and the Engineer blamed us for various things. I think we both did what would have been expected under the circumstances.

113. General FRANK. Could the circumstances have been improved?

Mr. BENSON. Well, the Japs brought that out.

114. General FRANK. I mean the circumstances under which the work was done.

Mr. BENSON. I don't believe so, General. Everybody was hysterical at the time. If any of you gentlemen were down here, we were all jittery. We didn't know when we were going to be attacked again. We didn't know whether we were going to get any equipment or any men from the coast, millions of dollars of equipment on the coast there. We didn't know when we were going to get it. We didn't know when we were going to get supplies. It was not until after Midway that things really settled down in our minds.

And everything had to be done at one time. As I understand, before the blitz we were short of materials and short of equipment, and the priorities exercised then were to get the most out of the men without any priority on jobs. Now, I think that is right. Of course, I was not connected then, but from what I heard that is right. After that priorities were established on jobs and changed very rapidly. The Commanding [3738] General would see something that had to be done now and would grab men off one job and put them onto another. The material was supplied. It was really a pretty bad situation. I don't think the circumstances could have been helped much.

115. General RUSSELL. Now then, as you got along into the spring, Mr. Rohl left here and went back to the continent?

Mr. BENSON. Yes, he went back a couple of times.

116. General RUSSELL. I mean he left the islands and was no longer a member of this executive committee?

Mr. BENSON. Oh, no. He was back and forth.

117. General RUSSELL. Until the end?

Mr. BENSON. It was very near the end. I don't know when he left last, but my remembrance would be November, 1942, when the contract was terminated on January 31, of 1943. That is just my remembrance.

118. General RUSSELL. Is it not a fact, Mr. Benson, that Mr. Rohl was asked to leave here along in May or June of 1942 by the District Engineer, Colonel Lyman, because Lyman thought that operations would be better without Rohl than with him?

Mr. BENSON. If that is so, I was not informed of it.

119. General RUSSELL. How frequently did you people have committee meetings?

Mr. BENSON. Well, we were all in the office every day. I was there while the heat was on every day and every night.

120. General RUSSELL. Give us a rough estimate of how much of the time Rohl spent on the islands after June of 1942 until the termination of the contract?

Mr. BENSON. I hate to do that. I can give you the exact dates he went away and the exact dates he came back, but I just [3739] hate to make a wild guess at it.

121. General RUSSELL. You could give us that for the record?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

122. General RUSSELL. Could you do that some time tomorrow?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

123. General RUSSELL. Just give us a memorandum of it.

Mr. BENSON. I tell you; I understand Mr. Woolley is coming on and he has all the records. If you ask him that same question he

can get the records.

124. General RUSSELL. Will you confer with Woolley after you go away from here and see whether or not he can furnish those?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

125. General RUSSELL. I want to go back just for one or two more questions to clarify the situation about the sale of the equipment. You were out here on an island, as I understand it, away from Oahu, doing some work, or doing some work on some part of Oahu on December 7th, 1941; is that right?

Mr. BENSON. We were doing work on Maui.

126. General RUSSELL. On December 7th, 1941?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

127. General RUSSELL. Is it true that the government just came and took the plant and equipment and said they were going to use it?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

128. General RUSSELL. And then it became necessary for you to negotiate with them for a price for the property which they had already taken over?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

129. General RUSSELL. Did you have anything to do with telling [3740] the government which part or parts of that equipment they could take, or did they select the parts they wanted?

Mr. BENSON. They took wherever they saw it.

130. General RUSSELL. And left some parts there?

Mr. BENSON. Yes. They took what they needed immediately. That that they needed, they took. Nobody said nay to anything that anybody wanted at that time.

131. General RUSSELL. What percentage of your equipment or plant did the government take charge of and move in here away from you where you were operating and begin to use?

Mr. BENSON. That would be pretty hard to tell. A large percentage.

132. General RUSSELL. 75 per cent?

Mr. BENSON. I would say so.

133. General RUSSELL. Then that left you with what they didn't want?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

134. General RUSSELL. And you could not operate with the stuff they left you?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

135. General RUSSELL. And this marginal stuff about which you have testified is the part of the equipment which they left?

Mr. BENSON. Yes, sir.

136. General RUSSELL. That is all.

137. General FRANK. Mr. Benson, was the Hawaiian Constructors an incorporated outfit?

Mr. BENSON. No.

138. General FRANK. From whom did you buy a 20 per cent interest for \$100,000?

[3741] Mr. BENSON. I bought from the individuals, from the Callahan Construction Company, Rohl-Connolly, Gunther-Shirley. They each put in a percentage of their holding to make my 20 per cent.

139. General FRANK. It was not a corporation; they were not banded together into a single organization for purposes other than

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to be co-adventurers for the United States Government in Hawaiian constructing? The government had taken your plant for \$156,000 and had given it to the Hawaiian Constructors for use, is that correct?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

140. General FRANK. Then they did the same thing with the plant of the Callahan, Rohl-Connolly and Gunther-Shirley companies?

Mr. BENSON. I don't know.

141. General FRANK. Do you know whether Rohl-Connolly, Gunther-Shirley, and W. E. Callahan had bought themselves into this organization?

Mr. BENSON. No. They were the originators of it. They went in together and each one put up so much money as a working fund, and that gave them an interest. Later on R. E. Woolley came in and he put up his proportion. When I came in I bought part of the ownership of the three members who were already in, so instead of putting up my proportion of the working fund I bought from them.

142. General FRANK. When did you come in? In May when?

Mr. BENSON. I came in on paper December 31, 1941, but I paid for it, according to the record, in May.

143. General GRUNERT. You actually became a stockholder in [3742] each one of those companies?

Mr. BENSON. No. There was only one company; it is one joint venture, and their interests—

144. General FRANK. Do you remember the date in May that you came in?

Mr. BENSON. I came in in December.

145. General FRANK. I know that.

Mr. BENSON. Except that I had not paid—I don't know the date.

146. General FRANK. From May, 1942, this was?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

147. General FRANK. You came in in May, 1942, and from May, 1942 to January 1st, 1943, that was eight months?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

148. General FRANK. And according to your own figures the profits were around \$1,070,000. 20 per cent is \$215,000. Therefore, in eight months you got over 100 percent interest on your money, didn't you? That is a pretty good investment, is it not?

Mr. BENSON. I would not consider that as eight months. I was in there aaround January 1st, 1942, I was in that organization, and I worked from that time on for that organization, and my organization went in at that date and worked.

149. General FRANK. Even so, 100 per cent realization on your investment is pretty good, in one year?

Mr. BENSON. Well, of course, that fee is not all profit. There were non-reimbursable items, and plenty of them, that the Hawaiian Constructors had to pay themselves, pay out of that fee. That was not all profit. It was a good investment. [3743] No question about that.

150. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you get a salary?

Mr. BENSON. From the Hawaiian Constructors?

151. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Mr. BENSON. No.

152. Colonel TOULMIN. Who paid your salary?

Mr. BENSON. The Hawaiian Contractors.

153. Colonel TOULMIN. How about the others, like Mr. Woolley, Rohl, and the rest of them?

Mr. BENSON. Wait a minute. I would like to correct that. There was a period when Woolley and I were down here alone. They made an allowance, which I paid into the Hawaiian Contractors, because I was on a salary from them. I will have to check that.

154. Colonel TOULMIN. Was it \$5,000, \$10,000, \$15,000; what kind of a salary?

Mr. BENSON. No, three months they allowed—

155. Colonel TOULMIN. What amount?

Mr. BENSON. I am trying to think. I have just got a blank on this, but if I had my guess on it I would guess \$250 a month for three months.

156. Colonel TOULMIN. That is the salary that was paid?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

157. Colonel TOULMIN. How about the others?

Mr. BENSON. No salary.

158. Colonel TOULMIN. This arrangement of the Hawaiian Constructors was just a partnership and when you bought in a 20 per cent interest there was a new alignment of interests?

Mr. BENSON. Yes, sir.

[3744] 159. General RUSSELL. The questions Colonel Toulmin has asked you has brought up some questions that I want to develop but which have not been developed so far. The government agreed to pay a fixed fee for this supervision by Callahan and you and others. Where down the line did the government start paying people? Do you get the point I am after. They did not pay you or Rohl or Grafe, apparently, any money at all. Your time was paid for out of this fixed fee.

Mr. BENSON. They paid all salaries that legitimately belonged to the work, except some that were in excess of their regulation, that could not be paid out of their fee, that is, we had to hire some men who would not come for the top fee that the Engineer would allow. Those we paid.

160. General RUSSELL. Let us be definite about your organization, the Hawaiian Contracting Company. You were in there as the president and general manager of that corporation?

Mr. BENSON. Yes, sir.

161. General RUSSELL. You had other executives in that corporation, too, didn't you?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

162. General RUSSELL. A vice president, secretary-treasurer, and those people?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

163. General RUSSELL. Now, were those other executives in the Hawaiian Contracting Company paid by the Hawaiian Contracting Company, or was that a—

Mr. BENSON. They were paid by the Hawaiian Contracting Company. The government did not pay a cent.

164. General RUSSELL. So your top organization then had to be paid out of this fixed fee, out of your part in the fixed fee?

Mr. BENSON. Yes.

165. General RUSSELL. I wonder where the line would be drawn [3745] as to who was paid by the Contracting Company and who was paid by the Government?

Mr. BENSON. There is a clause, I think, in the contract, that no part of the Contractor's general overhead would be paid by the government. We ran a separate organization. Everybody there worked for the Hawaiian Constructors on government work and did nothing for any of the other parties in the case.

166. General RUSSELL. They were paid by whom?

Mr. BENSON. They were paid by the government. The government paid all the costs.

167. General RUSSELL. Who were the people that were paid out of this fixed fee?

Mr. BENSON. Well, each one of us had an organization.

168. General RUSSELL. How big was your organization that was paid out of the fixed fee?

Mr. BENSON. We worked with the Hawaiian Dredging Company on a split basis, that is, we would divide up the work in the office in proportion at that time. We have altogether an engineer, cost accountant, assistant cost accountant, cashier, bookkeeper, purchasing agent, stenographers, payroll clerks—I cannot tell how much money went against that from our organization without going into quite a study.

169. General RUSSELL. All these people you just furnished the names of and others in the same category were paid out of this fixed fee and were not paid by the government?

Mr. BENSON. They were not paid by the government. There was no money paid by the government except the people that devoted their full time to the work of the government.

[3746] Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Benson, do you have any papers which will refresh your recollection as to whether Colonel Wyman was advised of this \$100,000 deal?

Mr. BENSON. No, sir, I have not.

171. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have papers evidencing your participation of the 20 per cent of the \$100,000 and any allied papers in connection with that?

Mr. BENSON. Well, we have an agreement of sale, but Colonel Wyman had nothing to do with that.

172. Major CLAUSEN. Would you produce that tomorrow?

Mr. BENSON. Yes, sir.

173. Major CLAUSEN. What portion, Mr. Benson, of the total profit which accrued to the Hawaiian Contracting Company on this job went to Mr. Dillingham?

Mr. BENSON. That is a rather peculiar question. The only profit that goes to Mr. Dillingham is a profit by reason of his stockholdings, dividends.

174. Major CLAUSEN. What portion of the stock during this time did Mr. Dillingham own in the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. BENSON. Let me see. My guess would be that he owned about a ten per cent interest.

175. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

Mr. BENSON. But, understand, there is no earmarking of any particular amount here. When we have got money to pay dividends, we pay dividends; and he gets his proportion the same as I do or any other stockholder.

176. Major CLAUSEN. Of course, I had understood from what you told General Frank that you were out of business and this was the final wind-up of your business.

[3747] Mr. BENSON. No, we are still in business.

177. Major CLAUSEN. What is that, sir?

Mr. BENSON. That is, we are ready to get into business.

178. Major CLAUSEN. You are ready to get into business?

Mr. BENSON. We have a quarry out at Kauai that is still running, and we have a small repair yard with a few men in it.

179. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you have assets?

Mr. BENSON. Yes, but outside of that our main work is through. We are not doing anything.

180. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

181. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Mr. BENSON, do you think of anything else that you might tell the Board that might be of assistance to it on any of the subjects that relate to the attack on Hawaii and to the construction at that time?

Mr. BENSON. I can give you my personal opinion of Colonel Wyman.

182. General GRUNERT. If you so desire, we would like to have it.

Mr. BENSON. I would like to give it, because I think it is due him.

I think he did a wonderful job. As I say, there was great confusion. I think possibly he tried to do too much and carried too much himself. As far as the work was concerned, he pushed it and pushed it hard. He worked hard himself. I have been over there, I was going to say many, but more than a few evenings, when we had to go over there or were called over, and we had been there to 11 or 12 o'clock, and when we left he had two stenographers and had a stack of papers on his desk that [3748] high and was going at it. At 8 o'clock the next morning he would make the rounds with the Commanding General.

Of course, in the great confusion and the grabbing of stuff after the blitz, proper orders were not given. When we came to get our pay we just could not get it. That just raised a very great howl against Colonel Wyman, and no doubt I joined in it myself. Looking back over it, I think we were wrong.

183. Major CLAUSEN. Is he a shareholder in this Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. BENSON. No, sir.

184. Major CLAUSEN. Is he a shareholder in any of the other companies?

Mr. BENSON. No, sir.

185. Major CLAUSEN. Is any of his family or relatives, to your knowledge, shareholders in any of those companies?

Mr. BENSON. No, sir. Not to my knowledge. I know he was not in with Woolley. He was not in the Hawaiian Contracting Company and I know he was not in the Hawaiian Constructors. That is as far as I can say of my own knowledge.

186. General RUSSELL. You have gone into the work of Colonel Wyman. Now, you had to do with rather big operations in your

time, haven't you, with top-flight executives and successful operators; isn't that correct?

Mr. BENSON. That is right.

187. General RUSSELL. Did you gather the opinion in estimating Colonel Wyman's work that he was attempting to do a lot of things that he should have been doing by an organization and give him a chance to have acted as a top-flight executive, rather than being tied to his desk all the time?

Mr. BENSON. That very well might be, sir.

188. General RUSSELL. Did you get that impression?

[3749] Mr. BENSON. Yes, I got that.

189. General GRUNERT. Any other questions? If not, we thank you.

Mr. BENSON. All right, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[3750] **TESTIMONY OF RALPH E. WOOLLEY, 2349 OAHU AVENUE,
HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major CLAUSEN. What is your full name?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Ralph E. Woolley.

2. Major CLAUSEN. And your residence?

Mr. WOOLLEY. 2349 Oahu Avenue, Honolulu.

3. Major CLAUSEN. What is your business or occupation?

Mr. WOOLLEY. General contractor.

4. Major CLAUSEN. And what is the name of that firm, Mr. Woolley?

Mr. WOOLLEY. It is under my name, Ralph E. Woolley.

5. Major CLAUSEN. You recall having been associated with the Hawaiian Constructors in the defense work here on the Islands with regard to a contract dated December 1940, and its supplements?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. When did you join that joint venture of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. WOOLLEY. It was sometime in May.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Of what year, Mr. Woolley?

Mr. WOOLLEY. '41.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And did you pay a consideration to the Hawaiian Constructors for that interest?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, I did. I put in—

9. Major CLAUSEN. How much?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I couldn't—I can give you it exactly, but my recollection is it was in the neighborhood of \$65,000, [3751] which was a 20 percent interest.

10. Major CLAUSEN. You got that interest for \$65,000?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is, I put up \$65,000 of capital, which was on the same basis that the others put up, and that I was given a 20 percent interest.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Before you made that deal, had you sold any equipment to the Government?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Let me ask this question: Prior to the time this basic contract of December 1940 was executed, were you ever approached by Colonel Wyman or any of his assistants or men connected with the Engineers, with a view to determining whether or not you would be interested in taking on any of the work that was contemplated?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir.

Major CLAUSEN. You paid this \$65,000 in May 1942; isn't that right?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I wouldn't be sure of the exact date, but that was the date—

14. General FRANK. The year?

Mr. WOOLLEY. The time when I was admitted.

15. Major CLAUSEN. May 1942?

Mr. WOOLLEY. '41.

16. Major CLAUSEN. '41?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes.

17. Major CLAUSEN. I see. May '41?

Mr. WOOLLEY. May '41.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Did Colonel Wyman, before this basic contract of December 1940 was signed, or any of his assistants, [3752] ever approach you with regard to using any of your equipment on this job?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Would you have been in a position in December 1940 to have taken on some of the work that was included within that basic contract and the supplements?

Mr. WOOLLEY. It depends entirely on what kind of work would have been offered.

20. Major CLAUSEN. You would have been able to take some of the work?

Mr. WOOLLEY. To take some of the work.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. And if you had been advised that there was to be this basic contract in existence, would you have been desirous of taking on this work, at December 1940?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I am not sure that I would, because I was doing some work for the Navy at that time.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Well, do you recall having given testimony before Colonel John E. Hunt, of our Inspector General's Department?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, sir.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Let me just read a portion of that testimony on page 448:

Question. As I recall it, the Hawaiian Constructors' contract was effective as of December 20, 1940, is that right?

Answer. I think that is.

Question. I think that is the approximate date.

Answer. I know it is the latter part of 1940.

[3753] Question. At that time would you have been in a position to undertake any of the work that you now understand to have been included in the original Hawaiian Constructors' contract?

Answer. Yes, I would have been able to have taken on some of that work.

Question. If you had been advised that is was going on, would you have been desirous of taking it on?

Answer. I would have been.

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Do you remember giving that testimony?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, I do.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Well, which statement is correct, Mr. Woolley; the one——

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, if it was the same class of work that was handled by the Hawaiian Constructors, I would have been able to take on some of the work.

25. Major CLAUSEN. The question, though, that I put to you today was this: whether you would then, in December of 1940, have desired to take it on, and your answer that you gave to Colonel Hunt was, "I would have been." Is that correct, sir?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, I think that is correct, yes, sir.

26. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, in December 1940 you were acquainted with the setup of the approximate work being done by the Hawaiian Contracting Company, local concern, Mr. Benson's company?

Mr. WOOLLEY. In December of 1940?

27. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I mean, you knew in December 1940 that Mr. Benson, the Hawaiian Contracting Company, was in business here?

[3754] Mr. WOOLLEY. Oh, yes.

28. Major CLAUSEN. And Mr. Glover? He was one of the local contractors?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

29. Major CLAUSEN. And Mr. Black? He was one of the contractors?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

30. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, you were familiar with various contractors here?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

31. Major CLAUSEN. And they could have taken on this work, couldn't they? And McKee and Company, and McClure?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, I am not sure, but I think probably they could.

32. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

33. General FRANK. May I ask a question?

34. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, certainly.

35. General FRANK. Mr. Woolley, with which outfit would you have preferred to have become identified, the Hawaiian Constructors or a group of men composing McClure, McKee, Woolley, Benson, Black, and so forth?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, General, I would have preferred to have associated myself with local contractors. I don't believe I would have cared to associate myself with McKee because of his method of operations. He was a one-man operator.

36. General RUSSELL. Was he an effective operator?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Very good.

37. General RUSSELL. But he was just a lone wolf type?

[3755] Mr. WOOLLEY. Just a lone wolf, and sometimes when he gets two or three men together, unless they are congenial in their operations, it isn't worth-while going in a joint venture with him.

38. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, he himself has stated that he was a lone wolf type.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Are you finished, General Frank?

40. General FRANK. Yes.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Woolley, are you acquainted with the transaction where the Government bought from the Rohl-Connolly Company some equipment, approximately \$166,000, which had theretofore been appraised by a Government employee at \$131,000?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I am not very well acquainted with that transaction. It was handled directly by Mr. Rohl, as I understand it, with the contracting officer.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Were you in on some of the preliminary discussions?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Only insofar as the desire of getting additional equipment was concerned, request to the contracting officer for additional equipment.

43. Major CLAUSEN. Were you there when the conversations were held regarding the appraisal that had been rendered on March the 12th?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I think I was in the same room, but I don't recollect any details of the conference.

44. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that Mr. Parker was told to put down this extra money between \$131,000 and \$166,000 on the basis of back rental?

[3756] Mr. WOOLLEY. No, I do not know that.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember that Mr. Parker said, "Well, I guess I might as well put it down, as long as it's going to go through that way," or words to that effect?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir, I do not.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall a transaction where the Government purchased equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company, which equipment was in part unusable?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, I know only of the request that we had made for additional equipment, and this was available, and we requested for this construction contracting officer, if possible to make it available to us.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know, or are you acquainted with the fact that on March 3, 1943, almost a year after the purchase was made of this equipment, that part was still in the yards of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, unused because it couldn't be used?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I was informed that there were some few of these dump wagons that were—or at least hadn't been used.

48. Major CLAUSEN. And these dump wagons in themselves total something like \$9,100; isn't that right?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I don't know as to their value.

49. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

50. General RUSSELL. Were you a member of the executive committee which fixed the policies for the Hawaiian Constructors after Pearl Harbor or after the blitz here?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, sir.

51. General RUSSELL. Who were the other members of that, Mr. Woolley?

[3757] Mr. WOOLLEY. There was Mr. Grafe, Paul Grafe, and Percy Benson, and Mr. Rohl.

52. General RUSSELL. How long did Grafe stay here after the blitz?

Mr. WOOLLEY. To the best of my recollection, it was the early part of February.

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53. General RUSSELL. In '42?

Mr. WOOLLEY. In '42.

54. General RUSSELL. How long did Rohl stay here after the first of the year '42?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I wouldn't be sure, General, but I think some time in either May or June. I know he made a number of trips, and I wouldn't be sure which was the final trip that he made.

55. General RUSSELL. Well, why did you select the month of May or June in '42 as being the time when Rohl left? Did you mean to convey the idea that from that date on he did not participate any more in the activities of this executive committee?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, I think that was about the early part of May. I think that was about the time.

56. General RUSSELL. Well, the point is this, Mr. Woolley: Did Mr. Rohl come back after this time that we are attempting to fix now, irrespective of when it was?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I think he did.

57. General RUSSELL. And he actually served after that time, upon his return to the Islands, as a member of this committee?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, he—I think he made a trip in April and then another one which was later. I can't get the—

[3758] 58. General RUSSELL. A trip to where?

Mr. WOOLLEY. To the coast.

59. General RUSSELL. He went to the coast in April. How long did he stay? Do you recall?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I think two or three weeks.

60. General RUSSELL. And he came back?

Mr. WOOLLEY. He came back.

61. General RUSSELL. And he stayed over here until when?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, my recollection is that it was either the latter part of possibly June—I couldn't give you the exact dates without referring to records.

62. General RUSSELL. All right. Then he went away?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, sir.

63. General RUSSELL. How long did he stay on that trip?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I couldn't give you the exact date.

64. General RUSSELL. Then he came back and began to function again as a member of the committee?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, he came back. He didn't—he was in poor health. He didn't function very well from then on.

65. General RUSSELL. When did his health fail?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I couldn't give you that exact date. He was in the hospital at Hickam Field. I couldn't, without going to the record.

66. General RUSSELL. Along in the spring of '42 did his health get right bad?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, he claimed that his heart was bad and that he was having these heart attacks and supposed to be under the doctor's care.

67. General RUSSELL. Did that continue until this work ended [3759] over here sometime in '43?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No.

68. General RUSSELL. His condition of poor health?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No. He left here in the middle summer. I couldn't—I can refer to the records and give you those exact dates. And then he didn't come back again.

69. General RUSSELL. In other words, his health got poor in the spring of '42, and he went to the hospital, and sometime in the summer of '42 he went to the continent and never did come back?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That's right.

70. General RUSSELL. All right. That is about what I want.

Now, you say that you became a member of these Hawaiian Constructors sometime along in May of '41?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That's right.

71. General RUSSELL. That you were not approached back in December when these constructors organized and initiated the work over here?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That's right.

72. General RUSSELL. You were not approached then at all?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Not at all.

73. General RUSSELL. Not by the Engineer contracting officer nor by the constructors?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir, I was not approached.

74. General RUSSELL. On whose motion, then, did you get into the constructors along in May of '41?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Mr. Paul Grafe came to see me in my office, early part of May, and asked me if I would be interested in becoming a member of the Hawaiian Constructors. I told him that [3760] I would like to investigate and check into it and think it over before I'd give him an answer.

75. General RUSSELL. What reasons, if any, did Grafe assign for approaching you and making this inquiry?

Mr. WOOLLEY. He told me that the contracting officer had requested them to get a builder into their organization because they expected to have considerable building as a part of the work, and that they had decided that I would be the one who would be acceptable, and so they asked me if I would consider it. I told them I would.

76. General RUSSELL. Then, his sole reason was that a new type of work had to be done, for which the Hawaiian Constructors, as then organized, was not fitted?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, that was the principal reason, and that the work was going to expand.

77. General RUSSELL. Be a lot more work?

Mr. WOOLLEY. A lot more work.

78. General RUSSELL. Now, did Benson come into this organization about May of '41, about the time you went into it?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No; Mr. Benson—the Hawaiian Contracting Company did not come in until January of 1942, the first of January 1942.

79. General RUSSELL. Now, you told the Major a moment ago that you paid approximately \$65,000 for a 20 percent interest in this contract. Then when you bought in, there was Callahan and their associate—

Mr. WOOLLEY. Rohl-Connolly.

80. General RUSSELL. Rohl-Connolly, and the other?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Gunther-Shirley.

[3761] 81. General RUSSELL. Gunther-Shirley. And they retained 80 percent, and you acquired 20 percent of the interest?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes. They told me they had put up so much money as capital then, and that if I came in I would have to put in an equal amount, based on what they had put in, and that I would participate equally with them from the beginning, on the contract.

82. General RUSSELL. Did you understand those people to mean, then, that \$65,000, or approximately that amount, that you were required to pay, represented 20 percent of the funds that these people had put into this operation?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That that was actual cash put in; that I would be obligated for any additional money required or loans that might have to be made to carry on the joint venture.

83. General RUSSELL. How were you going to get that \$65,000 back, Mr. Woolley?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, this was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract.

84. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. WOOLLEY. And the capital that you put in, initial capital, when you didn't need it, would be returned on the same priority basis.

85. General RUSSELL. How much eventually—I will give you the background of the examination: It appears that eventually the fixed fee amounted to some million plus seventy thousand dollars.

Mr. WOOLLEY. That's right.

86. General RUSSELL. How much of that fee had been earned when you went into this undertaking in May of '41?

[3762] Mr. WOOLLEY. I couldn't give you it exactly, but the amount of work, total amount of work under contract, was, I think, less than \$5,000,000 in aggregate.

87. General RUSSELL. Then a very small percentage—

Mr. WOOLLEY. Small.

88. General RUSSELL. —of this million-plus had been earned at that time?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right; quite a small percentage.

89. General RUSSELL. All right. But this \$65,000 which you put in was largely in the nature of working capital?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That's it.

90. General RUSSELL. And you expected it to be returned to you?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right. It was working—

91. General RUSSELL. Well, was a great part of that returned to you, plus your interest in the million seventy thousand dollars?

Mr. WOOLLEY. The entire capital that I put up, initial amount, was returned.

92. General RUSSELL. And in addition to that you participated to the extent of 20 percent in the aggregate fixed fee of a million seventy thousand?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That's right.

93. General RUSSELL. Now, we are interested, Mr. Woolley, to know—and it might be that we could have informed ourselves, but we haven't—as to how definitely the contract defined the non-reimbursable items of expense that these joint adventurers might have been called upon to pay from their funds as distinguished from Government funds. Now, could you tell us [3763] about that?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, you mean through the entire contract?

94. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. WOOLLEY. As I remember, we had some \$170,000, \$180,000 of non-reimbursable items.

95. General RUSSELL. That was all of the contract, all of the adventurers, including you and Benson's outfit and everybody, at the end of the—

Mr. WOOLLEY. That was the non-reimbursables of the joint venturers.

96. General RUSSELL. Then, if the total fixed fee was a million seventy thousand dollars, and you had non-reimbursables of \$170,000, the story is that the joint adventurers divided up to \$900,000 and got back in addition thereto all of their initial investment in the nature of working capital?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, yes, that is correct.

97. General RUSSELL. So each of the five participating adventurers received approximately, or each 20 percent interest in the contract was worth just under \$200,000: five into \$900,000?

Mr. WOOLLEY. At the end of the contract.

98. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes.

99. Colonel TOULMIN. Plus the return of the invested capital.

100. General RUSSELL. Plus the return of the invested capital, of course.

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

101. General RUSSELL. So the net profit of the operation was in the aggregate about \$900,000?

[3764] Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, I wouldn't say the net profit, because there were—each of us had our own expenses, our office expenses, in addition to that, which is part of our current operating costs.

102. General RUSSELL. Well, in order that the Board may be informed in a general way of this operation, about what size organization did you have from which you paid the operating expenses out of this 20 percent of \$900,000?

[3765] Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, up until the end of '41 I had other contracts operating at the same time, and I couldn't give you, without going to the records, what those figures were, interests, and so forth.

103. General RUSSELL. Off-hand, can you recall about what percentage of your 20% of the \$900,000 you were compelled to expend to carry on the duties required of you and your organization under this agreement?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, I couldn't give that to you now.

104. General RUSSELL. You do not remember how much of this 20% of \$900,000 was net profit to you, and how much was gross profit?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, I do not, because that extended over a period of three years.

105. General RUSSELL. I was going into that. This operation began in December 1940 and ended some time in 1943?

Mr. WOOLLEY. The contract was terminated in 1943 but it continued on into 1944.

106. General RUSSELL. Were you, if you know, working in connection with this operation into 1944?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, we were trying to get our contract settled and get our money.

107. General RUSSELL. After when?

Mr. WOOLLEY. After January 31, 1943; only some 14 months or more.

108. General RUSSELL. The story from your standpoint is that you went in, in May 1941, and came out in January 1943, with 20% of \$900,000, and during that time rather extensive work had been done here on the island, is that true? It was a big operation?

[3766] Mr. WOOLLEY. It was.

109. General RUSSELL. As I have heard the figure some place, it amounted to more than \$100,000,000.

Mr. WOOLLEY. The total work under contract according to estimates was around close to \$130,000,000. Then there were certain works that were canceled and terminated, so that the net was just under \$100,000,000.

110. General RUSSELL. Now, there are two or three other things, and I will be through. I don't believe that my mind is clear, and I do not know, as to the other Members of the Board, on who determined the expenses that the adventurers were to pay and the expenses which the Government had to pay in an operation of this kind.

Mr. WOOLLEY. My understanding of the operation was that all of the expenses incident to carrying on the work, if we thought that it was properly chargeable to the work, they were to present it to the contracting officer, who in turn reviewed them. If in his opinion they were proper charges he would O. K. them for payment; if not they would be sent back to us with a statement that they were non-reimbursable.

111. General RUSSELL. And that man was the contracting officer, who during this period was either Wyman, Lyman, or Kramer?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

112. General RUSSELL. Now, did you with your organization prepare the account which you desired the Government to pay and submit it, and Rohl would prepare his, and Callahan would prepare his, and send them to the officer and each of you deal with the contracting officer as an entity?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No. All of the expense items which were [3767] chargeable went through the Hawaiian Constructors.

113. General RUSSELL. The central agency?

Mr. WOOLLEY. And none of us submitted expense items independently.

114. General RUSSELL. Then all the items that the contracting officer received were debited against him, or attempted to be debited against him by the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is true.

115. General RUSSELL. And not the individual members?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

116. General RUSSELL. Were there numerous bickerings between the contracting officer and the Hawaiian Constructors as to what accounts should be paid by the Federal Government and what accounts should be paid by the constructor?

Mr. WOOLLEY. In general I do not think there was a lot of bickering, because all of the expenditures had to be authorized prior to the time of contracting for the work, and had to be approved by the contracting officer, and so that, once the authorization was given, the routine of submitting the bills or the requisitions for payment was a matter of routine.

117. General RUSSELL. Who took Rohl's place on this executive committee after his health failed and he went back to the continent?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, jointly Mr. Benson and I handled the work of the executive committee.

118. General RUSSELL. You had an opportunity to observe the organizations which were brought over here to the islands from the continent by Callahan and Rohl and Gunther-Shirley, you saw those organizations, did you not, their supervisors and foremen?

[3768] Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, sir.

119. General RUSSELL. How did they compare in your opinion with the supervisors and foremen and laborers of the local members of that association?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, a good many of those who were sent over here were heavy-construction operators, and those superintendents were entirely familiar with heavy work, whereas my organization is primarily a building organization, so that the two kinds of operation were not comparable. I should say the general quality of men was somewhat on a par.

120. General RUSSELL. With the local men?

Mr. WOOLLEY. With the local men; some better, and some not so good.

121. General RUSSELL. The same as in your organization, you had good, bad, and indifferent, too?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, we tried to get the best, but sometimes we didn't have them.

122. General RUSSELL. I do not believe I have any other questions.

123. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else?

124. Major CLAUSEN. Was your organization a corporation, Mr. Woolley?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir.

125. Major CLAUSEN. To your knowledge did Colonel Wyman or any person connected with him, or any of those people, have an interest in your organization?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir.

126. Major CLAUSEN. You said in response to a question by General Russell that when Mr. Grafe came to you and solicited [3769] your entry into this joint venture, that he had come to you because the contracting officer had asked him to get some builder, you recall that?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes; I stated. That is what he told me.

127. Major CLAUSEN. Well, who was the contracting officer at that time?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Mr. Wyman.

128. Major CLAUSEN. Yes; and you afterwards had a talk with Colonel Wyman, did you, about your entry into this joint venture?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

129. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Yes, sir.

130. Major CLAUSEN. And you told him that you were willing to come in at this \$65,000 figure?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, I did not discuss any figure with him. I discussed the figure with Paul Grafe.

1928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

131. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you ever discuss this \$65,000 figure with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Now, I may have; I would not be sure of that.

132. Major CLAUSEN. Well, do you have any memoranda or papers that would indicate that fact?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir.

133. Major CLAUSEN. And the contracting officer during this period of construction of the projects here during that time was Colonel Wyman, was he not?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Colonel Wyman.

134. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

135. General GRUNERT. Colonel Toulmin?

136. Colonel TOULMIN. Nothing.

137. General GRUNERT. Colonel West?

138. Colonel WEST. No.

139. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that occurs to [3770] you that you might tell the Board, that might be of assistance to it in coming to a conclusion?

Mr. WOOLLEY. The only thing, I think probably, General, you all know that this type of contract, the cost-plus contract, is one that is very flexible, and because of the nature of it, the control of it must be vested in the contracting officer, and so that the directing head is the contracting officer, and so that our part in the performance of this contract was to comply with the instructions and orders given to us.

140. General GRUNERT. Isn't it true that, late in 1941, the Chief of Engineers' Office got out a memorandum of instructions that govern or that set forth what the engineer should do and what the contractors should do under this cost-plus program?

Mr. WOOLLEY. You mean that directive issued from Washington? Yes, I know about that.

141. General GRUNERT. Now, wasn't there a considerable departure from those instructions on the part of the engineers, themselves?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, I think the records will show that.

142. General GRUNERT. That appeared to handicap and probably delay, and caused quite a number of at least of discussions between the two of you?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, that's why I stated that the nature of this is one where we had to follow orders. If it were left to a contractor to operate a job as we normally operate, we probably could have speeded things up a little better.

143. General GRUNERT. Now then, the contracting officer was the one that passed upon what bills the Government should pay, that the contractors "ran up" we might say. Do you know whether there are any regulations governing generally what [3771] those bills should be, or what sort of items the Government would pay for, or was it left entirely to the contracting officer to decide what they were to pay for?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, there is a regular book of instructions and regulations that the contracting officer is supposed to follow.

144. General GRUNERT. You say there was very little bickering about the payment of such bills, because they had the approval of

getting stuff before it was actually gotten, it had to be passed on by the contracting officer?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

145. General GRUNERT. Was there any bickering about that?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, sometimes there was; for example, the question of whether we needed it or not, and whether there was an immediate need, or they had already taken care of it. You see under this contract the Government bought all of the materials, because they had a buying power, and they did not want to duplicate, and we have a directive to that effect; and with our insistence on getting certain materials and things of that sort, we had to plead with the contracting officer to furnish them.

146. General GRUNERT. Up to the time Rohl left he was a "spark plug" of the directing group, was he not?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Well, he was a member of the executive committee, and we had a general superintendent of construction.

147. General GRUNERT. In other words, they got Rohl over here, and Grafe sort of faded out of the picture, until he left, and up until the time Rohl turned over to you and Benson, why, Rohl did most of the directing?

[3772] Mr. WOOLLEY. No, I wouldn't say that, General. I think Mr. Benson and I shared in it, assisted in the directing and helping to shape the policies of the work.

148. General GRUNERT. On every committee, even an executive committee, there has got to be one man that does most of the work?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That is right.

149. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

150. General RUSSELL. Yes. I knew I had missed something I wanted to talk to you about. Were there any efforts made, along in April or May 1941, about which you know, looking to having work done under a fixed-price contract; that is, by bids?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I don't recall of any.

151. General RUSSELL. You did not participate with other local contractors in working out bids for some work that Wyman wanted done here along in the spring of 1941?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Not with Colonel Wyman; no. We did under the constructing quartermaster.

152. General RUSSELL. Do you remember hearing of or seeing advertisements of requests for bids from local contractors for work that was to be done?

Mr. WOOLLEY. I think there were some airfields that were advertised.

153. General RUSSELL. Did you make bids on those airfields?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, sir.

154. General RUSSELL. Do you recall about when that was?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No, I don't. I really don't, because I wasn't interested in that question.

[3773] 155. General RUSSELL. You just did not take any interest in it?

Mr. WOOLLEY. Didn't take any part of it.

156. General GRUNERT. One more question. In that executive committee was the amount of power and decision and one thing and another apportioned according to the amount of interest held in the

1930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Hawaiian Constructors? You held 20%, and Benson, 20%, and somebody else held the other 60%?

Mr. WOOLLEY. That question never came up.

157. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? Is there anything else you can think of that you might want to open up, or something that might be brewing in your mind for some time and ought to come out?

Mr. WOOLLEY. No; the only thing, the records will show that we were more than willing to cooperate all the way through; and the records will show that.

158. General GRUNERT. If there are no other questions, we thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the Board having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, took up the consideration of other matters.)

[3774]

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[3775] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944.

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAURICE GAYLORD PARKER, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Parker, will you please state to the Board your full name and address.

Mr. PARKER. Maurice Gaylord Parker; Elks Club; Honolulu.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation?

Mr. PARKER. At the present time I am planning on going in the ice business for myself.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Parker, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will conduct this particular part of our investigation. General Frank.

4. General FRANK. Go ahead, Major Clausen.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Parker, what is your present occupation? Are you employed right now? [3776]

Mr. PARKER. No, I am not.

6. Major CLAUSEN. What was your most recent occupation?

Mr. PARKER. Working for Schuman Carriage Company. That was the job I had before I went to work with the engineers in 1942.

7. Major CLAUSEN. But you were employed most recently though with the United States Engineering Department?

Mr. PARKER. Well, that was May, up until the latter part of May of this year; then I got released on furlough for six months.

8. Major CLAUSEN. You mean they let you go for six months?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. The period during which you worked for the Engineering Department extended over what dates?

Mr. PARKER. From January 3, 1942, until the latter part of May, this year.

1934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

10. Major CLAUSEN. In what capacity were you first employed by the United States Engineering Department?

Mr. PARKER. As an appraiser of used equipment—trucks and cars and so forth. They didn't put it in as "appraiser," it was "civil engineer" on the boards.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Actually, though?

Mr. PARKER. But the work that I did was appraise equipment.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And how long did you perform that function of appraiser for the Engineering Department—over what periods?

Mr. PARKER. It started January 3.

13. Major CLAUSEN. January 3, of what year?

[3777] Mr. PARKER. 1942; until October 1942; I don't know the exact date.

14. Major CLAUSEN. And what experience, Mr. Parker, had you had as an appraiser of used equipment?

Mr. PARKER. The only experience I had had up till that time was on trucks and cars, when I was working with Schuman Carriage Company.

15. Major CLAUSEN. And is that a local concern, here?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

16. Major CLAUSEN. You had also worked for the Thomas Hafferty Company?

Mr. PARKER. That is correct.

17. Major CLAUSEN. And what kind of work did you do there?

Mr. PARKER. Well, originally, I was a buyer, local buyer, the buying of merchandise and equipment in town here.

18. Major CLAUSEN. You did the purchasing then for that company?

Mr. PARKER. And then the company liquidated after they finished a job at Lualualei, and we took all that old equipment we had had on the job and took it to pier 6, and I was foreman down there, and we sold and repaired to rent different pieces of equipment.

19. Major CLAUSEN. How long?

Mr. PARKER. About a year, there.

20. Major CLAUSEN. About a year doing that, also?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

21. Major CLAUSEN. And this was all before you went to work with the United States Engineering Department, is that so?

Mr. PARKER. That is correct.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Now, in all the activities of yours as an appraiser, did you ever have anybody question your appraisal?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, I did.

[3778] 23. Major CLAUSEN. In how many instances?

Mr. PARKER. Once.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Only one?

Mr. PARKER. Well, of course, when we went out to appraise, why, the owner might bring up the question, but I was never, as far as working for the engineers, questioned, but once.

25. Major CLAUSEN. And this one occasion occurred when Mr. Parker?

Mr. PARKER. I can't give the exact date, because I don't remember.

26. Major CLAUSEN. What year was it, Mr. Parker?

Mr. PARKER. 1942. I think it was in March, April, or May of 1942, I am not sure.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Was that in connection with some equipment owned by the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

28. Major CLAUSEN. And your appraisal was in the neighborhood of \$131,000, whereas they insisted upon an appraisal of \$166,000?

Mr. PARKER. I wouldn't say for the figures. It was about \$30,000 if I remember right, difference on those things.

29. Major CLAUSEN. In making that particular appraisal, as to which there arose this question, you feel that you made a fair, square, on-the-level appraisal?

Mr. PARKER. I do.

30. Major CLAUSEN. And just what did you do? How did you go about making that appraisal, and what basis did you use?

Mr. PARKER. Well, as I say, I don't remember the date, but it was early this morning when one of the boys that worked for the Hawaiian Constructors came down, with a list, and also, [3779] I think it was, Captain, in charge of or had to do with all the purchasing in the Engineers; I forget his name, now; and they had a list of equipment belonging to the Hawaiian Constructors, that he said, this young fellow, the captain, said we had to appraise that morning and have it in by that night, and there were about 14 pieces if I remember right. That is, there were more pieces, because, however, there were 10 or 12 trucks in there, but 12 or 14 different items of shovels.

31. General FRANK. You mean steam shovels?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir; they were Diesel shovels, and there were trucks, and they were scattered all over the island at the time, so this boy from the Hawaiian Constructors, knowing where this equipment was, he was to take me around, starting this morning, to appraise this equipment; so we started out, and on this list was the equipment, and also prices, the prices that the Hawaiian Constructors were asking for it.

32. Major CLAUSEN. You mean that Rohl-Connolly Company was asking the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. PARKER. Well, now, Rohl-Connolly, I didn't know at the time. I thought it was Hawaiian Constructors. That is who we were purchasing for—that is, doing the appraising.

33. Major CLAUSEN. At any event, before you went out on the job, they gave you a list with the prices on that they wanted you to verify?

Mr. PARKER. That is right.

34. Major CLAUSEN. As the value of the property?

Mr. PARKER. That is right.

35. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Proceed, and tell the Board just what you did.

[3780] Mr. PARKER. So we started out, but we had orders, this young fellow and myself, who worked for the constructors—I was working for the Government—to have each—

36. General FRANK. Now, just a minute. This Captain was working?

Mr. PARKER. No, this Captain told me to go with this Hawaiian Constructors' man, I forget his name.

37. General FRANK. Oh, there was another civilian who represented Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. PARKER. That is right; yes, sir; so we had orders to get the area engineers or the Hawaiian Constructors' superintendent to sign for this equipment, showing that it was on the job.

Well, there was some equipment at Hickam Field, and there was equipment at Schofield, equipment down where it was being repaired, like this called "Island Welding," now; some at base yard 6. Well, it was scattered all over. There was some out here, I forget the name of the fort; it was where they have the big gun out there on the way to Waianae. There was a shovel out there, and it took us the whole day to get around to see all this equipment. We had trouble with some of the superintendents. They wouldn't sign for it. They would take a look at it and say, "No! we don't want it on the job!" Like there was a pump, I forget what they call them. It was at Hickam, any way, and the superintendent there said he would not sign for it because they didn't need it on the job, it was laying out in the field.

38. General FRANK. Was it serviceable?

Mr. PARKER. That, I would not say. It was sitting [3781] there, and from my looks it was serviceable, yes, if they wanted it.

After I had checked it over and looked at the pipe and everything, there were pieces of pipe strewn all around, they had so many lengths of pipe I couldn't count them all and see whether they were there. I was taking a list as to the number of pieces, and I was supposed to have these pieces appraised and the report turned in that night; which I did, about eight o'clock.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Did you go around all over the island to get these?

Mr. PARKER. Went and saw every piece that was on the list they had. If I remember right, there were 10 or 12 trucks, and there were 8—if there was 10, there was 8 of them at 104-W; that is, out at Schofield; and two of them were sitting down, hadn't been able to run yet. They were down at Automotive Service being repaired.

40. Major CLAUSEN. In making that appraisal, therefore, you were told to have this job done that day, and to have it in that night?

Mr. PARKER. That is correct.

41. Major CLAUSEN. What reason did they give for this "rush act"?

Mr. PARKER. They didn't give any reason. I didn't ask. They said they wanted it in, that night, because it was a job they wanted finished up, that's all there was.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Did anybody then tell you that Colonel Wyman, who was doing part of the work, was going to be relieved in two days?

[3782] Mr. PARKER. No, sir; I didn't know a thing about it.

43. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, when you made your appraisal on this particular equipment, did you follow any usual practice as to getting the purchase price, valuing the wear and tear, and the depreciation?

Mr. PARKER. I know about what the shovels cost. They run around \$31,000 at the time, but they had been used; and the trucks, I knew what the price of trucks run, new, and they had been used; so I used my own judgment, like I appraised everything else.

44. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you were familiar with the catalog purchase-price figures?

Mr. PARKER. Not necessarily, because prices down here vary for this equipment. On the coast they would be able to buy it much cheaper. You would have to figure freight and so forth down here, and the catalog prices on this equipment would be different here.

45. Major CLAUSEN. In that connection, therefore, did you consider that the Hawaiian Constructors did not have to pay the freight from the mainland?

Mr. PARKER. No, I didn't. When I appraised any piece of equipment here I took into consideration the wear and tear, and what it would originally cost, only.

46. General FRANK. Here?

Mr. PARKER. Here; that is correct.

47. Major CLAUSEN. In the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. PARKER. If it was shipped down, as if you would buy a truck and have it shipped out here, and the amount of money they might have spent to repair it, which this [3783] equipment had been all repaired.

48. Major CLAUSEN. You say this equipment had all been repaired?

Mr. PARKER. Well, that is, the pieces like the trucks and the shovels. Now, the pumps were in good shape; that is, they looked in good shape; they were not running.

If I remember my figures, why, I didn't depreciate the pumps very much. I took them as the figure they turned in for them. It was the equipment like the shovels and the trucks that were the ones that I didn't think were worth the money.

49. Major CLAUSEN. In any event, your final total appraisal in the neighborhood of \$131,000 was turned in later on that afternoon?

Mr. PARKER. That evening, about eight o'clock.

50. Major CLAUSEN. And to whom did you give that, Mr. Parker?

Mr. PARKER. I gave it to this captain; but as I say, I can't remember his name.

51. Major CLAUSEN. And then what was said, or what was the next thing you did?

Mr. PARKER. That is all there was to it.

52. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you later on, though, did something?

Mr. PARKER. Then, the next morning, when I came back, they told me—well, it wasn't the next morning, because I went out to work, and about one o'clock I came back to the office, and they told me I had to report down to the Young building, to Colonel Robinson, that afternoon.

53. Major CLAUSEN. That was Colonel B. L. Robinson?

Mr. PARKER. I don't know whether that was the next day [3784] or the day after. I don't remember whether it was one or two days.

54. Major CLAUSEN. All right. What happened when you got down there to the Young building?

Mr. PARKER. Well, I went into the office and met Colonel Robinson, and he asked me, he said, "There is some discrepancy here in your figures and what the Hawaiian Constructors are asking for this equipment that you appraised." And I said, "Well," I said, "I don't know what it is. I appraised the equipment as I thought it was worth to the Government." He said, "Well, did you know at the time that

there was rental due on this equipment?" and I said, "No; and it wouldn't make any difference if there was. That rental don't interfere with the appraisals that I put on equipment." He said, "Well, there should be rental added to it," and he says, "Some of the Hawaiian Constructors' men are going to come up here, and they want to talk to you." I said, "O. K." And about five minutes later, why, in walked Mr. Woolley, Mr. Rohl, and Mr. Benson, and Mr. Middleton.

55. Major CLAUSEN. These men were all Hawaiian Constructors men, were they not?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir; and Colonel Robinson said, "You go over to that desk and talk to them." So I went over there with all these "big shots" from the Hawaiian Constructors. I felt really out of place.

56. Major CLAUSEN. Were you the only government representative there?

Mr. PARKER. I was the only one. That is why I felt out of place. Well, we sat down at this table, and I don't remember [3785] who did the talking, because they all had something to say, but one of them spoke up and said, "How does it happen that your appraisal is so much lower than our figures?" I said, "Well, I appraised it as what I thought it was worth." One of them said, "Well, we repaired all that equipment before it was sent down here, and we have figures." They had papers there of figures showing that they had spent so much money fixing up these trucks and the shovels and so forth, and I said, "Well, I still consider that my appraisal is fair, and even though you fixed it up," I said, "it was a poor job, because there's cracks in the pumps, all the shovels are not running, and the trucks are broken down right now, and," I said, "they did a very good job of painting over all these defects."

Mr. Rohl spoke up and said, "Look here, young man," he said, "we don't do such things as that." He says, "All our equipment is in good shape." And I said, "Well, I still contend that my appraisal is fair, and I am not going to change it." So they said, "Well, do you understand that there is rental due on this?" And I said, "Yes, Colonel Robinson just told me, but I didn't know it before, and," I said, "it don't make any difference as far as the appraisal is concerned. If there is rental due, of course, the Government will pay you." And they said, "Well, there's rental due on it. It happens that it starts from the time the equipment was delivered in San Francisco, until the time it was brought here, and up to the present time, even though it is not working." And I said, "Well, I am not changing it, but I will turn in a letter to Colonel Robinson to the effect that if the appraisal equals the amount the Hawaiian Constructors ask for their equipment, or exceeds it, why, I will O. K. the price that they had set [3786] on all of this equipment."

57. General FRANK. I don't get that. If what?

Mr. PARKER. If the amount.

58. General FRANK. What amount?

Mr. PARKER. Well, you see I was \$30,000 or \$35,000 under Hawaiian Constructors' set figure of this equipment. Well, if the amount—say my figures were \$75,000 or \$80,000, and they had so much rental coming to meet the figures that were set up, or exceed those figures, why, it was perfectly all right for the Government to pay it, if they had that rental coming.

59. Major CLAUSEN. What you mean is that, if their claim to this rental was correct, then quite obviously they were entitled to the rental?

Mr. PARKER. Why, certainly.

60. Major CLAUSEN. That is all it amounted to, that you told them?

Mr. PARKER. That is all—my appraisal plus the rental that they were entitled to, would exceed or meet the price they asked, why then it was up to the Government to pay it. I didn't, as far as my appraisal, I wasn't going to boost it just because there was rental due on it. That had nothing to do with me. If they had gone into a contract with the Government for rental, why, as I say, that was a different story.

61. Major CLAUSEN. Bearing in mind, therefore, that your appraisal was in the neighborhood of \$131,000, and that they asked for \$166,000, did you therefore write a letter, to the effect that if the difference between \$131,000 and \$166,000 was rental, then that represented a sum total that they should be paid of \$166,000?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

[3787] 62. Major CLAUSEN. Did anybody at any time, Mr. Parker, ever show you a basis for their claim to this rent in the form of a written document?

Mr. PARKER. I never saw and I don't suppose I ever did see any of those written contracts anyway.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Did not this all strike you as a most unusual, unheard-of proceeding?

Mr. PARKER. Well, at the time, no, it did not. But it seemed kind of funny that they would ask me to boost the price if there was rental or a contract written at the time, because we were so busy at the time I didn't even stop to think about it. I did my work and had more work to do and it did not—well, I just thought about it, that is all—I didn't ask questions or go and ask anybody else about it.

64. Major CLAUSEN. I do not mean the rental part. I mean this idea of putting you off in a corner with all these contractors and men surrounding you and you being the only government man there.

Mr. PARKER. I felt very much out of place and I was put out about it, that somebody else was not there to represent the government. I thought, in fact, that Colonel Robinson should have been there to tell me about this rental thing.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Did it seem to you a gang-up to force you to agree upon an established price?

Mr. PARKER. Very much so.

66. Major CLAUSEN. As a matter of fact, this equipment was not all in good operating condition.

Mr. PARKER. It was not workable, I do not believe, in my opinion.

[3788] 67. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you mean it was not workable because it was not in working condition or not workable because they were not using it then?

Mr. PARKER. It was not workable equipment, because they were doing repair work on it while I was there.

68. Major CLAUSEN. Did you also have occasion with respect to another appraisal to work with a Mr. Tillman?

Mr. PARKER. Yes.

69. Major CLAUSEN. Had that to do with the purchase of certain equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

70. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall the story to that in such a manner that you can briefly tell the Board what that was about?

Mr. PARKER. There was a Mr. Gilman—

71. Major CLAUSEN. Gilman?

Mr. PARKER. Gilman, yes.

72. Major CLAUSEN. In addition to Mr. Tillman?

Mr. PARKER. That is right. —and myself, went out to look over some equipment that was in the yard of the Hawaiian Contractors at Moilili. It seemed like the equipment had already been appraised, but they were going out there to check it over, for what reason I do not know, because Mr. Tillman did not tell us. We went out there and met Mr. Ross, who was in charge of the yard. We looked over a few pieces, and Mr. Ross got a telephone call, and he came over after he finished with the phone and talked to Mr. Tillman, and we left. We did not appraise any of the equipment. We just had started checking it. Mr. Tillman received this—well, they stepped off to one side for their conversation. I don't know what was said [3789] to Mr. Tillman, and he came over and said "Let's go back" and we were called back.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Were you there long enough and had you had observation enough of some of this equipment to see whether it was workable or was in poor condition?

Mr. PARKER. At that time, no.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Did you later on?

Mr. PARKER. Later on, we did.

75. Major CLAUSEN. And you verified what fact as to those questions; what were your observations as to the condition of this equipment?

Mr. PARKER. You mean at that time.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Later on, Mr. Parker.

Mr. PARKER. It was equipment that was old, obsolete equipment, had not been used for years.

77. Major CLAUSEN. Such as what?

Mr. PARKER. There were a couple of graders, a scarifier, some old wagon dumps on steel wheels, some wagon dumps on wooden wheels. In fact, there was about, I should say, 15 pieces or 25, between 15 and 25 pieces that were sitting in the yard there that was old equipment.

78. Major CLAUSEN. And this second observation, I mean this second trip of yours out there, occurred how long after the first trip?

Mr. PARKER. I don't remember.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Was it within a matter of months?

Mr. PARKER. Oh, three months. The F. B. I. came and took us out there.

80. Major CLAUSEN. You say then the Engineers put you on furlough?

[3790] Mr. PARKER. Well, after October, 1942; then I still remained with them until 1943, or 1944, this year.

81. Major CLAUSEN. Did anyone from the Engineers communicate with you about your appearance before the Board before you came here today?

Mr. PARKER. Only the MP said I was to report up here.

82. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

Mr. PARKER. You mean from the outside, some civilian contractor?

83. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. PARKER. That is all.

84. General RUSSELL. In this conference that you discussed where some four people representing the Hawaiian Constructors were present and you were the sole agent of the federal government, do you remember who led in the conversations at that time for the Constructors?

Mr. PARKER. Mr. Rohl and Mr. Middleton.

85. General RUSSELL. Did you know to whom this equipment belonged that you had recently estimated the value of?

Mr. PARKER. Who do you mean belonged to? A company or an individual?

86. General RUSSELL. As far as you know, any one or more of the Hawaiian group could have owned it?

Mr. PARKER. I knew the local men did not, that is, Mr. Woolley and Mr. Benson of the Hawaiian Contractors, because at that time, selling trucks, I got around and saw these people.

87. General RUSSELL. Who was this man Middleton?

Mr. PARKER. He was in charge of administration, I guess; he was their business manager.

[3791] 88. General RUSSELL. For all of the contractors?

Mr. PARKER. Hawaiian Constructors, so far as I knew.

89. General RUSSELL. Was he a local man or was he from the mainland?

Mr. PARKER. He was from the mainland.

90. General RUSSELL. I was answering the telephone and may have missed one or two things. What time in the morning did you start on this inspection?

Mr. PARKER. At 8 o'clock.

91. General RUSSELL. And you finished that night?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir. We really had to go to do it, too. We were driving 40 and 50 miles an hour.

92. General RUSSELL. You say "we had to go". Who was with you?

Mr. PARKER. This young fellow who knew where all the equipment was that worked for the Hawaiian Constructors. He went around and checked equipment, so he knew where it was all located.

93. General RUSSELL. They gave you a list when you started out on this trip of the equipment you were to appraise?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

94. General RUSSELL. You appraised all of that equipment in one day?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. You were thoroughly familiar with all those items of equipment?

Mr. PARKER. No, sir.

96. General RUSSELL. You were not thoroughly familiar?

Mr. PARKER. No, sir.

[3792] 97. General RUSSELL. Therefore, on some of the appraisals you were influenced by what, if you did not know the value?

Mr. PARKER. Influenced by the figures they had on the paper, like—I will give you two instances. This—I wish I could think what it called. It is a pump.

98. Colonel TOULMIN. What kind of a pump was it?

Mr. PARKER. For pumping in tunnel work and things like that.

99. General FRANK. A suction pump?

Mr. PARKER. No. It is more than a suction pump.

100. Colonel TOULMIN. Water?

Mr. PARKER. Cement.

101. Major CLAUSEN. To pour cement?

Mr. PARKER. Cement.

102. Colonel TOULMIN. Cement gun pump?

Mr. PARKER. A great big thing that pushed through a big pipe. But on the trucks and the shovels and also the motors, those I checked. I looked at every truck.

103. General RUSSELL. You did feel yourself qualified and competent to appraise those latter items of property you just described?

Mr. PARKER. Now, you say competent. I felt that my job was something that was a little bigger than I had ever had before, but I felt from my experience over here—now, you don't fit the experience over here like you do on the mainland, if you are taken and put in the same position as an appraiser that has had the experience in the States or that sold big equipment—no, I was not.

104. General RUSSELL. But is it true, or not, that where there was doubt in your mind as to the value at which you might [3793] appraise a given item of equipment, you gave the Hawaiian Constructors the benefit of that doubt by adopting the figures at which they had listed this equipment?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, I think I did.

105. General RUSSELL. Then the outcome of your appraisal must necessarily have been that if it erred at all it was on the side of liberality toward the Constructors rather than otherwise?

Mr. PARKER. No, I felt that I was not being liberal to the Constructors. I was trying to make it fair for both the government by appraising it where they would get their value in usage out of the equipment that we would buy—I say “we”. I mean the government.

106. General RUSSELL. You felt, however, that the appraisal which you made of the entire lot of equipment was full and fair to the Constructors?

Mr. PARKER. Very much, both fair to the Constructors and to the government.

107. General RUSSELL. You called them as you saw them?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir. I was not led or had anybody tell me a thing about it.

108. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

109. Colonel TOULMIN. I have one question. What were the defects that you found on this equipment covered up by the paint, do you remember?

Mr. PARKER. You know, those shovels, how they crack. They welded them and there were still cracks.

110. Colonel TOULMIN. Where? In the boom?

Mr. PARKER. Yes, sir.

[3794] 111. Colonel TOULMIN. The turntable?

Mr. PARKER. The boom.

112. Colonel TOULMIN. How were the gears?

Mr. PARKER. The gears were in good shape.

113. Colonel TOULMIN. How about the motors?

Mr. PARKER. The motors—two of the shovels were running and one, as I said before, they were still working on it, and they couldn't get the darned thing to run.

114. Colonel TOULMIN. How about the cables and sheaves?

Mr. PARKER. Worn.

115. Colonel TOULMIN. Not badly worn?

Mr. PARKER. Not badly worn.

116. Colonel TOULMIN. But they were worn?

Mr. PARKER. Yes.

117. Colonel TOULMIN. How were the bearings on the sheaves?

Mr. PARKER. The bearings on the sheaves were fair. There were a lot of new parts they had put on them, but you yourself know that a boom will crack. They did a good job of welding and painting over.

118. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, a boom that has been cracked and welded is a pretty second-rate kind of an article?

Mr. PARKER. It will bust again.

119. General GRUNERT. Now, Mr. Parker, do you think of anything that you might tell the Board to assist it in coming to a conclusion, anything else on your mind that you think the Board ought to know?

Mr. PARKER. I could mention one thing that you might know already.

120. General GRUNERT. Go ahead and tell us.

[3795] Mr. PARKER. On this equipment that the Hawaiian Contracting Company had, we never used any of it as far as I know, of the pieces that I mentioned a while ago, these graders and these old wagons. I happened to be down at the junk base yard yesterday and there they were sitting down there. They never were used, as far as I know.

121. General GRUNERT. Anything else?

Mr. PARKER. No.

122. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

123. Major CLAUSEN. I wish to read into the record a memorandum written to me in pencil by Major Lozier heretofore referred to in the testimony, which memorandum is that—

124. General GRUNERT. Who is Major Lozier?

125. Major CLAUSEN. Major Lue Lozier, JAGD referred to in the radiogram as being now permanently assigned to the Hawaiian Department and which radiogram was the one which indicated that General Bragdon and Major Powell were coming to the islands.

[3796] 126. General GRUNERT. Is that radiogram in the record?

127. Major CLAUSEN. It was read in the record, yes, sir. Major Lozier previously was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C.

This memorandum reads as follows:

(Memorandum dated September 16, 1944, Major Lozier to Major Clausen, is as follows:)

16 SEPTEMBER 1944.

Major CLAUSEN: I have searched the files in Col. Wimer's office USED and can find no letters or telegrams between Col. Wyman and Mr. Rohl—or records of telephone conversations between them. Col. Wyman says there is only one that he recalls—a formal travel order in February 1941 to Rohl to come out here—but I cannot locate it. As Col. Wyman recalls there was no answer to this one and I cannot locate any record of reply or action on this following the issuance of the travel order.

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Signed "Lozier".

128. General GRUNERT. What is Colonel Wimer's office? What official position?

129. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Wimer is presently the District Engineer; he testified yesterday.

And then I have this memorandum also from Major Lozier. It refers to "above data," which data are: estimated cost of total work, estimated cost of work canceled, final estimated cost of work, and the fees.

The memorandum reads:

[3797] (Memorandum dated September 15, 1944, Major Lozier to Major Clausen, is as follows:)

Major CLAUSEN: Above data taken directly from the basic contract, the supplements and the change orders. #53 was the final settlement agreement whereby it was estimated that 87.2% of the work theretofore put under the contract had been completed.

Signed "Lozier".

The figures I give will be the total figures:

Estimated cost of total work under the Hawaiian Constructors' Contract No. W-414-eng-602, \$112,031,375.

Estimated cost of work canceled, \$14,342,514.

Final estimated cost of work, \$97,688,861.

Fixed fee, \$1,215,597.

Fixed fee canceled by termination, \$155,597.

Fixed fee received by Hawaiian Constructors, \$1,060,000.

Then he has on here the figures as of 7 December 1941, if the Board wishes them. I may as well read them:

Estimated cost on that date, \$19,545,557.

Fixed fee as of that date, \$455,145.

And he has on here, with respect to the basic contract:

Estimated cost of work per basic contract, \$1,097,673.

Fixed fee per basic contract, \$52,220.

130. General GRUNERT. All right. Now you go ahead, Colonel Toulmin.

131. Colonel TOULMIN. I have here before me the complete record of the trial before a military commission in this Territory of Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, which resulted in his [3798] conviction and sentence to death. This was reviewed and changed to a sentence in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, for a period of 50 years. The essence of the record is found in the following documents:

First, the order of commitment of Kuehn to the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, consisting of six pages; the essential messages which constitute the essence of his offense, consisting of the code that he had supplied to the Japanese consulate in connection with his conspiracy with the Japanese consulate to transmit information as to the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and copies of three wires under dates respectively of December 3, 1941, December 5, 1941, and December 6, 1941; a statement by Kuehn under oath, taken before the investigator, Captain Chapman, under date of February 5, 1942, which sets out in summary his offense; an exhibit of January 3, 1942 which consists of an affidavit by Kuehn of some five pages, setting forth his actions that he admitted that he had taken and the offenses that he

had committed; and another affidavit of Kuehn under date of January 1, 1942, consisting of some eleven pages.

The sum and substance of these several documents, which I shall state for the benefit of the record, is that Kuehn visited Pearl Harbor from time to time, by agreement with the Japanese consulate, and located the vessels in the harbor so effectively that the testimony of the Port Captain showed that his locations were substantially correct. He apparently also even located them according to some code designation so that they could be picked out by anyone familiar with the harbor, and he supplied to the Japanese consulate, as a result of [3799] several visits, a simplified code by which the Japanese consulate could communicate and by which he himself could communicate by a variety of means, not only with Japan but with Japanese submarines offshore, these means of communication consisting of signals by the arrangement of sails on his boat, short-wave radio, a system of lights in his house, and a system of fires on the shore. The significant portion of the record is the fact that this information was an essential piece of information to the attack upon the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and the transactions occurred within approximately two weeks prior to the date of the attack.

The several documents heretofore mentioned are offered in evidence of a single exhibit, under the next number.

132. General FRANK. I think you had better give a designation of the thing as a whole, so if somebody wants to come back and see that he will know where it is.

133. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. The Otto Kuehn trial and conviction record, with appended affidavits and copies of the incriminating messages.

134. General FRANK. Where on file?

135. Colonel TOULMIN. The complete record, with attached exhibits, is on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department, now under the control of the Headquarters Pacific Area.

(Copy of essential documents in re Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, was marked Exhibit No. 52 and received in evidence.)

136. Major CLAUSEN. I shall read into the record at this time Office Memorandum, United States Government; date: September 11, 1944; to: SAC, Honolulu; No. 65-33780; from: John Edgar Hoover, Director—Federal Bureau of Investigation; his initials, "JEH":

[3800] (Memorandum dated September 11, 1944, from John Edgar Hoover to Sac, Honolulu, is as follows:)

Subject: KURT FREDERICK LUDWIG was; et al; ESPIONAGE—G

Reference is made to your radiogram dated September 10, 1944, and to Bureau cable dated September 11, 1944.

The information desired by Major Clausen is a letter addressed to C. W. Smith, Esquire, Post Office Box 1254, Shanghai, China, which had enclosed a postal card depicting Diamond Head and a map of the Island of Oahu. The letter was signed "Hmar."

On March 18, 1941, an individual having a passport in the name of Julio Lopez was killed at Times Square, New York City, by a taxicab and it was subsequently determined that his true name was Ulrich von der Osten. Investigation determined that Von der Osten had been sent to the United States by the German Intelligence to direct the espionage activities of Kurt Frederick Ludwig and his associates.

A Laboratory report reflecting the identification of the handwriting of Lopez with that on the "Hmar" letter is attached for your information.

1946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Ludwig and all of his associates received substantial sentences for their espionage activities in March of 1942.

Attachment

[3801] The attachment I offer in evidence as the exhibit next in order.

(Copy of laboratory report of F. B. I. dated November 19, 1941, re: HMAR; C. W. Smith; Espionage (G), was marked Exhibit No. 53 and received in evidence.)

137. General GRUNERT. All right. We shall go to other business.

(Whereupon, at 10:10 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[3802]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[3803]

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1944

FORT SHAFTER, TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 16, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry D. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL BERNARD L. ROBINSON, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, 520 1ST ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTION, HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA (Recalled)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel Robinson is being recalled by the Board. The witness is reminded he is still under oath.

2. General GRUNERT. All right, General Frank, go right ahead.

3. General FRANK. Colonel Robinson, you have an additional statement that you would like to present to the Board?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

4. General FRANK. Is it a satisfactory mode of presentation, do you think, to read the statement that you have signed, and then to submit the chart as an exhibit?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir, that would be satisfactory.

5. General FRANK. All right, suppose you read your statement.

[3804] Colonel ROBINSON (reading):

Since appearing before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on September 15, 1944, I have reviewed the files of the District Engineer's office relative to appraisal of equipment owned by the Rohl-Connolly Company, and desire to submit in further explanation of my testimony, a copy of a memorandum to me signed by Mr. M. G. Parker. I submit this memorandum as Exhibit A to this statement. On the memorandum appears in my handwriting and initialed by me, a statement as follows: "Rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal price. Prices submitted by Rohl approved." My statement on this memorandum was written on or about March 12, 1942, and means that the rentals plus Mr. Parker's appraisal price exceeds the price at which the Rohl-Connolly Company appraised the equipment in question. A calculation was made of the rentals and it substantially exceeds the difference between Hawaiian Constructors appraisal and Mr. Parker's appraisal. The price asked by the Rohl-Connolly Company was therefore approved in accordance with Mr. Parker's recommendation. It would appear therefore that had the procedure suggested to me by the Board during my testimony been followed, to wit: the payment of rental plus Mr. Parker's appraisal of about March 12, a greater price would have been paid by the Government for this equipment than was actually paid under the procedure adopted.

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The exhibit that refers to that much of this statement is this single letter here.

On the second point:

[3805] At my appearance before the Board on 15 September, it was stated that it had been reported to me that the equipment purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company was "junk," and that I had then said we would not purchase it. However, I caused an appraisal to be made by an employee of the Department named Gentry. An appraisal was also made by Mr. Roblee.

There is a copy of this here, attached, in 8 sheets.

The price asked by the Hawaiian Contracting Company was \$159,085. Gentry's appraisal was \$154,500. Roblee's was \$156,150. The appraisal was submitted to the District Engineer who approved it in the sum of \$156,411, or approximately \$2,500 less than the asking price.

And also what does not appear as part of this record, but which I checked in the District Files were the vouchers, which indicated it had been paid in the amount approved by the District Engineer.

The approval was dated March 13, 1942. It is to be noted that each and every item of equipment was appraised by competent appraisers at some substantial value and any statement therefore that this equipment or any item of it was "valueless," "worthless" or "junk" is in error and any inference that the government did not get full value is incorrect.

6. General FRANK. What about the next page?

Colonel ROBINSON. That is the exhibit.

7. General FRANK. That is part of the exhibit?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes. I can read this first exhibit. The other will be rather bulky. This is a memorandum to [3806] Colonel Robinson under date of March 12th.

8. General FRANK. Just a minute. This is written to you by Mr. Parker, the man who made the appraisal?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel ROBINSON (reading):

(Memorandum to Colonel Robinson from M. G. Parker, dated March 12, 1942, is as follows:)

With reference to the attached appraisal of equipment owned by Rohl-Connolly Company:

It has been explained that it will be necessary for the government to pay back rental on this equipment from the time of delivery.

If the rental from the time of delivery plus the appraised price shown on the attached list exceeds the price set by the Rohl-Connolly Co., it is recommended the purchase price asked by the Rohl-Connolly Co. be accepted.

Signed: "M. G. Parker, Appraiser."

And the following is in ink in my handwriting:

Rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal price. Prices submitted by Rohl approved.

And initialed by me "B. L. R."

(Eight-page estimate of equipment, Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd., was marked Exhibit 54 and was received in evidence.)

[3807] 10. General FRANK. You have seen the basic contract?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

11. General FRANK. With the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

12. General FRANK. That contract provides for rental of equipment, is that correct?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it does, yes, sir. I have not reviewed it recently.

13. General FRANK. That is rental of equipment from the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes.

14. General FRANK. What written agreement existed which provided for the payment of rental equipment that belonged to the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Colonel ROBINSON. I do not know, sir.

15. General FRANK. Then what authority did you have for authorizing rental?

Colonel ROBINSON. I did not authorize rents.

16. General FRANK. Was not the difference between the appraisal and the amount that was paid the difference between the appraisal value and the appraisal value plus the rental?

Colonel ROBINSON. This was a means of arriving at the value of the equipment at the time the Government received it. It was the basis used for arriving at that value.

17. General FRANK. How long had they had it? How long did they use it?

Colonel ROBINSON. The Government had received it in Los Angeles some time prior to December 7th. I do not know the exact date, but it was prior to December 7th, because that was [3808] the equipment that was in the vicinity of Christmas Island on December 7th, on the LUDINGTON.

18. General FRANK. How long had they used it?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it arrived here some time in January, but I am not certain of the date.

19. General FRANK. Of what year?

Colonel ROBINSON. Of 1942.

20. General FRANK. It arrived here in January of 1942?

Colonel ROBINSON. That is my recollection. I am not sure of the date.

21. General FRANK. And this is being bought in March?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

22. General FRANK. Therefore, for 3 months use you are paying 26 percent of its value?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. This is a means of arriving at the value of the equipment at the time it was received by the Government.

23. General FRANK. But what is your explanation of the consideration for the rental?

Colonel ROBINSON. Mr. Parker appraised the equipment as of March 12th. That was its value on that date. In order to arrive at the value on the date on which the equipment was received, a means of computation was used of simply checking the fairness of Mr. Rohl's price or the Rohl-Connolly price, of adding to Mr. Parker's appraisal what the government would have paid in rental had it rented the equipment.

24. General FRANK. But it did not rent the equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, it purchased it outright.

25. General FRANK. Yes.

[3809] Colonel ROBINSON. Shortly after this date.

26. General FRANK. Since it did not rent this equipment, I do not understand your explanation, because Mr. Parker in his report says it will be necessary for the Government to pay back rental on this equipment from the time of delivery and in the following memorandum—

Colonel ROBINSON. That is Mr. Parker's statement

[3810] 27. General FRANK. And in the following memorandum that you signed you say, "Rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal price. Prices submitted by Rohl approved."

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

28. General FRANK. Well, that is where you enter into the rentals.

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. I didn't accept that price. I accepted a lower price, which was the price given by the Rohl-Connolly Company.

29. General FRANK. But right there you took rentals into consideration?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

30. General FRANK. And what authority did you have for it?

Colonel ROBINSON. I had the—it was simply a means of arriving at the—at a fair price, to determine what the actual value of the property was.

31. General FRANK. Was there a voucher signed on which this property was paid for?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

32. General FRANK. Who signed the voucher?

Colonel ROBINSON. I remember seeing the disbursing officer's signature, Major McCrone's signature, on there. I don't know who approved the voucher, sir.

33. General FRANK. Somebody had to sign the voucher that the property taken over was, at the time it was bought, fit for the purpose for which it was to be used and was worth the price that was being paid for it, didn't he?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

34. General FRANK. That is a regular, standard voucher, [3811] isn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

35. General FRANK. And if that voucher was signed, in the face of your explanation here, that certification couldn't have been correct?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't understand that statement, sir.

36. General FRANK. Well, because this is being taken over as of March 12.

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

37. General FRANK. And you have the appraised value of it as of March 12 as being some 26 percent less.

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, the recommendation of the appraiser is that in the event that under this computation the price exceeds that asked by Rohl, the price be approved as asked by Rohl, which was done.

38. General FRANK. Yes, but the appraiser had pressure brought upon him to make this statement (indicating). We have had the appraiser before this Board.

Colonel ROBINSON. Did you?

39. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, if he considered pressure, I certainly brought no pressure to bear on him.

40. General FRANK. Go ahead.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Robinson, you come now before the Board, and you give a statement here in explanation or change of your testimony; is that correct?

Colonel ROBINSON. It's an explanation of it, yes, sir.

42. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, you say here:

On the memorandum appears in my handwriting and [3812] initialed by me, a statement as follows: "Rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal price."

What basis whatsoever was there for that rental, in writing?

Colonel ROBINSON. None that I know of, sir.

43. Major CLAUSEN. All right. You tell me here in this statement that you have reviewed the files of the District Engineer's office relative to this matter since you testified. You have looked for that and couldn't find it, haven't you?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, I didn't look for any such thing.

44. Major CLAUSEN. Well, why did you not look for the basis for the rentals?

Colonel ROBINSON. I have explained before that this method was a method—I have forgotten whether it was my idea to do it that way or whether it was the District Engineer's to do it that way: a basis of arriving at the true value of the equipment at the time the Government received it.

45. Major CLAUSEN. Don't you understand that before you can pay rent to anyone there is a prescribed procedure that must be followed—

Colonel ROBINSON. I paid no rent, Major.

46. Major CLAUSEN. —which assumes a written agreement, sir?

Colonel ROBINSON. I paid no rent.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Was the procedure that you followed in this regard with respect to rent your usual procedure in the Engineering Department when you were under Colonel Wyman here?

Colonel ROBINSON. It was the procedure to check the value of the equipment, yes, sir.

48. Major CLAUSEN. Was the procedure that you followed in [3813] this case your usual procedure with regard to payment of rents? Just answer yes or no, and explain.

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't believe I can answer that yes or no. It was one of the checks made in the cases where property had been in use prior to the time that the appraisal was made, which, due to the circumstances at around December 7th, where troops and other agencies were taking this property and putting it to use without any authority, and later the District Engineer's office having to settle up those accounts, that was a procedure used; yes, sir.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Regardless of what this contract stated, you would pay rental without any written agreement?

Colonel ROBINSON. I have stated that we did not pay the rental.

50. General FRANK. Let me ask him, just a minute.

Colonel ROBINSON. That it was a method of arriving at the true value of the equipment.

51. General FRANK. If you didn't pay any rental, let me ask you this: For how long was the equipment actually used?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, to the best of my knowledge the equipment arrived here in January on the LUDINGTON. Now, I have stated that I couldn't recall the exact date.

52. General FRANK. And it was used but two or three months?

Colonel ROBINSON. From January until March 12, if that's the period we are taking up, yes, sir.

53. General FRANK. And the rest of the time from the time it was put on the boat at Los Angeles it was on the LUDINGTON?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

54. General FRANK. That is correct, isn't it?

[3814] Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I don't know, sir. I believe some of it was taken off at Christmas Island.

55. General FRANK. But you don't know?

Colonel ROBINSON. I am not sure of that.

56. General FRANK. You don't know?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't know, no, sir.

57. General FRANK. Yes. But, so far as you know, it was not in use by the Government other than in transit on a boat?

Colonel ROBINSON. Some of it possibly at Christmas Island.

58. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. The remainder in transit on the boat, yes, sir.

59. General FRANK. Yes. Now, do you think that 26 percent is a reasonable rental on equipment for two or three months' use?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, the life of some of the equipment is as low as one or two years; the life of some of the equipment.

60. General FRANK. Well, if that is right, the equipment would pay for itself in five months? Four months?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. But we didn't pay that. We paid less than that.

61. General FRANK. I know. But do you think that 26 percent is a reasonable rental for two or three months' use?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, it sounds high.

62. General FRANK. It sounds high?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

63. General FRANK. All right. Then, the difference between any rental, if there were any, and what you paid, was an excess in appraisal, because the equipment should have arrived, to all intent and purposes, in as good condition as when it left Los Angeles?

[3815] Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, I don't believe that.

64. General FRANK. Well, do you know anything about it?

Colonel ROBINSON. That particular equipment?

65. General FRANK. No. Do you know whether it suffered en route?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, I don't recall it.

66. General FRANK. All right; go ahead.

67. Major CLAUSEN. Well, if you don't know, from where did you get your information as to whether the rentals added to appraisal exceed the appraisal price? Why do you think that the rentals added to appraisal—

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe I made the computation myself, sir.

68. Major CLAUSEN. You made a computation?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

69. Major CLAUSEN. You had read this basic contract, though, hadn't you? This is a stock form of contract?

Colonel ROBINSON. I had at that time, yes, sir.

70. Major CLAUSEN. And you knew then, as it stated here and as read by General Frank, that each contract for rental of construction plants equipment, and so forth, shall be in a form prescribed by the Secretary of War, approved by the contracting officer? You knew that then?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

71. Major CLAUSEN. And you had no such form or contract before you, did you?

Colonel ROBINSON. On this equipment rental?

72. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir, on the equipment.

Colonel ROBINSON. That's the only contract I know of.

[3816] 73. Major CLAUSEN. You had no such contract for the rental of this Rohl-Connolly Company equipment, did you?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

74. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, you said to the Board here something with regard to this second point, and you furnished several so-called appraisals by various men. Who was this man Gentry?

Colonel ROBINSON. Gentry was an employee of the District Engineer, sir.

75. Major CLAUSEN. He was representing the Hawaiian Constructors, was he not, in making this appraisal?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. I believe Mr. Roblee was representing the Hawaiian Constructors.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you believe. Do you know, sir?

Colonel ROBINSON. I am fairly certain of that.

77. Major CLAUSEN. Do you understand that a Colonel Hunt, John E. Hunt, made a very exhaustive study of this matter?

Colonel ROBINSON. I may have the two men's names mixed around. I believe that one of these men is an employee of the Department and the other is an employee of the Hawaiian Constructors.

78. Major CLAUSEN. This man Roblee, H. J. Roblee, who was he?

Colonel ROBINSON. I was under the impression—I may be wrong—that Gentry represented us and Roblee represented the Hawaiian Constructors.

79. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, Mr. Gentry was employed by the Hawaiian Constructors but represented the Engineering Corps in this matter; is that right?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe one of these men represented [3817] the Engineering Corps.

80. Major CLAUSEN. But you don't know?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't know at the moment, no, sir. I can probably find that out from the records.

81. Major CLAUSEN. Well, you say you examined the files. Don't you think that is rather important, for you to see whether the Government had a man in on this appraisal, sir?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, probably I should have checked it further, yes, sir.

82. Major CLAUSEN. But you haven't done that?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. I can do that, however.

83. Major CLAUSEN. And this Mr. H. J.—

84. General FRANK. Haven't you already submitted this as sworn testimony?

85. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

86. Major CLAUSEN. And had we not had the privilege of cross-examining you, don't you know that this may have swayed the Board? (There was no response.)

87. Major CLAUSEN. Who is this Mr. H. J. Roblee that you refer to in your statement?

Colonel ROBINSON. I will have to find out, sir.

88. Major CLAUSEN. You don't know?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't know at this time, no, sir.

89. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Who else was in on this appraisal that you referred to here? Mr. Gentry and Mr. Roblee and who else?

Colonel ROBINSON. As far as I know, those were the only two appraisers, as given by this record right here.

[3818] 90. Major CLAUSEN. Wasn't there a Mr. Ross?

Colonel ROBINSON. Not to my knowledge.

91. Major CLAUSEN. A Mr. Edward Ross, an employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Company? You don't know that either, sir?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, we had the Hawaiian Contracting Company price here. I don't know who his represent—who brought up this price over here.

92. Major CLAUSEN. Well, do you know if a Mr. Edward Ross, an employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, had anything to do with this appraisal?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I don't recall Mr. Ross.

93. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know whether this appraisal that you have offered to the Board here this morning is the amount substantially, named in a letter addressed by Mr. Rohl to the District Engineer, dated 9 January 1942, that he wanted?

Colonel ROBINSON. That may be true. I don't know, sir.

94. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know that?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir, I don't.

95. Major CLAUSEN. You haven't found that in your search of the files?

Colonel ROBINSON. My search of the files simply asked for—calling for the documents on the appraisals.

96. Major CLAUSEN. No. Colonel, you say you have reviewed the files?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

97. Major CLAUSEN. Relative to that appraisal?

Colonel ROBINSON. I have reviewed these files.

98. Major CLAUSEN. Now, just refer back to the Rohl-Connolly [3819] equipment. That was finally at a price set by Mr. Rohl; isn't that correct? Some \$166,000?

Colonel ROBINSON. That was his asking price; yes, sir. I believe so, sir.

99. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Now, I am asking you the question, with regard to this property purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company, whether the same thing wasn't true there, that Mr. Rohl

suggested this price that was finally the appraisal of these three men, Gentry, Roblee, and Ross.

Colonel ROBINSON. It may have been. I do not know, sir.

100. Major CLAUSEN. Now let me ask you this: You said here in this statement this morning—

(There was colloquy off the record.)

101. Major CLAUSEN. You say now something about this equipment not being junk. You make the bald statement here;

It is to be noted that each and every item of equipment was appraised by competent appraisers at some substantial value and any statement therefore that this equipment or any item of it was "valueless," "worthless," or "junk" is in error and any inference that the government did not get full value is incorrect.

Whose language is that?

Colonel ROBINSON. That is my language, sir.

102. Major CLAUSEN. And when did you dictate that?

Colonel ROBINSON. I did not dictate it, sir. I wrote it in longhand on the—Saturday, I believe it was.

103. Major CLAUSEN. Don't you know, sir, that some of that same equipment is, even today, or as recently as a few days ago, unused because it was just plain, clear junk?

[3820] Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I don't know that.

104. Major CLAUSEN. Have you looked to see?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

105. Major CLAUSEN. Have you inquired to find out?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

106. Major CLAUSEN. And yet you made that statement that it is not junk, and you haven't inquired to find out?

Colonel ROBINSON. I base that on this record right here.

107. Major CLAUSEN. You base it on the appraisal?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

108. Major CLAUSEN. But the appraisal was made before the price was paid, wasn't it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

109. Major CLAUSEN. So you don't know whether the equipment was ever used or not, do you?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I don't.

110. Major CLAUSEN. All right; that is about all.

[3821] 111. General RUSSELL. Colonel, in this written affidavit which you have submitted, I copied, or understood you to read, this language:

A calculation was made on the rentals.

That is in that statement?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

112. General RUSSELL. Was that a written calculation?

Colonel ROBINSON. As I recall, it was made by me. I looked in the files for that and couldn't find it. It was probably based on the AGC rentals which I spoke of the other day, but I remember making such a computation.

113. General RUSSELL. Do you remember how old that equipment was when it came into the hands of the Government?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I don't recall that.

114. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, it had been used rather extensively and had been repaired by Rohl prior to the time it was brought to the islands, had it not?

Colonel ROBINSON. I am quite sure it was used equipment. Yes, sir; it was in use over there in Los Angeles, or in the vicinity of Los Angeles.

115. General RUSSELL. Do you remember the argument with Rohl, in which he was charged with having painted over defects in this machinery or this equipment, and in which Rohl asserted rather vigorously that that statement was untrue, that they had spent considerable money in putting it in condition? Do you recall that argument?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

116. General RUSSELL. But you do have the definite impression that it was second-hand, repaired equipment when it was loaded on the boat in Los Angeles and sent out?

[3822] Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir; I have that impression.

117. General RUSSELL. Do you know how long this equipment was in use?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I don't recall that. I left here about the middle of May 1942.

118. General RUSSELL. Colonel, my view of it is that the rental agreement, the basis for arriving at that sum of approximately \$35,000 for the use of this second-hand equipment which had a market value of only \$130,000, for the short period of January, was approximately 60 days. I repeat that I believe the Board, or I as an individual Member of the Board, at least, am very much interested in the basis of that rental calculation, and if it is possible for you to give us a more intelligent idea as to those bases, it would be helpful.

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

119. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

120. Colonel TOULMIN. Colonel, may I ask you just a question or two, to clear up this matter? Why was it, if you were going to pay rental indirectly, as the procedure indicates that you did, in taking it into consideration as a partial basis of compensation to the contractor, that you did not follow the normal procedure specified by the basic contract as to having written documents duly approved authorizing the payment of all rental? Why did you not follow that procedure?

Colonel ROBINSON. Well, probably the price to the Government would have been greater under that scheme. That is probably the reason.

121. Colonel TOULMIN. Let us assume it was. Let us assume [3823] It would have been greater, and, if just, the Government could have paid the larger fee; but I am asking you the question, why did you not follow the normal procedure as to rentals specified by the basic contract?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't believe that that was my decision, sir.

122. Colonel TOULMIN. Whose decision was it?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it was the District Engineer.

123. Colonel TOULMIN. Colonel Wyman's?

Colonel ROBINSON. Or some agreement that was reached.

124. Colonel TOULMIN. Was the decision Colonel Wyman's?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. I don't recall weighing that, or having that authority.

125. Colonel TOULMIN. I see. So your recollection is it was Colonel Wyman's decision?

Colonel ROBINSON. That is my recollection; yes, sir.

126. Colonel TOULMIN. Are you aware of the fact that the contractor, the seller, might have made a very substantial additional profit by this procedure, against the Government interests, by treating the rental as a part of a sales price, instead of as income, and paid income-tax upon it? Did you take that into consideration?

Colonel ROBINSON. I don't believe I get the point, sir, on income tax.

(Question read.)

Colonel ROBINSON. I didn't take into consideration any tax matters; no, sir.

127. Colonel TOULMIN. I think that is all.

127-A. General RUSSELL. I want to ask a question based on this [3824] last testimony. Now, do I understand, Colonel, that it is your present testimony that as you remember you were directed by Colonel Wyman to make this calculation of the rentals due on this equipment?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir; I didn't state that. I am not sure that that was so.

128. General RUSSELL. Well, why did you make the calculation, not in keeping with the provisions of the basic contract? As I recall, now, you stated that the decision to make the calculations not in keeping with the terms of the basic contract was Colonel Wyman's decision.

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

129. General RUSSELL. I am merely attempting to get that straight.

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. I believe my statement was that it was Colonel Wyman's decision to buy the equipment on the basis on which it was bought. I believe it was my decision, working under Colonel Wyman's direction, to have the property appraised, to use the method which I have described here.

130. General RUSSELL. I am afraid you are running around the stump on us, to use a common expression, Colonel.

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir. There were two questions.

131. General RUSSELL. Now, wait a minute. I would like to have an answer to a very simple question. The calculation of the rentals was made not in keeping with the basic contract. Now, somebody made the decision to calculate the rentals in that way, and I want to know whether you made that decision, or whether Wyman made it. Now, do you understand the question?

[3825] Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

132. General RUSSELL. All right. Can you answer that?

Colonel ROBINSON. To the best of my knowledge, I used that method.

133. General RUSSELL. And you made the decision to use that method?

Colonel ROBINSON. In arriving at an appraisal price which I could submit to the district engineer.

134. General RUSSELL. That question may be answered Yes or No. Many questions cannot; that one can.

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Colonel ROBINSON. I believe I answered it, sir. To the best of my knowledge I made the decision to use that method of arriving at the final appraisal price to submit to the district engineer.

135. General RUSSELL. Very well.

136. General GRUNERT. Did the district engineer approve your method of attempting to arrive at an appraisal price in that manner?

Colonel ROBINSON. He approved the recommendation. I don't know as he approved the details of it.

137. General GRUNERT. Did you recommend that the appraisal price be set at \$166,000, or whatever it was, and not at \$131,000? Did he have knowledge of how you arrived at the \$166,000, instead of taking the \$131,000?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

138. General GRUNERT. He had knowledge of that?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

139. General GRUNERT. And you acted as his agent in doing that?

[3826] Colonel ROBINSON. Well, I submitted it to him for approval, sir.

140. General GRUNERT. For approval?

Colonel ROBINSON. He had to approve it; yes, sir.

141. General GRUNERT. With full knowledge of how you arrived at it?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir; he had full knowledge; yes.

142. General GRUNERT. And he had full knowledge of the appraised value as made by Parker, did he?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

143. General GRUNERT. And he had full knowledge of the reason for hiking that price from Parker's up to the actual price at which it was sold?

Colonel ROBINSON. He had knowledge of the full transaction; yes, sir.

144. General GRUNERT. And therefore he consummated the deal by saying to sell it at that new price, which was figured between the appraised price and the price that they got, and with the addition of what they called the "rentals," or what corresponded to a consideration of rentals?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir. He made the final approval.

145. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

146. General FRANK. How soon after this arrangement was made did Colonel Wyman leave the territory?

Colonel ROBINSON. I am under the impression that he left somewhere around the 22nd of March. His approval I believe was around the 13th. That would be about nine days. It is my recollection he he was relieved on the 15th, and the best of my recollection is he remained here about one week there- [3827] after.

147. General FRANK. When Mr. Parker was sent out to get this appraisal on this Hawaiian Constructors property, he was directed to accomplish it in one day. What was the haste in getting this accomplished before Colonel Wyman left, or before he relinquished control?

Colonel ROBINSON. I believe it was his desire to wind up all the loose ends prior to the time he left.

148. General FRANK. So this was a "loose end"?

Colonel ROBINSON. Yes, sir.

149. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

150. General GRUNERT. Is there anything you wish to add?

Colonel ROBINSON. No, sir.

151. General GRUNERT. Thank you for coming down.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

152. Major CLAUSEN. I would like to read into the record paragraph "c" on Page 13, paragraph "c" and paragraph "d" on page 15 of Colonel Hunt's Report.

(Excerpts from report of Colonel Hunt:)

Page 13, paragraph "c":

It appears to be reasonably certain that the equipment in question had been in actual use for various lengths of time during January, February, and part of March at the time of purchase, although use records were not available and apparently were not maintained. There was no record of any rental agreement relating to any of this equipment. It is quite possible that assuming the fairness of Mr. Parker's appraisal on 12 March, the equipment had a substantially higher value when delivered to the site of use or at point of shipment. It does not, however, appear that a depreciation of [3828] approximately \$35,000 in value, or about 26% could have occurred in that period. No suitable basis was available upon which to reconstruct a fair value to apply to the equipment as of the date of delivery. Mr. Rohl's effort to sway the appraiser's judgment by references to rentals due, seems an obvious effort to distort the facts in his own favor. All trace of the retained voucher and supporting papers was missing. No memoranda or other papers were found in connection with Colonel Wyman's letter directing the purchase at Mr. Rohl's figures. In the absence of justifying evidence or testimony, the conclusion seems inescapable that Colonel Wyman was unduly swayed, contrary to the Government's interests, by an unwarranted acceptance of these representations of Mr. Rohl in the face of conflicting recommendations.

8. a. It is next alleged that just prior to his departure from Hawaii, Colonel Wyman rushed through a purchase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company paying \$156,411 for the lot, including a considerable amount of equipment, as mentioned in c below, that was unfit for the emergency used for which, it was represented, it was immediately needed. In this connection, the procedure to be followed in purchasing equipment in Hawaii was recommended in a letter signed by Mr. Rohl. (Exhibit P) The procedure was to base payment upon an appraisal to be made by a Mr. Bruce Gentry, representing the Hawaiian Constructors; a Mr. H. J. Roblee, employee of the Edward R. Bacon Company of Honolulu and a third man representing the owner. In the [3829] case of the equipment purchase now in question, the third party was Mr. Edward Ross, employee of the Hawaiian Contracting Company. These three appraised the equipment in question, placing an upper value of \$156,150 upon it. This appraisal was substantially the amount named in a letter addressed to Mr. Rohl to the District Engineer dated 9 January 1942. In this case, the Government was not properly represented. Mr. Roblee, ostensibly the Government's representative, owed his livelihood to the Edward R. Bacon Company, of which the Hawaiian Contracting Company was a substantial customer in equipment purchases, his interests relating to those of his employer and its substantial customer. Mr. Gentry was a contractor employee and Mr. Ross obviously served the interests of the vendor.

Page 14, paragraph "c":

The items hauled to salvage, unused, totaling \$9,100, were examined by the investigating officer. These items were so far obsolete as to warrant the description "archaic". Some of the Watson wagons (hand operated, bottom dump wooden wagons) were arranged for animal draft, while others had been equipped with trailer tongues. All had been robbed of metal parts before the purchase, some were badly rotted and others were termite eaten beyond any possible usefulness. Scrapers, scarifiers and like items were incomplete, badly rusted and of doubtful usability, even in an extremity. Other items accepted and taken into possession of the District Engineer subsequent to 1 July 1942 aggregated

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another \$20,511. These last [3830] items were useable, but their acquisition was totally unnecessary, suitable like items having been available in sufficient quantity prior to acceptance by the District Engineer's forces.

Page 15, paragraph "d":

This transaction was directed by Colonel Wyman on 13 March 1942, and payment was effected in the same manner as in the case of the Rohl-Connolly equipment (Paragraph 7). The files yielded no correspondence in the matter other than that mentioned herein. In the course of Major Lumsden's inquiry, it developed that the District Engineer's appraiser had undertaken an appraisal of some items of this equipment, had been denied access to it on the first attempt, and had later been permitted to examine it with the result that on the items inspected, values were recommended which were in substantial agreement with those later used, in the actual purchases. Nothing further was done at that time, however, and when the purchase was finally directed, this appraisal was ignored and the new one made as indicated above.

[3831] TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN STEWART BRAGDON, CHIEF OF CONSTRUCTION DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. (Recalled)

1. Colonel WEST. General Bragdon is appearing before the Board as a witness at his own request, and the witness having been previously sworn, it will not be necessary to swear him again, but he is reminded that he is still under oath.

2. General FRANK. General Bragdon, I understand as a result of a telephone conversation with you that you have a statement in extension of testimony already submitted to the Board that you would like to submit this morning.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

3. General FRANK. Will you proceed, sir.

General BRAGDON (reading):

My purpose is primarily to cover two questions which the Board has raised from the general viewpoint of the procedure of the Engineer Department. One was the inquiry as to who was responsible for the progress of the work. The other was as to the methods or procedures with reference to the length of time needed to meet the requirements of these procedures as it might affect speed of doing work.

I had originally desired to submit information on these questions to the Board and on understanding that I could not appear before it, much of the matter was prepared for inclusion in Colonel Wyman's affidavit which is supplementing his original statement. This affidavit is being submitted today and what I say will be only partly included therein. However, I shall refer to the same exhibits and not enlarge the Board's report by repeating them.

[3832] 4. General GRUNERT. May I interrupt there? Where did you get the impression that you could not appear before the Board as a witness?

General BRAGDON. Your letter to me stated that, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. That you could not appear before the Board as a witness?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. I have that here, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. I do not recall that you were told that you could not appear as a witness.

General BRAGDON. Shall I read it, sir?

7. General GRUNERT. Read that part.

General BRAGDON (reading):

With reference to paragraph 5, the Board will not hear General Bragdon in presenting additional evidence because it will not receive argument or presentation of counsel for anyone. Any additional evidence that can be brought out by witnesses may be presented by General Bragdon to the Assistant Recorder in accordance with the foregoing.

8. General GRUNERT. Very well; go ahead. The fact that the Board is now hearing you as a witness to present evidence is sufficient to show that the Board desires you to present whatever you wish to present. Is that right?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. And he can be considered as a witness, by that paragraph.

10. General GRUNERT. He is here as a witness. I just wanted to make sure that the record did not show that at any time we denied his coming here.

11. General RUSSELL. I do not know that that is entirely [3833] satisfactory to me. Will you read the statement of the General about his not being permitted to appear here as a witness?

(Thereupon, the statement requested, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)

12. General RUSSELL. This is what I had in mind, General: In your written statement you say this:

I had originally desired to submit information on these questions to the Board and on understanding that I could not appear before it, much of the matter was prepared for inclusion in Colonel Wyman's affidavit which is supplementing his original statement. This affidavit is being submitted today and what I say will be only partly included therein.

Now, the question that is troubling me is whether or not you think that any injustice has been done to the presentation of evidence to the Board from the standpoint of the Engineers by virtue of your having to include some of the things which you expected to say on these two questions in the Wyman affidavit.

General BRAGDON. Not now, sir. The very fact that I am here now, I think, takes care of all of that.

13. General RUSSELL. Let us not think about it too much. Is it your fixed belief now that the procedure that you have followed, including certain information in the Wyman affidavit, plus what you are going to say to us now, covers these subjects fully and adequately and in full justice to all concerned?

General BRAGDON. I would say, yes, sir, understanding that the facilities I have here are limited, that is, I found that some of these regulations, some of the later ones, were not [3834] here.

14. General RUSSELL. General, I am particularly directing these questions to the Board's procedure and asking if any Board procedure has worked an injustice to anybody concerned?

General BRAGDON. No, sir.

15. General RUSSELL. That is all.

16. Major CLAUSEN. The record also will show that the witness previously appeared before the Board as a witness and that he at that time was awarded those rights.

General BRAGDON. But that was quite impromptu, Major, you know. I didn't even know you were going to call me in.

17. General RUSSELL. I think the General and the Board understand each other.

18. General FRANK. Will you proceed, please?

General BRAGDON (reading):

The responsibility for progress of work as well as the quality thereof runs through the entire chain of Engineering Command. The first step should be in the selection of the contractor.

I am talking now primarily with reference to negotiated contracts, because now, since the war period, that is what we have been primarily interested in. The selection of contractors cannot be held as of such great import on this, on the advertising method, because anybody can submit a bid and they have to take cognizance of the low bid, so these statements adjust themselves particularly to the negotiated form which is now presented.

The contractor is chosen after consideration of his managerial ability, experience record, financial position, plant owned or controlled by him and quality and number of [3835] his personnel. A contractor is selected whose experience record shows that he can accomplish expeditiously and efficiently the particular type of work for which he will be used. The officer who recommends or selects a contractor should assure himself in respect to all of the points mentioned. A good contractor realizes his responsibility for progress in meeting a completion date. His past record has been attained through the quality of his staff. A high quality contractor will always push his job.

The Engineer Department Officer in immediate contact with the work is usually the Area Engineer. If an Area Engineer has more than one job or project under him, he will have a Job Engineer or a Resident Engineer on each job. It is this Job Engineer or Area Engineer who has the initial responsibility of checking the contractor's progress as well as quality of the work. If it is a hired labor job, it is the Area Engineer or Job Engineer's personal responsibility. On contract work the Area Engineer and the Job Engineer are assisted by inspectors who are chosen because of their training, ability, and character.

Field Areas submit to the District Engineer semimonthly reports of progress of all items of work under their jurisdiction. There is being submitted with Colonel Wyman's affidavit an exhibit marked "K", which is a sample of the semi-monthly report for the construction project at a station. This sample was chosen at random. Semi-monthly reports cover a location and general description of the job, description of the date of the directive and supplemental directives, date on which layout plans were [3836] approved by higher command, date the lease of the land was approved, the percentage of completion for the various main elements of the project, the estimated cost, the status of plans and specifications, operations during the previous half-month period, and operations expected in the next half-month period. In addition, there is always included a set of bar graphs by which are shown all the important features of work, the scheduled completion and the actual completion realized.

Monthly reports of Engineer Operations were always required by Orders and Regulations of the Corps of Engineers. Beginning in the early part of 1941, semi-monthly reports were required for the military projects. These reports became more detailed as the press and importance of speeding up work became greater.

And the necessity for keeping constant touch and contact with it.

Area Engineers do not depend on their periodic reports alone for their contact with the District office. They are in constant contact with the District office to report difficulties and to seek assistance. The District Engineer's first step towards rushing progress is the careful selection of Area Engineers from men known to be able and vigorous operators.

For that "first" I would rather say: "Next step." I have already stated or brought out that the selection of the contractor is possibly the first step.

All District offices have Operations and/or Divisions whose tasks are to keep constantly in touch with the work [3837] and to inspect it both for progress and quality. Under pressure of work, most Districts also had additional Transportation Divisions, Control Divisions for coordinating and expediting

sections. The Honolulu District had a Transportation Division and a special coordinator in charge of inspection.

A Division is the next higher echelon above the District Engineer. The Division Engineer also receives the monthly reports of operation and the semi-monthly progress reports. Division Engineers habitually visit all projects under their jurisdiction or have some of their assistants do so. During the peak of the war period many Division Engineers had so great a number of projects that they had to constantly select those with the highest priority or those encountering the most difficulties for personal inspection, leaving inspection of the others to their assistants.

Above the Division Engineers is the Chief of Engineers. The semi-monthly progress reports described are transmitted to his office where the Control Section examines them minutely to determine which projects are falling behind. Projects of major importance which are falling behind would generally be visited at once by a special investigator. Investigations are made on every project which has fallen more than 2 percent behind. These inquiries are often made by telephone or teletype. If not considered that urgent a full explanation is required by letter.

Just in the last couple of months, in accordance with this procedure, I have sent special investigators out to different [3838] jobs, one in the middle West, one on the Pacific Coast, another on the East Coast.

The time-consuming processes previously inquired into by the Board are those required by law, by regulations of the War Department or of the Engineer Department, or long-established procedures. The general purposes of these laws, regulations and long-established procedures are to protect the government in expenditures, and to insure a high quality of work, through the checking and control by higher echelons. This control and checking has been and is generally by means of a distribution among various echelons —

who are responsible for the work,

of contractual authorities, and technical authorities, according to the magnitude thereof, and type of the work. The experience as to how such authority should be delegated has been gleaned through a long period of experience in execution of great public works.

There was a transition from peace-time methods of procedure to war-time methods which was generally accomplished by a decentralization of contractual authorities to lower echelons and a relaxation of the extent of review of Engineering and estimates by higher echelons. At the same time, however, in accomplishing military construction, it became necessary to obtain additional coordination by securing the review of the using service.

In other words, although we relaxed in many of our requirements, in doing military work, we had to constantly seek and secure the concurrences of the different technical services [3839] using services and tactical commands.

Sometimes concurrences of several other services or of tactical authorities were required. The procedures which consume time may then be divided into two general categories; namely, those necessary in securing approval or concurrence by tactical agencies or other using services responsible for operating, and those procedures involved in securing technical approval through Engineer channels. With respect to the coordination with tactical superiors and with other technical or using services, Colonel Wyman has given numerous illustrations in his affidavit. I can confirm that in my fairly extensive examination of the files in the office of the Honolulu District Engineer, I have seen great numbers of series of correspondence conducted by letters and staff memoranda. These series of correspondence often consumed not merely weeks but some months.

I do not offer any criticism of those staff memoranda. I do say they existed and were constant, and probably the great majority of them were necessary to get the concurrences and approvals.

19. General FRANK. Between whom?

General BRAGDON. A great many of them went to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, primarily to his G-4, who was represented by his Department Engineer, and then he would coordinate them, for example, with the Signal Corps.

Before discussing briefly certain regulations, I would like to call attention to the fact that certain laws had to be changed before relaxation in contractual [3840] methods could be secured. One of the most fundamental laws governing the making of government contracts, if not the most fundamental, is that requiring the advertising for competitive bids for public works. The Act approved July 7, 1940, Public No. 703, 75th Congress, modified revised statutes in this respect. I am submitting as an exhibit—

the only one I intend to submit,

marked Exhibit 1, a circular letter from the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Finance Letter No. 226, dated December 9, 1940, which authorizes the Secretary of War to expend moneys for national defense purposes with or without advertising.

And that was a revolutionary thing, that without advertising.

Pertinent provision of this law are quoted in the exhibit.

There is a quotation of that law.

Another proviso of this law was the express authority to use the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract.

At the end there of this long quotation I have underlined that authorization.

I would like to discuss briefly the tabulations which are included with Colonel Wyman's affidavit marked Exhibits A, B, C and D to that affidavit. These exhibits are tabulations of the contractual authorities for advertised contracts, for negotiated lump sum and for negotiated cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts as those authorities were delegated to the District Engineer, to the Division Engineer and retained in or delegated to the Office of the Chief of [3841] Engineers, and in some cases, retained in the Under Secretary of War's office, and as those authorities varied in peace time of 1940, in later 1940, at the time of negotiation of the Hawaiian Constructors contract in December, 1940, just after that date and during 1941, just after Pearl Harbor, and then in the period which immediately followed. The tabulations were extracted from existing Orders and Regulations. Some of the Orders and Regulations were missing from the files of the District Engineer, and did not allow of a completely accurate checking. However, any inaccuracies which may exist in the tables do not affect the conclusions which are drawn.

20. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not those records ever were in those files?

General BRAGDON. These are the District Engineer's files.

21. General FRANK. There are certain things that are missing from them.

General BRAGDON. Well, I will say, in the first place, those things which are missing from them were ones which followed later in 1942, after the District had been absorbed by the Department Engineer, and should not affect very much the points I am making. I am quite sure they have them, sir, because I noticed a number of data the Board has asked for, they won't find it at first but eventually they have been able to find it.

22. General FRANK. Does that reflect on the administration of the office?

General BRAGDON. No, sir. Just for example, the Board wanted Colonel Robinson's testimony on that appraisal. That was put in another place—I have forgotten exactly where—which [3842]

was not unnatural to have been filed there, and they had been looking for it in another set of files, and they ran across it yesterday and I personally certified his handwriting on it.

In order to understand the limitations on the authorities of the District Engineer and the approvals that had to be secured by him in connection with his work as far as engineering and contractual matters were concerned, it is of highest importance that there be kept in mind that at the time of the negotiation of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, it was about a year before Pearl Harbor. The great sense of urgency that existed after Pearl Harbor was not yet present, although changes from peace-time procedure had already begun to be made. In the tabulations referred to, the following points are brought out:

(1) The low magnitude of the peace-time authority, not only of the District Engineer but also of the Division Engineer, in the three important respects of approval of specifications, making of awards, and approval of contracts: The limitations in all three of these respects were \$10,000 for the District Engineer, and \$50,000 for the Division Engineer. Also, at that time no negotiated contracts were permitted under the law.

This was the one that existed at that time. The one in there, I think, was dated 1938 and ran up till some changes came in May of 1940, just a rather small amelioration of the requirements.

23. General FRANK. Are you submitting those in evidence, or just referring to them?

General BRAGDON. I was just referring to them.

[3843] The next progressive step, I should say, was the December 9th, 1940, circular which I have submitted as Exhibit 1. Shortly after that came one in the Regulations of 19 February, 1941. The pertinent matter that I wanted brought out was contained in this. I wanted to show these are the regulations they were taken out of. Then in another order, regulations came out in February, 1943.

The only reason I refer to that was, by that time or shortly prior to that this contained a lot of the elements which had been included in circulars as to the war-time procedures.

(2) The low limitation for the District Engineer continued up to February 19, 1941. As far as the approval of plans and specifications was concerned this meant that most plans and specifications had to be submitted to the Division Engineer on the mainland.

(3) However, it will be noted that in early December, 1940, the authority for making awards and approval of the contracts for both the Division and District Engineers had been increased up to \$50,000 for the District Engineer and above \$50,000 for the Division Engineer providing there was no protest when awarding was made. It was at this time that authorities for negotiated contracts were first permitted in accordance with the new law permitting performance of the work without advertising. It was under this authority for the use of C. P. F. F. contracts that the Hawaiian Constructors contract was negotiated.

(4) Early in 1941, still 10 months before Pearl Harbor, it will be noted that under the stress of the new [3844] work for the Air Corps a rather large decentralization took place consisting of:—

The Engineers Department took over the work for the Air Corps in December of 1940. Some of the things that happened about that time were:

(a) District Engineers were now permitted to approve specifications up to \$50,000, to make awards up to \$50,000, and to approve lump-sum contracts up to \$100,000. Authority to negotiate—

24. General FRANK. Was that arrangement to take over the Air Corps construction an arrangement between General Arnold and General Somervell?

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General BRAGDON. I am not sure of that, sir. I was in Providence at that time, and I do not know exactly what happened.

25. General FRANK. Along about that time or some time in there, General Somervell had charge of construction in the Engineers Office, did he not?

General BRAGDON. He had charge of the Construction Division under the Quartermaster General, not under the Chief of Engineers.

26. General FRANK. What period was that?

General BRAGDON. It was at this period, and I know it continued for another year. I remember the two Decembers. December of 1940, from then to December of 1941 we did the Air Corps construction only. The rest of the military construction was done by General Somervell as a branch of the Quartermaster's office for that entire year, December, 1940, to December, 1941.

Authority to negotiate had been quickly taken advantage [3845] of. Limitations for the District Engineer for this was set up to \$100,000.

(b) In like manner, Division Engineers were now—still early 1941—

permitted to approve all specifications except for certain unusual cases. This meant that these did not have to go to Washington but only to the Division Engineer. Division Engineers were empowered to make awards up to \$500,000 in all cases, with only a few exceptions, and to approve of all contracts that the District Engineer forwarded, if on a standard form. Only those not on standard form had to go to Washington. On C. P. F. F. contracts, however, the limitation of the Division Engineer was fixed at \$500,000.

(c) It will be noted, however, that at this time—

This is shown in the tables. What I am doing now is drawing deductions that can be gotten from an analysis of the tables.

27. General FRANK. What tables?

General BRAGDON. The ones I referred to, which are submitted with Colonel Wyman's affidavit.

(c) It will be noted however, that at this time the authority to use the C. P. F. F. form of negotiated contract had to be first secured from the Under Secretary of War.

(5) It will be noted that from the tabulations decentralization had begun in May of 1940, or 19 months before Pearl Harbor.

(6) Attention is invited to the great decentralization made immediately after Pearl Harbor. The same month [3846] that Pearl Harbor occurred, the Engineer Department took over all military construction of the Quartermaster Corps. The decentralization after Pearl Harbor was many times what it had been before. The District Engineer now could approve all plans and specifications with exception only of certain unusual ones which were over \$100,000.

In other words, for the unusual ones, even if they were less than \$100,000, he could go ahead.

(7) The details of the additional decentralization under the war period are shown on the tabulations. It will be noted that later in the war period all advertised contracts became prohibited and that the authority of the District Engineer became \$3,000,000 and of the Division Engineer \$5,000,000.

In other words, it was just the absolute reverse of the peace-time period. They were not supposed to advertise at all. It had to be by negotiated contract.

As an addition to the table submitted by Colonel Wyman, the Division Engineer was in turn given authority to redelegate his entire authority up to \$5,000,000 for negotiated contracts, to District Engineers.

On all negotiated contracts.

In this connection the Chief of Engineers had delegated all his authority to Division Engineers. Any contract over \$5,000,000 had to go to the Under Secretary of War.

(8) It should be also noted that the contractual authority of District Engineers of \$3,000,000 was further delegated to Area Engineers.

I would like to add there that the Chief of Engineers [3847] insisted that the delegation be made, and if he found a Division Engineer or a District Engineer holding back from decentralizing the three administering authorities, he got after them quite vigorously, and the Division Engineers were likewise instructed.

(9) Exhibit "D" to Colonel Wyman's affidavit shows the relative authority for the execution of Change Orders to contracts. It shows similar trends to those described above. Decentralization in the execution of Change Orders began in 1941. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, decentralization was practically complete. The tabulation submitted in Table "D" in Colonel Wyman's affidavit was not complete in that a later change permitted a \$3,000,000 approval Change Orders by the District Engineer, or \$5,000,000 upon a re-delegation from the Division Engineer. In like manner, the table does not show a later change of an increase to \$5,000,000 limitation for the Division Engineer.

In the specific case of the District Engineer of Honolulu, four days after the attack at Pearl Harbor, the Division Engineer delegated to the District Engineer all of his contractual authority, upon instructions from Washington.

Since the Office of the Chief Engineer delegated to the Division Engineer his authority, that meant that the delegation was all that the Engineer Department had to give, because the next step, for C. P. F. F. contracts above \$5,000,000 was for the Under Secretary's office.

It is pertinent to point out as brought out in Colonel Wyman's testimony, that priorities ascribed to Hawaiian Constructors during 1941 were the same as those on the continent in spite of the isolated position of Hawaii.

[3848] That was brought out in earlier testimony.

Constant efforts were made by all echelons of command to secure higher priorities.

From the foregoing it is seen that the responsibility for many of the procedures which might have been said to be time-consuming because of the limitations of authority was not that of any individual but lay collective in existing laws, regulations of the War Department and of the Engineer Department, which laws and regulations had many sound reasons for existence, and that those responsible for such laws and regulations recognized the need for their alterations and took steps to that end in order to meet the increased speed of pre-war conditions even though there was no certainty of war.

(The following was added in writing to his statement by General Bragdon after completing his oral testimony:)

Further, that in any particular real emergency all regulations could be cut across and devices such as letter contracts utilized to get immediate action.

[3849] (Circular letter dated December 9, 1940, from Office of Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C., in re procurement and contracts for national defense purposes, was marked Exhibit No. 55 and received in evidence.)

General BRAGDON. Then, I would like to add to that that, in spite of any regulations whatsoever, when real emergencies came up, the Engineer Department cut right across—and the Secretary of War approved it—cut right across those regulations, and would execute contracts almost instantly. Just recently I had to execute a contract which was of high importance and secrecy, and we had the prime contractor's assent. That was on Saturday I learned about it, that Saturday, and a heavy equipment contractor and a constructing con-

tractor signed up the next day, on a Sunday, on a joint-venture subcontract to the prime contract.

In other words, in spite of any regulations, when any specific point comes up everybody in all the echelons goes to the telephone—the District, the Division, and the Chief's office, and if necessary the Under Secretary office—and they would do it in a matter of hours. This complete delegation that I have described—I know if Pearl Harbor—if it had been known that Pearl Harbor was coming, it would probably have been made months before, at such date that they did know that that might come.

One other point that is not covered in my statement is the matter of letter contracts. We also had the device of a letter contract where it was contemplated that a negotiated contract—well, first I would like to say, it should be borne in mind that these negotiated contracts and CPFF contracts—one of their [3850] prime essentials is the speed. You don't know the plans and specifications, so—but you do have an estimate. But you can get the work under way and submit your—work out your plans and specifications later.

Now, even if you expect some delay in the negotiation of a CPFF contract, you can initiate a letter contract. A letter contract is simply a very brief letter to the contractor that work of such and such a magnitude is expected and that a definitive contract will be entered into within a certain length of time, maybe two or three weeks, and he signs on that his acceptance. That letter contract was used quite frequently—I used one just the other day—to start work immediately. At that, it gives a legal basis for the contractor starting instantly, and allows money to begin to flow.

I didn't—I don't know as the Board has specifically asked anything about fees. I noted—I believe they did—I would like to state that we had a tabulation which is the same as a curve of what fees would be allowed, which we always followed religiously. We never paid more than the fees allowed by that curve; that the percentages allowed for fees, fixed fees, would naturally decrease as the magnitude of the work, of the job, got greater; and then we had a regular scheme of deductions from such fees. That is, if the United States was going to finance the job, we would cut down the percentage. If they were going to do a lot of subcontracting, we would cut down the percentage by another percent. If we were going to supply equipment, we would cut down those fees. In most cases—well, practically all cases, they strove for an even less percentage [3851] in the individual cases at hand than the one allowed in the Under Secretary's curve.

That is all I have, sir.

28. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

29. General FRANK. None.

30. Major CLAUSEN. I have a question.

General, I refer to your answer the other day to Colonel West. The question was:

Suppose, General, in the course of your research for certain documents or data which this Board desired, you should run across some information which might be inimical to the interests of Colonel Wyman: what would you do in a case of that sort?

General BRAGDON. I would give it to the Board.

My question is, What have you run across which might be inimical to the interests of Colonel Wyman?

General BRAGDON. I do not recall anything.

31. Major CLAUSEN. You haven't found anything?

General BRAGDON. No, sir.

32. Major CLAUSEN. I think that is all.

33. General GRUNERT. Any question? Colonel Toulmin?

34. Colonel TOULMIN. Nothing. Thank you, sir.

35. General FRANK. Have you anything else to submit at this time?

General BRAGDON. No, sir. Oh, excuse me.

Yes, sir. I would like to submit an affidavit by Colonel Theodore Wyman, supplementing his earlier—his original statement and testimony before the Board.

36. General RUSSELL. Might I see that?

(Affidavit and the exhibits of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., supplementing testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, were marked Exhibit No. 56 and received in evidence.)

[3852] (Affidavit of Colonel Wyman is as follows:)

**AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., SUPPLEMENTING TESTIMONY BEFORE
ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD**

Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., a person subject to Military Law, appearing before me in person and being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

The following corrections should be made to the transcript of my testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 14 September 1944:

Page 3375, line 8, the word "bridges" should be changed to "barges".

Page 3470, line 11, the phrase "not of serious occasions" should be changed to "not a series of occasions".

Page 3478, line 8, the word "light" should be deleted.

Page 3581, line 13, the name "Mr. Epsen" should be changed to "Mr. Epps".

The answer recorded as given by me on page 3539, line 16, to the effect that I did not see Mr. Rohl at the Palace Hotel is erroneous, either because of a stenographical error or because of my misunderstanding of the question when asked. I did see Mr. Rohl at the Palace Hotel with Mr. Grafe, but did not discuss the questions of whether the contract would be enlarged in scope and amount.

In view of the Board's questions on my previous appearance covering the point of when I first knew [3853] that Mr. H. W. Rohl was not an American citizen, how I discovered this fact and what I did about it, I have reviewed the files on this point to refresh my recollection. My review of these files on this point reveals an inaccuracy in my statement made on page 3504 of the transcript and repeated on pages 3560, 3579, and 3580, to the effect that I "immediately" wrote the Chief of Engineers upon discovering that Mr. Rohl was not an American citizen. At the time I testified it was my recollection that I wrote the Chief of Engineers immediately, but a review of the file indicates that I did not write this letter until August 15, 1941. Consequently I would like my answers in this regard stricken from the record and for the following statement to constitute my testimony with regard to my discovery of the fact that Mr. Rohl was not an American citizen and the action taken by me after such discovery.

The first knowledge I had that Mr. H. W. Rohl was not an American citizen was gained through the following letter dated June 2, 1941 from Hawaiian Constructors to me as District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.:

JUNE 2, 1941.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

The DISTRICT ENGINEER

U. S. Engineer Office,

Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: [3854] Referring to your letter of May 7th—my answer thereto is supplemented by the following information:

1. H. W. Rohl, who owns 25% of the stock of the Rohl-Connolly Company, a member of the joint venture known as Hawaiian Constructors, was born in Germany and is not a citizen of the United States.

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2. Mr. Rohl has an application for United States citizenship pending before the Naturalization Department of the U. S. Government in Los Angeles.

3. Mr. Rohl desires and intends, if permitted, to aid the United States Government in every way possible in the defense program of the present National Emergency.

4. Mr. Rohl is not employed by the Hawaiian Constructors; he is not now, nor has he been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of the Rohl-Connolly Company.

5. Mr. Rohl does not have, nor has he ever had, access to the plans or specifications for the work under this contract, nor has he participated in the contract trials; in fact, he has purposely refused to do any of these things and intends to continue to refuse in the future until he either receives U. S. citizenship, or express permission is granted to him as provided for in the Act.

Very truly yours,

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
/s/ Paul Grafe.
PAUL GRAFE.

[3855] This letter was written by Mr. Paul Grafe for Hawaiian Constructors in reply to a letter that I had written to Hawaiian Constructors on May 7, 1941, which reads as follows:

MAY 7, 1941.
TWJr/wlm

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Pier 2-A, Foot of Channel Stret,
Honolulu, T. H.

GENTLEMENS Reference is made to Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Eng. 602 of your company.

Your attention is invited to the following information relative to the employment of aliens on National Defense Contracts.

"1. The employment of aliens by contractors on national defense contracts is not prohibited but is restricted as stated by War Department Circular No. 121, 1940, as follows:

Protection of classified plans and specifications

a. No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who wilfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more [3856] than five years, or both.

b. Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

c. For the purpose of this section, the term *person* shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise.

"2. Should it become desirable, for any reason, that aliens be employed by contractors on contracts affected by the foregoing restriction, application should be made through this office, requesting the written permission of the Secretary of War for such employment and stating fully the reasons therefor.

"By order of the Chief of Engineers:"

Information is requested as to whether or not any aliens are employed by your company who would come under the meaning of Section II, act June 28, 1940.

Very truly yours,

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

[3857] Prior to receiving Mr. Grafe's answer of June 2, 1941, I had already received an answer from Hawaiian Constructors, dated May 14, 1941, which reads as follows:

MAY 14, 1941.

Subject: Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Eng.-602.

The DISTRICT ENGINEER,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: Reference is made to your letter of May 7, 1941 relating to employment of aliens by contractor on National Defense Contracts. We wish to report that to our knowledge we have no aliens employed by our company who would come under the meaning of Section II, act of June 28, 1940.

We require each man to sign an application for employment on which he states whether or not he is a citizen of the United States. If he is not a citizen we do not hire him, except that some Filipinos are hired in accordance with District Circular #4 of March 22, 1941.

Yours very truly,

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
/s/ R. A. Schwieger.
R. A. SCHWIEGER.

The occasion for my writing my letter of May 7, 1941 to Hawaiian Constructors was the receipt by me on May 6, 1941 of the following Circular Letter, dated April 21, 1941, from the office of the Chief of Engineers:

[3858]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS.
Washington, D. C., April 21, 1941.

3820 (National Defense).
Re O. & R. Chapter VII.
Circular Letter

Finance No. 104.
Contracts No. 35.

Subject: Employment of Aliens on National Defense Contracts.
To: All Division and District Engineers.

1. The employment of aliens by contractors on national defense contracts is not prohibited but is restricted as stated by War Department Circular No. 121, 1940, as follows:

"Protection of classified plans and specifications"

a. No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who wilfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

b. Any alien who obtained employment on [3859] secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

c. For the purpose of this section the term *person* shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise. Sec. II, act June 28, 1940 (Bull. 15, W.D., 1940)."

2. Should it become desirable, for any reason, that aliens be employed by contractors on contracts affected by the foregoing restriction, application should be made through this office, requesting the written permission of the Secretary of War for such employment and stating fully the reasons therefor.

By order of the Chief of Engineers:

E. E. GESLER,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Finance Section.
41/774.

It should be noted that Mr. Grafe advised in his letter of June 2, 1941 that Mr. Rohl was not employed by the Hawaiian Constructors; that he was not at that time, nor had been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of Rohl-Connolly Company. I knew, of course, that Mr. Rohl had not taken any active part in the supervision or management [3860] of the

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work under Contract No. 602. Therefore, the fact that he was not an American citizen was not important in connection with the administration of Contract No. 602.

Later, as the work on Contract No. 602 expanded, it was felt desirable by Hawaiian Constructors and by me that his services be utilized in connection with this work. On August 15, 1941, I received the following letter from Mr. Grafe of Hawaiian Constructors:

August 15, 1941.

Re Progress of National Defense Program Contract No. W-414-Eng-602.

The DISTRICT ENGINEER,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: Mr. H. W. Rohl of 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, applied in the U. S. District Court in Los Angeles on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers, which have not yet been issued to him.

Mr. Rohl is one of the principal stockholders of the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company, members of the joint venture known as the Hawaiian Constructors, the contractors on Contract No. W-414-Eng-602.

Mr. Rohl is a man of outstanding ability, with good judgment, resourcefulness, and experience on construction work.

Mr. Rohl's services as an executive on work to be performed under subject contract are urgently needed to expedite the National Defense Program at [3861] this time, due to the large amount of work to be done, and the scarcity of supervisory personnel and efficient labor. Mr. Rohl has not taken any part in the performance of the work under subject contract, although anxious to do so, because, since he is not a naturalized citizen, he did not think it good policy to become associated with restricted and secret work.

It is requested that you ask the Department of Justice to give early attention to Mr. Rohl's application for citizenship, so that his valuable services will be available for this work, thus accelerating the progress of this part of the National Defense Program.

Very truly yours,

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
/S/ Paul Grafe.
PAUL GRAFE.

On the same date, I wrote the following memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, through the Division Engineer, advising that Mr. Rohl's services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under Contract No. 602, and requesting that the Attorney General's attention be invited to the facts with the request that action on Mr. Rohl's application for final citizenship papers be expedited.

[3862]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 15, 1941.
Via Clipper.

ND 600.114-602.

ND 230.

Request for Final Citizenship Papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.

The CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, U. S. ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

(Thru: The Division Engineer, South Pacific Division.)

1. Mr. Paul Grafe, Attorney-in-fact for the Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Los Angeles, California; Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California; Gunther and Shirley Company, Los Angeles, California; and Mr. Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, prosecuting Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, has requested the District Engineer to bring to the attention of the Engineer Department the status of Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, one of the principal stockholders of the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company. Mr. H. W. Rohl has applied to the U. S. District Court at Los Angeles, California, on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which, it appears, have not been issued to date.

2. Mr. H. W. Rohl is a very skillful construction supervisor. He has personally [3863] supervised several large construction jobs for the Engi-

neer Department under various contracts, also, other agencies of the United States. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam and other heavy construction in the State of California. Mr. Rohl is a man of outstanding ability, and of excellent judgment and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work.

3. Due to the fact that part of the work being performed under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602 is of a restricted nature, and because of his alien status, Mr. Rohl has been reluctant to take any active part in the supervision or management of the work under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602; therefore, his valuable services have been lost.

4. While District Engineer at Los Angeles, California, the writer had frequent contacts with Mr. Rohl in connection with the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater construction and the dredging of the Los Angeles Harbor. It is the writer's opinion that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

5. In view of the scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel for construction work in the Hawaiian Islands, it is the District Engineer's opinion that Mr. Rohl's services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under [3864] the above cited contract; therefore, it is recommended that the Attorney General's attention be invited to the case with a request that action on his application for final citizenship papers be expedited.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Inclosure:

Ltr 8/15/41 fr
Hawn Constrs."

My recommendation in this memorandum was concurred in by the office of the Division Engineer at San Francisco through the following 1st indorsement:

Subject: Request for Final Citizenship papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.

Forts 665 (Hon) 15

1st Ind.

OFFICE, DIVISION ENGINEER, SO. PAC. DIV.,
San Francisco, August 19, 1941.

To: The Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

Concurring in the views and recommendations of the District Engineer.

For and in the absence of the Division Engineer:

F. C. SCHEFFAUER,
Head Engineer.

Incl: n/c.

In response to this recommendation, I am advised that the office of the Chief of Engineers wrote the following letter to the office of the Attorney General on this matter:

[3865]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 28, 1941.

LEMUEL B. SCHOFIELD,

Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SCHOFIELD: The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; Rohl-Connolly Co., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif.; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer Corps Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one of the principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States district court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management

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of difficult construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and miscellaneous dams, tunnels, and other heavy construction in the State of California. To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government [3866] defense projects because of his alien status.

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the afore-mentioned defense construction project because of his peculiar qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be expedited.

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. KINGMAN,
*Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.*

I was requested by the Board to determine the date on which Hawaiian Constructors actually initiated construction work under Contract No. 602. The file reveals that this date was February 5, 1941. This is shown in the attached exhibit marked Wyman Affidavit, Exhibit "J".

The Board requested that I determine who had final authority to approve drawings, plans and specifications. My research on this point reveals the following:

1. Plans prepared by the District Engineer were first submitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for approval. Upon receipt of approval the plans, including design calculations and specifications, were transmitted to the Division Engineer in [3867] San Francisco for his approval.

2. For AWS projects certain items of equipment, such as towers, transmitter building, and power plant, were furnished by the using agency. Designs had to be held in abeyance until receipt of drawings from the using agency.

I have searched the files in the Office of the District Engineer in order to determine whether any written answer was received to my letter of January 22, 1941, written to Mr. Rohl requesting him to come to Hawaii in connection with the handling of Contract No. 602. I can find no answer. At the time I wrote this letter I did not realize that Mr. Rohl was not employed by Hawaiian Constructors, nor that he was not at that time nor had been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I was first advised of this situation in the above quoted letter of June 2, 1941 from Mr. Grafe. I did not follow up the request in my letter of January 22, 1941 because the Hawaiian Constructors shortly thereafter took steps to eliminate the difficulties that were being experienced in initiating work under Contract No. 602, the existence of which difficulties were the cause of my writing this letter.

The Board inquired as to who was immediately responsible for the quality and progress of work under Contract No. 602. My answer in this regard was not as complete as it should have been. This [3868] responsibility runs through the entire chain of engineering command. It begins with the selection of the contractor. Contractors are first chosen according to experience records as well as the knowledge of them possessed by contracting officer. The latter assures himself that the contractor can perform the work, both as to quality and time requirements, because he possesses finances, management, experience, plant, and personnel. A good contractor realizes his responsibility for progress and pushes the job.

The officer in immediate contact with the work is the Area Engineer. It is the Area Engineer who has the initial responsibility of checking progress and quality of work. An Area Engineer who has more than job Engineer who is a resident on the job. The Area Engineer and the Job Engineer are assisted by Inspectors who are chosen because of training and ability.

Field Areas submit *semi-monthly* reports of progress of all items of work to the District Engineer. These reports showed the estimated percentage of work completed as originally scheduled or planned, and the *actual* percent of completion attained, with explanations of reasons for delay or of difficulties.

I offer in evidence as Exhibit "K" a sample of the monthly report for a semi-monthly period for the construction program at a station. As part of it is shown the bar diagram of progress of individual [3869] features. These reports were prescribed by instructions contained in Orders and Regulations, Corps of Engineers, paragraphs 236 and 243, supplemented by instructions contained in

Finance Circular Letter No. 225, paragraph 21, December 9, 1940 and Circular Letter, July 24, 1941, Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Area Engineers are in constant contact with the District Office to report difficulties and seek assistance.

District Engineers carefully choose Area Engineers from men whom they know are able and vigorous operators. All District Offices have operations and/or inspection divisions whose tasks are to keep constantly in touch with the work and to inspect it both for progress and quality. Under pressure of war work most districts also had additional transportation divisions, control divisions for coordination, and expediting sections. The Honolulu District had a transportation division and a special coordinator in charge of inspection.

The next higher echelon is the Division Engineer. The Division Engineers normally receive monthly reports of operations which tell what was accomplished during the month on all projects in all districts. During the war period semi-monthly reports were prescribed. (Insert here date when semi-monthly progress reports were initiated.) These reports show breakdowns for every major job into its important features. Reports show the scheduled percent of completion and the actual, [3870] with explanations and reasons for delays and difficulties. It also shows the progress expected in the next semi-monthly period. Division Engineers habitually visit all projects under them or have some of their assistants do so to the extent that the magnitude of their work permits. During the war period Division Engineers generally have so great a number of projects that they must select those projects with the highest priority or those which were suffering the most difficulties to personally inspect, leaving the others to their assistants.

The next echelon of command is the Chief of Engineers. The semi-monthly progress reports described above are transmitted to the Chief of Engineers. There the Control Section examines them minutely to determine which projects are falling behind. Those projects of chief importance which are falling behind would generally be visited at once by a special inspector. For practically every project having fallen more than 2% behind, a special letter of explanation was required. Many times these were required by radio or telephone.

At a previous hearing I was asked, who was responsible for the "tedious process" in effect with respect to putting construction projects underway during the period from the receipt of approval of the Hawaiian Constructors contract, January 6, 1941 to December 7, 1941.

These time-consuming processes were those [3871] required by law, regulations, or long established procedures. The general purposes of these laws, regulations, and long established procedures is to secure control by higher echelon and to protect the Government in expenditures as well as to insure quality of work.

The change from peacetime methods of procedure to wartime was generally accomplished by decentralization of contractual authorities to lower echelons and a relaxation of the extent of review by higher echelons. However, some changes had to be made in laws of long standing.

The procedures might be divided into general types, namely; securing technical approval through Engineer channels; and securing approvals by tactical agencies or the using services, responsible for operating, and also securing the coordination required between all responsible agencies.

In order to understand the limitations on the authority of the District Engineer and all the steps that had to be taken by him in cooperation and coordination with other agencies, it is of the utmost importance that the Board keep in mind that at the time of the negotiation of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, it was about a year before Pearl Harbor. The great sense of urgency was not yet present, although changes from peacetime procedure were being gradually introduced. In order to make this clear I shall discuss the law, regulations, and [3872] procedures as they existed under the following general heads:

- a. Method of contracting.
- b. Procedures for technical approvals.
- c. Limitations on money magnitude for a and b.

Under each of these headings I shall compare the situation during:

- (1) Peacetime procedures which were in effect through most of 1940, and up to just before the date of approval of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, January 3, 1941.
- (2) Transitional period beginning in 1940 and during the period of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract up to 7 December 1941.
- (3) Immediately after Pearl Harbor and during the war period.

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I submit in evidence as Wyman Affidavit, Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D", tabulations of the contracting authorities for advertised, negotiated lump sum, and negotiated CPFF contracts prescribed for the District Engineer, Division Engineer, and the Office, Chief of Engineers, as these authorities varied in peacetime of 1940, in later 1940, and at the time of negotiating the Hawaiian Constructors contract in December 1940, just after that date and during 1941, and just after Pearl Harbor. These tabulations were extracted from existing orders and regulations. Some orders and regulations were missing from the files of the District Engineer but any inaccuracies will not [3873] affect the conclusions from statements made. If any great inaccuracies are found corrections will be submitted after records in Washington have been examined.

The following points are stressed:

a. The low magnitude of the peacetime contractual authorities of the District Engineer and of the Division Engineer, namely \$10,000.00 for the District and \$50,000.00 for the Division.

b. The low limitation for the District Engineer continued up to February 19, 1941. As far as the approval of specifications was concerned this meant that most plans and specifications had to be submitted to the Division Engineer on the mainland.

c. Under the pressure of preparation for war there was a progressive decentralization of authority as shown by the increased limits of authorities of the District and Divisions on the dates May 1, 1940, December 9, 1940, and February 19, 1941. This decentralization thus began 19 months before Pearl Harbor.

d. That negotiated contracts were not permitted before the latter part of 1940; that up to the war period the authority to negotiate had to first be secured from the Under Secretary of War.

e. That decentralization was progressive from 19 months before up to the date of Pearl Harbor. In no respect was it comparable to the great decentralization that came after Pearl Harbor. For [3874] example District Engineers during 1941 could approve lump sum advertised contracts up to \$100,000.00. Later in the war period their authority was increased to \$3,000,000.00.

f. Attention is invited to Note 2 in the District Engineers' Contractual Authority which states that decentralization up to \$3,000,000.00 went even below District Engineers to Area Engineers.

g. Exhibit "D" shows the relative authorities for the execution of change orders after contracts were once negotiated. It shows similar trends to those described above. Decentralization of authorities was begun before Pearl Harbor and immediately after almost completely decentralized for the war period. In the special case of the District Engineer in Honolulu, four days after the attack at Pearl Harbor, the Division Engineer delegated to the District Engineer all of his contractual authority. This enabled the District Engineer to take action on contract instruments up to \$5,000,000.00.

It will be seen from the above that the District Engineer in Honolulu during the period of 1941, which is the period under investigation, had many limitations under the law and under regulations of the War Department which required submission of specifications, awards, and contracts to higher authority. At the same time the War Department and the Engineer Department had started decentralizing to meet the increasing tempo pressure of war work. As noted in my earlier statement priorities [3875] ascribed to Hawaiian contracts were the same as those on the continent in spite of its isolated position.

It should be added that all job orders had to be submitted by the District Engineer, Honolulu, to the Division Engineer for approval. With reference to the use of negotiated contracts, either lump sum or cost-plus-a-fixed fee, revised statutes which had been most rigid on requiring advertising for competitive bids of contracts for public works had to be modified to permit execution of construction *without advertising* and to permit of the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contracts. The Act which afforded this relaxation was Public No. 703, 76th Congress, approved July 2, 1940. This information was published to the field in a Circular Letter from the Chief of Engineers, December 9, 1940, and at first the negotiated contract was merely recommended in cases where competitive bidding would not fulfill the needs of National Defense. It will be noted that in the tabulation the field offices had their choice of advertised contracts and negotiated contracts; that later in the war period advertised contracts were prohibited and only the negotiated ones allowed.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the responsibility for many of the procedures which might have been said to have delayed work because of limita-

tions of authority was not that of any individual but lay collectively in existing laws, regulations of the War Department, and of the [3876] Engineer Department which laws and regulations had many fundamental sound reasons for existence, and that those responsible for such laws and regulations recognized the need for their alteration in and took proper steps to that end to meet the increased speed of pre-war conditions even though there was no certainty of war.

As stated above some of the time-consuming procedures were those necessary for coordination with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Using Services. In my original statement I submitted one example of the procedure involved in this coordination as Exhibit "N." I desire to submit a few additional examples marked Wyman Affidavit Exhibits "E," "F," "G," and "H." It will be noted that the time interval to cover the interchange of indorsements in these coordinating staff memoranda ran up in one instance of the four examples to nine weeks. These are merely additional examples selected at random. As noted in my original statement there are hundreds of examples of such coordinating memoranda in the District Engineer files.

Through oversight one page of the schedule attached to Exhibit E, which was the study on priorities introduced by me in evidence during my testimony was not included in the exhibit. I submit this missing page in evidence as Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "I."

[3877] In connection with my statements on page 28 of my original statement read before the Board on September 14, I submitted several exhibits illustrating efforts on my part toward expediting the work under the Hawaiian Constructors' contract. I would like to submit in evidence, another exhibit bearing on this point since it is quite pertinent thereto. I am therefore submitting exhibit designed Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "L", which is a letter to all contractors engaged on defense projects within the Honolulu District emphasizing how imperative the expedition of this work was and urging anticipation of their material and equipment requirements.

I desire to submit a reply to the "Testimony of Mr. Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H., taken at Hickam Field on 21 April 1942, by Colonel Lathe B. Row, Inspector General's Department." This report was answered completely and adequately in letter of May 9, 1942 addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and signed by Colonel A. K. B. Lyman, Department Engineer. The latter became my successor, inasmuch as the Hawaiian Department absorbed the District Engineer's activities in February of 1942. I submit in evidence this letter in refutation of the charges made by Mr. Hoffman in said Inspector General's Report as an exhibit marked Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "M".

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, CE.

Signed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authorized to administer this oath by the 114th Article of War, on the 16th day of September, 1944.

/s/ Lue C. Lozier,
LUE C. LOZIER,

Major, Commissioned in the Judge Advocate's Department,
Army of the United States.

37. General RUSSELL. General, in a very hasty way I have reviewed or I have read the first five pages of the affidavit being submitted at this time by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., supplementing the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Those five pages deal with the subject of the alien status of one Mr. Rohl.

General BRAGDON. Yes.

38. General RUSSELL. It purports to correct some statements made by Colonel Wyman on the occasion of his appearance before the Board last week. The first material document is a letter of June 2, 1941, and is a statement alleged to have been made by Mr. Paul Grafe, representing the Hawaiian Constructors, as to the alien status of Mr. Rohl and his relation to the basic contract under which the work was being done here in the Territory of Hawaii.

My first question is this: Did you see the original of that letter in the files of the District Engineer here since you have come to the Island lately?

General BRAGDON. I am not sure, sir. I believe that Major Powell did.

[3879] 39. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General BRAGDON. He helped in the search of the files on this particular point.

40. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, the second question: Could that original letter be turned over to you by the office of the District Engineer and presented to us for inspection upon our return to Washington?

General BRAGDON. If it is present, yes, sir, I could have them do that.

41. General RUSSELL. All right. Would you make a note of that?

Now, there is another letter, of May 7, 1941, from Theodore Wyman, Jr., to the Hawaiian Constructors. Apparently that would be a copy of Colonel Wyman's letter. I wonder if we could have the file copy of that letter made available to us.

General BRAGDON. Which one was that, General?

42. General RUSSELL. It is the letter of May 7, 1941.

General BRAGDON. You would like the file copy of that?

43. General RUSSELL. If we could have it, please. And the same thing relates to the letter of the Hawaiian Constructors which would be an original which is dated May 14, 1941, and appears on page 5 of Colonel Wyman's supplementary affidavit.

Now, this further question, General: Colonel Wyman, in his supplementary affidavit now being submitted, states:

In view of the Board's questions on my previous appearance covering the point of when I first knew that Mr. H. W. Rohl was not an American citizen, how I discovered this fact and what I did about it, I [3880] have reviewed the files on this point to refresh my recollection. My review of these files on this point reveals an inaccuracy in my statements made on page 3504 of the transcript and repeated on pages 3560, 3579, and 3580, to the effect that I "immediately" wrote the Chief of Engineers upon discovering that Mr. Rohl was not an American citizen. At the time I testified it was my recollection that I wrote the Chief of Engineers immediately, but a review of the file indicates that I did not write this letter until August 15, 1941.

Now, the question is: Does a copy of this letter of August 15, 1941, which Colonel Wyman states that he wrote to the Chief of Engineers, appear in this supplementary affidavit of Colonel Wyman, or is it attached thereto as an exhibit?

I ask that question because I fail to find, in my hasty consideration of this supplementary affidavit, any copy of that letter.

General BRAGDON. I thought that letter was quoted here. Here is on page 9.

44. General RUSSELL. Well, I quit at page 5 because apparently we went into something else. Well, I then must amend the question to the effect that it is here and that I had finished my reading or I had stopped reading at page 5 because I thought that the circular letter, page 6, went into a new subject, and apparently it does not. Very well.

It does appear here, and I will ask you, then, this question: You know of no reason why the original of this [3881] letter of

August 15, 1941, which may be further identified as "ND 600.114-602, ND 230, Request for Final Citizenship Papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California," should not be in the files of the Chief of Engineers in Washington?

General BRAGDON. I know of no reason why it shouldn't be, sir.

45. General RUSSELL. That is all.

46. General FRANK. In response to a request for some data on the situation with respect to the airfield at Mokuleia there was submitted a memorandum to the Pearl Harbor Board from the Office of the Engineer, Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command, 16 September 1944, which reads as follows:

(Memorandum from Office of the Engineer, Headquarters Central Pacific Base Command, dated September 16, 1944, is as follows:)

In accordance with your request the following data is submitted for your information and guidance regarding Mokuleia Airfield.

a. *Lease*.—A lease covering lands occupied by the Army at Mokuleia Airfield was submitted to Mr. Walter F. Dillingham, President, Mokuleia Ranch & Land Co., Ltd., in February 1944 for his signature. To date this lease has never been returned and condemnation proceedings have been initiated.

b. The amount spent to date for the construction of airfield facilities consisting of camps, buildings, water supply, sewage systems, electrical distribution systems, gasoline storage facilities, revetments and appurtenant structures is \$4,833,556.54.

[3882] c. The number, kind and estimated cost of revetments constructed at this airfield is as follows:

(1) Five (5) cut-type for B-17.....	\$80,000.00
(2) Two (2) double reinforced concrete for B-17.....	\$54,000.00
(3) Two (2) double Marston mat for B-17.....	\$40,000.00
(4) Six (6) earthfill for B-17.....	\$100,000.00
(5) Thirty-one (31) cut-type for P-40.....	\$132,000.00

Signed by "S. Perliter, Head Engineer, Chief, Design Division."

Can you tell me why almost \$5,000,000 should be expended on private property with no authority other than a verbal agreement?

General BRARDON. I don't know the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of that land. Of course, under the War Powers Act we can get almost any land by condemnation. We usually, in the Army, try to get it by negotiation. I'd have to look into all the circumstances surrounding that.

47. General FRANK. Does this sound regular to you?

General BRAGDON. Well, in the sense that we always try to get authority, either a right of entry or a complete negotiation for land, before we went on, it looks as though that—well, I hesitate to answer that, General, because I don't know exactly what the circumstances were. I don't know whether they had a right of entry from Mr. Dillingham. They may have had a right of entry from Mr. Dillingham.

48. General FRANK. Well, this is a memorandum from the Engineer's office.

General BRAGDON. I don't know the circumstances surrounding it. I can bring Mr. Perliter and those who— [3883] have him come over here right away, and those also who were responsible for the—for their land acquisition.

49. General FRANK. On the face of this does it look regular to you?

General BRAGDON. I wouldn't say that that was irregular. They may have had a right of entry.

50. General FRANK. Will you answer my question? Does it look regular to you?

General BRAGDON. Well, it doesn't look irregular, without knowing the circumstances.

51. General FRANK. Please answer my question. I didn't ask if it didn't look irregular. Does it look regular to you?

General BRAGDON. Well, General, I can't give an honest answer to it—

52. General FRANK. All right. That's all I want.

General BRAGDON. —without knowing the circumstances.

53. General FRANK. Then, another thing: Why, on an air strip with \$5,000,000 spent on it, should not the Government obtain ownership rather than lease?

General BRAGDON. That also would require study to see what the circumstances were behind it. I do know this: that the policy on land acquisition changed from time to time in the United States. It was brought out that great quantities of land were being acquired, and then for a while the policy has been that we should lease land and not acquire it in fee. Now, whether that had anything to do with this, I wouldn't venture to state.

54. General FRANK. In your capacity as being out here as a representative of the Chief of Engineers to furnish us [3884] information, will you give us a further memorandum explaining this situation?

General BRAGDON. Will it be all right to submit that in Washington?

55. General FRANK. Yes.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

56. General FRANK. That is all.

57. General GRUNERT. Is there any other evidence that you have that you wish to offer?

General BRAGDON. No, sir.

58. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming. We shall take a recess.

General BRAGDON. May I ask something more, General?

59. General GRUNERT. Yes.

60. General FRANK. Is this on the record?

61. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General BRAGDON. In the record, yes, sir.

62. General GRUNERT. Yes, on the record. Go ahead.

General BRAGDON. If, upon presenting what has been submitted to the Board to my superiors in Washington, they feel that additional matter should be brought to the attention of the Board, that will be all right to submit it, I take it?

63. General GRUNERT. There will be a limited time that we have after we get back to Washington; and if you will communicate with the Record of the Board to find out what the limited time there is, up to what date we can receive evidence, we shall be glad to get any evidence that anyone has to offer, provided it is pertinent to the issue.

General BRAGDON. Thank you.

64. General GRUNERT. We shall take a recess now.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[3885] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL C. A. POWELL, SIGNAL OFFICER,
POA; FT. SHAFTER, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel POWELL. I am Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Pacific Ocean Areas; Fort Shafter.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop this particular part of our investigation.

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

3. General FRANK. Colonel Powell, on what duty were you, in the fall of 1941?

Colonel POWELL. In the fall of 1941, I was Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department.

4. General FRANK. Were you in charge of the installation of the aircraft warning service?

Colonel POWELL. I was.

5. General FRANK. On December 7, what was the situation with respect to the installation of the information center?

Colonel POWELL. The installation of the information center was by means of a temporary structure which I had built with my own soldiers in what we now call the "Signal Corps Area." It was a temporary structure, and it was operative.

6. General FRANK. Had they had exercises prior to December 7?

Colonel POWELL. They had, sir.

7. General FRANK. And it had operated successfully?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

8. General FRANK. And what was the situation with respect to [3886] the permanent radar sets? Had they arrived in the island?

Colonel POWELL. They had, sir.

9. General FRANK. When had they arrived, please?

Colonel POWELL. Two radar SCR-271s—that is the temporary set—were received the 3d of June, and one SCR-271-A, which has the higher tower, was received also the 3d of June.

10. General FRANK. Were they complete?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir; they were not complete. I have a prepared memorandum here which I would like to introduce, which I think would give you a picture.

11. General FRANK. Will you state the date on which all equipment was here and complete so that they could be erected?

12. General RUSSELL. You mean these three?

13. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. I do not have that information available, when the things were received, except I consider that when you say "complete" that means everything, including the conduit and the fittings and everything else.

14. General FRANK. Well, so that they could operate; that is what I mean.

Colonel POWELL. Oh, I see. Well, to the best of my knowledge and belief, I think that they could have been operated in November of that year.

15. General FRANK. Was installation of the permanent sets held up?
Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

16. General FRANK. What were the reasons?

Colonel POWELL. The reasons were that the engineers were unable to complete the sites for these permanent installations.

[3887] 17. General FRANK. Why were they unable to complete the sites, do you know?

Colonel POWELL. I do not know, sir.

18. General FRANK. Who selected the sites?

Colonel POWELL. A board of officers. The original sites were selected by a board of officers formed of Colonel G. L. Van Deusen; Lt. Col. John H. Lindt, CAC, and Lt. Col. Wm. E. Lind, Air Corps, and Captain R. J. Fleming, Corps of Engineers.

19. General FRANK. How many sites were there?

Colonel POWELL. There were eight sites, in the first directive sent out by the War Department.

20. General FRANK. You had equipment for how many sites?

Colonel POWELL. We had equipment for permanent stations. Now, wait a minute—there were only three permanent stations, General Frank.

21. General FRANK. But I am still talking about just the permanent sites.

Colonel POWELL. All right. There were only three permanent sites left.

22. General FRANK. Where were they? Do you not know from memory?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir. One was Kokee, one was Mt. Kaala, and the other was Haleakala.

23. General FRANK. Kokee is on Kauai?

Colonel POWELL. Kokee is on Kauai.

24. General FRANK. Haleakala is on Maui?

Colonel POWELL. Maui; and Mt. Kaala is on Oahu. Haleakala is on Maui.

25. General FRANK. When the equipment was finally placed on [3888] top of Kaala, was it satisfactory? Did it operate satisfactorily?

Colonel POWELL. The site was never completely installed at Mr. Kaala, due to the fact that it took them so long to get the cableway up that we never completely installed the station on M. Kaala. We abandoned it before we got it completely installed.

26. General FRANK. Why did you abandon it?

Colonel POWELL. Because we found that the station at Kaala, the height was too high, and so the board from Washington came out and told us that the site at Kaala would not be satisfactory, and so we abandoned it.

27. General FRANK. Did you ever put any equipment up there, actually to test it?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

28. General FRANK. So the fact that it was unsatisfactory is a theory rather than a fact, is it not?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

29. General FRANK. Did you ever put any equipment on top of Haleakala?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir; we had it completely installed and operated there for some time.

30. General FRANK. Was it satisfactory?

Colonel POWELL. It was never satisfactory for close-in detection.

31. General FRANK. How was it for distant detection?

Colonel POWELL. It would get out about 200 miles, but there was a dead space from about 30 miles out from the base.

32. General FRANK. There was a dead space from 30 miles out, on into the base?

[3889] Colonel POWELL. No—from the base out—out 30 miles, there was a dead space, there.

33. General FRANK. Oh, from 30 miles from the station, on out, it was a lot more satisfactory than inshore?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir; because we had to identify that.

34. General FRANK. Because it was close to the shore level?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

35. General FRANK. Now, you did put one on top of Kokee?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

36. General FRANK. How did that operate?

Colonel POWELL. Very satisfactory.

37. General FRANK. That has altitude?

Colonel POWELL. I think it only has an altitude of around about 2,000 feet, as I recall, General.

38. General FRANK. How far out does that detect?

Colonel POWELL. It goes out to about 170 miles.

39. General FRANK. So there is an advantage for distant detection of having them on the higher altitudes?

Colonel POWELL. That is very true; but at the same time, you introduce that space which you cannot get out from your base out to a certain distance, because the beam doesn't go down and cover that in.

40. General FRANK. And cannot that be covered by auxiliary radar?

Colonel POWELL. It can now, but because we have the new radars to do it, but at that time we didn't have the new radars to do it.

41. General FRANK. Is there any plan of putting radar now on [3890] top of Kaala?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

42. General FRANK. Nor on top of Haleakala?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

43. General FRANK. The present radar picks up only to a distance of about 130 miles, does it not?

Colonel POWELL. Out on Maui, I think it goes out about to 130, to 150 miles, according to the atmospheric conditions.

44. General FRANK. Well, is there not a decided advantage to the air forces on the island to know it 50 miles sooner?

Colonel POWELL. Well, I should think it would be.

45. General FRANK. Well, why are not some steps taken then to get some permanent sets up at these higher altitudes?

Colonel POWELL. Well, the Defense Board from Washington came out here and definitely stated that that is what would be done, so we have conformed to the Air Defense Board report.

46. General FRANK. Let us get down to the facts rather than getting into the theory. You have stated that from those altitudes they can pick up from 170 to 200 miles?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

47. General FRANK. You have also stated that it does not cover the distance from the shore line out to about 30 miles?

Colonel POWELL. That is right, sir.

48. General FRANK. But there are other auxiliary sets down on the shore line that can pick up, out to the 30 miles?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

49. General FRANK. Therefore, there is a distinct advantage in having both the long-distance and the short-distance detection?

[3891] Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir; but this short-distance set has only come out a very few months ago, I would say. We haven't had a good set that could get in on that shore line and accomplish that mission.

50. General FRANK. Now, is there any plan for placing these long-range sets on the high elevations?

Colonel POWELL. No plan at the present time, sir.

51. General FRANK. It is not being considered?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir; because the category of defense on these islands is changed.

52. General FRANK. Is it now possible for the enemy to send a surprise raid, in here, flying about ten feet above the water, immune from radar detection until it reaches a distance of about 20 or 30 miles out?

Colonel POWELL. I would say it is not possible for any enemy to come in and attack these islands from a distance at which the curvature of the earth, which is about 25 miles—we will pick them up.

53. General FRANK. How far out?

Colonel POWELL. About 25 miles, coming on, about 10 to 15 feet above the water.

54. General FRANK. But they can get in to within 25 miles, without detection?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

55. General FRANK. Right now?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir; because they are below the curvature of the earth.

56. General FRANK. And what about the stations at the altitude?

Colonel POWELL. Well, that would increase the distance [3892] away which they couldn't get in, due to the curvature of the earth.

57. General FRANK. All right. Was there any delay in furnishing the Corps of Engineers with drawings for the preparation of these sites—any delay on the part of the Signal Corps?

Colonel POWELL. Not by my office.

58. General FRANK. Well, was there any?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

59. General FRANK. Did you get the drawings from the Washington office of the Signal Corps?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir. We gave them all the information that they asked for.

60. General FRANK. There has been some discussion here that they did not get the drawings from the Signal Corps to enable them to proceed with the work. What is your comment on that?

Colonel POWELL. The original proposition here was to build all of these stations aboveground, and we were going to furnish the houses and everything that went with it, and all that they needed was the floor

plan of the buildings, and we gave them that, because we were going to erect the buildings ourselves, they were a prefabricated building, and they knew where the sites were. It was all selected, and all they had to do was survey them and build the roads and build the concrete platforms for these buildings.

61. General FRANK. Was there any delay in the building of the roads to the sites?

Colonel POWELL. That's what held us up.

62. General FRANK. That is what held you up?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

[3893] 63. General FRANK. Who was responsible for building those roads?

Colonel POWELL. The Corps of Engineers.

64. General FRANK. After it was possible to reach the sites, was there any delay in building the camp sites and erecting the towers?

Colonel POWELL. Well, General Frank, the proposition was changed when General Emmons arrived here, after December. We were building these buildings aboveground. Then when General Emmons arrived here, he immediately changed the whole thing, and stated that these sets must be installed underground; and of course that started the whole thing; we had to revise all of our plans and start all over again and build these bomb-proof structures underground.

65. General FRANK. Was it possible to use commercial current in these sets?

Colonel POWELL. Oh, yes, sir; we do do that.

66. General FRANK. You do that?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

67. General FRANK. What permanent sets are now operating?

Colonel POWELL. The 271s, sir.

68. General FRANK. Can you tell me the date that the permanent stations that you have, began operation, how long after Pearl Harbor? Can you tell me about the date?

Colonel POWELL. I would say about eight months after Pearl Harbor, they were all done.

69. General FRANK. Is there anything more you would like to state about the permanent sets?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir; I don't believe I have. I have [3894] felt that it was a very wise thing to put these permanent sets in, bomb-proofed, because they were in such a location that, the quantity of them was such that we had to have them in permanent; and I just feel that General Emmons made a very wise move in giving that order for putting them into permanent locations, bomb-proofed.

70. General GRUNERT. The witness appears to be referring to a statement there that he prepared. Will you tell us what that statement is, and how long it is, and whether or not we could possibly have a lot of these questions answered if we read that statement?

71. General FRANK. We are going to put that into the record as an exhibit.

72. Major CLAUSEN. It is a memorandum to the Board, sir, that we have in our possession, that he is now using to refresh his memory.

73. General GRUNERT. Oh, it is just to refresh his memory?

74. Major CLAUSEN. His subordinate, Colonel Marston, prepared that statement.

75. General GRUNERT. All right. Go ahead.

Colonel POWELL. I have this whole report here if you want it.

76. General FRANK. Has anybody any questions he would like to ask about the permanent AWS?

77. Major CLAUSEN. I have.

78. General FRANK. Go ahead. I am going to ask him about the temporary or mobile sets.

79. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, you referred to Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala as being the sites for the permanent sets, is that [3895] correct?

Colonel POWELL. That is correct.

80. Major CLAUSEN. When were those sites originally selected?

Colonel POWELL. That was approved by the War Department on the fourth endorsement, June 27, 1940.

81. Major CLAUSEN. June 27, 1940?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

82. Major CLAUSEN. You know, therefore, that as of that date the engineers were also advised that those were prospective sites?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

83. Major CLAUSEN. So they had from June 27, 1940?

Colonel POWELL. The Department Engineer was next notified of approval of the project in an endorsement dated the 13th of July. He came back at us and asked us for certain funds.

84. Major CLAUSEN. Are you sure, Colonel, that there was no lack of Signal Corps plans that in any way held up the work of the engineers?

Colonel POWELL. Nothing that I know of.

85. Major CLAUSEN. And you would know if there was?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir. There is nothing in the records. Of course, it is over three years ago, but I do not recall having them call on me for anything, or there isn't anything in the record to indicate that they ever called on us for anything like that.

86. Major CLAUSEN. In so far as your branch of the service was concerned, you were right up to date at the time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir; that is right.

[3896] 87. General FRANK. How soon after they arrived did they have money to proceed with the construction?

Colonel POWELL. This was the 13th of July, 1940; the District Engineer said that he was ready to proceed as soon as funds were received.

88. General FRANK. When were funds received?

Colonel POWELL. The Chief of Engineers gave the District Engineer an amount of \$50,000 on the 24th of July, 1940.

89. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know what amounts were subsequently furnished?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I do not have that information.

90. Major CLAUSEN. I have a letter referring to your permanent sites dated November 14th, 1941, to Colonel Colton, Chief, Matériel Branch, from yourself, Department Signal Officer, then Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, reading:

(Memorandum for Colonel Colton, Chief, Matériel Branch, from C. A. Powell, Lt. Col. Signal Corps, Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, November 14, 1941, is as follows:)

In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started

approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.

As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were notified and they [3897] took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor.

It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the personnel associated with the information centers.

We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When the fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operating for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately the same as ours is on Hawaii.

Do you recall that, sir?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

91. Major CLAUSEN. Just to shorten our proceedings here, I am going to ask you the general question whether or not the facts you set forth in this letter are correct?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

92. Major CLAUSEN. Now, let me ask you this: whether on the day of the actual attack, when the Japs struck Hawaii, did all the Jap planes come in low over the water or did some come in high?

Colonel POWELL. I cannot answer that question, because I do not know.

93. General FRANK. Has anybody anything more on the permanent setups?

With respect to the mobile sets, the two seven O's, when did they arrive?

[3898] Colonel POWELL. The SCR-270's were received approximately the first of August, 1940.

94. General FRANK. When were they in place?

Colonel POWELL. We did not have any set place for them at that time, because we wanted to train our personnel, and we shifted them from place to place around the island and selected places on a temporary basis.

95. General FRANK. When was the first time that they were placed for use with the Information Center?

Colonel POWELL. I do not believe I have that record right now.

96. General FRANK. When were the first exercises held using both the radar stations and the Information Center?

Colonel POWELL. I do not think I have that information.

97. General FRANK. Do you have any memory about it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. Approximately, I would say, October, September or October.

98. General FRANK. Of what year?

Colonel POWELL. Of 1940.

99. General FRANK. Was your Information Center set up in 1940?

Colonel POWELL. Let me see. Wait a minute. I mean 1941.

100. General FRANK. 1941?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, 1941, that is right; 1941.

101. General FRANK. There was an exercise held just shortly after it became operative, wasn't there?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

102. General FRANK. How successful was that exercise?

Colonel POWELL. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it was very successful.

[3899] 103. General FRANK. In other words, the radar picked up the airplanes and reported the locations to the Information Center?

Colonel POWELL. That is right.

104. General FRANK. And the Information Center notified the fighters and they went out and intercepted the airplanes?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

105. General FRANK. That was about when?

Colonel POWELL. That exercise—May I look at this? I will give you the date of that.

106. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. This one was about, I would say, the first of November that I am referring to here.

107. General FRANK. Then had it been desired, the aircraft warning service could have operated on December 7th?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir. It did.

108. General FRANK. I know, but it was not in order, placed on an operating basis continuously?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. That was due to the lack of spare parts. We were trying to conserve our instruments. They were brand new. We had no spare parts to repair the things with, so we were trying to keep it operating, what we felt was the most dangerous part.

109. General FRANK. What were the spare parts?

Colonel POWELL. The vacuum tubes and a number of the oscillators and other things, oscilloscope and other parts that go into making the machine. The vacuum tubes were the most critical.

110. General FRANK. Was commercial current delivered to the sites that you had selected and was it available on December 7th?

[3900] Colonel POWELL. To all those that were installed, it was, commercial power.

111. General FRANK. How many were installed?

Colonel POWELL. On December 7th?

112. General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. I think there were six.

113. General FRANK. When did the sets start operating on a full-time basis?

Colonel POWELL. December the 7th.

114. General FRANK. How did they stand up?

Colonel POWELL. Well, we had a lot of trouble. We had to cannibalize them with a lot of the instruments to keep them going all the time.

115. General FRANK. But you kept them going?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

116. General FRANK. What kind of communication did you have between the radar sets and the Information Center?

Colonel POWELL. Telephone.

117. General FRANK. Telephone?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir. We had a cable.

118. General FRANK. Did that work satisfactorily?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

119. General FRANK. Was it sabotaged on December 7th?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

120. General FRANK. Did you ever have any trouble with it?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

121. General FRANK. On December 7th, after the attack, was there any jamming of the air from a radio point of view?

Colonel POWELL. Not to my knowledge.

[3901] 122. General FRANK. That interfered with the ability of the radar to pick up planes in the air?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

123. General FRANK. Do you consider that there were any avoidable delays in the construction of the aircraft warning service system by the Engineers or by the contractors?

Colonel POWELL. I thought that they should have given the air warning a higher priority than they did, to get our work done. They were working on the airfields, and we had to take our priority behind the airfields.

124. General FRANK. What was it, do you know?

Colonel POWELL. I think it was "2". I am not sure.

125. General FRANK. Was money available?

Colonel POWELL. Money was not completely available until December the 7th.

126. General FRANK. And then it was available?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, we had all we wanted.

127. General FRANK. Then you had all you wanted?

Colonel POWELL. That is right.

128. General FRANK. What was the nature of the delays, other than priority?

Colonel POWELL. Well, it was just practically a construction job of building the roads up to them and building the base camps.

129. General FRANK. Was this place on the priority list that the aircraft warning service held called to General Short's attention?

Colonel POWELL. I am sure it was, because he decided on it. I am sure he decided the priority.

[3902] 130. General FRANK. And the airfields had a priority ahead of the aircraft warning service?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

131. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not they had money to build the airfields?

Colonel POWELL. I do not.

132. General FRANK. Prior to December 7th?

Colonel POWELL. That I do not know, sir.

133. General FRANK. What is the difference between the 270 and 271 sets?

Colonel POWELL. The only difference is that one is mobile and the other is fixed. They have the same range, from the same instruments, except one is mounted on trucks and the other is fixed instruments.

134. Major CLAUSEN. One of the other differences, Colonel, is the fact that the fixed station has a tower, does it not?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, a fixed tower.

135. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. Of course, when you say fixed, you mean everything is fixed. It is a fixed tower, and with the 271-A for instance, you can put up a 100-foot tower for it, where you cannot carry a 100-foot tower around in a mobile outfit.

136. Major CLAUSEN. Could you readily say that this is correct: The difference between the mobile and the fixed, therefore, is the difference between a fixed and a mobile gun? In other words, the fact of being fixed makes for greater accuracy?

Colonel POWELL. No. I would not say that.

137. Major CLAUSEN. Is that correct?

Colonel POWELL. I would not say that.

[3903] 138. Major CLAUSEN. It is just a question of putting up a tower?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. The higher tower you can get the greater distance you obtain, due to the curvature of the earth. That is solely due to the curvature of the earth. That is solely due to the curvature of the earth at a low altitude.

139. Major CLAUSEN. Getting back a moment to my question, as to whether the Japanese planes actually did all come in very low along the water, I show you a graph of a plot of the Opana Station, and ask you whether you have seen that before?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, I have seen that.

140. Major CLAUSEN. That indicates that the planes were actually picked up by the Opana mobile station at what range, what distance? That is Exhibit No. 15 in Evidence.

Colonel POWELL. Well, I cannot figure that from this, but, as I recall it, it was around 80 miles.

141. Major CLAUSEN. At least 80 miles?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

142. Major CLAUSEN. That indicates to you, therefore, what, with respect to the height of the attacking Japanese planes that came in that morning?

Colonel POWELL. It would indicate they were at least 500 feet in the air.

143. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have on that point. By the way, just one more question:

This graph you recognize as a graph of the plot that you later on sent to Washington?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

144. Major CLAUSEN. It has been referred to in other testimony.

[3904] Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

145. Major CLAUSEN. Now, you said something about the fact that the mobile sets were subject to a conservation of instruments. Is it not true also that the mobile sets were powered not by commercial power but by auxiliary power or gasoline motors, is that correct?

Colonel POWELL. That is true.

146. Major CLAUSEN. Is the record clear on that point? Didn't you answer differently to General Frank, or what is the fact?

Colonel POWELL. The mobile sets, when we put them into these stations and finally got them around, we brought in commercial power.

147. Major CLAUSEN. But that occurred after Pearl Harbor, did it not?

Colonel POWELL. I cannot answer that question. I do not believe so. We had plenty of engines around there, generators, and they were better regulated than was the commercial power.

148. Major CLAUSEN. With regard to the priorities that you have referred to in your answers to the questions by General Frank, the Engineers set those priorities, did they?

Colonel POWELL. I do not believe so. I believe the Commanding General set the priorities.

149. Major CLAUSEN. Of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

150. General RUSSELL. Who on the island knows the maximum range of that set of radar or that which reaches farther out to sea? Would you be that man?

Colonel POWELL. At Haleakala?

151. General RUSSELL. I don't care where it is. I want to know that set which goes furthest out, the maximum range?

[3905] Colonel POWELL. This is it, the 270 and 271.

152. General RUSSELL. How far will it pick up aircraft today?

Colonel POWELL. It all depends on its height from the sea.

153. General RUSSELL. Is not that height fixed there, Colonel?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. You can go upon a mountain and get like we did on Haleakala.

154. General RUSSELL. Do you mean to testify that nobody on this island today knows how far you can pick up incoming aircraft from the radar system as it is being operated?

Colonel POWELL. We can pick up today an average of 150 miles, if the plane is at least a thousand feet in the air.

155. General RUSSELL. That is all.

156. General GRUNERT. Are these all the questions you have of this witness?

We have had testimony before the Board, Colonel, to the effect that the necessity of changing the height of the towers on these permanent stations required additional blueprints and plans, and so forth, because the housing of that shorter tower was not the correct housing for the higher tower. Was there a change in the height of the towers, or was it put up to the Engineers?

Colonel POWELL. The towers we got were all prefabricated. We had the footings and we gave them to the Engineers. I do not know of any reason for such a statement. We did change the height of the towers, but they were shipped that way and they knew what we were going to have.

157. General GRUNERT. Then there is no reason why there was any delay on the part of the Engineers concerning the height of the towers on your permanent stations?

157A. Colonel POWELL. No, sir. I do not see any excuse for it.

General GRUNERT. Up to December 7th was there any S. O. P. [3906] on the getting of information to the Navy from your Information Center as it operated at that time?

Colonel POWELL. The Navy did not take much interest in this air warning system.

158. General GRUNERT. In what way?

Colonel POWELL. Well, they did not seem to be interested in it. We never were able to get any liaison officer over from the Navy to take part in the exercises or carry on the work.

159. General GRUNERT. Was it up to the Interceptor Command to provide them with the necessary communications, and then it was up to the Navy to furnish the liaison officer in the Center; is that right?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

160. General GRUNERT. You say they took no interest in providing such a man?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

161. General GRUNERT. It appears from the testimony we had that they claim they were greatly interested, and were so interested that they kept pushing the program and were so worried about the thing not being complete and one thing and another. It seems to be counter to what you tell us here.

Colonel POWELL. To the best of my knowledge, General, I did not know that.

162. General GRUNERT. Did not they run in a Lieutenant Commander by the name of Taylor to assist in getting the air warning service started?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

163. General GRUNERT. You never knew a Captain Taylor?

Colonel POWELL. There was a Captain Taylor that went up [3907] with me one time to Haleakala to see for what reason the set would not get close-in information, but that is the only time a Navy man came around my office or offered anything.

164. General GRUNERT. This S. O. P. of November 5th, which provided for an interceptor command, when was that interceptor command actually activated?

Colonel POWELL. I do not know that, sir.

165. General GRUNERT. Who would have the command of that Interceptor Command?

Colonel POWELL. General Davidson.

166. General GRUNERT. Was there at any time any controversy between the Signal Corps or between you and Davidson as to when to turn the thing over to the Air Corps?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

167. General GRUNERT. Was not that provided in the S. O. P. of November 5th?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

168. General GRUNERT. When was it actually turned over to them?

Colonel POWELL. That I do not know, sir.

169. General GRUNERT. The record shows that the Interceptor Command was actually activated December the 17th.

Colonel POWELL. I think that is about right.

170. General GRUNERT. Would that have been the date you actually turned it over?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

171. General GRUNERT. And up to that time there was no controversy between you, the two of you, as to whether the Air Forces [3908] should handle it or the Signal Corps should continue to handle it?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. I knew General Davidson very well. We were very good friends. We used to discuss the thing, and I told him as far as I was concerned it was a Signal Corps function and we would work out a switch together.

172. General GRUNERT. Did the Signal Corps function up to the time the Air Corps command was activated?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

173. General GRUNERT. Was there any thought given to activating this thing prior to December 17th? Why did they put out the S. O. P. of November 5th, 1941, which gave the impression that the Inter-

ceptor Command was in being? What was the delay between November 5th and December 7th in activating that?

Colonel POWELL. I do not know, because General Davidson and I were both on the mainland. We left at that time on October 15th with Colonel Meehan. We went to the mainland to visit the exercises being conducted there and to visit other air-warning installations to see how we could improve ours, and we got back here December the 3rd.

174. General GRUNERT. During your absence there was a Colonel Murphy who carried on for you?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

175. General GRUNERT. He is now deceased?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

176. General GRUNERT. But you know of your own knowledge that there had been practices using all five of these mobile sets?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

177. General GRUNERT. Together with an improvised information [3909] center?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

178. General GRUNERT. That worked satisfactorily?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

179. General GRUNERT. To you?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

180. General GRUNERT. To the Department?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

181. General GRUNERT. To the Navy?

Colonel POWELL. I don't know about the Navy. I don't know anything about them.

182. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether the Navy understood the status of the Interceptor Command prior to December 7th?

Colonel POWELL. As I say, General, I know nothing about the Navy.

183. General GRUNERT. Whose business was it to keep the Navy informed?

Colonel POWELL. I should think it would have been General Davidson, the Operations Officer.

184. General GRUNERT. But his command had not been activated.

Colonel POWELL. General Davidson had the fighter command, and I was just running the air warning service, which is serving the fighter command.

185. General GRUNERT. When the fighter command and the air warning service were put together, they called it the Interceptor Command, or did at that time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

186. General GRUNERT. That had not been activated up to December 17th?

[3910] Colonel POWELL. That is right.

187. General GRUNERT. And the S. O. P. on November 5th referred to it just as if it was in being?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

188. General GRUNERT. We have testimony to the effect that the Navy understood, because of that S. O. P., that the thing was in being. Now, whose business was it to inform them it was not, or what they could do with it, or otherwise? How about the air warn-

ing service? If it was not your business as to that, was it your business to keep the Navy informed as to the status or degree of progress of what the air warning service was doing?

Colonel POWELL. At that time I did not feel it was my responsibility to inform the Navy. My responsibility was to General Davidson, and that is who I worked through.

189. General FRANK. General Davidson, under the Department Commander, General Short?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, naturally.

190. General GRUNERT. Your understanding was that the reason the Commanding General adopted the hours of 4 to 7 a. m. was to have such warning service as was then in existence in being and working during the most dangerous hours?

Colonel POWELL. That is right, sir.

191. General GRUNERT. And the reason they did not have longer hours than that was because of the lack of spare parts and so forth?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

192. General GRUNERT. Now, Lieutenant Commander Taylor, in the Roberts Commission testimony, says that "On the morning of the 7th it (referring to the air warning service) was not ready by [3911] any means for air warning for air interception; it was 2 or 3 weeks before we could get them functioning." Do you suppose that testimony referred to the permanent stations, or permanent system, or could it have referred to the temporary setup with the mobile stations at that time?

Colonel POWELL. I think all he referred to would be the mobile stations.

193. General GRUNERT. Evidently Lieutenant Commander Taylor did not have much confidence in the functioning of this temporary system which appears to have functioned during drills and tests?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, and did function on the morning of December 7th.

194. General GRUNERT. Do you feel if the system had been in operation as you had it prior thereto, on December 7th, the morning of December 7th, when the attack hit, that they could have given sufficient warning to have helped the defense on that morning?

Colonel POWELL. That all depends upon the status of the personnel on the ground, what their status of defense was. It would not have helped if we had the system going if the fighters had not been alerted and on the ground and ready to take off in six minutes.

195. General GRUNERT. Let me put it this way: It would not have helped in the status they were then in, in Alert No. 1?

Colonel POWELL. That is right.

196. General GRUNERT. If they had been in Alert No. 2, which provides for defense against an air attack, plus sabotage, then what is your judgment?

[3912] Colonel POWELL. We would have given them fair warning and would have had the Air Corps get their fighters and I am sure there would have been a different result.

197. General GRUNERT. A reduced loss?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, definitely.

198. General GRUNERT. Have you anything else that you think you might add that would be of value to the Board that you can give us, after General Russell has asked you some questions?

199. General RUSSELL. Colonel, some discussion has occurred about this exercise which was referred to and described in the letter of November, as I recall it.

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

200. General RUSSELL. I was anxious to know the condition of readiness in supporting our ground troops in that exercise, as to those that went out and intercepted the incoming planes about 30 miles.

Colonel POWELL. That would have been the condition of readiness they should have been in on December 7th. It was all planned and the airplanes were all alerted and were at their airplanes and ready to take off, at their controls.

201. General FRANK. On what type of alert?

Colonel POWELL. I do not know that, sir.

202. General FRANK. There were three types of alert.

Colonel POWELL. Yes, but I do not know about that.

203. General RUSSELL. Were not the people in the airplanes when they got the message, ready to go up?

Colonel POWELL. That I do not know, sir. That is something that was handled by the Air Corps, and I do not know [3913] just what condition they were in, but I imagine they were by their planes and ready to go up and get off.

204. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

205. Major CLAUSEN. Just a question, please.

Suppose, Colonel Powell, that the order had been given for 24-hour operation of these stations, let us say a week before Pearl Harbor, would you have been able in some way to have complied with that order?

Colonel POWELL. That is something I cannot answer. We would have operated, but how many sets we would have been able to continue in operation is problematical, because we cannot predict what is going to burn up in a set.

206. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, by operating maybe one or two of the sets you could have been on a 24-hour operation and taken spare parts from one to put in another?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, but when you take out one set you reduce your coverage.

207. Major CLAUSEN. Yes; I mean there could have been some compliance with the order?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, definitely, we could have complied with it.

208. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

209. General GRUNERT. Any questions, Colonel Toulmin?

210. Colonel TOULMIN. No, sir.

211. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else you think of that you might want to tell the Board, Colonel?

Colonel POWELL. I would like to introduce this memorandum signed by my assistant to you. It is a kind of a resume of the [3914] status of the equipment for the fixed stations and the mobile equipment.

212. General GRUNERT. Is that memorandum prepared with your knowledge? Did you approve that memorandum?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, I do.

213. General GRUNERT. All right, sir. Identify it and mark it for the record.

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214. Major CLAUSEN. At this time we offer in evidence a memorandum dated September 14, 1944, from Colonel A. R. Marcy to Major General Walter H. Frank, with the exhibits referred to therein, as the exhibit next in order.

(Memorandum to Major General Walter H. Frank, signed by A. R. Marcy, Colonel, Signal Corps, POA, dated September 14, 1944, was marked Exhibit No. 57 and received in evidence.)

215. General FRANK. Is there anything else you would like to submit?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I have nothing at all.

216. General GRUNERT. That statement you have before you, to which you referred, you do not wish to offer that in evidence?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. This is a complete resume of everything that I know about the air warning. I went through my records and had it condensed in this shape, so I could have it.

217. Major CLAUSEN. Would that be of value to the Board?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I don't think so. I would be glad to tender it, if you care to have it. It is the only copy I have.

218. Major CLAUSEN. I would like to borrow it.

Colonel POWELL. Yes, if you want to borrow it, I will be [3915] glad to let you look it over.

219. General FRANK. I suggest we put it in evidence, have a copy of it made, and then return this to him.

Colonel POWELL. All right, sir. This was just handed to me this morning, so I have not gone through it thoroughly. But it was prepared by officers in my office going over the whole history of the air warning service.

220. General GRUNERT. I think would be of value to the Board. Put it in evidence and have a copy made, and return this to Colonel Powell.

221. Major CLAUSEN. At this time we offer a Report On The Establishment of the AWS in Hawaii, prepared by Signal Office, Central Pacific Base Command, 31 August, 1944, which is the document and paper referred to by the witness, and the exhibit next in order.

(Report On The Establishment of the AWS in Hawaii, prepared by Signal Office, Central Pacific Base Command, 31 August, 1944, was marked Exhibit No. 58 and received in evidence.)

222. General GRUNERT. If you have nothing else to state, and there are no further questions, thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

223. Major CLAUSEN. I have a communication from H. P. Benson of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, to the effect that his testimony given before the Board was incorrect. Mr. Dillingham, instead of owning only 10 per cent of the capital stock of that company owns in excess of 20 per cent. He also states in his letter that Mr. Dillingham received dividends in 1942 and 1943 of \$7,000 and \$4,200 respectively. I can either read this into the record, or in some other way bring it to the attention of the [3916] Board.

224. General GRUNERT. What is the pleasure of the Board? Have it read into the record? Is it long?

225. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

226. General GRUNERT. Read it into the record.

(Letter to Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation signed by H. P. Benson, dated September 18, 1944, is as follows:)

227. Major CLAUSEN (reading):

SEPTEMBER 18, 1944.

Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation, U. S. A., Honolulu, T. H.
Attention: Major Henry C. Clausen.

Sms: I wish to correct my testimony given before your Board on Friday, September 15th, in particular as it referred to the stock holding of Mr. W. F. Dillingham in the Hawaiian Contracting Company, Ltd. Of the 16,680 shares of its capital stock outstanding since December 22, 1937, Mr. Dillingham has continuously owned 3,500 shares. This holding was not altered during 1942 and 1943.

As to my answer to the question as to what portion of the fee received by the Hawaiian Constructors was in turn received by Mr. Dillingham, the answer should be, no portion of the fee, *as such* was received by Mr. Dillingham. As a stockholder, his pro rata of any dividends authorized by the Directors was paid him in due course in accordance with his stock holding.

For some years, the Hawaiian Contracting Company, Ltd., paid a regular dividend of one-half on one per cent per [3917] month. This was continued during 1942 and 1943, and suspended indefinitely as of January 1, 1944. In addition, the company paid an extra dividend of four per cent in 1943.

Mr. Dillingham, therefore, received as dividends in 1942, \$7,000.00, and in 1943, \$4,200.00.

Mr. Dillingham received no other compensation, commission or salary in any form from this company.

Very truly yours,

H. P. BENSON, *Pres. & Mgr.*

[3918] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BYRON C. MEURLOTT, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Major MEURLOTT. Byron C. Meurlott, Major, Military Intelligence, stationed in Honolulu.

2. General GRUNERT. Major General Russell has a few questions to ask you. I will turn you over to General Russell.

3. General RUSSELL. Major, how long have you been here in the Islands?

Major MEURLOTT. A little over 20 years, sir.

4. General RUSSELL. How long have you been employed by the Federal Government?

Major MEURLOTT. 19 years.

5. General RUSSELL. In the main, what have your duties in connection with this federal employment been?

Major MEURLOTT. During the past 19 years they have been largely in connection with observing activities of the Japanese community in the Islands.

6. General RUSSELL. When were you commissioned as an officer in the Army of the United States?

Major MEURLOTT. I received my reserve commission, I believe, in about 1928.

7. General RUSSELL. When were you called to active duty under that commission?

Major MEURLOTT. The first of April, 1941, sir.

8. General RUSSELL. Major, what is your present assignment?
[3919] Major MEURLOTT. I am officer in charge of what is known as Counterintelligence Division.

9. General RUSSELL. Whom did you succeed?

Major MEURLOTT. General Twitty, then Colonel Twitty.

10. General RUSSELL. And whom did he succeed, if you recall?

Major MEURLOTT. Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell.

11. General RUSSELL. Were the duties which you performed prior to being commissioned in the office, related or similar to the duties which you have been performing since you were commissioned?

Major MEURLOTT. Quite similar, sir.

12. General RUSSELL. Quite similar to those you have performed since you went into service under your commission?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

13. General RUSSELL. Major, there has been testimony before the Board, and we asked you to check on it, as to the number of the Japanese citizens, foreign-born or born here, who were followers of what is known as the Shinto theory of religion. Did you get that information?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir; I have it with respect to the number of Shinto shrines and the number of Shinto priests.

14. General RUSSELL. As of December 7, '41?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

15. General RUSSELL. Would you give the Board how many shrines there were and about how many followers of this form of religion existed on December 7, '41?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes. There were a total of 55 recognized Shinto shrines.

16. General RUSSELL. And what is your estimate on the number [3920] of Japanese who were followers of that form of religion?

Major MEURLOTT. I would say offhand it would be in the vicinity probably of 50,000.

17. General RUSSELL. How many Japanese were there on the Islands at that time? Approximately 150,000.

Major MEURLOTT. In the whole Territory, yes, sir, somewhere.

18. General RUSSELL. About a third of them were of this Shinto religion?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes.

19. General RUSSELL. Breaking it down as to those who were native-born and those who were born on the Islands, what proportion of the 50,000 were born on the mainland of Japan and what proportion were born here in the Islands?

Major MEURLOTT. Roughly, the entire alien Japanese community of about 40,000; very few exceptions there that weren't Shintoists.

20. General RUSSELL. You stated in one of our previous conversations something about the Japanese who followed Buddhism here on the Island, and you were of the opinion that the practices of that religion conformed the followers in a way to the practices of Shintoism; is that right?

Major MEURLOTT. Not necessarily the practices of Shintoism, sir. I meant by that statement that the Japanese in taking up Buddhism adapted it to the nationalistic teachings and practices of Japan.

21. General RUSSELL. Then, does it come to pass that from the standpoint of loyalty to the homeland or the Japanese Empire the philosophies of the two religions are closely [3921] related?

Major MEURLOTT. It does so far as the Territory of Hawaii is concerned.

22. General RUSSELL. What in your opinion is the difference in the outlook toward the homeland of the younger generation of Japanese on the Island from that of the older Japanese on the Island and those that were born in the homeland?

Major MEURLOTT. Well, they are divided in their sentiments. I wouldn't have any idea as to the proportions. Some are definitely loyal to the United States; others, as we have found in our investigations, are definitely loyal to Japan.

23. General RUSSELL. Is it true, or not, Major, that the agency or the office with which you are connected is continuing now its investigation of Japanese activities, and as a result of this investigation some Japanese are continuing to be interned?

Major MEURLOTT. That is correct, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. Could you tell me approximately the number of Japanese who have been interned in the last year?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

25. General RUSSELL. Say, beginning in the late summer of '43?

Major MEURLOTT. I have here the figures for the period from September 15, '43, to 15 September, 1944, an even year.

26. General FRANK. Divided into what periods? Divided by the months?

Major MEURLOTT. No, sir. That is for the whole period. The total number of aliens apprehended in that period: 51; total number of dual citizens, that is, those born here but [3922] having Japanese citizenship: 42; or a total of 93.

27. General RUSSELL. And you referred to aliens. They were Japanese aliens?

Major MEURLOTT. Purely aliens; yes, sir.

28. General RUSSELL. Purely Japanese aliens?

Major MEURLOTT. Japanese aliens.

29. General RUSSELL. In the aggregate figures, about 93?

Major MEURLOTT. 93, a total.

30. General RUSSELL. Now, of all the Japanese who have been interned since December 7, '41, do you recall the trial in any court, either civil or military, of any one of those people?

Major MEURLOTT. Not regular courts of law, sir. There have been established here boards for the internment of Japanese, and they have appeared before those various boards.

31. General RUSSELL. Do you believe that this form of surveillance which is being conducted by the office to which you are attached is important and is responsible for the absence of sabotage on the part of Japanese residents of this Island?

Major MEURLOTT. I believe so.

32. General RUSSELL. In that same connection is it true, or not, that the Japanese people on these Islands cling together, operate as a bloc, economically, socially, and politically?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

33. General RUSSELL. Has there been any change in the cohesion or the strength of cohesion with which they are being held together, by virtue of the present war conditions?

Major MEURLOTT. The only change has been brought about through the workings of security measures that we have [3923] established here. That is, we forced dissolution of many of the strictly alien Japanese organizations, and therefore they were not able to operate. Other than that there has been no noticeable change.

34. General RUSSELL. What influence on the political life of this community did this Japanese bloc have prior to the beginnings of hostilities on December 7, '41?

Major MEURLOTT. Politically?

35. General RUSSELL. Politically.

Major MEURLOTT. They had a great influence on the whole political life of the Territory.

36. General RUSSELL. In what way was that reflected, if you know in what ways that it was reflected?

Major MEURLOTT. In the candidates who were elected to the various territorial and municipal offices. There would seldom be any legislation that would be calculated to in any way hinder or affect the affairs adversely of the Japanese community. That was always obvious.

37. General RUSSELL. In other words, the local office holders and candidates were very respectful in their attitude toward the wishes of the Japanese groups here on the Island?

Major MEURLOTT. That is correct.

38. General RUSSELL. Was there definite evidence of the Japanese people voting together for candidates for public office?

Major MEURLOTT. It would be impossible to gather any evidence on that particular subject.

39. General RUSSELL. Major, based on this long experience of approximately 20 years with these Japanese people, what [3924] part, in your opinion, will they play in the future of these Islands, particularly in the political and economic life of the Islands?

Major MEURLOTT. In my opinion, they will definitely dominate the economic and political situation.

40. General RUSSELL. Would their opportunity for such domination be increased by granting to the Territory of Hawaii the status of statehood?

Major MEURLOTT. It would, sir.

41. General RUSSELL. Do you know of any efforts which have been made since the outbreak of hostilities December 7, '41, looking toward the reestablishment of these language schools on the Island?

Major MEURLOTT. There has been one definite instance in which an attempt was made to reestablish a school, in one of the more remote districts of the Territory.

42. General RUSSELL. Do you anticipate further efforts along that line?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir. I think that is pretty conclusively borne out by the fact that these schools, the great majority of them, have failed to dissolve their organizations. Some few have dissolved and turned their assets over to community endeavors, but that has been only a very negligible number.

43. General RUSSELL. Have you any plans for the future as the results of the conclusions which you have reached about the part to be played in these Islands in the future by the Japanese?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir. I don't believe I want to stay [3925] around here after the war.

44. General RUSSELL. Those are the only questions I have, Major.

45. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

46. Major CLAUSEN. I have a question, yes, sir.

Major Meurlott, I show you a memorandum entitled "Memorandum for the files," dated July 22, 1942, to the effect that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was such a drunkard that he was even incompetent to be a subversive influence. Did you make this?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir; I wrote that.

47. Major CLAUSEN. When you were operating under G-2; is that right?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

48. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have.

49. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

50. General RUSSELL. This is your signature on this?

Major MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

51. General RUSSELL. What do you base that rather sweeping conclusion on, Major?

Major MEURLOTT. That was merely passed on to me as a result of a conversation Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell had with Colonel Mollison at that time. He said that was a conclusion they had arrived at in a conference, and this was merely for the purpose of the files.

52. General RUSSELL. All right. That is all.

53. General GRUNERT. Major, have you anything else that you think of offering to the Board for its consideration in coming to conclusions as to its mission?

Major MEURLOTT. I can't think of anything offhand, sir.

54. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:20 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

[3926]

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[3927] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1944

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

The Board, at 9:30 a. m., pursuant to recess on Monday, September 18, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President, Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

General FRANK. I wish to read into the record the following memorandum submitted to the Board as a reply to questions asked General Bragdon with respect to the procedure and the regularity of the manner in which the Mokuleia Airport was obtained and improvements made thereon to the extent of over \$5,000,000 by the United States Government without even any lease on the property:

(Memorandum dated 18 September 1944, from Lt. Col. J. S. Bragdon, in answer to questions of General Frank in re Mokuleia Airfield, is as follows:)

[3928]

18 SEPTEMBER 1944.

Memorandum to Pearl Harbor Board

(Attention: General Frank)

Subject: Acquisition of Mokuleia Airfield.

This is in answer to General Frank's questions to me this morning concerning the acquisition of the Mokuleia Airfield. Three questions were asked with reference to the memorandum filed by Mr. S. Perliter, dated 16 September 1940 as follows, namely first: Whether I did not think that on the face of that memorandum that the transaction was irregular; secondly, why the Engineers had gone on the property without either a lease or a fee; and thirdly, why the Engineers were leasing the property instead of purchasing it in view of the large expenditure for work thereon.

I stated that I could not honestly answer the questions without going into the matter. I have questioned four persons in direct contact with the transaction, namely, Mr. S. Perliter, Head Engineer, Mr. H. C. Jackson, present head of the Land Acquisition Section, Real Estate Division of the Base Engineer Office, Lt. Colonel C. S. Marek, who was the Real Estate Officer at the time the work started, and Colonel B. L. Robinson, who was the Operations Officer.

My study of the matter after going over it with these four persons convinces me that there was nothing irregular in the entire transaction.

[3929] Mr. H. C. Jackson informed me as follows:

That Mr. Dillingham had given verbal permission to go on this land and that he in fact suggested it; that because of the great volume of land taken over and its cost, it could not be decided immediately just what property to lease or to purchase without careful study; that this matter had been taken up with General Emmons who approved the proposal that all tracts should be carefully reviewed and a decision later made as to whether each tract should be leased or

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purchased in fee; that the policy in the meantime would be to lease rather than to purchase; that in the meantime it was the policy in the interim period to cover our holding property by a lease.

This explains how initially the attempt was made to lease the land from Mr. Dillingham rather than to purchase.

It should be borne in mind that in land acquisition, whether by lease or purchase, it is necessary to submit a gross appraisal which requires a detailed study of all factors including cost of the land, its use, cost of restoration, post war values, etc.

Mr. Jackson also stated that in mid 1943 a study was made and submitted of a large number of tracts as to whether they should be acquired by purchase or lease; that Mokuleia was on this list as No. 2 for purchase, but that recommendations would be made on each individual case after studies thereof; that papers on the Mokuleia case are now in Washington [3930] with the gross appraisal and all other required data with recommendations for purchase.

Colonel C. S. Marek, who was Real Estate Officer at that time also states that Mr. Dillingham suggested the use of this field to General Emmons; that verbal permission from Mr. Dillingham was secured; that one reason why it was not known initially whether it should be better to purchase or procure a lease, and why in fact steps in either of these directions were impractical was that the Air Corps did not know how extensively this field would be developed; that at first it was merely an emergency field; that one reason later for delaying the purchase was his inability to get qualified appraisers. This matter had been taken up with higher authority in an endeavor to secure qualified appraisers.

Colonel B. L. Robinson stated that with reference to this particular tract, the Engineers were instructed to begin construction within twenty-four hours and did in fact have equipment on the job and construction started within twenty-four hours; that this project did in fact start as an emergency one. Mr. S. Perliter, Head Engineer, independently questioned, collaborated the fact that this was an emergency project; that it was not known at first just how extensive the project would be; and that the project was added to from time to time by the Using Service which was the Air Corps in this case. For your information work is still going on on this field, [3931] consisting of new buildings and widening of runways.

From all the facts above there was nothing irregular in this transaction and the entire matter is being clarified in a regular manner. I believe the foregoing answers rather completely all your questions. I have not had time to secure from the files all the basic papers covering the lease and recommendations but I am sure the information given by the four persons named above, who were in close contact with this matter, is trustworthy.

/s/ J. S. Bragdon
J. S. BRAGDON
Lt. Col., U. S. Army.

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD T. KAY, MILITARY AIDE TO THE GOVERNOR OF HAWAII, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Kay, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. KAY. My name is Harold T. Kay. Presently I am military aide to the Governor of Hawaii and active Colonel in the Guard. I am in civilian life vice-president of C. Brewer & Company, lived there for 22 years.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Kay, the reason I asked that you come before the Board was that during testimony of a former witness, a Colonel Pratt, who in 1941 was in charge of civil affairs for the Hawaiian Department, when I asked him, "Do you know of any witnesses now in Hawaii that can help us get the true story?" he testified to the effect:

[3932] Well, there is a gentleman named Mr. Harold Kay, who I believe now is military aid to the present Governor of the Territory, who on the morn-

ing of the attack observed the attack from his home at an altitude of 900 feet, which overlooked the whole south seaward coast of Oahu, through binoculars, and made notes of what he saw at the time, and I think he might be of some aid to the Board in finding out or corroborating testimony as to what actually did happen so far as he saw it there.

You were in Hawaii during the attack, were you?

Mr. KAY. Yes, sir.

3. General GRUNERT. And will you tell us what you saw and what you think will be of help to the Board in ascertaining the facts as to the attack?

Mr. KAY. Certainly.

4. General GRUNERT. Tell us your own story, please.

Mr. KAY. I might state that I made a report, at the request of the 7th Air Force Intelligence, of what I saw on the 7th of December, and that that report was filed with the Intelligence office, and subsequently a copy of it was furnished General McCoy of the Roberts Commission. It was made shortly after the attack, as a matter of fact the second day, on the 8th, and it states much more accurately than I can right now, due to the elapsation of time, the particular details. I could furnish the Board with a copy of that report. I have one or two copies in Honolulu, and I could forward a copy on to the Board, and it might be more accurate and it might be clearer than what I could tell the Board at this time. However, if the Board desires me to recollect to the best of my memory, I should be glad to.

[3933] 5. General GRUNERT. Will you do that, and then in addition thereto send us a copy of that report?

Mr. KAY. Yes.

6. General GRUNERT. Which we will study to see whether or not anything can be added that we want.

Mr. KAY. I shall be glad to.

The attack started around—well, shortly before eight o'clock. I place it at that time due to the fact that at that particular time I was trying to persuade my wife to take her children and go to the mainland, due to the tensity of the situation there; and during our argument, why, the house began to shake, and I told her to go downstairs to find out what the kiddies were doing, that I had never heard them make a noise like that before. And she tore downstairs and came back and reported that they were not doing anything; they were quietly eating breakfast.

So I told her to go outside and see what was happening. The house was still shaking, and large booms, and so forth, and she came running back and said, "Well, it's war all right."

Well, I, of course, dashed right out to our top lanai and saw Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor under attack. I had some powerful binoculars at that time and was able to see very clearly just what was happening, and it was a very vivid sight. From the south planes were coming in, and as those planes would pass over Hickam you could hear large explosions and you could see spurts of fire come out of the hangars, and as planes would pass over the ships in Pearl Harbor you could likewise see spurts of fire and hear large explosions.

Now, from where my house is located one can see the [3934] entire southern part of the Island from—

7. General GRUNERT. Right there, will you give us a description of where your house is, compared to a known military installation?

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Mr. KAY. I am about four air miles from Hickam Field and probably four and a half from Pearl Harbor itself, being located on top of Alewa Heights, which is to the right of Nuuanu Valley, or should I say left of Nuuanu Valley going up Nuuanu Valley, and my house is located at about 800 feet above sea level and combines a clear view of everything from the Waianae, Waialua, the Waianae, through Schofield, swinging around through Ewa, Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, the major part—in fact all of Honolulu, the various forts in along the sea front, on through to Diamond Head, and around to the other side of Diamond Head to Ruger. I am about three—well, probably a mile or mile and a half, direct air miles, from the shore line and the ocean, and probably the same distance from Honolulu harbor itself.

The day was a very clear day with only a few clouds gently moving with the very light trade wind. The visibility was excellent, one of our very best days, and at that hour of the morning, why, looking into the west the visibility is even enhanced due to the fact that the sun is shining toward the west.

8. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

Mr. KAY. Have I sufficiently located the house?

9. General GRUNERT. That is sufficient, yes.

Mr. KAY. As these planes—

10. General FRANK. Would you mind marking the position of [3935] your house with an "X" on there (indicating)?

11. General GRUNERT. On that map.

12. Colonel WEST. A red pencil might show up a little better.

13. Colonel TOULMIN. Just draw a line up there and say, "Kay house."

14. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, if you proceed with your statement, please.

Mr. KAY. Well, instantly there passed through my mind the thought that I should check on the radio to see whether any alarm had gone out. So I again sent my wife downstairs to turn on the radio, and she came back and reported that only church music was being played.

So I went to the telephone and called up KGU and KGMB, our two radio stations there, and was unable to get either station; called up the police station, and kept ringing busy, and then I called up what we call our emergency station there and was unable to make any impression on our emergency station that any general alarm should be sent out.

I kept that up over the period of the next hour or so, and refer to as I go along, but I stayed outside practically all that time except when I went in to put in these calls to see if I could get emergency. As I stated, when I first saw these planes they were coming from a south direction and directly toward Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor. It appeared to me that the planes were shuttling; in other words, they would let go their loads and return to the direction they came from, because there was a constant stream coming from that direction, and it would seem to me that they were turning around and going back.

[3936] Later, I would say probably about a half an hour, forty-five minutes later, I observed planes coming from a southeasterly direction, flying very low and slowly, about the speed that our inter-island commercial planes fly at, and they were proceeding along our

coast line, coming in at about Diamond Head and proceeding along our coast line, and would come to almost Pearl Harbor, and then they would go to a higher altitude, into the light clouds, and then suddenly dive down, and their descent would be followed by terrific explosions. The descent would be right over our battleships there, which could easily be seen both by the naked eye and clearly through the binoculars; and the dives would be followed, as I stated, by heavy explosions and large spurts of fire. During this period I saw no planes attack any of the planes coming in. There was sporadic light fire from in and about Pearl Harbor, some from the ships, and—well, I couldn't very well locate where the other fire was coming from, but it was rather irregular and didn't seem to have very much effect on the planes.

From about eight-thirty on, ships began to leave Pearl Harbor at high speeds, and planes would follow them out, and as they would follow them out you could see geysers of water splashing over the ships, and the ships after they got into the open sea would zigzag and head in a southeasterly direction, and that kept up, oh, for some time.

The air attacks came in waves and were not constantly maintained. There was a very heavy attack around nine-thirty, followed by terrific explosions, and that apparently was caused by these large planes that I could see coming in along [3937] the seashore.

15. General FRANK. Around Diamond Head?

Mr. KAY. From Diamond Head direction. And they came in in what seemed to be quite—not large numbers, but quite a few. At that time I saw no firing, as I stated, at any of these planes other than from around the Pearl Harbor area.

After fruitlessly trying to arouse the radio stations, and so forth, why, I gave that up around about the hour of, I think it was, about nine o'clock when radio suddenly awoke and blasted out that we were under attack. During that period several people called up, among them Mrs. Draemel, wife of Admiral Draemel, asking me what we could see from up at our place, that her husband, Admiral Draemel, had been called in, and also other people, but all the time that I could I spent out on this top lanai.

Then, with these attacks continuing and as a matter of fact increasing, I sent my family up into the hills, and I got together what armament I had, and went up there with them near a large reservoir that is up behind our house. I had in my mind that there might be attempted sabotage and that reservoirs might be attacked and that I might serve some useful purpose there in trying to protect that reservoir.

[3938] During this entire period one was struck with the futility of being able to do anything; it seemed so one-sided, and so difficult to do anything about it. These attacks continued through the morning. At the hour of about eleven o'clock planes flew very low over our hilltop in a direction headed toward the other side of the island, up through the Nuuanu Gap, probably 40 or 50 planes in that flight, and they flew very low, and they bore a very close resemblance to pictures that we had just seen of the German 2-engine Stuka bomber. They bore no insignia, and were a very dark, gray-black color.

About an hour after that, or about 45 minutes after that, approximately the same number of planes flew back, some going down the

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valley, letting go some of their bombs, a few over in the Diamond Head area, and then others, passing directly over our heads about 200 feet above us. On the return trip, we were able to observe some fighter planes escorting the bombers, and on the fighter planes one could observe the Japanese "rising sun" insignia, but these bombers still did not have any insignia that we could observe, and they were just immediately over our heads. They flew back toward Pearl Harbor and then went on out to sea.

Around about 9 or 9:30, we could see planes flying in the direction of Wheeler Field, but, at the distance that Wheeler Field is from our house, it was difficult to observe just what damage they may have done.

The observable attack was maintained until about 1:30, and the last heavy gun action—the gun action around the Pearl Harbor area was increasing at that time—was around about 1:30, and the last planes that we saw in the air, the last Japanese [3939] planes, was between the hours of about 1:30 and 2 o'clock. After 2 o'clock, we waited about a half an hour, or an hour, before going back to the house. We saw no planes take off of Hickam Field until about 11 o'clock, when we saw one plane go up.

As the attack progressed during the morning, it progressively hit the various hangars—well, of course, that happened right at the beginning—so that all we could see on Hickam Field was nothing but burnt-out hangars, with the exception as I recollect of the last two—that is, the two closest "mauka", or towards the mountains. The planes were pretty well demolished. One of the interesting things we noted was that the runway wasn't in any way damaged. We couldn't see any damage to it, and that led us to the belief that the Japs wanted to keep the runway for their own use later.

That, about, in brief summarizes what we could see.

16. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, will you tell us why you were so anxious to get your wife to the mainland?

Mr. KAY. Well, for over a year it had been a general feeling out in Hawaii that hostilities could very easily break out between the United States and Japan; as a matter of fact, for a matter of several years, it had been felt that they could break out, and that had grown increasingly tense, so that in the last year it was the general impression, at least among quite a few of us I know, that hostilities could break out any time; particularly the last two or three months, there, preceding Pearl Harbor.

17. General GRUNERT. Then at that time you were what we may call "warminded"?

Mr. KAY. I was, sir.

[3940] 18. General GRUNERT. And you anticipated an attack on Hawaii within a comparatively short time?

Mr. KAY. Yes, sir.

19. General GRUNERT. Was that the general feeling, or was that your own feeling?

Mr. KAY. I think that was the feeling that was held by a good many of us. For instance, General Herron, whom I know very well, held that feeling, and when General Herron was relieved by General Short, I met General Short through General Herron, and I had frequent conversations with General Short, whom I got to know socially,

and whom I became very fond of, as to the danger of attack on Hawaii and on the need to be prepared; and I recollect very clearly that General Short was very, very much concerned over the inadequate preparation that was possible with the supplies and equipment that had been made available to him.

20. General GRUNERT. Do you know to what extent he used those supplies and that equipment which had been made available to him, on the morning of the attack?

Mr. KAY. I couldn't say, sir. I talked with General Short after the 7th, and I have discussed Pearl Harbor several times with him, and I think he could better answer that question than I.

21. General GRUNERT. Now, you spoke of going from your house up to the reservoir, arming yourself, with the idea of protecting that reservoir from possible sabotage. Was there any evidence of attempted sabotage during the attack, or shortly after the attack?

Mr. KAY. Before answering that question, sir, could I [3941] refer back to my previous answer, with respect to why we felt that war was imminent—one of the reasons? I recollect clearly that General Short appeared before our local legislature about, I think, two months before Pearl Harbor, and plead with the local legislature to pass the mobilization bill—as we called it, the “M-Day Bill”, which at that time was under consideration by the legislature. It was an unprecedented move, and it marked the first time that a commanding general in our department ever appeared before our local legislature; and he made a very impassioned speech at that time, urging the legislature to do all it could to be prepared.

Now, with reference to the last question, I know of no sabotage, myself, personally. I have been asked that question by Members of Congress and people in the administration, and I have always had to answer it in this way, that there are no known records so far as I know of, corroborated, of any affirmative acts of sabotage. Clearly there was espionage. We all felt, though, that sabotage was certainly in the picture, and that undoubtedly there were many Japanese agents who could and would have availed themselves of any opportunity of committing sabotage.

22. General GRUNERT. Mr. Kay, I understand that you have stated that Senator Thomas was very much interested in this attack and the causes and so forth. Do you know the ground of his interest, or what form it has taken, and whether or not he knows of anything that bears on what this Board has been appointed to do? And I will tell you, the Board has been appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of [3942] Hawaii, on the 7th of December 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, the latter being largely concerned with construction activities prior to the attack.

Now, do you know what is Senator Thomas's direct interest, and whether or not the ground that he is attempting to cover, if he is attempting to cover some ground, is such that you could tell us what it is, and whether or not he could assist the Board, if the Board sees fit to call him?

[3943] Mr. KAY. My answer in brief is yes, and I would like to be permitted to elaborate on that.

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23. General GRUNERT. Go ahead. What Senator Thomas is this?

Mr. KAY. Perhaps I better give you this. It might be of interest. It will be a matter of identification of myself with the Senate Military Affairs Committee (handing document to General Grunert). Senator Thomas is from Utah and presently is acting chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

24. General GRUNERT. May I interject here that this is a letter of September 14, 1944, on the stationery of the United States Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, signed by Elbert D. Thomas, Acting Chairman, and it says:

(Letter to whom it may concern, from Senator E. D. Thomas, acting chairman, Senate Military Affairs Committee, dated September 14, 1944, is as follows:)

To Whom it May Concern:

This will introduced Colonel Harold T. Kay, Military Aide to the Governor of Hawaii. Colonel Kay is now en route to Honolulu, Hawaii, having been called to Washington to assist this committee with certain matters relative to the national security. It is urgent that Colonel Kay return to Honolulu at the earliest possible date and it will therefore be greatly appreciated if air transportation and every possible courtesy which will expedite his trip are extended to him.

All right. Go ahead now.

Mr. KAY. Back in 1939, when the war broke out in Europe, I told General Herron, who had been the Commanding General of that Department, that I would like to offer my services to the armed forces again. I previously held a commission in the [3944] Army Air Reserve about 15 years, and prior to that had been two years in the last war and I have been much interested in Army matters for a good many years, in fact, since the last war. It seemed to me that we would be drawn into this war, and at that time I felt everybody who could be of assistance should get into it.

General Herron at that time advised me that due to my age—I was 43 then; that is five years ago—it would be preferable if I retained my civilian status, but he would let me know from time to time when I could be of any help.

When General Herron was relieved I saw quite a bit of General Short, and at various times we discussed the preparations that could be made out in the Hawaiian Islands to resist any attack in connection with any war that might be waged against our country.

At the time of the attack it was generally felt that the Hawaiian Islands had been pretty well starved in the matter of equipment and artillery and was wholly inadequate to resist any sustained attack.

25. General FRANK. Do you know how it fared relatively with respect to all of the rest of the United States Army?

Mr. KAY. I could only answer through hearsay, and that brings me up to this point of Senator Thomas' offer and, if I may, I would like to defer my answer to that until I come to Senator Thomas' offer.

When the attack came along and it appeared that we were so impotent, the general feeling was in the services and amongst civilians that every effort should be made to get more help out there. I happened to be fortunate enough to know [3945] people in Washington, both in Congress and in the administration, who might be of assistance at that time in securing more help.

It was generally felt that practically everything that we had, that is, in the country itself, was going the other way, and it was felt that unless somebody tried in every way possible, that the assistance that we really required might not get out our way; it might be too late.

So I was asked by people out there, some of them in the service and others, to do all I could to get more help out there, and in February I went to Washington and there conferred with people in the cabinet, with people in Congress, and others with the administration, people in the War Department, on the subject of getting more help to Hawaii.

It was felt in Washington by most of the people I conferred with that unless something definite was done, the help that Hawaii needed would not get to Hawaii.

So I returned to Hawaii with Robert Hinckley; at that time Assistant Secretary of Commerce, and at that time the air adviser to the President, with the idea in mind that Hinckley could make a survey of the situation out there and report back to people in Washington just what was needed.

I understand such a report was made after conferring with General Emmons and General Tinker and Admiral Nimitz and others. I can say at this time, due to the fact that I was present when those gentlemen discussed our situation with Mr. Hinckley, that there was a general feeling that we did not have enough out there to successfully resist attack.

Senator Thomas, who was then acting chairman of the Senate [3946] Military Affairs Committee, had always had a great interest in the Pacific; he had lived about 7 years in Japan, and he was of great help to us at that time.

When I returned I was desirous of again trying to get into the service, but again I was asked to continue in the role of trying to get what help I could out there, and among those people who urged me to do that was Colonel Pratt, General Woodruff, who was formerly one of our Department Commanders, Mr. Hinckley and some others.

26. General FRANK. Was Woodruff ever Department Commander?

Mr. KAY. Yes. Just for a short time. That was before he went to the Northeastern Department.

I made several trips more to Washington from time to time and discussed our situation out there from time to time with Washington, and at all times I endeavored to act in a constructive way, simply on the basis of doing what I could without in any way interfering with military operations or in any trying to pose as a military expert, but simply from the standpoint if I could be of assistance with these other branches of the government I was only too willing to serve.

27. General GRUNERT. Then Senator Thomas' interest was mainly in the line of preparedness for Hawaii?

Mr. KAY. And in getting proper help out there.

28. General GRUNERT. Did he know anything about the attack or the conditions prior to the attack?

Mr. KAY. If I may continue on this one line one step further, just before leaving Washington I discussed with Senator Thomas the request that this Board had made that I appear before the Board, and he asked me to make this offer to [3947] the Board:—

29. General FRANK. To this Board?

Mr. KAY. To this Board. —that he place the services of the Senate Military Affairs Committee at your disposal, that they would endeavor to secure any and all information that might have any bearing on the Pearl Harbor situation, not only in Hawaii but in Washington and internationally, and that they felt—he felt—they could be of great assistance, in that they could subpoena records that this Board might not be able to subpoena, and that they might secure data from the State Department and from the various branches of the government and from other sources which might not be secured unless they were secured through some such body as the Senate.

He further wanted it to be definitely understood that he was making this offer in a constructive way and that whatever they did would be carried on in a quiet way, with no desire to gain any publicity, but simply to bring to the Board all necessary data and information, and that he was not very much in sympathy with the actions of some of the people in the House who apparently were trying to make this a political issue but he did want to see that all facts came out fairly.

It seemed from the standpoint of people who have been charged with dereliction of duty, particularly General Short, that it is only fair that all the facts be brought out, and Senator Thomas would like to be of assistance in that respect; and I speak as a friend of General Short when I state that, and also from the information which I have secured myself but which I cannot repeat now, because it would be hearsay, before this Board, and it might be considered as a violation of confi- [3948] dence on the part of the people who have given me such information, but who I am sure would be glad to give the information directly to the Board if it came through, say, a channel such as the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

30. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

31. General RUSSELL. I don't think so. It seems to me the witness has suggested a field for investigation but does not define it. I do not just know how to go about exploring the field he has reference to, how to approach the people who have made statements to him. I do not know just how to go about it.

Mr. KAY. I might give you a slight lead there, General. Senator Thomas met every Saturday morning with Secretary Hull of the State Department and also about every other Saturday with the President.

32. General RUSSELL. During what period, are you talking about?

Mr. KAY. Before and after Pearl Harbor. And also talked with Kurusu shortly after Pearl Harbor.

33. General RUSSELL. Senator Thomas is in Washington?

Mr. KAY. He left Washington two days ago and is arriving at Salt Lake City this morning, and can be reached at Salt Lake City.

34. General RUSSELL. Do you know when he is going to be back?

Mr. KAY. I do not think he will go back until after the election.

35. General GRUNERT. Any question from the rest of the advisers?

36. Major CLAUSEN. I just wondered, sir, first, if Mr. Kay when he sends that report in should be given the address of our office in the Munitions Building.

37. General GRUNERT. Yes. I expected the recorder to do [3949] that.

38. Major CLAUSEN. 4745 Munitions Building, not here, but send it to Washington.

39. General FRANK. And would you send it by air mail, please?

Mr. KAY. Certainly.

40. General GRUNERT. This Board is limited as to time. We have a full docket. That appears to cover what we hoped to get out of you and we are glad of this opportunity to find you available to the Board. I think General Frank has an additional question.

41. General FRANK. You were interested in sending your wife back to the States and was fearful of the situation with which the families might be confronted in case of war. Was that because you were apprehensive about internal uprising of the local Japanese or because of fear of outside attack?

Mr. KAY. Both, sir. The sabotage factor was just as strong a factor as any factor in the minds of our people out there. We have a large Japanese population, and although we have worked diligently out there to turn them into good Americans, we know that some percentage are more loyal to Japan than to the United States. Just what that is, we do not know.

42. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the State Department Peace and War White Paper?

Mr. KAY. I am not, sir. I have heard of it, and I have read excerpts, but I could not say that I am conversant with it. I have heard it discussed.

43. General FRANK. You never read it?

Mr. KAY. I have never read it all the way through.

44. General FRANK. You have seen it?

[3950] Mr. KAY. I have never seen the entire document.

45. General FRANK. You spoke of the M-Day Bill before the Legislature. What was your idea of M-Day?

Mr. KAY. Well, as we considered M-Day, it was the day where, for either internal or external reasons, an emergency affecting the safety of our people might arise, and on that day we should be prepared to meet it, regardless of whether it was inside or outside.

46. General FRANK. What I am trying to arrive at is, did you expect a declaration of M-Day before an act of war?

Mr. KAY. We all felt—I won't say we all felt—but it was generally assumed that we would not start off like a football game, and that time would be called for the game to be started. In other words, something might break out and we should be ready for it. It might be internal sabotage; it might be an uprising; it might be a sudden attack off our shores. Whatever it was, M-Day should find us ready.

47. General FRANK. Are you making any distinction now between M-Day and D-Day?

Mr. KAY. No, sir. Well, D-Day, I would say, would be quite different. M-Day, in our opinion, simply meant to us a danger, brought about by some enemy source.

48. General FRANK. A danger signal that you thought would be waved before war would be started?

Mr. KAY. No, sir. Frequently, it had been discussed that war could break out without any declaration. As a matter of fact I recall back in 1934 General Wells telling me one day that any time, he

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thought, during that period of crisis with Japan over the Manchuko question, Stimson's issuance of an [3951] ultimatum, we might hear of Japanese firing off of Oahu.

49. General FRANK. And you believed that war could start at the snap of fingers, and you did not expect any preliminary warning?

Mr. KAY. No, sir. When it started, that was that, and there was no opportunity of getting families out or anything else.

50. General GRUNERT. We thank you very much for giving us your time.

Mr. KAY. You are entirely welcome, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

51. General GRUNERT. I will read the stenographic report of my conversation today with Senator Thomas:

(The stenographic report of a telephone conversation taken at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, between Lt. Gen. George Grunert at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, and United States Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Utah, at 12:56 p. m., Wednesday, September 20, 1944, is as follows:)

General GRUNERT. Hello. Senator Thomas?

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. This is General Grunert.

Senator THOMAS. Yes, General Grunert.

General GRUNERT. I am president of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. In order that you may fully understand the purport of my message to you, will you please listen carefully to the following without interruption, and then we can talk about it later?

Senator THOMAS. Yes, sir.

[3952] General GRUNERT. We have just had the pleasure of hearing the testimony of a Mr. Kay.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Vice-president of Brewer and Company, of Honolulu.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Who is military aide to the Governor of Hawaii.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. He presented to me a letter of identification from you. He conveyed verbally your message offering your good offices and the powers and facilities of your great committee to aid this Board in the mission assigned to it in the investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

We are about to wind up our hearings. We have one day more, that is, tomorrow, Thursday, here in San Francisco, and will return to Washington to start another week of hearings in Washington commencing next Monday.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. At the end of that week of hearings we will complete our report, which must be delivered on the 14th of October.

The reason for my calling you is that we would like very much to get further details, as Mr. Kay would only say that there were important sources of information and important witnesses that were available, but he refused to disclose their names, referring us to you for further identification. I would prefer not to ask you for such [3953] information over this telephone.

Senator THOMAS. I did not catch that, General. Hello.

General GRUNERT. Yes.

Senator THOMAS. Hello, General. Somebody broke in.

General GRUNERT. Did you get that our report must be delivered by the 14th of October?

Senator THOMAS. Yes. That is where you better start, General.

General GRUNERT. The reason for my calling you is that we would very much like to get further details, as Mr. Kay would only say that there were important sources of information and important witnesses that were available, but he refused to disclose their names, referring us to you for further identification. I would prefer not to ask you for such information over this telephone, for reasons you will appreciate.

My reason for calling you, therefore, is to inquire, in view of the fact that we understand you will not be back in Washington until after the 1st of November, whether you would do us the great favor of letting us fly you to San Francisco, so that you could confer with us tomorrow, Thursday morning, here in San Francisco at the Presidio. We believe it would be very much more helpful to have this opportunity to do so now while the matter is fresh in our minds.

Senator THOMAS. When are you going back?

General GRUNERT. We are not sure whether the information and witnesses you know of will be of such character [3954] that we are authorized to call them or to inquire into these matters, in view of the powers given this Board.

Now, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which latter is largely concerned with construction activities prior to the attack.

Now, that is the end of what I wanted to get across to you and now we can go ahead and talk.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. We are due to go back soon. We have to leave here on the 22nd at the latest, possibly tomorrow afternoon.

Senator THOMAS. I could not come to San Francisco, General, even if you did fly me, because I just got home today and I am in the midst of a political campaign, and they have made appointments for me.

General GRUNERT. I see.

Senator THOMAS. You see, I have been chairman of the House-Senate Conference on disposal of surplus property and it has kept me all the time there in Washington. But I have nothing for you in the way of witnesses or anything of that kind. I think that what Mr. Kay is talking about is the probable Congressional investigation afterwards.

General GRUNERT. I see. We do not want to overlook [3955] any sources of information if they relate to the limited investigation that we are making.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. I just took this opportunity to make sure that we were not overlooking something that might refer to that particular phase.

Senator THOMAS. No. I would be on the investigation end myself trying to find out information. I thought maybe on your way east you probably would go through Salt Lake. Will you not?

General GRUNERT. No. We plan on going via the southern route.

Senator THOMAS. I see. I was going to say if you would let me know when you are coming through here I could meet you.

General GRUNERT. From what I gather, you have nothing particular, except the general matters pertaining to the whole situation and nothing that would be of particular interest to the Army Board in investigating the Army end of the Pearl Harbor attack; is that right?

Senator THOMAS. No, nothing that would mean anything at all. I do have, of course, as a student of the Pacific—and I suppose that is where Harold Kay would get the idea—I do know about Dutch Harbor; I do know about Old Japan and things of that kind.

General GRUNERT. I recall very pleasantly your having talked to us out at the War College while I was a director at the War College.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

[3956] General GRUNERT. Some few years ago.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. So I know of your deep interest and knowledge of Far Eastern affairs.

Senator THOMAS. Yes. General, the Commandant out there, when you were there, what was his name?

General GRUNERT. That was General Simonds.

Senator THOMAS. General Simonds and I were pretty good friends.

General GRUNERT. That is right. I recall your coming out there and giving us some illuminating thoughts.

Senator THOMAS. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Well, Senator, I won't take up any more of your time then. I just wanted to make sure we did not overlook a bet.

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Senator THOMAS. That is right. There is nothing in the way or persons or things; it would just be in the way of theory, because I know nothing of course about the matters as such.

General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much and I hope to see you in Washington, some time, Senator.

Senator THOMAS. Yes, sir. I hope to get back myself, thank you.

General GRUNERT. All right, goodbye.

(The conversation terminated at 1:03 p. m.)

[3957] TESTIMONY OF CYRIL J. HARRINGTON, 2142 EWING STREET, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Harrington, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Cyril J. Harrington, 2142 Ewing Street, Los Angeles, California.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your present occupation, Mr. Harrington?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I am working in pictures.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Harrington, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop this particular part of our investigation, so I shall ask General Frank to go ahead.

4. General FRANK. Mr. Harrington, where were you employed from September 20, '36, to November 1940?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Biltmore Hotel.

5. General FRANK. Where?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Biltmore Hotel.

6. General FRANK. In what city?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Los Angeles.

7. General FRANK. All right. In what capacity?

Mr. HARRINGTON. House officer.

8. Major CLAUSEN. At the present time, Mr. Harrington, you are not employed by the Biltmore; is that correct?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That is right.

9. Major CLAUSEN. You are an actor in the movies?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I do extra and bit parts.

10. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. You were at one time employed by the [3958] Biltmore, from September 20, 1936, to about November 5, 1940?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That's right.

11. Major CLAUSEN. And your duties during that time were called "house officer"?

Mr. HARRINGTON. House officer. Some call it house detective.

12. Major CLAUSEN. You were, in any event, whatever they called it, supposed to act as an overseer of things in the hotel and in general keep yourself informed of what went on; is that correct?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That's right.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Pretty well acquainted with him?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Very well.

15. Major CLAUSEN. And do you know a Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I don't know the Colonel as well as I know Mr. Rohl.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, but in the discharge of your duties as house officer at the Biltmore during that period of time did you have occasion to meet these men, Mr. Harrington?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I have seen the Colonel several times but very seldom ever said anything to him, or outside of "Good evening" or "How do you do," or something like that.

17. Major CLAUSEN. To your knowledge, however, Mr. Rohl, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, was from time to time a guest of the hotel?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Quite often.

18. Major CLAUSEN. During that period of time. Would he on [3959] these occasions get a suite or an apartment?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Always an apartment, if available.

19. Major CLAUSEN. What did this apartment or suite consist of in the line of rooms and available facilities?

Mr. HARRINGTON. It consisted of a parlor, dining room, bedroom, and it is not necessarily kitchen: an ice box where you could cool drinks or have—you know what I mean.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Facilities for making drinks?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That's right.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Well, did you have occasion to see Hans Wilhelm Rohl in these apartments from time to time?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have occasion to see Colonel Wyman at these apartments from time to time?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, sir.

23. Major CLAUSEN. And what would usually be the conditions of Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl on your visits to these apartments?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, Mr. Rohl always had a supply of liquor on hand, regardless of whether Colonel Wyman or whoever happened to visit the apartment there; or if he didn't have, he would get it. There was always liquor available, I would say. In fact, I was called to his apartment many—he had a habit of calling me up there most every time he was there, for some unknown reason; I don't know why; and lots of times introduced me as his bodyguard, and things like that, just showing off, in other words.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Well, had Rohl and Wyman on these occasions been drinking?

[3960] Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I wouldn't say that. I couldn't truthfully say that I saw Colonel Wyman take a drink, but the condition of the apartments, and I mean after the checking out, were such that there had been drinking going on; there would be no doubt about that.

25. Major CLAUSEN. And how about other things than drinking going on? Had you occasion to see girls up in these apartments?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, several.

26. Major CLAUSEN. And when you say "several," how many, from time to time?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, the more girls there, the better Rohl would be satisfied, if he was only there by himself; I might put it that way.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Well, can you tell the Board what kind of girls these were, from your observation and your general knowledge of these girls in your business as a detective?

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Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I can truthfully say that the girls that came to his apartment were not what you'd call habitués of the hotel, that is, found in other rooms, outside of two girls that were with Mr. Sveddrup or Sverdrup.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Sverdrup.

Mr. HARRINGTON. And they had been told to leave the hotel at one time, to my knowledge. However, I wasn't the one that instructed them to leave. The house officer at that time on duty was Cunningham, who is now in England, in the armed forces.

29. Major CLAUSEN. Would you see these girls in Mr. Sverdrup's room except Rohl's apartment.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, they were Sverdrup's friends, and he brought them to Mr. Rohl.

[3961] 30. Major CLAUSEN. You mean these particular girls?

Mr. HARRINGTON. These particular two I have seen in the hotel before.

31. Major CLAUSEN. I see.

Mr. HARRINGTON. But I had seen these girls that frequented Rohl's apartment on different occasions, but never saw them in any other room except Rohl's apartment.

32. Major CLAUSEN. Would they be what you might call goodtime girls?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I would be forced to say, more or less party girls.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. By the way, these parties that would occur in the apartment of Mr. Rohl or Mr. Sverdrup, how long would they last?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, Sverdrup couldn't hold a candle to Rohl. I mean Rohl might come and stay two or three days and in that time might spend a couple of thousand dollars, or give it away, but Sverdrup wasn't that type of a fellow. He was more or less on the conservative end, sir.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Now, specifically with regard to Colonel Wyman, did you see him in Mr. Sverdrup's apartment on any occasion when it was indicated that he had spent the whole night there?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Once.

35. Major CLAUSEN. And when was that, about, if you remember approximately?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, it was the night—it was about two weeks before Rohl left for Pearl Harbor, as I recall; maybe ten days before.

[3962] 36. Major CLAUSEN. And what year was that, Mr. Harrington, if you remember?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I believe it was '41.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I would say about November '41.

38. Major CLAUSEN. What time of the day or night was it that you saw Colonel Wyman in Mr. Rohl's apartment on that occasion?

Mr. HARRINGTON. About seven a. m.

39. Major CLAUSEN. Seven a. m., early morning?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes.

40. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know, had he been there all night, evidently?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I couldn't say for sure; apparently he had.

41. Major CLAUSEN. What was his condition, Mr. Harrington?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I would say, just by looking—I didn't say any more than "Good morning" to him—that he had been drinking and apparently hadn't been to bed, or didn't look like he had.

42. Major CLAUSEN. Wyman did not look as though he had been to bed?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No. He looked like he was ready to retire at that time.

43. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, he had been on an all-night party?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Of course, that's not authentic; I mean I don't know for sure, but—

44. Major CLAUSEN. Those were your observations—

Mr. HARRINGTON. That's right.

[3963] 45. Major CLAUSEN. —and conclusions, based on your experience in that particular sphere of observations; is that correct?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That is right. I would say that the man was there all night, but I don't know. He could have came in.

46. Major CLAUSEN. Well, in addition to looking at the general picture, it is correct, isn't it, also, that at that time you were not employed by the hotel?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That's right.

47. Major CLAUSEN. But what is the circumstance, therefore, as to how you happened to see Colonel Wyman in Mr. Sverdrup's apartment at 7 a. m. even though you were not employed at the hotel?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I met Mr. Sverdrup in a bar adjoining the Bowl the night before, if I remember correctly, and he asked me what I was doing, and I told him I wasn't doing anything, and he asked me how I'd like to go to Honolulu, and I said it all depended on what I was going to do over there; that I had been injured before, on the police force in Chicago, and I wasn't able to do strenuous work, and one thing another; and so he told me to meet him the next morning at 7 o'clock, to come to his apartment. And I said, "Why so early?" or something, and he said he was leaving early.

48. Major CLAUSEN. Did he say anything about going to talk this over with Mr. Rohl?

Mr. HARRINGTON. He said he was, but he evidently didn't.

49. Major CLAUSEN. And was this job something to do in Honolulu?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes, supposedly.

50. Major CLAUSEN. What did he say to you about having talked [3964] with Mr. Rohl, when you asked him about it on this morning?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I really don't remember, as I—I believe—now, I am not positive of this, whether Rohl was in the hotel at the time or not, but I think he was. But he had—he always had an apartment, and of course at this time, as this particular time, Sverdrup also had an apartment.

51. Major CLAUSEN. Was Rohl a sort of profuse spender of money, just throwing it around?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, he oftentimes called me at the Biltmore, and in fact I have even taken money out to him to night clubs on Vine Street, a five hundred at times, something like that; and he invariably, for no reason at all, only just to flash money, he would call the bellboy

and say, "Go down and get me five hundred at the desk," or maybe a thousand; and when the bellboy would hand it to him or if he would call me and send me down, he would never count the money or anything. I mean he—just hand it to him and he would never count it; and a great habit of tipping people. He put tens and twenties—he would separate them all and fold them all, and he would put them in a vest pocket. He would have singles, fives, tens, and twenties, and the bellboy would come up with a drink or a pack of cigarettes, whatever it might be; he would just reach his hand in a pocket and pull out a bill and never look what it was; it might be a ten, it might be a twenty, it might be a one, or it might be a five, or whatever it happened to be.

52. Major CLAUSEN. He had even on one occasion chartered a plane, didn't he, for himself, to fly to some place?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I flew with him to Salt Lake.

53. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, do you know the [3965] circumstances? He chartered that plane just for himself?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Just for he and I.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Called me up there about eleven o'clock one night and asked me how I would like to fly to Salt Lake. I said, "Are you crazy?"

And he said, "No, we'll get a plane."

So I told him I didn't know whether I would get away or not. Well, naturally, I like a trip like that. Most anybody would. So he called the airport, and he raised a lot of hell because he couldn't get a Mainliner. He wanted a Mainliner plane.

55. Major CLAUSEN. He wanted to charter a Mainliner?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes.

56. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ask him why he didn't just go as a passenger like normal people?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No, I didn't ask him. So he settled for an eleven- or twelve-passenger plane, cost \$850 for the one way, gave the pilot—or gave the pilot, the co-pilot, and the stewardess—he gave them a hundred-dollar tip at Salt Lake after we had breakfast. Then we got a suite of rooms at the Utah Hotel, and I flew back that night.

57. Major CLAUSEN. Did you fly back with him?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No; he remained there.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Or did he charter a plane back for you, or what?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No; I had to go as a private passenger.

59. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, Mr. Harrington, you saw Colonel Wyman, did you, in the company of Mr. Rohl and Mr. [3966] Sverdrup on occasions there at the hotel?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, now, Mr.—Colonel Wyman, rather—I never saw him with Sverdrup, only that one time.

60. Major CLAUSEN. What time was that? Tell the Board the instance.

Mr. HARRINGTON. That was seven o'clock that morning that I visited his apartment.

61. Major CLAUSEN. What is the instance about Mr. Sverdrup and Mr. Rohl?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Oh, yes; that's right. Well, of course, Wyman wasn't there. You mean about the two girls in the room?

62. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. You might tell the Board the instance.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, Sverdrup had a suite, I believe 7315 and 16, and he called down from—I believe he was in Mr. Rohl's apartment that time. In fact, I know he was. And he wanted the room cleaned up. They had been up there drinking, and ashes and empty bottles and things. So while they were up there he wanted the room cleaned up, and there was no maids on at that time at that hour. It must have been around midnight or maybe after. So we had a fellow there by the name of Ray Moore who was the cleaning man, had the contract to clean the hotel, the rugs and everything, and he used to help out, and help—only had one bellboy after the middle of the night there; and he used to do errands for the bellboys or act as an extra bellboy. So there was no one to clean the room, as I say, a maid, so he went up to clean up the room.

While he was up there he found a lady's purse there, and he called me, and of course the door was unlocked, and he [3967] thought I ought to know about it. And I looked in the purse, and there was about \$3 in there, as I remember. And I knew, or thought I knew, that they were visiting in Rohl's apartment. So I went up there, and Sverdrup got real mad about it and said that I had no business touching anything in his room; and I said, "Well," I said, "the lady could have missed her purse thinking she might have brought it up here and then somebody stole it or something, and somebody else might be involved." And I said, "I thought it was the thing to do to bring it up here."

Well, he flew off the handle, and Rohl told him to shut up and that I was his friend, and ordered him out of the apartment, to take his girl friends and leave.

63. Major CLAUSEN. He said, "Take your girl friend and leave"?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes.

64. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, Mr. Harrington, these things that you saw at the Biltmore to which you have testified occurred when in point of time, so far as the night was concerned?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That I can't say.

65. Major CLAUSEN. Well, when would you go on duty? That would give some—

Mr. HARRINGTON. Oh, I went on duty at eleven-thirty.

66. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, you would see these things from eleven-thirty—

Mr. HARRINGTON. On.

67. Major CLAUSEN. —p. m. onward; is that correct?

Mr. HARRINGTON. That's right.

68. Major CLAUSEN. I think that is all.

69. General RUSSELL. How frequently was Wyman in Rohl's apartment during this period of time, Mr. Harrington?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, that I don't know. I just— [3968] I get these insignias mixed up. What is your—what I told you out in front there about the elevator man, you know (addressing Major Clausen).

70. Major CLAUSEN. Yes; he has given me several leads to other witnesses.

71. General RUSSELL. I just am anxious to know whether the Colonel dropped into Rohl's room frequently or infrequently when Rohl was there during that period.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, as I told this gentleman, after midnight there they only have one elevator. Of course, now with the conditions there they have more.

Now, this elevator man was on that elevator for years, and he is a very reliable, conscientious fellow, and he is their only man on that elevator, and he would be in a position to know much more. Wyman could be in that apartment many times that I wouldn't know anything about unless I was called to the rooms, or something, because with an apartment a guest has most any kind of privileges that he wants. But Rohl frequently called me to the—called me up there and, you know, where that elevator man would know maybe many times that he went up there, if he did, where I wouldn't know anything about at all. That's what I am bringing out.

72. Major CLAUSEN. You asked my insignia?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, what I was going to say, I didn't know what—whether to call you—

73. Major CLAUSEN. Oh. Major.

Mr. HARRINGTON. "Major" or what to call you. That's what I meant.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. I didn't know.

[3969] 75. General RUSSELL. Now, did you see Wyman at any of these clubs where Rohl was, when you would take him over?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No. No, I never did.

76. General RUSSELL. That is all.

77. General FRANK. How frequently did you see Wyman in these apartments, generally, from your memory?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, that I couldn't say, because the man—I didn't pay any attention to him because he wasn't a—well, I might say this: he wasn't a sociable fellow that would talk to a fellow like me or a bellboy, where Rohl would kid around with everybody; and, as I say, I never talked to Wyman at all outside of saying good evening, and he could have been there a lot of times that I wouldn't even know whether he was there or not.

78. General FRANK. Well, do you remember seeing him there, generally from your memory, twice, a dozen times, or what?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Oh, I would say three or four times, and sometimes the elevator man would say, "Well, Colonel Wyman is up there," or, "Somebody's up"—he might mention to me that so and so went to Rohl's room, or something like that, and that could have been mentioned where I wouldn't even recall it.

79. Colonel TOULMIN. Would you say it was not unusual for Wyman to be up there?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No, I really don't know whether—

80. Colonel TOULMIN. It wouldn't strike you as being so unusual as for you even to remember the details, would it?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I wouldn't say it would be unusual for him to be there, because I heard his name mentioned lots of times, you know, when I was there, but, like I say, I never [3970] talked with the man.

81. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, you would take him to be a constant visitor, then?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I would say this: that if he was in town—but he was in Honolulu and everywhere else. I mean, if he was in

town, why, I think Rohl usually made it a point to get an apartment at the hotel. That's what I think, but that is not—

82. Colonel TOULMIN. I am talking about Wyman now.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes; that is what I mean. When Wyman would be in town or if he lived there all the time—I understand he lived on Beachwood Drive for a while, but I don't know whether Wyman lived there all the time or whether when he would come into town and then Rohl would take an apartment, or what; I don't know.

83. Colonel TOULMIN. Then Wyman would come up there?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes.

84. Colonel TOULMIN. I see. That is all.

85. General FRANK. In the nature of their association you feel they were pretty good friends?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Oh, definitely, I would say that.

86. Colonel TOULMIN. You would say they were intimate friends, wouldn't you?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, as I told the Major there, that in my estimation Rohl was smarter intoxicated than most people are sober. That's the way I figured the man. He would lead you to believe that he was ready to fall down, but he never overlooked anything.

87. General FRANK. Is that all (addressing Major Clausen)?

[3971] 88. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you hear any business discussions going on?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Never.

89. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

90. General GRUNERT. Everybody seems to be satisfied. Mr. Harrington, is there anything else that you might tell the Board that might be of value to it on this matter?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I guess you gentlemen, you are—what your interest is here now is in Wyman more than Rohl, isn't it?

91. General GRUNERT. We are interested in any facts concerning the two of them, that bear on what we are required to investigate. But if there is anything that is on your mind that you would like to get off your mind, we would like to hear it and then judge whether or not it will be of value to us.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I don't know of anything else, or I can't think of anything else right now. In fact, everything that I practically know about it was in that report, I believe.

92. General GRUNERT. All right, sir. Then, we thank you for coming up.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[3972] **TESTIMONY OF BRUCE G. BARBER, ATTORNEY, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Barber, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. BARBER. Bruce G. Barber. My home address?

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2. Colonel WEST. Yes.

Mr. BARBER. 3880 Olmstead avenue, Los Angeles, California.

3. Colonel WEST. And you are connected with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, at present, sir?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, sir; I am.

4. General GRUNERT. Mr. Barber, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop this particular part of our investigation, so I will turn you over to them.

5. Major CLAUSEN. I would like to ask how long you have been attorney for the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization?

Mr. BARBER. I have been in the service 19 years. I believe I entered in 1926.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall, on an occasion, having discussions with an Edward A. Furbush, during a period of February to March or April, 1943, regarding Hans Wilhelm Rohl, with aliases?

Mr. BARBER. No, sir; I have no independent recollection of that interview.

7. Major CLAUSEN. I am going to read. I would like to follow this procedure and read an excerpt from this report by this Federal Bureau of Investigation man, and ask the witness to verify whether or not these facts were developed by him and [3973] the agent. This reads, on page 8:

(Excerpt from report of Edward A. Furbush, 4/28/43:)

While examining the file at Immigration and Naturalization in Los Angeles, Immigration Attorney, Bruce Barber, on March 6, 1943, stated that he was in favor, after having the facts of the immigration investigation called to his attention, of denying Rohl his citizenship because of the many apparent flagrant violations of the immigration law.

Barber added that Colonel Theodore Wyman had communicated four or five times during the investigation of this case with William A. Carmichael, former District Director in Charge of Immigration and Naturalization Service, and now a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army, for the purpose of expediting the investigation by describing the necessity of Rohl's services in the construction work which was then under his charge. Attention is called to the fact that after the investigation conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Agents which furnished the information set out in Section III of this report, impelled them to recommend prosecution of the subject and deny him his citizenship. The investigation and request for prosecution was consummated May 27, 1941, according to the Immigration and Naturalization files. Prosecution was denied on the grounds that the Statute of Limitation on the misrepresentation of citizenship violation had taken effect. Rohl was given his final hearing and admitted on September 15, 1941 by the Federal court in Los Angeles on the basis that he was married to an American citizen.

It should be noted that Colonel Wyman was interviewed [3974] on February 20, 1941, and at that time stated that he first became acquainted with Rohl in California and that his relations with him were purely of a business nature. He had assumed without any basis, according to the information given by him, that Rohl was a citizen. He had added that he treated the information as hearsay that he had received, indicating Rohl's father was a Professor of Engineering in a German university and that Rohl was born in Germany.

Now, Mr. Barber, in connection with the files that were mentioned in this FBI report, have you brought with you today from Los Angeles what your superior described as a "skeleton file"?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, sir; I have.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Your superior was whom?

Mr. BARBER. Albert Del Guercio. He is the District Director for the Los Angeles District of Immigration and Naturalization Service.

9. Major CLAUSEN. And this file to which I invite your attention is the one which is now in your hands?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, sir. This is our temporary file, on the Rohl matter.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And where are the remainder of the papers?

Mr. BARBER. Our temporary file shows that the original file was forwarded to our central office in Philadelphia, to be transmitted to the Department, in Washington. This was on April 29, 1944, together with the central office file; and I am now informed that the Los Angeles file at least is being mailed out, air mail, from Washington, D. C. I believe it was [3975] mailed yesterday and is to come to Mr. Wixon, here in San Francisco.

11. Major CLAUSEN. And has Mr. Wixon your authority to turn that over to the Board?

Mr. BARBER. I believe Mr. Wixon, though I am not sure, is directed to come here with the file and testify from the file, or make its contents available to the Board.

12. Major CLAUSEN. May we have the file to which you have referred, and which is now in your hands?

Mr. BARBER. Ordinarily these files are a part of our permanent records, and we would not want to release them indefinitely. However, we would be glad to make it available to the Board for review.

13. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Mr. BARBER. And if it were wanted further than that, I, of course, would have to take it up with the central office.

14. General FRANK. Is there any objection to our photostating those?

Mr. BARBER. I see no objection.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Then we may have this file for observation and study and ultimate return to the Bureau?

Mr. BARBER. Yes. I would like to make this reservation, that I discuss the matter with Mr. Wixon, and if he believes it necessary, we might clear with our central office, because ordinarily under a Department of Justice instruction based upon the Supreme Court decision, these records are made confidential and are not to be given out. Of course, this is an Army agency, so I see no objection to it whatever.

16. Major CLAUSEN. May I suggest that you do that, for the [3976] reason that Mr. Wixon raised the point as to whether he was authorized to turn over to the Board the file that is being air-mailed to him. I call his attention to the fact that the only reason it is being air-mailed here is to turn it over to the Board.

Mr. BARBER. Yes.

17. Major CLAUSEN. And that if there was any question whatsoever, since we, as a Board, are very crowded for time, he immediately communicate by telephone or wire to obtain authorization.

Mr. BARBER. I will clear that matter with Mr. Wixon, and see that if necessary he wires the central office to get a clearance. Now, may I understand, correctly, that you merely want the file for a temporary period?

18. Major CLAUSEN. That is all, sir.

Mr. BARBER. I do not see any objection, personally, to that. I think we can arrange it.

19. Major CLAUSEN. We want it for observation and study and return to the Bureau.

Mr. BARBER. Yes.

20. Colonel TOULMIN. It is of no use unless we can look at it, Mr. Witness, you know.

Mr. BARBER. Yes, that is true. It would take some time to go through it and study it.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, to study it, to study the related items. Thank you very much. Now, may I have that?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, sir.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Now, I have hastily reviewed this file, and I do not see any wires or communications in here from [3977] Colonel Wyman. Would those things be in this other file that is being air-mailed out?

Mr. BARBER. If Colonel Wyman had made any written inquiries about the case, they would be in the other file. May I make some comment on the FBI report, there?

23. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I was first staying with the files, and I was going to ask you this question—

Mr. BARBER. All right.

24. Major CLAUSEN. —whether there was anything about this so-called “temporary file” which you have just handed me, that you desire to comment upon? Are some of these notes yours? For example, this list, here; is that yours?

Mr. BARBER. Well, that was made at our previous investigation, by me.

25. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir. Is there anything else in the file about which you would care to comment?

Mr. BARBER. No. I would be glad to answer any questions, though, that you care to ask.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in some of those papers?

Mr. BARBER. I have no personal knowledge; no, sir.

27. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Now, passing from that to this FBI report, would you care to make some observations?

Mr. BARBER. Yes. I would like to state that at that time it was customary for any agents of the government agencies who came to the office, to interview some of our officers with the file, and I don't personally recall this particular man's [3978] name or his interview with me.

28. Major CLAUSEN. This particular FBI man, you mean?

Mr. BARBER. The FBI man; yes, sir. I assume that that is correct. However, his observation, there, that I had said “flagrant violations,” I believe that would be an adjective that he has placed in there himself. I would merely tell him what the violations were, I am sure; and as to the call from Colonel Wyman, I didn't know whether there were any calls or not, so I couldn't have related there had been calls. I did know, however, from hearsay, that the Army had been interested in expediting the naturalization in this case, and it was our policy of course to do everything to further the war effort.

29. Major CLAUSEN. You thought you were furthering the war effort when this ultimate petition was granted?

Mr. BARBER. Well, you are asking me for an opinion, there. As I told the FBI agent, there, although the Army had asked that the case be expedited, as I understood it, we would go ahead and make

our same investigation that we would make in any case; and there were facts there for the court to consider, that may or may not entitle the man to citizenship; and that, of course, is up to the naturalization court.

30. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, have you concluded your observations on this FBI excerpt?

Mr. BARBER. Yes; I think that is all.

31. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, with those qualifications, it states the facts, so far as they were related to this man?

Mr. BARBER. Yes; I would assume that that is correct. I would naturally have gone through the file, and he would have [3979] asked me questions at the time, and the only information I had would be what I gained from the file. Now, the telephone call that he relates, there, I do not have any recollection of that, and I don't believe that that is correct.

32. Major CLAUSEN. He may have received that information from Mr. Carmichael?

Mr. BARBER. Well, that could be possible.

33. General FRANK. What telephone call is this?

Major CLAUSEN. The statement is made in here "that Colonel Wyman had communicated four or five times during the investigation of this case with William A. Carmichael, former District Director" at Los Angeles.

34. General FRANK. It is not clear in my mind from the evidence there, that Colonel Wyman was conversant with Rohl's alien status back in February or March 1941. Am I to understand that?

35. Major CLAUSEN. It states here, sir:

It should be noted that Colonel Wyman was interviewed on February 20, 1941.

In other words, he was interviewed by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization on February 20, 1941, concerning Rohl's application for citizenship; which would indicate to anyone that the man was an alien.

36. General RUSSELL. Are we going to get the man with whom Wyman talked? We are going to have that?

37. General GRUNERT. We are going to have him here—what else do you want?

38. Major CLAUSEN. I do not want anything else, sir. I mean, one thing just leads into another, and so forth.

39. General FRANK. I am the one that wanted that. I wanted [3980] to be sure that I understood, correctly, and to check it, that Wyman was all conversant with this thing back in February.

40. General GRUNERT. He was interviewed on the matter. I understand from that record that he was interviewed.

41. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

42. General GRUNERT. What the interview consisted of is not stated, there?

43. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir; and that is the paper that I especially wanted.

44. General RUSSELL. However, it is stated, there, what he said. Now, he did not say, in language, that he knew Rohl was an alien, but I think your assumption is sound that if he was talking to him about an application to become a citizen, he had to know.

45. Major CLAUSEN. My next question is whether the Board wishes Mr. Barber, who is so thoroughly conversant with matters, to explain the various steps through which a naturalization goes before it is finally acted upon and granted.

46. General GRUNERT. I think that would be all right, provided it is not an hour's lecture, or anything like that.

47. Major CLAUSEN. Just very briefly, Mr. Barber, would you state the various steps through which Mr. Rohl went, as married to an American citizen, from the time he filed his original application in January 1941 to the ultimate granting of it? I mean the usual routine for those cases.

Mr. BARBER. Yes; I could give you the usual routine. Being married to a citizen, he didn't have to have a declaration of intention, or what is commonly called a "first paper." That exempts him from that. He would then submit a preliminary form of a petition for naturalization, and then the Immigration Service would, first of all, verify his arrival in the United States, because that would be a prerequisite to his naturalization, that he had been admitted for lawful, permanent residence. After that was done, then there would be a check with the police department records, and then he would be called in with two witnesses to testify to his good moral character for the requisite period prescribed by law, and that constitutes the filing of the petition for naturalization.

Then, following the filing of the petition for naturalization, there is another statutory period that they must wait before they can be admitted to citizenship, and during that period, which at that time was 90 days, we would make our examination and investigation. Now, I say "90 days"—I am not sure whether that was under the 30-day or the 90-day. There were two different periods there, and the investigation would include possible neighborhood investigations, or, after interviewing two witnesses, there may be other investigations suggested.

48. General FRANK. This marriage to an American citizen must be a legal marriage, not a common-law marriage, is that correct?

Mr. BARBER. That is correct; and you will note from the temporary file and from the original file that an investigation was made to determine the legality of his marriage.

49. Major CLAUSEN. And then, after this additional investigation that you referred to, which occurred within the 90 days, what are the next steps?

Mr. BARBER. Then the next step is to either place the petition on the ordinary list of petitioners, that go through without any contest, or to place it on the contested calendar. His petition was placed on the contested calendar, where the facts of the case would be given to the court, and the court [3982] would be asked to determine whether or not the man would be eligible to citizenship.

50. Colonel TOULMIN. In open court?

Mr. BARBER. In open court.

51. Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask a question, at this point?

52. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

53. Colonel TOULMIN. I find a statement in this temporary file which apparently is a statement made to the court, in open court. It starts:

No objection will be made to the granting of this petition. For the information of the Court, however, the results of the investigation made in connection with the case are herewith presented.

Then follows a statement about Rohl and his history in this country.

Do you know, Mr. Witness, as a fact, that such a statement was made to the federal court, in open court, such as appears in this file, consisting of two pages?

Mr. BARBER. I do not know as a fact, in that I was not there at the time. I knew Mr. Tellmer, who handled the case. I knew that it was being handled. I did know that it was on the contested list, from hearsay.

54. Colonel TOULMIN. You believe that statement was made, then?

Mr. BARBER. Yes; and I do know, also, that this statement is filed with the clerk of the court, there.

55. Colonel TOULMIN. And after that statement, the court granted the petition for citizenship?

Mr. BARBER. Yes.

[3983] 56. General GRUNERT. This was what you called a "contested" case, was that the language?

Mr. BARBER. It would be placed on the contested calendar, but where there is a close case, for instance, where a man falsely claims citizenship, and it were outside of the statutory period in which we could bring prosecution, we would ask the court whether in view of that they would desire to grant citizenship. A great many of the courts have denied citizenship, particularly where the false claim was made within the statutory period for naturalization.

57. General GRUNERT. This being on the contested list, does the court look to the Bureau of Immigration to remove the so-called contest by their evidence or their testimony in open court? In other words, this: The information from the Immigration Bureau puts it on that list, doesn't it, or the lack of information?

Mr. BARBER. Yes.

58. General GRUNERT. Now, for the judge to go ahead with that, does new information from the Bureau bring the case up, or what?

Mr. BARBER. No. If I understand your question correctly, these contested calendars come up regularly once a month by rule of court, and if there is any case there that we cannot recommend without having the court review the facts, we bring it on, put it on this contested calendar. In some of those cases we submit the facts with recommendation of granting, so that the court makes the final determination with the facts in mind.

59. General GRUNERT. What I am trying to get at is, did the [3984] Immigration Bureau, because of the request by the War Department to expedite this case, or to consider the case, or whatnot, expedite it? What influence did that have with the Immigration Bureau, to get citizenship for Rohl?

Mr. BARBER. Oh, I understand, now.

60. General GRUNERT. You see what I am getting at?

Mr. BARBER. Yes. It would cause our investigation to be made more expeditiously. However, it did not curtail the usual investigation, but if the Army, or any representative of the Army, made a request that we expedite the naturalization of a person because he was needed, because of certain capabilities—we had many of those—we would do everything in our power to expedite the case at that time.

61. General GRUNERT. But it would not influence you to overlook anything that you should look into in order to decide whether or not a man should be a citizen?

Mr. BARBER. Absolutely not; because our full responsibility was to make that determination.

62. General GRUNERT. All right. Go ahead.

63. Major CLAUSEN. Except that you stated that this was more or less, I believe you said, a sort of border-line case?

Mr. BARBER. Yes; a border-line case. Otherwise, we would have recommended to the court directly that the case be denied.

64. Major CLAUSEN. So, when you have a border-line case, you also have a situation where it is your very definite recollection that the Army was pushing the case from the standpoint of the need of this man in the war effort, is that correct?

Mr. BARBER. Yes. I cannot testify as to this case from personal knowledge, but from reading the case, that is correct, [3985] and that would be the general thing.

65. Major CLAUSEN. And so that would be a consideration to be weighed in the action by your department?

Mr. BARBER. Yes; it would.

66. Major CLAUSEN. That is all.

67. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you know why Mr. Tom Clark, head of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, at Washington, has raised the issue, on April 3, 1944, of asking for the main files for investigation? What stimulated him to that, do you know?

Mr. BARBER. I have no idea; no, sir.

[3986] 68. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, I was going to ask you a question as to the next step after you make your investigation. You said something about the judge. This final accumulation of investigation and your petition you presented before the court for action; is that correct?

Mr. BARBER. Yes.

69. Major CLAUSEN. And in this case it was presented to the court at Los Angeles?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, sir.

70. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know, Mr. Barber, whether at that time the court had reported any letters evidencing the desire of the Army or the War Department to expedite or to have granted the application of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. BARBER. No, I do not, sir.

71. Major CLAUSEN. Who would be able to supply the Board with that information?

Mr. BARBER. I imagine the judge himself would give that information.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Were these proceedings taken down in shorthand?

Mr. BARBER. I do not know whether there was a court reporter present, or not. Ordinarily there is a court reporter present.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Did you know that there were attorneys present, Los Angeles lawyers?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, Rohl had his attorney present, and our Mr. Tellner was also present.

74. Major CLAUSEN. Is that a rather unusual thing, for the applicant to have a lawyer there to see that the application is granted? [3987]

Mr. BARBER. No. When it is on the contested calendar, they get more than one, perhaps as many as 60 sometimes, and there may be in those 60 petitions for naturalization several lawyers, and many of the petitioners will not be represented by lawyers.

75. Major CLAUSEN. That is with respect to the contested matters?

Mr. BARBER. That is right.

76. Major CLAUSEN. Now, the court that heard this case, was that court a newly-appointed judge?

Mr. BARBER. I do not know just how new. He is a recently-appointed judge, J. F. T. O'Connor.

77. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

78. General GRUNERT. Any questions from the Board?

Is there anything else, Mr. Barber, that you think of that you believe might be of value to the Board, that you would like to tell us?

Mr. BARBER. I cannot think of anything offhand; however, if you have any questions further I would be willing to answer them, either as to procedure or with regard to our files.

79. General GRUNERT. We have asked the questions that occur to us, and I wondered whether there was some other subject which you thought might come up or which you think might be of value to the Board, that we have not questioned you about.

Mr. BARBER. As to the letter that may have come from some Army officials to expedite the case, to the judge, I believe the judge would be glad to make it available to you, if there is such a letter. Knowing the judge, I am sure he would.

[3988] 80. General GRUNERT. You mean, the letter that came from the Army to the Immigration Bureau requesting, among other things, that the case be expedited?

Mr. BARBER. No.

81. General GRUNERT. Is that the letter to which you refer?

Mr. BARBER. No, sir, that is not. You asked me whether or not I knew that the judge had received a letter from some Army official. I don't know that there was such a letter, but if there was I would suggest that you communicate direct with Judge O'Connor. I feel certain that he will make that known to you or make it available.

82. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask a question there.

Mr. Barber, do you permit people to take letters out of your official files?

Mr. BARBER. No.

83. Colonel TOULMIN. If papers are missing from your official files what would be your deduction, as to whether it was an authorized or unauthorized act?

Mr. BARBER. That it was taken surreptitiously.

84. Colonel TOULMIN. Do you permit people to see your files who are not official people?

Mr. BARBER. Only government agents.

85. Colonel TOULMIN. Would you permit an Army officer to come and look at a file, particularly if he had written such a letter, to take a look at it?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, I imagine we would.

86. Colonel TOULMIN. And that would be another government agent that would have permission to look at the file?

Mr. BARBER. Yes, sir.

[3989] 87. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

88. General GRUNERT. There being no more questions, thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[3990]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF W. BRUCE PINE, 320 CAROLWOOD DRIVE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA—Recalled

1. Colonel WEST. Let the record show that the witness appeared before the Board on a previous occasion; he will not be sworn again, but is reminded that he is still under oath and subject to the cautions previously given him.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Pine, I will turn you over to General Frank and Major Clausen for further questioning.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Pine, the Board from time to time has had before it in the evidence a statement attributed to Colonel Wyman, to the general effect that in the spring of 1942, after an evening of drinking, he stated that while he may have done a great many things throughout his life there was one thing he had not done, and that was to sell out his country in the way that son-of-a-bitch Rohl did, that what he ought to do is to take his service revolver and shoot Rohl and then blow his own brains out. Now, I understand from Mr. Combs, that the source of that information, that is, the information that Wyman made this statement, is you. So would you detail to the Board just how you received that information?

4. General GRUNERT. Before replying, I understand that that is his testimony not before this Board, but elsewhere; is that right?

5. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir, this is in the form of a statement which the general counsel for the House Military Affairs [3991] Committee had.

6. General GRUNERT. That is all I want to know.

Mr. PINE. Yes, I can. From the time of the first draft right on through this recent summer, we were always accustomed, every two weeks, that is, every other week, having boys from the USO over one Sunday evening, and then boys from the officers' club in the Ambassador Hotel over the next Sunday.

7. Major CLAUSEN. Who is "we"?

Mr. PINE. Mrs. Pine and myself, at our home, on Sundays. The only way I could place the date of this at all, because all the information which I had I turned over to Mr. Edward Ferbush, who was the agent in charge of the investigation—

8. Major CLAUSEN. Who is he?

Mr. PINE. He was the agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who was then in charge of the current investigation of Hans Rohl.

9. Major CLAUSEN. At what place?

Mr. PINE. In Los Angeles. The reason I place this as being in the spring or early summer of 1943 is that it was after the hearing before the State Committee on Rohl.

10. Major CLAUSEN. You referred to the Tenney hearings?

Mr. PINE. That is right. The Tenney hearings.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

Mr. PINE. My impression is there were about 200 people there that afternoon, including quite a few civilians.

12. Major CLAUSEN. At your home?

Mr. PINE. Yes, sir. And particularly amongst the civilians, who were all residents of Beverly Hills and all of whom knew of Rohl and had known him over a considerable span of [3992] years, there was a great deal of conversation concerning Rohl's alien status during 1940 and 1941, and at other times, for it was general knowledge that he was participating in large government contracts.

Late in the afternoon, when the crowd had thinned out considerably, there was a young Army Captain who was waiting for his girl, who turned to me and said—this is approximately what he said—that he had known Rohl on the islands, that he was a Lieutenant then—

13. Major CLAUSEN. That was when?

Mr. PINE. When this Captain was a Lieutenant there.—and had thought that he had long since been arrested and that Colonel Wyman had been court-martialed. I told him that Rohl was as free as the air, and, so far as I know, Colonel Wyman was in Edmonton, Canada, in charge of the Alcan Highway of the Canol project.

He assured me that he felt that I was wrong, as he had been present, as I recall it, in front of the Pleasanton Hotel in Honolulu, when Wyman had emerged intoxicated and carrying his service revolver. He said, that Colonel Wyman was incoherent and raged and said that he was going to kill that German son-of-a-bitch who had sold out his country and that Wyman in spite of any misdeeds would finish Rohl and himself.

He further said that Wyman told him he was positive of this, because the F. B. I. had arrested a man in New York with written material which could have only come from his office or Rohl's.

I then asked the Captain if he would have any objection to giving such a statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, [3993] who I felt were actively investigating Rohl. He said that he had given one short statement, and an exhaustive one about a month later, to the Office of Military Intelligence in Honolulu, and that the other three officers who were present had all been interviewed, and that the F. B. I. could receive such information through the proper channels if they wanted it.

About this time his girl joined him, and I walked out to the car and asked him his name. Previous to this he had told me that he was on the General Staff in Washington, D. C. When I asked him his name, he laughed, thanked me for my hospitality, said that he had talked too much and he did not want to get in any trouble while he was on a vacation, as I recall it.

As soon as he left I called Edward Ferbush and gave him a brief resume of the Captain's statement. All the officers that day had come from the Ambassador officers' club in the Ambassador Hotel and every man who attended these parties registered. The only Captain or any officer registered from Washington, D. C., was a Captain by the name of Guiter, whose initials I do not recall.

After that, it being completely out of the province of our committee and myself, the matter was, so far as I was concerned, forgotten, until John Wiener, an investigator for the Committee on Military Affairs, came out and sought help on the entire matter. It was at this time that Mr. Combs told them of this incident, and Wiener said that when he got back to Washington he would locate Captain Guiter if it was humanly possible.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Pine, could you describe this Captain?

Mr. PINE. Well, it is hard for me to describe him. As I [3994] place him, he was about 28 to 30 years old, dark hair, and very tan, almost, you might think, that he was a Spaniard or something like that, like he spent a great deal of time in the sun.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Would you be able to tell the Board what other subjects, if any, you recall you discussed with this Captain?

Mr. PINE. That, so far as I recall, is the first time I remember meeting him during the afternoon. He was standing in a group that had been talking about Rohl.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Was there anything said by him which indicated the branch of the service to which he belonged?

Mr. PINE. He said that he was on the General Staff. Not being in the Army I did not know what he meant.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall what he said was the ultimate result of the fixed determination, apparently, of Colonel Wyman to go out and finish off Rohl and himself?

Mr. PINE. He said that—I have forgotten now—a week or two later he noticed Colonel Wyman and Rohl together on some occasion, and figured everything had been patched up.

18. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

19. General RUSSELL. There has been some evidence to the effect that Rohl was a rather heavy spender. Do you know about that, or didn't you testify about that?

Mr. PINE. I did. That is hearsay. I know when Wiener was out here they went into his accounts very thoroughly.

20. General Russell. Do you recall how long back or how early after he came to this country he began to spend money freely?

[3995] Mr. PINE. It was after 1925. In 1927, if my memory serves me, he bought the yacht PANDORA, and then began to bid on large-sized contracts. The yacht PANDORA was a racing sloop, carrying a two-man crew. It was after he married Mrs. Hubert in San Francisco, which was in 1925, that he came to Los Angeles and his prosperity seemed, so far as I could ascertain, almost to date from then.

21. General RUSSELL. This lady whom he married, was she wealthy?

Mr. PINE. I understand from quite reliable information that she was penniless.

22. General RUSSELL. Mr. Pine, the point I am getting at is this: A man does not just blossom out with a lot of money all at once.

Mr. PINE. There has been hearsay evidence that I have known about, but it was only hearsay, and I could never locate the people, that he had inherited money in Germany, had gone over there and received his money and it was with that money that he first started in the contracting business on a large scale. However, I also understand, again only on hearsay, that Tom Connolly said that Rohl had \$180,000 before he ever went to Germany, and he, Connolly, knew that.

23. General RUSSELL. Was Connolly a man of wealth?

Mr. PINE. As I understand, he is a man very well thought of here in San Francisco.

24. General RUSSELL. I mean, is he a wealthy man?

Mr. PINE. I believe he is. In that transcript I think Rohl testified that each put in an equal amount of money for the company's stock in 1932.

[3996] 25. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask Mr. Pine what he knows about the visits of Rohl to Germany. Can you give us a summary of what you know about that?

Mr. PINE. All I know is that I think it was in the year 1924, in November, Rohl went to the consul general here in San Francisco and obtained a German passport. He went to Germany and landed in Hamburg, went to Lubeck, Prussia, then returned to England, remained in England two months, and sailed from the port of Plymouth aboard the S. S. FRANCE.

26. Colonel TOULMIN. Was that the only visit he made to Germany?

Mr. PINE. So far as I have been able to find out, yes.

27. General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

Is there anything else you think of that may be new to the Board?

Mr. PINE. No, sir, I haven't anything.

28. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for your reappearance.

Mr. PINE. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL HOWARD B. NURSE, RETIRED, 729 B STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank and present address?

Colonel NURSE. Lieutenant Colonel H. B. Nurse, Retired, 729 B Street, San Francisco.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this particular part of our investigation will be handled by General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen.

[3997] 3. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Nurse, you were at one time assigned to the Hawaiian Department of the Engineering Corps under Colonel Wyman?

Colonel NURSE. That is right.

4. Major CLAUSEN. That was when?

Colonel NURSE. I reported there on January 6th, 1942.

5. Major CLAUSEN. And at that time your official position was what, sir?

Colonel NURSE. I was on the Military Governor's staff as liaison officer between the District Engineer and the Military Governor's office.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Was your permanent assignment to the Hawaiian Department or to the Engineering Corps?

Colonel NURSE. It was to the Hawaiian Department, I believe.

7. Major CLAUSEN. You continued in that position under Colonel Wyman for how long?

Colonel NURSE. Until he left, which I believe was the middle of March, 1942.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Didn't you say you were under Wyman as his executive officer?

Colonel NURSE. It was later on. I was detailed with the Military Governor's office from the 1st of January to about the middle of February, and then I was made executive officer under Wyman.

9. Major CLAUSEN. And that was specifically, again, during what period that you were executive officer under Colonel Wyman?

Colonel NURSE. About the middle of February to the middle of March, approximately.

[3998] 10. Major CLAUSEN. And then after that time your assignment was what, Colonel?

Colonel NURSE. I remained as executive officer under Colonel Lyman.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Under Colonel Lyman?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir. General Lyman, who relieved Colonel Wyman.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Did you at one time, later, head a division known as the Bottleneck Busting Division?

Colonel NURSE. Yes.

13. Major CLAUSEN. And that was when?

Colonel NURSE. January 1st, 1943.

14. Major CLAUSEN. To what time?

Colonel NURSE. Up until I left the islands about the 1st of July.

[3999] 15 Major CLAUSEN. Sir, a previous witness before the Board has suggested that we call you for the purpose of obtaining records which would throw some light on the conduct of affairs under Colonel Wyman. Do you have such records?

Colonel NURSE. Not of Colonel Wyman, no, sir. These records that I have as of when I was with the—head of the bottleneck busting section—was under General Kramer.

16. Major CLAUSEN. I see. All right. That is that.

I do find, however, in your testimony given before Colonel Hunt a reference to some knowledge on your part as to the acquisition of equipment by the Government which was authorized by Colonel Wyman from the Hawaiian Contracting Company. The transaction in question is supposed to have been consummated on or about March 14, 1942. Will you tell the Board what you know about that item?

Colonel NURSE. In 1943, in one of our investigations, we became aware that there was considerable equipment stored in the Hawaiian Contractors' yard that belonged to the Government and never had been removed, and we made a report to General Kramer showing him what we had uncovered there.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Your investigation took place about a year after the equipment had been purchased by the Government?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir. This was on January 13, 1943, I reported it to General Kramer.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Well, now, may I ask this general question: whether your investigation indicated that some of this equipment that had been purchased a year previously had never even been moved from the place where it was when it was bought?

[4000] Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir. This states here, this memorandum to General Kramer, that on—this was acquired on the 15th of March, 1942, in the amount of \$147,611.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And do you know what portion of the equipment had not been moved from where it was when it was bought?

Colonel NURSE. I might read this here, which covers the whole situation.

20. Major CLAUSEN. If you would, sir.

Colonel NURSE (reading):

The B. B.'s found stored in the yard—

21. Major CLAUSEN. Who are the B. B.'s?

Colonel NURSE. That is Bottleneck Busters.

22. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

Colonel NURSE (reading):

found stored in the yard of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, a large amount of construction equipment and tools which had been acquired by the U. S. E. D. on 15 March 1942 for \$147,611.00. A good deal of this equipment is apparently in unserviceable condition, though it is felt that much of it could be put back in service or parts stripped for repair of other equipment. Some few items on the original purchase order had been removed and receiving reports are being checked to determine if it was received by the U. S. E. D. The list of equipment remaining includes such items as: automobiles, draglines, buckets, bulldozers, compressors, cranes, [4001] drill machines, finishers, graders, hammers (pile driving), hoists, mixers, pumps, road rollers, scrapers, shovels, spreaders, tractors, trucks, trailers, and also three lighting outfits (new). Apparently the fact that these belonged to the Government was overlooked until the curiosity of a B. B. was aroused through having done some snooping. This information, together with a list of equipment has been turned over to Captain Spencer, who will take immediate action in removing it to his Base Yard.

23. Major CLAUSEN. Now, the matter that you just read is part of an official report that you made to whom?

Colonel NURSE. To General Kramer.

24. Major CLAUSEN. And the date of that report, sir?

Colonel NURSE. January 13, 1943.

25. Major CLAUSEN. And did you verify the accuracy of those statements that you have read to the Board?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir.

26. Major CLAUSEN. I think that is all.

27. General FRANK. Do you have reason to believe or to know that after that equipment had been bought it had never been removed from the yard?

Colonel NURSE. Well, I saw it, a great deal of it, myself, and the grass and the weeds were grown up around it so that you couldn't—some of it was hard to find. They just had to go out there and dig it out, send men in there to cut the weeds and grass in order to get some of it out where they could move it.

[4002] 28. General FRANK. Do you know or did you determine whether it ever had been used or not, after the Government bought it?

Colonel NURSE. No, no. I couldn't swear to that.

29. General FRANK. Well, were they extremely short of equipment over there, so that they normally were in need of it and would have used it?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, but a big portion of this equipment was un-serviceable, and I was led to believe that it was remaining in this yard for repair at such time as the Hawaiian Constructors could get around to do the work, but the superintendent there of the Hawaiian Constructors told me that the U. S. E. D. had turned in so much other equipment for repair that he just was bogged down; he never had been able to get at the repair of this equipment that was purchased from them.

30. General RUSSELL. That list that you read to us, Colonel, is rather comprehensive in its nature. It seems to describe almost all types of equipment that was originally sold to the U. S. Government by these Hawaiian Contractors; is that true?

Colonel NURSE. Yes; a great deal of it was the original equipment, I believe, of the Hawaiian Contractors, who are a big organization; and, as I understand it, why, the U. S. E. D. just went in there and took over everything that was in the yard.

31. General RUSSELL. Now, did you determine in that investigation that prior to taking title to this property the Government had had it approved and that the appraisal had been somewhat in detail, and each of these things had been described in that appraisal and a price fixed on them?

[4003] Colonel NURSE. It seems to me that later on I did. I might read this off.

32. General RUSSELL. Does that show how much this equipment that you were then investigating cost the Government?

Colonel NURSE. It does, although it is a little broader—

33. General FRANK. May I ask just one question: This Hawaiian Company is the Hawaiian Contracting Company, headed up by Mr. Benson?

Colonel NURSE. That's right. (Reading:)

Rented Equipment:

We are taking a terrible ribbing on much of the rented equipment, and, it is recommended a complete review be made of all equipment under rental, to determine whether rental is excessive and if so, action taken to adjust the price. For instance—One (1) '30 Caterpillar Tractor, about sixteen years old, rented from Ralph E. Woolley, under Contract No. W 414-eng-2753, dated January 1, 1942; rental for this tractor has been paid up to September 30, 1942 in the total amount of \$1,915.00. Invoices are now in the Finance Division for \$600.00 rental for October, November and December 1942. This will result in the U. S. E. D. having paid \$2,515.00 in rent for an old tractor with a value of perhaps \$200.00. It is understood this type of tractor has not been manufactured since 1930. This tractor stood idle for at least two months in the Hawaiian Contracting Company's yard. However, repairs were recently made [4004] and the tractor was sent out on the job yesterday. This matter was brought to the attention of Lieutenant Meek and Major Mutzabaugh, with the recommendation that vouchers now in the Finance Division be withheld and the Supply Division attempt to renegotiate this contract on a friendly basis.

The B. B. Division is now checking up on other rented equipment, especially that rented on a monthly basis, with a view to possibly having the various contracts renegotiated or contracts cancelled and new contracts executed. In each case the findings will be reported to Equipment Control and Supply Division for such action they deem necessary.

34. General RUSSELL. Those passages which you have just read, Colonel, while interesting, do not refer to the value of the property

purchased from the Hawaiian Contracting Company which you have testified that was never used.

Colonel NURSE. Yes.

35. General RUSSELL. Now, do you know how much the Government paid for that property that they never used?

Colonel NURSE. I don't remember. I think at the time I did, but I don't.

36. General RUSSELL. Your records don't show it?

Colonel NURSE. Doesn't show it, unless I have some other reports in here that I don't recall. There was an inventory made by our people and turned in to Captain Spencer.

37. General RUSSELL. Just a little while ago you read a list of that equipment which apparently was taken from those inventories.

[4005] Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir.

8. General RUSSELL. But you have no way of telling what its value was?

Colonel NURSE. No.

9. General RUSSELL. Or what the Government paid for it?

Colonel NURSE. No, I don't think I would have.

40. General RUSSELL. All right. That is all.

41. Major CLAUSEN. I, just along this line of the questioning of General Russell, wonder if in the papers that you have before you there, Colonel, you have some further identification of those unused pieces of equipment. In other words, if you had, maybe I could tie that in with the actual inventory and purchase prices. You see, what we would like to do, we would like to find out exactly what the Government paid for the specific items of the unused equipment that you have indicated you found.

Colonel NURSE. No. At the time we went in there I knew and made this inventory which I have no copy of, and it was compared with some record that we found there in the office, the original purchase of this equipment, but I don't remember the values.

42. General RUSSELL. Well, could you give us some idea as to the percentage of the total items purchased that was represented by these items or equipment which have not been moved and used? In other words, was it half of it?

Colonel NURSE. Oh, as I stated in here (indicating), that a small amount of it has been removed.

43. General RUSSELL. A small amount?

Colonel NURSE. A small amount, yes, sir. I don't know [4006] how you would—how you could base it on a percentage basis, because—

44. General FRANK. Do you know what was on the original list?

Colonel NURSE. I saw the original list. I don't recall now what was on that original list, but at the time that we made the inventory I saw the original list.

45. General RUSSELL. Based on that list which you saw representing the items of equipment purchased and the list which you compiled of the unused part of those items, it is now your testimony that the greater part of this property was never used by the Government?

Colonel NURSE. That is my opinion, yes, sir, that it was not used, with the exception of a few items which were unserviceable. Two lighting outfits were brand-new, never had been taken out of the

box, but outside of that I think all the rest of the equipment in the yard, with the exception of a crane they had there that couldn't very well be moved, was unserviceable, and it was held, a good deal of it, with the idea of repairing it, although much of it was antiquated equipment there that—well, there were mule-drawn dump wagons and things of that sort that we never would use in this day and age.

46. General RUSSELL. Then, your testimony now is to the effect, Colonel, that along the lines on which I have recently questioned you or just finished questioning you the answer which you now are giving us is just as accurate as any information that you can give along that line?

Colonel NURSE. I think it is, yes.

[4007] 47. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

Colonel NURSE. I don't even remember what was paid for this equipment. I think they went in there and just took over the whole yard, everything that was there, good, bad, and indifferent, at a lump sum.

48. Colonel TOULMIN. As a matter of fact, Colonel, it was a bunch of junk, wasn't it?

Colonel NURSE. That that remained in the yard, with the exception of a few items.

49. Colonel TOULMIN. With the exception of the two lighting outfits and the one crane, it was a bunch of junk, wasn't it?

Colonel NURSE. I would tell you that was pretty nearly true.

50. Colonel TOULMIN. Wasn't there a demand for good equipment in the Islands?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir.

51. Colonel TOULMIN. And anybody who bought that as a bunch of junk wouldn't be getting anything he could use, would he?

Colonel NURSE. Some of it could be repaired, and I think they had requisitioned parts for the repair of some of the items.

52. Colonel TOULMIN. That had never been done, had it?

Colonel NURSE. They hadn't received parts up to the time I made my investigation.

53. General FRANK. And this was a year after it was bought?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir.

54. Colonel TOULMIN. And in the interim of that year there was a great demand for machinery, wasn't there?

Colonel NURSE. There was.

[4008] 55. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

56. Major CLAUSEN. That demand was the reason why you investigated this condition, wasn't it?

Colonel NURSE. That is right.

57. Major CLAUSEN. I would like the witness to supply the Board, and give to me first for review to screen it, the report from which he read, and any allied papers; and if you want them back I will return them.

Colonel NURSE. I don't care for them. In fact, you can have this whole file.

58. Major CLAUSEN. Thank you, sir. And then I will look through that.

Colonel NURSE. There are other items here that you are interested in, that Weaver contract.

59. General FRANK. Oh, I would like to ask him a question about that Weaver contract.

Do you have the report there on the Weaver contract?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir.

60. General FRANK. Will you give me the salient points in that?

Colonel NURSE. Yes, sir. I might say that when I first became aware of the contract with the Weaver Company I had one of my men make an investigation, and then I went to Colonel Wimer, who was the contract officer, and called his attention to it, and in fact I called his attention to it twice, and no action was taken. I recommended that the contract either be canceled or renegotiated. So then I referred it to General Kramer, and immediately after that, why, they got action on it, but—and I have the copy of my report here to General Kramer [4009] and which, if the Board wants, I can read or I will turn it over.

61. General FRANK. Well, will you state who this man Weaver was before the Government made a contract with him?

Colonel NURSE. I never knew Weaver, but I had heard that he had worked for one of the local automobile companies there in their repair department and that he was new to the business himself and that he had some partner with him that I understand furnished the capital, and this man Weaver had no money himself, but they set up business and immediately after were given this contract.

62. General FRANK. Would you tell about it?

Colonel NURSE (reading):

It was found that there was a contract, No. 414 eng-4530, in existence with Weaver & Company for automotive repair at the rate of \$4.00 per man hour direct labor charge or a minimum payment of \$4,000.00 per month. All supplies, materials and parts to be furnished by the Government. It is believed this rate is exorbitant; it is understood that no such rates are charged elsewhere. The Automotive Service Corporation, Hawaiian Contracting Company and Von Hamm-Young charge from \$2.00 to \$2.50 per man hour with a few instances of \$3.00 per man hour for lathe or electrical work. The contract provides the contractor shall furnish all shop facilities, equipment, labor and supervision, yet it is understood the U. S. E. D. have furnished grinders, drills, taps and dies, welding machines and many other [4010] tools free of charge. Also a 1934 Harley-Davidson motorcycle with sidecar and a 1939 Pontiac sampan bus. This company has been paid approximately \$30,000 to date by the U. S. E. D. and it is understood they have considerable commercial work besides. On April 19, 1942, OPA Ser. Reg. 20 stipulated that contractors entering business after that date must establish their rates in accordance with their competitors and are forbidden to charge rates higher than their competitors. It is understood Weaver & Company went into business in July 1942, therefore, it would appear their rates called for under Contract W 414 eng-4530 is contrary to the OPA order.

Recommendation was made to the Control Officer—

That was Colonel Wimer.

that this contract be canceled and Weaver & Company be called upon to return to the U. S. E. D. the equipment which is government-owned. If the contract is not canceled, then it is believed it should be renegotiated with a revision downward of the rates being charged and the elimination of the guarantee of \$4,000.00 per month.

63. General FRANK. Who was the District Engineer when that contract was let?

Colonel NURSE. It was Lyman. General Lyman.

64. General FRANK. And what subordinate let that contract? Do you remember?

Colonel NURSE. What was that? I didn't understand.

65. General FRANK. What subordinate let the contract?

Colonel NURSE. Colonel Wimer was the contract officer. [4011]
Shortly after I reported this to General Kramer my men ran across a financial statement of the Weaver Company for April 1943, and I had a copy made of it. I showed it to Colonel Wimer, and he said yes, that he knew about it, but he said that it shouldn't have gotten out and that they were adjusting this contract. Some of the items here are:

Salary to the owner, \$1,000 for the month.

Travel and entertainment, \$1,018 for the month.

Legal audit, \$500.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Legal fees, that was?

Colonel NURSE. Legal. Legal audit.

67. General FRANK. Was the Government paying that expense?

Colonel NURSE. Well, that comes out of what they have paid at the rate of \$4 per hour. He lists these expenditures, if you want to see it (indicating).

68. Colonel TOULMIN. Go ahead.

Colonel NURSE. To offset the amount that the Government paid and bring it down so as to show a profit of only \$776.66 for the month.

69. Major CLAUSSEN. In other words, these items that you have read were furnished in substantiation of the rental charge as representing amounts that he paid out?

Colonel NURSE. I think that after I reported this to General Kramer, that Colonel Wimer was told to get busy on it, and the first thing apparently he did was ask for a financial statement to determine whether Weaver was making an excessive profit.

70. General FRANK. Do you know what amount he actually paid his mechanics?

[4012] Colonel NURSE. Well, I think it shows there, doesn't it?

71. General FRANK. How much an hour?

72. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes. That is the charge-off (indicating).

Colonel NURSE. No.

73. General FRANK. Do you remember generally from the investigation what he paid them as against the \$4?

Colonel NURSE. My recollection was, he paid a dollar and a quarter and a dollar and a half, but I am not positive.

74. General FRANK. All right. I have nothing further.

75. General GRUNERT. It seems to be a far cry from the phase that led up to or had anything to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is my understanding that all had happened after Pearl Harbor, after the attack on Pearl Harbor? Is that my understanding?

76. General FRANK. Yes.

77. General GRUNERT. Is that true?

Colonel NURSE. That is right, yes, sir.

78. General GRUNERT. And it has no connection, as far as you know of, with anything that pertained to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel NURSE. Not a thing.

79. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that you think of that would be of value to the Board in its consideration of the phases that led up to or during the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel NURSE. No, sir. I wasn't there. I didn't get over there until a month afterwards.

80. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Thank you very much, Colonel.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[4013] (Thereupon, at 3:30 p. m., the Board having completed the hearing of witnesses for the day, took up the consideration of other business.)

[4014]

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[4015] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1944

PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

The Board, at 11:20 a. m., pursuant to recess on Wednesday, September 20, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. WILLIAM A. CARMICHAEL, INFANTRY,
SOUTHERN SECURITIES DETACHMENT, SCU 1909, LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel Carmichael, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. William A. Carmichael, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, Southern Securities Detachment, SCU 1909, Los Angeles, California.

[4016] 2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will conduct this particular part of our special investigation.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, you formerly were a director of the Naturalization and Immigration Bureau at Los Angeles?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I was.

4. Major CLAUSEN. And that was during what period of time, Colonel?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. From February of 1940 until '42, in May 29th, '42.

5. Major CLAUSEN. And you had been with the Naturalization Service at Los Angeles for how long?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Just during that period. I was transferred there from Cleveland, Ohio.

6. Major CLAUSEN. I see. Now, during your tour at Los Angeles in that capacity, did you become acquainted with the file of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, application for citizenship?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I did.

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7. Major CLAUSEN. And without having that file before you at this moment you are unable to testify with detail and to give exact dates; is that correct?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. That is correct, yes, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And you have now ascertained just a few moments ago that the file which this Board expected and which is the file in question, instead of being sent to San Francisco, has been erroneously sent to Los Angeles; is that correct?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. That is correct, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. So that we don't have the file now. We are going to arrange to get that at Los Angeles when we arrive this [4017] afternoon. But in any event, you are able to recall some of the highlights of the case from reviewing this report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation which I showed you, dated April 28, 1943, by Edward A. Furbush; is that correct, sir?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Yes, sir.

9-A. Major CLAUSEN. Let me invite your attention, then, to this portion. This is on page 9:

Barber added that Colonel Theodore Wyman had communicated four or five times during the investigation of this case with William A. Carmichael, former district director in charge of Immigration and Naturalization Service, and now a Lieutenant Commander—

It should be "Colonel."

in the United States Army, for the purpose of expediting the investigation by describing the necessity of Rohl's services in the construction work which was then under his charge.

Now, you have stated to me, sir, that, rather than Colonel Wyman making these communications to you direct, that communications to that general effect were made by an attorney; is that right?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. That is correct. Mr. Martin, as I recall the name. Mr. Martin.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And do you recall what Mr. Martin told you so far as Colonel Wyman is concerned?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Only that Colonel Wyman was anxious that the naturalization be expedited because he had Rhol enaged in work in Hawaii, Government work there.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Now, then, I refer to this other portion [4018] of the report on page 9, reading as follows:

It should be noted that Colonel Wyman was interviewed on February 20, 1941, and at that time stated that he first became acquainted with Rohl in California and that his relations with him were purely of a business nature. He had assumed, without any basis, according to the information given by him, that Rohl was a citizen. He had added that he treated the information as hearsay that he had received, indicating Rohl's father was a professor of engineering in a German university and that Rohl was born in Germany.

I am going to ask you, sir, with respect to that, what you recall that you did with the file to ascertain whether Colonel Wyman actually knew these facts.

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Well, when we received the file I sent it to our office in Hawaii for investigation, knowing—

12. Major CLAUSEN. May I interrupt there?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Yes.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Did this situation strike you as peculiar, and for that reason was the file sent to Honolulu?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. It did strike me as peculiar that an alien should be engaged on secret work for the Government there at that particular time.

14. Major CLAUSEN. So then you did what, Colonel Carmichael?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. So I sent the file to our office in Hawaii for investigation locally.

15. General RUSSELL. May I interrupt there for just one question?

16. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

[4019] General RUSSELL. About when, Colonel, was that record or file sent out there?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Well, I don't know as I can recall the exact dates. The file will show when it was sent there.

18. General RUSSELL. To the best of your recollection?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Very shortly after his application was filed.

19. General RUSSELL. And his application was filed when?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I think, in the summer of '41.

20. Major CLAUSEN. The record shows. Do you want the actual information?

21. General RUSSELL. No. That is all.

22. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I felt that if Colonel Wyman did not know that he was an alien, that that was a very good way to bring it to his attention, and it was for that reason I sent it there.

23. General FRANK. And this was about when?

24. Major CLAUSEN. Well, the information that I have—do you want me to disclose the information?

25. General RUSSELL. Yes, if you could.

26. Major CLAUSEN. The application, sir, was filed in January '41. The report of the F. B. I. agent states that this interview which followed the action of Colonel Carmichael occurred on February 20, 1941, sir.

27. General FRANK. Where?

28. Major CLAUSEN. At Honolulu.

As I understand it, you sent the file to Honolulu and requested what action, Colonel?

[4020] Colonel CARMICHAEL. Investigation locally, which would bring it automatically to the attention of Colonel Wyman.

29. Major CLAUSEN. And was there any particular person in Honolulu to whom that was sent?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. Yes; the district director of Immigration and Naturalization. I mean our file.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Would it strike you as peculiar, sir, if I was to inform you that the district director stated he had no record of that action by you?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. It would.

31. Major CLAUSEN. The file eventually came back to you, did it, Colonel?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. It did.

32. Major CLAUSEN. And when the file was returned, do you recall now, without having recourse to the file, what was indicated, whether this investigation and the knowledge of the fact of Rohl's alienage and his background had been brought to the attention of Colonel Wyman?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I do not recall what we had on it. I don't recall. The file will show in that respect.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall who the person was at Honolulu who actually interviewed Colonel Wyman?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I do not.

34. Major CLAUSEN. And would the file indicate that?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. My memory on it is that there was nothing indicating an interview with Colonel Wyman. I don't think the file reflected that, but it did reflect that they had contacted someone in the Army there. Whether or not Colonel Wyman was interviewed, I can't say. In fact, my [4021] memory would indicate that he was not.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Was not interviewed?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. As per the file.

36. Major CLAUSEN. You mean from the file?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. From the file.

37. Major CLAUSEN. And would you know the basis for this statement by the agent Furbush of the F. B. I.: "It should be noted that Colonel Wyman was interviewed on February 20, 1941"? Do you know where he would have received that information, sir?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I do not. He might have obtained it from the file. I say it has been three years since I have seen that file, and a great many things have happened since that time, so—

38. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

39. General FRANK. Do you remember who was the district director in Honolulu to whom this went?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. I know him but I can't recall his name at the moment. He is in Washington now, in the Washington office.

40. General GRUNERT. Any questions? General Russell?

41. General RUSSELL. No.

42. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

(No response.)

Do you think of anything else that you can tell us about this matter?

Colonel CARMICHAEL. No, sir.

43. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition)

[4022] **TESTIMONY OF MRS. ALICE ANSTEY, 938 EAST EDGEWARE ROAD, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA**

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of her rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major CLAUSEN. Would you state your name, please?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Mrs. Alice Anstey.

2. Major CLAUSEN. And your address?

Mrs. ANSTEY. 938 East Edgware Road, instead of Edgemoor; w-a-r-e.

3. Major CLAUSEN. And you are employed where, Mrs. Anstey?

Mrs. ANSTEY. At the Hotel Biltmore.

4. Major CLAUSEN. And in what capacity?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Maid.

5. Major CLAUSEN. You have been for what period of time?

Mrs. ANSTEY. 15 years.

6. Major CLAUSEN. During that time did you happen to see a party by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, sir.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And did you also see a party by the name of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Now, during the course of the work that you did at the Biltmore Hotel did you have occasion to see this man Rohl and Colonel Wyman in their rooms at the hotel?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, sir; Apartment Z.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Apartment?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Apartment Z.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And on what floor was that?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Ninth.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see any liquor in these rooms?

[4023] Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, sir; plenty of it.

12. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Plenty of it.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see Mr. Rohl or Colonel Wyman in an intoxicated condition?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, sir. At one party in Apartment Z I saw Mr. Wyman intoxicated, but I have seen Mr. Rohl intoxicated many times.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Well, on this occasion that you saw Colonel Wyman, would you tell the Board the basis for your conclusion that he was intoxicated?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, he was—drank heavy and was eating a sort of—as a drunk man will when he's eating, sort of—didn't—

15. General FRANK. Drooped over the table?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Pardon?

16. General FRANK. Drooped over the table, as indicated by your gesture?

Mr. ANSTEY. Yes, sir.

17. Major CLAUSEN. And on this one special occasion that you refer to were there any other people brought into the place or that went in?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Girls.

18. Major CLAUSEN. What is that?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Young girls.

19. Major CLAUSEN. How many, Mrs. Anstey?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, I imagine—I am not—I would say positively on that, but it seemed to me there was about twenty girls going in and out. You see, I didn't see the entire table, and I wasn't allowed in the little dinette that is here.

[4024] 20. Major CLAUSEN. And this occurred about what time at night that you saw these things?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, that was around about 8:30.

21. Major CLAUSEN. You were on duty during what hours?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, I came on at that time at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and worked until about 10:30.

22. Major CLAUSEN. And do you know about when this occurred, Mrs. Anstey?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, that dinner party was around about 9:30.

23. Major CLAUSEN. And the particular——

Mrs. ANSTEY. The dates I don't particularly remember, because at that time I had no reason to know that I would ever be asked about it.

24. Major CLAUSEN. The approximate year? Could you give us that?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, I imagine that was about 1940. It was not long after I came to work on that floor. I had worked on the lower floors prior to that time.

25. Major CLAUSEN. What did these girls look like that were there?

Mrs. ANSTEY. They looked like a cheap type of girl, bleached-hair type, and just like girls that would be down on Main Street of Los Angeles.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl on other occasions when they had drinking parties of the same kind?

Mrs. ANSTEY. I didn't see Mr. Wyman at any other time, but I have seen Mr. Rohl on another drinking party, but it was [4025] just himself and another young lady at that time.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know what occurred on these parties? Did you ever see these——

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, at that time I had—I went to the bedrooms to give clean towels, and the beds were pushed together, and they were very badly used. There was lipstick and cigarette butts, bobby pins, hair pins, and stuff thrown all over, liquor glasses with lipstick on them.

28. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman on this occasion?

Mrs. ANSTEY. No, I did not see Colonel Wyman. I saw Colonel Wyman in the halls once after this party that I named.

29. Major CLAUSEN. You mean after this occasion?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, and he was perfectly sober at that time.

30. Major CLAUSEN. Did you ever see any undue familiarity, on this occasion that you referred to, between Colonel Wyman and any of these girls?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Well, any more than he would have his arms around them, set on their lap, or that is, they set on his lap.

31. Major CLAUSEN. I think that is all.

32. General GRUNERT. Do you know who gave this dinner party?

Mrs. ANSTEY. I understood it was Colonel Wyman.

33. General GRUNERT. Did you actually see him take a drink or drinks?

Mrs. ANSTEY. No, I didn't see him take the drink. I saw the drinks in there and the drinks in front of him and in his glass.

34. General GRUNERT. When he drooped over the table do you know whether or not he may have been ill or tired, or did you [4026] just assume he was drunk?

Mrs. ANSTEY. No; he was drunk, to what the waiter said to me, that he was drunk, and he looked drunk to me.

35. General GRUNERT. Did you only see him at the table, or did you see him attempt to get up and move about?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, I saw him get up.

36. General GRUNERT. And that indicated that he was intoxicated?

Mrs. ANSTEY. He was; yes, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. You saw him just on this one occasion?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, sir; in that party.

38. General GRUNERT. And on no other occasion?

Mrs. ANSTEY. At no other party than that occasion, but I saw Mr. Rohl afterwards.

39. General GRUNERT. Are these questions? General Russell? Colonel Toulmin?

40. Colonel TOULMIN. No, sir.

41. Colonel WEST. No.

42. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that you would like to tell the Board?

Mrs. ANSTEY. No, sir. That's about all.

43. Colonel TOULMIN. I might ask her one question, General.

Did you see Colonel Wyman at any other time when there were no parties going on?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Just in the hall one time.

44. Colonel TOULMIN. In the hall?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes. And I think he was looking for Apartment Q. Mr. Rohl was there.

Colonel TOULMIN. I see. And Rohl was in that hotel at [4027] that time?

Mrs. ANSTEY. Yes, in Apartment Q. Yes, sir.

46. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

47. Major CLAUSEN. These times that you saw him in the hall, can you give us about when that was, over what period that extended?

Mrs. ANSTEY. I imagine that was in around about just before Pearl Harbor.

48. Major CLAUSEN. You are not able to tell us certainly?

Mrs. ANSTEY. No, sir. You know, when we work in the hotel we don't remember dates. We see so many of those parties that I have really tried to forget them.

49. Major CLAUSEN. Yes.

50. General GRUNERT. Well, thank you very much for coming.

Mrs. ANSTEY. You are entirely welcome.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

51. Major CLAUSEN. At this time we offer in evidence, as the exhibit next in order, a communication to myself, Pearl Harbor Board, dated 15 August 1944, from Colonel L. R. Forney, General Staff Corps, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, of a photostatic copy of a letter which he received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation when he requested information relating to the mission of this Board.

(Letter dated August 15, 1944, to Major Clausen, Pearl Harbor Board, from Colonel L. R. Forney, with enclosures, was marked Exhibit No. 59 and received in evidence.)

52. Major CLAUSEN. This letter indicates possibly the connection with our mission to this effect: that as of December [4028] 1940 there was a file in the Federal Bureau of Investigation which was to the effect that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was possibly an agent of the German government and in any event was guilty of subversive activities, and which letter could have been obtained by anyone who desired to investigate the loyalty of Mr. Rohl.

I shall read that letter.

53. General GRUNERT. It is my understanding that he was under suspicion, and the Board knows nothing as to whether or not those suspicions were well grounded.

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54. Major CLAUSEN. That is correct, sir. This is offered with particular emphasis on the fact that there was suspicion directed against him of subversive activities as of July 1940. Whether these suspicions were well founded has not been fully proved.

I shall first state that the letter is apparently printed in ink. In the upper right-hand corner it says, "Received. Office of the Attorney General. July 13, 1940." Then, received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation July 17, 1940, and this is the letter:

(Letter, Enright to Early, July 8, 1940, is as follows:)

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, July 8, 1940.

STEPHEN EARLY, Esq.,
Office of the President,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. EARLY: I fully realize what a hideous offense it is to make a charge against a person if the charge is false, or, if one would inculcate for personal gain, or, solely, to harass the accused. That is why I am writing you, so that an investigation, (should you see fit to make one) [4029] can be made with the least danger of causing the accused an injury, if he be innocent. (If a leopard ever changes his spots.)

This person that I herewith accuse, is now a rich general contractor in Los Angeles County; twenty-three years ago he and I worked together on the south bank of the Bear River; fifty-five miles north of Sacramento, California. We became very confidential. I knew him, then, to be an under cover agent of the Imperial German Government.

Shortly after our Government (U. S. A.) entered the First World's War, the accused made a dash for Mexico so full of goose pimples that he looked like a boy with the measles; so wet with cold sweat: as if someone held a sprinkling pot over him full of ice water. For years I forgot about the accused.

Now comes a fellow workman who was on the same job twenty-three years ago. This workman went to France: Com. M. 110th Inf.; this veteran knows more about the accused than I do. The veteran comes to me propelled by the fact that the accused now has large contracts in the harbor of our western metropolis.

The veteran joins in with me in making this accusation.

To get to the man that I knew twenty-three years ago, one would have to have power, to tear off three different veneers: fraternal, social, and financial.

May I tell you that I was born in Virginia [4030] City, Nevada, fifty-nine years ago.

I place my life and my honor at the service of country.

Respectfully and sincerely,

/s/ WILLIAM HENRY ENRIGHT.

Postal Address.
7232 Amherst St.,
San Diego, California.

And attached is the name:

Bill Rohl of Rohl & Connelly, General Contractors, Los Angeles, Calif.

Next I have a memorandum for the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated—

55. Colonel TOULMIN. Just a minute. You haven't stated how you got that letter yet.

56. Major CLAUSEN. I stated, sir, that it was supplied to me by Colonel Forney, who had requested information from the F. B. I. relating to our mission, from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

57. Colonel TOULMIN. That is satisfactory.

58. General FRANK. And who is Colonel Forney?

59. Major CLAUSEN. Well, as I stated, he is Colonel, General Staff Corps, Military Intelligence Division, G-2, Washington, D. C.

And I have here a communication in the form of a memorandum for the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 14 August 1944, from the

Division of Naval Intelligence, by Wallace S. Wharton, Captain, U. S. N. R., together with a copy of the O. N. I. card dated 2 October 1940, Subject: Hans Wilhelm Rohl; also the copy of [4031] 11th Naval District N. I. S. report dated 17 October 1940; copy of 11th Naval District report dated 5 March 1941.

I particularly wish to invite the attention of the Board to the O. N. I. card, which would indicate that as of October 1940, if anyone had inquired, there would be a basis for suspecting subversive activities of Hans Wilhelm Rohl. I shall read the copy of the O. N. I. card, 2 October 1940:

(Copy of O. N. I. card, 2 October 1940, is as follows:)

ROHL, H. W.

ONI

Information from R. L. McCrea, C. P. A., 5451 Marathon St., Los Angeles, Calif, that subject has obtained all important contracts to construct San Pedro breakwater: that the subject keeps a yacht which was constructed in Germany and maintains a full German crew aboard; that subject and his crew are well informed concerning Naval activities; that subject is "a hard-boiled character" and informant believes he and his crew would stop at nothing to accomplish purpose. Conduct appropriate investigation.

ND-11-12

2 October, 1940.

Investigation report, which I offer in evidence, and I shall read the comment and recommendations only, is dated October 17, 1940, as follows:

(Comment and recommendations from N. I. S. investigation report dated October 17, 1940, are as follows:

1. Reporting officer has known subject and Matthies since 1926. [4032]
2. The vessel is manned by 9 U. S. citizens and 1 Norwegian national, a sailor named Harold Hartvigsen.
3. Subject and his wife are persons of refinement. At the present time the vessel is only used to carry owner's family and week-end guests to Santa Catalina Isd.
4. Informant R. L. McCrea is a dissatisfied ex-employee.

(Excerpts from N. I. S. report dated March 5, 1941, are as follows:)

60. Major CLAUSEN. Then, the other report by United States Naval Intelligence Service:

Subject: Rohl.

Report made at: Los Angeles, March 5, 1941, by Lieutenant A. A. Thomas, U. S. N. R.

Period covered: March 4, 1941. Status of case: Closed.

Origin of case: Originated from C. A. Emerick, Customs Agent in Charge, Los Angeles, California.

"Synopsis: Subject, German born and resident of U. S. for 25 years, is part owner in firm known as Hawaiian Constructors engaged in confidential construction work for U. S. Army in Hawaii. Also owner of yacht 'VEGA' having radio telephone Station KLVC under FCC license. Part of Subject's business in wife's name.

"Comment and recommendations:

"Comment: Inspector Dunn believes subject to [4033] have been dishonest in his actions and that his actions indicate possible subversive activity.

"Recommendation: In view of the fact that three other agencies of the U. S. are investigating subject it is recommended that this office desist from further action.

"Approved: B. L. Canaga, Captain, USN (Ret.)"

And attached to that is the report of 5 March 1941.

(Letter dated 14 August 1944, to Major Clausen, Army Pearl Harbor Board, from Navy Department, Division of Naval Intelligence, Counter Intelligence Branch, by Captain Wharton, together with enclosures, was marked Exhibit No. 60 and received in evidence.)

61. Major CLAUSEN. I also at this time offer in evidence a letter which I received from the G-2, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C., a form of a cross reference sheet, index concerning Colonel Theodore Wyman; subject: Corps of Engineers Operations in Canada (Canol Project); from: military attache of Canada. The summary is as follows:

(Summary from G-2 report, excerpt from exhibit No. 61, is as follows:)

"Enclosed are copies of letters addressed to American Minister by Dept. of External Affairs, Canada which are more or less self-explanatory and serve to indicate the manner in which the US Army Canol Project in Canada is being conducted by Col. Wyman; Canadian Govt. may see fit to request recall of Col. Wyman; by Disposition Form dated 11-10-42 to Operations Division.

The only letter that bears on the subject in this [4034] particular file is as follows: dated September 26, 1942:

(Letter dated September 26, 1942, to Chief, MIS, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., from John S. Gullett, excerpt from exhibit No. 61, is as follows:)

Subject: Corps of Engineers Operations in Canada (Canol Project).

To: Chief, MIS, G-2 War Department, Washington.

1. Enclosed are copies of letters addressed to the American Minister, Mr. Moffat, by the Department of External Affairs, Canada. These letters are more or less self-explanatory and serve to indicate the manner in which the United States Army Canol Project in Canada is being conducted by its representative, Colonel Theodore Wyman, C. E.

2. Unofficially Canadian Offices have reported more than once of the high-handed manner in which Colonel Wyman has conducted himself in Canada. And, during the visit of Mr. Moffat and the undersigned to the Canadian Northwest different people including high officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police spoke disparagingly of this officer. This is indeed unfortunate. Unless something is done to correct this situation it is the opinion of this office that the Canadian Government may see fit to request the recall of Colonel Wyman.

3. The contents of the enclosures were communicated to the State Department by Mr. Moffat.

4. This communication is forwarded in the belief that it is a serious concern of the War Department and [4035] of particular interest to your office.

Signed "John S. Gullett, Colonel, G. S. C., Military Attache."

General FRANK. What is the date of that?

Major CLAUSEN. September 26, 1942, sir.

With that are two enclosures: letters of September 22, 1942, and September 17, 1942, but which are not in this file, sir.

That is all I have.

62. Colonel TOULMIN. What became of those letters?

63. Major CLAUSEN. That is what I would like to find out.

I offer these documents as exhibits in addition to what I have read, and I suggest the first group of documents be offered as exhibit next in order.

The next group of documents, as exhibit next in order, and the memorandum and the letter which I have read last, concerning Canada, as the next in order.

(Letter, cross reference sheet dated September 26, 1942, from G-2, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C., with letter attached, was marked Exhibit No. 61 and received in evidence.)

64. General GRUNERT. Whereupon the Board proceeds to other business.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, proceeded to other business.)

[4036]

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[4037] **PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1944

**PENTAGON BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess on Thursday, September 21, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

1. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE HENRY L. STIMSON, SECRETARY
OF WAR**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

2. Colonel WEST. Mr. Secretary, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. STIMSON. My name is Henry L. Stimson. My present address is in Washington, D. C. My home address is in Huntington, Long Island, New York.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Secretary, the Board appreciates your giving us this time out of your busy schedule, and, in order to refresh your memory, I will give you a bit of the Board's background.

The order convening this Board states, in part:

[4038] Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby convened to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.

Since the existence of the Board is based on the Public Law referred to, the Board made a study of congressional hearings thereon, and as a result deemed it part of its duties to go into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. In consequence, the Board drew up a list of subjects on which it desires to question the Secretary.

The large field to be covered by the Board in the limited time available made it advisable to assign objectives or phases of inquiry to individual members, although the entire Board will pass upon all

objectives or phases. General Russell was assigned to this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding the questions, and other members will assist in developing them.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, sir; I understand that.

I received from the Board a list of questions which I have made the basis of my study in preparing to meet you gentlemen here today.

4. General GRUNERT. Then possibly it would be better for us to proceed by General Russell taking those subjects one by one, until we finish with those subjects, and then if there are any additional subjects or questions to be asked, we can bring them in at the end.

[4039] Mr. STIMSON. Yes. That would be perfectly satisfactory to me. Before you started, I wanted to just make this preliminary statement to you.

Of course this is the statute under which we are all acting, and the second section of that statute provides as follows:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

That means that after you have finished this investigation and the report, the results will have to be used by me in performing what I might call a quasi-judicial duty, namely, of ascertaining what proceedings the facts may justify, and commencing those proceedings; in other words, I am somewhat in the position, roughly speaking, of a district attorney in his relations with the grand jury.

5. General GRUNERT. Yes, I understand that.

Mr. STIMSON. And, by becoming a witness, I have to "watch my step" very carefully that I do not get into a position of advocacy or bias towards any person who may afterwards be proceeded against or concerned with the action which your report may recommend. And at first I wondered whether I could properly appear at all on account of that dual position, but I made up my mind that you were entitled to all the facts that I could give you, and that there were probably facts which I knew which were not yet discovered by you, though I have not been through your hearings, naturally, and so I decided to go ahead and help you as far as I can in producing facts; but when [4040] it comes to making inferences from those facts and giving you my opinions or conclusions, now, I think I will have to hold that back until I proceed on the whole record, after you have made your report, so that I will be in a position which is not open to criticism.

6. General GRUNERT. I think the Board understands your position, Mr. Secretary; and if the Board should ask any such leading questions, here, in your judgment, we will just skip them.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, thank you very much; that would help me.

7. General GRUNERT. Has the Secretary prepared a statement that he would rather read or explain, or should we go ahead with the agenda, here?

Mr. STIMSON. No; I have prepared what I have to say in the form of proposed answers or notes, really—notes to the questions which you sent me; so I am prepared to take them up in that order.

I had not quite finished what I wanted to say. I wanted to say that in making this statement I do not wish to be in any way interpreted as even suggesting that you should not examine me and ask me

any questions bearing on my own conduct that you may see fit. That is open to you absolutely, but I only do not want to answer questions which might affect adversely the other people who would be afterwards possibly involved.

8. General GRUNERT. I think the Board thoroughly understands that.

Mr. STIMSON. All right.

9. General GRUNERT. And the Board is not a bit timid!

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I should be very sorry if any board that I had appointed in such an important case as this went ahead [4041] timidly. That isn't the way to go ahead.

10. General GRUNERT. I will ask General Russell to lead.

11. General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, the memorandum which we sent you on August 3 was prepared, of course, at the inception of this investigation. Since that time there has been a lot of evidence adduced and much documentary data considered, and all of this has affected our thinking; and it might come to pass that this statement is not so up-to-date now as we thought it was when it was prepared. However, as suggested by you to the President of the Board, I think we can follow it with substantial results.

The first subject that was listed here is that of the "War Councils." By the "War Councils" we meant the meetings that were held by the Secretary of State, possibly the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, from time to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government. Did you attend those meetings, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. STIMSON. Would you mind my giving a precise definition of what regular organization we had developed here, that would come out in respect to "war councils"?

12. General RUSSELL. I wish you would.

Mr. STIMSON. The name "War Council" is the name of a statutory body which was created in, I think, the National Defense Law of about 1920; but it was purely a War Department board. It did not have any members from the Navy or from any other department in it.

13. General RUSSELL. I might interject that we borrowed this term, "War Council," from the Secretary of State's book, [4042] "Peace and War," and it may not be an appropriate term. For that reason, I was attempting to describe what we were thinking about.

Mr. STIMSON. That is the reason I wanted to give you, right now, at the beginning, exactly such organization as we did have.

The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays, in the times that we are talking over, but it consisted solely of myself, my assistants, civil assistants, and the Chief of Staff and such other officers as I invited in; and it had nothing to do with the Navy or matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of meetings—they can hardly be dignified by the term "organization"—but early, very soon after Mr. Knox and I came into the Government in 1940, we decided that we ought to meet regularly, and we ought to meet with the Secretary of State; we were approaching important matters; and so we went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any objection to meeting with us once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we began meeting on Tuesday

mornings at 9:30 every week, whenever we were present in Washington, or able to come, and those series of meetings went on until Mr. Knox died; they lasted right through.

They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and during the time at which you are about to inquire, just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, [4043] and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and myself were in constant contact.

The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which he usually called with great regularity—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff—that was, of course, General Marshall—the Chief of Naval Operations, who was at that time Admiral Stark; and sometimes, General Arnold. Well, that was also improvised, so to speak; it had no custom before it. It was created in the light of the approaching emergency, and among ourselves, as a nickname we called it the “War Cabinet,” or the “War Council,” or something like that; and evidently Mr. Hull, from what you say, used that expression in his White Paper.

There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met on the call of the President, at his office; and during this time about which you particularly ask, the autumn of 1941, they were meeting very frequently, also; and, fortunately, I have records. I have kept records during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly, and without much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking place, including everything that was important, that I deemed to be important, in regard to the crisis that was coming along; and including these meetings; so that I am in a position where I can give you dates of these meetings pretty fully.

14. General RUSSELL. How frequently were the President's meetings held, would you think?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I can tell you. I will give them all that came within the time that you speak of, but there was no regular day for them, they came at different days; and during the two or three weeks before Pearl Harbor there were a number [4044] of those meetings; I cannot give you off-hand how many, but I have got them all enumerated in my answer when you come to that question.

15. General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, as a result of these two sets of meetings that you have referred to, were you kept in touch with the negotiations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes; I was.

16. General RUSSELL. Do you think you were fully advised and that you knew all of the details of those negotiations, and the trend of the negotiations?

Mr. STIMSON. I think I knew it as fully as anybody in the Government.

17. General RUSSELL. Were those negotiations, or the things that transpired at these meetings, communicated to the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Mr. STIMSON. They were.

18. General RUSSELL. He was as thoroughly familiar with those details as you were, and with the trend in the negotiation?

Mr. STIMSON. I believe so. Now, let me tell you, there, we were then in the old Munition building; and the old Munition building in that respect was built just as our present quarters are. The Chief of Staff had his room right through a door like that, in the old building, and we were in very constant touch every day—every day. We had no intermediaries between us; we went back and forth through that door; and whenever I received any information from the meetings which I attended, and at which he was not present, which was of importance to the conduct of military operations or other things, I talked it over with [4045] him and told him. Of course, he was at the head of the staff, and he was my channel to getting things to the military staff of the United States Army.

19. General RUSSELL. Were any restrictions imposed on you as to the information which you might convey to General Marshall as head of the armed forces?

Mr. STIMSON. No. You mean, by whom?

20. General RUSSELL. By the request of the Secretary of State or the direction of the President of the United States.

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, none, whatever! none, whatever!

21. General RUSSELL. Now, in these meetings that we are discussing, which occurred late in the fall of 1941, did you consider the inevitability of war with Japan and its imminence?

Mr. STIMSON. We did; and I am prepared to give you in detail on that question. I suppose that is question 4, that you have, here.

22. General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, it is question 5, on a list of subjects. Question 4 related to restrictions, and you have just testified there were no restrictions.

Mr. STIMSON. In my order, that was touching question 3. I mean I am taking it from the list that was sent me some time ago.

23. General RUSSELL. Possibly I missed my number. Well, suppose you answer question 4. That will probably be my question 5.

General GRUNERT. May I suggest that if the Secretary has anything additional on any question he add it before we go to another subject.

24. General RUSSELL. Yes.

[4046] 25. General GRUNERT. So that we get all that you have.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I think that would be the most advisable way.

26. General GRUNERT. Unless you wish to submit that statement to us.

Mr. STIMSON. I have put it in question-and-answer form.

27. General GRUNERT. Then if you will see that we get all that you have, there, that will be fine.

Mr. STIMSON. And also, as I say, I was prepared to elaborate on certain things.

28. General GRUNERT. All right.

Mr. STIMSON. As an opening, General Russell, to that, I just might remind you—you must have been told by other witnesses—that all through that year 1941 we were engaged in what was literally a desperate effort to reenforce and fortify all our outposts, not only our Pacific outposts but the outposts which we had obtained in the Atlantic. Our production was not yet in full effect at all. It was very scanty. It was just beginning; and of course, there was a tremendous need, beyond what we could give at that time.

You will also remember that for many years after the treaty of 1921 relating to the Pacific, we were under a treaty obligation not to fortify the Philippines and not to fortify a number of our outposts in the Pacific, and that obligation was carried out loyally by this Government. That did not apply of course to Hawaii, but it did apply to Guam, and I do not remember whether it applied to Midway or Wake. It applied certainly to the Philippines and to Guam and to our outposts in the Far East. Under those conditions, the [4047] fortifications of those outposts had fallen very much behind the times; and our attention was directed to trying to keep that out and to bring them up as far as possible, and to also bring up the big, time-honored ring of outposts which has been our Pacific bulwark, beginning at Panama, running up to Hawaii, and then running up to Alaska; and in each case it was always a question of "more beggars than we had alms to give"—very much.

Well, all through that, there was a large number of meetings between Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, and myself. As I have told you, they were scheduled regularly for Tuesdays; but in October, November, and December there were frequent conversations, in addition to those meetings.

My records show now, to be specific, that I had meetings with Secretary Hull on October 6 and on October 28; and with Secretary Hull and with Secretary Knox, on November 25 and December 7. They also show conferences with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the Navy, together with Admiral Stark and General Marshal, on November 25 and November 28; and they show another meeting when Mr. Hull was sick, with Under Secretary Welles and Secretary Knox and the President, on December 2.

In addition to that there were telephone calls on this subject between me and Secretary Hull, on October 28, November 4, 10th, 24th, and 25th; twice on the 26th, November 26th; twice on November 27; on November 28, and on December 6.

It shows that I conferred with Secretary Knox on October 7th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, and on November 18th, 27th, 28th, and 30th. Those were meetings with Mr. Knox.

There were also frequent telephone conversations with him. [4048] The reason why there were more meetings with Mr. Knox during that time than with Mr. Hull was that Mr. Hull was ill, as I remember it, a little period during November and possibly October, but Mr. Knox and I went on with our meetings.

Now, during all of this period, the subject of the discussions was very largely concerned with the Japanese situation. I have refreshed my recollection by a study of the contemporaneous memoranda which I made at that time; and when I say "contemporaneous," they were made either in the evening or the early morning of the day following. I had a Dictaphone at my house on which I dictated them, and my secretary used to come to my house, and I can give you in that way perhaps more vividly than I could possibly give you from my unaided memory.

29. General RUSSELL. It is my suggestion, Mr. Secretary, that you just, since you have a memorandum prepared in question-and-answer

form, go through with it, and we will listen in, and if there is anything to be supplied, we can do that afterwards.

Mr. STIMSON. All right; thank you. I agree that that, I think, would be the most satisfactory way of doing it, for you, certainly.

[4049] The first one of those records that I have made a note of now—of course, they went back through the whole time ever since I came to Washington, but the first one—you asked for were those in November and December, and I have just confined myself to those. The first one was on November 5, 1941, where I made this entry:

Matters are crystallizing on both sides of us now, and the Navy is meeting with big losses in the Atlantic—

That was in the convoy work.

and Japan is sending somebody to us who I think will bring us a proposal impossible of acceptance. I spent part of the morning reading secret reports on the latter matters.

Now, I will say here simply that I had the same information that General Marshall told you, off the record, that he had in regard to such matter. I would rather not make any further record of it.

November 6th: I had about an hour's talk with the President. We talked about the Far Eastern situation and the approaching conference with the messenger who is coming from Japan. The President outlined what he thought he might say.

The messenger who was coming, you remember, was the one who came to join Nomura.

November 7, 1941: At cabinet meeting—

Now, it is the general cabinet meeting.

there was a general discussion of the problem in the Far East.

[4050] Of course, we didn't go into the military situation very much, because those were not discussed in the general cabinet, but it was a general discussion of the problem.

November 10, 1941:—

This was at a statutory war council meeting in the Department, only the members of my own staff present.

General Marshall read a long letter from General MacArthur in the Philippines telling us of the progress of the reorganization of the Philippine Army and the construction of airports throughout the Islands.

November 21, 1941: I talked to the President about the danger of poison gas in the Philippines. We have learned that the Japanese have used it on the Chinese at Ichang.

On November 24, 1941, I had a talk with General Olmsted, whom I recently promoted to be the Chief Signal Officer.

That was important on the subject that I will tell you later of, in answer to a later question: the use of the air warning service, which, as you know, was a radar operation.

November 25, 1941:—

This is a long one.

At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.

[4051] Then we had a long talk over the general situation there, which I remember.

We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one.

That's an hour and a half.

At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem.

When I got back to the Department I found news from G-2 that a Japanese expedition had started. Five divisions had come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai, and there they had embarked on ships, thirty, forty, or fifty ships, and have been sighted south of Formosa. I at once called up Hull and told him about it and sent copies to him and to the President of the message.

Of this message that I am speaking of from G-2.

That is the end of the notes on November 25th.

The following day, November 26:

Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day—

[4052] That means yesterday.

to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all. A few minutes later I talked to the President over the telephone, and I asked him whether he had received the paper which I had sent him over last night, about the Japanese having started a new expedition from Shanghai down towards Indo-China. He told me that he had not yet seen it. I told him that it was a fact that had come to me through G-2, and I at once got another copy of the paper which I had sent him last night, and sent it over to him by special messenger.

That was the 26th.

November 27. As you know, this was a very important day.

November 27, 1941: News is coming in of a concentration and movement south by the Japanese of a large expeditionary force moving south from Shanghai and evidently headed towards Indo-China, with the possibility of going to the Philippines or to Burma or to the Burma Road or to the Dutch East Indies, but probably a concentration to move over into Thailand and to hold a position from which they can attack Singapore when the moment arrives.

The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his finale—

I put in here, but I mean it was his final decision.

what his final decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new [4053] proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy".

30. General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I don't like to disturb you, but I have become a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th of—

Mr. STIMSON. This was the 27th.

31. General RUSSELL. 27th.

Mr. STIMSON. The day after the 26th.

32. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. STIMSON. The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it.

33. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off.

I then called up the President and talked with him about it. General Arnold came in—

This is to my office.

General Arnold came in to present the orders for the movement of two of our biggest planes out from San Francisco and across the Mandated Islands to Manila. There is a concentration going on by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands, and these planes can fly high over them and beyond the reach of their pursuit planes [4054] and take photographs.

This is all the 27th.

Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Gerow.

He was the Chief of the War Plans Division at that time, corresponding to the present Chief of Operations.

Marshall is down at the maneuvers today.

That was the maneuvers in North Carolina.

A draft memorandum—

These next three lines are not from my own memorandum, but from what appears from another paper:

A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed.

That appears in the memorandum which is already in evidence, by General Gerow, to General Marshall, the memorandum of November 27.

34. General RUSSELL. The joint statement is in evidence, not where the Secretary suggested, but General Marshall put it in evidence. We are acquainted with the joint statement.

Mr. STIMSON. Are you acquainted with it?

35. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. I just want to be sure.

36. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. STIMSON. Because it governed the—it helped—explains the next sentence. Now I begin with my own record:

I said that I was glad to have time, but I did not want it at the cost of humility on the part of the United States or of reopening the thing, which would [4055] show a weakness on our part.

And I go on:

But the main question at this meeting—

The meeting of Knox, Stark, Gerow, and myself.

was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely, that he—

That was the recipient.

should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was.

Now, to understand what I was talking about, an earlier alert, I am not sure which one I meant, but we had sent a message which would

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meet with the description, on November 24th, a joint Army and Navy message, but we had also sent warnings back as far as July 7, July 25, October 16, and October 20, which contained warnings to the members of the—commanders of the outposts as to the situation that was going on with Japan.

Now I go back to my narrative:

So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him—

That is, I was talking about MacArthur especially, but we were sending the messages to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska.

[4056] So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was.

That is the situation between him and the Japanese envoys.

Now let me have the message, that message which I have been referring to here.

The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right. You see, that message opens with these sentences:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely, that the man should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here.

That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally do: [4057] to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts.

I speak there in the words of the message to MacArthur, but there four messages sent out that are in evidence, and you will see the message to Hawaii carries the annotation on the back of it, which is very extraordinary, "Shown to the Secretary of War," and after they had drafted it. And we were covering the situation in the four great outposts of the Pacific.

37. General GRUNERT. Has the Secretary finished regarding that message?

Mr. STIMSON. No. I have regarding that message, yes. I am just going over to the next, to the following day.

38. General GRUNERT. I would like to ask whether you saw the rest of that message and whether you prepared the rest of the message or approved what was in that message.

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, yes; this message that I have just read a portion of to you, I went over very carefully the whole message.

39. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Because the part that I read you was merely the part which I have consulted Mr. Hull about.

40. General GRUNERT. We have that message in evidence.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

41. General GRUNERT. And lots of testimony about it.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

42. General GRUNERT. All I wanted to know was whether you were actually acquainted with the rest of the contents of that message.

[4058] Mr. STIMSON. I was.

43. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there.

44. General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, before you go away from that message, which we have considered and are considering rather seriously: When General Gerow came to your office that morning did he have a rough draft of that message?

Mr. STIMSON. I can't remember that, sir.

45. General RUSSELL. In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he stated, relative to the first sentence of the message, that initially the first sentence was to the effect that negotiations had terminated; that, confirming your report now, you called the Secretary of State, who suggested this other language: to all intents and purposes it had been terminated, with only a slight possibility of their being resumed.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

46. General RUSSELL. That is the language which appears in the actual message.

Mr. STIMSON. That they might come back and offer to continue.

47. General RUSSELL. And offer to continue. Now, what do you think Mr. Hull meant by his statement that they might come back and offer to continue: the effect of their coming back and offering to continue negotiations? What effect on the situation do you think the reopening of negotiations would have had?

Mr. STIMSON. That is a matter of conclusion which I [4059] rather hate to draw, but you can tell from your—if you have before you the record of those negotiations, I think it perhaps wouldn't be improper for me to say that it would have amounted to a surrender on the part of Japan of the position that she had been taking up to that point.

48. General RUSSELL. We have studied some the records of those negotiations, and it appears—

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I don't want to substitute my opinion of it for what the messages will speak for themselves.

49. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Or the course of the negotiations will speak for themselves.

50. General RUSSELL. Well, to be perfectly frank about the line of questioning that I am doing at the moment, it appears from the record that the Japanese people did come back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, following November 27, and did continue to discuss possible adjustments of the situation in the Pacific; and the thinking that I have been doing personally is whether or not the return of the

Japanese, the continuation of the negotiations, and the publicity which was given to those continued negotiations had the effect of weakening the message of November 27th which went to the four commanders.

Mr. STIMSON. No message went out relating to those further coming-backs, if they occurred, that I know of.

Is there any message at all in the file there?

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Mr. STIMSON. I never heard of any.

51. General GRUNERT. It was mentioned in the press, though.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, we weren't running the war on the press.

[4060] 52. General RUSSELL. Well, let us delimit that question a little more: What effect on the thinking of the Chief of Staff—strike that.

What effect on the thinking of the Secretary of War did the Japanese reappearance and re-entering the negotiations have as to the imminence of war?

Mr. STIMSON. I can only answer that as to the Secretary of War.

53. General RUSSELL. I struck the "Chief of Staff" out and substituted "the Secretary of War."

Mr. STIMSON. So far as I was concerned it didn't affect me at all. To the best of my recollection, my position remained unchanged in any way by anything that I heard, from the position that I took on the 27th of November.

54. General RUSSELL. Do you recall discussing those further negotiations with Secretary Hull?

Mr. STIMSON. No. The only thing that occurred that came to me about those was on the very morning of December 7th itself, when we were in Mr. Hull's office and he was awaiting the return of the envoys who had asked for that appointment; and, as my record here shows, back—where is that? Oh, yes; here it is. It is a little in advance of my story.

55. General RUSSELL. I don't want to confuse the story.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

56. General RUSSELL. But I was attempting to question you on it.

Mr. STIMSON. On December 7, 1941, Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at ten-thirty, and we talked the whole matter over.

[4061] Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the blow will strike.

Now, that was our attitude so far as—it is borne out by the contemporaneous memorandum from the time that I have been talking about, in November 27th.

57. General RUSSELL. May I ask a few questions now about these statements that the Secretary has just made relative to your conversations with the Secretary of State on or about the 26th and 27th of November? But first, do you remember when General Marshall first saw this message of November 27th which went out to these four commanders?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, he will have to testify to you on that. He was there the following day after that, and I have no doubt, from annotations that I have seen of his on other papers that day, that he saw the message.

58. General FRANK. This message, Mr. Secretary, in the last part of it, calls for, "Report measures taken." Did you follow through on this message?

Mr. STIMSON. No.

59. General FRANK. You left that to——

Mr. STIMSON. That was a staff matter that I left to the staff. I did see the message that came back from MacArthur and the message that came back from General Short, as shown simply by my annotation.

60. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. It it wasn't for that annotation there, I wouldn't have any memory of it at all.

[4062] 61. General FRANK. You didn't take the same interest in the reply as you did in the preparation of the original message?

Mr. STIMSON. It wasn't my matter, any more than any other message was. It was my duty to get through the President's direction in regard to that first one in accurate form, and in General Marshall's absence I was the messenger, so to speak, from the President.

62. General GRUNERT. Did you see the replies from General DeWitt and General Andrews, Panama and West Coast?

Mr. STIMSON. No, I have no recollection of seeing them at all. I have no recollection of seeing any of them except that on the two that I mentioned there are my initials.

63. General GRUNERT. It did not occur to you, then, the vast difference between the measures taken by MacArthur and those taken by Short?

Mr. STIMSON. It did not. If—well, I don't want to get into "ifs" if I can avoid it; but I am perfectly certain of this: that there was no idea put into my mind that the direct order to make a reconnaissance which was contained in the letter of November 27 had been disobeyed or hadn't been carried out, if it was.

64. General GRUNERT. You had no means of knowing what he had to obey the order with?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, I have, and I am going to give something on that.

65. General RUSSELL. There has been evidence to the effect that the statement in the November 27th message that it is desired, in substance——

Mr. STIMSON. May I just make myself clear?

[4063] In other words, if I were to speculate at all, I would say this: that owing to the fact that there is no record made in any of my daily memoranda that I was making at home of things that were important—there was no record made of having seen either of these return messages, and the only thing that the message that came from Hawaii could have meant to me under those circumstances, as I believe them, would be that sabotage was put on in addition to what we told him directly to do.

66. General RUSSELL. What did you tell him directly to do, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. STIMSON. Make a reconnaissance.

67. General RUSSELL. Have you the minutes?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, right here:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

68. General RUSSELL. Reconnaissance that you might deem necessary. Do you regard that as a direct order to carry out reconnaissance?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I am not going to go into that. The message speaks for itself. That is what I regarded it.

[4064] 69. General RUSSELL. And you told General Grunert that you did have evidence as to the means the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had for making reconnaissance?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, I have, now. I think, since we are on that, I will go back to the letter, now. It is quite a story—I mean, in length—but it is pertinent to this. You have asked me about a letter that the Secretary of the Navy wrote in the preceding January.

70. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. STIMSON. January 24, 1941; and the answer that I made, on February 7, 1941. Now, at about that time my records show that I was taking up very vigorously—you asked me what follow-up measures I took, or were taken—the answer to that is that I was taking up a long series of steps that were connected with the use of radar in picking up attacks from the air. There is a memorandum of a record for instance dated February 15, 1941, which is just a week after my reply to Knox, of an interview that I had in my room with the Chief of the Signal Corps and my assistant for air, Mr. Lovett, in regard to various types of radar and radio equipment which we were trying to get manufactured. I remember, now, though the record does not go into it; I remember that interview very clearly.

General Chaney, who was then in command of the air defense of the United States, had brought that up and was very anxious to get this material, and the meeting was called to discuss it. He was present, as well as the then Chief of the Signal Corps, and the result was a very discouraging report from the Chief of the Signal Corps as to the length of time that it would take to get such equipment.

[4065] As I remember it, and as the memorandum indicates, he thought it would take from six to nine months. Well, I regarded that as an emergency, and I began taking the matter up with all the vigor that I could put into it, in an emergency situation, to see if there were other ways of getting equipment than to wait for the manufacture of our own, and whether we could not hurry up the manufacture of our own. It is a long story, but radar became one of the matters which I took under my own wing in order to expedite equipment. As it happened, I was in touch with scientists whom I knew very well. It is not necessary to go into detail—they were connected with the Government in this operation, in this work of developing radar, and I was in close touch with them.

Through them, I learned of the alleged fact, as they told me, that Great Britain had been saved in the so-called "Battle of Britain," by having an air warning system around its cliffs—a matter which we had never heard of before—operated by radar, which gave them warning as soon as the attacking planes of Germany, perhaps fifty miles away, rose in the air, and gave time for their own intercepting planes to take the air and meet them without being constantly in the air, to the great cost of wear and tear on manpower and oil. Well, that was a situation that was manifestly of great importance to anybody who was in the likelihood of being attacked by air in an insular position like Hawaii and like portions of our coast. It was one of the things which Mr. Knox in his letter of July 24 had specifically referred to—the danger of an attack by air or by torpedo planes. However, in that letter, there—

[4066] 71. General GRUNERT. Was that the July letter?

Mr. STIMSON. The January letter. What I was doing was beginning, then. When Mr. Knox enumerates the dangers, he says:

The dangers envisaged in the order of their importance and probability are to be considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.

And my effort was to try to bring into our service this new weapon which had been evolved by the scientists and had been brought into operation by the British, and which had not been publicized by them. I got acquainted with it, only through scientific friends. I will not go any further into it, except to give you certain cardinal facts. In April I got a new special assistant, Mr. Bundy, who came in to help me, then.

72. General FRANK. This is 1941?

Mr. STIMSON. This is 1941. And I turned over to him, among other duties, the specific duty of following this equipment of radar, and from that time he was my alter ego about it; and without going into too great length, it resulted in great developments in our Army, and in our air defense. I mention it only to show you how important we thought it was.

Well, we got some equipment, finally, the best we could get, and had it sent to Hawaii; and I want to put in evidence this report which I had about it, which came in on November 19, of a maneuver that they had had out there to test it—November 19, 1941, some more than two weeks before the Pearl [4067] Harbor attack. The enclosure is a memorandum to Mr. Bundy, my special assistant; subject, "Performance of SCR-270," which was one of the radar instruments to detect approaching airplanes.

1. There is attached a copy of a memorandum from the Department Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department, relative to the operation of radio set SCR-270, in the Hawaiian Islands, which is forwarded for your information.

EUGENE V. ELDER,
Lt. Colonel Signal Corps.

And this is a copy of the memorandum which came in; and that was dated November 14, still earlier; memorandum for Colonel Colton, Chief of the Matériel Branch, and signed by C. A. Powell, Lieutenant Colonel of the Signal Corps, Department Signal Officer, of the Hawaiian Department:

In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started at approximately 4:30 in the morning, and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier—

which was used in the maneuver.

We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier, in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately eighty miles, due to the fact that the planes would circle around awaiting assemblage of the remainder from the carrier. As soon as the planes were [4068] established, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This was very easily determined, and within six minutes the pursuit aircraft were notified, and they took off and intercepted incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor. It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction-finding sets and the personnel associated with the information centers. We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When the fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we expect to have as good an air warning

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system available for us as is now operating for the British in that tight little island, as their situation is approximately the same as ours is in Hawaii.

73. General GRUNERT. For your information, Mr. Secretary, we have that letter. We have also had the author as a witness.

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, if you had told me that!

74. General GRUNERT. No, that is all right. We would like to have it in your part of the testimony.

Mr. STIMSON. It came to me and was a reassurance to me of a long line of effort that I had been making for some four or five months before.

75. General GRUNERT. I think it is a good thing that you put it in evidence where you did, to connect the story.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, that connects that.

76. General GRUNERT. If I might go back to what I had in mind as to the means that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had, to add to his reconnaissance, I had in mind more the means in the line of aircraft to take up additional [4069] reconnaissance far out at sea with a view to protecting himself. Do you know what state the department was in, as far as the so-called "long-distance reconnaissance" was concerned?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I only know by hearsay, and of course it was in my talks with General Marshall and General Arnold almost every day, how we should make the best use of the very small number of planes that we had. But I had nothing to do with it except to get reports.

77. General GRUNERT. I understand that. We have considerable testimony all around, and I just wanted to see if there was anything that you might add.

Mr. STIMSON. I just wanted to get before you the things that I happened to take up specifically. The Secretary of War normally does not, unless he is a very mistaken gentleman, meddle with the ordinary military operations of his staff.

78. General GRUNERT. I am glad you got that in the record, because I wondered, when your letter was written and you sent a copy to the Commanding General, why you did that personally. It was just a passing thought in my mind why that was done personally.

Mr. STIMSON. Normally, I would not have known of the letter or have seen it. I wouldn't have seen it, at all. But the President had taken a momentous decision that day. That was to send what I called in my record a "final alert," one which would put our outposts on the qui vive; I think I used the French term, there; and the Navy, as you know, sent out a simultaneous message to the Navy, and they said, "Consider this a war warning." And then Marshall was away, and I entered into that, as I have tried to explain many times before, [4070] for those two reasons.

79. General GRUNERT. I would like to develop a few more points about that message that we call the "Chief of Staff's message" of November 27; but I do not want to take it out of your hands, General Russell.

80. General RUSSELL. Go ahead.

81. General GRUNERT. Do you want to ask any more questions?

82. General RUSSELL. No.

83. General GRUNERT. The point is this. The phrase is used—

Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

Was there any idea, in the framer's mind, that that curtailed the action that the Commanding General might take, or in any way weakened the directive to take action?

Mr. STIMSON. There was not, in my mind; but the message speaks for itself, and it must be however considered in the light of the circumstances surrounding that, and also the character of the reconnaissance which could have been made.

You must bear in mind the fact that the reconnaissance by radar—which is altogether now the most important way of getting reconnaissance of coming airplanes—was a thing that was done from either a single hidden outpost or a single mobile wagon that carried the thing around.

84. General GRUNERT. Then you had in mind more, a reconnaissance, as you call it, by radar, rather than a reconnaissance by [4071] air?

Mr. STIMSON. I had no limitation.

85. General GRUNERT. No limitation?

Mr. STIMSON. I had no limitation. I didn't know, myself, what the different methods of reconnaissance between the Army and the Navy would be, except I did know that we had given these radar sets for Hawaii's defense. I either had heard or I had assumed that of course the Navy would play a large part in the reconnaissance of Hawaii, because in the first place they were the ships that were being protected, and in the next place they had the mobility to make outer reconnaissance. I have heard a good deal about the difference between inner and outer reconnaissance since; I didn't know it at that time; it was not my job.

86. General GRUNERT. Have we exhausted this particular subject?

87. General RUSSELL. Who was the author of the part of the message of November 27 that I will now read:

Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Do you recall who inserted that language in that message?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I know I did not; but I knew what it meant, and I knew that it was there. I did not draft this. I was present while four gentlemen were discussing what ought to be sent, and when the drafts began to be made I took an active part in the first two opening sentences that I read you, in order to be sure that they corresponded to what I knew, and [4072] what they didn't know; but the rest of the message, to me, was merely the carrying out by the staff of a matter which they had been told to do, owing to the President's decision.

88. General RUSSELL. Did you, when this message went out, on November 27, envisage an attack out there by aircraft from Japanese carriers?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I envisaged it as one of the possibilities. Certainly it was in Mr. Knox's letter that came in the preceding January.

89. General RUSSELL. Then you were not surprised at the air attack on the 7th of December?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack that would be made; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew more about it, the attack that was framing up in the southwestern Pacific. And I knew also that there was a concentration in the mandated islands—I know now, because the fact is that General Arnold showed me a proposed message for a photographic reconnaissance; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either Hawaii or Panama.

90. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not this message about the task force assumed to be assembling in the mandated islands was transmitted, or whether that information was transmitted, to the outposts, especially Hawaii?

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, I am sure it was; but don't the papers show it? I really do not know.

91. General GRUNERT. Do you consider that that information or that such information was necessary to an outpost?

Mr. STIMSON. How?

[4073] 92. General GRUNERT. How much information should a commander have, outside of the direct information that bears on what he is charged with? In other words, how much of any exchanges of information that may have taken place here between the State and the War and the Navy Departments should be transmitted to an outpost?

Mr. STIMSON. General, I think my opinion is of very little weight on that. Don't you think it would be more important to ask General Marshall?

93. General GRUNERT. We hope to.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes. I mean, I am the civilian head of the War Department, and you are asking me questions on a highly important military matter.

94. General GRUNERT. I just encourage you to say, "I would rather not answer that," if you wish.

Mr. STIMSON. Frankly, I don't know what happened in all those details. I didn't meddle with what were military staff matters, barring, when I was conveying a message from the President, and barring when I was taking up a new weapon like radar, which the average soldier didn't know anything about, and which I did.

95. General GRUNERT. I see.

96. General FRANK. Mr. Secretary, you have given us the whole series of meetings from October 6 on up through or to November 27th, which uncovered a continuing development of a critical situation; and this message of November 27 is the high-light message, I assume, that was to indicate to the Commander in Hawaii this critical situation?

[4074] Mr. STIMSON. Yes. Of course, I knew even at that meeting that another message was going out from the Navy to their commander.

97. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. And I know now from looking at the message that the Navy was directed to give that message to the Army; but I am not

sure that I knew then, any more than that Admiral Stark was present at the meeting, and that he was going to warn the Navy.

98. General FRANK. You were interested in the first two sentences of this message?

Mr. STIMSON. That is what I was interested in; and I was interested in the fact that I have quoted from my talk with the President, that there should be given a warning which was a final warning of a real war danger.

99. General FRANK. Did it ever occur to you, when that message went out, that the part of the message following the first two sentences might have had some effect in minimizing its critical nature to the recipient of that message?

Mr. STIMSON. No; I don't remember now having that occur to me. Of course, it is awfully easy to speculate with the knowledge of "hind-sight," but you must remember this, that we in Washington faced a whole horizon of danger, a good many different outposts. They were different in their nature. Hawaii was different from the Philippines in facts bearing on the question that you asked me. At Hawaii they had a very large population of Japanese of doubtful loyalty, say, to put it mildly. There was nothing like that in the Philippines. I call it to your attention so that you may determine, might [4075] not that fact bear on the warnings as to the surrounding population and the secrecy which was required for the preparations for the defense?

You will notice—I think it is the fact—when I looked them over, last night, the message to MacArthur leaves out that portion.

100. General GRUNERT. I think similar messages were sent to each.

Mr. STIMSON. Now, just let me make sure that that does not. This is the MacArthur message.

[4076] Yes. Take the vital sentence:

Prior to hostile action—

I am quoting now the Hawaiian message:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

Now, those last words are left out of the MacArthur message, and that reads simply this way:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Now, MacArthur had no white population to worry about to any extent down there, and he had no Japanese to worry about in respect to the secrecy, to disguise the intent from. Here, the problem before General Short was more difficult because he was surrounded by people that might report this thing at once to Japan.

I want to make clear again: I did not have those ideas at the time, because I was not making myself responsible for the terms of the message other than what I have described, but I can well see that whoever did it was facing two different situations and changed his words accordingly, and that it may have been a very wise caution to protect the secrecy of the reconnaissance.

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101. General GRUNERT. Have you any idea what measures taken might be more liable to alarm the public?

Mr. STIMSON. I'd rather not go into that.

[4077] 102. General GRUNERT. Anything more?

103. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. I can sit here and speculate for a long time, but that is not my job.

104. General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary we have probably gotten ahead of the hounds here, but we have discussed the fact that General Short's reply to this message that we are discussing of the 27th of November was brought to your attention. We are interested to know who sent that message up to you.

Mr. STIMSON. I don't know.

105. General RUSSELL. You don't recall that?

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, no.

Let me see. Have you the original here (addressing an assistant)? The two. There are two messages that came right in together.

Yes, the two, the MacArthur message and the Short message, come in this log right together, and at the top of the MacArthur message are the words, "To Secretary of War, O4C," is that?

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Mr. STIMSON. Oh, that's already in. "To Secretary of War, G. C. M."

106. General RUSSELL. There is no such entry—

Mr. STIMSON. There is no such entry in the other.

107. General RUSSELL. In the other message.

Mr. STIMSON. But you can make such—I have no recollection.

108. General RUSSELL. Yes. Well, I think this is in the record, but we possibly should get it clear: Were you generally [4078] kept informed of the strategic and tactical disposition and operation of field forces?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, yes, in most general form, not in detail at all.

109. General RUSSELL. Then, it was not out of the ordinary for this message of Short's and the message of MacArthur to have been sent in to you by the Chief of Staff?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, he sends to me at quite frequent intervals messages which are deemed by him to be important in keeping me up and abreast of the times.

110. General RUSSELL. I want to go back to some statements that you made already. They may be developed a little later in your narrative, though I am not sure.

I was impressed that in your early testimony you stated that when you talked to Secretary Hull on the 27th of November he told you that he was not interested any further in negotiation with the Japanese and had broken off negotiations. Did you know then, Mr. Secretary, that on the 26th of November Secretary Hull had sent a rather lengthy memorandum to the two Japanese Ambassadors here in which he did discuss terms by which an agreement might be reached?

Mr. STIMSON. I don't think I have—wait a minute. Let me see. Where is my narrative?

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Mr. STIMSON. My memorandum in the case shows that after Mr. Hull had told me that he had broken the whole matter off I learned

that he had broken it off by a restatement of our constant and regular position, which the Japanese had constantly refused to accept. That is the substance of it.

[4079] Is that satisfactory? Would that make it clear? or I can come nearer to it. Rather, I feel it is so important that you should get the exact facts here that I am ready to take a moderate amount of chances of —

111. General RUSSELL. Well, off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

112. General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, did you learn on the day of the 27th of November, 1941, the probable date when the Secretary of State had delivered this statement of policy to the Japanese Ambassador?

Mr. STIMSON. I have no present recollection except my notes, but I have the very strong impression from them that it had taken place on the day before, namely November 26th.

113. General RUSSELL. I think that clears it up, unless there are some other suggestions.

114. General GRUNERT. If you have cleared up that, suppose we suggest to the Secretary he go ahead with his statement.

Mr. STIMSON. Shall I go ahead now?

115. General GRUNERT. And we will try not to butt in until you have finished, this time.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I think—this is off the record. I think that the last part of my statement was connected with the November 27th.

116. General GRUNERT. That is right.

Mr. STIMSON. I hadn't gotten into November 28th, had I?

117. General FRANK. No.

Mr. STIMSON. Then on November 28th, 1941, according to my records, this is shown: that pursuant to my instructions G-2 had sent me a summary of the information in regard to the [4080] movements of the Japanese in the Far East, and it amounted to such a formidable statement of dangerous possibilities that I decided to take it to the President before he got up. That's in the morning. I told him there was an important collection and analysis of facts that I thought he ought to read before his appointment with us for twelve o'clock that morning, when the so-called war cabinet was to meet him, namely: Mr. Hull, Mr. Knox, myself, with Admiral Stark and General Marshall.

I afterwards went to the meeting of the so-called war cabinet, and then the President had read the paper that I had left with him. The main point of the paper was a study of what the expeditionary force which we then knew had left Shanghai and was headed south, was going to do. G-2 appointed out that it might develop into an attack on the Philippines or a landing of further trips in Indo-China or an attack on Thailand or an attack on the Dutch Netherlands or on Singapore. It was the consensus that the fact there was an expeditionary force on the sea of about 25,000 Japanese troops aimed for a landing somewhere—completely changed the situation when we last discussed whether or not we could address an ultimatum to Japan about moving the troops which she already had on land in Indo-China.

Those were discussions which you probably have testimony of in reference to the move of the troops that she already had in Indo-China

and whether there would be a threat to the neighboring countries there.

118. General RUSSELL. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. It was the opinion of everyone that if this [4081] expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indo-China and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three powers: Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines.

That's all the record that day.

On December 2nd, the next record, 1941, I left for the White House conference at twelve o'clock, and there were present there just Knox, Sumner Welles, and myself, as Hull is laid up with a cold. The President went step by step over the situation.

Then the last entry that I made up is December 7th, which I think I have already read you, about our meeting. If I haven't, I will restate it to you:

On December 7, 1941, Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at ten-thirty, and we talked the whole matter over. Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three stayed together in conference until lunchtime, going over the plans for what should be said and done.

Just one sentence more, and then I want to go back and say something off the record. This is on the record:

All important information from three meetings and conversations was communicated to the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff, as I have said, was present at some of these meetings. In every other case I passed the information on to him verbally.

Now, off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

119. General GRUNERT. Continue on the record.

120. General RUSSELL. This is one of the questions I have. Does the Secretary have a further statement?

[4082] Mr. STIMSON. (5) I was not present at the Atlantic meeting. That is the so-called Atlantic Charter meeting. I never heard of any discussions there on a Japanese air attack.

The next question is number 6: How well informed was the War Department as to the American-Japanese relations during 1941 and especially during the period November 25 to December 7, 1941? Was the Chief of Staff kept informed of such relations? What was the form of liaison maintained?

I think I covered all that.

The seventh is: Is the Secretary familiar with the Secretary of State's statement of November 25, 1941, regarding such relations? If so, was the information therein made known to the Chief of Staff?

Well, I think I have covered that in the entries from my own records.

The eighth is about Mr. Knox's letter of January 24th and my reply of February 7th. I think I have answered that.

121. General GRUNERT. That is right.

Mr. STIMSON. 9th: Were there frequent exchanges of information pertaining to American-Japanese relations and probable Japanese actions between you and the Secretary of the Navy? If so, did you keep the Chief of Staff informed of the gist thereof?

And I have already passed that. My answer in substance was that, as I have already stated, Secretary Knox and I met regularly, and I passed on to the Chief of Staff all important items of information that came to me.

10th: Were you kept informed of the War Department message [4083] concerning the tense Japanese situation, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in late November and early December, 1941, and of the Navy messages which the Navy ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to transmit to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department?

There, I think I have told you on that, the one that I had anything to do with is the one that we have discussed at length. I don't remember that I had anything to do with any other, though, as I say, they might well have been passed over my desk by General Marshall making his notation on it that to show it to me, just to keep me posted. I usually did not see Navy messages. I never saw them but on rare occasions—I don't remember ever seeing them.

Then the next one is 11: Particularly were you informed of the Chief of Staff's message of November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, of the G-2, War Department, message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, reference sabotage, and of the so-called Arnold message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reference measures to particularly guard against airplane sabotage? If so, did you consider them as conflicting or tending to show that the War Department had only protection from sabotage in mind?

Well, I think what I have said covers that. I have no recollection of having seen any message, outgoing message, except the one that I have described. That was November 27th. The one of G-2 and of General Arnold and of the Adjutant General I have seen since the controversy came up, but I don't think I saw them at the time at all, and I would rather not, therefore, state any inferences from them.

[4084] The next one, e (12), was one we have discussed rather fully: Did you see the report from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, called for by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27? If so, did you consider the reported measures taken as adequate under the circumstances? Did it occur to you that because of this report, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, may have deemed the measures taken as adequate, and if not considered so by the War Department, it (War Department) would have taken exception to the report?

Well, I have told you the only message that I must have seen is the Short one as to sabotage coming back from—at least, which has the word "sabotage" in it, coming back on November 27th from General Short. I have no independent recollection of seeing that at all, and there is no record in any of my voluminous recorded diaries or messages, or records which I have, about it. So that all I can say is, it certainly didn't convey to me any impression that what we thought of as the war warning was not being carried out as a war warning. I have no recollection of what my opinion was. My only reaction is a negative one, that if it made the impression that you suggest here, I would have remembered. I would have remembered it and I would have taken action.

13: Do you know of any restrictions placed upon the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which limited or prevented him from taking such action in preparation for defense as he deemed necessary under his mission and responsibilities?

Well, so far as messages are concerned, they speak for [4085] themselves, and I have nothing further to say; but I think you should remember here that one cardinal policy of the staff in this war has been decentralization. In other words, we pick the best men we can for theater commanders and assign their mission. The manner of accomplishing the mission is their responsibility, and we back them up. We consider it unsound to attempt to meddle with or make meticulous supervision of theater commanders in the performance of their mission, which they in the field are able better to judge from first-hand contact.

Now, that policy has been hammered into me over and over and over again. Experience has gone on all over the global theaters of the war, and it has always been uppermost in my mind and I have heard it applied by General Marshall so often that I know what is going to come when anybody gets worried or nervous about what is going on in New Guinea or in France or in somewhere else: "Remember the theater commander. He has the responsibility. Don't joggle his elbow." And that was the policy of the staff at the time of these occurrences. Of course, it has been developed on a very much larger scale ever since, under conditions where the temptation to interfere was much greater, but that has been the policy.

14: From the extent of your knowledge of information given to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to the Japanese situation from late in November to December 7, 1941, do you consider that he was sufficiently informed and warned of the probability of an air attack on Hawaii?

Now, I have stated all the facts that I know, and that question is one of the kind of questions, General Grunert, that [4086] I meant at the beginning that I don't think I ought to express an opinion on. That is for you gentlemen to reach.

122. General GRUNERT. So be it.

Mr. STIMSON. No. 15: In the light of what happened at Pearl Harbor, was the policy of "leaning over backwards to keep from offending the Japanese" justified? If not, then from a military viewpoint should not the Army under the circumstances advocate a more vigorous policy?

(2) Would not our national defense be better served by less attention to international amity and more to protection against national disaster?

(3) Is this not more so especially as to a nation like Japan who always strikes before declaring war or prepares to strike simultaneously with such a declaration?

Well, that is the kind of question that I think I had better not go into. I have views on them all, as every citizen has, but they are not views which relate to this case, and I don't want to air them here. I mean I don't think it is proper for me to go into that here.

16: Do you know why an armed photographic mission was ordered to photograph the island of Truk on December 5, 1941, when at the same time instructions were in force in the Hawaiian Department to avoid the commission of an overt act against Japan and to attempt to avoid alarming the civil population or to disclose intent in taking preparatory defense measures?

Well, I had seen the telegram, so I must have known of it, and I evidently thought that it was a mission that ought to be [4087] carried out, from that. That's all I know. I wouldn't have otherwise any recollection of it, though I must have known from that message that there was a concentration in the Mandated Islands, and it must have been known to the staff. Other than that, I would rather not comment on it.

123. General GRUNERT. Have you anything else?

124. General FRANK. No.

125. General GRUNERT. Have the advisers any suggestions, questions?

126. Major CLAUSEN. Unless there is something on this A. W. S. construction work that General Frank may have in mind.

127. General GRUNERT. I think we have covered it.

128. General FRANK. I think we have covered everything we want on that.

Mr. STIMSON. I wouldn't have gone so at length if I had known it was before you, but I thought that was new.

129. General GRUNERT. Some of the angles that you may have given us may have been new, but the subjects have practically all been covered.

Mr. STIMSON. Yes.

130. General GRUNERT. Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much for this lengthy hearing that you have granted to the Board, and the Board appreciates it.

Mr. STIMSON. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen. I only want to help you. That is all.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[4088] 131. General GRUNERT. The following memorandum, with a list of questions, was sent to the Secretary of War:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,

Munitions Building, 3 August 1944.

Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff.

Subject: Secretary of War and Chief of Staff as Witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. The Board would like to commence the hearing of witnesses Monday morning, 7 August 1944, with the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff with the view to developing the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack.

2. Can it be arranged to have these two witnesses appear individually before the Board on that morning? If so, will you please inform me as to the time and place. If not that morning, then when and where. For their convenience it is suggested that the Board meet in your conference room.

3. To acquaint them with the procedure and to inform them as to the subjects on which the Board desires to question them, I inclose herewith (Exhibits A and B), a statement for each of them.

For the Board:

GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
President.

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Incl. 1. Exhibit A
[4089]

EXHIBIT A

STATEMENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Procedure:

a. The witness presents himself before the Board, is sworn by the Recorder, and is asked to state his name, address, and occupation.

b. The Recorder then explains to the witness his rights under the 24th Article of War and asks him whether he fully understands them.

c. The President of the Board will then inform the Secretary as follows:

"Mr. Secretary, the order convening this Board states in part: 'Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby convened to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.'

"Since the existence of the Board is based on the Public Law referred to, the Board made a study of Congressional Hearings thereon and as a result deemed it part of its duties to go into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. In consequence the Board drew up a list of subjects on which it desires to question the Secretary.

"The large field to be covered by the Board in the limited time available made it advisable to assign objectives or phases of inquiry to individual members, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives [4090] or phases. General Russell was assigned to this particular phase so he will lead in propounding the questions and other members will assist in developing them."

2. List of subjects follows:

a. War Councils.

(1) Composition.

(2) War Department representation.

(3) Procedure in making known to the Army of so much of the information gleaned and conclusions arrived at as was considered necessary to the Army to execute its missions.

(4) What restrictions as to (3) if any, and who was the judge?

(5) As to Council meetings late in November and early in December 1941. Were such held? If so, was the probability of war with Japan, the probability of air attacks on Hawaii from carriers borne aviation, and the location of Japanese task forces, discussed? If so, and if conclusions were reached, was this information transmitted to the Chief of Staff?

b. Were you present at the Atlantic meeting of the President with Prime Minister Churchill? If so, are you at liberty to tell the Board whether during ensuing discussion matters came up with related to the probability of a Japanese attack on Hawaii? If so, was that information transmitted to the Chief of Staff? If not present, were you informed of such discussions and did you transmit the gist thereof to the Chief of Staff?

c. Relations with the State Department.

[4091] (1) Generally, how well informed was the War Department as to American-Japanese relations during 1941 and especially during the period November 25 to December 7, 1941? Was the Chief of Staff kept informed of such relations? What was the form of liaison maintained?

(2) Is the Secretary familiar with the Secretary of State's statement of November 25, 1941, regarding such relations? If so, was the information therein made known to the Chief of Staff?

d. (1) Does the Secretary recall the January 24, 1941, letter from the Secretary of the Navy wherein the Secretary of the Navy proposed joint preparedness measures in Hawaii, particularly to guard against surprise air raids and your reply of February 7, 1941, in which you directed the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to cooperate to make the suggested measures effective? If so, do you know what, if any, follow-up measures were taken?

(2) Were there frequent exchanges of information pertaining to American-

Japanese relations and probable Japanese actions between you and the Secretary of the Navy? If so, did you keep the Chief of Staff informed of the gist thereof?

e. (1) Were you kept informed of the War Department messages, concerning the tense Japanese situation, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in late November and early December, 1941, and of the Navy messages which the Navy ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to transmit to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department?

(2) Particularly, were you informed of the Chief of Staff's message of November 27, 1941, to the Commanding [4092] General, Hawaiian Department, of the G-2, War Department message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, reference sabotage, and of the so-called Arnold message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reference measures to particularly guard against airplane sabotage. If so, did you consider them as conflicting or tending to show that the War Department had only protection from sabotage in mind?

(3) Did you see the report from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, called for by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27? If so, did you consider the reported measures taken as adequate under the circumstances? Did it occur to you that because of this report, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, may have deemed the measures taken as adequate, and if not considered so by the War Department, it (War Department) would have taken exception to the report?

f. Do you know of any restrictions placed upon the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which limited or prevented him from taking such action in preparation for defense as he deemed necessary under his mission and responsibilities?

g. From the extent of your knowledge of information given to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to the Japanese situation from late in November to December 7, 1941, do you consider that he was sufficiently informed and warned of the probability of an air attack on Hawaii?

[4093] h. Re U. S. Policy.

Does the Secretary desire to answer any of the following questions?

(1) In the light of what happened at Pearl Harbor, was the policy of "leaning over backwards to keep from offending the Japanese" justified? If not, then from a military viewpoint, should not the Army under the circumstances advocate a more vigorous policy?

(2) Would not our National Defense be better served by less attention to international amity and more to protection against National disaster?

(3) Is this not more so especially as to a nation like Japan who always strikes before declaring war or prepares to strike simultaneously with such a declaration?

i. Do you know why an armed photograph mission was ordered to photograph the island of Truk on December 5, 1941, when at the same time instructions were in force in the Hawaiian Department to avoid the commission of an overt act against Japan and to attempt to avoid alarming the civil population or to disclose intent in taking preparatory defense measures?

General GRUNERT. As a part of the record of the transactions of this Board, prior to testifying and on the dates indicated below, the secretary of War was furnished the following from the records of the Board, during its absence from Washington:

Transcript of testimony of Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall (Vol. 1) (furnished 21 September 1944);

Transcript of testimony of Major General Walter C. Short, Retired (Vols. 4 and 5) (furnished 22 September 1944); and

[4094] Transcript of testimony of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (Vol. 16) (furnished 22 September 1944).

These records were furnished to the Secretary of War, upon his application, by Colonel William J. Hughes, Jr., JAGD, who had charge of the records in the absence of the Board.

(Thereupon, the Board, at 1 p. m., having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, proceeded to the transaction of other business.)

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[4094-A]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 10, 1944.

Lt. General GEORGE GRUNERT,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Munitions Buildings, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL GRUNERT: I have looked over a copy of my testimony before your Board and have indicated certain corrections on the sheets enclosed. Many of these are corrections merely in the English and, of course, I realize that the court reporter may have taken down accurately what I said. It is always difficult to speak precisely with due regard for clear English in oral testimony. All the corrections represent the actual and true facts according to my present recollection. The asterisks are at places where I am sure the reporter incorrectly took down what I actually said at the time.

I think I should also state that, although before I testified I had read General Marshall's testimony at his first appearance before your Board, I had not had time to read the testimony of either Admiral Kimmel or General Short.

For your record, I am taking oath to the truth of the facts I am stating in this letter.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of October, 1944.

EDWARD L. DAVIS, Notary Public.

My Commission Expires July 14, 1946.

[4094-B] Page 4039, 12th line: Omit the words "of yours."

Page 4042, 13th line: Insert the word "term" before the word "organization."

Page 4049, 3rd line: "One" should be "ones" and the words "that I" should be omitted. 4th line: "Were" should be inserted before "those." 14th line: "Matters" should be "matter."

Page 4050, 5th line: "Real" should be "statutory."

Page 4052, 6th line: "The night" should be omitted.

Page 4053, 14th & 15th lines: "This is . . . is the day" should be omitted. 23d line: "The" should be "my."

*Page 4056, 1st line: The name "Grew" should be "Gerow." 7th line: "Hold of" should be omitted.

At the bottom line of this page, I am clear that I said that it was not normally my business to prepare messages. This is a fact and I am sure I so stated.

Page 4057, 3rd line: Omit "Now, . . . oh."

*Page 4061, 6th line: I am sure the date to which I referred was November 27th. 14th line: Omit "The . . . that."

Page 4065, 4th line: "Emergent" should be "emergency." 10th line: "That" should be "whom."

Page 4966, 9th line: "Into our service" should be inserted before "this." 11th line: "Was" should be "had not been." 12th line: There should be a period after "them." "Acquainted with" should be inserted before "it." "Friends" should be inserted after "scientific" and followed by a period. "Works . . . and" on the 12th & 13th lines should be omitted.

Page 4067, 10th line: Initial "B" should be "V." 11th line: "Of the" should be omitted.

[4094-C] *Page 4069: There is apparent confusion in Question 78 and my answer, but I think the matter is adequately explained and needs no further change.

*Page 4072, Question 89: The fact is that General Arnold showed me a proposed message for a photographic reconnaissance. 4th & 5th lines from bottom: "Oh . . . show it?" should be omitted.

Page 4073, 13th & 14th lines: A period should follow "matter," and the remainder of the sentence should be omitted. 20th line: "New" should be inserted before "weapon."

Page 4078, 10th line: "Conveying" should be omitted.

*Page 4079, Answer to Question 112: I cannot be sure what my impression was on November 27th and, therefore, in line 2 of the Answer the word "had" should be "have."

Page 4080, 17th line: The words "present move" should be omitted and the words "fact that" substituted therefor. 24th line: "Of which we . . . this is" should be omitted.

*Page 4081, the last line of the Answer to Question 118: The correct statement is as follows: "In every other case I passed the information on to him verbally."

Page 4082, 2nd line: "The" should be "a." 26th line: A comma should follow "that" which should be immediately followed by the word "as." A comma should follow "stated."

(The Board directed that all changes in the record requested by the Secretary of War be accomplished with the exception of requested change in answer to question 90, page 4072. The Board did not believe that it was justified in making that change.)

[4095]

AFTERNOON SESSION

MUNITIONS BUILDING.

(The Board reconvened at 2:30 p. m., and resumed the hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS J. CLATERBOS, COLONEL, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, THE ENGINEERS SCHOOL, FORT BELVOIR, VA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel CLATERBOS. Louis J. Claterbos; Colonel, Corps of Engineers, the Engineers School, Fort Belvoir, Va.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, General Frank assisted by Major Clausen will conduct this particular part of our investigation.

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes, sir.

3. General FRANK. Colonel Claterbos, will you state the duty on which you were, in Los Angeles, in the late thirties and early forties.

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes. From August 1935 until July 1937, I was assistant to the district engineer in Los Angeles.

4. General FRANK. Then where did you go?

Colonel CLATERBOS. From there, I went to Leavenworth School.

5. General FRANK. And when you were in Los Angeles, who was the district engineer?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Colonel Theodore Wyman, Junior.

6. General FRANK. For the entire two years that you were [4096] there?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. You knew him pretty well?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes, sir. Yes, I have known him since 1920.

8. General FRANK. Did you ever serve with him before?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes, sir. I didn't work for him, but I served with him when I was at Fort Belvoir, from 1922 to 1925. He was then on duty on the same post that I was. He was executive of the Engineer Board, and I was on duty with a topographic battalion.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Colonel Claterbos, you and I have discussed the general nature of the investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of certain information that you possess concerning Colonel Wyman, before the Board met today, is that correct?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes.

10. Major CLAUSEN. This FBI man was Don C. Bird. The investigation was made March 7, 1944. Is that correct?

Colonel CLATERBOS. That is correct.

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11. Major CLAUSEN. Due to the eye condition which you now have, it is your doctor's advice that you do not read, isn't that correct?

Colonel CLATERBOS. That is right.

12. Major CLAUSEN. All right; for that reason, sir, I am going to read for you a portion of the report having relation [4097] to the matters that we are concerned with, and ask you whether the information which you gave to Mr. Bird was correct. This commences on page 3.

He—

that is, yourself, Colonel Claterbos.

advised that after leaving Los Angeles in 1937 his contacts with subject—

that subject being Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

and Wyman—

Wyman being Colonel Theodore Wyman, Junior.

—had been very few. He added that on December 4, 1941, he landed in Honolulu by clipper, en route to the Far East from the United States, and was in that city during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Further, that upon arrival in Honolulu he found both subject Rohl and Wyman there. He recounted an incident told to him by Wyman to the effect that early in 1941 when the Army decided upon elaborate installments in Hawaii, Wyman had called upon Rohl to accept a contract for the work, Rohl flying to Hawaii to make a preliminary survey prior to entering into negotiations on the contract.

Colonel CLATERBOS. I would like to interrupt, if I could.

13. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Colonel CLATERBOS. That is, to point out what I pointed out to you a few minutes ago, that that was a joint affair, it was a joint venture, and that he mentioned not only Rohl but he mentioned Grafe, the representative of the W. E. Callahan Company, and then there was a third.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Shirley-Gunther?

[4098] Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes, Shirley-Gunther. That should be changed, I think, to state that I mentioned to the FBI investigator that Wyman's explanation was that he had this big job, and he didn't have in the Hawaiian Islands at that time a contracting company capable of taking over that kind of a job, and that he had called upon people upon the Pacific coast that he knew were capable of handling a big job.

15. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, what you are saying, in effect, in brief, is that the contract was not solely with Rohl but was with this joint venture, is that right?

Colonel CLATERBOS. That is right.

16. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Colonel CLATERBOS. And if the joint venture had been more or less—well, I think it is all right.

17. Major CLAUSEN. All right. I will continue reading:

Further, that after returning to the United States and after long negotiations on the contract, the Army and Rohl had come to agreement and the contract was ready to sign, at which time Wyman noticed a clause in the contract prohibiting persons other than citizens from having connection with the undertaking, whereupon he, Wyman, casually remarked to Rohl, "You're a citizen, aren't you, Bill?" and Rohl had replied that he was not, necessitating the immediate naturalization of Rohl. Claterbos stated that at the time of the above conversation with Wyman, Wyman had indicated that Rohl had immediately taken steps to become

a naturalized citizen and thereafter signed the contract, the contract having been signed several months [4099] prior to Claterbos' arrival in Honolulu, Rohl by December 4, 1941, being actively engaged in work under the contract.

In connection with Rohl's having knowledge of the contracts for installations in Hawaii prior to September 15, 1941, Claterbos stated that he had no personal knowledge of the matter, but that in view of what Wyman told him in Honolulu, as mentioned above, he supposed that negotiations upon the contracts had been entered into much prior to September 1941. He stated that the extent of Rohl's knowledge about the contracts would depend upon the nature of the contract and upon the information made available to him during the negotiations on the contracts. He explained that in the usual case a "cost plus fixed fee" contract was let in such cases, and that in such a contract the Army made all the necessary calculations as to the number of men needed, the type of equipment necessary, the type of work to be done, etc., and then calculated the estimated expenses involved. Thereafter the Army would seek a contractor who had the equipment, experience and organization to handle the job whereupon the contractor was contacted and given an outline of the proposed work, the estimated cost and profit, etc., so that he could enter an intelligent bid on the contract. Colonel Claterbos stated that under the usual procedure the contractor would not have a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the work called for until the contract was actually signed and work begun thereon, but that it might be possible, because of the nature of the contract or because of the nature of the [4100] negotiations thereon, for the contractor to have detailed information prior to the actual signing of the contract, and that in such cases an examination of the contract and of the minutes of the meetings with reference to the negotiations thereon should reveal just what information had been available to the contractor. Colonel Claterbos stated that the contracts pertinent to this case, as well as the above mentioned minutes, should be available at the Office of the Chief Engineer, U. S. Engineer, Temporary building "F", 23rd street, Washington, D. C. Upon being questioned as to the present whereabouts of Wyman's former associates, George Withers and Colonel Norman A. Mathias, were now at the above-mentioned Temporary building "F", and that Colonel Withers would be able to obtain the contracts and minutes for examination by an agent of the Bureau.

Colonel Claterbos stated that he had no information concerning the possible transportation of 18 or more cases of whiskey from Los Angeles to Honolulu by Rohl in February 1942. He added, however, that Rohl might well have done so since he was a heavy drinker and entertained a great deal.

With the exception of the explanation that you made concerning with whom this contract was made, are the extracts that I have read correct, sir, and do they recite the true facts?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes, that's about—I mean I might explain that the reason I went into that detail of explaining the operation of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is that the investigator didn't seem to know much about it, and I had to more or less clear it up. I also explained to him, as I [4101] recall, that I was under the impression, just recalling from memory, that the final negotiations on that contract and the signing of it, were held in San Francisco, not in Honolulu, because the contract was undoubtedly entered into by the division engineer in the South Pacific Division, as the contracting officer. I explained that to him also.

18. Major CLAUSEN. You had reference to this first paragraph that I read, as to what Wyman told you about the signing of that contract?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And having discovered that Rohl was an alien?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes. As I recall, that took place in San Francisco, in the division engineer's office, because the whole thing was just a conversation I had with Wyman.

20. Major CLAUSEN. And that was the source of your information on this?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes.

21. Major CLAUSEN. When did you have this conversation with Colonel Wyman?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Well, I would say that it was about the 6th—or, I mean the 5th of December, 1941. I arrived there shortly after midnight, the 3rd–4th, and was there the 4th, 5th, and so on, and during one of those days I went with Colonel Wyman to visit several of the jobs that he was working on, and it was during lunch, while we were visiting the jobs, that we had this conversation.

22. Major CLAUSEN. By the way, you are a friend of Colonel Wyman, is that correct?

[4102] Colonel CLATERBOS. Right.

23. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have at this time.

24. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

Do you think of anything else that might bear on this case, that you want to tell the Board?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Well, of course, I want to, I would like to reiterate again what I said in there. I have been associated on the two big jobs with Wyman, plus this one out in Honolulu, and of course, in the past few months I have heard a lot and have seen and read a great deal of the inferences that have been drawn by newspapermen and radio commentators, but I honestly, in dealing with contractors, I know that Wyman was tough and hard, and has never in the period of time that I was with him, on a big job in Kansas City and out in Los Angeles, I certainly would never consider him as being dishonest or anything showing or tending to show favoritism to one contractor or another, regardless of his personal dealings with the man.

25. Major CLAUSEN. You do believe though, do you not, sir, that his associations with Mr. Rohl were somewhat out of the ordinary and normal?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Oh, absolutely! Yes, sir! Yes, I don't think there is any question about that. He was guilty of what I would call indiscretions.

26. Major CLAUSEN. What kind of indiscretions, Colonel?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Well, I would say, going on parties with him, perhaps to the exclusion of other people, and things of that sort.

27. General RUSSELL. Accepting his, Rohl's, hospitality?

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes; but as I pointed out in this testimony, in all the time that I was with Wyman, he was a [4103] a stickler for repaying obligations of contractors. He made that clear to his subordinates, he made it clear; and in all of his actions that I can recall, he never accepted any sort of a party without eventually paying it back.

28. General RUSSELL. In kind?

Colonel CLATERBOS. In kind, or in—well, what I mean is, if we went to a dinner or—yes, I would say, in kind.

29. General RUSSELL. All right.

30. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

31. General GRUNERT. Are there any further questions?

Well, thank you very much for coming in.

Colonel CLATERBOS. Yes, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF JAMES W. BUTTERFIELD, DISTRICT DIRECTOR,
BALTIMORE DISTRICT, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Articles of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Butterfield, will you state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. James W. Butterfield; room 202, Tower building, Baltimore, Maryland.

2. Colonel WEST. And you are connected with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, at present, I believe?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes. I am district director, Baltimore District, Immigration and Naturalization Service.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Butterfield, General Frank assisted by Major Clausen will conduct this particular part of our investigation.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Butterfield, your assignment previously [4104] was in Los Angeles, California?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir; I was located there from 1929 to 1942.

5. Major CLAUSEN. While with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And during that period at Los Angeles, your position officially was what?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Examiner in charge, naturalization division.

7. Major CLAUSEN. As such did you become acquainted with the application and petition of Hans Wilhelm Rohl for naturalization?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir; I did.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And in the course of your acquaintance with that applicant did you become familiar with the file thereon?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. And have I indicated to you certain papers in this file that I hold in my hand, which file was given me by the present district director at Los Angeles, Mr. Del Guercio? Do you recall this as being the file of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes; that would be the Los Angeles district file.

10. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the application of Mr. Rohl, did you conduct some of the investigation or examinations of the applicant?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes; I conducted an examination of Mr. Rohl and the witnesses who appeared for him in connection with [4105] the filing of his petition.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall that this case of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, after the filing of the application, became a special case to be rushed through?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes; I do.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And do you recall the basic reason assigned for that?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I do—that his services of himself and the company of which he was an officer were required or desired by Army authorities.

13. Major CLAUSEN. And in connection with that did you see a letter from Colonel Theodore Wyman, Junior, a copy of which is here in the field, dated January 11, 1941, sir?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes; I do recall such a letter, which was submitted in connection with his case, and was made a part of the file.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall in connection with the letter and this special treatment of the case that this letter was presented by an attorney by the name of Martin?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I couldn't recall whether it was presented by the attorney, Martin, or by Rohl, himself.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Now, if the Board pleases, some of the documents in this file are going to be referred to by this witness and other witnesses, and in any event, I should like to introduce them in evidence. There are too many; and, for the purpose of informing the Board and also, the interrogation of this witness, I would like to read certain of these in evidence at this time.

I will start with a memorandum which is dated February 5, [4106] 1941. I will ask the witness, first, whether that is in your handwriting? Is that your handwriting, Mr. Butterfield?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir.

16. Major CLAUSEN. All right, sir. It is a note in pencil. This says:

(Memorandum by Butterfield, Feb. 5, 1941, re Rohl:)

Re—Hans W. Rohl.

Attorney says we will get letter from Shoemaker to make this case a special.

17. General FRANK. Who says this?

18. Major CLAUSEN. "Attorney."

19. General FRANK. What attorney?

20. Major CLAUSEN. Well, that's it!

What attorney was it?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I would say that was Attorney Martin, probably. Note was made at the time, that either Martin or Rohl, or both of them together, brought in his application.

21. Major CLAUSEN. And after you made this note, did you get a letter from Shoemaker to that effect?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir; I did.

22. Major CLAUSEN. And is this the letter, the original of which is here, dated February 4, 1941?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir.

23. Major CLAUSEN. I will read this into the record. It is from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, dated February 4, 1941, to the District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California:

[4107] (Letter from U. S. Department of Justice to District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, Calif., dated February 4, 1941:)

It is understood that one Hans (or John) William Rohl made application for a certificate of arrival in your office on the 3d instant.

The services of this alien will be used in connection with the defense program. Please make his case special. It is meant by this that the application for certificate of arrival should be made special, the filing of a petition also, and

the hearing, if it can be disposed of immediately after the thirty days after its filing.

Report in connection with this case when it has finally been disposed of will be appreciated.

LEMUEL, B. SCHOFIELD,
Special Assistant to the Attorney General,
By /S/ T. B. SHOEMAKER,
Deputy Commissioner,
Legal Branch.

I am going to read in the record at this time, as the next document here in the file, a letter from the War Department, United States Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H., dated January 22, 1941:

(Letter from Wyman, district engineer, Jan. 22, 1941:)

Refer to File No. Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. ROHL,

Rohl-Connolly Company,

4351 Alhambra Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

[4108] DEAR SIR: Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with the Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands.

As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will be allowed transportation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel allowance not to exceed \$6.00 per day while en route in accordance with existing laws and regulations.

You will make application to either the District Engineer at Los Angeles or the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, for transportation.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

In the lower left-hand corner, it says:

January 27, 1941 (photostat made).

Carbon copy made by MA-2-19-41.

By the way, do you know who "M. A." is, in the lower left-hand corner?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. I couldn't say at this time. If it was from the Los Angeles office, it is some stenographer, and the only one I can think of now is Marie Altman; but that would be a guess.

24. Major CLAUSEN. One of the next papers in the file is an [4109] excerpt from Public No. 671, 76th Congress, being the act approved June 28, 1940, which has already been read in evidence—the act forbidding the employment of aliens, and to expedite the national defense, and for other purposes in connection with defense contracts. If the Board desires it read, I could read it. I am going to read one of the next letters here, in chronological order, dated February 20, 1941.

25. General GRUNERT. The Board desires that you read this law in this testimony now, so we can have a connected story.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Very well, sir. The law referred to is entitled:

NATIONAL DEFENSE

CHAPTER 440—3D SESSION

(PUBLIC—No. 671—76TH CONGRESS)

(H. R. 9822)

This is entitled: "An Act to expedite national defense, and for other purposes."

2098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SEC. 11. (a) No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who willfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

[4110] (b) Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(c) For the purpose of this section, the term "person" shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise.

Approved, June 28, 1940.

The next document I desire to read in evidence is a copy of a letter dated February 20, 1940, from the District Director, Los Angeles District, to the District Director, Honolulu, T. H., by air mail:

(Letter, District Director, Los Angeles, to District Director, Honolulu, dated February 20, 1941:)

One Hans (or John) William Rohl, a native and citizen of Germany, is an applicant for United States citizenship in this District, and through his attorney has presented a photostatic copy of a letter addressed to him by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, Post Office Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H.

A copy of the photostat referred to is enclosed, from which it appears that Mr. Rohl's presence in Honolulu is desired in connection with secret contract #W-414-eng-602. In connection with our investigation concerning the applicant's qualifications for citizenship, and in order that appropriate recommendation may be made to the court [4111] with reference to the matter, please ascertain whether Mr. Rohl at any time represented himself to Colonel Wyman, Jr., as a citizen of the United States.

A reply by airmail at your earliest convenience will be very much appreciated.

(Signed) WILLIAM A. CARMICHAEL,
District Director, Los Angeles District.

I also desire to read one of the following letters in the same file, from the inspector in charge of the Los Angeles office to the inspector in charge at San Pedro, California, dated March 1, 1941, to indicate the effect of the special instructions. I am merely going to read this part.

27. General FRANK. "To the inspector"—inspector of what? Is it an inspector of the Engineer Corps, or of what?

28. Major CLAUSEN. This is to the inspector in charge, at San Pedro, California, from the inspector in charge of the Los Angeles office of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization:

(Excerpt from letter, Inspector in Charge, Los Angeles, to Inspector in Charge, San Pedro, dated March 1, 1941:)

HANS WILHELM ROHL OR H. W. ROHL

APPLICANT FOR NATURALIZATION

The above named native and citizen of Germany has recently filed an application for citizenship and the Central Office has requested that his case be made special and rushed through.

I am now going to read in evidence a note, with the number at the top, "246-P-83608," dated March 11, 1941, "Re Hans Wilhelm Rohl," signed "Butterfield." By the way, those are your initials [4112] are they, sir?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir.

29. Major CLAUSEN. It reads as follows:

(Note dated March 11, 1941, re H. W. Rohl, by Butterfield:)

Re: Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

The petitioner called on me on March 11, 1941, and stated that the information he gave me concerning his first marriage was not correct; that he was not legally married to Marion Henderson but lived with her from 1914 to 1923 and is the father of her four children; that they lived together only in California and did not go through any kind of a ceremony; that Marion Henderson is now married and her name is Marion Clark and that she lives at 2371 Portola Way, Sacramento, Calif.; that the two minor children live with her; that he entered into a property settlement with her on April 22, 1925, and the agreement is attached hereto; that he provided for her and the minor children as specified in the contract.

Sir, is that a correct statement of fact as to what happened between you and the petitioner on that date?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir.

30. Major CLAUSEN. I now desire to read in evidence a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Honolulu, Hawaii; over to the right, "665-Rohl," dated March 1, 1941, sent by air mail; received in Los Angeles apparently on March 11, 1941:

(Letter from U. S. Naturalization examiner, Honolulu, to district director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Honolulu, T. H., dated March 1, 1941:)

[4113] DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Honolulu, T. H.

Los Angeles File B-23-1876, HANS WILHELM ROHL, Feb. 20, 1941.

In accordance with the directions contained in the above captioned letter, I called on Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, United States Army, for information regarding subject alien and particularly whether the alien applicant had ever in any manner represented or assumed himself to be a citizen of the United States.

Colonel Wyman in substance stated that he first became acquainted with the alien in California some time ago. That the Rohl-Connolly Company, with which the alien is associated, had done construction work for the Department of the Interior in the Indian country as well as projects on the Colorado River. During the construction of a breakwater in the California area, Colonel Wyman came in contact more or less with Mr. Rohl. During those business relations in California, Colonel Wyman assumed without any basis therefor that Mr. Rohl was a citizen of the United States. He knew from hearsay that Rohl was born in Germany and that his father had been a professor of engineering in a German university. Colonel Wyman stated the applicant gathered about him in his organization only high-grade men. That the quality of his work was excellent. Contracts were always faithfully carried out. That Mr. Rohl was a man of integrity. His outstanding social [4114] diversion was yachting.

As a result of the national defense efforts, the Rohl-Connolly Company, W. E. Callahan Company and another group, organized the Hawaiian Constructors, Ltd., to procure construction contracts in Hawaii. It was in connection with one of these projects that Colonel Wyman wrote his letter of January 22, 1941, to Mr. Rohl. To summarize in a word, Colonel Wyman said the alien never represented himself to be a citizen of the United States and if there was any misunderstanding in that regard it was due to the assumption of such citizenship by the Colonel himself.

[SEAL]

(Signed) JAS. P. DILLON,
U. S. Naturalization Examiner.

2100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In the lower left-hand corner, under date of March 1, 1941, appears the following endorsement:

Respectfully referred to District Director, Los Angeles District.

(Signed) W. G. STRENCH,
District Director, Honolulu District.

[4115] Then, in this same file, a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Honolulu, Hawaii. Over to the right, "665/Rohl," dated March 24, 1941, to the District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California:

(Letter dated March 24, 1941, from district director, immigration and naturalization service, Honolulu, to district director, Los Angeles, California, is as follows:)

Your File 23/101650, HANS WILLIAM ROHL, March 13, 1941.

The American Yacht "VEGA" arrived in Honolulu, T. H., January 21, 1938, from Balboa, C. Z., with four passengers and sixteen (16) in the crew. The passengers, among whom was your applicant, were passed by our boarding inspector as United States citizens upon their declarations manifested on Form 630. The data set out in the manifest appears as follows:

H. William Rohl, (M) Born 9/29/1886 at Tola, Kansas.

Floy E. Rohl (F) Born 10/27/1897 at Tola, Kansas.

Dr. Karl Lewis (M) Born 1/23/1891 at Grand Ridge, Ill.

Virginia Lewis (F) Born 4/2/10 at St. Louis, Mo.

The crew list was visaed at Nassau, Bahamas, again at Balboa, C. Z., as there were five aliens among the members.

Signed, "W. G. Strench, District Director, Honolulu District."

I desire to read at this time a portion of the very brief extracts from the examination of Mr. Rohl by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, being an investigation conducted by United States Immigrant Inspector, Frank G. Ellis, in the [4116] Los Angeles local office, Los Angeles, California, May 22, 1941, at 9:30 A. M., in the English language:

(Portion of examination of Mr. Rohl by Inspector Ellis, Immigration and Naturalization Service, May 22, 1941, is as follows:)

Question. Did Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., of the War Department, Honolulu, T. H., write you on January 22, 1941, in regard to construction work in the Hawaiian Islands?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Didn't Mr. Wyman state in his letter to you, he desired to have you proceed to Honolulu and consult with the engineers in regard to that contract?

Answer. Right.

Question. Did you, in conformity with that request go to Honolulu to look after that end of the business?

Answer. No.

Question. Did some other member of the firm proceed to Honolulu?

Answer. Mr. Grafe; he is the partner of the W. E. Callahan Company, who are in the venture with us. I didn't go because I didn't want to be placed in a position whereby I had seen plans, contracts of secret nature, without first being a citizen.

Question. Did Lieutenant Colonel Wyman know that you were still an alien when he corresponded with you in regard to this contract?

Answer. This was after the contract was awarded. [4117] When he was our district engineer here in Los Angeles, I knew him and Joe Connolly Company built the breakwater under him at San Pedro.

Question. Are you personally acquainted with Lieutenant Colonel Wyman?

Answer. Oh, yes.

Question. Did you ever at any time state to Mr. Wyman, that you were a citizen or you were not a citizen?

Answer. No, sir. I believe he was interviewed by your office in Honolulu. I am under the impression that Colonel Wyman still wants me over there, regardless of my status.

Which indicates, if the Board pleases, that Mr. Rohl knew that Colonel Wyman was interviewed at Honolulu on that express point.

Now I am reading from the same examination, page 14, as follows, again question of Mr. Rohl by the same inspector:

Question. Have you anything further that you wish to state?

Answer. I would like to say that the defense contract we have in Honolulu is not a money making venture. We were requested to take that contract and they especially wanted me in on it because I have done a lot of work for Colonel Wyman, and he believes that I am able. We considered it our duty to take that contract. We are donating our services, that is why I am anxious to expedite this investigation in my case.

31. Colonel TOULMIN. I think the record ought to show at [4118] this point that the fee, as testified to in this record, was \$1,070,000, as I recall it, as the result of Mr. Rohl's "donation."

32. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

Now I should like to read into the record a final letter. This is from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, California, file No. 16541/2171, dated May 28, 1941, to the District Director, Los Angeles, California:

(Letter dated May 28, 1941, from Inspector Shaw, immigration and naturalization service, to district director, Los Angeles, California, in re Hans William Rohl, is as follows:)

In re HANS WILLIAM ROHL, C. O. No. 280-D-2084 of 2/4/41, 2/20/41, and 3/14/41.

There is attached hereto Form 565, Application for Warrant of Arrest, prepared covering the above-named alien and containing the charge as indicated by the code word "Visible."

The evidence attached to the Form 565 indicates that the subject first entered the United States at the port of New York, New York, on the SS "Santa Marta" on October 23, 1913, at which time he was inspected and admitted as an immigrant; that he next arrived at the port of New York, New York, on the SS "France" of the French Line on January 16, 1925, at which time he was admitted to the United States for permanent residence upon surrendering Reentry Permit No. 20820 which was issued at Washington, D. C., on November 28, 1924.

The alien testifies that he entered the United [4119] States 10 or 12 times in 1932 at the port of Laredo, Texas; that at that time his company was engaged in constructing a road or highway in Mexico. He claims that he was never questioned by immigration officers and the Laredo office advises that they have no record of such entries. Therefore, it is presumed that such entries were without the inspection contemplated by the immigration laws then in existence. In 1933 the alien made a trip from the east coast of the United States on his wife's private yacht "Ramona." On this trip the "Ramona" put in at Acapulco, Mexico, for fuel and then proceeded to San Diego, California, where it entered. The records at San Diego fail to show the name of the subject on either the passenger or crew list.

The alien further testifies that in 1937 he boarded the yacht "Vega" at Jacksonville, Florida; that this vessel then proceeded to Nassau, B. I., where the crew list was visaed; that the yacht then proceeded to Balboa, Canal Zone, thence to Honolulu, T. H., where the yacht arrived on January 21, 1938; and that he cannot remember being inspected by the Immigration officers at the time of that arrival. However, a letter from the District Director, Honolulu, which is attached to the Form 565, states that the passenger manifest filed with that office covering the arrival of the yacht "Vega" lists the name of H. William Rohl as being born in Tola, Kansas, and that the subject was passed as a United States citizen.

[4120] The charge "Visible" is being brought on the following theory: Any legal residence which the alien had was cancelled by his departure to

Mexico in 1932 and re-entering the United States without inspection; that all residence in the United States subsequent to his last entry to the United States at Laredo, Texas, was illegal; therefore, upon his arrival at Honolulu, T. H., on January 21, 1938, he was not returning to a lawful residence; that the vessel on which he arrived was coming from a foreign port or place; that he gained admission through misrepresentation and, if the truth were known, he would have been required to present an unexpired immigration visa.

Signed, "Judson F. Shaw, Inspector in Charge, Los Angeles Local Office."

You know, Mr. Butterfield, that Mr. Shaw was the Inspector in Charge?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Yes, sir.

33. Major CLAUSEN. There is in the file an application, just a formal application for warrant of arrest, based upon the action.

I have no further questions to ask Mr. Butterfield.

34. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Mr. Butterfield, have you anything to state, to add to what has been told to the Board, that might enlighten the Board on this situation?

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Except one thing, where the Major called attention to the wording of a letter where we were [4121] directed to make it special and rush it through. I might say, for the purpose of the record, that at that time in the Los Angeles office I believe there was an arrearage of perhaps two or three months in handling applications for naturalization, and it was the policy at that time to expedite, to give preference to, applicants who were necessary or desired in the national defense.

35. General GRUNERT. That appears to be all. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

36. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more witnesses this afternoon, but I have several things here we might as well use a little time in getting into the record. Are you ready to dictate into the record a Hoffman letter and also a reference or have his testimony copied therein?

37. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; I am ready to do that.

38. General GRUNERT. All right; go ahead.

39. Major CLAUSEN. This is a letter received from Mr. Robert Hoffman:

(Letter dated September 9, 1944, from Robert Hoffman to Lieutenant C. F. Murphy, Army Pearl Harbor Board, is as follows:)

NEW YORK, N. Y., September 9, 1944.

Lieut. C. F. MURPHY,

% Army Pearl Harbor Investigating Commission,

Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR LIEUT.: This will acknowledge your long distance phone call to my home in Bronxville, from your San Francisco office. [4122]

Your call was a surprise in view of the fact that my testimony was taken by the House Military Affairs committee during the month of January 1944. For probably political reasons, none of the testimony that was taken in Executive Session at that time was ever published—and you may well imagine, that I am more than ordinarily displeased about the matter, as I had come all the way from Mexico City at their urgent request.

I do not feel that your military commission will accomplish much more, nor that the final report of the Army Commission, if displeasing to the present administration, will ever be published. Being familiar with some of the important facts that are being shielded in Washington, as regards the delayed defenses of Hawaii—I feel within reason that a potential whitewash is in the making, regardless of the honesty of the Generals on the committee.

There is only one solution to my testifying before your commission, and that is that my testimony, be held in the open, with newspapermen in attendance. Under no other conditions, would I consider coming before the committee. In fact, I would rather not come before them at all, as the commission, could not impartially give an opinion, as long as it was dominated by the present administration setup.

You may well believe, that I am neither [4123] Republican, Democrat, nor do I harbor any of the isms so prevalent thruout the country. Also that I have no axe to grind, nor no desire to hurt anyone. But to get the truth, you must have impartial men on the hearing board, and it should be out in the open—as there is no reason for the excuse of Military Security at this time. I have no intention of being a political goat, as has been the case of both Walter Short and H. E. Kimmel.

Thanking you for your courtesy, believe me to be,

Very truly yours,

ROBERT HOFFMAN.

Now I make reference, following the letter, to Exhibit No. 8 in evidence before the Board, Exhibit No. 8-A in evidence before the Board, being testimony given on January 24, 1944, and January 27, 1944, at a hearing held before the Special Committee of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House, being the testimony of Mr. Hoffman which is here.

And then I make reference to Exhibit 8-B in evidence, being the statement by Robert Hoffman which has been referred to in the testimony of Mr. Hoffman before the House Committee and which has been referred to by several witnesses before this Board.

40. General GRUNERT. Then, the exhibits you have referred to there have already become the Board record?

41. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; they are in evidence before the Board.

42. General GRUNERT. All right.

(Thereupon the Board, at 3:56 p. m., having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, proceeded to other business.)

[4124]

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[4125] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; and Major Henry C. Clauson, Assistant Recorder.

Absent: Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HOWARD C. DAVIDSON, COM-
MANDING TENTH AIR FORCE, KANJAKOHA, ASSAM**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General DAVIDSON. Howard C. Davidson; Major General; commanding Tenth Air Force, Kanjakoha, Assam.

2. General GRUNERT. General, this particular part of our investigation will be conducted by General Frank.

3. General FRANK. On what duty were you, in the latter part [4126] of 1941?

General DAVIDSON. I had command of the Fourteenth "Fighter Wing" it was called then, and when I came back to the United States to attend a maneuver in Seattle the last part of October, I believe it was, or the first of November—

4. General FRANK. You came back to the States, the latter part of October?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. When I came back, and while I was over here, the Fourteenth Fighter Wing was reorganized, and part of the staff was taken to man the base complement, and the rest of it was taken to start a "fighter command;" I believe they called it, the Seventh Fighter Command, finally.

5. General FRANK. This reorganization occurred while you were absent in the States?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

6. General FRANK. When did you return to Honolulu?

General DAVIDSON. I got back to Honolulu on, I don't remember whether it was the 3rd or the 4th of December. It was either the 3rd or the 4th, I can't recall exactly.

7. General FRANK. At that time, the aircraft warning service was being whipped into shape by the Signal Corps?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. I was sent to the United States to observe some maneuvers at Seattle, to show what an aircraft warning service was like; and just before I left, we had organized, out of pick-up material, a temporary set-up, to teach the operatives how to work an aircraft warning system when we got one started.

8. General FRANK. You say "we" did that. Whom do you mean by "we"?

[4127] General DAVIDSON. Well, the air people, General Martin's office, and the Signal Corps, together, got busy and built a little, temporary building on top of a warehouse down there near Fort Shafter, a room about as large as this, just a little larger than this.

9. General FRANK. That was your information center?

General DAVIDSON. That was our information center. That was the elements of the information center, which we were using to train the operatives. We had no intention of using that as an information center; at least, we thought we had no intention of using that as an information center. We did however use that after the attack on December 7. We started in June to building the permanent set-up for the information center.

10. General FRANK. That was the one underground?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. We were digging an underground set-up, to fix up an information center, a permanent installation; but the equipment for that did not arrive until about a year later, about June 1942.

11. General FRANK. Under whom was this temporary aircraft warning service operating?

General DAVIDSON. Major Bergquist was you might say in direct charge of getting the personnel trained from the Fourteenth Fighter Wing side of it. He was my man, helping to get the set-up and to get the men trained; and Colonel C. A. Powell was the signal officer, and he was largely instrumental in getting the little field telephones and various items.

12. General FRANK. That is, the technical equipment?

General DAVIDSON. The technical equipment, into this set-up. We had the blueprints for it.

[4128] 13. General FRANK. How much did it operate, for this training purpose?

General DAVIDSON. We operated it. I might interject, here, that before I left to go to these maneuvers at Seattle, it was not in operation, and when I got back it was being operated in the early morning each day.

14. General FRANK. Every morning?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. It was only operated to train the operatives, though. For instance, as you know, an information center has a number of various people, like the antiaircraft officer, and the Navy liaison officer, and the Transport Command officer, and all the various ones to help the controller. It was only operated with a controller, and none of those others were present. In other words, there was

no machinery to tell whether any plots on the board were friendly or hostile, we were simply operating them to teach the soldiers how to run one of these boards, which they had never seen and were not familiar with.

15. General GRUNERT. That was prior to your departure?

16. General FRANK. No.

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. Prior to my departure, they started building this little set-up. We wanted to build it at Wheeler Field, and Colonel Powell, I think, built it over this little warehouse, because that was his warehouse, and he had control over it, and it was near his equipment.

17. General GRUNERT. Then what you have described is what you found when you got back from your trip?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. When I got back, I found this little, temporary set-up, there, that was being used to [4129] train the operatives. That was the principal use, you could call it.

18. General FRANK. Under whose direction was this thing operating?

General DAVIDSON. General Short, I think, had ordered it to be operated every morning.

19. General FRANK. Well, what I am getting at is, was it operating under your direction, or under Powell's direction?

General DAVIDSON. That's very hard to say, because most of the men that were being trained there were Powell's men. Practically none of them were my men. They were Signal Corps men that were operating the board.

20. General FRANK. But the training was under Bergquist's supervision?

General DAVIDSON. It was under Bergquist's supervision. We had sent Bergquist back to New York, and he had gone through a course at Mitchell Field.

21. General FRANK. With whom? Who came back with him? Tindall?

General DAVIDSON. Tindall. Colonel Tindall, he is now, but he was a Major then. Major Tindall and Major Bergquist had both been sent back to Mitchell Field to learn how to operate this, but Tindall, he helped us in getting the personnel together, but he didn't have nearly as much to do with getting the information center set up as Bergquist did. Bergquist was very active and very intelligent on that work?

22. General FRANK. We have had testimony previously to indicate that the installation was being accomplished under the supervision of the Signal Officer.

[4130] General DAVIDSON. I wouldn't deny that, at all, because the signal officer was very active in pushing this, to try and just get anything that would work, there, and teach our people how to?

23. General FRANK. And, that there was some discussion in department headquarters with respect to the time at which this should be turned over to you as the interceptor commander.

General DAVIDSON. There was; yes, sir. There was a little problem there of just when these men would be trained and turned over to us; I can remember that.

24. General FRANK. And, while there was no clean-cut assignment of duties, nevertheless, Bergquist, as the air representative——

General DAVIDSON. "Controller," we made him.

25. General FRANK. —the controller, had charge of the training of the personnel, and this was being done in a fully cooperative manner with the Signal Corps people?

General DAVIDSON. That's right. There was no conflict at all. We had nothing but cooperation between the two branches, the Signal Corps and the air. They were both doing their best as far as I could see to try and anticipate the day that we would have fighter control there, and we would be all ready to operate it when we got it.

26. General FRANK. The attack came on the morning of December 7?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

27. General FRANK. You are familiar, are you not, with the fact that the radar out at Opana Point picked up in the oscilloscope the approach of the Jap attack?

[4131] General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

28. General FRANK. There was no action taken on that, because the Sunday morning practice had terminated at 7 o'clock.

General DAVIDSON. That's right.

29. General FRANK. And those people just happened to be on the job out there, waiting for transportation to take them to breakfast?

General DAVIDSON. That's practically it. What Lockard told he was, that the man he was working with was a cook that had come up and asked him to show him how the 'scope worked, and he had gotten permission from the sergeant to show this cook how the radar 'scope operated.

30. General FRANK. You stated just a moment ago that the development of this training had not progressed to the point where you had begun to train any liaison officers?

General DAVIDSON. I don't think so, sir. I don't think there were any liaison officers being trained, there.

31. General FRANK. Had you asked for any?

General DAVIDSON. You have me at a disadvantage, there——

32. General FRANK. I realize that.

General DAVIDSON. —because I got back from the United States, and I made my report on this radar, to General Martin, two days, on the information set-up. It took me about two days to get through, and the next day was Saturday, and the attack happened on Sunday; so it is very difficult for me to say just whether anybody had asked for the additional liaison officers; but as far as I know, they had not.

33. General FRANK. From your point of view, do you feel that there was any delay in the installation of the aircraft [4132] warning service?

General DAVIDSON. We thought there was, sir. We had been very anxious to get the equipment and the installation in, and were told that we would go over to this maneuver, and we sent three men over, including Colonel Powell and Colonel Meehan and myself, to Seattle, to see how it would work and how it should work, and what we could do to get our installation in.

34. General FRANK. Where was the delay, from your point of view?

General DAVIDSON. I think the delay was all down the line, because

the equipment was not sent to us until, I would risk a guess, at about June 1942, and while I was at this same maneuver, orders came in for Colonel Taylor to go over to Manila and start installing a fighter control there; and he was caught on the water, December 7, on his way to Manila to take the information over to them or just what they should do to start a fighter control.

35. General FRANK. He was going to accomplish, in Manila, what Bergquist was accomplishing, in Honolulu?

General DAVIDSON. What Bergquist was doing in Honolulu, yes, sir.

36. General FRANK. You say this delay was all down the line. From your point of view, was there any delay in construction that could have been avoided?

General DAVIDSON. I don't know, sir. They finally got busy on this tunnel. This tunnel where we were going to put the information set was far enough along for them to use it for several days after the attack on December 7, to house [4133] 300 or 400 people in it, so they had gotten busy on that, and were going along, I thought, fairly well.

37. General FRANK. That was being used as a bomb shelter?

General DAVIDSON. As a bomb shelter; after the attack, they used it as a bomb shelter to house a lot of the women and children on the island.

38. General FRANK. How soon after the attack did this temporary AWS start operating?

General DAVIDSON. Right away.

39. General FRANK. The same day, or the next day?

General DAVIDSON. Oh, I would say the same day, sir. Maybe they didn't get the liaison officers up there till the next day, but they certainly—they got the set working. The enlisted men were all working there on the same day.

40. General FRANK. The point about it is that had there been sufficient pressure put on, it could have been operating to a certain degree of efficiency, a week prior to that?

General DAVIDSON. That might have been so.

41. General FRANK. They had had maneuvers?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir; we had had a maneuver.

42. General FRANK. And it had operated efficiently?

General DAVIDSON. And it had operated; it had operated.

43. General FRANK. Therefore, it could have operated with a degree of effectiveness from November 27 on, could it not?

General DAVIDSON. I would say that's true. I think they had two radars in operation by that time, one at Fort Shafter, and one at Opana.

44. General FRANK. On December 7, they had one at Kawailoa, one at Opana, and one at Kaaawa?

[4134] General DAVIDSON. Kaaawa? That is the low one, over there?

45. General FRANK. Yes.

General DAVIDSON. That may be so. Maybe there were three, but I know there were two in operation by December 7. The Kaaawa one, though, was not very satisfactory. It operated very poorly.

46. General FRANK. On the other hand, it did pick up at various times that morning and make reports on the incoming planes?

General DAVIDSON. I don't know that, but it only operated when they got very close. It was just a very close-in kind.

47. General FRANK. Now, with respect to the airplanes, you are familiar with the fact that they were on a No. 1 Alert for sabotage?

General DAVIDSON. I got back from this trip to the States, and I was told that they had been taken off of alert and had been instructed that the danger from sabotage was much greater than the danger from an enemy attack, so they had been brought in from all of the bonkers that we had built for them, dispersed around the field, and had been concentrated on the flying mat, on the warm-up mat in front of the hangars, so they could guard them better; and we had about fifty guards around them to protect them from sabotage.

48. General FRANK. In this No. 1 Alert was there any percentage or any number of those planes that were on an immediate alert?

General DAVIDSON. I don't think so, sir. I don't know of [4135] any.

49. General FRANK. The situation was so new to you, because of your so recent return?

General DAVIDSON. I can't recall, now. Just as you said, I had just gotten back. I found my staff split up, half of it had gone to operate the basis, half of it had been left to form a nucleus for a fighter command, and I was busy making my report to General Martin, so I couldn't tell you now whether any of them were on specific alert on that morning or not.

50. General FRANK. What was Tindall's job, do you remember?

General DAVIDSON. I think he was a group commander, at that time.

51. General FRANK. At Wheeler Field?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir; a fighter group commander.

52. General FRANK. And Bergquist was acting as controller?

General DAVIDSON. You might say he was our principal controller in teaching.

53. General FRANK. About the information center?

General DAVIDSON. At the information center.

54. General GRUNERT. General, I have a number of questions, here, but, realizing your absence from the Hawaiian Department will necessarily handicap you in answering some of them, if I ask some questions here of which you have no knowledge, just say so.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

55. General GRUNERT. Just what date did you leave the Hawaiian Department to go to the Seattle demonstration? Approximately what date?

[4136] General DAVIDSON. It was approximately about the middle of October, as I remember it.

56. General GRUNERT. Middle of October, and you returned December 5th?

General DAVIDSON. About December 4th or 5th; yes, sir.

57. General GRUNERT. And prior to the middle of October how long had you been in command of that wing?

General DAVIDSON. That is October 1941. Since about the first part of May 1941.

58. General GRUNERT. Then, in these questions that I ask you, you can answer them from May to the middle of October and after December 5th; is that right?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

59. General GRUNERT. Do you know of an S. O. P. gotten out by the Department under date of November 5th which prescribed that an interceptor command under—I believe under your command, was organized. That particular part of that S. O. P. did not state when it would be activated, but left the intimation that it was then in being. Do you know of your own accord it was not in being at that time?

General DAVIDSON. Not an interceptor command, no, sir; not as we know it.

60. General GRUNERT. Do you know when it was actually activated? I believe we have record December 17th. Does that ring a bell with you?

General DAVIDSON. I believe it was, yes, sir, just about December the 17th, and the interceptor command was——

61. General GRUNERT. Were there any tests or exercises held prior to the time you departed from the Hawaiian Department, [4137] in connection with the Navy, in which the air warning service was used?

General DAVIDSON. We tested it out prior to my departure, and on that particular exercise it worked out very well.

62. General FRANK. How many radar stations were operating?

General DAVIDSON. Well, we got most of our information from the one right at Fort Shafter, but I couldn't say whether the Opana station was operating, or the Kaala, or not.

63. General GRUNERT. Then, you don't know why the interceptor command was not activated prior to December 17th and why it was not activated prior to December 7th?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I do not, except up till that time they had had what they call fighter wings, and we did not have interceptor commands.

64. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything about the joint Army and Navy drill and test that was held between the 17th and 22nd of November in which the air warning service operated apparently very satisfactorily and on which Colonel Powell made a report to that effect?

General DAVIDSON. I didn't get those dates, sir.

65. General GRUNERT. 17th to 22nd of November.

General DAVIDSON. On those dates Colonel Powell was with me in the United States.

66. General GRUNERT. At the same time he made a report on the satisfactory operation of the air warning service, to his chief, which was afterwards quoted by the Secretary of War to show that the air warning service operated satisfactorily at that time.

General DAVIDSON. The only thing I know is, sir, that he [4138] was with us on this maneuver in Seattle at that time.

67. General GRUNERT. Then, he evidently wrote that after he got back, from reports he had and from investigation he made?

General DAVIDSON. He must have, because he could not have reported on it at that time. I know that.

68. General FRANK. From first-hand knowledge?

General DAVIDSON. From first-hand knowledge.

69. General GRUNERT. In your command did you have any training planes, any planes that were in training that were on reconnaissance missions?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. I had only fighters.

70. General GRUNERT. Fighters. And they would not be used for reconnaissance purposes?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. They were P-40s, and I don't believe we even had the use of belly tanks then: they were very short-range.

71. General GRUNERT. What did you have to do with anything as to the immediate ground protection of your airfield or airfields?

General DAVIDSON. We had a very, what we thought, peculiar order on that. We had an order not only to protect our ground installations but to furnish, as I recall it, 500 men to go over and protect any place that the ground people designated, and they had designated a part of Schofield Barracks for us to protect.

72. General GRUNERT. How many of that—was that 500, or were those men out on that duty under Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, on December 7th?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, they didn't go out on it until [4139] the troops marched out of Schofield Barracks after December the 7th; and then our men, in addition to protecting Wheeler Field, had to go out and protect Schofield Barracks, and I think they stayed on that for about a month or so after December the 7th.

73. General GRUNERT. The S. O. P. of November 5th called on the air forces and gave them missions of such protection, but the evidence shows that they were not out on such duty on December 7th. But did you consider that those men were available to you for air purposes, or had to be kept for that other duty?

General DAVIDSON. I couldn't answer that, General. The day I got back, almost, you are talking of.

74. General GRUNERT. Just what field did you have charge of or command of?

General DAVIDSON. Wheeler Field.

75. General GRUNERT. Just Wheeler Field?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

76. General GRUNERT. And there you had a post commander, and you were the tactical commander; is that right?

General DAVIDSON. I was the post commander too when I left, and when I came back a part of my staff had been split up, and Colonel Flood was the post commander and I was the tactical commander.

77. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, under the standing orders what protection did you provide for Wheeler Field prior to your departure? Ground protection.

General DAVIDSON. We simply furnished as many sentries as we thought were necessary to protect it.

[4140] 78. General GRUNERT. Did you have any emplaced machine guns?

General DAVIDSON. We had the machine guns. The emplacements were built, but the guns were not manned all the time.

79. General GRUNERT. Did you have an S. O. P. for its own protection, of Wheeler Field?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir; and when we were on alert, then the guns were manned.

80. General GRUNERT. Were they so manned on December 7th; do you know?

General DAVIDSON. They were not, sir, because we had been taken off that.

81. General GRUNERT. You were on a sabotage alert?

General DAVIDSON. We had been taken off of No. 1 Alert and had gone on a sabotage alert.

82. General GRUNERT. And the sabotage alert did not envision an attack on the field? Just destruction of the equipment on the field?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

83. General FRANK. Had the alerts been readjusted during your absence?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

84. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not General Burgin, the antiaircraft commander, turned over his antiaircraft to you on December 7th as part of the interceptor command?

General DAVIDSON. I do not believe that the antiaircraft was ever turned over to the interceptor command on any date.

85. General GRUNERT. Although the interceptor command as such did not exist during practice drills, the evidence shows that [4141] the antiaircraft was turned over to the so-called command that existed, although it was not an interceptor command, for those practice tests and drills.

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. The antiaircraft command was under the command of the antiaircraft officer who was in the information center, but it remained under the command of General Nichols, I believe, who was the antiaircraft commander.

86. General GRUNERT. By turning over, I mean that particular part of the system of handling antiaircraft by an interceptor commander which amounted to saying, "We are ready to see what the controller—when the controller takes over," and he tells the antiaircraft to fire or not to fire.

General DAVIDSON. He could tell them to hold fire or that they were free to fire, and that is almost the limit of that.

87. General GRUNERT. That is what I meant by turning over the antiaircraft to the interceptor commander.

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

88. General GRUNERT. Was that done on December 17?

General DAVIDSON. I wouldn't remember that, sir. I don't remember, but it was the common practice at all times for that to be: that the antiaircraft commander present at the board had complete control of the hold-fire or open-fire of all the antiaircraft on the island, and he in turn was under the control of the controller.

89. General GRUNERT. Right.

90. General FRANK. Who was an air officer?

General DAVIDSON. Who was an air officer.

91. General FRANK. And your representative?

[4142] General DAVIDSON. And my representative, yes, sir. But we wanted to have control of the antiaircraft, and we asked for that time and again and were never given control of the antiaircraft by the interceptor command; and the reason given for that was that they had sighted the guns so that they could repel attacks from the beaches; therefore they didn't want the guns completely under the control of the interceptor command.

92. General GRUNERT. In other words, they had a dual mission?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

93. General GRUNERT. Ground and air?

General DAVIDSON. They had two missions.

94. General GRUNERT. Now, as to the air warning service and the degree of training of the personnel on December 7th, do you consider that that degree of training was such that they could have operated efficiently or semi-efficiently on that date?

General DAVIDSON. They seemed to do very well after that date, and I assume that they were just about ready by that time to start operating.

95. General GRUNERT. Now, prior to your departure for the States on temporary duty were you ever called in by General Short for conferences, periodic or special?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. And we made violent protests on having to furnish those ground troops: those air troops to protect ground and targets, but we were overruled on that.

96. General GRUNERT. Were you kept in touch with the international situation as to what was happening between Japan and the United States? Were you kept informed of the tenseness of the situation?

[4143] General DAVIDSON. As far as I know, we were not, and had very little inkling of the crucial point to which negotiations had come.

97. General GRUNERT. That was up to the time you left, October?

General DAVIDSON. Well, and when I got back I saw no signs of any knowledge that international negotiations had reached a crisis.

98. General GRUNERT. To whom would you look for such information when you got back, in order to catch up on the situation in Hawaii and in your command at that time?

General DAVIDSON. Well, the information, we would have gotten it by inference, from changing the sabotage alert to No. 1 Alert, which would be getting ready for an attack.

99. General GRUNERT. Then, did you think because you were in the sabotage alert there was practically no imminence of an attack?

General DAVIDSON. That is right, sir.

100. General GRUNERT. Now, the S. O. P. of November 5th called for a concentration of planes under No. 1, the sabotage alert, but the evidence shows there were two separate telegrams received directing that particular concentration. Do you recall those?

General DAVIDSON. I didn't get the dates there, General.

101. General GRUNERT. It probably was along November 27th or shortly after that. Have you any knowledge of—

General DAVIDSON. I don't know, sir.

102. General GRUNERT. —special telegrams that ordered the concentration, to be sure that they were concentrated?

[4144] General DAVIDSON. To concentrate them for the sabotage alert? I was told that telegrams had come in to do that, but I couldn't state myself where they came from nor when they were sent.

103. General GRUNERT. Now tell me about the difference in protection of the planes against sabotage in concentration versus dispersion.

Let me first ask you this question: Would you of your own accord have concentrated them as better protection against sabotage, or kept them dispersed feeling that you were better protected all around?

General DAVIDSON. At that time, General, I would have concentrated them. I never would concentrate them again, anywhere, but at that time I thought they were better concentrated to protect them against sabotage than they were scattered out all around the field.

104. General GRUNERT. Did it ever pass through your mind at any time that a concentrated bunch might be more hazardous in the line of damage that might be done to them than scattered ones?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. I think in June General Short had built a number of what we call bunkers: threw up earthen walls all around Wheeler Field, and we had space I believe for about 125 airplanes in those bunkers, and we kept them in there during the alert, thinking that it would protect them more from a strafing attack. I know now that it wouldn't, but at that time we thought it would. That is not quite true. If they are all concentrated on one big mat, they are easier to attack than they are if they are scattered around the field, [4145] but the bunkers will not protect them against strafing attack of machine guns when he is shooting right at them.

105. General GRUNERT. As to danger from fire, which affords the most protection?

General DAVIDSON. Well, of course—

106. General GRUNERT. I mean fire, actually flames.

General DAVIDSON. Well, the more dispersed they are then the less chance you have of spreading the fire.

107. General GRUNERT. And in sabotage or attack that question of fire is a great hazard?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

108. General GRUNERT. What was Commander Taylor doing with the establishment and perfection of the air warning service and the control center? Do you know Commander Taylor?

General DAVIDSON. Commander Taylor was loaned to us by the Navy and was very useful in getting the various installations perfected to put in this information center and was, as near as I can express it, Bergquist's assistant, and he stayed with us for, I would say, a month after December the 7th.

109. General GRUNERT. Did you know anything about this youngster Tyler that was in the control center on the morning of the 7th, who is alleged to have received this message from the Opana station as to the incoming bunch of airplanes? What was he doing there?

General DAVIDSON. He was the officer acting as controller, and it would have been an act of great prescience if it had clicked in his mind that those were enemy planes, but at the time that he was looking at the control board there were about [4146] 15 plots on that board in areas that could have been enemy planes, and he would have had to look at all the other 15 and say, "Those are not enemy planes, and this one plot that is coming in is enemy planes."

110. General GRUNERT. Do you attach any blame on him for his not having notified the air forces or the headquarters or the Navy, or whatnot, of this?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I cannot. He had no means of knowing those were not enemy planes. We did not have IFF on the planes until at least eight months after the attack.

111. General GRUNERT. Did you at that time have any way of telling who was who in the air?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir; except after that we would have the airplanes report in their position when they got within about 100 miles of Oahu, but that was our only means right through.

112. General GRUNERT. You spoke of not having received the equipment for the communication or control center until about the middle of 1942.

General DAVIDSON. That is right, sir.

113. General GRUNERT. Do you know why such delay for your permanent control center?

General DAVIDSON. I just imagined that it hadn't been made, sir, because we were ready for it, we wanted it right away, and we couldn't get it, so it must not have been available here to ship to us.

114. General GRUNERT. Do you have any knowledge of why, after Bergquist's return from his course of instruction at Mitchell Field and his desire and great interest in getting some sort of [4147] warning service established—why he was not encouraged and helped out, and it took such a long time from the time he got back up to the time they actually started to prepare the air warning service?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, except there weren't any in the United States. They prepared one in Mitchell Field, and the next one that they put in was in Seattle, and that wasn't opened up until right around the first of November, last of October or the first of November.

115. General GRUNERT. Tell the Board what you found in Seattle, to give us an idea of the state of progression of establishing air warning centers all over.

General DAVIDSON. At Seattle, General Walsh had established a very excellent warning center, central warning center, with about three subsidiary centers around there, and they had ordered in airplanes from all over the United States to carry out maneuvers to test out this center and see how effective it was; and they had ordered in observers from various places, including Hawaii, to get the knowledge, first-hand knowledge, of the operation of one of these centers.

116. General GRUNERT. And about what time, what month was that? What part of the month?

General DAVIDSON. It was the last of October or the first of November, right around between those two dates, and I would say from the 25th of October to about the first of November, 1941.

117. General GRUNERT. And you stayed there all that time, and why didn't you get back to Hawaii prior to December 5th?

General DAVIDSON. I was given a mission then by General [4148] Martin to take Colonel Powell to New York to get additional drawings and also to see if we couldn't get the equipment for this center, and we went then to New York—he went to New York, I came to Washington, and then went to the maneuvers in North Carolina for a day, to see how the center was working there, before going back to Hawaii.

118. General GRUNERT. Do you know what pressure was brought by the Commanding General of the Department to further the completion of the air warning service, if any?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. It would seem like it was something new to him, and he cooperated with us, but I don't know of any pressure that he brought to bear.

119. General GRUNERT. Had you known that there was imminence of war and if you had feared an attack on Hawaii within a reasonably short time, what could have been done to get that air warning service in better shape to operate by December 7th?

General DAVIDSON. Well, we could have had the board fully manned and the airplanes on the alert.

120. General GRUNERT. Does it make any difference whether they had been on Alert 2 or 3 as to the air warning service and the operation of the control board?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, because when we came off of No. 1 Alert we had—

121. General FRANK. What do you mean by No. 1 Alert?

General DAVIDSON. That was with the airplanes dispersed and the pilots out with them.

122. General GRUNERT. Well, then, in the S. O. P. of November 5th and as understood by this Board, No. 1 Alert is the sabotage alert; No. 2 Alert is the protection from an air attack [4149] plus sabotage; and No. 3 is the all-out alert.

General DAVIDSON. Well, it is No. 3 Alert, then, if I could change that.

123. General GRUNERT. That is what I thought.

General DAVIDSON. When we came off the No. 3 Alert, we were very short of field wire, so we rolled up our field wire and brought that all in from our dispersed positions and placed it in one of the hangars, and when we tried to get our field wire back out so that the controller could get a telephone communication straight through to the squadrons, which he has to have, the field wire was all afire, and we had to get additional field wire.

124. General GRUNERT. Then, as I understand it, you were on either a No. 2 or No. 3 Alert prior to their going on a sabotage alert?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. They were all out there at their airplanes, the telephones were all in, and the connections were made through to the control center.

125. General GRUNERT. That must have been a practice alert, then?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. Well, it was—no, sir, it wasn't a practice alert. It was just the regular alert. We were all set there until about December the 1st, for operations.

126. General GRUNERT. How about the time when you left in October?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. I don't remember that.

127. General GRUNERT. Then it is hearsay on your part?

General DAVIDSON. That is hearsay, yes, sir, on my part.

128. General GRUNERT. But you do not know whether they were [4150] actually on that alert or not, prior, up to December 1st?

General DAVIDSON. I couldn't say first-hand, no, sir.

129. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

130. Major CLAUSEN. I had one, sir.

Did you ever discuss, sir, with General Short why he operated the A. W. S. only from four to seven a. m.?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I never did. Those were his orders, though.

131. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else you might tell the Board that might be of value to it in coming to conclusions on those things in which you had any responsibility in the Hawaiian Department?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. General Short was, I would say, much more active than any other person over there in trying to get the Island in a state of readiness. He built these earthen bunkers and had gotten the ground troops to building fortifications all around the Island, and seemed to be much more alert to the danger of an attack than anyone else, I would say.

132. General GRUNERT. While you were in the States, from October until you started back to Hawaii, you must have been reading the papers and getting some conception of the strained relations, we shall call them, between Japan and the United States; so when you got back to Hawaii were you surprised that they were simply on a sabotage alert and not any other alert? Did that go through your mind?

General DAVIDSON. Not particularly, no, sir.

133. General GRUNERT. Then, you were not particularly impressed with the seriousness or imminence of probable war [4151] between Japan and the United States?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I was not.

134. General GRUNERT. But you did read the papers and get whatever you could in the United States, did you?

General DAVIDSON. Well, we were traveling around a lot, General, and I didn't get much of an impression over here that the relations were so badly strained as they were.

135. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you were concerned, while you were up in Seattle or while you were in Washington or New York, there was no particular indication of anything coming?

General DAVIDSON. As far as I am concerned, that is true.

136. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

I thank you very much for coming.

General DAVIDSON. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11 a. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, proceeded to other business.)

[4152]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and conducted the further hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH P. McDONALD, TECHNICIAN FOURTH-CLASS;
580TH AIRCRAFT WARNING; APO 958, c/o POSTMASTER, SAN
FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. McDonald, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Mr. McDONALD. T-4; Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, 580th Aircraft Warning, APO 958, care Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

2. General GRUNERT. Sergeant, in this particular investigation, General Frank will ask the questions, and the other Members of the Board will interject any questions they see fit; so just listen to what General Frank has to say and give him the answers to his questions.

3. General FRANK. You are back here on furlough, Sergeant?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. To what do you belong, now?

Mr. McDONALD. I still belong to 580th Aircraft Warning.

4. General FRANK. To what did you belong in December 1941?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, I was still with the 580th Aircraft [4153] Warning. It was just a company at the time and was just being organized. We just built up this information center about six months before, and we were assigned to certain jobs, and I happened to be communication man, switchboard operator.

5. General FRANK. Were you on duty the morning of the attack, December 7?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

6. General FRANK. Where?

Mr. McDONALD. At the information center—well, fighter control.

7. General FRANK. Where was this information center at which you were on duty?

Mr. McDONALD. It was located in Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

8. General FRANK. And it was the temporary information center that had been set up at that time and from which exercises had been held along back in October?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. You ran the private branch exchange switchboard?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

10. General FRANK. Do you have pretty clearly in your mind what happened on the morning of December 7?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, sir, I have written it so many times I imagine I have it memorized.

11. General FRANK. All right. Will you tell us about it?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, I was on duty. I went on duty at five o'clock the night before and I was on duty all night, up until 7:30 the morning of December 7; and at 7:20 I received a call from our unit on the north shore. I think [4154] the unit was 6-QM.

12. General FRANK. That was at Opana Point?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

13. General FRANK. Proceed.

Mr. McDONALD. I did not realize at the time that there was anybody in the building, so I wrote the message down, and when I turned around,

the clock was right behind me in the next room, it was in the corner, and I turned around to time the message, and I saw Lieutenant Tyler, and he was sitting at the plotting table. He was supposed to go off duty at eight o'clock, and he was just sitting there. Everybody went home, and that was the first day we had off in over a month, and so the guys went home about seven o'clock. I mean the plotters. They worked all along for a month there. They were working from 4 o'clock in the morning all the way through to dusk, and December 7 was the first day they got off in the month.

Well, when I received the call, I wrote it down, and I brought it up to the lieutenant. I am not quite sure whether I read it to him, or handed it. I think I read it to him. Any way, the lieutenant looked at it afterwards, and I expressed that it was the first time I ever received anything like this. I said, "Do you think we ought to do anything about it?" So I wanted to call back the plotters. I mean they didn't have much practice there all along, and when this fellow called in he expressed it to be "an awful big flight."

14. General FRANK. Tell us what the message was.

Mr. McDONALD. Says, "Large number of planes coming in from the north, three points east," and he really expressed; [4155] so after I told the lieutenant, he just, he didn't say nothing; so I went back to the telephone, and I talked to the man on the unit again.

15. General FRANK. That is, you talked to the man at Opana?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir; and he just repeated the message, and I went in and I told the lieutenant again. I said, "Sir, I would appreciate it very much if you would answer the phone"; and after he was finished with his conversation—

16. General FRANK. He answered the telephone?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir. After he was finished with his conversation, I asked him, "What do you think it is?" He said, "It's nothing." We learned later he was expecting bombers in from the States. Well, we thought he knew.

Sir, I don't mean to accuse this man, by any means. I am just trying to express it just the way I did, because I, when I wrote this message out, I wrote it up for a department signal, Hawaiian Department signal, and before I signed it, I brought it down and had him look it over.

17. General FRANK. You had whom look it over?

Mr. McDONALD. This lieutenant, Lt. Tyler; because I felt that anything that I do say was against him.

18. General FRANK. Did you make any comment to him as to whether you thought there might be something real about it?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, sir, I did. I said, "It's the first time I have ever received anything like this, and it looks kind of strange." I don't know the exact words I used; but anyway, I took this. I was relieved at 7:30, so I took this message with me. By the way, it was the first time I ever did that, but I wanted to show the fellows, up [4156] at the tent; so they all saw it; and when the planes were coming over there, I began to get a little shaky, especially when everybody was saying it was Wheeler Field on maneuvers; but when they started coming down and diving all around, I just started running for the nearest pile.

Anyway, after we realized, we went into the tent and turned on the radio. Everybody knew it was war, because the announcer was

saying, "Oahu is under attack!" So I ran down to the information center, and I gave the message to Lieutenant White. That was my communication officer and commanding officer, and he brought it up to the controller, my controller.

19. General FRANK. Who was the controller at that time?

Mr. McDONALD. I am not sure, sir, but I think it was a Major Bergquist.

20. General FRANK. Had he reached the information center by this time?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

21. General FRANK. What time was this?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, it was only a couple of minutes after the attack, because he came from Wheeler Field, and he said he was strafed and everything coming down.

22. General FRANK. Well, it would take more than a couple of minutes to come from Wheeler Field. That is 20 miles away.

Mr. McDONALD. Well, it must have been about a half an hour, by the time. It was about a half an hour; but anyway, he came down. He questioned me.

23. General FRANK. So, as it really turned out, the man at the radar station at Opana Point probably had really picked up the attacking Japanese force on the oscilloscope, and this [4157] was his report of it; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

24. General FRANK. And the lieutenant, when you showed him the message, had assumed that it was these B-17s coming in from the States, is that correct?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

25. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, this Lieutenant Tyler, who was in there, was in there for instruction, was he not?

Mr. McDONALD. I think he was, sir. I only saw him around there, I think that was about the second time I saw him. I knew he didn't understand, because he was—well, all those lieutenants just come down there, and they just learn by just looking at the men working.

26. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, it really wasn't your assigned duty to call these things to their attention, but your assigned duty was really just to man the switchboard?

Mr. McDONALD. I don't know, sir. Just commented. That's about what anybody would do.

27. General FRANK. When the information center really got to working, there were other men assigned around, plotting on the boards, whose duty it was to do what you were doing at this time, is that correct?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir. Well, I just got the thing. As soon as I got the information, I just brought it in to the lieutenant, and I just—well, I just expressed it, "I never had anything like this before."

28. General FRANK. All right, Sergeant.

29. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

[4158] 30. General RUSSELL. Who was Lieutenant White?

Mr. McDONALD. He was our communication officer, sir

31. General RUSSELL. Did he go on duty in the information center that morning when you went off, Sergeant?

Mr. McDONALD. He went on at 8 o'clock, I think; usually came around about a quarter of eight or 8 o'clock.

32. General RUSSELL. Did he go on every day?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir; he was our communication officer, sir, and he really lived up to his last name.

33. General RUSSELL. How about this Lieutenant Tyler? Is that his name, Lieutenant Tyler?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

34. General RUSSELL. Were you two the only two men in the information center that morning?

Mr. McDONALD. As far as I know; yes, sir.

35. General RUSSELL. You had been in there since the night before, at 5 o'clock?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

36. General RUSSELL. And this lieutenant had been in there all that time with you?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir; he came on about 4 o'clock in the morning.

37. General RUSSELL. Had anybody been in there up until 4 o'clock, except you?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir. There was a guard outside.

38. General RUSSELL. Normally, when you would get messages over the telephone, didn't you have somebody there to put them up on a board of some sort?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir. In case I ever got any messages, [4159] I had all the information I wanted, in book form, and if I didn't understand, I could contact Lieutenant White, or contact any of the officers around.

39. General RUSSELL. Was there always an officer there after four o'clock in the morning?

Mr. McDONALD. After 4 o'clock? When we went on the alert, why, there were.

40. General RUSSELL. I mean before this morning.

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir; they usually came on about 7:30 or 8 o'clock.

41. General FRANK. On this particular morning, the information center had been manned, there had been some people up there to run it, from 4 to 7, had there not?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

42. General FRANK. About how many?

Mr. McDONALD. I judge there were about 15.

43. General FRANK. And they went off at what time?

Mr. McDONALD. They went off at 7.

44. General FRANK. They went off at 7 o'clock? Well, how did you happen to stay there?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, I was on duty until 7:30; and you see it was Sunday morning, and they didn't eat—my relief didn't eat breakfast until about 7 or 7:15, so I had to wait until about 7:30.

45. General FRANK. And the people who had been manning it from 4 to 7 had left, and you and the lieutenant were the only ones left of those who had been there from 4 to 7, is that correct?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

[4160] 46. General RUSSELL. How long had you been working in the center?

Mr. McDONALD. I was working there for about four months before that.

47. General RUSSELL. Had the other soldiers been working along with you for those four months?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir; everybody.

48. General RUSSELL. The same crew would be in there every morning?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir. Most of them were trained men.

49. General RUSSELL. Now, you say that you did not have a day off. I do not know whether that got in the record, what you meant about that, or not. Was everybody going to quit, that day, Sunday, December 7?

Mr. McDONALD. No. They didn't have to pull their shift—I mean, they pull it until 7 o'clock in the morning, and then they would have the rest of the day off on Sunday.

50. General RUSSELL. But all the other days, they stayed on after 7 o'clock, they all did?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

51. Colonel TOULMIN. What was the reason, Sergeant, for their getting off on that particular day?

Mr. McDONALD. I could not understand it, sir. I just happened to be unlucky, I guess.

52. Colonel TOULMIN. Had they had a day off at any other time prior to that?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, I don't think there were any passes for a month before that. I am not quite sure about that, sir. I think most of the men never got passes.

[4161] 53. Colonel TOULMIN. During the preceding month was the aircraft warning service working all right?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir; it was all working. We used to pick up the clippers and everything else.

54. Colonel TOULMIN. It was doing all it was supposed to do, then?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

55. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

General RUSSELL. Would it work all day, Sergeant?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir. Most all day long, the radar was on.

56. General RUSSELL. You had been in there almost every day up until this December 7?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

57. General RUSSELL. After 7 o'clock in the morning, you continued to stay on, there, every day, is that right?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir. We changed. We had different shifts.

58. General RUSSELL. But when you would go off duty, some other boys would come in?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

59. General RUSSELL. All right.

60. General FRANK. On this particular morning had there been any reports of flights in the air from 4 to 7?

Mr. McDONALD. That was the first I received, sir.

61. General FRANK. Would you receive them? Wouldn't they go directly to the board?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, yes, sir; they have their tactical phone. It goes right to the plotting board.

[4162] 62. General FRANK. So, while the board is manned and in operation, these messages coming in would go directly to the telephone on the board and would not come to you; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir; that is tactical.

63. General FRANK. And this one happened to come to you because the people at the board had left, and it came to your telephone exchange?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

64. Colonel TOULMIN. Who called you from the outlying station, do you know?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, sir, it was Joe Lockard.

65. Colonel TOULMIN. And what did he say?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, at first they just said, "There's a large number of planes coming in from the north, three points east," and then when I returned to the phone, he said, "Hey! Mac!" Then he expressed it again, the same message.

66. Colonel TOULMIN. Was he calm, or excited, or what?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir; he was excited. He said he never saw so many planes, so many flashes on the 'scope.

67. Colonel TOULMIN. When you gave him back the information to "forget it," or something to that effect, what did he say?

Mr. McDONALD. Well, the Lieutenant talked to him last, sir.

68. Colonel TOULMIN. I see. That is all.

69. MAJOR CLAUSEN. Do you have any way, Sergeant, of fixing the exact time that you received this call first from Lockard?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir. When I turned around, to time the message, it was 7:20.

70. Major CLAUSEN. You are pretty sure of that?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

71. Major CLAUSEN. You saw that time on the clock?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

72. Major CLAUSEN. Was that the time you wrote on the message?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

73. Major CLAUSEN. Did you work on any other stations connected with the radar besides this information center?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir. We had our definite jobs. We all helped put up a radar, then we were assigned to different jobs.

74. Major CLAUSEN. This was a mobile radar station?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

75. General GRUNERT. Sergeant, had there been previous tests and exercises using the communication center?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir.

76. General GRUNERT. And how did it work—all right?

Mr. McDONALD. Yes, sir; it worked.

77. General GRUNERT. Do you know how many stations they used in those exercises, how many radar stations outside of the communication center?

Mr. McDONALD. I imagine they used them all, sir.

78. General GRUNERT. And how many would be all, do you know?

Mr. McDONALD. There were about five or six; I am not quite sure.

79. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? Sergeant, do you know of anything else that you might have in your mind that you would like to tell the Board, that may be of help to it?

Mr. McDONALD. No, sir.

80. General GRUNERT. All right; thank you for coming down.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[4164] **TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. MARTIN F. SCANLON,
U. S. ARMY**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General SCANLON. Martin F. Scanlon; Brigadier General, U. S. Army. At present, I have an Evaluation Board, covering the Pacific Ocean Area.

2. General GRUNERT. General, on this particular part of the investigation, General Russell will propound the questions, and the Board will interject any questions that seem to be pertinent.

3. General RUSSELL. General, where were you on duty on the 27th and 28th days of November, 1941?

General SCANLON. In the War Department, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, A-2.

4. General RUSSELL. Do you recall any conferences that were held on the 27th or 28th, for the purpose of preparing messages to send to air installations throughout the world?

General SCANLON. There were no conferences. I was instructed on the morning of the 28th to prepare a message to be sent out to all air bases and air commands, to warn them to guard against sabotage, subversive action, and espionage; and the message was delivered to me, either by the secretary of the staff, or the Chief of the Air Staff; I am not sure which.

5. General RUSSELL. Who directed you to prepare that message?

General SCANLON. It came from General Arnold, through [4165] either his Chief of Air Staff, or the secretary to the staff.

6. General RUSSELL. That was the message for you to prepare a message, which reached you in that way?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, will you go ahead and tell us about the preparation of the message, its history, and so forth.

General SCANLON. Well, I received this message—I can't remember, I don't recall Arnold told me himself—from this Chief of Staff, to prepare this message and have it ready by noon; and I called in Major Blake and Major Beatty.

8. General GRUNERT. Just a minute. May I get that straightened out? It was not from the Chief of Staff, it was from General Arnold's Chief of Staff?

General SCANLON. From the Chief of the Air Staff.

Blake was then in the Chief of the Air Corps' office, and counter-intelligence, and Major Beatty was over with the Combat Command, in the intelligence section; and I asked them to come in so that they could make the rough draft of a message dealing with this type of instruction, as they were more familiar with it. It came under counter-intelligence. On the completion of that message, I reviewed it, and, I think, made some changes in it, and then took it to General Miles, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army, for coordination.

[4166] 9. General RUSSELL. He was what?

General SCANLON. No. I am sorry. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. And General Miles didn't agree with what I had written. He thought it was too strong, and I felt that it should be strong because aircraft and aircraft engines were more subject to sabotage than most other things in the service.

10. General FRANK. Will you state, before you proceed any further, what created the necessity for this message?

General SCANLON. The critical situation between ourselves and Japan at the time.

11. General FRANK. Well, I thought this had to do with some sabotage that they had discovered on engines.

General SCANLON. There had been sabotage on some of the aircraft or the engines that were going out west, but I don't know—I am not familiar with just what it was.

12. General RUSSELL. Well, in order that we can clear up the question, now, that General Frank has raised, do you recall exactly what was said to you, and by whom, which resulted in your calling in these other two officers to prepare a message?

General SCANLON. No; my memory doesn't serve me well enough. I just know that I was directed to do this, and I started to do it.

13. General RUSSELL. Were you told orally or in writing to do it?

General SCANLON. Orally.

14. General RUSSELL. Orally. And by the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces?

General SCANLON. That is right; either by him or the Secretary of the Air Staff.

[4167] 15. General RUSSELL. You do not recall which one?

General SCANLON. I don't recall, no.

16. General RUSSELL. Nor do you recall the subject matter of the conversation?

General SCANLON. No. I was simply told to prepare a message along the lines that I indicated a few minutes ago.

17. General RUSSELL. Well, will you reindicate that?

General SCANLON. To warn our various installations to be on guard against sabotage, subversive action, and espionage.

18. General RUSSELL. And did they state why they wanted their installations to be on guard against these things?

General SCANLON. No, not to my recollection.

19. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, then, we have got to the place where you took a message over to the Assistant Chief, Assistant—

General SCANLON. Assistant.

20. General RUSSELL. —Chief of Staff, G-2, General Miles?

General SCANLON. Yes.

21. General RUSSELL. Have you got a copy of that original draft?

General SCANLON. I think, yes. I think that is the original draft [indicating].

22. General RUSSELL. Would you read it into the record for us, General?

General SCANLON. This was from Army Air Force, A-2, to the Air Adjutant General, Cable Section, 1941, 11/28:

[4168] (Message from Army Air Force, A-2, to the Air Adjutant General, Cable Section, dated 11/28/41, as follows:)

It is requested that the following instructions be transmitted by cable to the Commanding General of each Overseas Department and Air Base Command:

"1. The world situation requires immediate attention to the problem of taking the necessary preventative measures to guard against sabotage, subversion, and espionage in all echelons of the Army Air Forces.

"2. It is desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the complete protection of your establishments and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversion propaganda, and protection of all activities against espionage.

"3. Further desired that reports of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions be submitted to the Chief, Army Air Forces on or before December 5, 1941."

And then it's:

five nineteen forty-one. end.

That's written out.

23. General RUSSELL. That was to be signed by whom?

General SCANLON. Well, that would have been sent out by the Adjutant General, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. Of the Army?

General SCANLON. Of the Army.

25. General RUSSELL. Adams.

[4169] General SCANLON. It would go to our Air Adjutant General, who would then transmit it through the Army Adjutant General.

26. General RUSSELL. But as originally designated, only air installations would have been reached, or did you say the Commanding General of Overseas Departments and air bases?

General SCANLON. In this message it said,

Overseas Department and Air Base Command.

27. General RUSSELL. All right.

General SCANLON. Then there were other messages sent out: one to the Chief of Air Corps. It is a memorandum directing him to take steps because certain installations came under his control and not under the Chief of the Army Air Force.

28. General GRUNERT. And they pertained to the continental United States?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir. They were matériel command and that one out in Los Angeles: Western Defense Command.

29. General RUSSELL. Then, as initially conceived, as I understand it, General, you designed this message in the form which you have read and intended that it reach, in the main, only air commanders?

General SCANLON. Air commanders it what it was for.

30. General RUSSELL. Yes. All right. Now, then, you submitted that message to General Miles?

General SCANLON. General Miles. And he thought it was too strong, and he wanted to change it.

31. General RUSSELL. What part of it did he object to as being too strong?

General SCANLON. Well, I can't remember offhand, but he wanted also to add in that no illegal measures would be taken and that no steps would be taken to unduly alarm the civilian [4170] population, and we hashed that over practically all afternoon and finally

submitted it to General Bryden, who was then Deputy Chief of the Staff, who eventually approved it, and I then took it back to the Chief of the Air Staff, who turned it over to the Air Adjutant General.

32. General RUSSELL. Now let us be clear in our statement, please, General. After debate lasting almost all afternoon, you reached an agreement for an amended message?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

33. General RUSSELL. Not your message but an amended message?

General SCANLON. Well, it ended up with being practically, I think, identically the same message that the G-2 had sent out, simply adding the paragraph requesting that we be informed as to what measures had been taken to comply with this by the 5th of December.

34. General RUSSELL. Well, we are injecting another message into our story now. Let us stay on the single track. A message was prepared, and it was not the one that you carried over, but it was an amended message, and it went to some superior air force headquarters for approval; is that right?

General SCANLON. No, sir, it didn't go to any superior air force headquarters for approval. It went to the Chief of the Air Staff for issue through the Air Adjutant General, then through the Army Adjutant General.

35. General RUSSELL. During the course of those discussions during that afternoon of November 28 was General Arnold there and participating?

[4171] General SCANLON. No, sir; he didn't see the message. He left the office shortly before noon.

36. General RUSSELL. Where were these discussions? In the office of G-2, or where?

General SCANLON. With General Miles in General Bryden's office directly after lunch, and then later on again after we had finally written the thing to make it exactly like the War Department message.

37. General RUSSELL. How did you happen to come to go over to G-2's office at all?

General SCANLON. Well, A-2 was a stepchild and required to coordinate everything with G-2, and we didn't have any—

38. General RUSSELL. This message that you have just read is the one you took to G-2?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

39. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, have you the message which was agreed upon by you and G-2 and which was submitted to General Bryden for final approval?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir. This is it here [indicating].

40. General RUSSELL. Would you read that into the record for us?

General SCANLON. "Air Adjutant General, Cable Section." Let us see. It starts out, "Army Air Forces, A-2," to Air Adjutant General, Cable Section, 1941, 11/28:

[4172] (Message of November 28, 1941, submitted to General Bryden for approval, to Air Adjutant General, Cable Section, is as follows:)

1. It is requested that a cable substantially as follows be sent to the Commanding General of each Overseas Department and Air Base Command:

"Desire that instructions substantially as follows be issued to all units and establishments under your command and control colon

"Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department parenthesis see paragraph three MID SR thirty dash forty five end parenthesis stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for the protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop

"Further desired that reports of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces on or before December five nineteen forty one end."

Now, then, there is a record here of the places to which this was sent, sir.

[4173] 41. General RUSSELL. General, just for the sake of uniformity in the record, could you be mistaken about that message which you have just read being the message that was finally sent?

General SCANLON. That was not the one that was finally sent, evidently, but that is the one that we turned over to them to send, and when it went to the Adjutant General's it must have been changed again, because I have a copy of the message that was received in Honolulu.

42. General RUSSELL. All right. Now let us wait just a minute and see who these Adjutants General are to whom the message you have just read went. Who were they?

General SCANLON. The Air Adjutant General was Colonel Dick.

43. General RUSSELL. Colonel Dick.

General SCANLON. Well, that is given as 484 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; and to the Commanding General, USAF Far East, it is message 647; and the C. G., Caribbean Defense Command, message No. 475; and the C. G., Alaskan Defense Command, it doesn't have any number.

44. General RUSSELL. That message which you just read, then, as read, was sent to the C. G. of the Hawaiian Department as message No. 484?

General SCANLON. That is what it states here on this note from the Air Adjutant General, yes.

45. General RUSSELL. It may be that we can straighten out the confusion along the lines suggested by General Frank.

Now, then, have you another message that was sent that day, General?

General SCANLON. There was a message, a memorandum sent [4174] the Chief of the Air Corps and a message sent to the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command.

46. General RUSSELL. Was there another message sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department that day, except the one you have just read?

General SCANLON. Not to my knowledge.

47. General RUSSELL. Well, when I was talking to you a moment ago you made the response that the message which you have just read, and as now described as message 484, was not the message that was actually sent, but the Adjutants General revised the message and sent another. Now, have you a copy of another message?

General SCANLON. Well, I have a copy of the message that was received in Honolulu as 484, but I have not compared them, I just

got these things together. But I don't believe they are exactly the same. It may have been in a paraphrase and it has been changed.

48. General RUSSELL. General, I think we had better confine our testimony for the moment to one or the other of these messages. We are attempting to determine who prepared the message which is 484. Do you recognize the message 484 as being the one which you prepared?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

49. General RUSSELL. And submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff, and it was approved and sent out?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

50. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, then, General, I will ask you whether or not you approved or prepared another message, which was sent out under No. 482, to the Commanding General of [4175] the Hawaiian Department.

General SCANLON. No, sir; I had nothing to do with that, sir.

51. General RUSSELL. How do you explain the fact that two different messages dealing with substantially the same subject matter were sent by the same office, the Adjutant General of the Army?

General SCANLON. The original of 482 I believe was sent out on instructions from the Chief of Staff of the Army, and General Arnold decided he wanted to send a message to all the Air Force Commands and installations.

52. General RUSSELL. Can you tell the date and the hour when 484 was dispatched from Washington?

General SCANLON. No; I have not got that, but it was not dispatched until that evening sometime.

53. General RUSSELL. Have you any record there about 482 at all, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department?

General SCANLON. I simply have a copy of the message No. 482 which I obtained in Hawaii before leaving there.

54. General RUSSELL. Had you ever seen message 482 prior to the time you saw it in Hawaii?

General SCANLON. I had seen the draft which had been sent out and was shown me by General Miles.

55. General RUSSELL. Did the Air Corps people, as such, have anything to do with the preparation of or approval of the message 482?

General SCANLON. Not to my knowledge.

56. General RUSSELL. Will you read to us, or into the record, message 482 which you have and which you testified you obtained in Hawaii?

[4176] (Message No. 482, dated November 28, 1941, to C. G., Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., from Adams, is as follows:)

General SCANLON (reading):

Secret.

114 WAR KR 189 WD PRTY.

WASHINGTON, D. C., 842P, November 28, 1941.

C G

HAWN DEPT.

Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and

equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

Signed, "Adams."

57. General RUSSELL. Now, you obtained this 482, you say, from what source?

[4177] General SCANLON. If I am not mistaken, General Miles showed me that copy of 482 during the changes in the original message which I had brought to him.

58. General RUSSELL. Now, where did you get the copy that you have in your book?

General SCANLON. I obtained this copy—this copy here I obtained from the Adjutant General's files at Fort Shafter on Friday last, whatever date that was.

59. General RUSSELL. In other words, you picked up 482 in Hawaii?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

60. General RUSSELL. Where did you get 484, once more?

General SCANLON. I got that from the 7th Air Force Adjutant General's files in Hawaii.

61. General RUSSELL. But 484 was addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, too?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

62. General RUSSELL. All right. Now then, a little bit about the message, your original draft. Would you let me see that, please, General?

Now, your original draft is in three paragraphs. Paragraph 1 merely states that the world situation requires attention to prevent sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

63. General RUSSELL. In substance.

The second paragraph directs that all such measures as are necessary to protect against these things be taken.

General SCANLON. That is right, sir.

64. General RUSSELL. And the third, to report to you what had [4178] been done to carry out paragraph 2.

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

65. General RUSSELL. That is what it was. Now, when that got over to G-2, he added on all of these other things which you are talking about? He placed them in the message?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir. No illegal measures should be taken, and that no steps should be taken to unduly alarm the civil populace, I believe.

66. General RUSSELL. "Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security."

Now, then, what was meant or what was developed in this conference as to the meaning of, "Illegal measures are not authorized"?

General SCANLON. Well, I am not sure, but I think it referred to the fact that it was divided between Army, Navy, and F. B. I., and we were not to go outside our authority in taking any steps. We were also not to take any steps against civilians. I think General

Miles was afraid that somebody might get over-excited and start throwing a lot of civilians in jail.

67. General RUSSELL. Yes. "Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security." What sort of a delimitation on activity did that language convey?

General SCANLON. I am not sure of that.

68. General RUSSELL. Do you recall any discussions about that? (A document was handed to General Scanlon.)

69. General RUSSELL. I will point it out to you (indicating).

70. General SCANLON. Surely.

[4179] 71. General RUSSELL. "Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security." Do you know what you had in mind?

General SCANLON. I am not sure; I can't recall what was in mind.

72. General RUSSELL. You don't recall any discussion about that?

General SCANLON. No, sir.

73. General RUSSELL. "Avoiding unnecessary publicity."

General SCANLON. Well, they didn't want any unnecessary publicity because of the effect it might have in disturbing the public.

74. General RUSSELL. Now, all of those three things were put in there by G-2 of the General Staff?

General SCANLON. Yes.

75. General RUSSELL. And the Air Corps as such, as represented by you, did not suggest them and, so far as you know, was not interested in them?

General SCANLON. Well, we were interested in getting out a message to warn these people to take such steps as necessary to protect themselves.

76. General RUSSELL. But you, as you have conceived the message and originally prepared it, didn't throw about it any of the limitations that eventually were thrown about it?

General SCANLON. No, sir.

77. General GRUNERT. I would like to ask a question there: What took this long time in discussing, then, how the message should be worded? It took, as I gathered, about half a day or more in discussing the wording of the message. What were the [4180] disagreements?

General SCANLON. Well, I was anxious to send it in as was, and General Miles was anxious to tone it down and put in these restrictions.

78. General GRUNERT. Did you have any objection to the restrictions? If so, what were they?

General SCANLON. Well, I didn't want to put any restrictions in, to begin with, and I thought that the message as outlined in general was sufficient.

79. General GRUNERT. Then, you had nothing back of it except you wanted to have more teeth in the message than you thought that would put in there; is that right?

General SCANLON. That is correct, sir.

80. General GRUNERT. All right; go ahead.

81. General RUSSELL. Now, there is another statement here, General, that we might like to be enlightened on:

against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department parenthesis see paragraph three MID SR thirty dash forty five end parenthesis.

General SCANLON. Well, that is the one that delineates the responsibility of the War Department, the Navy, and the F. B. I.

82. General RUSSELL. And you think that reference and the reference to refrain from taking illegal measures mean the same thing?

General SCANLON. No, sir. I was incorrect when I said that in regard to illegal measures.

83. General RUSSELL. Well, we have wondered just what was [4181] meant by that term, "illegal measures," General. Do you have any recollection now of the suggestions about it in this conference?

General SCANLON. I think it was simply to try and prevent commanding officers taking any steps against civilians.

84. General GRUNERT. Might it have been to avoid doing something that was not authorized by law, or prohibited by law, in the line of tapping wires or anything like that?

General SCANLON. I think that is correct.

85. General RUSSELL. Now, General, as I read this message, apparently you people were just interested in the protection of your property and the installations. That was all you were attempting to effectuate by sending this message?

General SCANLON. That is all.

86. General RUSSELL. Did you know at the time that it went out that a message had gone out from the Chief of Staff of the Army the day before to the Commanding Generals of the Departments, and some others possibly, or certainly to the Commanding Generals of the Overseas Departments to the west, in which certain instructions were contained and certain enemy information had been given?

General SCANLON. I did not know it until I had taken my message to General Miles for coordination.

87. General RUSSELL. At that time did the message of the Chief of Staff of the 27th of November come in for discussion?

General SCANLON. At that time he stated that he had sent a message, a similar message, out the day before, which was much milder, and he thought mine was too strong; and that I insisted that I thought it should be strong, that our aircraft [4182] was more subject to sabotage than a great many other things.

88. General RUSSELL. Well, now, there were two messages that went out on the 27th. One was a rather short message which went from G-2 of the General Staff to the G-2s of the Overseas Departments. And for the purpose of this testimony we shall confine it to the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

89. General RUSSELL. Now, there were two messages—I will repeat, General—that went out on the 27th of November. I shall read

you a G-2 message first. That was from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, in this language:

Advise only the C. G. and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin.

Now, was that the message that General Miles was talking to you about?

General SCANLON. No, sir.

90. General RUSSELL. Well, there was another message.

General SCANLON. I do not think that is the message he was talking to me about.

91. General RUSSELL. Let me call your attention to another message which went out on the 27th.

General SCANLON. Because I don't remember ever having seen the message.

92. General RUSSELL. Have you ever heard of that message before?

General SCANLON. I don't remember.

[4183] (Message dated November 27, 1941, from Marshall:)

93. General RUSSELL. Let me read you another message:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

. Did you ever hear anything like that?

Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Did you ever hear of that message?

General SCANLON. I do not remember having seen that, at the time. I have seen it, since.

94. General RUSSELL. Could you identify for us what message General Miles did refer to when he told you he had already sent a message?

General SCANLON. Yes; in a large book, here, sir.

95. General RUSSELL. Your book?

General SCANLON. If I am not mistaken, the message that [4184] he referred to was what is known as "482," because this is a copy of the message that I got, at the time.

96. General RUSSELL. Have you got a copy of that message?

General SCANLON. Well, it is not given down here as "482." It is in this form, here.

97. General RUSSELL. It appears, therefore, General, that you went over and had a conference, and out of that conference came message 484, and it was sent, was it?

General SCANLON. 484; yes, sir.

98. General RUSSELL. And General Miles told you then that he had sent another message, and it is now your opinion that it was the one you have just shown to me, which in your book is referred to as message "482"?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

99. General RUSSELL. And the two messages which I read you a moment ago as having gone out on the 27th of November, so far as you now know, you never saw either one of those?

General SCANLON. I don't remember them, at that time.

100. General GRUNERT. I can readily understand, then, why G-2 objected to sending your message, if he had already sent an almost identical message on the same day, which I understand was 482.

General SCANLON. Well, General Arnold wanted a special message to cover the Air Forces, from the Air Force.

101. General GRUNERT. And then that special message to cover what General Arnold wanted, was 484?

General SCANLON. 484; yes, sir.

102. General GRUNERT. I get it, now.

[4185] 103. General RUSSELL. And the thing that actually occurred, General, was that G-2 insisted upon an amendment of 484 to bring it in line with his message, 482?

General SCANLON. To bring it to practically the same as 482, except for the additional paragraph requiring a report as to what steps had been taken to comply with it.

104. General RUSSELL. But you do recall definitely that General Miles objected to your original draft, because he thought the message was too strong?

General SCANLON. Yes, sir.

105. General RUSSELL. And did not have these limitations to it?

General SCANLON. That is right, sir.

106. General GRUNERT. Do any Members of the Board have anything further?

General, have you anything else that you might think of which would be of value to the Board?

General SCANLON. I do not think of anything now, sir.

107. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much for coming.

General SCANLON. I am "acquitted"?

108. General RUSSELL. General, I do want to ask one question on the record before you go. Do you recall who was in this G-2 conference which lasted almost all afternoon?

General SCANLON. I think Colonel Cooper, from my office, with me, and General Miles, and I am not sure whether General Gerow was in at the last or not; but I believe he was.

109. General RUSSELL. Where and when did you see General Bryden?

General SCANLON. I saw General Bryden directly after [4186] lunch, and then again about 4 o'clock, I believe.

110. General FRANK. Did he contribute anything to the message?

General SCANLON. No, sir.

111. General FRANK. Did he have any interest in it?

General SCANLON. Well, we were trying to get him to approve the message as it was finally drawn up, and which he eventually did.

112. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. DILLON, NATURALIZATION EXAMINER,
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALI-
ZATION SERVICE, NEWARK, N. J.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Dillon, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. DILLON. My name is James P. Dillon, and my home address is 624 High street, in Newark, N. J.

2. Colonel WEST. What is your occupation at present, Mr. Dillon?

Mr. DILLON. I am naturalization examiner in the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, stationed at Newark, N. J.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Dillon, General Frank will be assisted by Major Clausen in developing this particular part of our special investigation.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Dillon, you recall that I asked you some questions in the outer office?

[4187] Mr. DILLON. I do.

5. Major CLAUSEN. In February 1941 and in March 1941 you were in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, were you, sir?

Mr. DILLON. I was.

6. Major CLAUSEN. You were stationed at Honolulu, T. H.?

Mr. DILLON. Honolulu; that is right.

7. Major CLAUSEN. In what capacity?

Mr. DILLON. Naturalization examiner.

8. Major CLAUSEN. And you, while there, received a letter from the District Director of the Los Angeles District, dated February 20, 1941, by air mail, reading as follows:

(Letter, dated Feb. 20, 1941, to Dist. Director, T. H.):

DISTRICT DIRECTOR,
Honolulu, T. H.:

One Hans (or John) William Rohl, a native and citizen of Germany, is an applicant for United States citizenship in this District, and through his attorney has presented a photostatic copy of a letter addressed to him by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, Post Office Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H.

A copy of the photostat referred to is enclosed, from which it appears that Mr. Rohl's presence in Honolulu is desired in connection with secret contract #W-414-eng-602. In connection with our investigation concerning the applicant's qualifications for citizenship, and in order that appropriate recommendation be made to the court with reference to the matter, please ascertain whether Mr. Rohl at any time represented himself to Colonel Wyman, Jr., as a citizen of the United States.

[4188] A reply by airmail at your earliest convenience will be very much appreciated,

(Signed) WILLIAM A. CARMICHAEL,
*District Director,
Los Angeles District.*

That is the copy of the letter, which is in the official file that I have received from the Bureau of Immigration, at Los Angeles.

You received that, sir, did you?

Mr. DILLON. I did. I received the original of that; yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. While you were at Honolulu?

Mr. DILLON. In Honolulu. I was in Honolulu, at the immigration station.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And following the receipt of that letter, you did have a talk with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. DILLON. I did.

11. Major CLAUSEN. And what did you tell him, sir, and show him, concerning the letter, itself? Did you show him that letter? I mean this letter.

Mr. DILLON. My best memory is that I did show him that letter.

12. Major CLAUSEN. And where did this conversation take place?

Mr. DILLON. Either on the sixth or seventh floor of the Young Hotel building, in Honolulu.

13. Major CLAUSEN. And can you approximate the time when you had that conversation with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. DILLON. You mean in the day, or the date?

[4189] 14. Major CLAUSEN. No, I mean about the month, bearing in mind that this is February.

Mr. DILLON. Oh, by reference to a copy of this letter, it was in February, or early March, 1941.

15. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.

16. General FRANK. Are you sure there are seven floors to the Young building?

Mr. DILLON. No, I am not. No, I am not.

17. General GRUNERT. But it was somewhere in the Young building?

Mr. DILLON. It was on the top floor, I believe, or the next to the top floor, in Young's hotel building.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall when you approached Colonel Wyman whether he was with other military personnel?

Mr. DILLON. My best recollection is that he was with one or two other officers, and they were around an elbow-high plan or drafting table.

19. Major CLAUSEN. And do you recall, then, where it was that you had your conversation with him?

Mr. DILLON. I couldn't with definiteness state whether we went off a pace or two, or whether he continued on there at that table and I interrogated him there, or whether we went off to a little room. I can't recall.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Before you had your conversation with him, did you identify yourself as to who you were?

Mr. DILLON. I did.

21. Major CLAUSEN. And do you have that identification with you?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, I have. I carried this identification [4190] of the Department of Justice, indicating I was a naturalization examiner from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

22. Major CLAUSEN. And just what did you tell him with regard to Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. DILLON. Either I handed him the letter for him to read—

23. Major CLAUSEN. You mean this letter dated February 20, 1941?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, from our Los Angeles office; or I orally told him that we had received a communication from our Los Angeles office making inquiry regarding Rohl, and the fact that there were some suggestions he made a representation he was a United States citizen, and asking Colonel Wyman whether he knew about that, or whether

it was his understanding that he was a United States citizen. Now, he might have read the letter, and from the letter indicated what his understanding was about the representation.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Did you tell him that Rohl had an application for citizenship?

Mr. DILLON. Yes, I did—that he was an alien applicant.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Now, this conversation took some 10 to 30 minutes, is that correct, Mr. Dillon?

Mr. DILLON. That is approximately correct. It certainly was not more than 30 minutes.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Do you recall exactly, without referring to your reply to this letter of February 20, 1941, what the results of your findings were with respect to Colonel Wyman, and what he said to you, and what you said to him?

Mr. DILLON. Well, I returned to the immigration station [4191] and typed, myself, the substance of the information that he supplied me.

27. Major CLAUSEN. That letter to which you refer is this letter dated March 1, 1941, from yourself to the District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, at Honolulu, which in the lower left-hand corner indicates it was referred to the District Director at Los Angeles, on the same date, March 1, 1941, is that correct, sir?

Mr. DILLON. That's my report.

28. General GRUNERT. And that letter is already in our record, is it?

29. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. I have read it in evidence, sir.

Just take a look at the letter to which I invited your attention, Mr. Dillon, and state to the Board whether that is the identical letter which you sent in response to the letters from the District Director at Los Angeles.

Mr. DILLON. That is my report to my District Director, to be forwarded to the District Director at Los Angeles, as a result of my interview with Colonel Wyman.

30. Major CLAUSEN. And inviting your attention, Mr. Dillon, to the signature of James P. Dillon, in the lower right-hand corner, is that your signature?

Mr. DILLON. That is.

31. Major CLAUSEN. And to the signature of Mr. Strench, in the lower left-hand corner; is that the signature of Mr. Strench?

Mr. DILLON. I recognize his signature; yes.

32. Major CLAUSEN. Who was Mr. Strench?

[4192] Mr. DILLON. Mr. Strench was the District Director of Immigration and Naturalization for the Honolulu District.

33. Colonel TOULMIN. At that time?

Mr. DILLON. At that time.

34. Colonel TOULMIN. I notice the date on there, of March 1, 1941. Who put that rubber-stamp date on there, do you know?

Mr. DILLON. Mr. Strench's secretary.

35. Colonel TOULMIN. That was his custom, and it was the custom of your department, to have somebody put that rubber-stamp date on, when Strench certified a letter to be correct?

Mr. DILLON. I couldn't vouch for that, because his office was on the other side of the building, and I didn't see this file thereafter.

36. Colonel TOULMIN. Was it customary to have two signatures on a letter of this sort?

Mr. DILLON. No. Sometimes a covering letter would be written, independent of the report, and forwarded. Other times, to shorten the correspondence, he would just make a forwarding notation, as he did in this case.

37. Colonel TOULMIN. All right.

Major CLAUSEN. At this time, in conformance with the direction of General Frank, I will ask that the letter, dated March 1, 1941, to which the witness has referred, and which has been authenticated by the witness, be copied into the record at this point.

38. General FRANK. It is the letter to which the witness has referred as his original letter, bearing his original signature.

39. Colonel TOULMIN. And it is endorsed by his superior, when forwarded to the addressee.

[4193] 40. Major CLAUSEN. That is right, sir.

(The letter referred to, dated at Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1, 1941, is as follows:)

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1, 1941.

Airmail.

665/Rohl

DISTRICT DIRECTOR,
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Honolulu, T. H.:

Los Angeles File B-23-1876, HANS WILLIAM ROHL, Feb. 20, 1941.

In accordance with the directions contained in the above captioned letter, I called on Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, United States Army, for information regarding subject alien and particularly whether the alien applicant had ever in any manner represented or assumed himself to be a citizen of the United States.

Colonel Wyman in substance stated that he first became acquainted with the alien in California some time ago. That the Rohl-Connolly Company, with which the alien is associated had done construction work for the Department of the Interior in the Indian country as well as projects on the Colorado River. During the construction of a breakwater in the California area, Colonel Wyman came in contact more or less with Mr. Rohl. During those business relations in California, Colonel Wyman, assumed [4194] without any basis therefor, that Mr. Rohl was a citizen of the United States. He knew from hearsay that Rohl was born in Germany and that his father had been a professor of engineering in a German university. Colonel Wyman stated the applicant gathered about him in his organization only high-grade men. That the quality of his work was excellent. Contracts were always faithfully carried out. That Mr. Rohl was a man of integrity. His outstanding social diversion was yachting.

As a result of the national defense efforts, the Rohl-Connolly Company, W. E. Callahan Company and another group, organized the Hawaiian Constructors, Ltd., to procure construction contracts in Hawaii. It was in connection with one of these projects that Colonel Wyman wrote his letter of January 22, 1941, to Mr. Rohl. To summarize in a word, Colonel Wyman said the alien never represented himself to be a citizen of the United States and if there was any misunderstanding in that regard it was due to the assumption of such citizenship by the Colonel himself.

[SEAL]

(Signed) JAS. P. DILLON,
U. S. Naturalization Examiner.

Respectfully referred to—
District Director,
Los Angeles District.
(stamped :) MAR 1 1941

(Signed) W. G. STRENCH,
District Director,
Honolulu District.

(Stamped on face of letter :) RECEIVED MAR 11 1941

[4195] 41. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

42. General FRANK. Mr. Dillon, are you positive that in your conversation with Colonel Wyman you made him understand positively that Mr. Rohl was an alien?

Mr. DILLON. Very definitely, yes.

43. General FRANK. There is no question about that in your mind?

Mr. DILLON. None at all.

44. Colonel TOULMIN. What did Colonel Wyman say, when you told him that? Did he express surprise, or was it something he apparently already knew?

Mr. DILLON. No. From reading my report in the anteroom before I came into the hearing, Colonel Wyman appeared to be under the apprehension that Rohl was a citizen of the United States.

45. Major CLAUSEN. That is what he told you?

Mr. DILLON. Yes.

46. Major CLAUSEN. But you had no way of knowing whether that was a fact?

Mr. DILLON. No; I did not know what his state of mind was, except what he suggested.

47. General GRUNERT. Mr. Dillon, is there anything else that you think of, that you think the Board ought to know? Have you anything in mind that you would like to express to the Board on this particular subject, that might assist it in coming to a conclusion?

Mr. DILLON. I can't say that I have. My memory, of course, is commensurate with the time that has elapsed since my report in 1941. I haven't any occasion to have thought of [4196] the matter since that time, other than a broadcast that I mentioned out in the anteroom, to the Major, two or three months ago.

48. General GRUNERT. But there is no question in your mind as to the testimony you have given as to that record?

Mr. DILLON. None at all, sir.

49. General GRUNERT. Nor as to that letter which you signed?

Mr. DILLON. No, sir.

50. General GRUNERT. All right; thank you, very much.

Mr. DILLON. You are welcome.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[4197] **TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH CLARK GREW,
FORMER AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Grew, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. GREW. Joseph Clark Grew; official address, Department of State; personal address, 2840 Woodland Drive, Washington.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Grew, the Board very much appreciates your coming over. We wanted to come over to see you, but I understood you insisted on coming to us, and we appreciate it very much.

Mr. GREW. Very happy to!

3. General GRUNERT. In this particular part of our investigation I am going to ask General Russell to lead in asking the questions, and

then, if the rest of the Board have anything to add, they will interrupt or add, afterward.

4. General RUSSELL. You were formerly our Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; I was.

5. General RUSSELL. Would you state for the purpose of the record just what period of time was covered in that activity?

Mr. GREW. I was Ambassador to Japan, and I presented my credentials there on June 14, 1932. I functioned officially until December 7, 1941.

6. General RUSSELL. There was a very good reason for the termination of your services as Ambassador to Japan, on the 7th of December, 1941, was there, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. I would say, a compelling reason, General.

[4198] 7. General RUSSELL. During the period that you were out there as Ambassador to Japan, did you keep a diary of the events which you considered worthy of preserving?

Mr. GREW. I did, sir.

8. General RUSSELL. Later, did you embody the contents of that diary in a book which you published?

Mr. GREW. I did, sir—part of the contents.

9. General RUSSELL. It embodied only part of the contents?

Mr. GREW. A very small part, because there was not room for the voluminous diary which I kept during those years.

10. General RUSSELL. Mr. Ambassador, is the book which I have in my hand, and which I now exhibit to you, entitled "Ten Years in Japan," the book which was authored by you, with your diary as the basis?

Mr. GREW. It is, sir. It was based partly on my diary and partly on my official dispatches and telegrams.

11. General RUSSELL. Your relation with Washington was through the office of the Secretary of State, largely?

Mr. GREW. It was, sir.

12. General RUSSELL. It was our desire, Mr. Ambassador, that we have you identify this book, for the reason that the Board may want to incorporate in its record certain extracts from that book.

I wonder if you would be good enough to give the Board, very briefly, the trend in the development of the relations between the Japanese empire and the American Government, during your period of service as Ambassador to the Japanese empire, emphasizing, if you will, the trend in the years 1940 and 1941.

Mr. GREW. That, General, is a very broad subject, of [4199] course, and a very difficult subject to explain; I would say, to explain intelligently, in small compass. I would have to go into a great deal of background, I think, in order to give an adequate explanation of that trend.

However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during the period you mention; that is, the years 1940 and 1941; was almost steadily down-hill; we, of course, in our embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to arrest that trend; and I think everything was done that could possibly have arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But, we were up against what I would call a "tidal wave" of military

extremism in Japan; and I think the results as culminating in Pearl Harbor proved that fact.

13. General RUSSELL. When, in your opinion, did it become evident that war with Japan was inevitable?

Mr. GREW. I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it; and, not being a defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable, up to the last minute. So that I cannot mention any particular date, prior to December 7, 1941, when I felt that war was definitely inevitable.

14. General RUSSELL. During the course of your service as Ambassador to the Japanese empire, the United States invoked certain economic embargoes against the Japanese empire. I do not recall when the first of these was invoked, but I remember some difficulties or some action of that sort I believe in the year 1940. What were your views on these economic embargoes [4200] and their relation to the international situation between the Japanese empire and the American Government?

Mr. GREW. I would like to say, first, General, that those embargoes were exerted not by way of penalizing Japan, or, at that time, of thwarting Japan, but rather because of our own preparedness program and the fact that we ourselves needed the materials which were then embargoed.

During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan—and embargoes are in the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults—I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes. I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations with that country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might, and probably would, end in war; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I felt it would be very short-sighted to get into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abyssinian campaign.

But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt the time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to [4201] consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect; and, shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.

Our relations then started directly on a down-hill course, and they ended in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been two years earlier.

Does that answer your question, General?

15. General RUSSELL. Yes. It is true, though, that in this period of time when you were keeping the State Department advised of develop-

ments in the Japanese empire, you were insisting upon and pressing for adequate preparation militarily to implement the other policies?

Mr. GREW. I began to press for that, General, from the moment of my arrival in Japan in 1932, and I constantly kept developing that theme. I remember writing Mr. Stimson, who was then Secretary of State; I think it was in the latter part of 1932:

The Japanese army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it wants war!

I have forgotten the word I used, but as I recollect, at that time I said it would be criminally "short-sighted," I think, not to recognize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop in the Far East. Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches throughout the ten years of my service there, right up to the end.

16. General RUSSELL. What in your opinion were the views of the Japanese people as to whether the American Government was [4202] prepared to fight, or would fight, for what they considered to be the proper thing in the Pacific?

Mr. GREW. The Japanese people as a whole, General, discounted our intention to fight, or our ability to fight. They regarded us, no doubt based on the propaganda with which they had been filled, out there, as a "decadent nation," in which pacifism and isolationism practically ruled the policy of our Government. The Japanese propaganda machine took every good care to emphasize in the Japanese press all the speeches made by our isolationists and pacifists in this country, very often spreading big headlines in their newspapers, and they were very careful to publish nothing on the other side of the picture; so that the Japanese people received what I considered to be a totally wrong impression of the spirit of the American people and the possibility that if sufficiently provoked the United States might go to war, and would be capable of waging total war, if it did.

17. General RUSSELL. Mr. Ambassador, we have read your book, and we have made a study of the book "Peace and War" which was prepared under the supervision of the State Department, the most of which, as it relates to our dealings with Japan, is constructed around the information which you sent back from Japan. There are two or three things in this book which we want to impose on you for a minute to ask you about.

[4203] There is a message of January 27, '41, which is the message that some conversation was occurring between the consulates in Japan in which the Japanese source had stated that in event of trouble with the United States a mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese. We have wondered what the basis of that message might be.

Mr. GREW. General, the basis of that message was a statement made to a member of my staff by the Peruvian Minister in Tokyo, a man in whom I had full confidence, on the basis of reports which he had heard from Japanese sources. I do not know the actual sources from which he received that report, by name, but they were such that he placed a certain amount of weight upon them; and, while in imparting this information to the member of my staff the Minister said that he considered it a fantastic rumor, at the same time he felt that it was sufficiently important to justify his passing it on to me.

18. General RUSSELL. And the Peruvian Minister from whom you received the information was a man of such type and you attached importance to it to the extent that you forwarded that information to the Secretary of State?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir; he was a substantial man, a close personal friend of mine. I knew him very well, I had known him for years, and I was quite certain that he would not mislead me in anything that he might pass on to me.

19. General RUSSELL. Mr. Ambassador, jumping over the period of several months, we come to a message which you sent to the Secretary of State on the 3rd of November 1941, which has impressed us considerably. Do you remember that particular message?

[4204] Mr. GREW. I do, sir.

20. General RUSSELL. After the message had been sent, I recall some statement which I have seen some place to the effect that you at that time regarded that message as containing data that would become historical, or words to that effect. We were wondering if at that time, and I refer now to November 3, 1941, you had about reached the conclusion that the relations had deteriorated to the point that war was inevitable.

Mr. GREW. As I said, General, there was no point at which I had come to that conclusion. I felt, as stated in that telegram, that there was a grave likelihood that Japan would attack us; and I said in that telegram that she might attack or might take action which would bring about war with the United States with dangerous and dramatic suddenness; and in another telegram shortly after that, on November 17th—I am not sure it is in that book. These two books (indicating)—

21. General RUSSELL. Yes, I have it marked. I was going to ask about it.

Mr. GREW. These two books are more complete than that book (indicating). These two volumes.

22. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GREW. Then I perhaps need not refer to the second volume.

23. General RUSSELL. No. I was going to ask about it in a moment, so we shall consider them together.

Mr. GREW. Well, in the second volume, as I recollect, I said that the sands are running fast, and I also said that Japan would in all probability adopt the tactics of initiative [4205] and surprise, and that the Government in Washington should not depend upon me to inform it when and where the Japanese would attack, because I would not know, the Japanese being past-masters at secrecy. As I recollect it, that was the pertinent part of that telegram of November 17, although I haven't the text before me now.

24. General RUSSELL. Your recollection of it seems to be very accurate and definite, but I should like at this point, for the purpose of the record, to read into the record the last paragraph of your message of November 17, 1941.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

25. General RUSSELL. I am reading from the message:

We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect any signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above, and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The Embassy's field of naval and military observation is restricted almost literally

to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.

I want to ask you this question, which violates our statement this morning that opinions would not be requested, but I am anxious to get this opinion anyway:

We have considered what could have been done by the Intelligence sections of our Army and Navy to have watched [4206] military or naval activities in the islands of Japan—the home islands and the home waters of Japan—which might have resulted in detecting the Japanese task force which operated against us at Pearl Harbor on December 7, '41, had sufficient personnel been available to those agencies for the coverage of the islands and the waters adjacent to the Japanese islands. I think that question is wandering in its nature, but what I am attempting to learn, as a basis possibly for some action, is: What could we do to keep up with that sort of people?

Mr. GREW. I would answer your question this way, General: I stated in that telegram I sent that we would probably be restricted to reporting what we saw actually with the naked eye, and I based that on the following situation:

In Japan in '39 or '40—I have forgotten the exact date—they passed an anti-espionage law which was so tight that any Japanese who was found directly or indirectly communicating any kind of information which could be possibly interpreted as revealing some Japanese secret to a foreigner, could be given the severest penalties, even to the death penalty, I think, as I remember it. The result of that law was that our contacts in Japan simply fell away from us because they didn't dare see us. I myself had the greatest difficulty in keeping up contacts with any of my former Japanese friends who in days past had been able to keep me to a certain extent informed of what was happening. But that became utterly impossible after this law was passed. The Japanese were just afraid to be seen communicating anything to us.

Now, to answer your concrete question, if we had taken measures to increase our personnel in Tokyo at that time, it [4207] could only have been done through the use of undercover Japanese, because it would have been utterly impossible for any foreigner, I think, to have been able to get at facts such as you have in mind; and I do not think I am in a position to say whether it would have been practical and helpful and would have brought about results if we had had a larger personnel there.

In that connection I would much prefer to leave that question to our military and naval attaches, Commander Smith-Hutton and Colonel Creswell, who would be in much better position to answer it than I am. I am afraid that is about as much as I can tell you on that point.

26. General RUSSELL. All right. We shall go to something else.

Are you familiar with the memorandum which was prepared by the Secretary of State and delivered to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on the 26th of November, 1941, in which the Secretary of State outlined the proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan? It is commonly referred to as the message of November 26.

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, I am.

27. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when your attention was first called to that message and you became familiar with its contents?

Mr. GREW. Do I recall the date on which I was——

28. General RUSSELL. On which you became familiar with its contents.

Mr. GREW. No, sir, I could not recall the precise date at which I was informed of it, without exploration.

29. General RUSSELL. Was it prior to December 7, '41?

[4208] Mr. GREW. Oh, yes.

30. General RUSSELL. Was it some date before December 7th?

Mr. GREW. Yes, undoubtedly.

31. General RUSSELL. Was that message given publicity in the Japanese press, if you recall?

Mr. GREW. I do not want to commit myself on that, General, because I frankly do not recall precisely. I believe it was published, but I would have to look it up. I would have to look up the record because my memory might serve me falsely on that.

32. General RUSSELL. What was the reaction of the Japanese people, both private and official, to that document, if you remember?

Mr. GREW. The reaction of the Japanese military people and also of probably the majority of the civil government officials, who took their cue from the military at that time, was that they characterized that memorandum as an ultimatum. If I may do so, I should like in that connection to express the personal opinion that that attitude of the Japanese officials to the memorandum as an ultimatum was totally unsound and wrongly based.

33. General RUSSELL. It is your considered opinion, therefore, that they used it as a pretext for the accomplishments of what they desired?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir. It was in no respect an ultimatum, either in tone or substance.

34. General RUSSELL. Mr. Kurusu came over in the fall of 1941, late in the fall, to participate in these negotiations. There has been discussion as to the type of man he was, and [4209] his outlook on international relations and Japanese military ambitions and his friendship for the American Government. Would you care to discuss him for just a moment for us?

Mr. GREW. I can say this, General: that prior to the fall of the—I take it that these records are completely secret, aren't they?

35. General RUSSELL. Secret, yes, sir.

Mr. GREW. I just want to be sure of that point because of certain things I wouldn't care to say which might be later published.

36. General RUSSELL. Well, now, if anything that you are about to say would be inimical to our future operations or our future relations with the Japanese nation or other nations, it probably would be better for them not to be said.

37. General FRANK. Or go off the record.

38. General RUSSELL. Or go off the record.

39. General GRUNERT. I would suggest, Mr. Ambassador, that you speak to us off the record, because I do not know who is going to get these records of this investigation.

Mr. GREW. I see.

40. General RUSSELL. Well, in the light of the Ambassador's statement that he has just made, I shall withdraw the question, because there would be no point in insisting on it.

41. General GRUNERT. That would be better.

Mr. GREW. Well, I think I can say something first on the record and then something off the record.

Continuing on the record, I would say this: that before the fall of the government of Prince Konoye, Admiral Toyoda, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, told me that Admiral Nomura, [4210] the Ambassador in Washington, was very much fatigued and that he wanted to send a Japanese diplomat who had a complete knowledge of English to help him in his work. I knew that that phrase, "very much fatigued," was merely camouflage for the feeling in Tokyo that Admiral Nomura's knowledge of English was not sufficient to the job and that in certain cases his reports of his talks with the President and Mr. Hull were neither complete nor accurate.

I think Admiral Toyoda based that feeling on the fact that after these conversations took place in Washington with Admiral Nomura I received from Mr. Hull a full report of those conversations, and for the purpose of checking up and leaving no margin for error I was in the habit of passing my reports on to the Foreign Minister so that he could check up on his own reports to be sure of the accuracy and adequacy of the reports he received from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. I am aware that in a great many cases he found that the reports which I submitted to him were considerably more complete than the reports that he had been receiving from the Japanese Embassy, and I have no doubt that he wanted to send a Japanese diplomat to Washington for the purpose of overcoming those defects in Admiral Nomura's handling of the situation.

Now, nothing happened during the life of the Konoye cabinet. Admiral Nomura simply told me that he was considering approaching a certain Japanese diplomat whose name he did not mention to me, but he would not feel in a position to say anything more until he had the matter settled. But the Konoye cabinet fell very shortly thereafter; and within a very [4211] few days, as I remember it, of the establishment of General Tojo's government the Foreign Minister, Togo, came to me and said that he wanted to send Mr. Kurusu to Washington to cooperate with Admiral Nomura.

Now, putting those two things together, it is perfectly logical to assume that Mr. Togo was simply carrying out Admiral Toyoda's original intention to send to Washington a Japanese diplomat who had full command of English.

Mr. Kurusu probably had the best command of English of any Japanese diplomat. He spoke perfect English, he was married to an American, he had associated a great deal with Americans in times past, and he would have been the logical man to choose if the purpose of sending him was to support Admiral Nomura in his work.

Now, to pass from there to the general belief in our country that Mr. Kurusu was sent for the purpose of pulling the wool over our eyes and to lull us into a false conception of the situation, I do not feel in a position to express an opinion. I don't know. I merely submit that evidence, which has always seemed to me of some importance in interpreting Mr. Kurusu's mission.

Now, that is for the record. I shall now speak off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

42. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

43. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes; I should like to ask the Ambassador one or two questions.

I think it would be helpful if we put this book in evidence, and as a preliminary to that I should like to ask [4212] you a question or two. This volume of yours, "Ten Years in Japan," which was published in the United States, 1944, represents a composition of extracts from your diary and also copies of certain messages that you selected which were official in character; is that correct, Mr. Grew?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

44. Colonel TOULMIN. And we can take it that it represents, as accurately as you know how, in the year 1944, the conditions that are recited and related in this book?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, it does. I would add to that, however, the fact that this diary of mine was scribbled from day to day, and I often had to revise the opinions which I put down one day, shortly thereafter when new information came to me or maturer thought caused me to revise those opinions. What I wrote and what is published here is an accurate statement of what I was thinking at the time it was written.

45. Colonel TOULMIN. That is what we are interested in.

46. General FRANK. And the question about it is: It is as nearly factual as it is possible to make it?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir.

47. Colonel TOULMIN. And with that understanding we would like to have this marked in evidence as an exhibit next in order number.

(Book, "Ten Years in Japan," by Joseph C. Grew, was marked Exhibit No. 62 and received in evidence.)

48. Colonel TOULMIN. Now there are one or two questions I would like to ask, if I may.

As I take it from your testimony, war was more or less certain in the latter part of 1941; is that correct?

Mr. GREW. Colonel, that phrase "more or less" is open to considerable latitude. I don't know that you can say that it was more certain or less certain. I would say that it was likely during the latter part of '41.

49. Colonel TOULMIN. And became increasingly so as the sanctions were applied?

Mr. GREW. And became increasingly likely to happen, but I was unwilling to say at the end that it was certain to happen. I think in one place in my diary I actually used the phrase that, "War is not only possible but probable."

50. Colonel TOULMIN. I recall that.

Mr. GREW. I think I did not go further than that.

51. General FRANK. May I ask a question right there? May I phrase that question a little differently: Considering the state of preparedness of Japan as compared to the state of preparedness of the United States and the advantage that another one or two or three months would have, is it not your opinion that the Japs—the Jap Army and Navy and Air Force—were about as ready at this time for war with the United States as they could be?

Mr. GREW. Yes, sir, I think so. If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war, for the reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be the result of war. It realized at best it was going to be a terrific gamble, and some of the more far-seeing statesmen realized that it might involve Japan in the gravest dangers, and some of those statesmen undoubtedly did their best to arrest the expansionist movement. [4214] Now, the question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war.

52. Colonel TOULMIN. What do you think, then, Mr. Grew, was the motivating cause and incident that brought about the decision of Japan to go to war? At what time do you think factually something occurred that committed them to this course of action?

Mr. GREW. When you speak of Japan, Colonel, the phrase requires a little explanation. There are two Japans. In Japan the army and navy are practically independent of the rest of the government. The War Minister and the Navy Minister, although members of the Cabinet, report directly to the emperor over the heads of both of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister.

Now, we have very good evidence that caused us to believe that when the Japanese Army invaded Manchuria in 1931 the then Cabinet did not know of those plans. I have very definite evidence to convince me of that fact. I do not think that the Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara, knew that that was about to happen, and that belief was confirmed later to me, or at least it was heavily weighted, when Baron Shidehara, who was, I would say, a completely honest man, or the best Japanese statesman that we have known, gave assurances to my predecessor, Cameron Forbes, that the Japanese Army would not move beyond Mukden, whereas it was later shown that at the very moment that Baron Shidehara was giving those assurances the Japanese Army was already a hundred miles beyond Mukden, but he wasn't allowed to know it.

[4215] Now, arguing from that basis, I think it is perfectly possible that the Cabinet was not informed of the plans for attacking Pearl Harbor. My belief is—well, I won't say confirmed, but it is increased by the fact that I had a conversation with Mr. Togo, the Foreign Minister, at half past twelve, half past midnight, on December 7, 1941. That was about three hours before Pearl Harbor. And I have always been convinced from the nature of that conversation that Mr. Togo did not at that moment know that Pearl Harbor was about to break. I have had other evidence, too, which convinces me personally that he didn't know.

So when you speak of Japan having made the plans, I would prefer to refer to the military authorities and not to the government as a whole.

53. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, suppose we limit the question to that extent.

Mr. GREW. Now, to go back, I am coming to your question. We will go back to the military people, the army and the navy: At what point

did they decide definitely to attack? Naturally, they had all their plans made for years beforehand, in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects, and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail; but as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don't myself know exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the point at which they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always been my belief that it was about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26 that the button was touched. I can't [4216] prove that; I have no evidence. It is just my general feeling.

54. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, now, one more question and I am through burdening you: You referred to the economic sanctions, the various restrictions we put on our commerce with Japan. Did not those restrictions start, as I recall it, in 1938 or '39 to some degree, and progressively were increased as the years went on?

Mr. GREW. As I recollect it, we began with what we called moral embargoes.

55. Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Mr. GREW. That is, our government let it be known that it hoped that these things would not be sent to Japan, but there were no legal steps taken at that time. I am afraid I cannot tell you offhand, without looking it up, just what dates the legal steps were taken and how they continued. I don't recollect the dates at this moment.

56. Colonel TOULMIN. You mentioned, though, in your diary, during the fall of 1941 quite frequently, as early as the early part of the autumn, and particularly mentioned the fact that the sanctions then being applied were driving Japan into bankruptcy, I think sometime in October. That would be approximately the time?

Mr. GREW. Well, my recollection is that they began to enforce the embargoes in the late autumn of 1940. I cannot confirm that. It was some time along there, I think.

57. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, at the beginning of the enforcement of the embargoes you were in the last stage of your relationships, were you not, because if you were not successful with such embargoes you only had one other alternative; two [4217] alternatives: either to withdraw them or to precipitate a conflict. Is that correct?

Mr. GREW. No, I don't think we argued it that way. Of course, there were not only the embargoes but the freezing order and the denunciation of our treaty and commerce with Japan, which had taken place considerably earlier; several steps one after another. We did not—now, are you speaking about us and the Embassy, or the Government?

58. Colonel TOULMIN. I am speaking of the Government of the United States.

Mr. GREW. Government of the United States. I cannot tell you offhand what the position was of Mr. Hull at that time. I would much prefer to leave that question of opinion to him.

59. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, I am interested in the effect on Japan, as you observed it, the factual matter as far as you determined it to be a fact, when the embargoes had become sufficiently severe to precipitate a critical issue between Japan and the United States.

Mr. GREW. Yes; the embargoes, I will say, especially plus the freezing order, did undoubtedly greatly increase the tension at that time.

60. Colonel TOULMIN. And about what time did that reach its peak?

Mr. GREW. It was progressive, and continuously progressive up to the end.

61. Colonel TOULMIN. Increasingly so as you applied each sanction one after the other?

Mr. GREW. I would say so, yes.

62. Colonel TOULMIN. And the effects became apparent?

[4218] Mr. GREW. The effects became apparent.

63. Colonel TOULMIN. So that the relationship under the economic sanctions was gradually narrowing to a point of some decision by one government or the other that something must be done about it; isn't that a fair statement?

Mr. GREW. Yes, I would say that is a fair statement, Colonel. I do not mean to say, when you say something had to be done about it, that it had to be war, because there were other things to do about it besides war. The Japanese at that time could have taken steps to meet some of our views in connection with their expansion through the Far East. They could readily have done that, and if they had done that we might, for our part, have relaxed some of the economic pressure which we were placing on them. I think that that would have been a perfectly logical thing to have happened, but it didn't happen.

64. Colonel TOULMIN. Knowing the Japanese Army and Navy and their independent policy, it would be rather to be expected that they would resort to some hostile action rather than to any other type of action; would not that be the fact?

[4219] Mr. GREW. Certainly, as far as the Japanese military machine went, yes; but there, again, it became a question of whether the government was going to be able to control the military machine or not.

65. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all I have. Thank you.

66. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, do the various books to which you have made reference in your testimony contain all the information that you conveyed to Washington on the likelihood of war?

Mr. GREW. I could not say that, I do not believe, because I sent a great deal of material during all of that period to the State Department, both by telegram and by written dispatch, and it would have been impossible within the confines of two volumes to have published all of that material. I think the high lights have been published, but I could not say that it has all been published. Frankly, I could not answer that question without looking into it, but I am sure that everything I wrote was not published, by any means.

67. Major CLAUSEN. The natural question, sir, would be, whether the files to which you refer, which might reveal other information, had been scanned by you and screened by you, so that you had selected therefrom the most outstanding pieces of information that you sent to Washington.

Mr. GREW. I, myself, did not choose the documents which were published in these books. These were determined by other officials in the State Department. I am referring to these two official books on the foreign relations of the United States and Japan, 1931-41. This volume is more or less a prelude to these two volumes; but these expand the material contained in this one.

[4220] 68. Major CLAUSEN. Now, with reference to your book, "Ten Years in Japan," does my question evoke any information in that regard?

Mr. GREW. I can say that I think that I certainly picked out the high lights of my reports during that period. I couldn't do them all, but the high lights, I think; yes.

69. General GRUNERT. There is one question that I have that I will see if I can frame properly. Considering the military, and their direct access to the emperor, then considering what we will call the "civil," as distinguished from the military, they also had direct access to the emperor, did they not?

Mr. GREW. The civil government? The prime minister, certainly.

70. General GRUNERT. But, with the military in the saddle, they overrode, possibly, what the prime minister wanted to do?

Mr. GREW. They were certainly in a position to do so; yes, sir.

71. General GRUNERT. Now, we take Nomura and Kurusu, here in Washington; following your line of thought that possibly the prime minister did not know what the military intended to do, then is it natural to assume that Nomura and Kurusu, being his agents, did not know?

Mr. GREW. That is correct, sir; but I would like to make a little more clear that statement of mine, and that it is possible that the civil government were not informed of the plans to attack Pearl Harbor, in advance. That does not for a moment mean that they were not informed of the likelihood that under certain circumstances war might occur. Of course, they knew that, without any shadow of doubt; and Nomura and Kurusu knew [4221] that, too. I was referring purely to the attack on Pearl Harbor, itself.

72. General GRUNERT. But is it not also true that the "military," so-called, in Japan, undoubtedly kept in very close touch with what was happening in Washington, and that therefore they probably chose the most psychological moment at which to start something, from wherever it did start, to make the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GREW. I would say that their intelligence was probably very complete, and therefore, they must have known pretty well what was taking place in our country at that time.

73. General GRUNERT. Then it is liable to be more than a coincidence that they should start a task force to attack Pearl Harbor just about the time the tension was greatest here, and the information had been passed out on November 26, which amounted practically to an ultimatum, or which they considered an ultimatum, is that reasonable?

Mr. GREW. Now, if you say "which amounted to an ultimatum," I, of course, take issue with that, because I do not consider that that document was in any respect, in tone or in substance, in the nature of an ultimatum. It was not so intended, and it was not so phrased.

74. General GRUNERT. Did I understand you to say that the Japanese press took it as such?

Mr. GREW. Well, the Japanese authorities, the military authorities, took it as such, themselves; yes. They wanted to!

75. General GRUNERT. But it did appear to be more than a coincidence that they should start something from Japan that [4222] would hit Pearl Harbor just about the time those things came out of Washington, which Japan, the military at least, considered an ultimatum?

Mr. GREW. In other words, General, you mean that they probably took this memorandum of Mr. Hull's as a hook on which to hang their attack?

76. General GRUNERT. On which to start their task force from the main island, or wherever it did start, so as to hit Hawaii December 7.

Mr. GREW. Yes.

77. General GRUNERT. It is not beyond reason?

Mr. GREW. No, no. I am not sure that I entirely understand your question as to whether it is a coincidence, or not. I think the military wanted to attack us, and when that memorandum was written, they saw their chance to work up the war psychology in their own country, by professing to believe that memorandum was an ultimatum. They had their plans all laid. I dare say they felt that that was as good a time as any. They saw their chance to hang it on that. To that extent, I think it was hardly a coincidence.

78. General GRUNERT. I have just been handed a question which about fits in, here, and I think you have given the answer to it. The question is this:

Knowing the Japanese mind, do you think the Japanese military maneuvered the situation into a possible ultimatum, so as to strike at that time?

Mr. GREW. I definitely do; but that is a question of opinion, nothing that we can ever prove.

79. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

[4223] Mr. Ambassador, do you think of anything else that might be not only of interest to the Board but might be of value to the Board in coming to conclusions as to its mission, that you would like to tell the Board?

Mr. GREW. General, I think the field has been fairly well covered in the questions that have been asked me. I would be glad to be helpful in any way I can, and to submit any further evidence, but nothing occurs to me particularly at this moment.

80. General GRUNERT. I inquired of the particular Members of the Board that looked into these particular questions, how long they would need you, so as to have you give us the minimum of your time, and they said, at most, a half an hour. I see an hour and five minutes has gone by, and we certainly appreciate it very much.

Mr. GREW. Only too happy to be of service any time I can.

81. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming. We certainly appreciate it.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[4224] **TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. LEONARD T. GEROW, COMMANDING 5TH CORPS, STATIONED AT LUXEMBOURG**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General GEROW. Leonard T. Gerow, Major General, commanding 5th Corps, stationed at Luxembourg.

2. General GRUNERT. General, General Russell has this particular part of our investigation, in which we have parceled out so as to cover particular subjects; so he will lead in propounding the questions, and the members of the Board will fill out.

General GEROW. General, may I make just one little brief statement with reference to my memory on these things?

3. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General GEROW. I would like to make it a matter of record, if there is no objection.

The events concerning which I am about to testify occurred approximately 3 years ago. Since that time I trained a division for overseas service, took it to England where I served as its commander for about a year. Following that assignment I was designated to command the 5th Corps. I trained and equipped it for an invasion of the Continent and made detailed plans for its operations. I landed with the Corps on the beaches of France on D-Day, June the 6th. Since that date and until September 18, 1944, when I left the German border to come to Washington for this hearing, the Corps was continuously engaged with the enemy. Its operations extended [4225] from Omaha beach to the Siegfried line where units of the Corps are now fighting.

I make this statement in explanation of any failure on my part to recall in detail from memory events that happened during the period covered by this investigation. I have brought with me several papers that were prepared by me during the period November-December 1941, and one prepared since my arrival in Washington date on Friday last. I respectfully request permission to refer to these papers for the purpose of refreshing my memory.

4. General GRUNERT. I think the Board is glad to grant you that permission.

5. General RUSSELL. I will say further that whatever papers I have I shall be glad to pass on to you, General, and in any other way we will all help you.

General GEROW. Thank you, sir.

6. General RUSSELL. Now, what was your assignment in 1941?

General GEROW. I was the Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division.

7. General RUSSELL. For that entire year?

General GEROW. I was either Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, or Assistant Chief of Staff of War Plans Division from December 6, 1940, to February 15, 1942.

8. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, General, if we can take our thinking off of Luxembourg and get back into what the Pacific was three years earlier: What were your responsibilities in connection with the operations in the Hawaiian Department in the year 1941?

General GEROW. As Chief of War Plans Division I was responsible for the supervision of the preparation of certain [4226] war plans that pertained to the defense of Hawaii, that is, the basic Department directives to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for war operations.

9. General RUSSELL. General, the Board has heretofore had before it other witnesses and has gone rather thoroughly into these plans; so for my part, at least I shall omit any discussion of those plans with you.

Relative to the equipment which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had in 1941 for reconnaissance and defense, do you think that you are fairly well familiar with that?

General GEROW. I am not, General. I prepared for the Roberts Commission a statement of the general operations of the War Plans Division; and I think appended to that report that I prepared were some statements regarding the general status of equipment at that time. I have a copy of that with me, sir, if it is not available to the Board.

10. General RUSSELL. Would you say, or not, as a generalization, that the equipment available to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for reconnaissance at that time was adequate or inadequate? Do you remember that?

General GEROW. General, I cannot state positively whether or not it was adequate. I think the records of the War Department, however, would show whether or not in the opinion of the Department Commander he believed it to be adequate.

11. General RUSSELL. Were you acquainted with the defensive problems, or were you acquainted with the mission of the Army forces out on the Island of Oahu?

General GEROW. I was at the time, sir, and I can refresh [4227] my memory from these papers that I have here, from that report that I submitted to the Roberts Commission, as to the exact mission.

12. General RUSSELL. Do you know offhand what the Army was doing out there, why it was out there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I know that in general its purpose was to defend Hawaii.

13. General RUSSELL. What was its relation to the Navy?

General GEROW. I should like to—may I ask you to elaborate a little on that question, General, “its relation to the Navy”? That would cover—

14. General RUSSELL. Well, I will state it another way: Was the Army's mission out there to protect the Navy? Was that its sole mission?

General GEROW. One of its missions was to protect Pearl Harbor.

15. General RUSSELL. What other missions did it have?

General GEROW. May I refer to these notes, sir?

16. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General GEROW (Referring to notes). The missions assigned the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under the Army strategical plan were as follows:

Joint—hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and control and protect shipping the coastal zone.

(B) Army—hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the associated powers and the destruction of Axis sea communication by offensive action against the enemy forces or commerce [4228] located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

17. General RUSSELL. From what are you reading now, General?

General GEROW. I am reading now, sir, from this paper that I presented to the Roberts Commission.

18. General RUSSELL. What is the name of it?

General GEROW. The date of it, sir, is the—

19. General RUSSELL. No. The name of it.

General GEROW. The name of it. Simply a statement made by Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, before the Military Commission, December 18, 1941.

20. General RUSSELL. But the things that you are reading there now came from the joint plans for the defense of Oahu by the Army and Navy, didn't they?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. This says, under the Army strategical plan, these are.

21. General RUSSELL. Well, you didn't prepare those and send them to the Roberts Commission?

General GEROW. No.

22. General RUSSELL. You copied them from some plans that were—

General GEROW. Yes, sir; these came from the War Plans. It is either the joint Army and Navy or the Army strategical plan.

23. General RUSSELL. All right. Those are in evidence, and I shall abandon the line of questions that I have been pursuing.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. Do you recall offhand, without reference to any documents at all, what the War Plans Division thought [4229] of the possibility of an air attack on Oahu in the year 1941?

General GEROW. That was one of the possibilities that we considered.

25. General RUSSELL. Were you familiar with the relations between the American and Japanese Governments during the year 1941?

General GEROW. I was fairly familiar with those relations, yes, sir.

26. General RUSSELL. How would you describe those relations in the fall of 1941?

General GEROW. I should say that the situation was quite tense, that we felt in War Plans Division that anything might happen, even to the point of war between the United States and Japan.

27. General RUSSELL. When did you arrive at the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable, if you did arrive at any such conclusion?

General GEROW. There was a general build-up, as I recall, between July and November of a picture which led to the conclusion in November that war with Japan might occur.

28. General RUSSELL. Do you think that was toward the end of November when that spirit was developed there in the War Plans Division, or that sentiment or feeling was developed?

General GEROW. No, sir; I would say it was probably in the earlier part, during the month of November.

29. General RUSSELL. Sometime during the month of November?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

30. General RUSSELL. General, in order that we may go back into the thinking of those days, I have here a file in which [4230] you did some work. It is the original file from the office of the Adjutant General. It is No. 380.3. In it is an estimate of the situation in the Pacific, as compiled or developed by the Navy. The Navy message was to the effect that:

(Navy message dated 16 October 1941 is as follows:)

A grave situation has been created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-

American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. In either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the United States and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers.

Meaning Britain and America.

In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan. Appropriate Army and Naval district authorities should be informed by CINCPAC and CINCAF.

[4231] That was a message that went out and, our records show, was delivered to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. Apparently a study was made by you. This is in October of 1941.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

31. General RUSSELL. And you do not agree with that, but you recommend that you send another message to the Hawaiian Department. This is your recommended message. This is the language: (Message to Hawaiian Department, recommended by General Gerow, October 1941, is as follows:)

Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation, for your information, tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

Now, that letter went out to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the 20th of October?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

32. General RUSSELL. Could you look at that, your signature (indicating), and, with that, rework yourself into the atmosphere of the late fall of 1941, or the fall of 1941?

General GEROW. I remember the message.

33. General RUSSELL. Is it true, or not, that the War Plans Division concluded that the naval estimate of the situation, which was four days prior thereto, was a little more apprehensive of immediate war than the Army estimate?

General GEROW. Of course, General, we got our estimates of the enemy situation from G-2.

[4232] 34. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General GEROW. And I remember discussing this particular situation with G-2's estimate, or with G-2, and reached the conclusion at that time that the Navy estimate was more pessimistic than we believed it should be, from the information that we then had at hand.

35. General RUSSELL. I had thought, General, that if you could recall it would be helpful to the Board if you could tell us something about what information the War Plans Division received from G-2 during 1941. Have you any record of any estimates that they sent you?

General GEROW. No, General, I have no record of any such estimates. I do know that estimates were submitted from time to time by G-2 to War Plans Division, and we discussed personally the various aspects of the situation.

36. General RUSSELL. Do you know what would happen in the case of these estimates that would come over from G-2? Would they be filed in your office?

General GEROW. Some of them might be filed in the War Plans Division files, but I cannot tell without checking.

37. General RUSSELL. Well, where else would they have been filed?

General GEROW. They would have been—might have been filed and returned to G-2; might have been returned to G-2 for file.

38. General RUSSELL. And they would either be in War Plans Division files or in G-2 files?

General GEROW. Or, I should say, add to that: possibly in the files of the Joint Board.

[4233] 39. General RUSSELL. Are those the only three places that you know where they might be?

General GEROW. There was often an exchange of information between the Army and Navy. There may be copies of some of those estimates in the Navy files.

40. General RUSSELL. You were at that time familiar with the agreements between the Army and Navy for the reconnaissance and defensive measures at Oahu?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, at that time.

41. General RUSSELL. And they were all embodied in these plans which were filed in the office of your division?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

42. General RUSSELL. Now, we have discussed with you these messages of October 16th and October 20th, one a Naval and one an Army message. The next record, General, we have of a message which was sent by the War Plans Division to General Short, Hawaii, was a message of November 27th which went out from the Chief of Staff's office. I wonder if since your return from the European theater you have had reference to that message.

General GEROW. I have looked that message up, sir.

43. General RUSSELL. And now, by virtue of having looked it up since your return to Washington on Friday last, you are familiar with that message?

General GEROW. I am familiar with it, sir, and I have brought with me a memorandum which I submitted to the Chief of Staff regarding a conference I had with the Secretary of War on that message.

44. General RUSSELL. I see. Let me ask you one or two [4234] questions, and then we possibly will go into the conference about which you are talking.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

45. General RUSSELL. Do you recall who initiated that message or why it was prepared?

General GEROW. May I read from my notes, General, which cover that point? These notes were prepared for the Chief of Staff on November 27th, the afternoon, the evening.

46. General RUSSELL. Of November 27, of what year?

General GEROW. 1941, sir.

47. General RUSSELL. Yes, do.

General GEROW. And they are fresher than my memory would be, sir.

48. General RUSSELL. All right.

General GEROW. This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m. November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages had been sent to General MacArthur

and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the joint Army and Navy message sent November the 24th. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations with Japan had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption.

I am not reading this exactly as it appears in this memorandum. I am refreshing my memory from it. This is a matter of record in the War Department and an official document and is available to the Board.

[4235] 49. General RUSSELL. What is in the War Department?

General GEROW. This particular memorandum from me to the Chief of Staff.

50. General RUSSELL. Where is it of record in the War Department?

General GEROW. I couldn't state. I imagine that it is in the hands of the Adjutant General or in the Chief of Staff's files.

51. General RUSSELL. All right.

General GEROW. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Later in the morning I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved.

Now, my pencil note on this, which I put on after I saw this message, from memory:

Similar messages to go to other overseas commanders were prepared later the same day.

This is a separate—

52. General RUSSELL. Now may I ask a question there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

53. General RUSSELL. You say later in the day similar messages were prepared to go to the other commanders?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4236] 54. General RUSSELL. Overseas commanders?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

55. General RUSSELL. Now, and you made that note from memory?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

56. General RUSSELL. And that has been done since you came to Washington the past few days?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, by consulting the records.

57. General RUSSELL. What records?

General GEROW. The War Department records showing what messages had been sent.

58. General RUSSELL. What was there about those messages to indicate that they were developed later that day, General?

General GEROW. They were dated on November 27, and it was a logical following up of the instructions of the Secretary to prepare messages for these overseas commanders; and I should like to carry on with my notes here to clear up that point, which I think will be explained.

59. General RUSSELL. All right.

General GEROW. On the late afternoon of November 27 I attended a conference in the office of General Bryden, the Deputy Chief of Staff. Present at the conference were: General Bryden, General Miles, General Gerow, and Colonel Bundy. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the inclusion in the message of November 27 of the statement,

Needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately.

I cannot recall at what stage in the preparation of the messages this phrase was inserted in the message to Hawaii. It is possible that the draft was shown to G-2 by my staff and the phrase was inserted at the [4237] request of that office.

At the conference I objected to the phrase being included in the message. My position was that the War Plans Division message was specifically a warning against possible hostile action by the armed forces of Japan and should not be confused with a warning against sabotage; that, if G-2 desired to warn the command against sabotage, such a warning should be the subject of a separate message.

As a result of the discussion the phrase regarding subversive activities was stricken from the message, and the change initialed by me on the original. G-2 was authorized by the Deputy Chief of Staff to send a separate sabotage message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department.

60. General RUSSELL. Therefore, the message of November 27, as finally approved with the subversive element eliminated, was actually approved in General Bryden's office late on the afternoon of November 27?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, and, if I remember correctly, was shown to the Secretary of War and initialed by him or approved by him.

61. General RUSSELL. Do you know who suggested that the other commanders, the overseas departments—the Hawaiian Department, the Western Defense Command, the Panama Command—be given the same or similar messages that the President and the Secretary of War had directed be sent to the Philippines?

General GEROW. It probably originated in War Plans Division as a normal procedure to follow in sending out such a warning message with regard to hostile activities on the part of Japan.

[4238] 62. General RUSSELL. You are very definite in your recollection now, which is supported by a contemporaneous memorandum to the Chief of Staff, that only the Philippines—and the Commanding General of the Far East and of the Philippines—was to be alerted or sent a message, according to the instruction of the President and the Secretary of War, in the beginning?

General GEROW. As my notes or my memorandum here indicates, the discussion in the Secretary's office was directed largely towards the message or primarily towards the message that was to go to General MacArthur and Admiral Hart. There is a reference in this memorandum which states as follows:

The various messages to Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed.

I am unable at this time to fix in my mind the extent of that discussion. I know the conference lasted, say, for an hour.

63. General RUSSELL. That was at 9:30 in the morning?

General GEROW. That was a later conference, sir.

64. General RUSSELL. How many conferences did you have with the Secretary of War that day?

General GEROW. I had two, sir.

65. General RUSSELL. And the Secretary of War was not in on the third conference with General Bryden late in the afternoon?

General GEROW. No, sir; he was not, sir.

66. General RUSSELL. Then, the messages which went out were the result of three conferences: two in the office of the Secretary of War and one in the office of General Bryden, the Deputy Chief of Staff?

[4239] General GEROW. Yes, sir. The third one was merely over—the third conference was directed entirely at the question of the inclusion of the sentence with regard to subversive activities.

67. General RUSSELL. General, I want to be very positively definite about this, if we can get it in the record in a definite way. When you read your notes or your memorandum to the Chief of Staff, I received the rather definite impression that when you were sent for by the Secretary of War your directions were to prepare a memorandum or a notice of some sort to General MacArthur. Now, that was the impression which I got very definitely from your reading of those notes, and I am wondering if that is a correct impression.

General GEROW. According to this memorandum for the Chief of Staff that I prepared at that time, it is a correct impression.

68. General RUSSELL. Where in those notes that you are referring to now does any reference to sending that type of notice to other Department Commanders appear?

General GEROW. The only place that it might appear would be in the sentence,

The various messages to Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed.

69. General RUSSELL. That does, then, refer to the first conference which you had in the office of the Secretary of War?

General GEROW. No, sir. The first conference that I had with the Secretary of War was in the morning at 9:30.

70. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General GEROW. At which only the Secretary, General Bryden, and myself were present. At that time the Secretary [4240] gave me instructions with reference to the preparation of this message, and I left his office, consulted Admiral Stark, as was the custom between the two Departments, and then returned later with Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark and Mr. Stimson, and then this discussion that I have just referred to took place.

71. General RUSSELL. Then it was developed that others were to be notified similarly or to the same general effect?

General GEROW. I can't say that it was developed definitely. I can't remember that conversation in that detail, General, but it would be standing operating procedure for us to notify all these commanders of a warning notice of that kind, as we did habitually.

72. General RUSSELL. Well, I think we can clarify our thinking on this, General, if it is your impression that in the first conference where you were called in, and Bryden and the Secretary of War and you were talking, that the President and the Secretary of War wanted

MacArthur notified, and that was all, and then at the second conference, where the Navy had been called into the picture and further time for thought had been afforded, the other commanders were included in the discussions. Now, is that your recollection of what happened?

General GEROW. That is the—my notes show—my memorandum to the Chief of Staff bears out that idea, that the initial conference was directed primarily to the Philippines.

73. General RUSSELL. So it is your recollection that the thing the President and the Secretary of War looked on was to notify MacArthur to be on the alert because of what was about to happen?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; that is correct, but I don't [4241] feel that—strike that out.

That is correct.

I would like to scratch out that last part.

74. General GRUNERT. But you didn't feel at the time that they didn't want the others to be notified to be on the alert?

General GEROW. No, sir. I feel, in regard to that, that it was a responsibility of the War Plans Division to see that all these commanders were notified, without being specifically told to do so.

75. General GRUNERT. For instance, if there was an indication of trouble in the Far East, where there is no indication of it going to Hawaii or Panama or the West Coast, why, then they would naturally direct your attention to a message to go to MacArthur?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

76. General GRUNERT. But then they left it to you to suggest amplification; is that the idea?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. That would be normal procedure on the part of War Plans Division.

77. General RUSSELL. General, I am not so much interested in speculations.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

78. General RUSSELL. But I am attempting to fix the fact as to what the Secretary of War and the President wanted done; that's all.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

79. General RUSSELL. And I think we have fixed that as your testimony, a request that MacArthur be notified.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4242] 80. General RUSSELL. But nobody else was included in that request. Now, is that the statement?

General GEROW. That, General, as I say, is indicated from these notes. I can't remember the details of the conversation that morning, sir, but this was written shortly after the conference, in which I attempted to set down my reaction to what was said in the Secretary's office.

[4243] 81. General RUSSELL. A memorandum prepared concurrently with the developments would you think be a more reliable evidence than your memory?

General GEROW. Very much more so; yes,

82. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, let us talk about something else.

Was General Marshall in on any of the conferences on the 27th?

General GEROW. No, sir. I think he was out of town at the time.

83. General RUSSELL. Do you recall showing General Marshall, when you submitted to him this memorandum, the message which you had sent?

General GEROW. There was a copy attached.

84. General RUSSELL. What was the date of your memorandum?

General GEROW. I was just looking at that, General. There are two dates here. One shows November 27, 1941, which I think is the actual date of the memorandum. There is another date, November 28, 1941, which I think refers to the fact that this was noted by the Chief of Staff and initialed by him, on the 28th.

85. General RUSSELL. Then, you sent him a memorandum, which included a description of what had happened during his absence, and to that memorandum was attached a copy of this message of November 27?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

86. General RUSSELL. Then your records indicate that General Marshall actually knew of the message of November 27, the following day, November 28?

[4244] General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

87. General RUSSELL. General, did you and General Marshall have any discussion of the situation in the Far East, or of our relations with the Japanese empire, prior to the time that he went down into the maneuvers, or wherever he was gone on the 27th?

General GEROW. I have a notation in this memorandum for the Chief of Staff, one sentence, that reads as follows:

I then showed him—

referring to the Secretary of War.

a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting.

“You” meaning the Chief of Staff.

Now, that is my only recollection of that draft message, is what is stated in this paper.

88. General RUSSELL. Now, are we to understand, General, that at the 9:30 conference on the 27th you showed to the Secretary of War and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Bryden—

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

89. General RUSSELL. —the draft of a message which General Marshall had shown, the joint—what is the term used, there?

General GEROW. A copy of the draft message.

90. General RUSSELL. —draft message, which he had—

General GEROW (interposing). —discussed at the Joint Board meeting.

91. General RUSSELL. —at the Joint Board meeting. Now, is it your intention to convey to the Board your recollection that when you went to the meeting that morning you had a message which General Marshall had discussed with the Joint Board?

[4245] General GEROW. This is a memorandum which I wrote at the time, states that I did have. General, I do not have a clear recollection, other than this memorandum, that I did have such a message.

92. General RUSSELL. In studying the evidence which you gave before the Roberts Commission—and please understand the purpose of referring to it—

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

93. General RUSSELL. We are merely giving you this, trying to work you into this background. '

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

94. General RUSSELL. In the evidence which you gave before the Roberts Commission, you stated that, in the Secretary of War's office, a telephone conversation took place between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State, and that, as a result of that conversation, certain language which was in the message was changed. Specifically, the language in the message was, that negotiations with the Japs had ended, and you inserted in lieu thereof this other language, which is the first sentence of the message of November 27, that you have before you.

Now, could it be, that the language in the message that you have described as General Marshall's having had before the Joint Board, was to the effect that the negotiations had ended, and that that was changed by virtue of the telephone conversation between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State?

General GEROW. I remember very distinctly, General, that the expression that we had in the message, whether it [4246] was put in, that morning, in the Secretary's office, or not, I don't know, was too strong, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, when Mr. Stimson called him up, and he suggested a change; and I remember taking down in pencil the exact wording that the Secretary of State wanted included.

Now, I don't know, at that Joint Board meeting, how such a message was prepared. General Marshall may have stated to me, "Gerow, you get together with the Navy and prepare a message along this general line," as was customary at Joint Board action, at times.

95. General RUSSELL. And that may have been done before General Marshall left on the afternoon of the 26th, is that right?

General GEROW. Well, sir, he may have given me those directions, to prepare that message, and I might have prepared such a message and he never saw it, or I might have prepared it before he left and showed it to him.

96. General RUSSELL. You just do not remember?

General GEROW. No, sir; but I don't believe I prepared it and showed it to him. I believe that it was a message that I prepared on his general direction.

97. General RUSSELL. But, to come back to your memorandum of the 27th, apparently delivered to General Marshall on the 28th, we are traveling on safe ground when we conclude that General Marshall saw the message of the 27th, as finally sent, on the 28th?

General GEROW. I am positive that that is correct, sir.

98. General RUSSELL. Now, to go into the message of the 27th, for a moment, General, there is some language in there [4247] that the "Japanese action is unpredictable," and that "hostilities may begin at any time." Do you know who was the author of that language which follows the changed or first sentence?

General GEROW. Will you repeat that message, General? I am not—

99. General RUSSELL. All right. Let me get the message before me. We can be more definite. The first sentence is:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

That is a sentence which was softened on instructions or on information furnished by the Secretary of State?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; furnished me by the Secretary of War after a telephone conversation with the Secretary of State.

100. General RUSSELL. Then, the next sentence is:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Do you know who was the author of that language? Do you know whether the Secretary of War suggested that language, or did you put that in?

General GEROW. I think that language was possibly put in by either Colonel Bundy or myself, sir.

101. General RUSSELL. The next sentence is to this effect:

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

[4248] There has been some testimony about that. You testified about that, at the time of your appearance before the Roberts Commission?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

102. General RUSSELL. And there is some evidence to the effect that this was carrying out an expressed desire of the President. Do you know anything about that?

General GEROW. It is hard for me to——

103. General RUSSELL. Maybe I can be of a little help, there.

(Thereupon, at 5:30 p. m., the Board recessed the hearing of witnesses, for the day.)

[4249]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[4250] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. LEONARD T. GEROW, COMMANDING 5TH
CORPS, STATIONED AT LUXEMBOURG—Resumed

1. Colonel WEST. General Gerow, the witness is reminded that he is still under oath.

2. General RUSSELL. General, when we left yesterday I was asking you about that sentence in the message of November 27 which we refer to as the Chief of Staff's message, and that sentence was to the effect, or that sentence which we were discussing at that time was:

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. [4251] I had asked you whether or not in your previous testimony you had stated that this sentence was inserted in the message upon an express desire of the President of the United States that such thought be expressed. Do you recall your answer to that question, or did you make an answer?

General GEROW. As I recall, I did not make a definite answer.

3. General RUSSELL. Have you, since the question was asked you on yesterday afternoon, made any investigation to determine whether or not your testimony before the Roberts Commission was to the effect that this sentence was inserted because of an express desire of the President of the United States?

General GEROW. I have referred to my testimony given before the Roberts Commission, and I should like to see that again and quote from that as to my statement with regard to the inclusion of the phrase in question.

(A transcript of testimony before the Roberts Commission was handed to the witness.)

4. General RUSSELL. Would you now quote from your testimony before the Roberts Commission as to your statement about the President's desire?

General GEROW. I quote from the records of the Roberts Commission. The Chairman of that Commission asked me the following question. This is quote:

Well, then did the Army, War Department, intend that he should sit on a peacetime basis until some attack developed against him?

My reply to that question was as follows, quote:

No, sir. We pointed out in the message the [4252] possible danger of attack and directed reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act.

5. General RUSSELL. General, following the sentence which I have just read, which sets forth the desire that Japan commit the first overt act, there is an additional sentence:

This policy should not, repeat should not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Do you recall anything about who prompted the insertion of that sentence into this message?

General GEROW. I believe that message was inserted in War Plans Division by myself or Colonel Bundy.

6. General RUSSELL. The language that I have just read, which lifts the restriction of overt act insofar as it relates to jeopardizing the defense, was placed in there in order to insure freedom of action to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department; is that right?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. Now, General, this entire discussion of "overt act" which is contained in these two sentences—it would be interesting to the Board to know just what sort of a situation or situations you visualized when you were inserting this matter of overt acts and as to who should commit the overt acts first.

General GEROW. I should say that in a situation in which [4253] vessels or aircraft of the Navy of Japan might violate the regulation governing the waters surrounding Oahu, that the Commanding General would be fully authorized to take such necessary action or such action as he might deem necessary to restrain or stop the vessels or aircraft of Japan.

8. General RUSSELL. In other words, if Japanese aircraft or vessels, surface or submarine, should approach Oahu, you felt that legitimate or reasonable construction of this message would have permitted the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to have destroyed them or attempted to destroy them?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

9. General RUSSELL. Let us take a concrete example, General, in conclusion of our discussion of that. Let us assume that the Japanese task force which did strike on the morning of December 7 had been discovered in a critical area some six, seven, eight hundred miles off the coast of Oahu. You think then that the Commanding General would have been justified in using such defensive means as he had at that time in destroying that task force?

General GEROW. Under the circumstances, I would say yes.

10. General GRUNERT. That particular phrase about restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense:

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your own defense—

did that mean to you that he could take any action over there preparing himself and his command to carry out his mission under the defense plan?

General GEROW. I felt that he was fully authorized to [4254] take any action that he deemed necessary to insure the successful performance of his mission.

11. General GRUNERT. Even if that action taken might have alarmed the public or might have shown intent?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. If he thought that his mission was being jeopardized, he was authorized under those circumstances to take any action, regardless of any precautionary statements that may have been put in the message.

12. General GRUNERT. Then, that part of the message was intended to give him a free hand, as far as you knew, but the message seemed to caution him in doing this, if he can, the idea being: if he can do it without alarming the public, if he can do it without showing intent, it should be so done; but if he can't do it without that, he should do it anyway if it tended to jeopardize his defense; is that right?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, that is correct. He should do anything that was necessary to insure the successful execution of his mission.

13. General GRUNERT. Was there any discussion, in reading the message, as to its ambiguity or its being what we might say a "Do or don't" message: Do this but don't do so and so—one part of the message weakening the other?

General GEROW. I do not recall any such discussion. The whole idea back of that message was to definitely warn the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department of the danger of an attack by Japan, with the idea that he would take such precaution as a Commander would normally be expected to take to prevent surprise. It was expected that he should make such—in addition to the reconnaissance that was called for, it was [4255] expected that he should make such deployment of his forces as he felt were necessary to insure prompt action in case his reconnaissance discovered anything in the vicinity that might jeopardize the successful execution of his mission.

14. General RUSSELL. All right, General. Let us go back and consider these two sentences together for a moment:

If hostilities cannot be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is an order, isn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

15. General RUSSELL. Then in the next sentence you say:

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

16. General RUSSELL. Now, the man in the field receives that message with those two sentences, one following the other.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

17. General RUSSELL. Then a situation arises. He has instructions there which require some construction and might result in some little debate in his mind as to whether or not he could act freely; don't you think?

General GEROW. That is quite true, but the officers commanding our overseas departments were officers of long experience and of senior rank, and it was expected that an officer in such a situation would be confronted with decisions of that nature that he would have to make and that he would make them as he saw the situation at the time. He might construe the movement of a Japanese task force towards Hawaii as an overt act, and attack it, and another man might not so [4256] construe it; but that is a matter which is left to the discretion of an officer who is commanding a garrison or an area such as Hawaii.

18. General RUSSELL. General, if war was on the doorstep, as you people here in the War Department seem to have thought, that morning of November 27, why was it necessary to go into those details in this message at all?

General GEROW. Well, we felt that General Short ought to get, as far as we could give him, the complete picture as we saw it here.

19. General RUSSELL. Well, now, telling him to let Japan commit the first overt act if possible, but not to jeopardize his defense in order to do that, wasn't giving him one particle of information about the situation, was it? Those were purely directive things.

General GEROW. That is correct; they were directives.

20. General RUSSELL. Yes. I had intended to go back a little on what you actually told General Short. You start off by saying:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

Now, do you know of anything else in that message which told General Short about the relation between the American Government and the Japanese Empire?

General GEROW. No, sir, not in this particular message.

[4257] 21. General RUSSELL. That was the sole and the only information passed on to him about what the soldier calls "enemy information," wasn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, in this particular message.

22. General RUSSELL. In that particular message. Isn't it true that the War Department hadn't sent General Short any message at all, prior to November 27th, since the message which I read to you yesterday, on October 20, 1941?

General GEROW. I cannot answer that question from memory. The records of the War Department will show, I believe, what messages were sent, either by the War Department or by the Navy Department for the information of the Army, during the period in question.

23. General RUSSELL. You prepared for the Roberts Commission a memorandum which showed the messages which had been sent by the War Department to General Short, didn't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, I did.

24. General RUSSELL. I am going to show you a document here and ask you if that is the document which you prepared for the Roberts Commission as to the information which you had sent General Short.

General GEROW. Yes, sir, this is a document I submitted to the Roberts Commission.

25. General RUSSELL. Could you refer to part of that document, General, and tell us whether or not any message had gone from the War Department to General Short in a period between October 20th and November 27th, 1941?

General GEROW. This document shows on October the 18th that a radiogram was sent by the War Department to the [4258] Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, which reads as follows:

Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

On November 24, 1941, a radiogram from the Chief of Naval operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was sent, which read as follows:

(Radiogram dated November 24, 1941, from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is as follows:)

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (GINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 15) inform senior Army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch.

On November 26, 1941, there is an extract of a secret cablegram sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, quote: [4259] (Extract of secret cablegram dated November 26, 1941, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines X X X before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns.

On November 27, 1941, a secret first-priority message was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, quote:

(Secret first-priority message dated November 27, 1941, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities can not, repeat can not, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem [4260] necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat

not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Another message was sent out on November 27, 1941, a radiogram from G-2, the War Department, to G-2, the Hawaiian Department:

(Radiogram dated November 27, 1941, from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin.

Another radiogram, from G-2 of the War Department to all corps areas and overseas department commanders, was sent out on November 28, 1941.

26. General RUSSELL. Well, now let us come back to the date of the 27th which we are talking about, General.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

27. General RUSSELL. Now, you have just read to me the messages which were sent to General Short between the 20th of October and the 27th of November, and those messages were read. A naval message was delivered to him on the 24th, and on the [4261] 26th a message was sent to him relative to arming certain bombers that were going to go into the west somewhat farther?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

28. General RUSSELL. Now, therefore, the naval message and the bomber message were the only two messages that you know that went to General Short between the message of October 20th and the message of November 27th which we are discussing?

General GEROW. I refresh my memory from my report to the Roberts Commission. Since I arrived in Washington for this hearing I have asked the War Department to prepare for me a list of the alert messages which were sent to General Short. I should like to check this index.

29. General RUSSELL. Before making a positive statement?

General GEROW. Before a positive statement that those were the only messages sent.

30. General RUSSELL. Yes. Very well.

31. General FRANK. Are you going to let him do it now?

32. General RUSSELL. Have you the record there?

General GEROW. I have that here, sir, yes.

33. General RUSSELL. I didn't know that.

General GEROW. The dates to which you refer, General, were?

34. General RUSSELL. October 20th and November 27th, '41.

General GEROW. You do not desire to go back prior to October the 20th?

35. General RUSSELL. I have no desire. I was starting at that point.

[4262] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

36. General RUSSELL. However,—

General GEROW. No, sir.

37. General RUSSELL. —if you think there is something material before that time, the Board will be glad to have you give it.

General GEROW. There is another message, dated November 27, 1941, to CINCAF and CINCPAC, which reads as follows, quote:

(Message dated November 27, 1941, to CINCAF and CINCPAC, is as follows:)

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased, and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spanavo informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.

This message was sent by the Navy.

There is another message here which I believe is probably a paraphrase of the message that I have already read from this testimony before the Roberts Commission, but I should like to read it again for the purpose of the record.

[4263] 38. General RUSSELL. Go ahead.

General GEROW. Radiogram from G-2 of the War Department to G-2, the Hawaiian Department, on November 27, 1941:

(Radiogram dated November 27, 1941, from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

No. 473 Secret. Japanese negotiations have come to a practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only.

Signed, "Miles."

Those are the only messages during that period of which I have any record.

39. General RUSSELL. It appears, therefore, safe to say, General, that after October 20, 1941, no War Department message was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department until November 27, 1941?

General GEROW. I think that is correct, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. May I interject there: Is it not also true that, by an understanding between the War and Navy Departments, in order to avoid a possible breaking of the code, a message sent by one or the other was to be transmitted to the corresponding Commanders?

General GEROW. That is correct. There was a working agreement with the Navy whereby they would transmit information in their messages to our Commanders, Army Commanders.

41. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

42. General RUSSELL. I want to go back now and connect up the enemy information which General Short had from the War [4264] Department, after which we shall deal with the enemy information which he had from the Navy Department.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

43. General RUSSELL. And I am referring now to Japanese information.

When he made his decision of November 27, 1941—and we shall deal with the War Department first, and then with General GRUNERT's Navy messages later—this message of October 18th that you have listed here, which I referred to as October 20th:

Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

Now, that was the information which the War Department gave General Short about the Japanese situation on October 18th or 20th, '41; that is true, isn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

44. General RUSSELL. Now may I call your attention to the fact that on the 16th of October the Navy had prophesied an outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Japan and had stated that since the Japanese Government considered that Britain and America were responsible for her present situation she probably would attack us. You remember that message?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4265] 45. General RUSSELL. Now, was the effect of the message of October 20, while you disagreed with that situation, to put General Short on notice that the War Department was doing its own thinking about the Japanese situation, notwithstanding the fact that he was getting information from the Navy?

General GEROW. General, will you repeat your question?

46. General RUSSELL. Was the effect of your message of October 20, in which you disagreed with the estimate of the Navy, of October 16, which had been transferred to General Short, sufficient to put General Short on notice that the War Department was doing its independent thinking about the Japanese situation, irrespective of what the Navy was doing?

General GEROW. I can't state how General Short interpreted that message.

47. General RUSSELL. Would that have been a reasonable interpretation of those two messages?

General GEROW. General, I don't know. That's in the mind of the Commander, out there.

48. General RUSSELL. What is in your mind? You were handling the messages at that time.

General GEROW. I wouldn't have felt that the War Department was trying to tell me that it was doing its own thinking on the matter.

49. General RUSSELL. You would not, at all?

General GEROW. No, sir.

50. General RUSSELL. Now, that was for the message of October 20, in which it stated that there was no abrupt change in the Japanese policy anticipated.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4266] 51. General RUSSELL. Now, the next time you said anything to General Short, from the War Department, was on the 27th of November, the critical message which we are considering, now, and you say:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

52. General RUSSELL. Now, let us look at that sentence for a minute. You are talking there entirely about information that is transpiring between the State Department of our Government and the ambassadors from Japan, are you not, in that sentence?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

53. General RUSSELL. And you say that "to all practical purposes" that is broken off, "with the bare possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue," do you not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

54. General RUSSELL. Let us assume now that the Japanese government did come back and offer to continue; wouldn't that, to all intents and purposes, eradicate the enemy information in that sentence, because the negotiations were being continued?

General GEROW. I don't quite understand your question, General.

[4267] 55. General RUSSELL. You tell General Short that the—

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

Now, I am just wondering what effect on his thinking the coming back of these Japanese people and continuing these negotiations would have.

General GEROW. Well, I think the message was quite definite. To all intents and purposes, the negotiations were terminated. There was just the barest possibility that Japan might.

56. General RUSSELL. Well, suppose that bare possibility came to pass and they did come back, then what would that mean?

General GEROW. The only thing I could construe that it would mean would be a continuation of the negotiations, General.

57. General RUSSELL. And their breaking down then had disappeared, and they were going on, isn't that true?

General GEROW. You mean that they didn't have any idea of any hostile intent because they resumed these discussions, is that the question, sir?

58. General RUSSELL. You are sending General Short a statement of fact upon which he must base action, and that statement of fact is that these negotiations have broken down, to all practical purposes, but there is a bare possibility that they will be resumed?

General GEROW. May I see the wording of that message, sir?

[4268] 59. General RUSSELL. It begins at the bottom line, right there, General.

General GEROW. If you notice, General, we say, in here, that "to all practical purposes" these negotiations have been terminated, there was "only the barest possibility that the Japanese might come back and offer to continue." I think the expression there is such as to give to the recipient of this message the idea that there was very little if any possibility that the situation would improve.

60. General RUSSELL. Now, you do not say that. You say:

There is very little possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

That is what you told him.

General GEROW. There is only the barest possibility—

the barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue—

and we follow that, sir, with the statement—

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment,

61. General RUSSELL. How do you construe that as helping anybody, when you say you do not know what the Japanese are going to do, but they may go to war? How does that give him any Japanese information? You tell him you don't know what they are going to do.

General GEROW. General, as I recall the wording of that sentence, in the original message—and this is entirely from memory—it was stated that the negotiations had been terminated, and in the discussion with the Secretary of War, on the morning [4269] of November 27, the Secretary of War talked over the telephone to the Secretary of State, and as a result of that conversation, the wording of that first sentence was changed. I believe the reason it was changed was because technically in the mind of Mr. Hull the negotiations had not actually been broken, and he, for the purposes of the record, did not want to say that definitely, that the negotiations had been terminated.

62. General GRUNERT. Subsequent to this message of November 27, did the War Department send General Short any message to the effect that negotiations had been resumed?

General GEROW. Not to my knowledge, sir.

63. General RUSSELL. Now, is it accurate to say that this first sentence of this message of November 27 of the Chief of Staff which we are now discussing—and I want to put the language in, in order that there may be no misunderstanding in the record:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue.

—is it accurate to say that that language was put in that message upon the request, instruction, or direction of the Secretary of State?

General GEROW. They were inserted in there at the direction of the Secretary of War, in so far as I am concerned.

64. General RUSSELL. Then that was not your language, but the language of the Secretary of War?

General GEROW. That is my recollection, General.

[4270] 65. General RUSSELL. And that language replaced other language which you had placed in the message?

General GEROW. To the best of my belief, that is correct.

66. General RUSSELL. All right. Do you recall, now, what language you had in the message, which was replaced by the language that we are now discussing?

General GEROW. No, sir; I do not; and I have tried to find the draft of that message, and I believe that it was destroyed, in accordance with the policy of destroying secret documents that were no longer needed.

67. General RUSSELL. As suggested by General Frank, would you give us your best recollection as to what that language was?

General GEROW. The best of my recollection is, the sentence stated—

Negotiations with Japan have been terminated.

I can't swear to that. To the best of my knowledge and belief, that was substantially the wording of the first sentence.

68. General RUSSELL. Now, the next sentence, here, General, is

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.

You think that is a War Plans Division sentence?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

69. General RUSSELL. Uninfluenced and untrammelled by any outside agencies?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

[4271] 70. General RUSSELL. Now we come to the next sentence:

If hostilities cannot be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

We have had rather full testimony about the origin of that sentence.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

71. General RUSSELL. The next sentence is:

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

And we have had testimony from you to the effect that you think that is a War Plans Division sentence?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

72. General RUSSELL. We then in the message apparently break away from the hostility attitude and give Short instructions as to what he is to do immediately, because you say:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

—with qualifications or limitations or restrictions which we will discuss in a moment; but you say:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Now, what reconnaissance agencies were available to General Short when he received this message on the 27th of November, assuming that he did receive it on that date?

General GEROW. Well, I would say generally that he had at his disposal aircraft. He had an aircraft warning service [4272]. He had his stationary posts around the perimeter of the island, and on the various other islands.

73. General RUSSELL. Now, General, how many aircraft were available, and of what types, on the morning of the 26th, to General Short?

General GEROW. General, I cannot answer that question.

74. General RUSSELL. Did you know, on the morning of the 27th of November, how many he had?

General GEROW. That information was available to me; yes, sir.

75. General RUSSELL. Do you recall consulting to determine how many aircraft he had available for this reconnaissance?

General GEROW. I do not.

76. General RUSSELL. So, so far as you know, now, when you sent that message to him about reconnaissance, you did not know how many aircraft were available to him for that purpose?

General GEROW. No, sir; I knew at the time, how many. The information as to the number of aircraft available was available in the War Department and in the War Plans Division at that time.

77. General RUSSELL. And you knew it at that time?

General GEROW. I knew that that information was available; yes, sir.

78. General RUSSELL. I didn't ask that question. I asked you if it is your recollection that you knew how many he had that morning.

General GEROW. General, I cannot go back that far, from memory, and say that I looked up the list of aircraft in Oahu, at that time. It is possible that I did so; it is quite [4273] possible that I did not.

79. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, the radar situation. Did you know what it was on the morning of November 27, 1941?

General GEROW. I knew there was radar in Oahu.

80. General RUSSELL. Did you know how long he had had it, and whether or not it was a new agency for reconnaissance?

General GEROW. I cannot recall off-hand how long he did have it. He had it, General.

81. General RUSSELL. You knew at that time that radar was relatively a new development in the American Army, did you not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

82. General RUSSELL. And that it was probably in an experimental stage out on the Island of Oahu?

General GEROW. I would not say it was necessarily in the experimental stage, because, as I recall, we were installing them in Panama and they were being installed in Oahu, and, I imagine, at other places.

83. General RUSSELL. They were in the process of being installed on Oahu on the morning of November 27, 1941; you knew that?

General GEROW. I can't say from memory that that was the situation, sir.

84. General RUSSELL. So, from memory, now, you cannot testify as to what agencies you knew that General Short had for reconnaissance on the morning of November 27, 1941?

General GEROW. Not of my personal knowledge. The records of the War Plans Division probably showed it, and members of my staff probably knew exactly what he had in the way of reconnaissance.

[4274] 85. General RUSSELL. Now, you directed him to take such reconnaissance as he might deem necessary; is that what you stated?

General GEROW. May I see that?

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

86. General RUSSELL. Well, do you think "as you deem necessary" referred to reconnaissance and other measures, or could it have been construed in the message in that way?

General GEROW. The way it is worded, it could be construed either way, I believe, General.

87. General RUSSELL. Now, suppose that General Short instituted no reconnaissance other than what was being carried on by the Army or under his command prior to the receipt of this message that we are discussing; would you have regarded his failure to have extended his reconnaissance in the same way as a wilful disobedience of an Article?

General GEROW. If he had no reconnaissance, I should say that it was a failure to obey an order, not necessarily direct disobedience to the order.

88. General RUSSELL. Let us assume, General, that on the morning of November 27 and on the mornings thereafter he had such radar as was available to him, operating from 4 o'clock in the morning until 7:30, and that this condition continued and obtained on the

morning of December 7, 1941; then would you regard his failure to extend his reconnaissance as a disobedience of that article?

General GEROW. General, I think that is a matter that the commander on the ground has to decide, as to whether or [4275] not he has adequate reconnaissance to prevent surprise.

89. General GRUNERT. Was it not left to his judgment under that wording or that phrase, "as you deem necessary"? Was it not left to his judgment under the foregoing warning, as to what means he would use?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; except for one point: He was directed to make reconnaissance. Now, the extent of that reconnaissance was left to his judgment and discretion.

90. General GRUNERT. Does that message convey to you that the reconnaissance and other measures are necessary, or just that "other measures" are necessary?

General GEROW. The message definitely states that he was directed to make a reconnaissance, and then, in addition, such other measures as he deemed necessary, having in mind the readiness of his troops and his other facilities to act promptly on the results of that reconnaissance.

91. General GRUNERT. Then the intent of the message was, that he was ordered to make reconnaissance and to take such other measures as he might deem necessary, but he was ordered to make the reconnaissance, and the phrase "as you deem necessary" is not considered to apply to reconnaissance?

General GEROW. Well, it may apply. He was directed to make reconnaissance and such other measures as he deemed necessary, but he was directed specifically to make the reconnaissance.

92. General GRUNERT. Was he not also directed to take such other measures?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; he was directed to take such other measures as he deemed necessary.

[4276] 93. General GRUNERT. There seems to be a sort of question on the interpretation of that phrase, "as you deem necessary"; that is, whether or not it applies to the reconnaissance, or just to the other measures.

General GEROW. I think it could be interpreted to apply either way, General.

94. General FRANK. Is it not a question of the punctuation in the message?

95. General GRUNERT. There is no punctuation in the message, is there?

96. General RUSSELL. No, sir; not the one we have. I haven't got the original one before me.

97. General GRUNERT. Another question, right there: If you interpret the words "as you deem necessary" to apply both to the reconnaissance and "other measures," why was it necessary to tell him to do such things as he thought necessary? Is that a fair question?

General GEROW. That is the whole point. We emphasized specifically reconnaissance. Then, in our mind was, that in order to take advantage of that reconnaissance, what that reconnaissance might develop, other measures were necessary, at the time.

98. General GRUNERT. All right. Go ahead.

99. General RUSSELL. Then you add this:

But these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

General GEROW. Well, it meant that we might precipitate this action. No one was certain that war was going to occur [4277] on December 7, and we wanted as much time as we could get to prepare for it. We did not want to alarm the civil population of Oahu, particularly, because of the fact that information would be immediately transmitted to Japan, and we were taking precautions to meet something that might precipitate the very thing we wanted to avoid.

100. General RUSSELL. Taken together, the sentence of this message that if possible Japan should commit the first overt act, and "not to alarm the civil population," "not to disclose intent," was not the plain effect of that language to direct General Short to tread softly and be very cautious in what he did out there?

General GEROW. General, it is impossible for me to interpret the thought of General Short.

101. General RUSSELL. I am not asking for General Short's thought. I am asking for your thought.

General GEROW. No, sir. Of course, I am in the position of having helped write the message. I knew what I had in the back of my mind, so I know how I would have looked at the message when I received it at the other end. My thought would have been, "Here is a threat of war. The War Department wants me to be on the alert with my reconnaissance and be prepared to take advantage of what that reconnaissance might develop. They are not certain as to when war is going to occur, or certain that it is actually going to occur; so they do not want to disturb the civil population. They do not want to put into effect war measures. They do not want me to go out and deliberately attack Japan, but they do want me to prepare myself to meet any action by the armed forces of Japan."

[4278] Now, as I say, that is not a fair interpretation to make of the message, because I wrote it, or helped to write it.

102. General RUSSELL. You are now telling the Board what you had in mind and attempted to express in the message?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

103. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, we have here the language: Report measures taken.

Why was that put in there?

General GEROW. As I recall, and I think, as I testified before the Roberts Commission, we had had some difficulty in getting prompt information as to the receipt of messages to our overseas garrisons. We wanted to be sure that this important message reached its destination. The second reason for the inclusion of that sentence was that we wanted to know what the current dispositions of the troops were in our overseas garrisons. We wanted to have that information available not only for Hawaii but for all the other overseas possessions.

104. General RUSSELL. You had a responsibility in connection with the defense of Hawaii, which, though somewhat different, was yet just as definite as was General Short's; that is true?

General GEROW. Yes.

105. General RUSSELL. And it was necessary, therefore, for him to send you the information as to what dispositions he was making and what he was doing, in order that you might intelligently fulfill your obligation in connection with the defense of the Hawaiian Department; is that true?

General GEROW. I made some notes on that, sir—if I may.

[4279] 106. General RUSSELL. Would you answer the question that I have just asked, because I think it is important.

General GEROW. As you know, full latitude was and is given now to commanding generals of overseas garrisons in working out their detailed plans for the execution of joint Army-Navy war plans and Army strategical plans based on the joint plans. And the policy of the War Department was that the local defense plans would be sent to the War Department for information, but that they would not be formally approved by the War Department, and not even commented upon, unless it appeared they were not in accord with the basic Army plan as to concept, mission, and means assigned. The theory was that the commanding generals were senior officers of long experience, and that they were fully capable of working out, on the ground, detailed plans necessary to implement the broad directives of the War Department. The same basic thought was back of the message of November 27, when we included that phrase, "report measures taken." We wanted the CG of the Hawaiian Department and the Army garrisons to know that there was a threat of hostile action by the armed forces of Japan; that he should utilize his reconnaissance means, and take such action promptly, that he should institute such other measures as he deemed necessary for the prompt implementing of all his plans, in the event reconnaissance detected the approach of Japanese military forces. Just how he would perform those tasks was left to his discretion as a responsible officer on the ground.

107. General RUSSELL. Would you please read the question again that I asked the General.

(The question referred to was read.)

[4280] General GEROW. It is not true.

108. General RUSSELL. Why, then, wouldn't the language, "please acknowledge receipt," have served just as well?

General GEROW. Because that would not have given us the current disposition of his forces.

109. General RUSSELL. Why did you want to know the current disposition of his forces?

General GEROW. Because the War Department might have to order other dispositions under certain circumstances, and we desired to know where his troops were, whether they had been on the alert for a considerable period of time, or whether they had been on normal garrison duty.

110. General RUSSELL. And you did not ask him, General, for the history of what his troops had been doing? You asked him to tell you the measures taken?

General GEROW. "Report measures taken."

111. General RUSSELL. That is right. As a result of this message of November 27? Now, do you want this answer which you have just read into the record to stand, in the light of your attention being called to the actual language of your message of the 27th?

(The record, beginning with "General Gerow. It is not true," and ending with the words "had been on normal garrison duty," was read.)

General GEROW. May I strike that out, and change that?

112. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General GEROW. And make the reply, "As a matter of information." Strike out the preceding answer to that last question, why we wanted to know it, and substitute as the answer the words, "As a matter of information."

[4281] 113. General RUSSELL. That is the total answer that you want to make, now?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

114. General RUSSELL. That the "report measures taken" was placed in there, and you expected to use the reply purely as a matter of information?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

115. General RUSSELL. Now, let us talk a moment about this basic thought which was back of this language.

You used this language:

The policy of the War Department was that the local defense plans would be sent to the War Department for information, but that they would not be formally approved by the War Department, and not even commented upon, unless it appeared they were not in accord with the basic Army plan as to concept, mission, and means assigned.

I interpret that basic thought now as meaning that when you had a report from a department commander, you did not approve it, and you did not comment upon it, unless it was "not in accord with the basic Army plan as to concept, mission, and means assigned." In other words, I interpret that as meaning, if the plans sent to you from the departments were not in accord with your thinking about what they should be, then you would comment upon them; is that right?

General GEROW. If they were not in accord with the specific subjects that I mention there, the concept and the mission.

116. General RUSSELL. Let us supply that basic idea now to the message that might have come back from General Short in response [4282] to your message of November 27, 1941. Now, suppose that the message which he sent back in reply to that directive to "report measures taken" was not in accordance with your thinking, as to what measures should have been taken; then would you have commented upon it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

117. General RUSSELL. If you had not agreed with them, you would have commented upon them and disagreed with them; that is right, isn't it, General?

General GEROW. I might not have agreed with certain of the details of what the commander was doing, but I certainly would have tried to—even if I had not agreed on those details, I would not have told him to take other dispositions.

118. General RUSSELL. Do you mean to say that if he had sent you back a report which in your opinion violated all of the demands and requirements of the situation, that you would not have done anything about it?

General GEROW. No, sir, General; I do not make that reply.

119. General RUSSELL. Well, what do you say?

General GEROW. Well, I say this, that if he complied with the general plans of the War Department, the basic directives of the War Department as to the action which he should take, that he "did not violate," I think this paper says—that he did not violate the concept of the War Department plan, the mission, and the means assigned—if he kept within those limitations, we would have not criticized his plan; because, if he kept within those, within the scope of the concept and the mission, he could not have been far wrong.

[4283] 120. General GRUNERT. But as to the degree to which he was in that scope and concept, if that required 100% of action and he only did 10% of action, that would not have been living up to the concept of the plan, would it?

General GEROW. No, sir; he would not have lived up to the concept of the plan.

121. General RUSSELL. Before we go away from this, General, I am trying to follow your line of thinking, and I must admit that I am having a little difficulty; but let me ask this question, and it might clear up the situation. You are now testifying that the report that General Short might have made to you on measures taken would not have created any comment by the War Department if those measures had come within the basic concepts of the great big plans that we have been talking about?

General GEROW. The plans that we have been talking about, General, provided for just these sorts of contingencies. In other words, in, I think, the coastal frontier plan, it said—I think I made a note on that, if I may quote from it.

122. General RUSSELL. Yes; do that. I am trying to connect it.

General GEROW. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan especially provided that when the CG, Hawaiian Department, and the naval base defense officer, agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as might be necessary to make available to the other commander certain air forces for operations in accordance with the predetermined plan. A threat of hostile attack was clearly [4284] stated in the War Plans message on November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District.

123. General RUSSELL. Precisely! You expected him then to operate within these plans?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; with these restrictions that we put in that message.

124. General RUSSELL. And if he did not operate within those plans, and if the measures which he reported indicated that he did not operate in accordance with those plans, then of course he was violating the basic concept?

General GEROW. That's correct, sir.

125. General RUSSELL. Would you point out, here, where you read from last?

General GEROW. You mean the last?

126. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

This extract from which you have read indicates that under this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, when a hostile air raid or attack was sufficiently imminent, there would be a combination of air forces by the Army and the Navy, out there?

General GEROW. There would be. There was a working agreement that the Army would give the Navy—the Navy would use some of the Army planes, perhaps, and the Army would use certain of the Navy planes; I have forgotten just the particular distribution.

127. General RUSSELL. And you further drew the conclusion that [4285] a threat of hostile attack was clearly stated, in the War Department's message of November 27—

"and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with" this plan.

That is the remainder of the quotation that you referred to?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

128. General RUSSELL. Now, your message goes further.

General GEROW. I would like to make one statement before we leave this general subject.

129. General RUSSELL. All right. Put on the record whatever the General has to say.

General GEROW. In order to clarify what I mean by these statements that I have just made, I would like to give an example of what I have in mind. As a Corps Commander, very recently I was given an order for advance and attack. That order consisted of two lines on a map giving the boundaries of my Corps. It showed a goose-egg, a circle, probably 30 miles away, as a marked objective. That is the only order that I got, except as to the time of an attack. Now, the Army Commander did not expect me to prepare a detailed plan, and get his approval. I prepared the plan that I wanted to put into operation. It was sent to Army headquarters. The Army Commander probably read that plan over. Maybe he would modify it in some details if he had been making the plan, but the plan never came back to me, approved or disapproved; and I did not expect it to come back to me.

[4286] I feel that here is a similar situation, that the Commander has been given all the War Department feels is necessary to tell him, the assignment of a job to defend Oahu, or the missions that he has under that plan; that the War Department is in no position, particularly the head of the War Plans Division, to sit down and criticize or comment on the details of the commander's plan—the plan of the commander who is actually on the ground.

Now, I hope I have made myself clear by that example.

130. General RUSSELL. Let me ask you a question about that example. Suppose, when your plan went back, you were going to attack the "goose-egg" in the opposite direction, and that the commanding general had seen it, and detected it?

General GEROW. Well, I couldn't very well attack it in the opposite direction, General, without going outside the limits of my corps zone, sir.

131. General RUSSELL. Now, this message goes further, here, and it says:

Should hostilities occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

132. General RUSSELL. This Rainbow Five placed into operation all of these plans that we are talking about, did it not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

133. General RUSSELL. Now, as a matter of fact, General Short reported what action he took out there, did he not, on the same day that he got this message, on the 27th?

General GEROW. Yes; I think it came on the 28th; I am not sure, sir.

[4287] 134. General RUSSELL. You are familiar with that message?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

135. General RUSSELL. You saw that message?

General GEROW. Yes, sir—initialed it.

136. General RUSSELL. You initialed it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

137. General RUSSELL. You made no comment on it?

General GEROW. No, sir.

138. General RUSSELL. You did not disapprove it in any way?

General GEROW. No, sir.

139. General RUSSELL. You sent it to the Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. I won't say that I sent it to the Chief of Staff. It may have gone to the Chief of Staff prior to coming to me, sir. I do not remember the exact routing of the messages.

140. General RUSSELL. The Secretary of War saw it?

General GEROW. I would have to check the records, sir, to say whether or not he did.

141. General RUSSELL. I assume that if his initials were on the message, it would indicate that he saw it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

142. General RUSSELL. When it came back to you, or when you first saw it, did you analyze it to see what General Short had done?

General GEROW. Sir, may I refer to my notes again? because the same question was asked me by the Roberts Committee, and I expected it to be asked at this one.

I read and initialed General Short's reply to the War Plans Division's message of November 27. It did not occur to me that [4288] it was an answer to the War Plans Division's warning message of November 27th, but was rather a reply to the sabotage message sent out by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on the evening of November 27th. This mental reaction was perhaps due to the fact that the sabotage message was discussed at some length the evening of the 27th. Further, General Short's message made no reference to action with regard to reconnaissance and other defense measures directed in the War Plans Division's message of November 27, but was confined solely to sabotage, a subject which was not mentioned in the War Plans Division's message. The reference in General Short's message to radio 472 of the 27th meant nothing to me at the time, since the number in question was put on the message by the War Department Message Center and was not the number used by War Plans Division to identify the document. War Department records will show that there was a tremendous amount of important, pre-war business being handled by War Plans Division during the months preceding December 7. It was a physical impossibility for me to check personally each message received and identify it with other corre-

spondence on the subject. This task was decentralized to the several sections of the Division.

The message in question would normally be handled by the Plans Group. If further action was required with respect to it, the Chief of that group would normally draft a proposed solution and present it to me for approval. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no action was taken on the message received from General Short. The Chief of the Plans group is now deceased, and I have no way of knowing what his mental reactions were. If he realized the message was a reply to the [4289] War Plans Division's message of November 27, it would be perfectly reasonable for him to assume from the statement contained in General Short's message, namely, "Liaison with Navy," that General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic plan, which provided for close integration of the Army-Navy effort, both for reconnaissance and combat.

Further, the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan especially provided that when the CG, Hawaiian Department, and the Naval Base Defense Officer agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as might be necessary to make available to the other commander certain Air Forces for operations in accordance with a predetermined plan. A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans Division's message of November 27, and there was no reason for the members of War Plans Division to believe that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District. Even if I had realized General Short's message was a reply to the War Plans Division's message of November 27, I would very probably have interpreted it as I imagine the Chief of the Plans group did.

143. General GRUNERT. May I ask a question, there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

144. General GRUNERT. Similar messages were sent to the Philippines, Panama, and the West Coast; is that correct?

[4290] General GEROW. Yes, sir.

145. General GRUNERT. And they reported the action taken, more or less at length, but in more detail—what I might call greater security measures. Did you see those reports when they came in?

General GEROW. I probably did. I probably initialed them, as was my custom, sir.

146. General GRUNERT. Then it did not occur to you at that time to compare what was done in Hawaii with what was done in Panama, the Philippines, or elsewhere, and thus to consider that insufficient action had been taken in Hawaii?

General GEROW. I did not compare them, General. As I say, there was a great deal of important business, and I assumed that when the orders were issued and the information furnished to General Short, that he had taken the necessary action to comply.

147. General RUSSELL. No other message, however, General, came in from General Short, except this one?

General GEROW. None that I know of, sir.

General RUSSELL. Therefore, if you came to the conclusion that message was in reply to the G-2 message relating to sabotage which went out on the 27th, it comes to pass that you did know, you must have concluded, that General Short had not replied to the other message which we are discussing?

General GEROW. The thought that he had not replied never occurred to me between the interval of November 27 and December 7.

I say, there were many other important problems coming up at the time, and I expected my staff to follow through.

I believe the reason it was not followed through was because the staff of the plans group assumed, as I probably [4291] would have done, had I connected the two messages, that "liaison with the Navy" meant that General Short was working with the Navy, that it would take some time to make these readjustments and put the actual situation into operation, that he had taken action immediately against the Japanese stage. I could see no other reason for the inclusion of the phrase "liaison with the Navy."

149. General RUSSELL. Doesn't it come to pass, therefore, General, that you were making very dangerous assumptions, on small facts, about a tremendously important matter?

General GEROW. General, I did not make any assumption. I did not connect the two messages, when this short message of General Short came. I didn't connect that with the War Plans Division message of November. In that, I was in error, and I should perhaps have checked the number, or someone should have checked it for me and identified the two messages and connected them.

150. General RUSSELL. But you have just testified, General, that you had connected it, you would have assumed that the language in General Short's report, "liaison with Navy," would have meant that he was doing all of these other things; to which answer, I have asked the question that I have just asked, about a dangerous assumption on a small factual basis, on a tremendously important matter.

General GEROW. Well, I said, I think I might have assumed that, General, I do not know, since I did not connect the two messages. I merely put that out because Colonel Bundy is not here, and that that assumption was one that he might well have made.

151. General RUSSELL. Well, one final question, and then we [4292] will go away from this message, which I am searching you on quite thoroughly, because the Board is considering it very seriously, and it plays an important part in this history.

General GEROW. It does; yes, sir.

152. General RUSSELL. The last sentence in the message is to this effect, or is in this language:

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Again I come back to the question which I have asked on several previous occasions: If war was upon us, and those people were probably going to be attacked, out there, and if, as you say, your message indicated to General Short that he probably would be attacked, was it not necessary for the people, down to the lowest echelons, who were going to withstand that attack, to know that it was coming?

General GEROW. May I read the exact wording of that, sir? The sentence reads:

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

That, again, is a matter for the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to decide on.

153. General RUSSELL. He would pick out the essential officers and the "minimum essential officers"?

General GEROW. Absolutely, sir. The platoon commander would not have to know the information that General Short had. All he would have to know was, "You go out to this particular position, in these particular trenches, and you be ready to meet anything that might happen; this is an alert." That is all he needed to know. He did not need to know the state of [4293] the conditions with Japan, and that we did not want to disturb the civil population, that we wanted Japan to commit the first overt act. He didn't need to know all those things.

154. General RUSSELL. He did not need to know that war was about to break?

General GEROW. I don't think that platoon commander—he might have been told that the relations with Japan were strained, but not the full contents of the message.

155. General RUSSELL. There was a lieutenant, General, in the information center, who received a message that a great or a relatively large flight of planes had been detected, 130 miles off the coast of Oahu, at a definite point, and he passed it up. Suppose that lieutenant had been told that hostilities might break out any moment, and had been on the alert, don't you think that that would have helped the situation tremendously?

General GEROW. General, I do not know what that lieutenant was told. I do not know what instructions were given to him.

156. General RUSSELL. Do you not think that would have been a violation of the last sentence of this order, the spirit of it, at least, if General Short had passed that message down to that lieutenant in that information center?

General GEROW. No, sir; not if General Short felt it was necessary for that officer to know it, for the security of his mission.

(Brief recess.)

[4294] 157. General RUSSELL. All right. General Gerow, you have just shown me the memorandum from which you read on yesterday afternoon, which you identified as a memorandum to the Chief of Staff dated November 27, 1941, and a note which was on the bottom of the memorandum to the effect that the minutes of the Joint Board meeting of November 27 do not show that either a proposed warning message to anyone or the Marshall-Stark memorandum to the President was discussed. For the purposes of the record I will ask you to identify the paper which I am just handing you, and state whether or not it is the paper just described.

General GEROW. It is the paper, sir, just described.

158. General RUSSELL. May we have that and introduce it into the evidence here as a part of the records of this Board?

General GEROW. May I suggest, General, that I had this copy made personally for reference, that the original of this document is on file

in the War Department, and I should like to suggest that the original be furnished to the Board in lieu of the copy, which is not even certified as a true copy.

159. General GRUNERT. Why not have the witness read the thing into the record as a part of his testimony?

160. General RUSSELL. Do you object to reading that into the record as a part of your testimony?

General GEROW. I have no objection at all, sir. I read parts of it.

161. General RUSSELL. Yesterday?

General GEROW. Yesterday, sir.

162. General GRUNERT. All right. Read it into the record in its entirety, together with the footnote.

[4296] General GEROW. This note that is on here was put on here merely to refresh my memory and as a result of the search that was made of the Joint Board records to find out if there was any reference in those records to this message that I referred to in the official memorandum from me to the Chief of Staff. The note is not a part of the original record in the War Department.

163. General GRUNERT. All right. Then read it, but omit the note.

General GEROW. I read the paper in question:

WPD 4544-13. Dated November 27, 1941. This paper shows that on November 28, 1941, it was noted and initialed by the Chief of Staff and was noted and initialed by the Deputy Chief of Staff.

(Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, in re Far Eastern Situation, is as follows:)

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

1. The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 a. m., November 27, 1941. General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed. I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest [4296] possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines. I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

2. Later in the morning, I attended a conference with the Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, and Admiral Stark. The various messages to the Army and Navy Commanders and to Mr. Sayre were discussed. A joint message for General MacArthur and Admiral Hart was approved (copy attached). The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed to be prepared for the President. The Secretary of War wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point. It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

3. Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

Signed, "L. T. Gerow."

Typed, "L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff."

In the lower left-hand corner:

2 Inclosures: Memorandum for the President 11-27-41

Memorandum for TAG, 11-27-41.

164. General RUSSELL. Where would the record to which you [4297] have referred as being on file in the War Department be, General GEROW?

General GEROW. I believe that it would probably be found in the Chief of Staff's office. They changed the organization of the War Department since I left, and it might now be in the hands of the Adjutant General.

165. General RUSSELL. In this memorandum that you have just read to us you refer to a message to the President, and I believe you refer to it again as a joint memorandum. Do you have any independent recollection of what that was?

General GEROW. No, sir; I couldn't testify definitely which memorandum it was. In the Joint Board we wrote a number of these memoranda, and I couldn't possibly identify that memorandum. It is no doubt of record with these other papers.

166. General RUSSELL. Now, this vital question about the message in a general way, General: If I recall your testimony yesterday afternoon correctly, there were three conferences held about this message of November 27 that went out to General Short and to the other Commanders. No. 1 was 9:30 in the morning, in the Secretary of War's office, and then later in the day you were back in the same office with other people. Then, as I recall, late in the afternoon there was a conference with General Bryden, the Deputy Chief of Staff, in which these messages, including the one to General Short and the Hawaiian Department, were finally approved; is that correct?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

167. General RUSSELL. Now, thinking through on this last conference and not hastening an answer at all, do you remember [4298] who was at that conference, the late afternoon conference?

General GEROW. To the best of my recollection and belief, it was General Bryden, General Miles, Colonel Bundy, and myself. There may have been others, but I do not recall them.

168. General RUSSELL. You don't recall, for example, that the Secretary of War or any of his representatives were there?

General GEROW. I can state positively that the Secretary of War was not there.

169. General RUSSELL. It was purely a military meeting of military men?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

170. General RUSSELL. And at that meeting the messages that went out to the Commanding Generals of the Departments, including the one to General Short, were given final approval?

General GEROW. As I recall, only the one to General Short was discussed at that meeting, and that was brought up for discussion only because of the fact there was a sentence in there that referred to taking action to prevent subversive activities. That discussion was purely and simply directed towards a discussion of that one aspect of the message, and not the contents of the message in general.

171. General RUSSELL. What I am attempting to clear up is that after these messages were worked out by the War Plans Division they were submitted to military people and approved by military people, without influence from outside agencies or civilians, and sent out as military messages. Is that true or not?

General GEROW. That is correct, yes, sir.

172. General RUSSELL. I think that is all I have on this phase.
[4299] 173. General GRUNERT. Except insofar as the construction of that message is concerned.

174. General RUSSELL. Well, I think this question is appropriate, and I had intended to go back to it: That message to General Short; we will confine ourselves to that now. There were these sentences appearing in that message, which had been influenced by the other people who were not at the conference to which you have already testified?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

175. General FRANK. The first two sentences were put in there at the instance of the Secretary of War himself?

General GEROW. Let's see what the second sentence is (examining message). The wording of the first sentence was the wording suggested by the Secretary of War after a telephone conversation with the Secretary of State. The second sentence was put in there as a result of information that I received from some source which I can't accurately identify at the moment, possibly either the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War.

176. General FRANK. I think the record indicates that the Secretary of War stated, if he himself was responsible for the first two sentences,—

General GEROW. Yes.

177. General FRANK. —that he wanted to be sure that that information went to General Short.

General GEROW. There is one other statement I would like to make there. With reference to the other message I recall—and this is purely as a matter of memory—there was no reference in the Philippine message, which I think was the one that was [4300] really actually approved by the Secretary of War, to any subversive activities or sabotage. I don't think there was any reference in there, in that particular message; and how it got into the message that was to go to General Short, I cannot testify definitely, but it was later, as you know, removed following a conference on the afternoon of the 27th.

178. General GRUNERT. I have two questions I want to get in.

General, do you know whether or not the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, after he made his report of measures taken, communicated with the War Department as to whether or not the War Department deemed the measures taken sufficient or wanted any other measures taken?

General GEROW. Insofar as I can recall, there was no message to that effect received from General Short.

179. General GRUNERT. Do you, as A. C. of S., War Plans Division, representing the War Department, consider that you supplied the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with adequate warning from which he could or should have taken adequate measures for defense?

General GEROW. I consider that the War Department had given General Short adequate warning of the possible hostile act by Japan.

180. General GRUNERT. All right. I have no other questions.

181. General FRANK. Had you been in General Short's position and had sent a reply such as he sent to the War Department, do you think

that you would have followed it up with another message to the War Department asking, Was my message of such and such a date O. K.?

General GEROW. General, again I can't place myself in [4301] General Short's position. I don't know what I would have done under the circumstances.

182. General FRANK. Well, General Grunert just asked a question if General Short sent such a message, and you said he didn't.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

183. General FRANK. Was there any necessity for his sending such a message?

184. General GRUNERT. I asked for a statement of fact. You are asking for an opinion.

185. General FRANK. I know.

186. General GRUNERT. If the witness desires to answer, well and good. If he does not, it is up to him.

187. General FRANK. But he already has stated that the information or the instructions given to General Short, he considered, as a matter of opinion, were satisfactory for him to take action.

188. General GRUNERT. The witness may answer as he sees fit, or not answer as he sees fit.

General GEROW. I cannot interpret what I would have done under the similar circumstances.

189. General FRANK. All right.

190. General RUSSELL. General, there have been suggestions made by members of the Board about the two naval messages reaching General Short between October 20th and November 27th. Briefly we shall refer to those, the first being that of November 24th. It has been read. The enemy information, the Japanese information, in it is this:

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable [4302] outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility.

Now, that enemy information went to General Short on the 24th of November. Contemporaneously with the sending of the message that we have discussed as the Chief of Staff's message of November 27th, the Navy sent another message out which we assume was shown to General Short:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces.

And the instructions follow.

Now, those two messages contain information about Japan which was shown to General Short. The first one says they may move in any direction, and then adds this: "including an attack on the Philippines or Guam."

The second one says Japan is expected to go on the aggressive within a few days, and then: an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, Borneo, is indicated.

13] Now, assuming those messages were shown to General is it not true that all of the information relating to the Japanese forces, their movements and probabilities, indicated overwhelmingly action in the Far Pacific rather than in Hawaii? General GEROW. Well, it indicated, I think, perhaps a major effort in that direction; but, since the message stated that this is a warning and that they may move in any direction, I think it was unable to assume that you might expect simultaneous action in all places, the scale of which might differ from the one of which we had considerable information, moving down from Indo-China.

14. General RUSSELL. How do you account for the fact, when you were called in first by the Secretary of War and he discussed with you the message from the President, that only MacArthur was considered?

General GEROW. My personal opinion, without any facts to substantiate that view, is that the Philippines were the farthestmost outpost. It is the most vulnerable point that we had. Its defenses were at a lower state, I believe, than—I know—than were those in Hawaii. The concern was naturally directed towards your outpost position in that place that might be—certainly would be hit.

2. General RUSSELL. Was it true that the Philippine Islands were nearly in the path of this proposed southern advance of the Japanese forces?

General GEROW. I think that is quite true, sir.

3. General RUSSELL. Now, we have a copy of messages that were sent out—and we can handle this very briefly—beginning [4304] to a very tense situation which developed in the Pacific in 1940. You were at that time not on duty in the War Plans Division, as I recall?

General GEROW. What date was that, sir?

194. General RUSSELL. That message was sent on June 17, 1940, and possibly I am comparing it with your message or with the message of November 27, '41:

Immediately alert—

in reading now from the message of June 17, 1940.

General GEROW. Yes.

195. General RUSSELL. (Reading:)

(Alert via radiogram, June 17, 1940, War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Main- in alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct to Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

That was sent out on June 7, 1940, and the alert there was directed to deal with the trans-Pacific raid.

Now, when we come on into 1941, which is almost 18 months later, we send to the Commanding General of the same Department that message of November 27th. We send the message which we have been discussing this morning, which does not, apparently contain the definite instructions as the earlier message of June 17, 1940.

[4305] Now, the question is this: Had there come about in the War Department thinking, between June '40 and November '41, a

feeling that there was less likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor and Army installations by carrier-borne aircraft?

General GEROW. We always recognize the possibility of such an attack on Hawaii. I think my general feeling was that the Philippines would be attacked first, perhaps.

196. General RUSSELL. But you do not recall any thinking which might account for the difference in the instructions to the Hawaiian Department in June '40 and those in November '41?

General GEROW. No, sir.

197. General RUSSELL. Now, I have also been impressed with the fact that that alert of June 17, 1940, was followed up from day to day by messages back and forth as to what was going on.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

198. General RUSSELL. The record, so far as I have been able to discover the facts contained in it here, indicates that nothing transpired between General Short and the War Department from November 27 until the attack on December 7 except these messages that went out on the 27th and 28th and General Short's reply thereto.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

199. General RUSSELL. Apparently there was a period in there when there were no contacts at all between the two departments, and I was wondering if you could account for that fact.

General GEROW. Well, I think the thought was at that time, [4306] in view of the message that the Army had sent out and the Navy had sent out, that the Commanders had been sufficiently warned as to what to expect.

200. General RUSSELL. Were there any new developments that had been transmitted to General Short, or did you feel called upon to check on him to see what he was doing out there?

General GEROW. There were no new developments until that message came in on December 7th which we received at that time.

201. General RUSSELL. Well, I am going to jump over now to that message and see what you know about that.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

202. General RUSSELL. When did you first know about that message of December 7, 1941?

General GEROW. When I went to the Chief of Staff's office, I should say somewhere around about eleven-thirty, on the morning of December 7th.

203. General RUSSELL. Was it in the Chief of Staff's office then?

General GEROW. As I recall, he had that message on his desk at the time.

204. General RUSSELL. Do you know when that message first reached any agency of the War Department?

General GEROW. No, sir. I have no first-hand knowledge of that, sir.

205. General RUSSELL. Do you know how we might obtain the information as to when it first reached some agency of the War Department?

[4307] General GEROW. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, would have that information, if anyone has it.

206. General RUSSELL. You don't know from whom the information in the message came, do you, or who delivered the message to the War Department?

General GEROW. I don't quite understand your question.

207. General RUSSELL. Well, to make it plain, did the Navy send it over there? Do you recall?

General GEROW. No, sir, I wouldn't know. The first I knew of the message was when I saw it in—

208. General RUSSELL. And that was about eleven-thirty on Sunday morning?

General GEROW. Somewhere around between eleven and eleven-thirty.

209. General RUSSELL. Had any message based on this information been prepared for delivery to the Hawaiian Department?

General GEROW. I believe that when I went to the Chief of Staff's office he had prepared a message in his own handwriting which he read aloud to those of us who were present.

210. General RUSSELL. And you think that the Chief of Staff's message had been prepared and was ready to go when you got there, when you reached his office?

General GEROW. That is my impression, sir; and I have a copy of a memorandum I made for record here on December the 15th, as to my recollection of what happened in the Chief of Staff's office that morning, sir.

211. General RUSSELL. Have you the record with you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I should like to read it into [4308] the record.

212. General RUSSELL. Yes. We should be glad to have it.

General GEROW. I quote from a memorandum for record prepared by me on December 15, 1941:

(Excerpt from memorandum dated December 15, 1941, by General Gerow, and paraphrase, are as follows):

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 a. m., Eastern Standard Time, General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions—

I feel that I might be discussing matters of ultrasecrecy in parts of this message, and I would like to consult the War Department as to whether or not I should put this out.

213. Colonel TOULMIN. You might let the record show you are now paraphrasing.

General GEROW. Yes. Cut out the last thing, "He felt that the Japanese Government"—

I am now paraphrasing:

The Chief of Staff felt that the delivery of the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, Commanding General of the Caribbean Defense Command, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and the Commanding General 4th Army, [4309] were read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the message center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the message center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

214. General FRANK. The sending of that message was a transaction directly between General Marshall and Colonel Bratton?

General GEROW. As I recall, yes, and as my notes show.

215. General GRUNERT. Do you know what the most expeditious means were at the time?

General GEROW. No, sir. That was a matter that would be handled by the Signal Corps and the message center.

216. General GRUNERT. Had you as head of the W. P. D. ever used the oceanic telephone to Hawaii?

General GEROW. I had not used it to Hawaii. I had used it on one occasion to the Philippines.

217. General FRANK. Had it been satisfactory?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

218. General FRANK. This was a red hot message, wasn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

219. General FRANK. Do you know whether that was encoded or not?

General GEROW. No, sir; I know none of the details of [4310] the handling of the message in the message center.

220. General GRUNERT. Evidently the Chief of Staff considered that an additional warning was necessary to the various Commanders despite the warning of November 27th, then?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. He felt there was some significance as to this time, and he wanted to warn them to be especially on the alert at that particular time.

221. General GRUNERT. Who was Colonel Bratton? What was his official position?

General GEROW. He was on duty in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

222. General GRUNERT. Then he might have knowledge of the origin or the source of that information that the Chief of Staff had?

General GEROW. I think he would have knowledge of it, yes, sir.

223. General GRUNERT. I have one question, to see whether or not you have any recollection of ever having received from the Hawaiian Department an S. O. P. of November 5th which described in part the various alerts so-called: No. 1, which is sabotage; No. 2, which was defense against an air attack plus sabotage; and No. 3, which was an all-out alert. Do you recall, in your War Plans Division, of having had that information furnished you from Hawaii?

General GEROW. I don't recall ever having seen it myself. Copies of it may have been furnished the War Plans Division. That I cannot state without checking the records.

224. Colonel TOULMIN. General, I call your attention to your copy of the memorandum to the Chief of Staff under date of [4311] November 27, '41, which you addressed to the Chief of Staff, in which this sentence is contained:

The Secretaries were informed of the proposed memorandum you and Admiral Stark directed to be prepared for the President.

Do you have any recollection of that memorandum independently of this document?

General GEROW. No personal recollection of the details of it.

225. Colonel TOULMIN. Did you see it at that time?

General GEROW. I presume that I did.

226. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to show you what may be that memorandum which was contained in this record. I am showing you the record, pages 9 to 12 inclusive, and I will ask you to read this

unication, which purports to be a joint memorandum of Marshall and Admiral Stark under date of November 27, 1941, k you, after reading it, if you can state whether you recall that was the memorandum referred to in your memorandum to the Chief of Staff under date of November 27, 1941.

starts here, General (indicating).

General GEROW. I believe that that is the same memorandum.

Colonel TOULMIN. The memorandum referred to in paragraph four memorandum to the Chief of Staff under date of November 27, 1941, was apparently again referred to in your later note that you endorsed on the foot of your memorandum, indicating some indication that you have made; is that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct.

Colonel TOULMIN. And you could find no record of that memorandum having been presented, so far as the minutes are concerned of joint board, on the date of November 27th?

General GEROW. A search was made of the records for me.

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes?

General GEROW. And that is the note.

Colonel TOULMIN. As far as you know, that there was no record of it?

General GEROW. As far as I know, there was no record.

Colonel TOULMIN. Do you know, either from this memorandum in my hand here, just referred to, or from your independent collection, when the Marshall-Stark memorandum was actually sent forward to the Secretaries or its contents communicated to them by one or otherwise? That is, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State.

General GEROW. From my own personal knowledge I cannot answer that question. This memorandum indicates that I took this memorandum, I believe, up to the Secretary.

Colonel TOULMIN. That is not quite clear, General. I shall again ask you the question.

General GEROW. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. It is very vital to have that cleared up.

General GEROW. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum states that:

Both the message and the memorandum were shown to the Secretary of War. He suggested some minor [4313] changes in the memorandum. These were made (copy attached).

Colonel TOULMIN. Now, it refers there to "the Secretaries." To whom did that refer?

General GEROW. That refers to Secretary—that last statement I just read, it only referred to the Secretary of War. In the paragraph it refers to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, who was present on the morning of November 27th.

Colonel TOULMIN. At this meeting?

General GEROW. At the meeting in the Secretary of War's office.

Colonel TOULMIN. Of which this memorandum in your hand was a confirmation, in a sense? Or report?

General GEROW. Yes. This memorandum reports on the first conference that I had with the Secretary of War alone, and the second conference that I had later in the morning, which was attended by

Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson, and Admiral Stark and myself, and I think possibly Colonel Bundy..

237. Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, one more question on this phase: At the end of paragraph 2 in this memorandum to the Chief of Staff under date of November 27, 1941, signed by you, occurs this sentence:

It was agreed that the memorandum would be shown to both Secretaries before dispatch.

The word "Secretaries" refers to Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson; is that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct.

238. Colonel TOULMIN. Now, will you tell me whether or not, [4314] to your knowledge, directly or indirectly—so that it is reasonably certain—whether that joint memorandum was delivered to Secretary of State Hull either verbally or in writing, and, if so, at what date?

General GEROW. You are referring now to Secretary——?

239. Colonel TOULMIN. Of State.

General GEROW. Hull?

240. Colonel TOULMIN. Hull.

General GEROW. Not Secretary of the Navy, Knox?

241. Colonel TOULMIN. No. Secretary of State, Hull.

General GEROW. I cannot recall whether or not it was delivered to the Secretary of State.

242. Colonel TOULMIN. Was it intended to be delivered?

General GEROW. I think the memorandum was addressed to the President.

243. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, was it delivered to the President?

General GEROW. I cannot testify definitely as to that.

244. Colonel TOULMIN. You don't know. Your understanding is that it was, I take it?

General GEROW. Well, I don't know whether it was delivered to the President or whether it was taken over to the State Department and discussed with Mr. Hull and some changes or amendments made in it. I couldn't state on that.

245. Colonel TOULMIN. Well, when did you last see it, then, General? On that date of November 27, I suppose.

General GEROW. I cannot testify definitely as to that. There were a number of these memorandums prepared at various times, and I cannot say positively now when any particular one [4315] was delivered and how, by what means it was handled.

246. Colonel TOULMIN. Would its transmission, according to War Department practice, be recorded some place, as to the date when it went over, and the hour, and so forth, being transmitted to the President?

General GEROW. I believe that it would be duly recorded.

247. Colonel TOULMIN. Where would it be? Where would you find that record?

General GEROW. It might have been recorded in the Secretary of State's office, it might have been recorded in the Chief of Staff's office, it might have been recorded in War Plans Division, and it might have been recorded by the Secretary of the General Staff.

248. General GRUNERT. And each one of these echelons kept files, did they?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. They had some files, of some few papers.

249. General GRUNERT. And the Adjutant General's records are not complete on all these subjects, then, are they?

General GEROW. No, sir, not as far as War Plans are concerned and the matters being handled by the Joint Board.

250. Colonel TOULMIN. Had your meeting on November 27, the details of which you have related here, been advised, so far as the statements were made in the meeting to you, by the Secretary of State that the Japanese had received a paper of some ten points and that they had rejected it on the 26th, the date on which they had received the ten points?

General GEROW. Colonel, I can't recall.

[4316] 251. Colonel TOULMIN. You don't recall it?

General GEROW. That from memory, no, sir.

252. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all. Thank you.

253. General RUSSELL. I want to ask two or three questions on this joint statement.

Do you recall having prepared that joint statement or having participated in its preparation?

General GEROW. I believe that I participated with the Navy in the preparation of it. Either I did or Colonel Bundy, my Plan Group Chief. As to those things, the procedure was, in those cases, that one, either the Army or the Navy is responsible for preparing an initial paper. Then it would be passed back and forth, and corrections were made between the War Plans Division of the Army and the War Plans Division of the Navy until finally one draft was evolved that both War Plans agreed on, and then it was presented to the respective Chiefs of Staff or the respective Secretaries for approval.

254. General RUSSELL. But as head of the War Plans Division, when this joint agreement was prepared, you should have been familiar with the contents of it.

General GEROW. I was, I imagine, thoroughly familiar at that time with the contents.

255. General RUSSELL. Let me read the gist of that to you:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter action against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory [4317] of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 east or south of 10 north, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Now, that states that the British and the Dutch and the United States military authorities in the Far East had gotten together and reached an agreement that they wouldn't take joint military counter action against Japan unless she did these things. If she had done one of those things, then of course joint military action would have been taken by the British, Dutch, and Americans out there; is that true?

General GEROW. I think joint action would have been taken only after a final approval of such action by the Commander-in-Chief.

256. General RUSSELL. Well, it said they had gotten together and agreed.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. Well, there were a number of agreements had between the War Department and the representatives of the other nations.

257. General RUSSELL. Who represented the United States in that agreement?

General GEROW. I cannot answer that question, sir.

258. General RUSSELL. Do you know whether any agreements were in writing between these people here?

General GEROW. No, sir, I do not know without referring to the records there.

259. General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

260. General FRANK. I think you stated that this sentence in [4318] here, "United States desires Japan commit the first overt act"—you know, do you, that that was the desire of the President?

General GEROW. I so testified before the Roberts Commission. That information I presume came to me through the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War. I cannot answer that positively.

261. General FRANK. You are conversant with the Joint Army-Navy pamphlet?

General GEROW. Joint Action of the Army and Navy?

262. General FRANK. Yes.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

263. General FRANK. You know also that they had a joint coastal defense plan in Honolulu?

General GEROW. Yes.

264. General FRANK. The Joint Army-Navy Action, provision is made there that in case of war or action creating a critical situation the two Commanders on the scene can get together and come to a decision with respect to one or the other assuming supreme command. You are familiar with that?

General GEROW. I would like to check that provision of the Joint Action of the Army and Navy.

265. General FRANK. The last sentence on the page (indicating).

General GEROW. I am.

266. General FRANK. Do you think the situation in Honolulu on December 7 called for such action?

General GEROW. Not necessarily so.

267. General FRANK. Had the two Commanders come to that decision, to whom would that one man have reported in Washington?

General GEROW. Had he been a Navy officer, he would [3419] have reported to the Navy Department. Had he been an Army officer, he would have reported to the War Department, I believe.

268. General FRANK. Do you think that would have been satisfactory to the Department to whom he did not report?

General GEROW. I can't answer that question. I know of no other method by which he could exercise such command.

269. General FRANK. Do you think that would have been satisfactory?

General GEROW. That would be a matter that I—

270. General FRANK. As Chief of War Plans Division?

General GEROW. Well, that is a theoretical question that I'd prefer not to answer.

271. General FRANK. But it is a situation that did actually exist. That is the point.

General GEROW. I don't quite understand your statement there.

272. General FRANK. Immediately after the attack one man was put in charge and reported in here to Washington, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff situation was created to take care of it; that is correct, isn't it?

General GEROW. Well, sir, I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff situation was created to take care of many other situations.

273. General FRANK. Yes.

General GEROW. Not specifically this case.

274. General FRANK. But it automatically took care of this situation too.

[4320] You have no comment on it; that is all right.

Were you familiar with the action that the Secretary of State took on November 26 terminating negotiations?

[4321] General GEROW. I am not.

275. General FRANK. In this message, it states:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

That left it to the discretion of the Department Commander, did it not?

General GEROW. I think it could be interpreted either way, either as a directive that he would undertake reconnaissance, or not, as he interpreted the message.

276. General FRANK. Also:

These measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

That was a restriction, to a certain degree, do you believe?

General GEROW. Yes, it was bound to have had some restrictive effect.

277. General GRUNERT. Let us go back a minute to that former question I asked. As it now occurs to me, there is only one interpretation you could take:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

With that word "such" in there, I can see no way of interpreting it, except "as you deem necessary." Without that word "such," it might be different, but there is no complete directive there. He is not to take reconnaissance, except such as he deems necessary. That word "such" attaches it to "as you deem necessary." I cannot see any other interpretation of it; can you?

General GEROW. What I am wondering is whether, in the paraphrasing of this message, the various copies, how did [4322] the one read that General Short actually received? Now, we have here, certainly, in the files, the original message as written. We probably have—you probably have—the Board probably has the paraphrased one that was sent. You probably also have a copy of the message as it was received by General Short.

278. General FRANK. I think this is the wording in your message.

General GEROW. Which he received?

279. General FRANK. Yes.

General GEROW. Or the one that was sent?

280. General FRANK. Which he received.

281. General GRUNERT. Go ahead. We will go back into that when we check up the record.

282. General FRANK. Were you familiar with the agreement that the Army and Navy had with respect to reconnaissance in the Hawaiian Department?

General GEROW. I probably was at that time familiar with it, because it was known. The record of that was undoubtedly in the War Plans Division.

283. General FRANK. This is the official record from the Adjutant General's files, and this sentence in the original message states:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent.

"Such" is in the original record; and the copy of the message that we have, as it was received in Hawaii, reads the same way.

284. General GRUNERT. All right. Go ahead.

[4323] 285. General FRANK. To refresh your memory on it, there was an agreement that the Navy would be responsible for distant reconnaissance, the Army would be responsible for the operation of the fighters over the island; and does that "ring a bell" in your memory?

General GEROW. I couldn't state that that was in the provisions, because they were all different for all the different overseas possessions, and I cannot rely on my memory to say that was the agreement. It is undoubtedly of record.

286. General FRANK. What I am leading to is this: In addition to radar reconnaissance, it was possible, too, to conduct air reconnaissance, since this message directs such reconnaissance as is deemed necessary. The plan, over there, called for the Navy to do that. Before sending that message, did you contact the Navy, here, relative to that?

General GEROW. Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark were present at the discussion of this message.

287. General FRANK. Do you think that they would have been familiar with this agreement, by which the Army turned its planes over to the Navy for distant reconnaissance?

General GEROW. Probably Admiral Stark was familiar with that, because, if you remember, that was quite a live subject, at that time.

288. General FRANK. The point I am making is this: Here is a message directing reconnaissance by the Army, which, we will assume, included air reconnaissance; but the Navy was charged with conducting the air reconnaissance, with Army airplanes, and it would appear that there would need to be some coordination, there, in order for the Navy to do what was [4324] being agreed upon between the Army and Navy heads, here in Washington; and, to date, we have found no message which told the Navy to conduct any reconnaissance.

General GEROW. As far as I can recall, there was no prior arrangement with the Navy, with regard to this, conducting reconnaissance.

289. General FRANK. Now, you have made a point of the phrase, "concept, mission, and means assigned" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and that, provided his action coincided with those three items, you would not interfere with his decision; is that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct.

290. General FRANK. Did you know what his conception of the situation was?

General GEROW. I am referring, in his concept, to the concept that is stated in the basic plans that are put out in the joint Army-Navy plans and the Army basic strategical plan. The concept, as I recall, was so stated in those plans.

291. General FRANK. Did that plan become effective prior to the first act of hostility?

General GEROW. I should like to refer to the plan. The plan, itself, stated when it would become effective. Whether it was a threat of war, or whether war was imminent, or whether war had actually occurred, I can't state.

292. General FRANK. The last sentence in this message of November 27 states:

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan.

[4325] General GEROW. The purpose of that was to tell him in advance that he had full authority to act under Rainbow Five without any further messages from the War Department, in case hostilities occurred.

293. General FRANK. Yes; but there were certain preparations that had to be made in order for that plan to be effective at the moment of hostilities?

General GEROW. That was why the War Plans Division's message stated that he would undertake reconnaissance "and such other measures" as he deemed necessary.

294. General FRANK. Pursuing this same discussion, we come to "means assigned." We have testimony before the Board to indicate that they were handling their radar equipment carefully, not overloading it or running it at excessively long periods, because they were so short of spare parts, that they could not keep the instruments operating all the time without their breaking down, and that they had to "cannibalize" some, in order to keep others going; therefore, the "means assigned" for the operations of the radar were limited. Were you familiar with the fact that the "means assigned" for radar reconnaissance were limited?

General GEROW. The members of my division that handled the particular Hawaiian project were familiar with it. I can't state that I personally had it brought to my attention. We were short many things, in all of our overseas possessions.

295. General FRANK. And you were conversant then with the fact that he did not have the facilities for continuous operation of all his radar, because of lack of spare parts?

General GEROW. I don't recall that subject ever having [4326] come up to me, personally. It wouldn't of necessity have had to. The staff of War Plans Division would have done all they could to correct any deficiencies that the Commanding General might have indicated.

296. General FRANK. This situation, between November 27 and December 7, was a very sensitive one from an international point of view, is that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct.

297. General FRANK. It had to be handled very carefully, is that correct?

General GEROW. That is correct.

298. General FRANK. Otherwise, the restrictions placed in this message of November 27 would not have been there?

General GEROW. That is correct.

299. General FRANK. We have a record of a long series of conferences, extending from October 6 through to December 2nd and 7th, about this whole situation; and a long series of telephone messages between the War Department and the Navy Department, and between the War Department and the State Department; and yet there was no additional information sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department after the circumscribing message of November 27, was there?

General GEROW. No, I do not believe there was.

300. General FRANK. Also, in a series of six messages starting with the Navy message of the 16th of October, the Navy message of the 24th of November; Navy, of the 27th of November; Army, of the 27th; another one of the Army, of the 27th; and the Army, of the 28th. Of those six messages, four told the commanders to be careful, and not to offend the Japs; three of [4327] those messages told them to look out for sabotage. It was the desire in Washington to put off the start of war as long as possible. As a result of this complex situation, it had to be handled at least naively, don't you think?

General GEROW. I do not know, General, just what you mean by that.

301. General FRANK. Well, it had to be handled very carefully?

General GEROW. Very carefully; yes, sir.

302. General FRANK. And you have already stated that you expected the man on the spot, General Short, to do the thing which would take care of the situation?

General GEROW. That's correct.

303. General FRANK. Now, General Short was considered a reasonable, normal, stable, intelligent officer, was he not?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

304. General FRANK. In certain of these messages, he was told to show the information only to his Chief of Staff, to confine it to himself and his chief of staff?

305. General GRUNERT. In how many messages? One?

306. General FRANK. One message.

307. General GRUNERT. All right.

308. General FRANK. And, in another, to the minimum number of essential officers. So the amount of advice that he could get on these messages and on this situation was limited by instructions from the War Department?

General GEROW. You mean these instructions that—

309. General FRANK. Instructions that restricted him to showing this information to a limited number of officers.

General GEROW. I do not feel that that restricted him in [4328] the information that he could get.

310. General FRANK. Where was he to get the information?

General GEROW. It said "the minimum essential number of officers." The "minimum essential number" was within his discretion. If he

wanted to ask an assistant G-2 something, he was not prohibited by the War Department from doing so. If he wanted to ask a regimental commander, or his coast defense commander, he could still get that man and give him the picture—these people—and ask them any questions that he might want to ask.

311. General FRANK. Why was any restriction put on him, at all, if he had all these qualifications?

General GEROW. We were discussing the possibility of war at that time—all these papers show that—the possibility of war with Japan. Now, if that information were generally disseminated at large to the Army it might have caused comment in the press, or it might have caused action on the part of some officers, that would have precipitated the war, as I see it.

312. General FRANK. There already was comment in the press. Subordinate officers in Honolulu were getting their information on the war situation from the press; and, as a result of talking to officers in the Hawaiian Department, officers like General Murray, General D. S. Wilson, General Burgin, they were getting information from the newspapers, and no information through official channels.

General GEROW. But the information was available to General Short, if he felt that those officers should have it. Haven't we got the same situation here, today? Haven't we got the newspaper articles that discuss things that are highly [4329] secret, given to the American people, when those matters would really be of benefit to the American people if they were officially published? We have the same situation.

313. General FRANK. But the commanders who are fighting the war have the necessary critical information to help them plan their operations, do they not?

General GEROW. That is right.

314. General FRANK. And that information is not given to the public?

General GEROW. That is right.

315. General FRANK. And yet, here was a lot of information that the newspapers were giving out, and General Short was not getting anything, from November 27 to December 7; do you see?

General GEROW. Well, was there any information available at that time that would have been helpful to General Short in carrying out his mission?

316. General FRANK. Do you not think that Mr. Hull's action on November 26, and the critical nature of it, would have been of vital importance to General Short?

General GEROW. Well, I feel that the War Department message of November 27, which was drafted following that decision of Mr. Hull's, pointed out very strongly the possibility of war with Japan.

317. General FRANK. Now, that is opinion, is it not?

General GEROW. That's correct.

318. General FRANK. That's opinion?

General GEROW. Right.

319. General FRANK. Now, you ask the same question of General Short, and he gives you another opinion; and yet you just told [4330] me that he is considered a reasonable, normal, stable, intelligent officer?

General GEROW. That's why I made the statement, General, that I can't place myself in the position of General Short, because I was on this end of the picture and he was on the other end.

320. General FRANK. Another point about this thing: The Japanese got the information about the Hull decision of November 26, did they not?

General GEROW. I don't know, sir.

321. General FRANK. Well, he gave it to the Japanese representative here in Washington.

322. General GRUNERT. May I interject, there, that the line of reasoning, and the questions asked and conclusions expressed in those questions are the individual ones of the Member of the Board asking the questions. The Board has not reached any conclusion on any of these matters, and the record should so show. Go ahead.

323. General FRANK. That is very true. I am trying to get an expression of opinion from the witness.

324. General GRUNERT. That is all right. I just wanted to make sure that the witness did not consider these things as conclusions of the Board.

General GEROW. No.

325. General FRANK. But you were conversant with Secretary Hull's action in submitting a communication to the Japanese on November 26?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I was informed of it.

326. General FRANK. And the Japanese were familiar with it, [4331] because they got it?

General GEROW. That's correct.

327. General FRANK. And General Short did not get it?

General GEROW. Well, I misunderstood you when you said the Japanese had it. I thought you meant perhaps their military and naval personnel, and that that fact influenced them to act. I realize that their own ambassadors here in Washington had received it.

328. General FRANK. The point I was trying to bring out was that there was information that was vital, that was in the hands of the Japanese, that the people on the frontiers did not have; do you see the point?

General GEROW. I see the point, but I think it is a matter of opinion as to how much information you should send to a commander. I felt that in the message of November 27th there was adequate warning that an attack might occur, and that this attack would be made by the armed forces of Japan and not by merely subversive elements.

329. General FRANK. Do you realize that in this series of messages great emphasis was placed on the fact that the expected action was down in the Philippines and the Kra Peninsula and Thai and Borneo?

General GEROW. I think that fact was discussed in several messages. I don't think it was referred to in the message of November 27.

330. General FRANK. No. But all of these messages were communicated to Short.

General GEROW. That is correct.

331. General FRANK. And he was influenced by a whole group [4332] of messages from both the Army and the Navy.

Did you expect an air raid on Hawaii at that time?

General GEROW. I think we stated in that message that the action Japan would take was unpredictable.

332. General FRANK. I am just asking for your personal opinion; if you want to give it, all right; if you don't, that is all right.

General GEROW. I felt that anything was likely to happen. I felt that there might be a raid on the Panama Canal, operations against Alaska, against Hawaii, and against the Philippines. I didn't feel that we had sufficient information to definitely decide just what Japan would carry out.

333. General FRANK. A few minutes ago, in discussing the situation with General Russell, you made a comparison of General Short's situation to your situation as a corps commander?

General GEROW. I did.

334. General FRANK. When you received the order to attack, you were given all the information of the enemy that was available, were you not?

General GEROW. Not by my Army commander. I got it from my own G-2.

335. General FRANK. Yes; but the Army commander gave you whatever he had?

General GEROW. His G-2 gave my G-2 whatever information he had.

336. General FRANK. Yes. You were told to attack, and there were no restrictions on you, other than your boundaries?

General GEROW. I was given the boundaries and the [4333] objective, and told to attack.

337. General FRANK. And the enemy was firing real bullets at you, and there was no question that you had to look out for anybody?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; that is correct.

338. General FRANK. All you had to do was to go out and get your objective, and to kill them off?

General GEROW. That is correct.

339. General FRANK. And here was a situation that was full of delicacy, where the man had certain restrictions and was circumscribed, and had to be careful not to offend the very people with whom he was about to go to war.

General GEROW. Well, if you recall, General, I used that illustration merely to try to clarify what I was thinking about at the time this message was sent out. When his reply came back, that question of "report measures taken," I didn't feel that under the circumstances it was the responsibility of War Plans Division to comment on or to attempt to prescribe the detailed method of how that commander would carry out his particular mission.

340. General GRUNERT. Colonel Toulmin, any questions?

341. Colonel TOULMIN. None, sir; thank you.

342. General GRUNERT. General Russell?

343. General RUSSELL. None.

344. General GRUNERT. I have one more question.

345. General RUSSELL. I was just going to put in this summary of statements made by Brigadier General Gerow, before the Roberts Commission, which contains a lot of messages and data, if there is no objection to it.

[4334] General GEROW. Yes, sir; I would like to have it inserted in the record.

346. General GRUNERT. All right. Have you identified that?

347. General RUSSELL. Yes, I think that is sufficient identification of it.

(The Summary of Statements made by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow was marked as Exhibit No. 63 and was received in evidence.)

348. General GRUNERT. Did the War Plans Division have to edit or pass on all command or informational messages that were sent to the overseas departments? Did they all channel through the War Plans Division for coordination, or were others empowered to send the messages direct, of which you might not have had information?

General GEROW. I think G-2 was authorized to send messages direct.

349. General GRUNERT. You mean inter-G-2, but addressed to the Commanding General, is that so?

General GEROW. Well, I think his messages had to be cleared through the secretary of the General Staff, as did all other messages, not necessarily cleared through War Plans Division, or intelligence matters.

350. General GRUNERT. But as far as the War Department was concerned, they at that time, or prior to that, at least, used to handle practically all other matters through War Plans, because the War Plans were looking after the overseas departments?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

351. General GRUNERT. And I just wanted to find out whether [4335] that continued to be the scheme, and whether the War Plans Division was held responsible for the information sent to the departments, and the instructions sent.

General GEROW. The War Plans Division's responsibility was of course for all messages concerning the war plans themselves—the development, and what we call the “project,” which involved the matériel, the equipment, and so forth.

352. General GRUNERT. I am questioning, a little bit, the system, or the lack of system, or the lack of coordination of departments of the War Department General Staff in dealing with its subordinate commanders, and I wanted to see whether or not there was any one agency charged with coordinating everything that went out to such commanders.

General GEROW. No, sir; I don't think the War Plans Division was responsible for coordinating everything.

353. General GRUNERT. Then who was, do you know?

General GEROW. I don't believe there is any one agency that was responsible.

354. General GRUNERT. Then it all headed into the Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. If you will notice that, in some cases messages would go out, the operational messages or the War Plans messages would go out over the signature or the name of General Marshall, and there would be others that would go through the process of the Adjutant General's office.

355. General GRUNERT. When messages went out with the name of Marshall on them, were they considered of greater import than messages sent by the Adjutant General, or by Miles, or by Arnold, and so forth?

[4336] General GEROW. I should say, naturally, they would be so considered, since they carried the name of the Chief of Staff.

356. General GRUNERT. Then whose business was it to see whether or not there were any messages in conflict? We will take the messages of November 27, the one big warning message, in your mind. You take the G-2 message, which talked about sabotage. We will take the Adjutant General's message, which also told the tale about sabotage, and referred primarily to protection of aircraft. Whose business was it to coordinate those messages, so that the wrong impression would not be created in the minds of the commanding generals of the overseas departments?

Without such coordination, there was liable to be confusion and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff?

General GEROW. It was done usually, General, I believe, by a matter of getting concurrences between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something that was going to be sent out. A directive that the G-2 might want to send out would probably be sent down to the War Plans Division for his concurrence on the directive. Likewise, War Plans might send one up to G-2 for concurrence, and if those various sections in the General Staff concurred, there was no necessity for any other coordination.

357. General GRUNERT. Then that section conveyed the information that there was nothing in there that they had previously sent, or that was intended to be sent in the future, or that such a message would interfere with; is that it? Is that the idea?

[4337] General GEROW. From the standpoint of the operation of that particular division, there was no objection to that message going.

358. General GRUNERT. I am trying to get it from the standpoint of the man who receives it and has to obey these things, as to the confusion as to the meaning and intent of the War Department. They all come down to him, one from G-2, one from the Adjutant General, one signed "Marshall." If there is any conflict, or any change of ideas, what message was the commander out there to obey—the one signed "Marshall," because he is the top man, or what? That is what I meant by the question as to what coordination there was in the War Department for such procedure. Was it just a coordination of concurrences?

General GEROW. The coordination of concurrences, and then most of these important messages I believe went through the secretary of the General Staff.

359. General GRUNERT. Then it appears to be the secretary of the General Staff?

General GEROW. No.

360. General GRUNERT. It appears you do not know just who does it. Do you?

General GEROW. Well, no, sir. I have been away from this three years, General, and there is probably a "green book" somewhere, and I think there is, in existence; and to express an opinion, I would like to get the "green book" and sit down and go through it, and cite what the regulations are; but I can't remember those over this period of time.

361. General GRUNERT. You did not consider it your particular duty at that time, did you?

[4338] General GEROW. No, sir; not to coordinate all the messages of the War Department that went to our overseas possessions.

362. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, I will give you one last opportunity to tell the Board anything else that may be in your mind, that you think might assist the Board in coming to conclusions and accomplishing its mission. Have you anything in mind that has not been brought out by questions, or subjects opened up, that you would like to put in the record, and put in the minds of the Board?

General GEROW. No, sir; I don't believe I have anything to suggest.

363. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD A. FURBUSH, SPECIAL AGENT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; CHICAGO, ILL.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Furbush, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. FURBUSH. My name is Edward A. Furbush, Special Agent, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. Colonel WEST. Here, in Washington?

Mr. FURBUSH. I am assigned to the Chicago office.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Furbush, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will conduct this particular part or phase of our investigation.

[4339] 4. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Furbush, you were formerly assigned to the Los Angeles office of the FBI?

Mr. FURBUSH. Yes, sir.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Did you work on a case of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. FURBUSH. I did.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And you rendered a report, dated 28 April 1943, sir?

Mr. FURBUSH. I did.

7. Major CLAUSEN. And I wish to invite your attention to the bottom of page 8, over to section 5, on page 9, and ask you to tell the Board the source of your information, the portion I have bracketed off.

Mr. FURBUSH. During the course of the investigation—

8. General GRUNERT. We do not know anything about what he is looking at, or what he is going to testify about, except it is a volume.

9. Major CLAUSEN. I want to get an answer, first, sir; then I will get the identification of it for the record.

10. General GRUNERT. All right.

Mr. FURBUSH. I will try to explain that, General.

During the course of the investigation I conducted as an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in Los Angeles, with reference to Hans Wilhelm Rohl, I looked at the file on Hans Wilhelm Rohl, at the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal building, in Los Angeles. Subsequent to examining the contents of that file, I had a conversation with an attorney by the name of Bruce

Barber. Bruce Barber is an attorney for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and I asked Mr. Barber if he had any further information [4340] to offer with regard to Rohl than what was contained in the files. Barber told me at that time that he was familiar with the investigation conducted by his office with reference to Hans Wilhelm Rohl, and added that when the facts of the investigation by the immigration agents were brought to his attention, he suggested that Rohl be prosecuted for violations of the immigration laws, and that a request be made that his citizenship be denied.

I asked him to explain this, further, and he said that the agents who investigated the case, after Rohl applied for citizenship in March 1941, determined that Mr. Rohl had a project down in Mexico in connection with his business, and that he had to cross the Mexican border at Laredo, Texas, on ten or twelve different occasions, and that not once did he tell the immigration officials that he was an alien, when, in fact, he was one. He told me, also, that it is impossible for a man to cross the border through immigration ten or twelve times without being asked if he was a citizen or an alien.

He also told me that on several occasions Rohl had taken trips on his yacht from Florida and New York over to Honolulu, and at various times the yacht had landed on foreign territory, and, returning from those trips, Rohl would have to go through immigration officers and customs officers; and on two occasions they had evidence reflecting that when he was asked if he was a citizen, he said yes, he was, when, in fact, he was an alien; told them that he was born in Iola, Kansas, giving his right date of birth.

11. Major CLAUSEN. May I ask specially whether you had a conversation with Mr. Barber concerning telephone calls from [4341] Colonel Wyman?

Mr. FURBUSH. Yes, I did, Major.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Would you state to the Board what those conversations were.

Mr. FURBUSH. Barber told me that when Rohl had first applied for citizenship, in March 1941, Barber's office had received several telephone calls—he told me, four or five telephone calls.

13. Major CLAUSEN. From whom?

Mr. FURBUSH. From Colonel Wyman, I believe he stated. The telephone calls were directed to a Mr. Carmichael, who was then head of the immigration office in Los Angeles, who, since then, is in the Army. The nature of the telephone calls, according to Mr. Barber, were to hurry the investigation of Mr. Rohl, as his services were essential to this country.

14. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Proceed, Mr. Furbush.

Mr. FURBUSH. Mr. Barber terminated this conversation by stating that the facts that had been brought to his attention had been presented to the courts in Los Angeles, and that prosecution had been denied, in view of the fact that the statute of limitations had set in.

Major CLAUSEN. Now, the portion of the report to which the witness has been referring is the portion which has already been read in evidence by me, at the interrogation as a witness of Mr. Barber.

Mr. Furbush, I show you a purported excerpt of a conversation between Colonel Wyman and three other Army officers, after an evening of drinking, in the spring of 1942, which is alleged to have occurred in

Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. I [4342] will ask you whether, during the time you were connected with the Los Angeles office, this report was brought to the attention of the office at Los Angeles, by Mr. Bruce Pine?

Mr. FURBUSH. That never came to my attention, Major, when I was in Los Angeles.

16. Major CLAUSEN. Did it come to your attention subsequently, as having been a matter taken up by the Los Angeles office?

Mr. FURBUSH. Yes, it did.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Tell the Board the facts.

Mr. FURBUSH. While reviewing the Bureau file yesterday, I came across this information. The statement here attributed to Colonel Wyman is incorporated in a two-page letter submitted to the Bureau by Special Agent Francis V. Manion, who was attached to the Los Angeles Federal Bureau of Investigation, field division. Manion, in that two-page letter to the Bureau, set forth this information, this paragraph attributed to Wyman, as having been given to him by Mr. Combs and Mr. Pine.

18. Major CLAUSEN. Do you have a copy of that letter from Mr. Manion?

Mr. FURBUSH. I don't have a copy of the letter with me. It is in the Bureau file.

19. Major CLAUSEN. Could you make a copy available to the Board—request a copy, or would you prefer that I make the request direct through G-2?

Mr. FURBUSH. I would prefer that you make the request that way.

20. Major CLAUSEN. For purposes of identification, can you let me have the approximate date of this letter?

Mr. FURBUSH. February 7, 1944. It is substantially—as a [4343] matter of fact, it is almost word for word the same as this, here.

21. Major CLAUSEN. Which is the document that has previously been read in evidence?

Mr. FURBUSH. Yes; and not only is it word for word, but it is set out in the same fashion. That is, Mr. Pine and Mr. Combs gave this information to Manion.

22. Major CLAUSEN. Can you tell the Board from your investigation of just what the file disclosed, whether any action was taken by FBI to track down this statement of this Captain Guiter?

Mr. FURBUSH. When that information was brought to the attention of the FBI, it was immediately given to the criminal division of the Department of Justice.

23. Major CLAUSEN. And what is the policy, when Army officers are involved in charges?

Mr. FURBUSH. It is brought—it was also brought to the attention of the Army, by Captain Guiter, the name mentioned therein. It was told to agent Manion that Captain Guiter had brought this information to the attention of his commanding officers, the following day; that is, the day after he heard the statement made by Wyman.

24. Major CLAUSEN. And what is the policy of the FBI with regard to charges of dereliction which include Army officers?

Mr. FURBUSH. The policy of the FBI with reference to that is to bring this information which comes to the attention of the FBI to

the officers of the Army, Army officers; that is, the division of the Army with whom we do business, G-2, the intelligence division, for their own information. We don't [4344] conduct any investigation, unless they request it.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Does the file indicate any request from the Army to conduct any investigation?

Mr. FURBUSH. No, it does not, Major.

26. Major CLAUSEN. So that, so far as the file discloses, the report was made, and you assumed, or rather the FBI assumed, that the Army would conduct its investigation?

Mr. FURBUSH. It was not an assumption. It was a knowledge, I think, Major.

27. Major CLAUSEN. It was what, sir?

Mr. FURBUSH. It was knowledge on the part of the FBI that this information—they knew that this information was in possession of the Army and also in possession of the criminal division of the Department of Justice.

28. Major CLAUSEN. And for which reason, no further steps were taken?

Mr. FURBUSH. And for that reason, no further steps were taken by the FBI. In other words, no request was made by the Army or by the Department of Justice to conduct any further investigation along these lines.

29. Major CLAUSEN. The document to which I have invited the attention of the witness is the same one which I previously read, concerning Captain Guiter and this alleged information concerning the statement by Colonel Wyman that he should take a service revolver and shoot himself.

30. Colonel TOULMIN. In order that there may be no misunderstanding about the witness's testimony, that statement ought to be marked definitely as having been the statement shown to this witness; otherwise, it depends upon the interpretation of what [4345] he said.

31. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. It is in evidence, sir.

32. Colonel TOULMIN. Then mark it. You did not show him the exhibit, you showed him that other paper.

33. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. Well, it is the same one. You can mark that, if you wish. Would you mark that, Mr. Reporter?

34. Colonel TOULMIN. If there be a duplication, it can be identified by other numbers.

(The paper referred to, being a statement by John Weiner, *in re* statement by Colonel Wyman, was marked as Exhibit No. 64, and was received in evidence.)

35. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Furbush, is there anything further in connection with these two phases, which you can offer, that may be helpful to the Board, and that have not been explained?

Mr. FURBUSH. Not from my own knowledge. If you have some questions that trouble you, maybe I can answer them.

36. Major CLAUSEN. We have accumulated quite an amount of data on this. I have no further questions.

37. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 1 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses present at the morning session, took up the consideration of other business.)

[4346]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2:20 p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses, pursuant to the recess.)

**TESTIMONY OF SIDNEY C. GRAVES, 2401 FOXHALL ROAD,
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Mr. Graves, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. GRAVES. Sidney C. Graves, 2401 Foxhall Road, Washington, D. C.

2. Colonel WEST. And what is your occupation, Mr. Graves?

Mr. GRAVES. Insurance business at the present time.

3. General GRUNERT. Mr. Graves, General Russell will lead in propounding the questions and try to develop what we are after as far as you are concerned.

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

4. General RUSSELL. Mr. Graves, how long have you been a resident of the city of Washington?

Mr. GRAVES. Since 1921.

5. General RUSSELL. You came here from?

Mr. GRAVES. Siberia.

6. General RUSSELL. Siberia?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes; that is, during—I have been all over, but I came from Siberia the last time.

7. General RUSSELL. That was your last port of call before you came to Washington?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes.

8. General RUSSELL. Mr. Graves, are you acquainted with [4347] Sir Owen Dixon, who at one time was the Australian Minister to the United States?

Mr. GRAVES. I met him on one occasion.

9. General RUSSELL. You saw him only one time. For the purposes of the record, do you know whether Sir Owen Dixon is now a resident of the District of Columbia?

Mr. GRAVES. I do not.

10. General RUSSELL. You have no information—

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir.

11. General RUSSELL. —as to whether he is here now?

Mr. GRAVES. I have just the same hearsay information that he has been leaving the first of this week which was said on the air, but that's nothing to my knowledge.

12. General RUSSELL. Oh, that will be of help to us.

Mr. GRAVES. Yes. He has been recalled, General. I mean he is supposed to leave here the first of the week.

13. General RUSSELL. But up until that time he was actually here in Washington?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

14. General RUSSELL. Mr. Graves, you say that you saw this man, Sir Owen Dixon, on only one occasion?

Mr. GRAVES. Only one that I remember of.

15. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when that occasion was?

Mr. GRAVES. It was a dinner given at Mrs. McCeney Werlich's on Sixteenth Street about P. I don't know the address. It's in the book.

16. General RUSSELL. Now, you have given the place. Do you recall approximately the date of that dinner?

Mr. GRAVES. The date was December 7, 1943. But I might [4348] interpolate there that I remembered it was during the winter, that I established the exact date by referring to my wife's diary; I would never know it of my own knowledge.

17. General RUSSELL. But this was a social affair, a dinner party?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

18. General RUSSELL. A large number of guests or a small number of guests?

Mr. GRAVES. There were ten or twelve, as I remember.

19. General RUSSELL. I believe among the guests were Senator Ferguson and a Mr.—

Mr. GRAVES. Frank Hanighen.

20. General RUSSELL. Now, the information which we have, Mr. Graves, is to the effect that at some time during that evening Sir Owen Dixon made some remarks relative to a Japanese task force, and possibly in the remark he included some information or some data about an Australian task force. It would be helpful to the Board, if you overheard such a conversation, if you could give us the substance of it.

Mr. GRAVES. This conversation took place after dinner and I don't remember whether any of the ladies heard it or not, but it took place after dinner in the presence of the gentlemen that were at the dinner, and he stated in substance about as follows: that he had been a Judge in Australia and at the outbreak of the war had resigned his judgeship to take charge of coastwise shipping in Australian waters; that 72 hours approximately before Pearl Harbor he received a flash from his naval intelligence that a Japanese task force was headed possibly in the direction of Australia and that they [4349] should prepare for a blow. He further stated that 24 hours later this was confirmed, that it was followed almost immediately by the advice that this task force was apparently not headed toward Australia; and Sir Owen Dixon added that it might have been headed toward some American possession. One of the guests asked him if this information was available to American authorities, and he stated, as I remember it, that it was if it had been requested. And that's all there is to it, General, as far as that is concerned.

21. General RUSSELL. In your remarks a minute ago, in reporting the second part of this, the second part of Sir Owen Dixon's statement, to the effect that later, 24 hours later—

Mr. GRAVES. Yes.

22. General RUSSELL. —he received further information from his intelligence, which was confirmed—

Mr. GRAVES. Confirming his first flash that the Japanese task force was out. That's what I meant to imply, that he—that at least is what he meant to imply, I am certain.

23. General RUSSELL. Yes, but that Sir Owen Dixon himself said that possibly it was headed toward our possessions of the United States. Now, it wasn't clear to me whether or not Dixon was quoting information as to the task force headed towards us or whether he was just talking ex cathedra about it.

Mr. GRAVES. And it is not clear to me also, because it was impossible to separate, and naturally I didn't question the gentleman at the time. I was surprised at such information being made public and at a social gathering, and [4350] I didn't say anything to him, but at the time it struck me that I did not know whether his intelligence reported it was heading toward an American possession or whether that was Sir Owen Dixon's own interpolation. That's what I mean to convey.

24. General RUSSELL. You did, however, get the definite impression that Sir Owen Dixon was attempting to communicate to you people that he had two separate messages from his intelligence?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

25. General RUSSELL. One followed the other by approximately 24 hours?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

26. General RUSSELL. And there is no doubt in your mind as to the contents of the first information which was conveyed to him and which he transmitted to you people?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir.

27. General RUSSELL. But there is some doubt in your mind as to whether or not the information as to the task force heading toward us, in the second information, came from his intelligence or was merely supplied by Sir Owen Dixon?

Mr. GRAVES. Correct.

28. General RUSSELL. I wanted to get that rather definitely in the record.

Do you recall just what period of time was covered by Dixon in making these statements that you have just given us the substance of?

Mr. GRAVES. Oh, I would say certainly not longer than five minutes; I would say perhaps not that long.

[4351] 29. General RUSSELL. Did it provoke any discussion among the people to whom he made the remark at the time?

Mr. GRAVES. It broke up almost immediately following that, but you could see from the expression of some of the men's faces there that they were rather flabbergasted at that type of information. We didn't have time to discuss it at that time. Of course, it had been discussed afterwards among people that were there.

30. General RUSSELL. When Dixon was questioned as to whether or not this information which he had received had been transmitted to the American Government, you got the definite impression, which you have described to us, that he said they could have had it if they had asked for it?

Mr. GRAVES. He did not definitely say that it had been.

31. General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, at the time that Dixon was accumulating this information from his intelligence service he was a resident of Australia, was he?

Mr. GRAVES. Oh, yes. This was in—

32. General RUSSELL. In '41?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

33. General RUSSELL. Long prior to the time he came to Washington?

Mr. GRAVES. Oh, yes. He had been on that duty probably since '39.

34. General RUSSELL. Did you ever discuss this conversation with Mr. Hanighen since the date of Dixon's statement?

Mr. GRAVES. Oh, yes.

35. General RUSSELL. Could you name any other people who might have been there and overheard this same conversation, [4352] except Hanighen and Senator Ferguson?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir, I can't be definite, because I tried. After that length of time, Hanighen and Ferguson made the main impression on me because we three were sitting right with the Australian Minister, and being Senator Ferguson was there, and we all looked at each other, and I had forgotten there were two guests from Virginia, but I don't remember who they were. There was my wife, of course, and the hostess, and I have forgotten the name of the odd women.

36. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, you have only seen this man Sir Owen Dixon on that one occasion?

Mr. GRAVES. That's all.

37. General RUSSELL. I think those are the only questions I have.

38. General GRUNERT. 72 hours before the attack would make it three days before. That would be December 4th, wouldn't it?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes, sir.

39. General GRUNERT. And 24 hours from that would make it December 5th?

Mr. GRAVES. I think so.

40. General GRUNERT. Now, I didn't quite understand. Mr. Dixon was with the coastwise shipping of Australia?

Mr. GRAVES. Yes.

41. General GRUNERT. Did the coastwise shipping have a special intelligence service of their own, or did he get it from what intelligence service? Do you know?

Mr. GRAVES. That I couldn't tell you, General, because he didn't interpolate that.

[4353] 42. General GRUNERT. He referred to an intelligence service?

Mr. GRAVES. That's all.

43. General GRUNERT. Or his intelligence service?

Mr. GRAVES. No.

44. General GRUNERT. Or the Navy intelligence service?

Mr. GRAVES. Just "the intelligence service." Put it that way. It's probably as nearly as I can pin it down.

45. General GRUNERT. "The intelligence service." And as I understood it Mr. Dixon added that it might have been headed for American possessions. Did you take that to mean that it was his guess, or that was part of the intelligence report?

Mr. GRAVES. I took it to mean that it was part of the intelligence report, but in making the statement that finally became public I wanted to be just as fair as I could be, and I realized that it might have been his interpolation at the time he said it. I took it as the intelligence report.

46. General GRUNERT. Was there any discussion afterwards or at that time as to what American possessions he might have referred to—

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir.

47. General GRUNERT. —in considering Guam, the Philippines, Hawaii, Wake, or anything else?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir. The assumption was otherwise, but there was no statement made.

48. General GRUNERT. You have never since seen Dixon to discuss it with him?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir.

49. General GRUNERT. The papers evidently stated there was a denial on his part.

[4354] Mr. GRAVES. Well, off the record.

50. General GRUNERT. Did it surprise you?

Mr. GRAVES. Off—well, that's all right as far as I am concerned. His denial said that he never said that he had advance knowledge of an attack on American possessions, and that's all the statement that I have seen that has been made by Sir Owen Dixon. He did not deny this conversation, but he said he had no advance—that he never said that he had any advance knowledge of an attack on an American possession.

51. General GRUNERT. Did you consider that beating around the bush?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir. We were not yet in the war and—

52. General GRUNERT. I mean the recent statement in the papers.

Mr. GRAVES. No. We were not yet in the war, and he might have thought that the task force was headed toward an American possession and very correctly have stated that he had no idea of an attack on an American possession, so I assumed—of course, I took it as the best denial that he could make, because he could not deny this conversation, because too many people had heard it.

53. General GRUNERT. Are there any further questions? (No response.)

Do you think of anything else that you might tell the Board regarding this?

Mr. GRAVES. No, sir. I know nothing about the circumstances of the matter at all, except this conversation. That was all.

54. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

[4355] Mr. GRAVES. You are welcome. Thank you, gentlemen. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

55. General RUSSELL. I introduce in evidence a statement furnished to the Board by Colonel Robert B. Richards, General Staff Corps, Budget and Fiscal Officer, M. I. D., which statement is dated August 21, 1944. This statement was furnished to the Board pursuant to a request made upon Colonel Richards at the time of his testifying before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on the 15th day of August, 1944. The testimony of Colonel Richards is reported in Volume 7, commencing at page 730 and ending at page 745, of the above volume of the record.

Statement furnished by Colonel Robert B. Richards, General Staff Corps, Budget and Fiscal Officer, M. I. D., dated August 21, 1944, is as follows:)

14369 Fiscal year	Of- ficer	En- listed	Civil- ian	Total	Funds	Fiscal year	Of- ficer	En- listed	Civil- ian	Total	Funds
1921....	58	-----	151	209	\$300,000	1932....	50	3	118	171	57,480
1922....	66	-----	130	196	225,000	1933....	53	3	122	178	47,000
1923....	54	-----	127	181	162,500	1934....	54	3	123	180	39,990
1924....	61	-----	127	188	149,000	1935....	49	3	123	175	27,500
1925....	62	-----	126	188	65,500	1936....	50	3	124	177	87,000
1926....	63	-----	122	185	65,500	1937....	52	3	119	174	87,000
1927....	58	-----	120	178	61,520	1938....	54	3	122	179	89,450
1928....	62	-----	125	187	60,000	1939....	85	3	137	225	89,450
1929....	66	-----	124	190	62,480	1940....	276	3	308	1,087	155,000
1930....	63	-----	123	186	57,480	1941....	388	58	885	1,331	360,000
1931....	59	3	121	183	57,580	1942....	1,202	172	1,484	2,858	879,000

N. B. (1) In 1939 G-2 obtained a maintenance allowance for M. A.'s. This accounts for the big increase in the 1940 fiscal year account. Prior to then only men of independent means could become M. A.'s.

(2) Prior to 1939 no funds were expended for "confidential" purposes.

[4357]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE,
Washington, 21 August 1944.

Mid 904

Memorandum for the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

(Attn: Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell)

Subject. Additional Information.

1. During the questioning of Colonel Robert B. Richards 15 August 1944, answers to the following questions were requested to be submitted:

a. The number of enlisted agents in the Hawaiian Department during the period from 1 July 1940 to 31 December 1941.

b. The amount of Military Intelligence funds expended by Hawaiian Department for the hire of agents and informers during the fiscal year 1941 and the first half of the fiscal year 1942.

c. The amounts of the budgets of Germany, Japan, Russia and Great Britain for Military Intelligence purposes for the years directly preceding the calendar year 1942.

2. The records and facilities of this Division disclose the following:

a. The status of the Corps of Intelligence Police (later called Counter Intelligence Corps) in Hawaiian Department, was as follows:

4358	Date	Number authorized	Number on duty
1 July 1940.....	-----	4	3
27 June 1941.....	-----	19	12
7 December 1941.....	-----	19	12
31 December 1941.....	-----	19	19

b. Analysis of records in this Division show that between 1 July 1940 and 1 January 1942, the following allotments from the appropriation Miscellaneous Expenses, Military Intelligence Activities, Army" were made to the Hawaiian Department by this Division:

Date	Amount	Period	Limitation
25 July 1940.....	\$6,060	Fiscal year 1941.....	Not to exceed \$3,060 for hire of civilian clerks
15 November 1940.....	1,500	Fiscal year 1941.....	None
16 July 1941.....	8,320	1st Half F. Y. 1942.....	Not to exceed \$2,430 for hire of civilian clerks
22 December 1941.....	4,980	3rd Qtr. F. Y. 1942.....	Not to exceed \$1,980 for hire of civilian clerks

Thus during the period 1 July 1940 to 7 December 1941, there was available to the Hawaiian Department, exclusive of the hire of civilian clerks, the total of \$10,310 from the appropriation "Miscellaneous Expenses, Military Intelligence Activities, Army".

2224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Records on file in this Division indicate that during the period 17 August 1940 through 6 October 1941, the Hawaiian Department reported confidential expenditures of these funds as follows:

[4359] Expenses of Commissioned and Enlisted personnel in connection with Intelligence and Counter Intelligence activities-----	\$1,479.97
Hire of civilian agents and translators and payments and entertainment for informers-----	895.00
Postage, post office boxes, books, periodicals, newspapers, etc-----	729.89
Total-----	\$3,104.86

NOTE.—Of this total, the amount of \$2,224.60 was expended from 17 August 1940 thru 30 June 1941.

Of the \$7,560 allotted in fiscal year 1941, the sum of \$424.79 was reported by Hawaiian Department as unexpended and unobligated. Thus the actual expenditures of \$7,135.21 may be taken as:

For civilian clerks (1 at \$1,620 and 1 at \$1,440)-----	\$3,060.00
For confidential purposes-----	2,224.60
For other purposes-----	1,850.61
Total-----	\$7,135.21

c. No information available to this Division discloses a specific breakdown of National Defense appropriations for Military Intelligence functions of Germany, Japan, Russia or Great Britain. Germany has not published a budget since 1932 and none of the other three countries have shown the amounts of their Military Intelligence activities, either in amounts or percentages, however, the following is submitted:

[4360] (1) It is the opinion of one Military Attache to Germany, that, based upon his observations in that country from 1939 to 1942:

"I am of the opinion that the German Reich placed no limit on expenditures to obtain military intelligence information in Europe and Africa. The mission given to German intelligence organizations was to obtain complete coverage. I am convinced that this coverage was complete for the invasion of the West. It is impossible to accurately estimate the total expenditures of the German Government for intelligence purposes."

(2) A study made by this Division 20 April 1939, the following figures were presented as estimated Intelligence allotments of Japan for the years indicated:

1934-35-----	\$9,519,170
1935-36-----	8,004,409
1937-38-----	8,072,743

Reliable information in this Division indicates that the Japanese Foreign Office allocated over \$250,000 in 1937-38 for propaganda and intelligence purposes in the United States alone.

(3) Concerning Russian expenditures, the only figures available are included in a report dated 12 September 1936, which was summarized as follows:

"As a summary, a guess might be hazarded that the Soviet Union expends for general purposes of positive intelligence, about 2½ millions annually [4361] and for negative intelligence under the direction of the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs a sum amounting to tens of millions of dollars."

(4) It is known that a large appropriation is voted by the Parliament of Great Britain for the Secret Intelligence Service as part of the Foreign Office budget, and that the head of the Secret Intelligence Service is never obliged to give an accounting for the disposition of the money. In a newspaper report on the 1936 budget, the only figure published relative to Intelligence funds was an amount of £250,000 for Secret Service under the Home Office requirements.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

/s/ Robert B. Richards,
ROBERT B. RICHARDS,
Colonel, GSO
Budget and Fiscal Officer, MID.

[4362] **STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. HENRY D. RUSSELL, MEMBER, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, REGARDING THE RELATION OF THE BOARD TO CONGRESSMAN JOHN M. ROBSION**

56. General RUSSELL. I desire to present at this time a statement for the record as to the relation of the Army Pearl Harbor Board with the Honorable John M. Robsion, Member of Congress, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

In the study by the Army Pearl Harbor Board of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD relating to the attack on Pearl Harbor, it discovered a report of a speech alleged to have been made by the Honorable John M. Robsion, Member of Congress from the State of Kentucky.

Thereupon, the following self-explanatory letter was addressed to Congressman Robsion by Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

(Letter, dated August 2, 1944, from Lt. Gen. George Grunert, president, Army Pearl Harbor Board, to Congressman John M. Robsion, is as follows:)

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
Munitions Building, August 2, 1944.

Honorable JOHN M. ROBSION,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN ROBSION: The Board named by the War Department under the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, is meeting continuously.

In the study of available records the Board has considered carefully Congressional proceedings relating to the [4363] events at Pearl Harbor.

The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of June 5, 1944, contains an address delivered by you in which you discussed House Joint Resolution 283. In that address the following statements appear:

"After weeks of delay, authority was given to certain secret agents of the Government to tap the wires between Honolulu and Tokyo. On Friday night, December 5, 1941, these Government agents listened in and heard one of these Jap vice consuls hold a 17-minute conversation with a high Jap official in Tokyo. Our Government officials spent that Friday night translating and attempting to decode this conversation. On Saturday morning, December 6, 1941, a copy of this translated, decoded conversation was given to the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Army with instructions for him to deliver it to General Short. He reports that he went to General Short's house about noon on Saturday on December 6, 1941, and General Short was having a party of some sort, and General Short cursed this Intelligence Officer and almost bodily threw him out of the house for bringing that paper to him. Another copy was given to the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Navy at Pearl Harbor to give to Admiral Kimmel. That naval officer admits, we are informed, that he put it in his pocket, and intended to give it to Admiral Kimmel on Sunday afternoon, December 7, 1941, but the attack came on Sunday morning, December 7. There were many other [4364] warnings and some of them were given to the authorities here in Washington, and some of the daily newspapers of Honolulu carried large black headlines that Pearl Harbor would likely be attacked on that week end, but nothing was done to protect our fleet, our bombers and planes, or to prevent the butchery of nearly 4,000 officers and men."

These remarks are on page 5444 of the RECORD.

The Board is very anxious to investigate the occurrences described in your speech. It would be a great help to the Board if you could appear before it in Room 4747, Munitions Building, at your early convenience. In the event you desire, plans will be made to talk with you at such other place as you may designate and when it will be convenient to you.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
President.

57. General RUSSELL: The above letter was delivered to the office of Congressman Robsion by Sergeant Montgomery on the date of its draft.

At the end of two weeks after the delivery of said letter, the Board had received no reply thereto. Thereupon, Lieutenant Murphy, Administrative Officer of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, telephoned Congressman Robsion's office and was advised by Mr. Smith, the Congressman's secretary, that the letter had been forwarded to the Congressman at his Kentucky home. By long-distance telephone, Lieutenant Murphy talked with Congressman [4365] Robsion, and he was told by Congressman Robsion that he (Robsion) was very anxious to appear before the Board, and would return to Washington at the week end following this conversation.

On the next Monday, Lieutenant Murphy telephoned Congressman Robsion's office, and was advised by Mr. Smith, the Secretary, that the Congressman had returned to Washington on the preceding Saturday, but had been taken seriously ill and was then in the Naval hospital.

Within a few days, General Russell talked with the surgeon who had operated on the Congressman and who was then in attendance upon him. This surgeon stated to General Russell that the Congressman had undergone a major operation, but that his recovery appeared normal and that, in the surgeon's opinion, within a week or ten days, the Congressman would be physically able to confer with a Member of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. General Russell agreed to call the surgeon at the expiration of the period set by the surgeon.

Such call was made on the surgeon by General Russell, and the surgeon reported that Congressman Robsion was recovering satisfactorily, and it was the belief of the surgeon that within two or three days, General Russell, or some other Member of the Board, could call upon Robsion at the hospital to talk with him.

Within the next two or three days, General Russell called the surgeon and was told by the surgeon that Congressman Robsion was then physically able to confer with a representative of the Board, but stated that it was his (the surgeon's) desire to discuss the matter with the Congressman. Returning to the phone a few minutes later, the surgeon stated that he [4366] had talked with the Congressman, but that the Congressman had stated that he did not feel physically able to see anyone. When asked whether or not it would be possible for some Member of the Board to confer with the Congressman before the Board's departure for California and Honolulu, and having given the surgeon the probable date of the departure, General Russell was told that Congressman Robsion would not see him here prior to the departure of the Board.

Upon the return of the Board to Washington, and on the 25th of September, General Russell called the office of Congressman Robsion and talked to some man who represented himself as the Congressman's secretary. This man stated that the Congressman had left the hospital and was confined to his home, in Washington. Further, this gentleman stated that the Congressman had undergone a very severe illness, and that his recovery at this time was not complete. At the request of General Russell, this man stated that he would convey to the Congressman the Board's desire to have him appear before it as a witness, and would then notify General Russell of the Congressman's decision.

To the date of placing this statement in the record, to-wit, 28 September 1944, no word has come from the Congressman or anyone representing him.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS B. SHOEMAKER, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, IN CHARGE OF ADJUDICATIONS; CENTRAL OFFICE, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major CLAUSEN. Will you state for the Board your name, [4367] present position, and residence.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Thomas B. Shoemaker, Assistant Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, in charge of adjudications, in the Central Office at Philadelphia, Pa.

2. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Shoemaker, before coming in here today, I showed you a file that I had received from the District Director at Los Angeles, and at this time I invite your attention to one of the letters therein, which purports to be a letter from you, as Deputy Commissioner, Legal Branch, to the District Director, at Los Angeles, dated February 4, 1941, in which you ask that the application for certificate of arrival of Hans William Rohl be made special. Will you look at that letter, please, which I now show you, and state to the Board whether that is your signature, and whether you sent that letter, on that occasion.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is my signature, and I was responsible entirely for that letter.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Now, referring to the immediately following copy of letter in the file, which appears to be a copy of letter from Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., dated January 22, 1941, to Mr. H. W. Rohl, will you tell the Board, from your examination of the file, what request if any from the Army had been made to you, with respect to Mr. Rohl and his application.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. As I look back over this file, I think either Wyman—that is, Lt. Col. Wyman—or counsel for Lt. Wyman, had come to see me about getting action expedited in connection with Rohl's naturalization.

4. Major CLAUSEN. Did you say "Counsel for Colonel Wyman"?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Counsel for Colonel—well, I should say [4368] counsel for Rohl. I beg your pardon, I would like to amend that.

5. Major CLAUSEN. Now, do you recall at this time whether the counsel presented the letter which is in the file, here, a copy of which is a letter from Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl, as being a basis for making the request that the case be treated as special?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Well, I can't tell you that, definitely, but I could come pretty nearly asserting that to be the fact, for this reason: We would not expedite the naturalization of anyone hardly unless there was some particular reason, and if an Army officer or anyone connected with the War Department should be most insistent with regard to expediting naturalization of some individual, we would naturally be desirous of cooperating and would go the limit, and would even do that today.

6. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Shoemaker, when I received this file from the District Director at Los Angeles, he cautioned me that I could not

have any of the papers in this file photostated, and, since I have returned, I have discussed that question with you, and as I understand it, I am now permitted by you, as a higher authority, to have such papers and letters in here photostated as I desire.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is correct; you may photostat any papers in there that will serve your purposes.

7. Major CLAUSEN. As the Board may desire?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Exactly.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Now, today, while you were waiting to be called as a witness, did you receive from an office here in [4369] Washington, an additional file?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I did.

9. Major CLAUSEN. The one which I hand you?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I did; and this is the file.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And what office was that sent from?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is our liaison office, here in Washington. You see, our central office is in Philadelphia.

11. Major CLAUSEN. There are certain papers in this file which I desire to call to the attention of the Board, and which may be relevant on consideration of all the facts.

The very first document in the file is a declaration of intention, signed by John William Rohl.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Down at the bottom, there.

12. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, "John William Rohl," signed, July 23, 1915.

13. General GRUNERT. Is John William Rohl identical with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

14. Major CLAUSEN. Hans Wilhelm Rohl is the German of John William Rohl, sir, and this has been referred to in other testimony as being an act of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, as of that time.

The next paper in the file is a photostatic copy of a letter from Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl, dated January 22, 1941, which contains his signature.

The next paper in the file is a memorandum from Mr. Shoemaker for the file, dated February 1, 1941. Mr. Shoemaker, is that your notation on the memorandum?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That's my—those are my initials, and I dictated that memorandum.

[4370] 15. Major CLAUSEN. I will read this to the Board. It is on the letterhead of United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington:

(The memorandum by T. B. Shoemaker, Deputy Commissioner, dated February 1, 1941, is as follows:)

FEBRUARY 1, 1941

Memorandum.

Mr. Galloway, former Assistant Attorney General, called at this office today. He stated that this alien is married to an American citizen and would not wish to leave the United States until he can become naturalized. I talked the matter over with Mr. Dimock, who stated that in view of the defense work on which the alien would be engaged, as shown by the letter of January 22, 1941, from Lt. Col. Wyman (copy herewith), special action should be taken to get the certificate of arrival, get the petition on file and secure final hearing.

(Initialed) T. B. S.

T. B. SHOEMAKER,

Deputy Commissioner, Legal Branch.

Who, Mr. Shoemaker, was Mr. Galloway?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Mr. Galloway was former Assistant Attorney General of the United States, in charge of the criminal branch, I think, under the prior administration.

16. Major CLAUSEN. And he was practicing law?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir.

17. Major CLAUSEN. In February 1941, in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, he was practicing law in Washington, D. C.

[4371] 18. Major CLAUSEN. And at this time, did he represent the applicant, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I so take it, there, very clearly.

19. Major CLAUSEN. So, in addition to Mr. John Martin, and Mr. David Cannon, there is this other lawyer, Mr. Galloway, representing the applicant?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Who was Mr. Dimock, referred to in your memorandum?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Mr. Dimock was a former Assistant Secretary of Labor, and later, assistant in charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was the second man in rank.

21. General FRANK. Where?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. In Washington, D. C. Major Scofield was the Special Assistant to the Attorney General, and Mr. Dimock was the next in charge.

22. Major CLAUSEN. The next paper in this file to which I invite the attention of the Board is a memorandum from E. B. Medley to Mr. W. W. Brown, dated 7-1-41, July 1, 1941, which states, at the bottom:

(Excerpt from memorandum, E. B. Medley to W. W. Brown, dated "7-1-41," is as follows:)

Mr. Galloway (DI 6196) telephoned and asked if report had been received from California. He was told that it had. He would like to talk with the gentleman handling the case and I suggested that you would talk with him probably. Will you be so good as to call him up, please?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Do you want me to identify those persons?

[4372] 23. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; if you can.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Mrs. Medley was formerly my secretary, now retired, living in Florida. Mr. W. W. Brown was chief of the warrant branch of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in the central office. Presumably, I was absent at that time.

24. Major CLAUSEN. The next paper to which I invite the attention of the Board is a memorandum for the file, dated September 5, 1941, stating as follows:

(Memorandum dated Sept. 5, 1941, signed "CB", follows:)

Mr. Stilphen, Br. 5567 War Department, was contacted by Mr. Devaney on this case today.

(signed) CB.

Who is "CB"?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I imagine some one of his secretaries. He is my assistant, Mr. Devaney.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Mr. Devaney is your assistant?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. My assistant. I imagine that is one of his numerous secretaries which have changed in the changing process during the war.

26. Major CLAUSEN. Did you have a talk with Mr. Stilphen about this case, Mr. Shoemaker?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Not so far as I can recall.

27. Major CLAUSEN. Do you know who Mr. Stilphen was?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. No, I don't.

28. Major CLAUSEN. The next paper in the file is a memorandum dated September 8, 1941, "Memorandum for the file," reading as follows:

(Memorandum, dated Sept. 8, 1941, signed "CB", follows:)

At Mr. Devaney's direction, I informed Mr. Stilphen, [4573] of the War Department, of the contents of the telegram dated September 6, 1941, from the Los Angeles office of this service.

He was most appreciative of our information about Mr. Rohl's hearing.

It is isigned with the initials, "CB," and then, attached to that, is a telegram, dated September 6, 1941, Office of District Director, Los Angeles, to the Commissioner at Washington, reading as follows:

(Telegram, dated Sept. 6, 1941, signed by Blee, follows:)

Attention T. B. Shoemaker. Your telegram September sixth. Final hearing of petition for naturalization of Hans William Rohl set for September fifteenth and his attorney David Cannon so advised.

(Signed) Blee.

Do you know who Blee was, sir?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. He was assistant in charge of the Los Angeles office; since retired, I think.

29. Major CLAUSEN. The final two papers in the file are two letters, both dated October 10, 1941. The first is to Mr. Benjamin L. Stilphen, Esq., room 2029, New War Department, 21st and Virginia Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C., and it reads as follows:

(Letter from Lemuel B. Schofield to Benjamin L. Stilphen, dated October 10, 1941:)

MY DEAR MR. STILPHEN: Reference is made to your interest in the case of Hans William Rohl, whose services are desired by the War Department in connection with defense construction [4574] projects in Honolulu.

Mr. Rohl filed a petition for naturalization in the United States District Court at Los Angeles on March 10, 1941, and a special hearing thereon was held on September 15, 1941.

You are advised that all the facts in the case were presented to the court, and no objection was made to the granting of the petition. After consideration of all the facts, the court entered an order admitting Mr. Rohl to citizenship on September 15, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) LEMUEL B. SCHOFIELD,
Special Assistant to the Attorney General.

By A. C. DEVANEY,
Chief Examiner, Legal Branch.

The same letter being the same date, of which the copy is here, indicates it went to Brigadier General John J. Kingman, Acting Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington, D. C.

30. General FRANK. I think it should be stated in the record here that it will be remembered that Mr. Stilphen was a civilian employee of the office of the Chief of the Engineer Corps in the United States Army, to whom was delegated the responsibility for following through on the efforts of the Chief of Engineers, who tried to hasten action on Rohl's citizenship.

31. Major CLAUSEN. I have no further questions.

32. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions by the Board?
[4375] Mr. Shoemaker, do you think of anything else you might offer that might be of assistance to the Board?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. No. Of course, I don't know the exact purpose of your inquiry, but I might add that this man was naturalized prior to December 7, or December 10, 1941. Even in those days, we were watching the naturalization of Germans, and yet there were no particular details laid down for our guidance. We watched them because we were essentially Americans, the same as you gentlemen, and tried to forestall any possibilities of subversive influences being used, in any manner, shape, or form. It would be an entirely different proposition today in the naturalization of any alien enemy. Unless a man had filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen at least two years prior to the declaration of war, or he was otherwise eligible to become naturalized, he would have to be excepted from the classification of alien enemy by the Attorney General before he could be naturalized.

I personally handled many of those cases. We make them prove the case. In other words, we don't take for granted anything that they say. I might give you an illustration of that. I had a friend of mine come in not long ago to get a German naturalized. Well, I looked the case over, and I told him that he hadn't sold him to me. "Well," he said, "can I see anyone else?" I said, "Yes, you can see the Commissioner," so he went up and saw the Commissioner; and he did not sell it to the Commissioner. Finally, it went to headquarters at Washington, and they knew of the case, and they rather looked with favor upon this fellow because he had been doing some good work for the United States forces.

[4376] Then I asked the Commissioner what he was going to do. He said, "I am going to ask them whether that is a directive or whether it is a suggestion. If it is merely a suggestion, he is not going to get excepted from the classification of alien enemy," and he was told to use his own judgment, and he was not excepted from the classification of alien enemy.

33. General GRUNERT. Mr. Shoemaker, if you had not received this letter from the office of the Chief of Engineers, what would have been the net results as to the granting of citizenship to this man, Rohl?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Well, that is of course, after all, surmise, but I should say that he would not have gotten his naturalization as quickly as he did.

34. General GRUNERT. It would have been a question of months in the future, would it not?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, it would have more than likely been delayed.

35. General GRUNERT. But did this letter from the Chief of Engineers in any way influence you as to the qualification for citizenship of this man, Rohl?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Absolutely not, except that if an army officer vouches for a man, you naturally are inclined to look with favor upon that man, because you feel that he, as such, will be the first one to stand in his way if he were not bona fide.

36. General GRUNERT. Would this be more so, if you got a letter from the head of one of the governmental departments, in which it was stated that this man's loyalty to the United States is established

beyond question, or words to that effect? Did [4377] that strengthen the letter in any way?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, I should say it did.

37. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

38. General RUSSELL. After all is said and done, it is a question of the weight that you give the evidence, and evidence from a commissioned officer of the Army is given great weight?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Unquestionably; yes, sir.

39. General RUSSELL. There is some evidence which has been adduced before the Board to the effect that at this time quite a number of aliens were being naturalized because of the desire for their services in governmental projects. Do you know anything about that situation?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I knew we had quite a few cases of that kind; yes, sir.

40. General RUSSELL. So the application of Rohl was not one to itself?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. It was not rare and exceptional, because there were other cases of that kind, unquestionably.

41. General RUSSELL. That is all.

42. Colonel TOULMIN. Mr. Shoemaker, can you explain to me why it was that Rohl was admitted to citizenship, in view of the fact that this record, here, contains a letter or memorandum to the District Director, Los Angeles, California, under date of May 28, 1941, signed by Judson F. Shaw, Inspector in Charge of the Los Angeles local office of your organization, accompanied by application for a warrant of arrest, which shows the illegal entry of this alien, Rohl, into this country, and the violation of our statutes on the subject, and, despite that fact, that he was naturalized? I call your attention to this [4378] file, and the official papers in it.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Well, it would be a question again of weighing the evidence. One man, one inspector, frequently will feel that a man should not be naturalized, and he will make a hard-and-fast conclusion on that. The other man who considers the case in its entirety—let us say for instance, considering that presumably the War Department wanted him naturalized, that he would serve a good purpose, he would serve our interest primarily, might resolve that against the conclusion of Mr. Shaw.

43. Colonel TOULMIN. Then, following General Grunert's thought in his questions to you, the fact that Colonel Wyman interested himself in Rohl's case would have a counterbalancing influence over this recommendation of the inspector, together with the proposed warrant for Rohl's arrest?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Unquestionably.

44. Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

45. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether, outside of the letter from the Chief of Engineers, and correspondence from Colonel Wyman, the engineer there was any other influence of any kind used to get citizenship for this man, Rohl?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I do not know of any other influence than that reflected by the record; and in dealing with that, I notice that the attorney for Rohl, Wyman, and General Kingman, were interested in his naturalization. They are the only three whose names make

any impression on me. There is no one else, so far as I can recall, who did.

I do recall very distinctly, former Assistant Attorney General Galloway, coming in, because I knew him personally.

[4379] 46. General GRUNERT. Is it usual or rather unusual for an applicant for citizenship to have such highfalutin legal personages advocating his citizenship?

47. Major CLAUSEN. In the case there were four lawyers.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. It is unusual; but it happens, on occasions, that certain individuals are interested, maybe for a consideration, in having certain individuals naturalized. Generally speaking, there is no such influence, or attempted influence, used.

48. General GRUNERT. Then it is a question of being willing to pay the fee of a lawyer of repute to assist you in what you are after?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. The fee for naturalization is fixed by the statute at \$25.

49. General GRUNERT. The lawyer's fee?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. The lawyer's fee. However, I rather imagine that some of them have greatly exceeded that amount.

50. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

51. Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask Mr. Shoemaker just one more question. It is not necessary to have a lawyer before your Bureau in order to be naturalized, is it?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Not at all.

52. General FRANK. Therefore, would you not consider a case a suspicious one that had to be supported by four lawyers?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Not necessarily; no.

53. General GRUNERT. Mr. Shoemaker, your department does not naturalize citizens, it is up to the court, isn't it?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. It is entirely a judicial question.

[4380] 54. General GRUNERT. But the court is influenced a great deal by the reports you make on the applicant, is it not?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Generally speaking, the court will accept our recommendations; but I may say, now, that the process is entirely different from what it was when this case of Rohl was pending. All of those cases must come to a central office and be determined by us as to what action if any, in the recommendation to the court, will be taken, whether to grant, deny, or continue it.

55. General GRUNERT. Then there was no reason why his case should have come to your attention, except to expedite it, or make it a special case?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is correct, sir.

56. Colonel TOULMIN. Just one more question.

Mr. Shoemaker, you have stated that on and after December 10, 1941, the new stringent regulations went into effect about naturalizing a German alien, in which the very severe burden of proof was on the German alien, and the more liberal rule in effect prior to December 10, 1941, had then been abandoned, is that correct?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Let me make this plain. On January 13, 1941, the present Nationality Code went into effect. That provided, among other things, in section 326, for the naturalization of alien enemies. Now, at that time there were not any alien enemies, and it was only after our—I think it was December 8, 1941—our declaration of war

against Japan; and I think it was December 10 or 11, our declaration of war against Germany, that that became effective.

57. Colonel TOULMIN. Then, if Rohl's naturalization proceed-[4381] ings had been deferred from the date of his naturalization in September 1941, until December, in the event it would take its normal, natural course, he would have run into a condition, due to this new code, which did not exist when he was naturalized?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Exactly.

58. General GRUNERT. Then, in addition to his probable or alleged need by the engineers for governmental work, could he have known at that time that a more stringent code might be made effective in the event of war?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Unquestionably, he could have known of it. Whether he did or not, I don't know, but he could have known of it, because the law was on the books.

59. General GRUNERT. And this more stringent code applies only to alien enemies, or to all aliens, now?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. It applies to all aliens, but there is one clause of section 326 which has reference to alien enemies.

60. Colonel TOULMIN. Now, Mr. Shoemaker, the law was on the books in September 1941, was it not?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is correct.

61. Colonel TOULMIN. And therefore, everyone being presumed to know the law, Rohl had notice of the fact that if there were war with Germany, that statute would apply, is that right?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Unquestionably.

62. General GRUNERT. I am getting a liberal education. I want just a little more.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. All right, sir.

63. General GRUNERT. In the event a mistake may have been made in naturalizing an alien and making of him a citizen, how can such things be undone under the law?

[4382] Mr. SHOEMAKER. We have the right to institute cancellation proceedings. We also have the right, where the time limit has not expired, to appeal. Of course, the time limit in this case has expired, but if it be shown that he obtained his citizenship fraudulently or illegally, we can institute proceedings to cancel his papers. Whether we can get them through, in view of some of the opinions of the Supreme Court, recently, is open to question.

64. Colonel TOULMIN. Is there any statute of limitations?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. No statute of limitations applies, and it is what the Supreme Court has said, in effect, is "a presumption running backwards."

65. General GRUNERT. And the burden of proof is on some interested person to bring up the case, is it, or is it taken up by any part of your department, with knowledge of the case?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. The case would be taken up by the United States attorney, more than likely, on our initiative.

66. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

67. Major CLAUSEN. I have one, sir. We have reliable information, based upon reports of the Federal Bureau of Identification, that in addition to the letter which is in the file, from Colonel Wyman, he telephoned to the District Director, or personnel in the office of

the District Director, at Los Angeles, and yet there is no notation in either file that I have seen, to that effect. Would the fact that those calls came in, relating to the applicant, urging naturalization, and that there is no record in the file, be irregular?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. No; unfortunately, they would not be, because some people are not as meticulous in making memoranda [4383] as they should be, some of our officers. It seems if I got anything like that, I would do the same thing that you have seen—make the memorandum, and let the record reflect just what happened.

68. Major CLAUSEN. That is all I have, sir.

69. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of the witnesses for the day, took up the consideration of other business.)

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[4385] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 1 p. m., pursuant to recess, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

1. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR HOMER FERGUSON, OF MICHIGAN

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

2. Colonel WEST. Senator, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Senator FERGUSON. My name is Homer Ferguson. I live at 18280 Fairway Drive, Detroit, and I live at the Westchester, in Washington, D. C.

3. General GRUNERT. Senator, in this particular part of our investigation, I am going to ask General Russell to propound the questions, and the Board will interject such as they see fit, at the time.

[4386] 4. General RUSSELL. You are Senator Ferguson, as you have just stated to the Recorder?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir; Senator, of Michigan.

5. General RUSSELL. You have been interested from time to time in the events and incidents leading up to and surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941?

Senator FERGUSON. I have.

6. General RUSSELL. Senator, the Board, of course, is operating, as you doubtless know, under a joint congressional resolution which directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy severally to proceed to the investigation of the incidents at Pearl Harbor, and to institute proceedings against anyone that such investigation might indicate should have proceedings instigated against him.

Senator FERGUSON. I am familiar with that. I, in fact, introduced the resolution in the Senate.

7. General GRUNERT. I think that statement, General Russell, is a little bit too far-fetched.

8. General RUSSELL. Well, let me see it.

9. General GRUNERT. Wait, until I see the order to convene the Board, because I want to make sure the Senator understands just what the Board is about. I have it, right here.

Senator FERGUSON. I might state that I introduced the resolution and was on the subcommittee in the Senate, the Judiciary; but as to your orders, I have just read them, recently.

10. General RUSSELL. I was quoting, not our orders; I was quoting the congressional resolution under which we proceed.

11. Major CLAUSEN. Public 339. Do you want the official [4387] copy of that, sir?

12. General RUSSELL. Yes, sir. That may be rather awkwardly expressed, but it is substantially correct.

Senator FERGUSON. I am familiar with it.

13. General GRUNERT. Well, never mind, I do not think we need that. I thought you were defining what the Board was charged with doing. Will you do that?

14. General RUSSELL. You gentlemen were just one or two steps ahead of me, that is all. I was calling the Senator's attention to the congressional resolution, and I may have worded it clumsily.

Senator FERGUSON. But I am familiar with it.

15. General RUSSELL. Senator, the Secretary of War, pursuant to that resolution, has named a Board, consisting of General Grunert, General Frank, and myself; Colonel West is the Recorder; stating:

This Board of officers is hereby appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.

So the legislative joint resolution, together with the order naming the Board, defines our jurisdiction and delimits our investigation. We thought it would be well at the outset to have that understanding.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I am familiar with the resolution and the order appointing the Board.

16. General RUSSELL. Now, Senator, we are addressing ourselves specifically to information which has come to the attention of [4388] the Board, relating to a dinner party which the Senator is represented as having attended, and at which party was Sir Owen Dixon, the Australian Minister at Washington.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I attended the dinner where he was.

17. General RUSSELL. We have also learned that Mr. Sidney C. Graves and Frank C. Hanighen, of Washington, were present at the same dinner.

Senator FERGUSON. I attended the dinner where those three parties were.

18. General RUSSELL. Particularly, we are interested in a conversation or some remarks which were made by Sir Owen Dixon at that dinner, and which you are represented to us as having overheard. Would you please tell the Board just what occurred?

Senator FERGUSON. I attended the dinner. After the dinner, I had a conversation with Sir Owen Dixon, who was then Minister of Australia, in which he related an incident about Pearl Harbor. I remember it rather well, because it was a rather startling statement for a Minister—that is, in my opinion.

It was to this effect: that he had been a judge in Australia, and that he had gone with a shipping board for the Australian Government, as an official; that, 48 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, he had received, and the Board, the people who were with him had received word that Japan was going to strike; that, for the next 24 hours, they did not know where, so they were greatly concerned. At the end of the 24-hour period, which would be 24 hours before they did strike, he then learned that they were going to strike America; and he [4389] related how he remembered the conversation so well; that when he went into the meeting, he stated, "We have won the war!" And the men in the room were rather surprised at that expression, that Australia had "won the war." They did not know they were in a war; and he says:

I explained to them that they are going to attack America. That means America will come in—and that means we have won the war!

19. General RUSSELL. Was Sir Owen Dixon asked any questions about these remarks, or did they just pass with these statements from him?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, as I remembered the remarks—I did not know the other people had heard it—it was between the time that I was getting my coat out of the closet, and he was getting his, with our wives—that period, and the time we walked out to our cars. His car was waiting at the curb, because I asked him whether we couldn't take him, the rationing of "gas" was pretty short, and I did not know whether he had his car or not; and he said no, he had his car.

20. General RUSSELL. Then the conversation was largely confined to you and Dixon, was it not?

Senator FERGUSON. That's as I had understood it. I hear rumors and I see affidavits that there was another conversation that people heard, either at the table or at the coffee; but I don't recall it. I recall what took place on that conversation.

21. General RUSSELL. And you are definite in your recollection that it took place as you were going to the closet to get your coats?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[4390] 22. General RUSSELL. Or between the closet and the cars, or both?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes—both, I would say. And I wouldn't say that other people were not there getting their coats, because I was intent on listening to this conversation. It was about the time that the extension of time was up, on the first extension of time, as I recall it, of the statute of limitations.

23. General RUSSELL. The conversation, as you remember it, was between you and Dixon?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

24. General RUSSELL. And he was addressing his remarks to you, as an individual?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that is right; he was.

25. General RUSSELL. And if anybody else heard them?

Senator FERGUSON. I would think they were overheard by the other people. I understood, and he was talking to me.

26. General RUSSELL. Do you remember seeing a Mr. Sidney C. Graves or a Mr. Hanighen, along with you and Sir Owen Dixon, at the time he was talking, or do you know those gentlemen?

Senator FERGUSON. I know them. I knew of them, and I just cannot place them as being there when I heard this conversation.

27. General RUSSELL. It is your impression now, Senator, that no one heard the conversation but you, the conversation about which you have just testified?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, it could have been heard, naturally, by our wives. They were talking. Mrs. Ferguson is very fond of Mrs. Dixon, and they could have been talking about [4391] something else.

28. General RUSSELL. Now, in order that we may clarify this situation and so that the Board might be able to pass on the issue as to whether or not there were one or two conversations, I am going to read you from an affidavit which has come to the attention of the Board. Of course, at this moment, it is hearsay. We hope to have the witness in here. The language of the affidavit is to this effect:

After dinner the Australian minister made the following statement to most of the guests, including myself:

"Early in the war I held a government position which involved knowledge of shipping and naval intelligence. Several days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor I learned from our intelligence service that a Japanese naval force was headed in the direction of Australia and that an alarm should be given. Within a day later Intelligence further informed me that the Japanese naval force was apparently not headed for Australia but was headed for some American islands."

Now, that is the description by another person who was there at the dinner, and the recitation of facts contained in that description in no way fits the description of the conversation which you have just related.

Senator FERGUSON. That is true; and I do not recall that conversation, at all. Mine was as I related, because it impressed me about the part that they had "won the war."

29. General RUSSELL. Do you recall Dixon's saying anything about having transmitted that information to any agency of our [4392] Government?

Senator FERGUSON. No, sir.

30. General RUSSELL. Do you recall any question being directed to Dixon as to whether or not such information was available, and his replying that it would have been available to the American Government, if any request therefor had been made?

Senator FERGUSON. No, I did not. In the small group, after the dinner, we were in a rather large room and in clusters, as it were, drinking coffee, which is the custom here in Washington; and I do not recall in that room hearing about this incident. I have been trying to place it. I heard it, that night, and I cannot place it in that room. I place it from the time we started to get our coats, until we got to the car.

31. General RUSSELL. Now, Senator, in order that we may develop this story which has broken on the Board, very lately, I will say, in the investigation, we made an effort to locate Sir Owen Dixon for the purpose of determining what he knew and calling him before the Board to give us the information. We discovered that he had left Washington when we began our investigation.

In the course of that investigation, we were furnished a certified copy of a statement from Dixon, which has come over to us from the

State Department with this rather impressive seal on it, and I am going to read that statement from Dixon, which was handed me within the last ten minutes. It is from Owen Dixon to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull. I read:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just been informed over the telephone by a representative of the press that Congressman Church informed [4393] the House of Representatives this afternoon that he held a sworn statement that on some private occasion I had said that in Australia, forty-eight hours before Pearl Harbour, I knew that a Japanese task force was about to attack somewhere and that a little later I learned that it was about to attack American territory. I at once informed the press, as the fact is, that I had never had any information that any Japanese force was about to attack any territory of the United States or any information that any warlike measures were likely to be taken against the United States and never said so.

I have not yet had an opportunity of seeing the Congressional RECORD or any other report of what actually took place in the House, but I felt that I should not delay acquainting you with the matter.

Yours sincerely,

(S) OWEN DIXON.

The tone of the letter rather indicates that it was not asked for by the Secretary of State but was volunteered and was sent to the Secretary of State.

Prior to the time that I read this letter to you, Senator, had you any information about this denial by Owen Dixon, either from the press or from personal sources, or in any other way?

Senator FERGUSON. I had seen it in the press. I had seen it. A newspaperman had called me up, or came in, and asked me what I had to say about it, and I said I had no comment at that time. I think I put it this way, instead of "no comment," that I didn't care to discuss the merits of the facts in relation to Pearl Harbor at that time.

[4394] 32. General RUSSELL. How long had you known Sir Owen Dixon prior to the night that you attended the dinner party about which you testified?

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to place as to whether or not that was the first time or the second time that I had met him. If I am not mistaken, that was the first time that I had met him. I had been to his home one time, but that was subsequent; and our wives had met, as I understood, at their home.

33. General RUSSELL. Well, have you had any contacts with him since the evening of this dinner, which, as I recall, was in December 1943?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, that's right. I was at his home to a cocktail party, where Mr. Curran—I think that's the name of the gentleman, who was an official—that is as I recall it; and then I had an invitation to his home, a few weeks ago, to a cocktail party for his farewell, when he was going away. Now, I may have met him at one other time, and I am trying to place it. I met him with Minister Nash. I have met him at different times, at different functions; just meeting him, not at his functions, but meeting him at different Ministers'.

34. General RUSSELL. Then you would describe your relations with Dixon as more or less social and casual?

Senator FERGUSON. Certainly; social, and just casual.

35. General RUSSELL. In these subsequent meetings that you have described, have you discussed this conversation that you had at the dinner party, relating to the Japanese task force?

[4395] Senator FERGUSON. I never questioned him or asked him any questions in relation to any official duties or anything in relation to Pearl Harbor. My testimony still stands, though, as to my conversation with the Minister, Sir Owen Dixon, notwithstanding that.

36. General RUSSELL. The letter was merely read, Senator, for information, and to show what the Minister said.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, I understand that; but I had not commented, and I thought I had better still leave the evidence, that it stood just as I stated it, because it is one of those shocking conversations that you remember.

37. General RUSSELL. Senator, the Board has been advised and knows that you have been intensely interested in this subject that we are now investigating. Would you tell us whether or not you have in your possession facts, or leads which we might follow to develop facts, which would help us in the accomplishment of our mission to make a complete report on this disaster?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, what I have, of course, would be, naturally, hearsay; but I am willing, as you put the expression, "leads."

Just recently, probably last Saturday, I made a record for broadcast with a newspaperman, in which he asked me questions, and I, in turn, asked him questions. I had known that he knew, or claimed to know, certain facts. It was covering the proposition of why I wanted the facts to be known in relation to Pearl Harbor. I have been an advocate that the public should know the facts, and he wanted to question me on that for a broadcast that he is going to make; and in that, he made several statements, which I think, now, I should tell you gentlemen.

[4396] One of them was—well, to lead up to it, it is all in the broadcast, so you will be able to get it—that he had had a conversation with the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and one with the Under Secretary, Mr. Welles; that they were both greatly impressed, that they felt that it meant war, particularly after the note of the 26th of November; that he had a call from an admiral of a country—I want to get near his words—who is now an ally of ours. He had told me previously it was a Dutch admiral, so I will tell you now, it was a Dutch admiral; that the Dutch admiral had told him about two carriers coming from Japan down to Midway, and was greatly concerned as to where they were going, whether they were going to the Philippines—these were Japanese carriers—to Singapore, or to the Dutch East Indies, or coming to Pearl Harbor; that the Dutch admiral told him that he had been awakened at night, I think it was on the 4th of December, by a British admiral, in Washington—this took place in Washington—and that he wanted him to come over to his room, he couldn't sleep; the British admiral couldn't sleep; and that when he got over there, the British admiral explained his reason for not being able to sleep was, that an attack was imminent, and that he was trying to place in his own mind as to where they were going to attack, and that is why he wanted to discuss it with the Dutch admiral.

They discussed it, and finally came to the conclusion—the British admiral reasoned it out—that Japan could not attack the British or the Philippines or anyone else, other than Pearl Harbor, because if she did she would leave our [4397] fleet at Pearl Harbor to her

flank, so it would be very bad military strategy. He didn't put that in—pardon me—take that out. He didn't use the word "strategy," but it would be bad to allow them to be at a flank.

38. General RUSSELL. Now, Senator, I was making a note, unfortunately. You referred to this broadcast, in which some announcer interviewed you—

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

39. General RUSSELL. —and in which you interviewed the announcer?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

40. General RUSSELL. Could you identify the announcer, and the time and place of the broadcast?

Senator FERGUSON. The broadcast has not yet taken place.

41. General RUSSELL. Oh, it hasn't?

Senator FERGUSON. Just on a record, to be broadcast.. The broadcaster, the interviewer, was Barnet Nover, a writer on the Washington Post.

42. General RUSSELL. And the lead, there, which you consider material to us, is this conversation between these two representatives, one, of the Dutch Government, and one, of the British Government?

Senator FERGUSON. That is right.

43. General RUSSELL. Now, did you get the impression from that that the representative of the British Government was predicating his prognostications on certain facts, or that he was just speculating, based on strategical principles, only?

Senator FERGUSON. I took it that he had the facts, that the carriers, the force, was out to attack, and then his [4398] ultimate decision was, that they had to attack Pearl Harbor, not that they had official news. That is why we wanted to discuss it. He couldn't sleep; and when they got over there and worked it out together, why, they decided that.

44. General RUSSELL. And who had discovered those carriers?

Senator FERGUSON. The conversation is, that the Dutch admiral knew of them.

45. General RUSSELL. The Dutch admiral?

Senator FERGUSON. And the British admiral knew of them, and had called this Dutch admiral to come over, and that he couldn't sleep; he wanted to talk to him; and this was at night, in the night.

46. General RUSSELL. Could you give us the names of these two, the British and the Dutch admirals?

Senator FERGUSON. I did not ask him the names on the record, on the broadcast, and he didn't state them.

47. General GRUNERT. And who gave the information to the news commentator; one of these admirals?

Senator FERGUSON. The Dutch admiral.

48. General FRANK. Did he give the date on which these two carriers were at Midway?

Senator FERGUSON. He states, in the broadcast, because he corrected it. "It was the 3rd—no, Wednesday—the 3rd, yes."

49. General FRANK. Of December?

Senator FERGUSON. Of December 1941.

50. General RUSSELL. Senator, have you other leads that you think we might follow down and discover pertinent evidence?

Senator FERGUSON. No. I assume that you have the [4399] fact of the two boys, which has been publicized a lot, "the two privates," I think the Roberts report calls them.

51. General RUSSELL. The radar operators?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, noncommissioned. I think you have had those.

52. General RUSSELL. Yes, we have had those people. We know about those.

53. General GRUNERT. Yes. I think, now, we have about 36 volumes of testimony.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. This one little broadcast—I thought I had better tell you about that, because it will probably be released on the air, and I hadn't any knowledge that that had ever been used by anyone before, and I wanted you to know that that was one thing; and I just drew this conclusion, because I remember my answer on the broadcast, "Why didn't someone waken Kimmel and Short?" That's on the broadcast. When he told this, about this man wakening the other one to come over and discuss it, I just asked him that.

54. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not this broadcast shows that the information allegedly possessed by these two admirals was ever taken up with any governmental official here in Washington?

Senator FERGUSON. It does not. This is in the broadcast—that he knew the Secretary of State was keeping close tab with the Army and Navy, because I asked him, then, the question, on the broadcast, whether or not he knew whether or not the Army and Navy, here, were keeping as close tab with the ones out at the outposts.

55. General FRANK. If the two Japanese carriers had been at [4400] Midway, Midway was a United States possession.

Senator FERGUSON. They were coming down toward Midway.

56. General FRANK. Oh, they were coming down toward Midway?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

57. General GRUNERT. Presumably from where, did he say?

Senator FERGUSON. From Japan.

58. General GRUNERT. From Japan, or from the mandated islands, or from that vicinity?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, did I say Midway, gentlemen?

59. General FRANK. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. The Marshalls.

60. General FRANK. Oh, the Marshalls?

Senator FERGUSON. I beg your pardon, I misspoke myself.

61. General RUSSELL. Then the testimony, now, would be that these carriers were proceeding down toward the Marshalls?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and the difficulty that the Britisher had, at first, and that the Dutch admiral had, was as to which way they would go from there; because I remember looking at my map. I remember looking at my map on the wall, now. It was the Marshalls, on that broadcast. I am glad you spoke about the island again, General Frank.

62. General GRUNERT. If there is anything else that is in your mind, you might mention it, so that the Board can decide whether or not it has covered the particular leads or questions that are now in your mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. There is a lot being said about the message that was sent by commercial cable, that arrived somewhat after the happening at Pearl Harbor, as to what it [4401] was. There are many variations of that, of how we learned about it, here, and how we learned about it, later.

63. General GRUNERT. That has been covered.

Senator FERGUSON. That, I assume, has been covered, in detail. That's about the only incident that impresses me, now, that I would think that you haven't already covered.

64. Major CLAUSEN. Senator, in addition to the lead which you already gave me, which was, Robert Hoffman, on the Pearl Harbor phase—

Senator FERGUSON. Oh, yes! I had talked with you about Robert Hoffman.

65. Major CLAUSEN. On the Pearl Harbor phase. Have you any additional lead on that subject?

Senator FERGUSON. You see, we had a very good man, Robinson, on this Hoffman angle. He is an FBI agent. He works for the Truman Committee, now called the War Defense Committee, and I had considerable information about Hoffman, as I told you, about his knowledge of what took place at Pearl Harbor. He was presumed to know about Pearl Harbor, as well as the investigation that I was making up there at Canol and the Highway.

Of course, at the time, I didn't go into it. Although our committee at times skirted around, preparing, at Pearl Harbor, we have always considered that there was a great amount of waste, and should have been investigated, but we never got around to investigating the work that the Hawaiian company and the other companies did out at Pearl Harbor, and I never talked to Hoffman, personally, as I told you. We subpoenaed him, and he got away.

[4402] 66. General GRUNERT. Senator, that appears to exhaust everything, unless you can think of something additional.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I do not think of anything, General. If there is anything at all, about it—

67. General GRUNERT. It seems to me a short sort of hearing for a long trip, but we are very much obliged to you.

Senator FERGUSON. No, it is perfectly all right.

68. Colonel WEST. Senator, as these proceedings are confidential, we are cautioning all witnesses not to disclose anything that takes place while here.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, does that mean that you assume that my lips are forever closed, as a citizen and as a Senator? I wouldn't want that to happen. I am still a citizen and a Senator, and I expect, as time goes on, to maybe have something to say about Pearl Harbor. I have tried to keep quiet, and I will treat it this way, as to what I testified.

69. Colonel WEST. That is it.

Senator FERGUSON. But I mean I may repeat the same thing somewhere else. I have already repeated the one part of it; but I will not say that "I told them so."

70. General GRUNERT. I think you understand.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we understand each other, gentlemen?

71. General RUSSELL. Yes, we understand it.

72. General GRUNERT. Thank you, very much.

Senator FERGUSON. And I may, either off or on the Senate floor, talk about Pearl Harbor, General. I feel very keenly about Pearl Harbor.

73. General GRUNERT. I expect you to, and I expect others to do the same thing. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the above admonition.)

[4403] (Thereupon, at 1:40 p. m., the Board took up the consideration of other business.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board met again at 3 p. m., and continued with the further hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

74. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

This transcript of the telephone conversation I had with Senator Ferguson will be copied into the record, next, following the testimony of Senator Ferguson.

(Transcript of telephone conversation between Lt. Gen. George Grunert and U. S. Senator Homer Ferguson, of Michigan, at 1 p. m., 28 September 1944, follows:)

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

(Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, called United States Senator Homer Ferguson, of Michigan, at the Detroit Golf Club, at 1 p. m., 28 September 1944. The conversation follows:)

75. General GRUNERT. Hello. Senator Ferguson?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, General. How are you?

76. General GRUNERT. This is General Grunert. I am President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, General.

77. General GRUNERT. The Board, as you doubtless know, was convened by the Secretary of War, pursuant to an act of Congress.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I remember.

78. General GRUNERT. In order that you may fully understand the purport of my message to you, will you be good enough to listen carefully to the following, without interruption?

[4404] Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

79. General GRUNERT. And then we can talk about it, later.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, sir.

80. General GRUNERT. It has come to the attention of the Board that at a dinner party in Washington, 7 December 1943, Sir Owen Dixon, Australian Minister to Washington, is alleged to have said that 72 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor and while he was in charge of Australian cargo shipping, an intelligence flash warned him that a Japanese task force was at sea and Australia should be prepared for an attack, and further, that 24 hours later he (Dixon) allegedly was informed that the Japanese were not headed for Australia but for an American possession.

You were named as one of those present at that dinner who heard the alleged remarks of Sir Owen Dixon.

The Board is advised that you are very much interested in the attack on the Island of Oahu by Japanese armed forces, and that you are very probably in possession of facts, and leads to facts, which would be very helpful to the Army Pearl Harbor Board in its efforts to develop to the fullest extent the history of the attack.

The Board is now in session, at Washington, and it hopes soon to conclude its hearings. When the taking of evidence has been completed, we will begin the preparation of our report, which we hope to expedite as much as possible,

The reason for my calling you is that we would like very much to have you appear before the Board, in order [4405] that the information which you may have can be made available to us, and may become a part of the record.

Yesterday, a Member of the Board talked with one of your secretaries, and learned that you would not be back in Washington for several weeks. It would be a great favor, and of assistance to the Board, if you would let us fly you back to Washington, so that we might confer with you, and call you as a witness, if such conference indicates the desirability of placing information which you may have in the record.

In order that you may consider this request intelligently, we call your attention to the purposes for which the Army Pearl Harbor Board was appointed. They are:

To ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which latter is largely concerned with construction activities prior to the attack.

Now, that is the end of what I wanted to say to you, before opening the discussion. Now, we can go ahead and talk.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when would it suit you to fly me back to Washington?

81. General GRUNERT. Any time. I can get a plane, here, or I can have my plane come from New York tomorrow, or early next week.

[4406] Senator FERGUSON. When do you want to close the testimony? I would like to come down so I could be back here, Monday morning, or Sunday morning.

82. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. You haven't got a plane here, have you?

83. General GRUNERT. No. I have one, in New York. No, I have none at Detroit. How much of a flight is it, do you know?

Senator FERGUSON. It is only about 600 miles.

84. General GRUNERT. Well, how about my sending my plane from New York directly to Detroit?

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that would be fine, and then we could leave tomorrow morning.

85. General GRUNERT. Then you could leave tomorrow morning, and he could take you back, tomorrow afternoon.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

86. General GRUNERT. Tomorrow—wait a minute. We have a rehearing of General Marshall, tomorrow, and also, General Short is coming for a rehearing, tomorrow. We could work you in, some time, though. We could work you in, about the noon hour.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, that would be fine. You have your plane pick me up tomorrow morning; then I will come down there, and I will stay as long as you want me to, even though I stay Saturday.

87. General GRUNERT. I do not think, unless you have a great deal more than I anticipate, that that will be necessary.

[4407] Senator FERGUSON. No, I don't think it will take long.

88. General GRUNERT. You see, we are limiting ourselves strictly to the Army phases, and those things that bear directly on such phases.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I see. Well, I will be glad to tell you what I know on it.

89. General GRUNERT. And if you think you have information of that sort, why, suppose I telephone my plane in New York.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

90. General GRUNERT. Now, just where would it go to, in Detroit?

Senator FERGUSON. I think it had better come to the Detroit airport.

91. General GRUNERT. Detroit airport? That is the municipal airport of Detroit?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, the municipal airport in Detroit; and they can wire me, care of the Detroit Golf Club.

92. General GRUNERT. Wire you, care of the Detroit Golf Club, to tell you when they will arrive?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and I will be there to take the plane.

93. General GRUNERT. And then arrange with you as to what time you wish to depart, tomorrow morning?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Well, any time will suit me that will suit them.

94. General GRUNERT. Well, I think it would give you [4408] more time, up there, if we figured on your getting here about noon.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, then, General, have them pick me up some time about eight or nine o'clock.

95. General GRUNERT. I see. All right, sir. Then, when you leave Detroit, the plane can notify me, here, so we can have someone pick you up at the airport and bring you up to us.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Thank you, very much.

96. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. I will come down, General.

97. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you.

Senator FERGUSON. Good-bye!

98. General GRUNERT. Good-bye!

(Conversation concluded at 1:10 p. m.)

99. General GRUNERT. I also wish to have copied into the record the announcement I made to all concerned, here, this morning, as to secrecy, as to the information received from the Secretary of War, concerning publicity, also concerning the record.

(The announcement by Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, to all personnel of the Board, assembled in his office at 9 a. m., September 29, 1944, on the subject of secrecy, is as follows:)

100. General GRUNERT. For the information of the Board, I record the following:

On September 27, my Aide, Major Hurt, received a telephone message for me from General North, who was present with the Secretary of War as his advisor, the day he testified before the Board, to the effect that [4409] The Secretary of War had telephoned General North from New York, instructing him to inform me that the Secretary desired that nothing concerning the Board be published or given publicity unless cleared with the Secretary in person.

That, on September 28, I received a telephone call from General Nelson, General Marshall's executive, giving me practically the same information, except that he added that the Secretary wanted the Board's report delivered to him and not be made public, nor copies delivered to anyone other than himself, without his O. K. I informed Nelson that all concerned with any phase of the Board's activities had been cautioned and recautioned a number of times as to avoidance of leaks, and as to any publicity without my express authority. Also, that I took up all matters of publicity with the Deputy Chief of Staff, General McNarney, and that all seekers of information concerning the Board or its activities were referred to him. Also, that when finished, the Board would deliver its report, with all copies, to General McNarney, in person, as he has been the Board's sole contact with the War Department and outside agencies as to publicity. General Nelson said this was O. K. and would be in conformity with the Secretary's wishes.

I then asked him whether that was understood by General McNarney. He replied it was, and that McNarney understood the Secretary's wishes.

As an additional precaution, at 9 a. m., September 29, I had all personnel connected with the Board—Members, [4410] Advisors, reporters, stenographers, administrative assistants, analyzers, compilers, and so forth, together with Colonel Hughes, W. D., authorized Judge Advocate General's Department representative—assembled, and specially cautioned them as to secrecy and avoidance of leaks, threatening them with loss of heads if culpable.

101. General GRUNERT. There is also another thing I want to read into the record, as follows:

(The memorandum referred to, relative to the testimony of Major General Howard C. Davidson, taken in the necessary absence of General Russell and Colonel Toulmin, is as follows:)

102. General GRUNERT. In reference to the testimony of Major General Howard C. Davidson, Commanding Tenth Air Force, Kanjakoha, Assam, recorded on pages 4125-4151, inclusive, Volume 36, General Russell (Member) and Colonel Toulmin (Executive) were absent on official business of the Board during the hearing of this testimony. The Board desires that they carefully peruse the transcript of this witness' testimony.

[4411] **FURTHER TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT (ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG. GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN)**

1. Colonel WEST. General Short, the witness, has already previously appeared before the Board. He will not be sworn again, but the witness is reminded he is still under oath.

2. General GRUNERT. General, by order of the Secretary of War, the Board has been furnishing you, through your counsel, a copy of the transcript of the testimony of witnesses who have appeared before it. Is the Board to understand that the purpose of this rehearing you have requested is to discuss matters gleaned by you from such transcripts, or to furnish the Board with new or additional evidence of your own?

General SHORT. With one exception, it will be to rehash the things, certain things, that have come up in reading the testimony, that I wanted to comment on.

3. General GRUNERT. Then it is my understanding that you have a statement on which you may be questioned?

General SHORT. What I would like to do would be to take up each one of these things in turn that appear in certain testimony, some remark or something of that kind, and just make my statement about it.

4. General GRUNERT. Would you rather have us exhaust that particular topic, each time, or wait until you get through?

General SHORT. I think it would be better to exhaust it each time, because I think in most cases there won't be much of anything to exhaust, it will just be corrections.

5. General GRUNERT. I see. Now, if it meets with the approval of the Board, we will have the General go ahead and give his additional testimony, by topics, and then pause to see whether the Board has any questions, at that time; and, [4412] at the end of his testimony, we can proceed to any additional examination we desire. Will that be all right with you, General Short?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I might say that there may be some of these things that have already been brought out by the Board but that we haven't yet gotten the copy of the proceedings. I think that volume 36 is the last that we have received, so some of it may have been covered that I don't know about.

6. General GRUNERT. I understand; but you go ahead, on the assumption that we have not covered it, and we will see.

General SHORT. There is just one of the things, as I have mentioned, that was new, so I would like to introduce it, first.

7. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

General SHORT. I have here an affidavit signed by Sidney C. Graves with reference to statements made by the Australian Minister. I am introducing this, with the request that the Board, if practicable, substantiate, or come to a negative conclusion, as to whether this information had been received in the War or Navy Departments. Now, I say, you may have already investigated this, but we have not had the volumes that would pertain to it. Do you wish me to read this?

8. General GRUNERT. Go ahead. Finish your first topic, then we will discuss it.

General SHORT. I will let General Green read it, if you [4413]
You do not mind.

General GREEN. It says:

(The affidavit of Sidney C. Graves, regarding alleged statement of Sir Owen Dixon, is as follows:)

To Whom It May Concern:

On December 7, 1943, I attended a dinner in Washington. Among those present were Sir Owen Dixon, then serving as Australian Minister to the United States on duty here in Washington, Senator Homer Ferguson, Mr. Frank C. Hanighen, 1737 H Street northwest, Washington, D. C., and others whom I do not remember.

After the dinner the Australian Minister stated to myself and the others mentioned above, in substance, as follows:

Shortly after the outbreak of war, in 1939, I left my judgeship to assume control of coastal shipping in Australian waters. About 72 hours before Pearl Harbor, I received a flash warning from my Naval Intelligence that a Japanese Task Force was at sea and Australia should prepare for an attack; 24 hours later this was further confirmed with a later opinion of Intelligence that the Task Force was apparently not aimed at Australian waters and perhaps was directed against some American possessions. Finally, on December 7, 1941, my Intelligence stated,

"We are saved, America is in the War, Pearl Harbor has been bombed."

The Australian Minister was questioned by one of the guests as to whether this information was available to American authority, and he stated in substance that it was if requested.

[4414] I certify that the above is a substance of the statement made by Sir Owen Dixon on the aforesaid date.

/s/ Sidney C. Graves,
/t/ SIDNEY C. GRAVES,
1147 Connecticut Ave. NW.,
Washington 6, D. C.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Washington, D. C. ss:

Sworn to before me a Notary Public this 21st day of September, 1944.

(SEAL)

/s/ EDNA W. HERBERT,
Notary Public, D. C.

General SHORT. Now, I would like to say that that information, if received by the War Department or the Navy Department, was never transmitted to me, at Honolulu; that I did not receive anything to correspond to the information given, there.

9. General FRANK. Did you receive anything to the effect that they had information that a Japanese expedition was proceeding south along the China coast?

General SHORT. We had information. That, I think, was through a Navy message.

10. General FRANK. Was it not perfectly possible for that to coincide with this?

General SHORT. It could have been; but the point I am making is that if they furnished information to our War Department, I would like to have it verified, so we would know, not be guessing, what they had, first.

11. General FRANK. If who furnished it?

General SHORT. If the Australian or if our military, [4415] naval, or consular people in Australia furnished information to our Government of this information that the Australians had received, it seems to me it is extremely important that it be verified, because it might be of such a nature that it would have been critical to me if it had been given to me.

12. General GRUNERT. For the information of the witness, the Board has already had the testimony of Mr. Graves and of Senator Ferguson,

and it expects to call Mr. Hanighen; so this matter is being gone into.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. Does that end your first topic?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

General SHORT. Now, the next thing I have is simply a mistatement in figures by Colonel Throckmorton, who was G-1. In his appearance before the Board, volume 12, page 1390, General Grunert asked:

What was your particular interest in that message? As G-1?

referring to a message given above.

Colonel Throckmorton answered:

My particular interest was the strength of the Department. Our authorized war garrison at that time, as I remember the figures now—I may be in error one way or another—was 194,000, and we had not approached those figures at that time, that strength.

The actual authorized strength at the time, in June—as late as June—of the war garrison, was 59,425, in place of 194,000. On July 22, the Adjutant General, by endorsement— [4416] and these letters are in the volume that I submitted as an exhibit—reduced the war garrison to 57,249, and then augmented it by 2,441, for Kaneohe Bay, which had never been considered in the strength of the war garrison, making the total authorized strength of 59,690; so you can see there is a very great discrepancy there, between 59,000 and 194,000.

The Board in all probability caught it, but I figured that I should call their attention to it.

15. General GRUNERT. At this particular stage, I suppose the witness, in receiving these transcripts of testimony, knew that they are all stamped "Secret"?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. And governed himself accordingly?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Now, there is one statement by Admiral Pye that I simply want to call your attention to for emphasis, in volume 9, page 1070. General Frank had just said to Admiral Pye:

Another thing I gathered was that, from your viewpoint, the Navy did not have adequate means to prevent a surprise.

To which Admiral Pye replied:

I believe that to be true, yes. In confirmation of my previous statement that I thought the attitude of the officers of the fleet was just about the same as the attitude of the War and Navy Departments, I happened to be the first person to meet Secretary Knox upon his arrival in the Hawaiian Islands, about the 10th of December, and the first thing he said to me was, "No one in Washington expected such an attack—even Kelly [4417] Turner.

Admiral Pye then explained that Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division and was the most aggressive-minded of all of them. Now, I think that is an important statement, because I have been trying to make it apparent to the Board that the actions of the War Department, as well as the messages they sent, convinced me that they did not believe in the probability of an air attack on Hawaii. Apparently, that was true throughout the Navy Department, including Secretary Knox, from his own words. He says that nobody was expecting the attack; and I just simply wanted to bring that to the attention of the Board, as a matter of emphasis, because it coincided very definitely

with the idea that I had received from the War Department, by their actions.

Those actions included constant denials of requests for increases in personnel, for money for the improvement of defenses; and things like sending out planes the night before the attack without ammunition—all kinds of things, that really were stronger in their effect than mere words. If you assume that they were acting in good faith, you have to arrive at the conclusion that they undoubtedly were not contemplating an air attack on Honolulu.

A number of questions were asked different witnesses about our not having slit trenches and things of that kind for the protection of women and children on posts, and I am not sure whether they went so far as the proposition of civilians in town; I am inclined to believe they did. I wanted to point out that I wrote a letter. We had a very complete plan. Colonel Lyman, who was an Hawaiian and probably able to get [4418] closer to the civil population than anybody we had, had drawn these plans for evacuation and had worked very close to the civil community in that, and we had drawn a plan for a concentration camp in the mountains close to Scofield for the evacuation of the Army women and children, if they were still there.

This was more or less to be camouflaged as a recreational proposition, ahead of time, and it would also have had the advantage that the families would have known exactly where they were to go to camp, and what they were to do, for we had been operating it as a recreational center for some time before the evacuation came along.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * *
Page 4418, line 9,—change "for" to "if".

/s/ Walter S. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,

Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

I wrote a letter. This plan went in with all the details on the 11th of July. However, on the 7th of June, I had written to General Marshall, personally, and explained to him what we were trying to do, and that the detailed estimates would come along; and on the 11th of July, he answered my letter. June 7 was the date of my letter, and his reply to my personal letter was on the 3rd of July, stating that the funds were needed for things that were more urgent than this evacuation camp.

I just wanted to bring that up to show that we had contemplated the necessity for evacuation, and that we had detailed plane. We tried to get the money through the OCD and the Governor; and Sam King, the Delegate, made a serious effort to get the money for this purpose. We did not succeed.

17. General RUSSELL. General Short, I missed those dates on that correspondence between you and General Marshall.

General SHORT. My personal letter to him was on the 7th of June, and his reply was on July 3. Now, the detailed [4419] esti-

mate, with the plan, the official one that went in—and you have a copy of it in the exhibit of mine—was July 11, I think. I think you will find that. I am sure you will find that in the exhibit under the question of evacuation camp. The detailed plan went in after my letter. I thought I was paving the way by writing him ahead of time and telling him what we were doing, and I hoped that way it would be a little better received when it got there.

When we failed to get the money for evacuation camps, we made detailed plans for evacuation to school buildings that were out of the probable area of bombardment, and had arrangements made for cots and blankets, for running cafeterias, and so forth; and that program was actually put into operation on the 7th of December 1941.

I come now to three things that are all tied in, because they all show a very serious need for me to have access to important communications that apparently were available in the War Department. The first of these concerns a question that was asked by Justice Roberts of Colonel Bicknell, who was the assistant G-2 in Honolulu, known as our "contact officer." He asked him about a code message, and I would like to have General Green read this question. This is out of the Roberts Report.

General GREEN. This is volume No. 3, page 318, an extract of it. The first was:

(The quotation from vol. 3, page 318, of the Roberts Commission's record, regarding a code message, is as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, what do you know about an interception of a message having certain code signal [4420] words that were to be used to signify attack on these islands?

Colonel BICKNELL. That message was turned over to the FBI encoded in a file of papers which were removed from the consulate after the police established a guard at the consulate. The story as related by them is that they smelled papers burning when they went in the consulate on the morning of the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Colonel BICKNELL. They saw smoke coming from behind a door. They asked the consul if there was a fire, and he said, "No, there is just something in there." They opened the door, which was a double door, and found a wash tub on the floor in which they were burning these documents. The room was full of smoke, and there was just one brown—this bellows type envelope that was full of papers that had not been destroyed. They removed that—I don't think the consul knew that they got it—and brought it down to the FBI, and we turned it over immediately to the Navy Intelligence, inasmuch as Commander Rochefort has the key to some of their codes. Within, I think it was less than 24 hours, Commander Rochefort had broken one of the messages in this file in the consulate, which gave the system by which various lights, star boats, and other systems—

The CHAIRMAN. That is the so-called Kita, k-i-t-a, code?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

I might explain that, from the first question, I read straight through, although those first two questions by the [4421] Chairman and the answers of Colonel Bicknell thereto are not material here.

Continuing:

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about. I refer to the fact that some ten days before December 7 it is supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishments in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any such story?

Colonel BICKNELL. I never heard of such a thing; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Never heard of it?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

General SHORT. I might say that the very fact that the president of that Board had information pertaining to such a message and thought it worth while to bring it up, to see whether we had it, indicates it must have been a message of importance. I know nothing about that message, and I think it is very important that the Board know to what Justice Roberts referred; and I think it is equally important that that be made [4422] available to me, for what it might be worth.

18. General RUSSELL. General, before we go away from that, you are making a request which, if soundly based, might be pertinent. As I have listened to General Green read that part of the record, it indicates there was a search made by Justice Roberts for the existence of a fact, but it was a fruitless search.

General SHORT. No, sir; I do not agree with you. It indicated to me that Roberts knew what it was and was trying to find out whether we did, whether we had gotten it; because there would be no purpose in Justice Roberts asking a question like that, without he had some information.

19. General RUSSELL. You were searching for the basis of Justice Roberts' question?

General SHORT. Of his question; just exactly. That is what I would like to know—what caused Justice Roberts to ask that question. When he found out that we did not know anything about it, he seemed perfectly satisfied to drop it. He did not give any information, and he never brought it up to me.

20. General RUSSELL. I thought I got your point. Your point was not clear.

21. General GRUNERT. Is it my understanding that you are requesting something of the Board, or just requesting the Board to consider these matters?

General SHORT. I am requesting that the Board obtain that message, if it is here in the War Department, so they will know what the information was that was in the hands of the War Department, that should have come to me, and did not.

22. General GRUNERT. All right. You say you had something [4423] else hooked in with that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; there are two more; than you, General.

Now, General Marshall sent me a message, the one that was received seven hours after the attack. It was sent at 12:18. Just to refresh your memory as to the importance of this message, I will ask General Green to read it.

General GREEN. This is taken from the testimony of General Short.

23. General GRUNERT. May I interject, there. When you have your counsel read anything, he must stick to the text. Inasmuch as he is not a witness, he cannot be permitted to make side remarks regarding that text.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. All I expected him to do is to read it as it is.

24. General GREEN. I understand sir, that I am here as General Shorts' counsel. I have an order to that effect, sir, and, while I do not want to contest it, or anything of the sort, I think I should be permitted a reasonable discretion in making remarks to the Board.

25. General FRANK. Then you should be sworn, if you want to appear.

General GREEN. Not as counsel; not as counsel, sir, I wouldn't think.

25. General FRANK. Then do you want to appear as a witness and as counsel, both?

General GREEN. No, I don't.

General SHORT. I will read it, if that will make any difference.

[4424] 27. General GRUNERT. I do not think there are going to be enough interjections to make any difference. Go ahead.

General GREEN. I quite agree sir.

This is volume No. 4 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, page 309:

General SHORT. Here is the message.

"(Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H., 'Marshall', is as follows:)

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today—that would be 5½ hours earlier in Honolulu—what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately STOP Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly STOP Inform naval authorities of this communication."

General SHORT. I am sure that General Marshall had some positive basis for writing that wire, that he had information that had been obtained through breaking down a code or obtaining a message of some kind, and I would like to have the Board have available exactly what was the basis for his writing that message; and I would also like that it be furnished to me, along with the other evidence, because it is perfectly apparent that he would not have written that message without he had something to cause him to write it; and that, it seems to me, would be extremely important to me in justifying my stand, in every way.

28. General GRUNERT. On that subject, I have a question, here, to clear up the testimony:

General Short, in his testimony before the Army [4425] Pearl Harbor Board, declared, in his "conclusions":

"Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear, without loss of time for encoding and decoding, and so forth, I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack."

The attack, it was brought out, occurred at 7:55. The message was filed at 6:48, a difference of 1 hour and 7 minutes. No. 1 Alert anticipated that pilots would be available within a 4-hour maximum.

Question: How much preparation to meet the attack could have been accomplished within this period of time, although the witness did testify "pursuits actually in air by 8:50, shows did not require 4 hours."

Have you any additional information?

General SHORT. It seems to me that is a complete answer. The fact that we did get planes in the air in 55 minutes indicated that we could have done it, if we had had the information; or at least we could have gotten them dispersed, which would have been of considerable impor-

tance, if that message had been put through so we would have had one hour and seven minutes, if you want to put it that way; but that is not allowing, I do not believe, time for the "uncoding," is it? You see that took some time. I think we would have had a little more than that, and I think that we could have done it just as fast as we actually did do it.

29. General GRUNERT. Then I understand that the additional [4426] time, according to your testimony, could have been used in dispersion of planes and probably getting more of them in the air.

General SHORT. We might have had some in the air already, but probably not—might have had some fighter planes; we could not have gotten bombers, in that time.

30. General GRUNERT. All right. Will you go ahead, unless there are some other questions.

General SHORT. The next thing is in the final part of Admiral Kimmel's testimony. He makes a statement that I would like to have read to the Board, and then I would like to comment on it.

31. General GRUNERT. This is Admiral Kimmel's testimony before this Board?

General SHORT. Admiral Kimmel, before this Board; yes, sir.

General GREEN. This is from volume 16, page 1811, of this Board's proceedings:

Admiral KIMMEL. I have a statement that I would like to make to the Board with regard to the information which was supplied to the two responsible commanders in Hawaii. We thoroughly considered all such information and took the action which we deemed appropriate. There was no disagreement between the Army and Navy, and none between me and my personal advisers.

Since Pearl Harbor information has come to my knowledge that vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments was not supplied to responsible officers in Hawaii; in particular, that the War and Navy [4427] Departments knew that Japan had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29 November, for the signing of an agreement, after which they would take hostile steps against the United States; that on 28 November, an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United States. This was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan. I had been advised of this recommendation and had received no qualification of that information. I had no knowledge of the delivery of the ultimatum to Japan on 26 November 1941. I am further certain that several days prior to 7 December 1941, there was information in the War Department and the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States and, very probably, that the attack would be directed against the fleet at Pearl Harbor, among other places; that there was information in the War and Navy Departments on 6 December 1941, that the hour of attack was momentarily imminent, and that early on 7 December 1941 the precise time of the attack was known. It was known at least three or probably four hours before the attack. All this information was denied to General Short and to me. I feel that we were entitled to it. I felt then that if such information was available to the War and Navy Department it would be sent to us. Had we not been denied this, many things would have been different. Had we been furnished this information as little as two or three hours before the attack, which was easily feasible and possible, much could have been done.

[4428] General SHORT. I feel that Admiral Kimmel would not have made that statement, unless he had factual data to corroborate it. I haven't had access to that data, and, from reading Admiral Kimmel's testimony, it does not appear that the Board has been furnished with it. I think it is absolutely essential that his factual data be considered by the Board, and that my counsel and I have access to what that was, because that is a tremendously important matter, to

me, just as important to me as it was to Admiral Kimmel, to know what the information was that was denied us.

Inasmuch as I was not given an opportunity before the Board to cross-examine witnesses, I had no opportunity to elicit from Admiral Kimmel the information to which he referred. I have written a letter, as of today, to the Secretary of War, asking that a search be made, that the Board be authorized to, and that my counsel be authorized, to make a search of War Department files for the information which pertained to all three of these; and that, if it is not to be found in the War Department files, that a demand be made on the Navy for the information with reference to these things. Now, I am submitting a copy of the letter that I wrote to the Secretary of War. Do you wish to have that read, General Grunert?

32. General FRANK. General, are you putting the Board in the position of working for you?

General SHORT. I am putting the Board in the position, I hope, where I feel that they should want to consider everything, that this should not be a one-sided investigation; but that here is something that is tremendously important from my point of view. I feel that they ought to be just as much [4429] interested in it as I do, in considering it; and there is nothing in the proceedings that we have had to show that they have had that available.

33. General FRANK. Have you found anything in the proceedings of this Board that has indicated to you that this Board has not tried to conduct an impartial proceeding?

General SHORT. No, I have not; but I found nothing in this Board's proceedings—now, they may have done it; the Board may have had access to everything that Admiral Kimmel has in mind, but I feel that he definitely would not have made that statement without he had data to support it.

If the Board has already considered all this, that's what I am after, as far as the Board is concerned. On the other hand, if they have considered it, and it has been off the record, these things, so I have not had access to them, then I hope my letter to the Secretary of War will cause them to be made available to me. I do not know what the Board has had, off the record. They may have had everything I am asking for.

I do not think your statement is a fair one, that I am trying to have the Board work for me. I am really just hopeful that they will get everything before the Board that is necessary for a complete understanding of the case.

34. General FRANK. That is just what they have been endeavoring to do.

General SHORT. Well, I hope they have succeeded, 100%; and as I say, some of the stuff, you may have seen it all, may have discussed it all, off the record; but I don't get what you discuss off the record, and that is one of my reasons for [4430] writing this letter to the Secretary of War, hoping that that would be made available to me; but it seems to me that I have a perfect right to know the basis for things of that kind.

35. General GRUNERT. Will you continue with your statement.

General SHORT. Now, that is all the three things covered, in that. Do you wish that letter to the Secretary read, or shall I just introduce it?

36. General RUSSELL. Let me get clear on that. General Short, that is a letter which you have written to the Secretary of War?

General SHORT. I have written to the Secretary of War.

37. General RUSSELL. You are enquiring of the Secretary of War?

General SHORT. I am doing more than enquiring; I am asking him, because I did not know whether the Board would feel that they could make that available to me, if they had it.

38. General RUSSELL. May I read that letter.

(The letter was handed to General Russell.)

39. General GRUNERT. Is there anything in that letter, that you have not mentioned in your testimony, here?

General SHORT. No, sir. Maybe the last paragraph might be a little more complete on the "why" of this, although I think I covered that, too.

40. General GRUNERT. It appears to me, and I think I speak for the Board, to be a matter between you and the War Department. If you have given in your testimony all the facts that you wish to have considered by the Board. I see no need in adding to the volume of its record by including your letter to the Secretary of War.

General SHORT. I would like to have it appear as a matter of record that I informed the Board that I had made this [4431] request.

41. General RUSSELL. I do not believe that the purport of this letter is clearly understood. I did not understand it, until I read it. I think it is a two-pronged affair. General Short wants us to call on the Secretary of War to make available to this Board the information that they have, and also, to make it available to him, or his counsel.

General SHORT. To me or my counsel.

42. General RUSSELL. That is the purpose of the letter. It is two-fold. I make this suggestion. General Short has tendered this letter for admission into the records of this Board. I do not think the Board has thought through on it; I have not, as a Member of the Board. We have not considered its implications, and I think that we should have time to consider it, before we reach a final conclusion as to whether we shall incorporate it in the record, or not.

43. General GRUNERT. All right. The Board will take a recess for five minutes. The room will be cleared.

(Brief recess.)

44. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

General, you have informed the Board that you have given to it such testimony as you desire, which is included in this letter, except simply the last paragraph. If you desire to give the Board the gist of what is in the last paragraph, they will be glad to hear it; otherwise, the Board considers this matter is one between you and the War Department.

General SHORT. I would like to make a little statement, there. I offered this to the Board, as a matter of courtesy. I feel that it would not be courteous for me to write to the [4432] Secretary and ask him to do this, and not inform the Board that I had made the request; and of course I knew that they would get the request from him, but I felt that it was a matter of courtesy to furnish the Board with a copy of it, if they desired.

45. General GRUNERT. Thank you for the courtesy. We understand it.

General SHORT. When I look at that, I believe I did cover that last paragraph. Let me look at it again. Yes; I think I did. I explained that I was asking for this largely because I had not had a chance to——

46. General GRUNERT. All right; go on with your next topic.

General SHORT. Now, the next topic that I am going to mention may be entirely unnecessary. I received volume 36 and read it just before coming in here. The last of it was General Gerow's testimony. Now, you may have had him back in for further testimony, but in the testimony that appeared in the volume that I received, it failed to bring out that, after asking or telling me to "report action taken," there was nothing in his testimony to indicate that he and his section failed to follow up and to know that I had reported action taken.

In his testimony before the Roberts Commission he admitted that he had failed to follow up and that his division had failed to follow up, and that he did not know that I had reported the action taken at that time, an alert for sabotage. Now, as I say, the Board may have brought that out in further testimony, but my knowledge of his testimony ends with volume 36. There is an indication there that he was to come before the Board later in the afternoon, but I wanted to emphasize [4433] that, because I considered it a very important thing in his testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Now, the last thing that I have. Colonel Powell, in his testimony before the Board, indicated that there was a shortage of supplies for the radar, such as vacuum tubes, and so forth, and although I had not observed in reading his testimony anything to indicate that that matter had come up before the budget committee, I have here a memorandum signed by Powell, that probably can be verified before the hearings of the budget committee; I am not sure; but I would like to present it.

47. General FRANK. Of what budget committee?

General SHORT. The War Department budget committee, in October 1941. This is a memorandum, signed by C. A. Powell, Colonel, Signal Corps, Signal Officer:

1. I learned of the following information, and thought it might be of interest to General Short:

"Supplemental estimates for funds, submitted to the Budget Advisory Committee in October, with which to procure sufficient vacuum tubes to permit operation of A. W. equipment on a basis of 24 hours daily, were reduced to permit operation only two hours daily, five days a week, with the statement that the Signal Corps was carrying air-warning plans to extremes, that the United States was not threatened with attack, and plans should include provisions for defense only. Other items covering funds to provide stocks of material for immediate use in connection with task forces, such as radio equipment of suitable type and power to maintain reliable communication between task forces and GHQ were drastically reduced with [4434] the statement that funds had been provided with which to purchase communication equipment for an army of 4,000,000 men. Explanation that TBO equipment was unsuited to communication over distances up to a thousand miles or more and that suitable equipment required from four to eight months to procure was not accepted as sufficient justification."

/s/ C. A. POWELL,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.

Sources: Lt. Col. H. S. Paddock, Signal Officer, 27th Division, Hilo, Hawaii, T. H., who appeared before the Budget Committee.

/s/ W. C. P.

Now, I haven't had an opportunity to verify that from Colonel Paddock. I am just putting it in for what it is worth.

48. General GRUNERT. Does that complete your statement?

General SHORT. Gentlemen, that is all that has come up as a result of going over the testimony that we have had, relatively hurriedly, because some of it we got yesterday afternoon, and some of it we got this morning; and there may be—I haven't had a chance to go over in detail my own testimony—there may be some clerical errors in that. I put that off, because I knew, in effect, what was in there. If I should find clerical errors in there, I would like to have the opportunity just to make a report of that.

49. General GRUNERT. The Board will be glad to receive a statement from you as to any such errors, which statement will [4435] be appended to the record of your testimony.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I would not expect to find many, because most of the testimony that I have read has been very well taken.

50. General GRUNERT. Do you desire to answer any questions that the Board may have on other subjects than those that you brought up, this afternoon?

General SHORT. I would be very glad to.

51. General GRUNERT. Has the Board any such questions? While the other Members of the Board are thinking about it, I have just a few, here, to clear up some possible discrepancies in the record, and also, or possibly more correctly, between testimony of the Roberts Commission and testimony before this Board, or some facts that may have been testified to in the Roberts Commission's hearings that were not covered by the Board, or your statement before the Board.

There is one, here, regarding newspaper allegations of drunkenness on the part of General Officers, on Saturday night, preceding the attack. Is there any basis in fact for such allegation?

General SHORT. There is absolutely no basis, I am sure. I never heard—

52. General GRUNERT. What knowledge did you you have of what the general officers of your comand were doing that night?

General SHORT. General Murray, I think, and maybe one or two others—I have kind of forgotten—I was on a party, at a dinner party, up at Scofield, that was being given as an Army relief proposition, with cabaret at the Club. I think General Murray was on that party, and I am not sure, General Wilson [4436] may have been. I think probably a great many of the general officers of the Department were there that night. I think that the Air Corps people were having some kind of party, so I would not expect the Air Corps officers to have been there; I do not know. I do not know that as far as the three Air Corps generals, Martin and Rudolph and Davidson, it just happens that no one of them ever took a drink.

53. General GRUNERT. May I broaden that question a little, to include all personnel at the party that you attended?

General SHORT. I did not see anybody with any indication of too much liquor.

54. General GRUNERT. Now, as to the reconnaissance directed by the War Department in its message of November 27. You appear to have had 39 bombers in commission. Why were only six of these capable of long-distance reconnaissance? Although all in commission

might not have been long-distance planes, could they not have been used for shorter distances, if they were not long-distance reconnaissance planes?

In view of your directive and your knowledge the Navy was not performing the long-distance reconnaissance, should you not have made such reconnaissance as your available means permitted?

General SHORT. There was nothing in the War Department message to indicate that they intended to abrogate the agreement that the Navy was responsible for long-distance reconnaissance. Any analysis would have indicated to me that the man who wrote the message was entirely unfamiliar with the fact. In spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved that plan, that provided for that, whoever wrote the message was [4437] not familiar with it, or it had slipped his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible.

55. General GRUNERT. I want to get your interpretation of that particular part of the message that referred to reconnaissance. This is the particular phrase that I am referring to:

Prior to hostile Japanese action COMMA you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

How did you interpret that particular phrase?

General SHORT. I interpreted that as an absolute lack of familiarity with the Hawaiian defense agreement between the Army and Navy, that laid down responsibility for the long-distance reconnaissance that they had. Whoever signed that, and whoever wrote it, was not as familiar as he should have been with the defense plan.

56. General GRUNERT. Let me take another phase of it. Did you interpret that to give you the authority of deciding the necessity for such reconnaissance?

General SHORT. I did not. I think if they had wanted, because the Navy had an absolute right to call on me for every plane that I had, under that agreement, there wasn't any question about it, I would have had to turn over every long-distance plane that I had to them; and I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement, they would have told me so.

57. General GRUNERT. Then you base everything on the responsibility of the Navy for long-distance reconnaissance, under your agreement?

General SHORT. Definitely; and it had been approved by [4438] the Chief of Staff and by the Chief of Naval Operations.

58. General GRUNERT. Even though you knew that such long-distance reconnaissance was not being made?

General SHORT. I knew a lot of long-distance reconnaissance was being made. Now, it was reconnaissance from a task force, but it covered a strip 600 miles wide. Now, the fact that it was basically for the protection of that task force did not mean they would shut their eyes and refuse to see something that was going to pass by the task force. It was just as truly reconnaissance as if they had gone out there by themselves.

59. General GRUNERT. Those were the only two things that I had.

Another question, on that particular phase: Did you understand by the word "reconnaissance" that that included the reconnaissance by radar as well as by other means?

General SHORT. I would have considered that it did. It is a form of reconnaissance, but I do not believe it is a generally accepted use of the word.

60. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions by the Board, or by the advisers or counselors to the Board?

61. General RUSSELL. No, I have no questions.

62. General GRUNERT. You might clear up two additional points. First, we will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Department had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department's attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about that agreement?

General SHORT. I did not, but I reported to them exactly [4439] what I was doing.

63. General GRUNERT. Then you considered your report the answer to that?

General SHORT. They called on me for a report. If they had not called on me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but they definitely told me to "report action taken," which I did; and I heard nothing further from them.

64. General GRUNERT. We have had testimony before the Board, from a member of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and apparently the emergency, or the imminency of such an emergency, was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that understanding, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance, prior to such an emergency?

General SHORT. If the emergency existed, it was their business; if it did not exist, there was no necessity.

65. General GRUNERT. Then, when do you judge the emergency came about?

General SHORT. It very definitely came about, at 7:55 on the morning of the 7th.

66. General GRUNERT. Then you did not expect any long-distance reconnaissance prior to that, as a matter of following out the plan?

General SHORT. Not necessarily. That would have been a question for the Navy. As I say, there was considerable going on, because there were two task forces out, and a carrier out.

67. General GRUNERT. Did it ever occur to you, of any [4440] necessity of a local agreement, to put parts of that plan into effect as was provided for in the plan?

General SHORT. We would have put it into effect without any hesitation, Admiral Kimmel and I, if we had believed that there was any probability of an attack.

68. General GRUNERT. Then, in your judgment, there was no emergency?

General SHORT. There was no probability of an air attack, in my judgment, at that time. I was wrong, but that was what I felt, and what Admiral Kimmel felt.

69. General GRUNERT. You are fully aware of that plan, without looking at it?

General SHORT. Yes; definitely, that is true.

70. General GRUNERT. Then any statements I made about the plan were familiar to you?

General SHORT. Yes, and I think I might say that would be true of any war plan, that it would only become operative when the conditions made it necessary. You make a plan in time of peace, to operate when it is necessary.

71. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

72. General RUSSELL. Yes. I do not think that that experience has been developed from this angle. I think it has been developed by the Navy people. Now, General Short, as I recall, the initial plan placed upon the Army the burden of reconnaissance, long-distance and in-shore, is that true?

General SHORT. I think that was true, up to '39 or '40. I think that had been changed before I got out there. I think perhaps General Herron was the one that got that changed, and then we wrote it into a definite plan, on March 21, 1941. I [4441] think it was actually operating when I got there.

73. General RUSSELL. I think there is testimony before the Board to the effect that the Navy agreed to take over the distant reconnaissance, because they had in that Patrol Wing 2 some PBYs, and the Army did not have any aerial equipment for long-distance reconnaissance, for which reason the Navy assumed it.

General SHORT. Well but we signed a definite agreement, on March 21, 1941, but I think it had been actually operating that way before I got out there; but we signed the agreement, Admiral Bloch and I, and it was sent over to Washington and approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations; so there is no question about it meeting the approval of the War Department.

74. General GRUNERT. But the nubbin of the whole thing appears to me that nobody is going to do anything until the emergency arises.

General SHORT. Until they feel that it is essential. Now, if we had made a different estimate of the situation, that an air attack was probable, undoubtedly we would have had it; they would have been calling on me for every plane, and they would have had the most complete reconnaissance they could have made.

75. General RUSSELL. Do you not think that that message of November 27, 1941, which directed you to take "such reconnaissance and other measures" as you deemed necessary, while vesting in you a discretion as to reconnaissance and defensive measures, did indicate to you a belief on the part of the War Department that reconnaissance at that time was necessary?

[4442] General SHORT. Well, it indicated to me, as I said before, that whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance, because I am sure that if the Army, the War Department, had intended to abrogate an agreement with the Navy, they would have done so in a more formal way than by telling a subordinate to go ahead and do something different.

76. General RUSSELL. Now, you had the burden of in-shore reconnaissance at that time, the close-in reconnaissance?

General SHORT. That is right.

77. General RUSSELL. And, whatever the papers had said, they had sent out to you certain radar equipment to install and operate?

General SHORT. Yes.

78. General RUSSELL. And those radars, whether they were technically reconnaissance agents or not, were actually there and they could have been employed to gather information of incoming aircraft?

General SHORT. They were operating, as you know, from 4 to 7, on my orders.

79. General RUSSELL. There is a little discrepancy in the testimony on that. I might say the testimony is diametrically opposed. As I recall your testimony, General, you said that they were operating from 4 to 7:30, at one time.

General SHORT. No—4 to 7.

80. General RUSSELL. 4 to 7, because you regarded dawn as the danger period. At another time, they were operating largely for training, because you did not expect an emergency?

General SHORT. That is true, but it was the time I thought we should train, at the hours that eventually would be [4443] the most dangerous, that they should get into the work during that period, because that to my mind was the danger period.

81. General RUSSELL. We had other evidence to the effect that the radars were operated for limited periods during the day, because of the shortage of spare parts.

General SHORT. That is true. Now, they went ahead and trained, on their own, more or less, and, you might say, by relief, because they did not have enough tubes to work 24 hours a day, and there would be a certain number of sets in operation from 7 till 11, and then a certain number, from 1 to 4, and that was up to the signal officer. I did not prescribe what they would be. I think he did prescribe just exactly what sets would work in those periods.

82. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

General SHORT. If there wasn't an emergency, then there would not be any necessity for the radar.

83. Major CLAUSEN. The question is this, General. You answered a question of General Russell's, that whoever wrote the message of November 27, calling on you to make reconnaissance, wrongly assumed that that was your responsibility.

General SHORT. That is my exact opinion.

84. Major CLAUSEN. All right. Now, you assumed it was the responsibility of the Navy, under that Joint Hawaiian Defense Plan?

General SHORT. It was not a question of assumption; it was definitely laid down.

85. Major CLAUSEN. In the Joint Hawaiian Defense Plan?

General SHORT. Yes.

86. Major CLAUSEN. Didn't that say it was not to become [4444] operative unless there was an emergency? Isn't that correct?

General SHORT. Well, that would become operative any time we thought there was an emergency.

87. Major CLAUSEN. Well, isn't that correct—in emergency?

General SHORT. In an emergency, it would become, without any question; you put it in; it would just go in automatically.

88. Major CLAUSEN. Then, did it not appear to you, sir, when you received a wire from the War Department, at Washington, calling upon you for action that was to be taken under the Joint Hawaiian Defense Plan in the event of an emergency, that there was then an emergency?

General SHORT. Then, if it were, it was the Navy's job.

89. Major CLAUSEN. What did it appear to you?

General SHORT. I am taking not only the message, I am taking all the actions of the War Department; because sometimes actions are much more important than just plain words. When they sent out planes the night before, without any ammunition, wholly incapable of defending themselves, as late as 10 o'clock the night before, that indicated to me the War Department did not believe there was an air attack, and, undoubtedly, no one. I didn't believe there was a probability of an air attack, and Kimmel didn't, or there would have been entirely different action.

90. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, but this wire contained part of a whole; the part of the whole was reconnaissance, which you said—

General SHORT. Do you think the words are as important as their actions in sending planes right into the area without any ability to fight?

[4445] 91. Major CLAUSEN. My question is whether, when you got that wire, you did not reason that it was the Navy's responsibility to conduct reconnaissance, under a war plan which was then operative.

General SHORT. I figured that if the War Department had thought—if you read the whole message, there is nothing to indicate that they thought there was an air attack imminent. I think today that if they had believed there was an air attack imminent, they would have said so. I don't see any reason why they shouldn't say so.

92. General GRUNERT. We will have no arguments. If there are other questions to be asked, and answers to be given, let it so be; but there is no use arguing, one way or another.

Are there any further questions?

Is there anything else that you think of, that you would like to state to the Board?

General SHORT. No, sir; there is nothing else.

Will the Board want me to appear before them any further, or not?

93. General GRUNERT. I do not think so. There is nothing that the Board knows of, now.

General SHORT. Will it be satisfactory if I leave town, Sunday afternoon, then?

94. General GRUNERT. Any time, from now on.

General SHORT. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[4446] 95. General GRUNERT. At this point in the Board's proceedings I think it would be well to read into the record the application of the last witness, Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, to the Adjutant General, requesting a copy of the testimony given before the Board, together with a reference to the Board of that request; the Board's first endorsement, and the Adjutant General's action thereon, on the

original request. We make it of record by copying it into the record. Is that the desire of the Board?

There is no need of my reading it. You are all familiar with it. We will have it copied into the record of the Board.

It appears here that the request made contains the first endorsement by the War Department granting that request, but, separately, there was an informal action sheet sent to the Board, and the first endorsement on that action sheet shows the Board's reaction thereto; so there appear to be two "first endorsements," both the first endorsement to the letter itself by the Adjutant General, and the first endorsement to the informal reference of the letter to the Board; so I will leave that to the Recorder to straighten that out.

96. Colonel WEST. I will get that in the record properly.

(The request by Major General Walter C. Short for a copy of testimony given before the Board, together with the endorsements, action sheets, etc., in relation thereto, is as follows:)

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ROOM 1844, MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, 11 August 1944.

[4447] Subject: Request for Copy of Testimony Given Before the Board of Officers.

To: The Adjutant General of the Army.

1. On appearing this morning before the special Board of Officers holding a hearing in connection with the investigation of the facts surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, I requested to be furnished with a copy of my testimony before the Board as soon as practicable and likewise requested that I be provided with a copy of all of the testimony taken by the Board before the Board proceedings are concluded. I made these requests for the purpose of examining and reviewing the same so that if any supplementary or explanatory statements were desirable I might have the further opportunity of presenting them in order that the said Board might have the full advantage of my intimate knowledge of the facts as they existed at that time. The Chairman of the Board stated that my requests were of such a nature that they should be decided by the War Department and suggested that I make direct application concerning the same.

2. Accordingly, I request that as soon as practicable I be furnished with a copy of my testimony before the Board. I request also that immediately I be furnished a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter I be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken. I also request access to all of the exhibits from time to time. The Board appears to have three reporters for the purpose [4448] of expediting the transcribing of the testimony and I believe approval of my requests would present no administrative difficulty.

3. In order to expedite matters, I request that these copies be given to Brigadier General T. H. Green, 2056 Munitions Building, who will forward same to me wherever I happen to be.

/s/ Walter C. Short,
/t/ WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(In red pencil:) 201-Short, W. C.

(S: 21 Aug 44)
EHB/ACK/ab

WAR DEPARTMENT

SERVICES OF SUPPLY

Office of The Adjutant General

File No. AGPO-M 201 Short, Walter C.

14 August 4

(11 Aug 44) URGENT

INFORMAL ACTION SHEET

Subject: Request for Copy of Testimony Given before the Board of Officers.
From: Officers Branch AGO Rm 2446, Munitions Bldg., 78978 Phone.
To: The President, Army Pearl Harbor Board 4743 Munitions.

Col. West
(Attn)

For remark.

/s/ DANA E. SMITH,
Major A. G. D.
(for) E. H. BURGER, Col, AGD,
Chief, Officers Branch.

1 Incl.
Ltr. 11 Aug 44.

[4449]

1st Ind.

GG/dw

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
Rm 4743, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C., 15 August 1944.

To: The Adjutant General.

As to General Short's requests, the following is recommended:

a. That his request to be furnished with a copy of his testimony before the Board be granted.

b. That his request that he immediately be furnished a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, be denied.

The Board does not believe it wise to grant these requests because of the danger of publicity, the granting to one witness what is denied to others, and the possible jumping to conclusions as to the Board's report before all evidence has been received, sifted and conclusions thereon reached. However, the Board has no objection to having General Short or his advisor, General Green, at the Board's headquarters peruse and study the record of testimony taken now and when the Board returns to Washington prior to a rehearing of General Short.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL.

(over)

(reverse side)

c. That the request that General Short or his adviser, General Green, have access to all of the exhibits from time to time be granted. However, this access must be at the Board's headquarters and said exhibits must remain [4450] with the Board.

For the Board:

GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army,
President.

1 Incl.
n/c (1 cc w/d)

2270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(Stamped :) CONFIDENTIAL

AGPO-M-F 201 Short, Walter C.

(11 Aug. 44)

1st Ind.

ACK/ab/2446

WD, AGO, *Washington 25, D. C., 24 August 1944.*

Thru: Brigadier General T. H. Green, Rm. 2056, Munitions Bldg., Washington 25, D. C.

To: Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired.

The request of Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, to be furnished with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, less exhibits, and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, is approved.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. A. Ullo,

/t/ J. A. ULIO,

Major General,

The Adjutant General.

Copy for, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Rm. 4743, Munitions Bldg., Washington 25, D. C.

(Stamped and initialed :) Off. Br. /s/ ACK /t/ ACK-78978 .

(Stamped :) CONFIDENTIAL.

[4451] (Thereupon, at 4:15 p. m., the Board took up the consideration of other business, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day.)

[4452]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[4453] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM A. EARLY KING, 0314546

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Captain, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Captain KING. Yes. William A. Early King, serial number 0314546; last assignment was to Civil Affairs Training School, University of Chicago. There were orders issued because of physical condition, I believe, transferring me to the Judge Advocate General's Reserve Corps, Fort Columbus, Ohio, which station I have not reported to. I am at present a patient, though, on sick leave from Gardiner General Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, sir.

[4454] 2. General GRUNERT. Captain, in this special part of our investigation, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will propound the questions, and the Board will interject any that it sees fit.

3. Major CLAUSEN. Captain King, you just met me a few minutes before the Board assembled, this morning, and indicated to me certain facts. Let me ask you this; if you were ever assigned to the Hawaiian Islands, and, if so, during what period, sir?

Captain KING. I was assigned to the Hawaiian Islands, on orders from the Adjutant General; arrived there about the 28th or 29th of April.

4. General FRANK. What year?

Captain KING. Of 1942, sir. Assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Department, station, Fort Shafter, and entered on duty there, about May 12, 1942, sir.

5. Major CLAUSEN. During the course of your service, there, Captain, did you have occasion to render an opinion concerning the affairs of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Captain KING. Not only Colonel Wyman, Colonel Lyman. It was a legal question, sir, both of them, sir.

6. Major CLAUSEN. And your recommendation of charges against Colonel Theodore V considered?

Captain KING. I don't know whether [4455] or Wyman. I prefer, sir, to let sir, speak for itself.

7. Major CLAUSEN. The subject of your c was it, of the district engineer, concerning

Captain KING. District engineer or departmentified it at that time, sir.

8. Major CLAUSEN. Well, if you will, refer I am going to refer to these, later.

Captain KING. Yes, sir.

9. Major CLAUSEN. Just in brief, did you there had been serious derelictions of the di property accountability was concerned?

Captain KING. Yes, sir.

10. Major CLAUSEN. And did that condition with directives exist for some time prior to

Captain KING. From the facts given to me the papers, it was my opinion it did. I based response which I was shown by the Ins investigations which he had made, and the ac to take, prior to December 7, 1941.

11. Major CLAUSEN. When you rendered t some trouble arise in connection with yourse.

Captain KING. Well, frankly, sir, I was not put my finger on any exact evidence, but a few days after the opinion was given the I asked for a transfer.

12. Major CLAUSEN. The Inspector General [4456] sir?

Captain KING. The Inspector was Colonel

13. Major CLAUSEN. And did you also sp of the Inspector General's Department conce

Captain KING. Yes, sir. I spoke mostly, Millard Pierson, sir.

14. Major CLAUSEN. Was this matter tho Colonel Pierson?

Captain KING. Yes, sir.

15. Major CLAUSEN. On various occasions

Captain KING. Yes, sir.

16. Major CLAUSEN. I show you, Captain, a nel Jones, a document consisting of five pa document consisting of two pages, which is which two documents you handed me just l morning. I have not had an opportunity of r so would you indicate to me just what those

Captain KING. Yes, sir. The paper of firandum for Colonel Jones," was the copy of

Jones, given in response to a question from the Inspector General, and supporting my conclusions. A copy of that was later given to the Inspector General, and I believe it is in his files in the Hawaiian Department or Central Pacific Area, whichever it is, now. It was the old Hawaiian Department, at that time, sir.

17. Major CLAUSEN. Does the Board desire the witness to read that document? It may be informative.

18. General GRUNERT. I would like to know what is in it.

[4457] 19. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

Would you read that, please, Captain.

Captain KING (reading):

(The memorandum by Captain King, for Colonel Jones, is as follows:)

Memo. for Col. Jones:

Re accountability of District and Department Engineer in connection with cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts:

I. FACTS:

1. The District Engineer, prior to February 28, 1942, the importance of which date will be mentioned later, under the Chief of Engineers had charge of river and harbor work and construction work, and was not under the control of the Hawaiian Department, but reported to the Division Engineer and was controlled by him under the direction of the Chief of Engineers.

2. As early as November 18, 1941, drafts were prepared by the Inspector General's Department of criticism of the District Engineer's office, in reference to maintenance of property accounts. Those inspections and these criticisms were directed at conditions then existing or found approximately ten days previous to the date of the Inspector General's written report, so that it may be seen at the outset the vice existed prior to December 7, 1941. These drafts are attached to this memorandum and marked "1".

Sir, I do not have any of those exhibits with this opinion, sir. They are all in the Inspector General's Department.

3. On December 13, 1941 and on December 30, 1941, [4458] there was issued by the Finance Department two letters dealing with the subject of property accountability. Letter of December 13, 1941 mentions Par. 522 of FM 100-10. Notwithstanding the fact that formal accountability requirements are modified in certain respects, there is nothing in the Field Manual which dispenses with formal accountability for construction activities, nor is there anything in regulations or the circular letter dispensing with formal accounting activities in reference to construction. Also, attention is directed to paragraph 522, Field Manual 100-10, which is set out in letter of December 13, 1941, that commanders are charged in theatres of operations, where formal accounting is dispensed with, with "insuring" that there is no misuse of supplies or equipment. It is my opinion that even though formal proper accountability was dispensed with at this point, such directive did not apply to the district engineer, who then exercised construction functions, and he should not have dispensed with formal accountability.

These letters of December 30th and 13th are in the file of the Inspector General. They are called to your attention and marked "2".

It is, therefore, my opinion that the telegram of January 3, 1942, of Colonel Wyman, then District Engineer, was improper.

The policy of the Chief of Engineers is mentioned in letter of January 5, 1942, in theatres of operation, marked "3".

4. Under date of February 17, 1942, there was [4459] issued Circular letter No. 1222, which had for its subject matter the accounting of property in connection with military construction activities under the Chief of Engineers. Copy of that letter is attached to this memorandum and marked "4". This letter describes the method of accounting of construction activities. Paragraph 1 excludes from the accounting "excluding repair and maintenance or other work under the jurisdiction of the Corps Area Commanders." It must be taken to mean that the "other work" under the jurisdiction of the Corps Area Commanders is rather in the nature of maintenance or repair work and the accounting procedure for major construction jobs must follow the directive of a letter. It is

significant that a number of pages of this letter deal with setting up guards so that contractors will not misuse government equipment and charged for it. Assuming, without conceding, that the phrase "other work jurisdiction of Corps Area Commanders" means all construction contracts, merely minor jobs in the nature of maintenance or extension work, the direction of this letter must be followed because the jurisdiction of the construction was not under the supervision of the Department Commander on February 1942, but under the supervision of the District Engineer.

5. Under date of February 28, 1942, the Department Commander, Emmons, did take jurisdiction of all construction activities and all work by the District Engineer except that dealing with river and harbor functions up until this date at least the District Engineer had to be governed by Letter [4460] No. 1222. Copy of letter of February 28, 1942, attached to this memorandum and marked "5". Your attention is directed to paragraph of this letter, concerning turnover of supplies and equipment. Your attention is also directed to paragraph "j", so far as reports, records and documents are concerned, directing that they be continued to be kept in accordance with the regulations of the District Engineer and submitted to the Chief of Engineers. This letter was issued by order of the Secretary of War. Assuming, without conceding, that accountability for property and supplies could have been dispensed with and had been dispensed with previously, it would have been required in order to comply with the directive of the Secretary of War so that construction projects were concerned.

6. An inspection was made about March 4, 1942, and report made about March 14, 1942, copy of which report is annexed hereto and marked "6", wherein the matter of property control was given stress. As a result of such inspection the directive of the Commanding General who initiated the buck sheet, directing that the property accounting system be reestablished. Copy of buck sheet with several Emmons' initials, and I have seen the original, is attached and marked "7". Copy of directive issued by the Adjutant is with accompanying papers marked "8". It is significant that this letter is dated April 26, 1942. If this letter is by 1st Indorsement, 18 days wherein Col. Lyman says it isn't done, and says doing it constitutes a hardship, and says in effect, I won't do it until after the war to obey the order."

[4461] II. DISCUSSION: It is significant that the criticisms of the Inspector General occurred before December 7, and that no inventory was carried to protect the interests of the Government. It is true certain forms were not received, but the findings of the Inspector General are to the effect that even though the forms were not received, some proper inventory should have been kept.

When the facts mentioned above occurred, Colonel Wyman went back to the mainland and ceased to be District Engineer about March 15, 1942, at the same time the letter was written transferring control of construction functions to the Department, was in charge of construction. Colonel Lyr, on March 1, 1942—as Department Engineer, took over the construction function and a department function. He also became district engineer, supervising construction and river activities.

Colonel Lyman mentions in his various memorandums that a tally-out system is used. This is not in accordance with the regulations nor directives of the Chief of Engineers and does not protect the interests of the Government. The weakness is that a tally-out method does not legally charge the contractor responsible person for the supplies and materials given to him. It also lacks any method of accounting for what is turned in and what the contractor is relieved of. From a standpoint of legal proof, in the event of litigation between the contractor and the government, the tally-out method as a charge against the contractor would be doubtful, if any value at all, and the interest of the government would be seriously handicapped. [4462]

From the facts obtained from the Inspector, in spite of the direction of the letter of February 28, 1942, Colonel Lyman failed to take any inventory when he took over construction functions. His reply to the order of the Commanding General, April 26, 1942, after a period of 18 days, is an admission of failure to obey or even attempt to obey the order.

It is my opinion that the proposed 3rd Indorsement of the Inspector General is a mild one under the circumstances, and should be concurred in; and that consideration be given as to whether or not charges should be preferred against the officer at some later date.

20. Major CLAUSEN. Now, the other document, consisting of these two pages, is merely a confirmation of your preceding document, isn't that correct?

Captain KING. Yes, sir. This was written in the office. I think Colonel Pierson got a copy of it, either formally or informally, but I know it was written in connection with that one. That one, he got; I think he saw this; and he may actually have this one, sir, my recollection is, assuming, without conceding.

21. General FRANK. Wait a minute.

22. Major CLAUSEN. You don't have to read that, as long as it is just the same. Now, as I understand that, you gave these documents to Colonel Pierson.

Captain KING. The first document was turned over to Colonel Pierson, I am sure.

23. Major CLAUSEN. You gave it to him?

[4463] Captain KING. Colonel Jones turned it over, very likely in my presence, and I know that he had a copy of that one, sir.

24. Major CLAUSEN. Did Colonel Pierson evidence this unpopularity towards you, after you had done that?

Captain KING. No, sir. My friendship with Colonel Pierson remained very closely, and as an indication of that, I would like to call to your attention, sir, a letter written by Colonel Pierson to the now General Weir of the Judge Advocate General's Department.

25. Major CLAUSEN. The fact is, as I gathered from your memorandum, you were merely finding legally that the recommendations of General Emmons were sustainable, isn't that correct?

Captain KING. Yes, sir; that is, that he had a legal basis to issue an order.

26. Major CLAUSEN. In other words, this is what happened: General Emmons wanted property accountability invoked with regard to the district engineer's office?

Captain KING. Yes, sir.

27. Major CLAUSEN. And you said it should be done, because it is the law?

Captain KING. Yes, sir.

28. Major CLAUSEN. All right. I have nothing further, except, if the Board desires, the witness has two letters of commendation, one from Colonel Pierson, and one from General Gibson. As I understand it, after you requested a transfer, when this unpopularity occurred, you were then assigned to a division commanded by General Gibson?

Captain KING. I was assigned to the Hawaiian Service Command, and on the Island of Oahu, and General Gibson later [4464] became district commander, and I was his judge advocate for that island, and his provost judge, returning to this country because of illness.

29. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions? Colonel Toulmin?

30. Colonel TOULMIN. None, with me.

31. General GRUNERT. Do you think of anything else that you might tell the Board, which may be of value to it in coming to the conclusions on this matter?

Captain KING. Sir, the full amplification of this letter, and a lot more details than I know of, some of which I have informally discussed

as background, not specifically, on this point, or in connection with Colonel Pierson, but I think, where I know one fact, he knows sand, sir, and also in the possession of Colonel Row.

32. General GRUNERT. The Board has had both of those of witnesses, and your testimony is just piecing out, so I think considerable testimony from both of them.

Captain KING. Yes, sir.

33. General GRUNERT. Unless there is something special to think of that you wish to call the Board's attention to.

Captain KING. No, sir. The only thing was, that after this was written, I asked for a transfer from the Judge Advocate General's office in Fort Shafter, and, after some bickering back and forth, it was granted.

34. General GRUNERT. All right, sir, thank you very much indeed.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[4465] 35. General RUSSELL. I introduce in evidence a proposed letter sent by the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the War Department with the request that the War Department transmit that proposed letter or a similar letter to the Secretary of State.

(The letter sent by the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the War Department, with proposed letter to be sent to the Secretary of State dated August 23, 1944, is as follows:)

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL HDR/ngv

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Munitions Building, 23 August 1944

Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff:

Subject: Proposed letter to the Secretary of State.

1. Enclosed is a copy of a proposed letter to the Secretary of State. The contents are self-explanatory.

2. It is requested that you ask the Secretary of War to dispatch a letter to the Secretary of State embodying the substance of the proposed letter.

For the Board:

/t/ GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
President

1 Incl.

Proposed letter (in dup)

(stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(The enclosure:)

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

[4466] (Proposed letter to Secretary of State:)

The Honorable, The SECRETARY OF STATE.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Board named by the War Department to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, has called and heard the testimony of many witnesses. In the course of the examination of these witnesses, the State Department has been referred to occasionally.

When the proper agencies have been asked what efforts were made to cover Japanese activities in the Mandated Islands they have replied that such efforts were made from time to time but were unsuccessful because permission of Japan to visit the islands could not be obtained. Further, it has been inferred that the State Department had a policy which required that requests for visits of Americans to the Mandated Islands, including the islands in the islands by elements of the Navy, could only be made after permission of Japan had been obtained. Such requests under this policy were

the interested military and naval agencies through the State Department. It would be helpful to the Board if you would have your records searched and furnish the Board with a memorandum setting forth the existence of any policy or policies regulating or in any way bearing upon this subject. Similarly, it would be helpful if you would furnish to the Board what your records may disclose on applications made by the State Department during the period 1940-1941, [4467] inclusive, to the Japanese Government for permission of Americans, including

(stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(next page:) (stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL
elements of the armed forces, to visit points in the Mandated Islands.

In the messages sent to the responsible Army and Navy Commanders in Hawaii there are cautions against taking provocative action against the Japanese, alarming the public, and in one message the statement is made that in event of hostilities the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. Some of the witnesses have testified that these restrictions were placed in the message because of our National Policy over which the armed forces had no control. There is testimony to the fact that the instructions relating to the "overt act" resulted from the expressed wishes of the President of the United States.

In its full consideration of the factors responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster the Board would appreciate the State Department's views on this latter matter touching the influencing of military directives by the national policy.

Immediate consideration of the requests contained herein and an early reply is urged so that the Board may consider same in its future deliberations.

(stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

[4468] 36. General RUSSELL. I also introduce in evidence a letter from the Secretary of State, in reply to the above proposed letter, which is dated September 23, 1944.

(The letter by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, dated September 23, 1944, is as follows:)

(Stamped:) RECEIVED

WAR DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARY'S OFFICE,
1944 SEPT 25 PM 3:58.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 23, 1944.

In reply refer to FE
CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. SECRETARY: The receipt is acknowledged by the War Department's letter of August 26, 1944, in which there is requested the assistance of this Department in obtaining for the board named by the War Department to ascertain and report the facts relating to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, certain data of record and an expression of the Department's views on certain aspects of the effect of national policy upon military directives prior to the attack under reference.

With regard to the question of visits by American nationals and American vessels to the Japanese Mandated Islands as a means of obtaining information on Japanese activities there, the facts are as follows:

Japan was given under a League of Nations mandate [4469] full power to administer the Mandated Islands as an integral part of Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed in a treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands pursuant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically opened to foreign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit.

Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, provided that: "Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the mandated islands." Article IV of the

Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and Japan on February 21, 1911, contained the following

The Honorable HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

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provision: "The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties with the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in territories of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce always to the laws [4470] of the country to which they thus come."

By an exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandate Japan assured the United States that "the usual comity will be extended to the nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the harbors and ports of those islands." The term "usual comity" in its application to visitation of the nationals and vessels of other countries means the courtesy which is accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of other countries.

The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals and American vessels, just as visits in general by American nationals and private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not involve a procedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to the Japanese Government and would not therefore have come to the cognizance of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of refusal of the Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government taken diplomatic action at the instance of the American parties. A No record has been found in the Department's files of any application for permission made by the Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the years 1940-1941, the years concerning which you made inquiry. According to information made available to the Department in 1940, attached to the [4471] office of the Naval Attaché in Tokyo in August 1939 at the ticket office of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company with regard to possibilities of making a trip to the Mandated Islands, it was informed that all reservations for passages were filled for a period of several months. His subsequent efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by tactics on the part of the Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that instance.

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The policy of this Government in regard to visits to the Mandated Islands by public vessels of the United States was in accord with the general practice of international law. The law on this subject is stated in Hackworth's International Law, Volume II (1941), pages 408-409, as follows:

"The vessels of war of a foreign state, when under the command of commissioned officers of and in the service of that state, are granted immunity from the jurisdiction of another friendly state in the ports, harbors, or waters of the latter. They are organs or instrumentalities of the foreign state when on friendly missions to ports open to them in another state and are immune from the local jurisdiction of a character analogous to that of the foreign sovereign. This does not mean that a ship of war may freely visit the ports of a foreign state wholly in disregard of the wishes of that state or of regulations established by it for the entry and departure of such vessels. The practice generally observed in these respects is for a ship of war whose vessel expects to make a call, to ascertain in advance whether the state would be agreeable to the state to be visited and for the vessel to visit only after a favorable response has been received. This custom does not of course apply to a ship of war that is driven into the territory of a foreign state by reason of stress of weather or unseaworthiness."

The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports and Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this Government in requesting permission for visits by its public vessels to the ports of other countries.

No record has been found of any requests in 1940 and 1941 by the War or Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to visits to the Mandated Islands. In

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previous years the Navy Department at various times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States naval vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Mandated Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the Japanese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese [4473] Government indicated its readiness to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but not the unopened ports named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. The Navy Department, however, canceled the proposed visits to the opened ports for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this Government in 1936 and in 1937, the Japanese Government, on grounds of inconvenience, withheld its permission for United States public vessels to visit the opened ports as well as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands.

In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in actual practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports in the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination in 1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922, this Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government decided to adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribiloff Islands which the Japanese were permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Convention of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936 permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial waters of the western Aleutian Islands.

With regard to your request for an expression of [4474] the Department's views touching upon the influence of foreign policy upon military directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against any country or to cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States. At the same time, with reference to the testimony mentioned in your letter, there was nothing in this Government's foreign policy which imposed restrictions upon the taking of essential measures of national defense. As regards the statement mentioned in

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your letter that in the event of hostilities the United States desired that Japan commit the first overt act, nothing has been found in the Department's records bearing upon this point nor did this point arise in any discussion at which I was present or of which I have knowledge.

With regard to the lines along which this Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was directed in 1941, a detailed record is given in Chapter XIV of Peace and War (a publication issued by the Department in 1943), and on pages 325-386 of Volume II of Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941.

If I can be of any further assistance to you in regard to the subject of your inquiry, I shall be glad to be informed of your desire.

Sincerely yours, *

/s/ CORDELL HULL

[4475] 37. General RUSSELL. I introduce into evidence the proposed letter, prepared by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, under date of 4 September 1944, which was submitted to the War Department with a request from the Army Pearl Harbor Board that a letter similar to the proposed letter be sent to the Secretary of State.

2282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(The letter from the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the War Department, dated 4 September 1944, submitting a proposed letter to Secretary of State, is as follows:)

(Stamped:) SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 4 September 1944

Memorandum to: Deputy Chief of Staff, Pentagon Building, Washington,
Subject: Proposed Letter to the Secretary of State.

1. Developments in the investigation now being conducted by the War Department Board relating to the attack by Japanese on December 7, 1941, convinced the Board that it should call Ambassador Grew as a witness.

2. A proposed letter to be sent by the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State is inclosed.

3. The Board realizes that it would have been better had all requests of the Secretary of State been made at one time and in one letter. It is impossible, however, to anticipate all developments.

/t/ GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lt. General, USA,
President of the Board

1 Incl: Proposed ltr to Sec'y of State.

(Stamped:) SECRET

[4476] (The enclosure:)

(Stamped:) SECRET.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 4 September 1944

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Members of the Board, which has been directed by the War Department to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, have read parts of the book, "Ten Years in Japan," written by Ambassador Joseph C. Grew. The Board may desire to place certain facts forth in the book in its record. For that purpose Ambassador Grew was requested to appear as a witness by the Board after its return to Washington on or about the 23rd day of September. It would be appreciated if you will call this to Ambassador Grew's attention and make him available as a witness.

Testimony has been adduced in which it is alleged that on the 26th of November, 1941, an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United States and this was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan. This evidence is to the further effect that responsible officials in Hawaii were [4477] not advised of the delivery of the ultimatum. The Board requests that the Secretary of State inform it, either in writing or oral testimony, as to the truth or falsity of these statements about the delivery of the November 26th ultimatum.

The Secretary of State is advised that the Board has before it, and has considered, the memorandum of the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, dated November 26, 1941, and appearing on page 810 et seq. of the book, "War and Peace—United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941," recently published by the State Department.

In replying to a request made by the Roberts Commission, the Secretary of State sent a letter to that Commission, in which he discussed the information which he had given the Secretary of War and other representatives of the War Department, touching the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government, in that period covered by the letter. The original letter is in the files of the Navy Department at Washington and has been made available to this Board. It would be helpful if the Secretary of State would advise whether or not he now considers that letter a complete statement of all of the information transmitted to the War Department by the State Department during the described period.

During the year 1941 were any requests made by the State Department on the War Department or the Navy Department respecting the employment or location of our armed forces? If such request or requests were made, the Board would like to be informed of their nature.

(Stamped:) SECRET.

[4478] 38. General RUSSELL. I introduce into evidence a letter dated September 28, 1944, from the Secretary of State, in reply to the proposed letter of 4 September 1944.

(The letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War, dated September 28, 1944, is as follows:)

(Stamped:)

RECEIVED

WAR DEPARTMENT

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

1944 Sep 28 PM 12:23

In reply refer to FE
SECRET

SEPTEMBER 28, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The receipt is acknowledged of the War Department's letter of September 14, 1944, in which it is requested that there be brought to Mr. Grew's attention the fact that he may be requested to appear as a witness before the Board which has been directed by the War Department to ascertain and report the facts relating to the Japanese attack upon Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The Board also requests that the Secretary of State furnish certain specified information.

In accordance with the War Department's request, Mr. Grew has been informed that the Board may desire his presence as a witness and he has indicated that he will be prepared to place himself at the Board's disposal in this matter.

With regard to the allegation that on November 26, 1941, an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United States and that this was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and [4479] Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan, the facts are as follows:

On November 20, 1941, the Japanese representatives presented to me a proposal the text of which will be found on pages 755-756 of the Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II. and also on pages 801-802 of Peace and War. That proposal called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, suspension by the United States of freezing measures, discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and "cooperation" between the United States and Japan "with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which

The Honorable HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

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the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies." It contained a provision that Japan for her part would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of the said forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. It contained no provision for reversion by Japan to peaceful courses. While there was a provision against further extension of Japan's armed forces into southeastern [4480] Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there was no similar provision which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina—for example, China and the Soviet Union.

The Japanese spokesmen at once began pressing for an early reply. At the same time Japan's armed forces were advancing into new positions in areas adjacent to the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya and Thailand.

The serious possibilities of the situation became a matter of common discussion in high official circles both civilian and military of this Government. On November 25, at a meeting of the War Council at which the highest officers of the Army and Navy were present, I reviewed the situation and I indicated that the question of our national defense from that point on should be especially the concern of the Army and the Navy.

Although hope of reaching an acceptable solution of issues with the Japanese Government had practically vanished, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement, and in the belief that, if the tragedy of an attack by Japan should eventuate, the people of this country would wish to know what this Government had been willing to do with Japan as a basis for an agreement which might be expected effectively to preserve and foster peace in the Pacific and in the Far East, I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesmen—who were urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20—what became [4481] the last of the Government's counter-proposals.

This Government's communication of November 26 above referred to is the document mentioned in the third paragraph of the War Department's report wherein it is stated that the Board has before it and has considered the recommendation of the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington dated November 26, 1941. It will be noted

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that in that document it is stated, with reference to the Japanese proposal of November 20, that "The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in connection with the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. It will be noted also that the paragraph immediately following that passage reads as follows:

"With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple program covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during further conversations."

It will thus be seen that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultimatum. Furthermore, the document contained a restatement of principles which have long been basic in this country's foreign policy, and the practical application of those principles to the situation in the Pacific suggested in the document was along lines which had been under discussion with the Japanese representatives in the course of the informal exploratory conversations during the months preceding delivery of the document in question.

A comprehensive account of the circumstances surrounding the making of the Japanese proposal of November 20 and of the American proposal of November 26 is contained on pages 366-375 of Volume II of Foreign Relations of the United States—Japan, 1931-1941.

In the War Department's letter, also, a request is made that I state whether I consider that the letter which I sent on December 30, 1941, to Justice F. B. Chairman of the Commission to Investigate the Facts and Circumstances Connected with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, contains a complete statement of all the information transmitted to the War Department by the Department of State during the period to which my letter of December 30, 1941, relates. As stated in that letter, which was in response to a request for information in brief and summary form, during the year 1941 many conferences with the Secretary of War and at intervals conferences

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with the Chief of Staff and officers of his staff, and at those conferences I secured a full interchange of information and views relating to critical situations in the world including—of course—developments in the Pacific. [4483] My letter was intended to give a complete reply to the inquiry made by Mr. Roberts; it did not, of course, go into the substance of the considerable amount of information communicated during that period to the War Department.

As already indicated, the seriousness of the situation created by the Japanese proposal of November 20 was discussed

quent conferences with representatives of the War and Navy Departments and all important factors concerning our relations with Japan during the period in question were carefully reviewed. As stated in my letter to Justice Roberts, at meetings of the War Council on November 25 and November 28, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that, in my opinion, the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

With reference to the War Department's inquiry whether there were during the year 1941 any requests made of the War Department or of the Navy Department by the Department of State respecting the employment or location of our armed forces, I may state that I regarded the question of the disposition of our armed forces as a matter which lay within the competence of the War and Navy Departments. No record has been found of any request during the year 1941 by the Department of State relating to the location or [4484] employment of our armed forces in Pacific waters or in the Pacific area, to which regions it is assumed that the War Department's inquiry relates. If this assumption is not correct, I shall be glad upon being so informed by the War Department to have a further search made of the Department's files.

If I can further assist the Board in its investigations, I shall be glad to do so in any manner which will be most helpful.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ CORDELL HULL.

39. General RUSSELL. Upon consideration of the above documents by the Army Pearl Harbor Board; upon consideration of the further fact that General Russell, a Member of the Board, and Colonel Toulmin, the Executive Officer of the Board, conferred with the Secretary of State on the 27th day of September 1944, relative to the matters discussed in said documents, and other matters; upon further consideration of the fact that former Ambassador Grew had been called before the Board and had testified since the conference between the Secretary of State, General Russell, and Colonel Toulmin; and upon further consideration of the fact that the White Paper of the State Department had been considered by the Board, and that the book of Ambassador Grew, "Ten Years in Japan," has been introduced into evidence and is a part of the records of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, it was concluded by the Board that the investigation now being conducted by the Board, as relates to the State Department, had been concluded, and that no good reason existed for calling the [4485] Secretary of State as a witness before the Board.

(Whereupon, the Board, having concluded the hearing of the testimony of the witness, took up the consideration of other matters.)

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[4487] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 4 p. m., pursuant to recess, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF LORRY N. TINDAL, COLONEL, AIR CORPS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel TINDAL. Lorry N. Tindal; Colonel, Air Corps; station, headquarters, Ninth Air Force: APO 696.

2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, in this particular part of our investigation, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop what we hope to get from you. General Frank.

3. General FRANK. On what duty were you in December 1941?

Colonel TINDAL. I was the S-2 and assistant S-3 of the bomber command, at Hickam Field, sir.

[4488] 4. General FRANK. When had you been with the fighter command, at Wheeler Field?

Colonel TINDAL. About a month previous to that. I had the Fifteenth Fighter Group, and they decided to put in younger fighter group commanders, so they relieved the two group commanders they had and put in youngsters.

5. General FRANK. On what date were you relieved from the Fighters?

Colonel TINDAL. I don't remember that. It was about the 1st of November, I believe—October or November—I do not remember.

6. General FRANK. So you had been away from there just about a month when the attack came?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir; about a month, or six weeks, something like that.

7. General FRANK. You had had some education in the organization and operation of an interceptor command, had you not?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

8. General FRANK. Where?

Colonel TINDAL. At New York.

9. General FRANK. You went to the First Air

Colonel TINDAL. I went to the First Air Force not called the First Air Force School, then. It Defense Command School.

10. General FRANK. And when did you go to

Colonel TINDAL. In March 1941.

11. General FRANK. You know that, when the Harbor, there was in effect a No. 1 Alert, in the Ha

[4489] Colonel TINDAL. I don't exactly mean by the "No. 1 Alert," General.

12. General FRANK. The alerts were numbered No. 3, and the No. 1 Alert was the lowest type of alert against sabotage, only.

Colonel TINDAL. That is correct, sir.

13. General FRANK. When you were with the had there been these three systems of alert?

Colonel TINDAL. As well as I remember, there

14. General FRANK. When the No. 1 alert was any fighter planes that were on an alert of more hours?

Colonel TINDAL. I don't remember, General. I don't know for sure; I don't remember.

15. General FRANK. It seems that we have testified the record to the effect that, notwithstanding the Alert was called for, for the planes to be brought and "herded," so to speak, nevertheless, a certain were loaded with ammunition, and the pilots had greater readiness than four hours. Do you know that was true?

Colonel TINDAL. No, sir; I don't.

16. General FRANK. Had it been true when you were in command?

Colonel TINDAL. There was always a rule that a certain percent of the personnel would be away from the field as I remember, that is the extent of the alertness, and personnel.

17. General FRANK. Do you know what the situation was [4490] morning of December 7, with respect to fighter planes that had ammunition?

Colonel TINDAL. There were two squadrons of fighters that were doing gunnery, one, at Haleiwa, and gunnery field, at Mokuleia—not at Mokuleia—at Haleiwa were loaded.

18. General FRANK. Were the other airplanes loaded?

Colonel TINDAL. The ones at Wheeler Field, I don't know, sir. I only know that the ones at Haleiwa and Mokuleia were loaded, because it was a habit to load those airplanes at night, so that they would be constantly loaded, at night before, for the next morning's missions. In connection with the Fighter Command, but I know the habits that were in force at that time.

19. General GRUNERT. Did that apply to the Saturday night?

Colonel TINDAL. Oh, yes, sir!

20. General FRANK. Do you know what fighter action these planes in the outlying fields participated in, on the morning of December 7?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

21. General FRANK. Will you tell us.

Colonel TINDAL. The outfit, the squadron that was at Haleiwa was not attacked, except for one strafing plane, and they were not hurt, and they took off. The pilots, some of them were at Wheeler Field, some were at Haleiwa, and they took off and made such interceptions as they could, returning to Haleiwa for arms and fuel. The ones at Bellows Field were [4491] attacked, and suffered quite heavily, but they also got some planes off, and also intercepted and attacked such Japanese planes as they could.

22. General FRANK. Did you have anything to do with the organization and construction of the information center?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

23. General FRANK. What was it? Will you tell us your experience, there.

Colonel TINDAL. After I came back from the school in New York, Colonel Bergquist, who was also with me at the school, and Colonel—the signal corps man—I forget his name, now.

24. General FRANK. Powell?

Colonel TINDAL. No, no; not Powell. This Signal Corps man was subsequently sent to the Philippines, where he died.

25. General FRANK. Murphy?

Colonel TINDAL. Murphy. Murphy was also at the school. The three of us, with the help of all the other signal people we could get hold of, tried to put together, with what materials we could get our hands on by “beg, borrow, and steal,” an interception center. We first built one at Wheeler Field in the basement of the headquarters building there, and, later on, after searching around a good bit for a place to put one, we found a storage shed in the cable yard.

26. General FRANK. At Schafter?

Colonel TINDAL. At Shafter. There, we built the one that was in use until they finished the tunnel under the mountain. The one in the cable yard worked very well, as a makeshift, but it was not the best in the world, by any means.

27. General FRANK. That did operate, immediately following [4492] the attack of December 7, did it not?

Colonel TINDAL. Oh, yes, sir! That was operating before the attack on December 7, sir.

28. General FRANK. And it operated successfully for a period of time after the attack?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

29. General FRANK. Until the one in the tunnel was completed?

Colonel TINDAL. It operated until the tunnel was completed and the installation made, there.

30. General FRANK. That was about when, do you remember?

Colonel TINDAL. About five months later.

31. Major CLAUSEN. You were at the information center on the morning of 7 December 1941, sir?

Colonel TINDAL. That is where I went when the bombing started.

32. Major CLAUSEN. And could you describe the condition that you observed when you arrived at the information center? Was it in operation?

Colonel TINDAL. It was in operation, but it was in quite a turmoil. The suddenness of the attack and the shock of the attack I suppose kind of threw them off their feet.

33. Major CLAUSEN. What time did you arrive, sir?

Colonel TINDAL. I arrived at about 8:20, I imagine.

34. Major CLAUSEN. Did you assist in the work at the information center at that time?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes. That is what I went there for.

35. Major CLAUSEN. Did you observe attempts being made by the operators and the men stationed there to ascertain the direction of the planes that were returning to their carriers?

[4493] Colonel TINDAL. The men on the plotting board were working. They were carrying out their duties, I believe, to the best of their ability.

36. Major CLAUSEN. And did you observe the various plots that were being made?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes.

37. Major CLAUSEN. Were you able to ascertain the direction of the returning planes, returning to their aircraft carriers?

Colonel TINDAL. There were so many plots on the board, all at once, that it was hard to ascertain any single path, or any definite pattern of airplanes returning. However, to the southwest of the island, there were very definitely two tracks to the southwest, ending in a couple of circles, oh, about 30 to 50 miles away.

38. Major CLAUSEN. Were these stations that were then the source of the information mobile stations?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes.

39. Major CLAUSEN. And, from your experience in Hawaii and other places, could you tell the Board whether, if the permanent, higher stations had been constructed, you would have been able to have ascertained this information more accurately?

Colonel TINDAL. The mobile stations that were then operating were in the positions that they were going to put their permanent stations in, I believe; and the mobile station is exactly the same equipment that your permanent station is.

40. Major CLAUSEN. If the higher stations had been completed, do you know if the direction of these returning planes could have been ascertained more accurately?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes.

[4494] 41. Major CLAUSEN. And is it a fact they could have been obtained more quickly?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, in my opinion.

42. Major CLAUSEN. I have nothing else.

43. General RUSSELL. Who was operating this information center when you reached it on Sunday morning, Colonel?

Colonel TINDAL. The plotters around the board, who were connected by wire to the radar stations, were operating the board. There was a man on the balcony who was making a record of the plots, and those records I think have been maintained; they are in the files, somewhere.

44. General RUSSELL. The point is this, that there were people who had been trained and designated to operate this information center, is that correct?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

45. General RUSSELL. And you regard them as people who were capable of operating it that morning?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

46. General RUSSELL. About how many people were used under the plan at that time to operate the information center?

Colonel TINDAL. To operate the information center, on a regular operating basis, with the number of radar stations we had at that time, which I think was four, it would take one man for each radar station, and it would take four on the Island of Oahu.

47. General RUSSELL. Assuming that they had six stations, then they would have to have six operators?

Colonel TINDAL. They would have to have one listener and one plotter for each radar station.

[4495] 48. General RUSSELL. Well, would the listener and the plotter be the same fellow?

Colonel TINDALL. Oh, yes! Yes, sir. The operator of the radar talks continually to this man at the board, and he makes the plots as he is told, on the board, and then your fighter officer and your artillery officer and your Navy officer in the balcony above, and the bomber officer, handle their respective jobs.

49. General RUSSELL. Were they all there, that morning?

Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.

50. General RUSSELL. These people you are talking about?

Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.

51. General RUSSELL. None of those people got there, at all?

Colonel TINDAL. The fighter man was there, sir.

52. General RUSSELL. Now, you have not seen the set-up they have got in the information center out there now, have you?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes.

53. General RUSSELL. How many people have they got running these 26 stations, now, do you know, in that information center?

Colonel TINDAL. Oh, I don't know how many are in there, now.

54. General RUSSELL. Are there a hundred?

Colonel TINDAL. I don't know how many are in there, now.

55. General RUSSELL. There are a lot of folks around there?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes; there are a lot of folks.

56. General RUSSELL. Do you know why they put 26 radar stations on the island out there, at this time?

Colonel TINDAL. 26? They are a different type of radar, General. There are some long-range and some short-range.

[4496] 57. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

58. General GRUNERT. What is the procedure for the SOP as to the fighter squadrons going up to fight? Do they go up individually, in flights, or what?

Colonel TINDAL. General, it depends on what they are going up to fight. If they are going up to fight a small force, they will send a flight. They do not send a great big force to tangle with a small one, it is not necessary, and they are told they may be dispatched in flights, individually, or by squadron or group.

59. General GRUNERT. What I want to get at is, on the morning of the 7th, how did they go up? Were they organized to fight, or did they go up as individuals, to do the best they could?

Colonel TINDAL. They went up as individuals, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. And then they just went up to do the best they could under the circumstances?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. As to the information center, in plotting the flights of the planes in the air, could they tell whether the flight was enemy or friendly?

Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.

62. General GRUNERT. Then it was not a well organized, functioning information center as we know it now?

Colonel TINDAL. Well, our fighters at that time, in Hawaii, did not have the identification, friend or foe.

63. General GRUNERT. Then all they could do was plot what was in the air?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes.

64. General GRUNERT. And the ones on the balcony could not [4497] tell whether they were friend or foe?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir. The Navy people, the Navy officer, there, should know where the Navy planes are. He is in direct communication with his own headquarters, who keep him informed as to where his planes are. The bomber people are kept informed from the bomber headquarters where the bombers are.

65. General GRUNERT. But, on the morning of the 7th, there was no such organization?

Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.

66. General GRUNERT. There was no Navy representative there, no liaison officer?

Colonel TINDAL. No.

67. General GRUNERT. Was there a bomber representative?

Colonel TINDAL. No, sir. They had, as well as I remember, one officer on duty. They kept one officer on duty in the place, at all times, and that one was on duty, at the time.

68. General GRUNERT. In your opinion, was the radar station plus the information center about as well along in the organization as could be expected at that time? In other words, you were there assisting in setting it up, and was it satisfactory to you? Had they made satisfactory progress, as far as you could determine? If they didn't, do you know what caused delays, and why were they not in better shape?

Colonel TINDAL. I don't believe that the information center was functioning at its best efficiency.

69. General FRANK. When?

Colonel TINDAL. At that time.

70. General GRUNERT. Define it a little more.

[4498] Colonel TINDAL. I would say in a period of time before and after December 7—I mean before December 7, anyway; due primarily I think to the lack of knowledge, the lack of knowledge of the people; I mean all the forces concerned, in what radar could do if properly applied.

71. General GRUNERT. That was one handicap. Now, how about the "push" that was back of them in getting them started? Was there

a lack of interest, or was there a lack of realization as to the functions, or what?

Colonel TINDAL. In my opinion there was, sir.

72. General GRUNERT. There was what?

Colonel TINDAL. A lack of push, a lack of interest, and a realization of what the thing would do.

73. General GRUNERT. They didn't have the liaison officers necessary, detailed, and properly instructed?

Colonel TINDAL. On the 7th? No, sir.

74. General GRUNERT. But they could have had, had they "doped" the situation as being as serious as it turned out to be; they could have had them there and had them instructed, could they not?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

75. General GRUNERT. You have had practices, in tests and exercises, in which the center functioned fairly well?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

76. General GRUNERT. And at that time they showed an interest because of the exercise, was that the idea?

Colonel TINDAL. Well, it is sort of a "new toy," you know, General.

77. General FRANK. And the Service had to be sold on it?

[4499] Colonel TINDAL. It had to be sold; yes, sir.

78. General GRUNERT. But, had they "doped" the situation properly, that selling would not have taken long, if they thought something was imminent?

Colonel TINDAL. I don't believe if the situation had been "doped" properly, that the station would have been quite so empty as it was at that time, sir.

79. General GRUNERT. In your opinion, was it possible to get these liaison officers, to instruct them, and to be able to know of the various components in the air, so that the thing could have been made to function in case an enemy raid came in, that they could locate it at a reasonable distance and report it?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.

80. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

81. General FRANK. Had those people been present in the exercises that they held along the first part of October or November?

Colonel TINDAL. Now, which people is that, General?

82. General FRANK. These liaison people.

Colonel TINDAL. Liaison people?

83. Colonel FRANK. Yes.

Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir; they had them present at those exercises.

84. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that you think of that you might tell the Board, that would give us a better understanding, or would give us a better opportunity to come to conclusions, primarily as to the air warning service and the information center?

[4500] Colonel TINDAL. I believe that the air warning service and the information center—the air warning service was on the job. They were doing a good job. They were operating their equipment, and the time of operating this equipment, as well as I remember it, at that time, was an hour before sunrise to an hour after sunrise, the maintaining of a watch, and the equipment was operating it, as the record of the plots during that period show. I think if more interest had been put in the building up and the making of an information

center, that probably it would have gotten along a lot faster, and people would have been better trained.

85. General GRUNERT. And if they had had that interest, the training would have followed, and if they had had a 24-hour service, then you think it would have been of great value?

Colonel TINDAL. Yes; I do.

86. General GRUNERT. Are there any more questions? Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:35 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of the testimony of the witness, took up the consideration of other business.)

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[4502] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess, proceeded further with its hearing, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

1. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

I desire at this time to place in the record certain exhibits, the first of which is a letter dated 8 July 1944, containing orders of the War Department, Adjutant General's Office, convening the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

(Letter Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 8 July 1944, convening Army Pearl Harbor Board, marked Exhibit No. 65, was received in evidence.)

The next is a letter dated 11 July 1944, amending orders, from the War Department, Adjutant General's Office.

(Amending Orders, War Department A. G. O., 11 July 1944, marked Exhibit No. 66, was received in evidence.)

[4503] The next is a letter dated 22 August 1944, amending orders from the War Department, Adjutant General's Office.

(Amending orders, War Department, A. G. O., 22 August 1944 marked Exhibit No. 67, was received in evidence.)

The next is a letter dated 22 July 1944, containing supplemental orders from the War Department, Adjutant General's Office.

(Supplemental Orders, War Department, A. G. O., 22 July 1944, marked Exhibit No. 68, was received in evidence.)

The next is a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of War to the Judge Advocate General, dated 12 July 1944.

(Memorandum from Acting Secretary of War to the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944, marked Exhibit No. 69, was received in evidence.)

2. General RUSSELL. I introduce in evidence a memorandum addressed to General Grunert, President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 25 August 1944, from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the report consisting of 32 numbered pages and certain exhibits attached thereto, all of which are bound in a folder.

(Memorandum addressed to General Grunert, President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 25 August 1944, from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, marked Exhibit No. 70, was received in evidence.)

[4504] **TESTIMONY OF LT. ROBERT H. O'DELL, INFANTRY,
0397269, 5TH HEADQUARTERS, SPECIAL TROOPS, 22ND CORPS,
CAMP PICKETT, VA.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Lieutenant O'Dell, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Lt. O'DELL. Robert H. O'Dell, First Lieutenant, Infantry, 0397269; present assignment, 5th Headquarters, Special Troops, 22nd Corps, Camp Pickett, Virginia.

2. General GRUNERT. Lieutenant, General Russell has a few question to ask you to develop this subject that we have before us.

3. General RUSSELL. Lieutenant, where were you in November and December of 1941?

Lt. O'DELL. I was the Assistant Military Attache at the American Legation. I was stationed in Melbourne, Australia.

4. General RUSSELL. Under whom were you serving at that time?

Lt. O'DELL. The Military Attache was Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith.

5. General RUSSELL. Did you attend some conferences among the representatives of the British, Dutch, and American Governments?

Lt. O'DELL. I did, sir.

6. General RUSSELL. Early in December 1941 and prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. Lieutenant, will you state who attended [4505] those conferences?

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir. The conference was called by Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Burnett, Chief of Staff, Royal Australian Air Force, and was held in his office. Present were: Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, United States Military Attache; Commander Salm, the Dutch Indies naval liaison officer to the Australian Government; myself; and at times during the conference Air Commodore Hewitt, the Royal Australian Air Force intelligence officer, came and went during the time that we were there.

8. General RUSSELL. Would you state whether or not these conferences were held, Lieutenant, because of the movement of Japanese task forces southward and possibly into the China Sea?

Lt. O'DELL. That was the reason for their being called, sir.

9. General RUSSELL. Omitting the details of the conference—the discussions and conclusions and whatnot—we will come to the action taken by the American representative.

Lt. O'DELL. Colonel Merle-Smith.

10. General RUSSELL. Now, will you point out to me any written document which may be in your possession which represents the action taken?

Lt. O'DELL. Should I just look through this, sir (indicating)?

11. General RUSSELL. Yes. I lost the place. Is that the book?

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir; this is the cable in question, sir. (Indicating)

[4506] 12. General RUSSELL. Now, state whether or not this cable signed by Merle-Smith was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

Lt. O'DELL. It was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Commanding General, Philippine Department, at the same time, sir, in separate codes.

13. General RUSSELL. The date which is shown on the cable, Lieutenant, is December 6, which would be Saturday. Was that Australian December 6?

Lt. O'DELL. That is Australian time, sir.

14. General RUSSELL. That would be American and Hawaiian December 5th?

Lt. O'DELL. 5th.

15. General RUSSELL. Or Friday?

Lt. O'DELL. That is right, sir.

16. General RUSSELL. I am going to read into the record, so they can take back this book—it is just one page—paraphrase of a secret message.

(Paraphrase of secret confidential restricted message received at War Department December 7, 1941, from Melbourne, Australia, by Merle-Smith, is as follows:)

Received at War Department at 7:58 p. m. December 7, 1941.

From Melbourne. Filed December 6, 1941.

Received in I. B. 10:30 a. m. December 8, 1941. No. 24.

"1. The Netherlands Far East Command ordered execution of Plan A-2 based on their intelligence reports (without confirmation here) of naval movement [4507] on Menado and/or Ambon from Palau. They offered the suggestion that the Royal Australian Air Force likewise take reciprocal action on Laha, Ambon (Amboina?), and Keopang.

"The R. A. A. F. accordingly acquiesced to the suggestion and in addition sent task scouting planes to Northwest Passage and Buka, and dispatched a flight of Catalina aircraft to Rabaul. Reinforcements of the Australian Army were held ready for transfer to Keopang and (Amboina) should the Dutch Command so request them.

"2. The Netherlands Command at 8:00 A. M., 7 December reported planes to have reached Keopang, and that Australian air assistance was now deemed unnecessary. However, at 11:00 A. M. the Air Corps Chief decided to go forward with all aircraft as planned.

"3. This message was delayed 17 hours by (?) Government (x).

"4. Manila has been informed."

Signed "Merle-Smith

G-2 Note:

Lieutenant, maybe you had better read that note.

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir.

17. General RUSSELL. Because it does not make much sense to me.

[4508] ("G-2 Note" at bottom of preceding message is as follows:)

Menado—Celebes Island

Ambon (Amboina)—Dutch naval base in southern Molucca Islands

Keopang—Timor

Rabaul—Bismark Archipelago, north of New Guinea

Buka—Solomon Islands.

Lt. O'DELL (reading) "Menado—Celebes Island." That is its location at the top.

"Ambon (Amboina)"—Dutch naval base in south Molucca Islands.

"Keopang—" They have "Timor." It should be—it is in Dutch Timor. It is part of the Island of Timor, belongs to Portugal.

"Rabaul—Bismark Archipelago, north of New Guinea." Or it's the top of New Britain.

"Buka—Solomon Islands." But, sir, that Buka belongs to Buka Passage, which is far out and yon from the Solomons. It's at the top between New Britain and your Solomon Islands.

18. General RUSSELL. Lieutenant, in the body of the message sent to Hawaii which I have just read to you there is reference to something which occurred at 8 a. m. 7 December. That would be 8 a. m. 6 December American time; is that right?

Lt. O'DELL. To the best of my knowledge it would be, sir.

19. General RUSSELL. On the bottom of this message is a Code Section note:

[4509] ("Code Section Note" at bottom of preceding message is as follows:)

This message was addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaii, and relayed to War Department by Signals, Hawaii, with request for decipherment and repeat to them. This message also contained a request that Honolulu repeat it to War Department.

Chief of Staff WDMC—

Whatever that is—

SC WDMC will paraphrase and repeat it back to Honolulu.

You were present at these conferences, and you were there when Merle-Smith determined to send this message?

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir.

20. General RUSSELL. You were thoroughly conversant with what was going on?

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir.

21. General RUSSELL. It was the purpose of this movement of the Dutch and the British to meet this task force which was moving south from Japan?

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir, and also to prepare for possible Japanese moves that they did not have information on. I say that, sir, because it mentions Buka, which is over a thousand miles away from the scene of the action that is described in the cablegram. They took preparatory measures. They sent out reconnaissance aircraft over a net which spread from—covered all of the approaches to Australia.

22. General RUSSELL. Some question has arisen because of the fact that the Commanding General, Hawaii, as he is referred [4510] to in this message, sent it on to the War Department for deciphering. Had there been communications between the office to which you were attached in Australia and the Hawaiian Department prior to the sending of this message; and had such communications, if they had occurred, been in code?

Lt. O'DELL. We had several communications, both directions, with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in a similar code.

23. General RUSSELL. Did you use the code in transmitting the information in the message which we have just described as had been used by the Commanding General of Hawaii in sending his messages to you?

Lt. O'DELL. Yes, sir. But I think I should point out that although we used the same code the cipher tables changed monthly, and I imagine that our last message in the same code to the Hawaiian Department probably was in the latter part of November, and this is early December. There is a possibility that the cipher table was different even

though it was the same code, but it is unlikely for the reason that the cipher tables are sent out together for four months at a time. You use a different table, but all four tables are sent to the people who are to get them simultaneously.

24. General RUSSELL. The reason for introducing this testimony is that the message which was read into the record indicates that Merle-Smith, the American representative at Melbourne, Australia, as a result of certain conferences with the British and Dutch authorities at that point, along just prior to the sending of this message, which was on December 5, 1941, American time, had learned that the Dutch and British had entered into an agreement for sending certain forces north to [4511] intercept a Japanese task force which was moving south and at that time had probably reached the China Sea. The clash of these two forces would have meant war and was very imminent and could have occurred at any time. Merle-Smith, the representative of the American Government, decided not to send this message by way of Washington since some delay would have been caused in transmitting it from Washington to the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments. Hence he sent it direct to those two departments.

25. General GRUNERT. And the same time, if he sent it direct, that could have been decoded in Hawaii; is that right?

26. General RUSSELL. Yes, and it would probably have been available not later than Friday night before the attack.

27. General GRUNERT. Then the thought occurs to me, Why did they send it to Washington to decode if it could have been decoded there? That is quite an unusual procedure, isn't it?

28. General RUSSELL. Well, I will go further and say that the evidence was very clear from this witness that they sent it in a code which Short had previously used, in transmitting it to him; and he made the further explanatory remark that on the first of each month a change occurred and it may have occurred though the witness did narrate such facts which he thinks negatives the idea of the change.

29. General FRANK. You were about to make a statement. What was it?

Lt. O'DELL. Sir, that one of the reasons he sent this direct to Hawaii, aside from the urgency of the time factor, was that in mentioning Plan A-2 I don't know enough about it to say much, but it is my understanding that A-2 fell into the [4512] Rainbow Plan and that certain action was called for by the American Navy under Plan A-2; and, therefore, if the Dutch had ordered the execution of Plan A-2, some reciprocal action was required on the part of the American Navy, and that they in Pearl Harbor—that is, that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, would naturally inform the Navy of the fact, and that it would come from other sources, of course, as well, but that we wished to confirm the fact of the execution of Plan A-2, which was a mutual agreement among Britain, Holland (the Indies), America and Australia: four powers.

30. General RUSSELL. I have no further questions.

31. General GRUNERT. Is it also possible that this throws light on the newspaper article about what one Sir—what is the name? Dixon?

Lt. O'DELL. Dixon, sir.

32. General GRUNERT. About what Sir Owen Dixon is supposed to have said at a party one night? That may throw light on that.

Have you anything else that you think would assist the Board?

Lt. O'DELL. Sir, that was the reason that I came into this at all. When I read in the newspaper about Sir Owen Dixon's statement he was not the Minister here at the time. The Minister at the time was Mr. Casey. Sir Owen Dixon handled shipping in Australia. Sir Owen Dixon denied that he had made—that he had any previous knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor or that the Australian Government had that. That is so. None of us knew anything at all about Pearl Harbor. [4513] But very carefully, in my own opinion, Sir Owen Dixon did not say that the Australian Government hadn't any prior knowledge of an attack pending in the Philippines or in the Indies. The Australian Government did have information of that, but he denied that they had any on Pearl Harbor, sir.

33. General RUSSELL. Sir Owen Dixon is alleged to have made a statement, Lieutenant, since it has come into the picture, that there was a task force moving to strike possessions other than the United States and he knew that 72 hours in advance; that 24 hours later, and 48 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, he learned that this task force had been diverted by the Japanese Government and was moving toward an American possession. Can you throw any light on that?

Lt. O'DELL. That information undoubtedly is so, sir. It probably was the same convoy in the South China Sea. Neither the Dutch Intelligence nor the Australian Intelligence were able to say where this convoy was heading—to where. They said that it would get to where it was going within 60 hours, but the Dutch went on the assumption, of course, that it was headed for them rather than for an American possession. But that, I believe, would appear as the reason why.

34. General RUSSELL. Let me ask this specific question: Did anything come to your attention out there, in these last critical days, upon which Sir Owen Dixon might have based his statement that this task force had been diverted from its original course and was then steering toward an American possession?

Lt. O'DELL. No, sir; not to my knowledge, sir. And Sir Owen Dixon and the Australian Government undoubtedly had [4514] other intelligence information indicating the imminence of war, but not in regard to that particular question.

35. General GRUNERT. Is there anything in this incident that would indicate that that force that is being discussed had been diverted to come toward Hawaii?

Lt. O'DELL. It would have been impossible, sir. It would have taken at least four days, at the very minimum from past 60 hours. That is, we expected a hit somewhere in 60 hours. It would have taken another four days after 60 hours to have gotten to Pearl Harbor.

36. General FRANK. We already have before the Board information that it was known that the Japanese task force was moving south from Japan.

Lt. O'DELL. That probably was another convoy, sir.

37. General FRANK. So we knew that it could approach Guam or the Philippines.

38. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon the Board, at 12:15 p. m., proceeded to other business.)

[TOP SECRET]

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[TOP SECRET]

[2] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.—Resumed. (ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG. GEN. THOMAS NORTH)**

Colonel WEST. The witness has already been sworn. It will not be necessary to swear him again, but he is reminded that he is still under oath.

General GRUNERT. General, we appreciate your coming to the Board. The Board would like to have come to you, but it was your own choice.

General MARSHALL. Well, I thought that I could manage this morning easier than I could the other day.

[3] General GRUNERT. We shall ask General Russell to continue with your rehearing, because this is the special phase in which he has done more digging than any of the rest of us.

General RUSSELL. General, we sent a letter to you from Los Angeles, I believe, or from San Francisco, under date of August 31, outlining certain things that had come to the attention of the Board which we desired to have you discuss with us. It is my suggestion that you go ahead with such discussion as you think proper, and at the end of that discussion we can bring up any details which we would like further information on.

General MARSHALL. In other words, take the questions that you brought up, and use that as the basis for discussion?

General RUSSELL. Yes, if you think that is well.

General MARSHALL. Well, that is quite agreeable with me.

The first question to which my attention was invited by the Board was this:

"That the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29 November for the signing of an agreement, after which they would take hostile steps against the U. S."

The War Department had the information that the Japanese Government desired the negotiations to be completed by the 25th of November and that this date was postponed to the 29th of [4] November. As I stated to the members of the Board in confidence at my previous appearance, the first date of the 25th of November that came to our attention puzzled us greatly as to what its significance might be, and, as I told you then, the only thing that we could think of at the moment was, it pertained to the fact that on that day the anti-Comintern pact expired. But that was not acceptable, and there was nothing else that we could focus on.

During all this period the Japanese had been involved in actions in the China theater and towards Indo-China, which indicated to our minds very plainly that they were either about to embark on a war in the Malaysia area, at least, or were in the process of carrying out very dire infiltration operations such as they did in Manchuria and in Northern China, and during which, you remmebr, it was technically held that there was not a state of war.

However, we later received information from our secret sources, but conclusive, that the date had been extended to the 29th of November. That, in our view, wiped out any thought that the original date of the 25th of November pertained to the anti-Comintern pact. So we were left in the position of still endeavoring to reason out just why that specific date was announced.

There were numerous troop or convoy movements as well as instructions, which we obtained from our secret sources, to Japanese officials, particularly in the China region, which indicated preparations either for hostile acts or, as I said before, for bold infiltration methods in the Far East.

November 29th arrived and passed, and we entered into [5] December without anything happening other than the continuation of these movements, which we could follow fairly well, down the China coast and Indo-China and headed quite plainly towards Thailand and the Gulf of Siam.

General RUSSELL. May I ask one question before you go to 5? I believe you are going to 5 from there.

General MARSHALL. I was going to try to tie the two together.

General RUSSELL. It is accurate to say that the information which the War Department had was to the effect that the dates of November 25th and November 29th had certain significance, but the War Department did not determine just what that significance might be?

General MARSHALL. What that was. That is correct. And I repeat again that in all the past procedures of the Japanese they had taken very bold measures, on the grounds—on the assumption, I presume—that they could get away with them without the United States entering into war. Their feeling, so nearly as we could determine, was one that the United States would not participate in a war and they could

take advantage of that by doing things that otherwise would immediately provoke a state of war.

As to the British, they were in the predicament of being overextended in every direction and unable to provide adequate garrisons, particularly of air forces, for their many distant installations, such as Singapore. That being the case, it appeared to us that the Japanese quite probably were prepared—were going ahead to get in as strong a position as possible, on the assumption that the reluctance of the United States and the [63] reluctance of the British Government in its dilemma of the moment would permit them to establish themselves—that is, the Japanese—in a very strong position for whatever they did in the future, either in the way of threatening negotiations or an actual launching into a state of war; and, of course, in all of this the Burma Road was a very pertinent consideration. If you recall, it had been closed for quite a time, and then it was reopened, to the anger of the Japanese; and the movements into the Gulf of Thailand and threatening the Malay Peninsula, and all, of course, related to what might be done in the business of closing the Burma Road.

The next question that was quoted to me is this:

That early on 7 December 1941 the precise time of the attack was known. It was known three or probably four hours before the attack.

The War Department received on the morning of the 7th of December a message which had been intercepted by the Navy, directing the Nomura mission then in Washington to perform certain acts at 1 p. m., Washington time, that date.

As I stated to you the other day, in secrecy, off the record, that message became available to me in the neighborhood of—well, at about 11 o'clock or thereabouts, and the circumstances were these: I was about to leave for the War Department, having been horseback riding Sunday morning, when a message came in that they had there an important document, and used the expression "magic," which determines that sort of material, which they thought I should see at once, and they would bring it to me at Fort Meyer.

I said I was then about to leave for the War Department, [73] and I would go to the Department, which I did, in this building. There I saw General Miles, Colonel Bratton, who had charge of all these secret codes at that time, General Gerow, and I have forgotten who else might have been present.

As a matter of fact, I reached there before the assembly of these officers had been completed, and was given this lengthy document which was the reply of the Nomura mission to Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State. I read that through. Some parts of it I reread in order to get its full significance, and as I reached the last page of it I found under it this final message separate from that document, which had been, as I was told at the time, monitored, as they call it, out in the Northwest at about 6:30 that morning. Now, whether that 6:30 was Washington time or West Coast time or Greenwich time, I don't know; I wouldn't be able to check on that. You can get that from the records. But, at any event, it then appeared to me this December 7th, one o'clock Washington time—there was no doubt in the minds of those present, certainly not in my mind, that that "one o'clock" had some very definite significance. When they specified a day, that of

course had significance, but not comparable to an hour. Something was going to happen at one o'clock, it was quite evident to us. Otherwise it was a most remarkable message.

I then called Admiral Stark on the White House phone, which has a greater degree of privacy, not secrecy, than any other phone we use, and he was at his desk. I asked him if he had read the final message referring to one o'clock. He stated that he had, and I proposed that we send an immediate message to all theaters concerned. Admiral Stark hesitated, because he said [8] had alerted them all and he was afraid of confusing them further.

I hung up and then wrote out in longhand, pencil, the draft of the message reading as follows:

(Draft of message written in longhand by General Marshall on December 7, 1941, is as follows:)

The Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, today, what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly.

I finished writing this and gave it to Colonel Bratton to take immediately to the message center to be dispatched by radio to the Western Defense Command, the Panama Command, the Hawaiian Command, and the Philippine Command; but as he was leaving the room the White House phone called again, and Admiral Stark asked me if I had sent the message, and I told him it was in the process of leaving, and he said, "Please put on it the usual expression to inform the naval officer."

I therefore added in my handwriting:

Inform naval authorities of this communication.

That procedure was always followed to avoid sending two code messages about the same subject, which greatly facilitates deciphering by the cryptologist, and we would have to follow that procedure all the time, and do today, of course. I was told at the time, whether after the actual dispatch from the room of the messenger or while I was reading the lengthy Nomura [9] message, that these things had come in during the night, the one p. m. message in the early morning, and that they had been received on the naval side, and they were so overburdened with the length of the document and the necessity for speed that they had gotten the War Department similar agency to assist them in the translation of the deciphered message from Japanese to English, and that had been completed in the War Department side.

I have since been told that certain sections of the Nomura document, late that evening before (they used the expression "night"; what hour I don't know, but presumably quite late) were sent in pieces to the Secretary of State; that the final section of the message was not deciphered and translated until the following morning, that is, they didn't get through there. And I will explain some of the details in regard to that.

Now, when this mass of material was finally sifted out and put into English form, the people in that section of the War Department, of G-2—Colonel Bratton in particular—they took it and went through it. That consumed a certain period of time, to see what this thing was. And then the next thing was to get me to see it, and I have de-

scribed how that occurred. And then we came to the actual transmitting of the message to Hawaii.

That transmission followed this procedure: Colonel Bratton, who took the original pencil message to the message center, when he returned, was questioned by me as to the procedure going to be followed there, how long it would take to encipher it, how long it would take to dispatch it; and I couldn't quite understand his explanation, so I sent him back to bring me a clearer picture of the procedure, and sent with him Colonel Bundy, [10] who was the officer of War Plans Division in immediate charge of all matters pertaining to the Pacific.

When they returned they gave me a statement which in general effect, as I recall, meant that within thirty minutes from that moment it would be in the hands of the recipients. It still wasn't quite clear to me as to what these time elements were, and I sent the two of them back, Colonel Bratton for the third time, to check again; and their reply, so far as I can remember now, was satisfactory when they came back.

I learned later (as a matter of fact, I did not learn until the Roberts Commission) that, while they could raise the Philippines and Panama and the West Coast on the radio, they couldn't raise Hawaii, for some reason. They couldn't get any reaction from Hawaii. But they did have a special Western Union connection with San Francisco, and, I think, the Radio Corporation of America connection out to Hawaii. Therefore they did it on that.

I recall being told at the time that when—that there was—no, no. I am wrong. I wasn't told at the time. It developed afterwards that where they thought that that would go through with great speed, particularly because they had a teletype installed from that office in Honolulu to the Army Headquarters, it developed later that the teletype was not in operation that particular morning, at that particular hour, and therefore the message, instead of flashing through on the teletype, was sent by a boy on a bicycle, and he got caught in the bombing, in the first bombing operation.

General FRANK. Did the message get through all right to the Philippines?

[11] General MARSHALL. Yes, it went through to all the other places. I haven't got the exact times, but it went through there in time for them all to make the movements.

General FRANK. Well, was the substance of the message picked up through this "magic" intercept?

General MARSHALL. Now, "the message"? Which message are you speaking of?

General FRANK. This last message, the substance of this message that you have just been discussing.

General MARSHALL. Well, I have been discussing the message I sent out, and you are talking about the "magic" message?

General FRANK. No. I am talking about the message that you sent.

General MARSHALL. You say was that picked up?

General FRANK. Where was the substance—what I am getting at is this: the Japanese already knew about this one o'clock business.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General FRANK. Well, what was the necessity for encoding?

General MARSHALL. Because we didn't know what "one o'clock" meant.

General FRANK. Well, the Japs knew what it meant.

General MARSHALL. Yes, but we didn't.

General FRANK. Well, then, from whom were we keeping it a secret?

General MARSHALL. We still did not know what "one o'clock" meant, and we were still under the duress of not, on our part, doing something that would precipitate the whole business, in [12] addition to the fact that it could be construed as an overt act involving an immediate act of war against Japan.

Please have this in mind: Throughout this procedure, the procedure of the previous two or three months (as a matter of fact, the preceding eight months)—let us see; I have got to count on my fingers—oh, the preceding nine months, we had been endeavoring to see that there was not a rupture in the Pacific, which meant for us, if that happened, we were instantly engaged in a war on two fronts, when we were not prepared for a war on a single front, with our resources and the state of development of the Air Force, and everything of that sort. And that became even more pressing as the Japanese threats became more alarming, more evident. Every week that we gained was of immense benefit to us in our state of preparation. And, for example, at this particular period, with these convoys on the ocean, with the marine convoy coming out of Shanghai evacuating those troops, with a large number of ships taking planes, crews, supplies to General MacArthur, who had had literally nothing prior to that time, we were endeavoring in every way we could to go as long as possible without a rupture in the Pacific.

Now, in the light of what has happened—as you say, the Japanese knew what they were doing—the situation is quite clear, but we had at that time no knowledge of just what "one o'clock" meant. It might have meant one of a number of different things. At the moment our attention was focused on where we saw their moves, and those pertained to Malaysia in particular. We could not tell, in the fantastic way in which the Japanese infiltrations were being conducted, whether or not [13] they were going to try to carry out some procedure to their advantage which would leave us in the position of having to become aggressors in this matter, and all of that is involved in this business; and if you send the message in the clear, that is general advertisement of the whole business and also instantly and automatically discloses all our codes. That simple fact alone, which I have arrived at at the end of this thing while thinking out loud, would have stopped us from that, because that would have immediately closed all knowledge of that—the very thing that we are worried about right now.

Now, the coding machine is a very quick procedure. It is done on a machine as rapidly as the girl types. The whole thing was the actual transmission of a message. The gain in time if you didn't code would practically be that she would type from the pencil notes the same thing that I had written there, rather than type it in a way that it came out encoded, because that is done on a machine and is done, as I understand it—while I am not an expert; I am not familiar with the thing—

General FRANK. Was the telephone considered as a means?

General MARSHALL. No, it was not considered. or it may have been considered but it would not have been used, I am quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii first, because all our information at the moment was out at the other theater, out in the other thing. If I had thought I could put telephone calls through at those hours, which meant we had to get the fellow out of bed and do a number of things, and all the time-consuming element on the business, I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, because we had had very peculiar things there, and of [14] course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii.

And from our own experience, my own experience, even now our telephone is a long-time procedure. We have the very finest equipment now. It just literally cost thousands and thousands of dollars, and we talk to London and we talk to all of them, and it is a long-time business. You put the other thing through in a hurry. The only thing on the telephone is, you can debate back and forth, which we now find we do a little bit better by teletype than we do on the telephone. We have a secret telephone at the present time.

General GRUNERT. Did you feel assured that the message of December 7th, as sent, would get to the commanders concerned prior to the one o'clock hour at which things might happen?

General MARSHALL. I had no feeling of assurance. I mean, I did feel assurance, from what they told me, that it would arrive there before one o'clock, but we also had the feeling that it takes a long time to implement any acts; and whether there was time enough available is quite another matter, because you have to get to a great many people and it is a long procedure that you are going through with.

General GRUNERT. Did you feel, as Admiral Stark evidently felt, that the previous warning messages, and in the case of the Army the primary one appeared to be that of November 27, were sufficient warning to be on the alert without the December 7th message, just putting on such an alert against most any eventuality?

General MARSHALL. Yes and no. November 27th, in our [15] view, was a sufficient alert. The message of December 7th meant that you would put more people into the alert deployment than would be justified over a long period of time.

General GRUNERT. Here is a general question I might get in at this time: Do you consider that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was furnished with sufficient information from the War Department on which he could reasonably and intelligently base a decision as to the defensive measures that he should take to meet any probable eventuality?

General MARSHALL. I do.

General GRUNERT. Have you anything else on this particular subject?

General RUSSELL. Yes, sir; I have some questions on the message of the 7th, the way it has developed. In the beginning we thought we would just let the Chief of Staff go ahead and give us what he had, but since we are going to extract this from the record I think we had better develop this part of it fully as we go along. I have a question or two, if you haven't any.

General FRANK. Go ahead.

General RUSSELL. There were two papers on your desk when you reached your office that morning of December 7th. I have before me now the book which was prepared by the State Department, commonly referred to as the White Paper, and at page 832 of that book there is a memorandum set forth which was handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p. m. on December 7th, 1941. It closes with the language:

[16] (Extract from memorandum from Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, 2:20 p. m., December 7, 1941, is as follows:)

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Was that the paper that was on your desk that morning?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Along with this message?

General MARSHALL. Yes. That was the one that was on top of the message, you see; that was the first thing I read.

General RUSSELL. Then it had come to pass that the short message had been intercepted, to the effect that the code machines would be destroyed and an ultimatum delivered at 1 p. m. on Sunday, had been translated along with this rather long memorandum from the Japanese Government which was to be delivered to the Secretary of State; is that true?

General MARSHALL. I think there is a little confusion there in the way you stated it. As I understand it, that message came in to the Navy Department for deciphering and translation from Japanese to English on the evening of the 6th, the first part of it (and just when, the records will show; I don't know); and that the greater part of it, or at least two-thirds of it, something like that, was completed (that is, gotten into English) that night of December 6th; what hour, I don't know. And that was sent to the Secretary of State. The final part of it, its deciphering and translation was completed [17] during the night and towards morning and then was dispatched at that time.

The message giving the hour of one p. m., Washington time, and referring to the destruction of code machines in there, to which you have just referred—that came in after this, and, as I recollect, at the time—though again it is a naval record that you can get—and, as I refer to here, was monitored in the Northwest, in Puget Sound, along about six-thirty, or what time I don't know, but that is what my direct recollection of what I was told at the moment was, because I was asking why they didn't give me that first. That was my reaction when I landed on this startling thing, after going through the momentous document of the Nomura presentation, which of course is a very—

General RUSSELL. Well, that is what I was attempting to clear up for the record.

Now, in the same connection we have here a statement that we know very little about. It is from naval sources. It is a recitation of messages that were reaching the Navy Department and the War Department in late November and early December '41. Here is a statement that I believe your evidence has thrown interest on, if it hasn't entirely clarified:

(Excerpt from recitation of messages reaching Navy and War Departments in late November and early December 1941, was read as follows:)

Finally at 10:15 a. m., Washington time, December 7, '41, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented [18] to the Secretary of State at one p. m., Washington time, that date.

which apparently is a statement from a naval source that our Signal Intelligence Service—I mean the Army Signal Intelligence Service—picked up that message about that one o'clock time; and it must be that the confusion arose because of the fact that the Navy had sent all of those, including the short message, over to our people for translation, and that we did not pick it up but it was picked up by the naval people.

General MARSHALL. Well, I don't know about that. I have given your my recollection, but Colonel Bratton is here; I had him recalled from the overseas theater.

General RUSSELL. That was the next question I was going to ask

General MARSHALL. And you can bring him in, and he can talk authoritatively.

General RUSSELL. And he can develop for us the times when these messages arrived and where they arrived?

General MARSHALL. Yes. I had him recalled from one of the overseas theaters, and he is here available to you gentlemen.

General RUSSELL. Well, that answers that. I do not think I have any more questions.

General MARSHALL. I will go ahead a little bit further in this matter. I don't recall whether I was talking on the record or off the record as to the divulging of the information in these messages. Was that off the record?

General RUSSELL. Yes, sir; when you were here before——

General MARSHALL. No; I mean this morning, as I discussed [19] it here.

Major CLAUSEN. It was off the record, sir.

General MARSHALL. Off the record.

General RUSSELL. It was prior to our starting.

General MARSHALL. You say it was off the record, so I will mention that:

In preserving the secrecy of a procedure such as that referred to here of deciphering and making available to us the enemy's radio and other messages transmitted from commanders or governmental representatives, great care has to be exercised to protect the source and to continue it available for our better information. As I explained to you off the record, there were very few officers in the War Department, except those actually working on this type of information, who were aware that such a thing was going on. I cited as an example that General Arnold was not aware of this. He had the information that this situation was critical.

And I might illustrate that by explaining that I sent him to the West Coast; the exact date I don't recall, but it was just before the last—before the planes that were windbound at Hamilton Field that were due to go to the Philippines, and it was just before their departure. I felt that there was not enough energy and vigor being displayed in getting these B-17 Flying Fortresses under way. They were

to have cleared about the the first of November, but there was a delay of some weeks due to factory delays in delivery, according to the previous program on which we had based our plans. However, once they got out on the Coast there developed this other—this further, other, serious delay of several weeks due to adverse winds [20] which developed at an unexpected time of the year between San Francisco and Hawaii. But it seemed to me that they were not aggressive enough in trying to overcome the difficulties and get these planes through, which meant everything in the world to General MacArthur.

I, therefore, as I have said, sent General Arnold out to San Francisco to energize this procedure. He was aware that the situation was extremely critical. He called me up on the telephone and stated in effect, "These fellows don't realize how serious this matter is, but I think we can speed up the departure of these planes." He either told me that he had done this or I told him to do this—I don't recall now which way; nor does he—to line up these squadron commanders personally and drive them to the business of getting this thing done as quickly as possible.

Now, on their side there is this to be said. The Flying Fortress flights over to Hawaii and on to the Philippines were in their infancy. They were hazardous, and they were limited by certain factors that affected the procedure. That is, as I recall, the maximum load that the manufacturers calculated could be cleared from the ground was some 40,000 pounds, I think. General Frank will know about this.

General FRANK. Yes.

General MARSHALL. And later on they raised that by eight or ten thousand pounds. Well, that had to do, of course, with the amount of gasoline you could carry, and that bore very distinctly on the adverse winds over this twenty-four to twenty-seven hundred mile flight; and in some of the cases where they sent those planes through to the Philippines they [21] took out all of the armament in order to save weight, to make certain they could clear these great distances.

So that had its limitation on these men who were not flying out into the long spaces with the greatest, the lengthiest overwater flight at that time being considered, with the winds still most uncertain, and with the gasoline supply very distinctly limited, which probably or almost certainly had to do with the fact that when they did take off they didn't carry ammunition; they just had every gallon of gasoline they could get on the plane.

However, the point I wish to make is that General Arnold went out there at my direction, to energize this procedure, to impress them with the critical nature of it. But of course he would never have been instructed to tell them what our principal sources of information were, and he himself would not know that, because at that time he was not in the small group that knew just where all this information came from. He wasn't told the serious nature of the affair, but only those portions of it that were not involved with what we then termed as "magic."

We had our difficulties, which he has recalled to me and which I had forgotten, in getting these planes ready, because we couldn't go to the manufacturer and tell him that the Japanese were just about to declare war, because that would have been in a newspaper column in the next 24 hours, and our effort at the time was to extend our prep-

arations in every way we could by getting as many days of grace as we could in moving this first effect of quantity production, which had become available the latter part of July and particularly in August [22] and September, out to the Philippines, because, as you are probably already aware, the Philippine garrison had in effect literally nothing.

Their planes were obsolete. They had caliber .30 ammunition and 75 ammunition and a limited amount of antiaircraft ammunition, and an extremely limited number of antiaircraft guns; in fact, just a small number for Corregidor.

As an illustration of that, in looking up the records, I found—and then recalled very sharply—that Admiral Hart was pressing Admiral Stark to give him antiaircraft guns (that is, Army antiaircraft guns) to defend the anchorage at Cavite, because they had moved 29 large fleet submarines out there, to give better protection, and the minimum number was 18, I think. The only way we could get those guns was to take them from the antiaircraft regiments that we were training in this country, which virtually stopped their development because they had no guns with which to shoot; and also to take the ammunition, which was extremely limited, because we would have to give the greater allowance to the Navy because of the fact that they would be the first ones involved in a fight.

After I had procured these guns, antiaircraft guns for the Cavite anchorage, over the remonstrances of General McNair, who said we couldn't develop any antiaircraft at all if they took all our guns away in this country, the Navy then came across to get the guns for a certain number of marine expeditionary battalions to go to islands in the Pacific; and they took, as I recall, 16 of the 18 guns, or 18 of the 20. I don't know which way it was. I do know this, that it left us two to send Admiral Hart. So what we were trying to do to gain [23] time as to get this material into the Philippines.

As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had the maximum of material that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian garrison.

As to Panama: if the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and material was 100, Panama was about 25 percent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible.

We were endeavoring at this time to get into some posture of defense in Anchorage and Kodiak Island, but we were first most seriously concerned about the deficiency in Panama because that would have a determining and catastrophic effect if the canal was cut; and, second, the critical deficiencies in the Philippine garrison and its isolated position.

I might say, going back quite a bit, that I returned to Washington from one of my numerous inspection trips at that time, as we were reforming the Army, and found on my desk at eight o'clock in the morning a draft of a letter to be sent by the Secretary of War replying to a letter from the Secretary of the Navy setting out the deficiencies (the military deficiencies, meaning Army deficiencies) in the Hawaiian setup. That letter is available for the record.

General RUSSELL. It is in the record.

General MARSHALL. It is in the record.

The draft of a reply prepared by the War Plans Division in effect stated that due to the fact that we did not have available equipment to be sent to Hawaii there was no prospect of our getting the additional items, the principal addition [24] items, much before October. I canceled this draft because I felt that it put the Secretary of War in a most unfortunate position. I did not at all like the letter, because our shortages were well known, and our obligations as to Panama and particularly as to the Philippines were also well known and had been frequently discussed. However, as I have just said, this letter put the Secretary of War in a very unfortunate position, and I felt that we would have to take some extraordinary measures to do something to further meet the situation.

We proceeded to take from most of the few fighter squadrons in the United States all but three of their planes, as I recollect. These planes we were collecting were P-36s, which was shortly to become obsolescent but was the best plane that we had at that time suitable for the operation in Hawaii. The P-40, a later plane, had some defect in the engine which caused frequent failures, and I thought that it would not do to send that plane out because most of the flights were over water, and a new P-40 was due in another month or two.

I arranged with Admiral Stark by telephone to have a carrier brought into San Diego in February, and we would concentrate the planes there and send them over on that carrier, a number sufficient to carry the Hawaiian P-36s up to 50 planes; and just how many—I think they had 19 and we supplied the difference. There were other things going by the same carrier, but for the marines.

I then directed General Arnold to take up with the Curtiss people the question of expediting their production program to produce the new model P-40, so that they would be [25] available for loading without crating, on a carrier in San Diego March the 15th. That date had to be taken because that was the only time they could bring the carrier in, for other reasons with which I am not familiar now.

He went to the Curtiss plant, or had the president of the Curtiss Company come here, and they went over the situation, and he stated that they could not advance the production rate. When General Arnold told me this, I told him to go to Buffalo and see them again and bring the heaviest possible pressure on them, which he did. They in turn undertook to do this thing, had a sort of inspirational talk in the plant, and produced the necessary P-40s which had to leave there, the last of them, by March 9th—I remember these dates very well—they reached San Diego in time to be embarked on the carrier.

There were also certain other items of antiaircraft, certain items of antiaircraft materiel, other guns, which were given advance dates; and a reply on that basis was prepared by the Secretary—was prepared for the Secretary of War's signature, which is available for your record, and you may now have it; I don't know. You should have it if you haven't.

General RUSSELL. Yes, sir; we have that under file.

General MARSHALL. However, in all of this the fact must be borne in mind that Hawaii was just one place that was exposed—that's the wrong word—that was on the Japanese front, and it was by far the best prepared that we had. It had enjoyed a position of No. 1 priority up until 1936, I believe. Thereafter the turn was made to get

something to Panama, but the Philippines during this period received nothing. I remember, as I recall, some communications from the Chairman [26] of the Board when he was in command of the Philippines. I recall General Sutherland, MacArthur's present Chief of Staff, coming to the United States and pleading for more materiel for the Philippines. You commented on, Did other people know this? I think we all knew that we were poverty stricken, and it was a question of who got the little that we possessed, and the problem was: Could we develop an army if all the materiel that was taken away from us which was essential to the development of an army. And then that moves us into the European tragedy that was developing in a most ominous manner.

General RUSSELL. Now, since we have gone into the question of equipment, has the General finished his statement on that point?

General MARSHALL. I think so, yes.

General RUSSELL. Well, now, since we have gone into that, there are a couple of questions that I might ask.

Is your testimony just given to be construed as meaning that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had been furnished adequate materiel or agencies to conduct the necessary reconnaissance for his protection out there?

General MARSHALL. Yes, I think so, because at that particular time of December 1941, in contrast to the preceding year, the burden of the sea reconnaissance—I have forgotten the technical expression you use—

General RUSSELL. Distant reconnaissance.

General MARSHALL. Distant reconnaissance—was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided.

[27] General RUSSELL. But you were under the definite impression in late November and early December of 1941 that General Short had adequate reconnaissance agencies to carry out the desired reconnaissance of the island?

General MARSHALL. Yes. We had made every conceivable effort to deploy the radar out there ahead of other places. We had done everything we could to provide the means to carry out the air functions of that command, particularly as they were determined in the final agreement between General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

General RUSSELL. Did you at that time, General, think or believe that General Short had adequate weapons, ammunition, and other means for the discharge of his defensive mission in the protection of the Island of Oahu?

General MARSHALL. I did.

General RUSSELL. Very well, sir.

Now, not off the record, but we are just talking, not asking a question: As I interpret questions 3 and 4 of the letter of August 31st, they too will have to be subject to withdrawal from the record.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General RUSSELL. And if you could go to question 3, as a mere suggestion.

General MARSHALL. All right.

This statement by a witness was given me to comment on:

That he was certain that several days prior to 7 December 1941 there was information in the War Department and the Navy Department that Japan would attack the U. S., and, very probably, that the [28] attack would be directed against the fleet at Pearl Harbor, among other places.

I have already referred several times to the information that we had and to our thought regarding it. However, prior to the 7th of December, '41, the War Department had no definite information that Japan would attack the United States. The possibility of an early hostile attack by Japan was foreseen. On the 24th of November the Chief of Naval Operations, after discussing the matter with me, warned the Commanders of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, as well as the Naval Districts on the Pacific Coast, of that possibility and instructed them to inform their Army officers. I understand that the Secretary of State told the Secretary of War on the morning of the 27th of November that conversations with the Japanese had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. As a result of this conversation the War Department on the 27th of November sent a warning to the Philippines, the Hawaiian Department, the Caribbean Defense Command, and the Western Defense Command.

These messages stated that future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The War Department had no information that an attack would be taken against the fleet at Pearl Harbor. There were many evidences of possible hostile intentions in the Far East and peculiar circumstances regarding the Japanese merchant shipping to pass through the Panama Canal.

Did I ever refer to that before?

General RUSSELL. Yes, sir; not in this morning's testimony.

[29] General MARSHALL. No. The other day.

General RUSSELL. But I think it was in your previous testimony.

General MARSHALL. Prudence dictated that warnings be sent by the War Department to those officers responsible for the defense of all our areas within reach of Japanese action. As a matter of fact, the information the War Department possessed at the time pointed to a Japanese movement towards the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines.

I have been given another statement by a witness:

That there was information in the War and Navy Departments on 6 December 1941 that the order of attack was momentarily imminent.

The limiting date for the Japanese envoys to complete their negotiations was November 29. That date had passed without overt acts except the continued movement down the China and Indo-China coasts, so far as we knew. I was not aware on the late evening or night of the 6th of December that a long intercepted message was coming in and was in process of being deciphered, translated, and transmitted to the Secretary of State. The final section of the message, I am told—and I think referred to previously in this hearing—was not completed until the early morning of the 7th of December.

I will further state that I have heard recently statements regarding knowledge of a Japanese fleet movement which was given us from Australia. We had no such information in the Department, that I ever heard of, on December 7th.

General RUSSELL. General Marshall, I believe that those questions conclude the prepared questions which must be [30] considered in connection with the general category which was described.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Before we go off from that category of data, I have before me a statement from other sources of information which reached the naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department. I believe this would be a good place to call your attention to those four or five things and ask whether or not you have any recollection of having seen these messages and they are in the same category.

It is stated that on the 24th of November, 1941, the Navy learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. "We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds."

Now, do you have any recollection of the transmittal of any such information as that to your office by the Navy?

General MARSHALL. No, I haven't.

General RUSSELL. Continuing, the second message:

On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States.

Was any such information as that communicated to you by the Navy?

General MARSHALL. Not to my recollection.

General RUSSELL. The third message: "On December 1, we [31] had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia."

Now, do you recall any such information having been sent to you on December 1st from the Navy to that effect?

General MARSHALL. No.

General RUSSELL. Any such information having been sent you?

General MARSHALL. I do not.

General RUSSELL. Now, December 4th: "We received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia."

Do you remember any such information as that on December 4th?

General MARSHALL. No, I don't.

General RUSSELL. "At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time." Which would have been on the evening, at 9:00 p. m., of December 6th.

General MARSHALL. Would you read that again, please?

General RUSSELL. "At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military Intelligence [32] at this same time."

I might interpolate here, in asking that question, that that probably refers to the——

General MARSHALL. Nomura message.

General RUSSELL. The Nomura message.

General MARSHALL. Well, I told you what I did about that.

General RUSSELL. Yes, there is probably an answer on that.

And this final message:

At 10:15 a. m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) that date.

That question has been read to you previously this morning and discussed by you.

General MARSHALL. Yes. I might say in regard to that last question, it says, "the Japanese declaration of war." I don't—that is a matter for personal opinion.

General RUSSELL. Well, I think it is the construction of the author here as to what was meant by the language——

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. —of that message that was delivered to you along with the Nomura message.

General MARSHALL. I was thinking of both the Nomura message and the other one. Whether the Nomura message was a declaration of war or not was——

General RUSSELL. Now, before we go away from the Nomura [33] message I would like to read to you the final paragraph of that message of December 7th which indicates rather strongly that they were—well, it just says they were through.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General RUSSELL. They were sorry that an agreement couldn't be reached.

Do you recall now whether or not that paragraph had been translated and was in the message on Sunday morning, December 7th, when you had access to it?

General MARSHALL. I am pretty certain it was. In fact, I have assumed all the time that it was, because the message that I received that morning was the completed message, the last section of which had come in during the night. As I said before, my understanding was—though I am not the best witness on this, and I am indulging largely in hearsay—that the major portion of that message was delivered to the Secretary of State on the night before, although I don't know.

General RUSSELL. General, I am going to talk to you now, and I am going to describe a message to you that I am not too familiar with and that I can't talk too intelligently about. I just read it the minute before you came into the room, and maybe we can work something out of it together.

This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that:

On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message," and ending with [34] the positive warning that war was imminent.

Now, this is on the 4th day of December:

Admiral Wilkinson approved this message—

which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely—

and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a busy man,"

and so forth.

Now, to come to the message itself:

The "Winds Message" was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, '41, while Lieutenant (junior grade) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. Navy Reserve, was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified the message as the "Winds Message"—

General FRANK .W-i-n-d-s?

General MARSHALL. You are trying to find out what that is.

General RUSSELL. "Winds Message."

General MARSHALL. I can explain it.

[35] General RUSSELL. (Reading):

—we had been looking for. The significant part of the "Winds Message" read:—

There are a lot of Japanese words which I can't pronounce.

Now, then, after reciting the Japanese words the recitation continues:

The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: "War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia".

Now, apparently the memorandum from which I have been reading attaches considerable importance to this message which they describe as the "Winds Message." Do you know any connection that the War Department may have had with that message or whether or not it was ever transmitted to the War Department?

General MARSHALL. We were aware, as I recall, that the Japanese had instructed their people that a certain reference to—was it winds or weather?

To winds.

General GRUNERT. Winds and weather.

General MARSHALL. Winds and bad weather. —would occur in an ordinary broadcast and would be repeated in a certain number of times, and things of that sort; and that when that occurred certain things were to be done, and as I recall one of them was the destruction of their code machines. I have forgotten, or I do not recall at the moment, the particular—the other implications of that message. However, I was aware of it a few days before when I was before the Naval Board, [36] because they had the actual deciphered code, you see, which had been intercepted, which gave this information. And I might add that the interest there before the Naval Court was, when we picked up this broadcast conveying this particular information. The records of the War Department show that prior to December 7th none of our monitoring services had picked up such a Japanese broadcast.

Oh, here it is; I have the message. On the 28th of November 1941, a Japanese message was deciphered and translated which read as follows:

From Tokyo to Washington, 19 November 1941.

Regarding the broadcast—

I would like to refer there: if you look at the date you can see how long a time it took to get these things processed, the great difficulty with the means then available to do it.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications the following warnings will be added to the middle of the daily Japanese-language shortwave news broadcast:

Subparagraph 1. In case of a Japanese-U. S. relations in danger: Higashi no kaze ame (translated that means "East wind rain").

Subparagraph 2. Japanese-U. S. S. R. relations: Kita no kaze kumori (North wind cloudy).

Subparagraph 2. Japan-British relations: Nishi no kaze hare (West wind cloudy).

[37] This signal will be given in the middle and at the end, as a weather forecast, and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers and so forth. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forwarding as urgent intelligence.

In subparagraphs 2 and 3 they do not repeat the "In case," but that is implied. That finishes the message.

I am told, or I am informed, that on the 28th of November, 1941, Colonel Bratton, who was in charge of all these secret matters and who, as I stated, is available here for the Board, made arrangements for listening for Japanese broadcasts that might include this code. These arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler, then in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, who put Colonel Bratton in charge with a Mr. E. G. Sterling, then Chief of the National Defense Operations Section of the Federal Communications Commission. The F. C. C. did thereafter monitor Japanese broadcasts for the purpose of determining if the Japanese sent a message using the "Winds" code. Colonel Bratton was unable to find that a—our records do not show that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the F. C. C. or the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor.

It appears from the record that on the 5th of December, '41, Colonel Sadtler, in the office of the Chief Signal Corps Officer, was informed by Admiral Noyes, Naval Communications Officer, that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code had been intercepted the previous night and that the message decoded meant that Japanese-Great Britain relations were to be [38] broken; that on December 5, 1941, Colonel Sadtler so informed General Miles, Colonel Bratton, General Gerow, Colonel Gaily, General Gerow's executive officer, and General Bettlesmith, who was then Secretary of the General Staff, but that General Miles or Colonel Bratton never informed General Marshall personally of this Sadtler information.

The presumption, of course, is that Colonel Smith informed me.

We find in the records that Colonel Bratton prior to this time had been informed by the Navy that Commander Rochefort of the 14th Naval District knew all that our own Navy Department knew about the "Winds" code message, and that on the 5th of December he caused the following message to be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

(Message of December 5, 1941, to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, in re Japanese "Weather" broadcasts from Tokyo, is as follows:)

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant 14th Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

The record shows that General Miles and Colonel Bratton were, on the 5th of December, 1941, and had been for some time prior thereto, expecting a break in Japanese-Great Britain relations.

You remember, I commented on the fact that we didn't know their method of going down the Indo-China coast. They were trying to keep us from a war break and involve only Great Britain.

I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles [39] or Colonel Bratton that any mesasge implementing the "Winds" code had been received by the Navy.

General RUSSELL. Well, there seems to be some conflict because, as I interpret the message that you have just read, our people reached the conclusion, based on what they knew, that the only executive flash on this code that had been made indicated that there would be a break with Britain only.

General MARSHALL. That's the——

General RUSSELL. That is the sense of that message?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General RUSSELL. While the Navy people's report from which I am reading now indicated that war was to come with the United States and with Britain, but not with Russia.

General MARSHALL. Well, that is the actual mesage that I read to you.

General RUSSELL. Yes, we have it here. I think there is a little conflict between that interpretation and this interpretation, and might I inquire——

General MARSHALL. What do you mean by "interpretation"?

General RUSSELL. The Navy people say that the executive order, whenever it came in—and they alleged it came in on the 3rd of December—executing the code words which were intercepted apparently on the 28th of November, interpreted, meant that war was coming with the United States and with Britain, but not with Russia; and the message which you have just submitted to the record, as I remember it, was to the effect that trouble would come with Britain alone.

General MARSHALL. The Chief of Army Intelligence, G-2, [40] General Bissell, informs me that from the records it appears that Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps was informed by Admiral Noyes, Navy Communications Officer, that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code had been intercepted the previous night and that the message decoded meant that Japanese-Great Britain relations were to be broken.

General RUSSELL. Well, I think the materiality there is that they transmitted, according to that statement, to the War Department information that the relations with Britain would be broken, and did not report our relations with Japan; and in the document from which I am reading they stated that we would be included in the break.

Now, so far as I know, these are the questions which have been developed, the answers to which might involve, or might have involved, disclosing the source, which we do not want to disclose.

Before going away from it I want to ask this question, in an effort to connect this information with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department: You had come to the definite conclusion some time in the fall of '41 that war with Japan was inevitable?

General MARSHALL. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. General, can you recall about when you reached that conclusion?

General MARSHALL. It is awfully hard to recall these things.

General RUSSELL. It was a gradual sort of process of reasoning?

General MARSHALL. It was a gradual process. There was [41] this thought, of course, woven in all of this matter: That the Japanese would attain every conceivable advantage before an actual state of war was on, and our problem was how to handle that phase of the matter. I have referred a little while ago to the fact that they had made movements in Manchuria; they had done things in China; they had very recently, as of 1941, gotten themselves installed in Indo-China; they had made what internationally would be characterized as outrageous moves; and nobody had done anything about it, and they were acting very much on that presumption, that nobody would do anything about it. Great Britain was so heavily involved and at that time was in such dire circumstances in its war with Germany that they felt that there would be every reluctance on the part of the British to become involved in a war with Japan; therefore, they could take the greatest possible liberties in what they did.

The same, for a slightly different reason, applied to the United States, so far as public opinion was concerned, I think the Japanese were capitalizing on the belief that it would be very difficult to bring our people into a willingness to enter the war. That, incidentally, was somewhat confirmed by the governmental policy on our part of making certain that the overt act should not be attributed to the United States, because of the state of public mind at that time. Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific Fleet.

My own thoughts were, I believe, roughly of this nature: That the Japanese were going to take every conceivable advantage and finally would reach the point where they could [42] safely declare war, involve us in war, and get all the other things they were after; that they would go as far as possible before they did that, which would certainly seem to be the part of wisdom.

I also felt this, from the information that we were receiving: that they were now getting in a highly nervous state because of the arrival of supplies in the Philippines. I recall one of the "magic" messages which went to the Japanese Consul General in Manila to check up immediately on the presence of Flying Fortresses in the Philippines. We apparently had gotten them in there without their knowing it, and it was quite a long time before any evidence of their knowledge of those Fortresses being there. Just how that could be managed, I don't know. He also was reporting to them the tremendous unloading procedures being carried out at night and the movement of things at night from the docks, and everybody barred from the vicinity, which accumulated in my mind the thought that they were in a critical posture as to what they must do to prevent us from building up further in the Philippines.

Our own belief was that, once we got the planes out there, and particularly these convoys that were then on the Pacific, which had, compared to what the Philippines already had, a wealth of material that they would absolutely lack, that the Japanese would be in an extremely delicate strategical position in trying to carry out any enterprise to the south of the Philippines. That was a matter of conjecture as to the potency of a force of heavy bombers numbering nearly a hundred, [43] the largest we ever had gathered together up to that time, and their ability to range far and wide over the ocean, and their assumed ability to bomb successfully moving naval vessels.

So in my mind the question was when they would turn from offensive infiltrations to acts that would absolutely develop a state of war. Connected with my thoughts in this matter was the fact that the campaign in Russia was proceeding at a most remarkable rate. The great offensive of the German Army at that time gave the impression that Russia was about to be overwhelmed. And if you look back you will find that Hitler had announced that the capture of Moscow would occur, I think, about December 15th. And as a matter of fact I think what happened was, the Japanese became committed to all these things and the final overt acts on their part in the firm belief that the German Army was going to eliminate Russia, which of course was a very pertinent consideration from the Japanese point of view, considering the Russian force then on the Manchurian front and the great threat to Japan's security if a strong Russia was established in that vicinity. So that it was a problem, in my mind, of detecting when they would pass from this progressive infiltration to acts that absolutely provoked war.

What they were doing, which from the technical point of view is interesting and relates to this matter, was building up all of their installations. For example, when they started in their operations against the Isthmus of Kra, the Malay Peninsula, down to Singapore, they had already established in Indio-China their air bases, their bombs, their gasoline. Everything was read, and it permitted them to concentrate [44] great force and to give covering, air cover, to all their transport movements that were coming down there.

The desperate situation of the British was indicated by the loss of their two great battleships, the RENOWN and the PRINCE OF WALES, while undertaking to sink those Japanese convoys without air coverage. Air coverage was practically nonexistent, with no way of providing them. But the Japs were set up.

And as an example of what that means, we on our side, when we became involved in the development, immediately after December 7th, of air forces from Australia and Sumatra and Java, Bali, and those other islands, including Borneo—we had no ground installations at all. It was with the greatest possible difficulty that we could operate the planes, because we didn't have personnel on the ground to keep them going. The Japanese had done all that beforehand. Our losses in planes were very heavy, in particular, because we had no adequate ground installations, either in mechanics or fields or bombs or anti-aircraft guns, and we just lost all over the place on that basis. Now, the Japanese were accomplishing all that without becoming involved

in war. The problem, then, was how long they would go ahead on that basis.

General GRUNERT. May I suggest that we have a slight pause at this point.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

General RUSSELL. I think I shall change the question and ask if it is a fact that you came to the conclusion some time in the fall of 1941, and prior to November 1st, that war with Japan was inevitable.

[45] General MARSHALL. I came to that conclusion, I think, about that time, but as to when the Japanese would carry their actions to the point of actually provoking war, I was still in a state of uncertainty because of the methods they had employed in all their previous maneuvers. And I might add; and I was also uncertain as to whether or not they might not endeavor to maneuver in such a way that they would provoke the English, in the hopes that we would not participate with the British.

General RUSSELL. Now, General, when in that critical period in the fall of '41 did you reach a firm belief that war with Japan was imminent?

General MARSHALL. Was the question when?

General RUSSELL. When, in that particular period of time?

General MARSHALL. I couldn't give you an actual date. The whole period from July onward was one of terrific effort on our part to build our fences as quickly as we possibly could, and also to have the State Department do all in its power to prevent a rupture.

General RUSSELL. General, you had reached the conclusion on the 27th of November of '41 that war with Japan was imminent?

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes. I wasn't here on the 27th of November, but that would be my conclusion.

General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MARSHALL. But even then I must state that just when they would provoke an open rupture was still—

General RUSSELL. Debatable?

General MARSHALL. Still debatable. If you read these "Winds" messages, they were talking about the rupture of [46] diplomatic relations, and very remarkable things had been done under a rupture of diplomatic relations while still evading an actual act of war; and just how far they would play on the American public's reluctance to engage in a war, and the British unwillingness to further extend their slender resources, was quite a problem.

General RUSSELL. Well, do you believe that the information as to Japanese activities, conduct, movements, and so forth, which you have described rather fully this morning, which reached you from secret sources, influenced your thinking as to the inevitability and the probable imminence of war?

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Would it have been possible and feasible to have sent the substance of this secret information to the Commanding Generals of the Overseas Departments by courier or otherwise, thereby avoiding the danger of exposing the codes that you were striving so diligently to protect?

General MARSHALL. It was both practical and feasible, but I felt then that it was unwise. I would say now, considering what has happened, that the situation might well have been helped by translating

that information to them. In our own view, an alert of the character, particularly the character of the two that occurred at that time, the Naval alert and then the later Army alert, were sufficient for any Commander with a great responsibility; and in addition to that you must remember that we were pouring through Hawaii, on the way to the Philippines, convoys, rushing everybody. Everything was being pushed to the last extreme. Nobody could look at [47] that without realizing that something very critical was in the wind. Our great problem was how to do these things, energized in the way we were—the shipments, and collecting the means and getting them out, particularly to the Philippines, which passed entirely through Hawaii—without giving such notice to the Japanese that it would have an unfortunate effect in our stalling off this affair.

Undoubtedly they did obtain that view. I think they were rushed in their decision by the fact that if they didn't catch it, didn't act within a certain period of time, it would be too late: we would have gained the necessary strength to make it undesirable, to make it too dangerous for them to act. All of that was apparent to the Commanders in the place. Only the most critical necessities would have involved us in taking over all that commercial shipping, in pushing these troop movements, in pushing the cargo shipments, in taxing the Pacific Fleet's resources in providing convoys. Everything was involved there at the time, and I cannot see how—I never have quite understood how the change from a great fear, as expressed in all the previous communications, of an air assault, suddenly seemed to lapse. I don't know what the explanation of it is, and I myself have never discussed it.

I went ahead with the war, in the next two hours, and have kept at it ever since, and didn't go into this thing at all. For instance, the voluminous report like that is entirely beyond my capacity. I was busy with the war with Japan and Germany. And I have also thought it was wise that I shouldn't discuss the thing. And I have been brought into it now. In a limited way I have familiarized myself as far as the documents [48] permitted me to do, but I must say even now it is a very sketchy thing on my part.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

General RUSSELL. I have been developing this end of it, and we have had no meeting to consider final conclusions, and whatnot. In my opinion, based on the record as it now stands, and the new stuff that is coming in to us, there are several other subjects which should be submitted to General Marshall and that he should discuss with us. From the War Department standpoint I think we should discuss them, and from the Board's standpoint I think we should have them. I have prepared a few questions on them, and I have the definite feeling that the record is going to have an incompleteness about it as to those things unless we do get General Marshall's opinion on them; and if they are not discussed by him I shall be inclined to dictate into the record those things which I think should have been discussed with the Chief of Staff. I know he has to go now, but I am just wondering if he cannot come back at a later time.

General MARSHALL. I'll tell you, I am going to see the Chinese official right now, I am going to the combined Chiefs of Staff at two-thirty, and I have to get ten minutes with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on

a most critical matter before then. I have to see the Ambassador that is going to France. I am leaving.

General GRUNERT. It appears necessary, then, that we ask you for about another hour early next week.

General MARSHALL. Well, it will have to be early because confidentially I am leaving for France on Tuesday, and I have [49] to go.

When I appeared before the Board before, there were certain communications that I said I would have looked up that passed between myself and General Short prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I have had them collected, and here they are (indicating).

General GRUNERT. If there are any additional questions that we have on our urgent agenda that have not been answered, then we shall ask them Monday, complete the thing Monday.

General RUSSELL. The memorandum submitted by the Board to General Marshall on August 31, 1944, is as follows:

(Memorandum dated August 31, 1944, Army Pearl Harbor Board to General George C. Marshall, is as follows:)

31 AUGUST 1944.

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Investigation.

To: General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

1. Since your appearance before the Board it has heard much testimony and has examined many documents. As a result information, apparently material, has been brought to the attention of the Board, which it did not have when you testified. Hence the Board requests that you subject yourself to a rehearing as early as possible after the Board's return to Washington, D. C., now scheduled for Sunday, September 24, 1944.

2. The particular subjects on which the Board would like to get additional information follow:

[50] a. A witness before the Board stated that it had come to his knowledge that vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments on the following subjects was not supplied to responsible officers in Hawaii:

(1) That the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29 November for the signing of an agreement, after which they would take hostile steps against the U. S.

(2) That on the 26th of November an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the U. S.; that this was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan.

(3) That he (the witness) was certain that several days prior to 7 December 1941 there was information in the WD and the Navy Department that Japan would attack the U. S., and, very probably, that the attack would be directed against the fleet at Pearl Harbor, among other places.

(4) That there was information in the War and Navy Departments on 6 December 1941 that the order of attack was momentarily imminent.

(5) That early on 7 December 1941 the precise time of the attack was known. It was known three or probably four hours before the attack.

b. Particular reasons, if any, which prompted the selection of General Short for the command [51] of the Hawaiian Department.

a. Knowledge possessed by the Chief of Staff as to the means available to General Short for reconnaissance, and as to the effectiveness of the reconnaissance being conducted.

d. Whether the Chief of Staff knew that between 27 November and 7 December 1941 the Alert in effect in the Hawaiian Department for the Army forces provided security against sabotage only.

e. Whether there were any restrictions imposed upon the War Department relating to its activities in the Pacific by either the President or the State Department? Specifically, were the injunctions to commanders in the Pacific area to avoid commission of the first overt act, alarming the population in Hawaii, disclosing intent, etc. the result of instructions from such sources?

f. Reasons for not using the telephone to inform General Short of the information contained in the Chief of Staff's radiogram of 7 December 1941.

3. On your former hearing the Board understood that you would direct a further search of War Department records to determine whether or not there were other communications between you and General Short in 1941 than those about which you testified. The Board has not been informed as to the results of that search.

4. As to the five subjects listed in paragraph 1 *a* this letter, if in your opinion the Secretary of War has information thereon that you may not have, will [52] you please transmit those subjects to him to be added to the subjects on which the Board hopes to have him testify.

For the Board:

GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieutenant General,
President.

(Thereupon there was a brief recess.)

[TOP SECRET]

[53]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[TOP SECRET]**[54] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1944**MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board, at 10:45 a. m., pursuant to recess on Friday, September 29, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF RUFUS S. BRATTON, 03726, COLONEL OF INFANTRY,
HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT: COMMANDING OFFICER,
SPECIAL TROOPS, HEADQUARTERS, THIRD ARMY, E. T. O.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel BRATTON. Rufus S. Bratton, 03726, Colonel of Infantry, Headquarters Commandant; Commanding Officer, Special Troops, Headquarters, Third Army, E. T. O.

General GRUNERT. In the particular part of the [55] investigation that we have, concerning what you may know something about, General Russell, here, will conduct the examination for the Board, and then the Board will piece out, wherever it sees fit. General Russell.

General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Chief of the Far Eastern Section G-2, War Department.

General RUSSELL. As such, in discharge of your duties in that assignment, were all secret messages relating to the Japanese situation received by the War Department, from whatever source, made available to you?

Colonel BRATTON. General, before replying to that question, I have been cautioned by G-2 to remind the Board that my answer bears upon documents which are now classified as top secret, and the answer is yes.

General GRUNERT. For the information of the witness, your testimony today on these matters will be separately recorded and treated as top secret.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Your answer would be yes?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. That, then, definitely stated, would involve information which reached the War Department as a result of the decoding of Japanese information, data, and messages?

Colonel BRATTON. The decoding and deciphering of certain Japanese diplomatic correspondence.

General FRANK. Intercepted?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[56] General RUSSELL. Colonel, do you know what agencies during the latter part of 1941 were engaged in the interception of such messages as your last answer described?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; the S. I. S. of the Signal Corps.

General RUSSELL. Would you tell us what that is?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

General RUSSELL. Would you explain, define "S. I. S."?

Colonel BRATTON. Signal Intelligence Service.

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. The Signal Corps; and the code encipher section of naval communications.

General RUSSELL. Are those the only two agencies made available to you who intercepted Japanese information in the latter part of 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, possibly before I asked that question I should have made a preliminary statement that there is some information before the Board as to activities of the Federal Communications Commission. Do you recall any intercepted Japanese information reaching the War Department from that source?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; to the best of my knowledge and belief they were not engaged in that type of work, legitimately or otherwise.

General RUSSELL. But it is your definite recollection that no information came to you, in the capacity which you have just described, from that source?

Colonel BRATTON. Not that type of information, General. [57] Shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor it came to our knowledge that the Japanese, by means of certain code phrases which they would inject into their weather broadcasts from Tokyo, would have a certain significance. Knowing that the F. C. C. monitored all those broadcasts from a station on the West Coast, I made arrangements through Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps to have these weather broadcasts monitored by the F. C. C. station, which at that time I believe was in Portland, Oregon. I made arrangements with certain officials of the F. C. C. to call me on the telephone immediately in the event this code which I knew of was monitored or intercepted. They had my telephone number at the office and at my home. They did call me on one or two occasions repeating what appeared to be this weather code signal which I was waiting for. Examination of the

intercept, however, disclosed that it was not the code that I was looking for. That is the only direct contact that I have had with the F. C. C. or any of its officials.

General RUSSELL. About when were these two messages delivered to you by the F. C. C.?

Colonel BRATTON. During the first week in December, sir.

General RUSSELL. I want at this point, because I think it is related, to discuss with you the message which has on occasions been referred to as the "Winds" message, spelled in our record W-i-n-d-s.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And ask whether or not the information delivered to you by the F. C. C. on either of the two occasions [58] related to that "Winds" message, if you are acquainted with the "Winds" message.

Colonel BRATTON. They related to it, but they were not transmissions of the code that I was waiting for, sir.

General RUSSELL. On yesterday, Colonel, General Marshall was before the Board, and General North. There was read into the record a statement as to this message that we are discussing now, the "Winds" message. Did you prepare that statement or talk about its contents? The reason I am asking you that, I want to shorten this investigation if I can.

Colonel BRATTON. I don't think I know about the communication that you speak of.

General RUSSELL. All right. I am talking about the statement that General Marshall had relating to the "Winds" message. It evidently was prepared for him by some member of his staff.

Colonel BRATTON. It was not prepared by me, sir.

General RUSSELL. Not by you. Now, did you ever get information, from any source, relating to this, I will call it, weather intercept about which you have testified that you made some request on the F. C. C.?

Colonel BRATTON. As I have stated, sir, I got several reports from the F. C. C. about an intercept of a weather broadcast which they thought might be what I was looking for. The message that I was waiting for, that is, the one which, deciphered, would indicate a break in the relations between Japan and the United States, never reached me from any source whatever prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I had conversations on one of two occasions with Colonel Sadtler [59] of the Signal Corps, with Lieutenant Kramer of the Navy, and with Commander McCullom of the Navy, the latter being my opposite number in O. N. I., concerning messages that had been picked up, either by the Navy or by the F. C. C., containing weather broadcasts and containing phrases similar to those that we were waiting for.

On the morning of December the 5th I have a vague recollection of a meeting in General Miles's office where Colonel Sadtler was present, in which he said something to the effect that the message had come through. Questioning developed the fact, however, that the message he was talking about was one which indicated a break in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Japan. That was beside the point at that time because it was our belief that relations between Japan and Great Britain were on the point of rupture and had been for several days. The message that we were waiting for was one which would indicate a break in relations between Japan and

the United States. I never received that message from any source prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I am going to show you a discussion of this message of December 4. I think we can take it up about here (indicating) and read down to that point. Will you please read that, and after which I will ask you a question or two.

Colonel BRATTON. This message never reached me, sir, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, nor, to the best of my knowledge and belief, did it reach any other official of G-2 or the War Department.

General RUSSELL. Have you seen that message, Colonel, at [60] any time before this morning?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Did you know of its existence at any time until this morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Only by hearsay, since my return to Washington recently.

General RUSSELL. And by "recently" you would mean within—

Colonel BRATTON. Within the last two weeks, sir.

General RUSSELL. Two weeks. This is not, then, the message which the Federal Communications Commission sent to you thinking that it was the "Winds" message which you were expecting and very desirous of having?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. This is an entirely different message?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, are you familiar enough with the code words used in the message which I have just exhibited to you, and which you have just read, to state to the Board whether or not the translation and interpretation of those code words has been correctly done there?

Colonel BRATTON. As to the first phrase, "Higashi no kaze ame," that has been correctly translated.

General RUSSELL. And what was that translation?

Colonel BRATTON. War with—it meant a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. The code message that we intercepted and deciphered did not say that when this "Winds" message came through it meant war. It did say that it meant a break in diplomatic relations. Stop.

[61] I believe that the second phrase, "Nishi no kaze hare," is correctly translated: War with Britain: that is, a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain.

And I believe that the third phrase has also been correctly translated, meaning that there will be no break with Russia.

General FRANK. You were a language student in Japan, weren't you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Therefore, you are conversant with the Japanese language so that you can actually translate those phrases?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. For the purpose of the record, I will state that the message which the Colonel has just been discussing with the Board is a message which appears in the testimony of L. F. Safford, who at the time of giving the testimony was a Captain of United States Navy, this testimony being given on April 29, 1944; and the portion of the

testimony containing the "Wind" message which the Colonel has just discussed appears on page 361 of the record which is being used in questioning the witness.

Now, Colonel, going away from the "Winds" message, which we apparently have exhausted, unless you have some other suggestion to make about it.

Colonel BRATTON. I have an additional statement to make, if I may, sir.

General RUSSELL. About this particular message?

Colonel BRATTON. About this code, this "Winds" code.

[62] General RUSSELL. Very well. I think it would be well to make that here.

Colonel BRATTON. There were several codes sent out by the Japanese foreign office at about this time, to their diplomatic officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. There were several versions of this wind and weather code sent out. I discussed these codes with my opposite number in the O. N. I., Commander McCullom, on a number of occasions. Learning from him that they were monitoring the Japanese communication system in Honolulu as a function of naval communications, and learning also from him that their expert there was a Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the whole matter, I deemed it advisable, on or about the 5th of December, to have our G-2 in Honolulu contact Commander Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could explain to G-2 what it was we were waiting for, and could explain to him orally, with complete security, the significance of the message. G-2 did send a message.

General FRANK. G-2 in Washington?

Colonel BRATTON. G-2, the A. C. of S. G-2 in the War Department, then General Miles, upon my recommendation, did send a message to G-2 in Honolulu, on or about the morning of the 5th of December, directing him to contact immediately Commander Rochefort with respect to the significance of certain weather broadcasts coming from Tokyo. That document is available in the files of G-2 now, sir. The message did go out. I did it this way as a means of saving time and for security reasons.

[63] That is all I have to say on that point, sir.

General RUSSELL. Have you a copy of that message of G-2 of the Hawaiian Department with you there?

Colonel BRATTON. Not in my possession, sir, but it can be secured from Colonel Clarke.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, before we go away from this line of questioning which we are doing now upon codes—and it has been suggested by your last statement: You say that there were a number of Japanese codes in existence in this critical period of late November and early December of '41?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I recall from memory, as an example, one that was to be used in telephone conversations.

General RUSSELL. We have had some evidence before the Board which has left the Board—I wouldn't say left the Board, but left me—somewhat confused. Is it true, or not, that the Japanese code which was broken about this time in '41 is the same code which is in existence now?

Colonel BRATTON. I can't testify on that of my own knowledge, General. I have been away from Washington for over a year.

General RUSSELL. Well, the last time you were in contact with that code, we will say a year ago, was that the same code that the Japanese armed forces were using or that the Japanese Empire was using in 1941?

General FRANK. In other words, had they changed the code, to your knowledge?

Colonel BRATTON. Over a period of some six years when I handled these matters for G-2, the Japanese changed their codes and ciphers a number of times. It held us up for periods of [64] from two to six weeks, as a rule, before we could get the hang of the change. At the time I left Washington, to the best of my knowledge and belief, we had not broken any Japanese military code or cipher. We had broken several of their diplomatic codes and ciphers and one or more of their naval operational codes and ciphers.

Does that answer your question, sir?

General RUSSELL. Yes. I think one more question will clarify it, because we shall talk cases.

Let us assume, for example, that the Japanese authorities knew this morning that we or the American forces had broken the code, to the place that we could interpret these code words which you have just interpreted for us. Would that indicate anything to the Japanese authorities today which might cause them to take any action of any kind?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I think, if I understand your question, if the Japanese knew today that we were reading any of their codes or ciphers, they could so effectively change them as to make them unreadable from now on over a period of considerable time.

General RUSSELL. Two to six weeks?

Colonel BRATTON. Such an act on their part might well prolong our war with Japan much longer than necessary.

General RUSSELL. I think the question that I was attempting to ask, I probably did not ask: This code that you have just interpreted for us, and from the record that we exhibited—are those code words being used by the Japanese today?

Colonel BRATTON. Not to my knowledge, sir.

[65] General RUSSELL. If they knew, therefore, that we had intercepted these messages and had broken that code at that time, it would convey to them no information as to whether or not we had broken the code which they are using today, would it?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, yes, sir, it would, because these code phrases are a code within a cipher. I didn't make that clear. The whole message about this "Winds" signal was in a very secret cipher, and these code expressions were contained in that. This was their most secret cipher, and it contained a code which was to be broadcast as part of a weather broadcast.

General RUSSELL. And they are continuing to use that cipher?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And this would disclose the fact that we did have information on that secret cipher which they do not know that we have, if they should learn that we have picked this up?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Therefore, the danger of any leak exists now as much as ever?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

General GRUNERT. Therefore, the danger that any leak of this thing might affect the war effort exists now as it has in the past?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. In the answers to the questions that General Russell has asked you I notice in each instance you [66] said that you did not get any information on this prior to Pearl Harbor. Did you get any information on this since Pearl Harbor or just after Pearl Harbor? Was there any point in your putting into your answer the phrase that you did not get this prior to December 7th?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, there is this point to it: My recollection is very definite to the effect that I did not get it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It may have been made available to me thereafter, and it would not have made much impression on me at that time because the attack had been made; it would no longer have as much significance in my mind.

General FRANK. You stated in one of your answers that Colonel Sadtler had made a report that there had been some Japanese broadcast of a "Winds" message.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. What was the substance of that?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection of that is very vague, General, and I have discussed the matter with General Miles, and his memory is equally vague. I have seen a statement made by Colonel Sadtler to the effect that on the morning of the 5th of December 1941 he went to General Miles with the oral statement that the "Winds" implementing message had been received by the Navy. He says that General Miles then sent for me and the three of us discussed it in General Miles' office. Colonel Sadtler further stated that he got his information from Admiral Noyes of the Navy, and it was to the effect that the phrase had come through which meant a break in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Great [67] Britain. I don't remember the incident. Colonel Sadtler is so positive in his statement, however, that something of the sort must have happened. But the point I wish to emphasize is this: we knew that relations between Japan and Great Britain were on the point of being broken at any minute. We had been telling everybody so. That is not the message that we were waiting for. The one that we were waiting for was one which would indicate a break between Japan and the United States.

General FRANK. Since you were waiting for this, and you did have some information on a message that did come through, so far as you remember you did not investigate it further to find out if the "Winds" message concerning the United States had come through; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, I did make further inquiries about this message, but prior to investigating the thing more thoroughly I had dispatched to G-2 in Hawaii the message that I have previously referred to, so that if this "Winds" code implementing message did come through they in Hawaii would be alerted just as quickly as we were.

General FRANK. Do you know whether or not Colonel Fielder ever got that message?

Colonel BRATTON. I do not, sir.

General FRANK. Do you know whether or not he ever got any information from Rochefort?

Colonel BRATTON. Of my own knowledge I do not, sir.

General FRANK. We had Colonel Fielder on the stand as a witness in Honolulu.

[68] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. And asked him if he had any information about any code word being flashed, and I think his testimony indicated—at least, he said he did not.

Colonel BRATTON. The message was dispatched, sir.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, before we go away from this subject of the "Winds" message, have you anything else there, documentary or otherwise, that you would like to say about it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I would like to read into the record an extract from a document known as "Summary of Far Eastern Documents," compiled in G-2 in the fall of 1943. A paragraph extracted from page 36 of this document reads as follows:

(Excerpts from "Summary of Far Eastern Documents" are as follows:)

FE 361D On 5 December G-2 instructed G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer immediately with a naval officer on duty at Pearl Harbor who had learned from most secret sources that weather broadcasts from Tokyo would include information regarding Japan's intention to break diplomatic relations with certain designated powers including the United States.

General GRUNERT. I would like to ask a few more questions along that line. This message you referred to was sent to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Do you know of any instructions to G-2 [69] of the Hawaiian Department that would have prevented him from informing his Commanding General of the tenseness of the situation at that time which might have caused the Commanding General to take greater security measures than he would have had he not had that information?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General GRUNERT. Had you been G-2 out there and received that message which, in a way, put you on an additional alert or a state of alertness, would you have considered it your duty as G-2 of the Department to have at least secretly informed your Commanding General that such a thing might be expected and that therefore everything should be prepared for any eventuality?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Was there an acknowledgment of that message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to the G-2 of the War Department? In other words, do you know whether or not he actually received that message?

Colonel BRATTON. We have no documentary proof thereof, General, but the standing operating procedure—

General GRUNERT. Did anything happen later to show that he had received it in any way?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, we have negative evidence that it was received, in this way: it was standing operating procedure in the message center of the War Department at that time to check back in code, by

number, the receipt of all outgoing messages. The officer in charge of the message center at that time, Colonel French of the Signal Corps, made the statement in my presence, yesterday or the day before, that [70] to the best of his knowledge and belief no nonreceipt check was ever received on that numbered message, and that to the best of his belief the message was received by the addressee. It was most certainly sent out, as the record shows.

General GRUNERT. The transcript of the testimony of Colonel Fielder will show that he was given an opportunity to inform the Board of anything additional to those things on which he was questioned, that would further our investigation. Now I am trying to find out why he didn't inform the Board, either on or off the record, of this additional, really, warning that something was in the wind. I can't quite understand, unless there are G-2 instructions to the contrary, that he could not impart such information without authority from the War Department, or something of that effect. You see what I mean?

Colonel BRATTON. I understand perfectly, General; and there, of course, were no such instructions issued by the War Department to any of its G-2s, that I know of. Our policy at that time was to expect the G-2s everywhere to be in the very closest contact with their Commanding Generals.

General GRUNERT. Then, the only reason I can see for it is that he evidently forgot the whole business.

Colonel BRATTON. I find that hard to believe, sir. Of my own knowledge, between the *24th of November and the 7th of December* there were *five warning messages* sent out of the War Department to *Hawaii*. The fifth one was not delivered to the addressee until after the attack. To the best of our knowledge and belief all four of the others were.

General GRUNERT. Will you recount the dates of those? [71] I think the Board has all of them or has had testimony on all of them, but I want to recheck.

General FRANK. Those four include messages to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the Navy, or are they all exclusively from the War Department?

Colonel BRATTON. One or two were naval messages, sir.

If you will allow me to quote again from this document, sir, on page 34 of the document previously referred to as "Summary of Far Eastern Documents," is this statement:

FE 356A Based on all the information available, including that from the State Department, and the most secret sources, and after consultation among G-2, WPD, and the Navy, a message was dispatched on 24 November from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, Manila, and Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, and the Naval Commandants at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, and Balboa, with the request that senior Army officers in their respective areas also be informed. This message stated, among other things, that there "are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan" and warned of a possible "surprise aggressive movement in any direction."

On page 35 of the same document:

FE 358A On the same date, 27 November, the Chief of the War Plans Division, after consultation with G-2, directed the dispatch of a first-priority message to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and the Caribbean Defense Command stating [72] that, among other things, "Negotiations with

Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes" and that "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment".

FE 358B G-2, in a message to the G-2s of all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, instructed them to "advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin stop."

Now:

FE 358C On 28 November G-2 directed that a radio be sent first-priority warning Corps Areas and Overseas Department Commanders that because of the critical situation all precautions should be taken immediately to guard against sabotage, subversion, and espionage within their commands.

The message of 5 December has already been read into the record as FE 361D (pg. 68).

Now:

FE 366A On the morning of 7 December G-2 learned that the Japanese Ambassador had received instructions to deliver to the Secretary of State at one o'clock in the afternoon a statement which rejected an American proposal of 26 November and which asserted that it was impossible to reach any agreement through further negotiations. Based on [73] this information the Chief of Staff, after consultation with G-2 and WPD, wrote a first-priority radiogram which was dispatched about 12:17 p. m. to the Commanding Generals of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, and 4th Army. The message read as follows: "Japanese are presenting at one p. m., Eastern Standard Time, today, what amounts to an ultimatum; also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on the alert according stop Inform naval authorities of this communication stop".

I think that covers the five messages, sir, that I have knowledge of.

General RUSSELL. Now, you have been reading from a document which you have described as "Summary of Far Eastern Documents"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Where is that of record? In the office of G-2?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

General RUSSELL. Where is that document from, what office?

Colonel BRATTON. From the files of G-2 in the War Department, sir.

General RUSSELL. How long has it been there; do you know?

Colonel BRATTON. Since it was prepared, in the fall of 1943, sir.

[74] General RUSSELL. Now, the last message which you read to the Board, Colonel, is the one that I indicated a little earlier that we wanted to discuss with you for a moment, the message of December 7th.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. The information which the Board has is that on the morning of December 7th there were on the desk of the Chief of Staff of the Army two messages, one to the effect that the ultimatum would be delivered at one o'clock and the code machines were being destroyed, and the other a rather long statement which was alleged to have been in response to the memorandum of the Secretary of State of November 26. Do you recall that there were two such messages there on that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I put them there myself and can identify them both.

General RUSSELL. Let us consider the short message relating to the destruction of the code machines and the delivery of the ultimatum.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

General RUSSELL. From what source did the War Department receive the information upon which that message was based?

Colonel BRATTON. There is the translation made in the code encipher section of naval signal communications, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you know what time it was delivered to the War Department?

Colonel BRATTON. It was delivered to me, sir.

General RUSSELL. At what time?

Colonel BRATTON. Between half past eight and nine o'clock [75] Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

General RUSSELL. Do you remember the circumstances of the delivery, by whom delivered, and so forth?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir, not at this time, but there is no reason why I should, because there were a great bulk of this material being delivered to me daily at all times of the day and during the night, during these days.

General RUSSELL. That was about the most important message that you had received in this period, wasn't it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. It was brought over to me, as I remember now, by an officer courier from the Navy.

General RUSSELL. Do you know from what source the Navy discovered this information?

Colonel BRATTON. They had intercepted the Japanese message, General, and deciphered it themselves.

General RUSSELL. This was a naval intercept?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

General RUSSELL. This was a naval intercept?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; it was a naval—I don't know who intercepted it, but it was a naval translation. For your information, sir, the Army and the Navy divided this material. There was so much of it that in order to process it and get it out where it could be used the Navy took certain parts of it and the Army took certain parts of it, and the results were interchanged so that we both had all the material all the time.

General RUSSELL. But this message reached you between eight-thirty and nine o'clock on the morning of December 7, 1941, Washington time, and at that time it had been deciphered and translated?

[76] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And was in plain English?

Colonel BRATTON. It was in English when I received it, sir.

General RUSSELL. Yes. Now let us consider the long memorandum which you stated a moment ago that you placed on the Chief of Staff's desk that morning. From what source did you get the long memorandum?

Colonel BRATTON. I believe it was a naval translation also, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you recall whether or not the Navy asked the Army to help in the deciphering and translation of either one of these two messages?

Colonel BRATTON. It might be that we helped each other on the translation of the long one, because it was in fourteen parts and covered some ten pages, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you recall what time you placed the short message on the desk of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. The short one, sir?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. I handed it to him in person, sir.

General RUSSELL. About what time?

Colonel BRATTON. May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. I would like to answer that in some detail if I may, sir.

General RUSSELL. All right.

Colonel BRATTON. The message in question was delivered [77] to me from the Navy some time between 0830 and 0900 that morning. It was immediately apparent that it was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S. G-2, and the Chief of WPD with the least practicable delay. Neither of these officers were in their offices at that time.

I called General Marshall's quarters by telephone and was informed that he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go out and find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as practicable, as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then called General Miles and reported to him the step that I had taken, and recommended that he come down to the office at once. I do not remember whether I called General Gerow or whether General Miles called him, but we had some discussion as to which one of us would do it, and I don't remember now which one of us did, but in any event General Gerow was summoned to his office.

I waited for the telephone call from General Marshall, which I received sometime between ten and eleven. I informed him that I had a message of extreme importance which he should see at once, and told him that I would bring it to his quarters if he so desired. He said to report to him in his office, as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 11:25, immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter General Miles arrived. The message was laid before General Marshall and discussed. We were all asked by the Chief of Staff for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance of the message in connection with the lengthy Japanese ultimatum which the Chief of Staff had on his desk [78] and read aloud to us at this time.

General Miles and I stated that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply, one p. m., an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas. General Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that they, the Commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert.

General Marshall then called Admiral Stark on the telephone and told him over the phone that he thought we should send out a warning, as indicated above. After Admiral Stark replied, General Marshall put down the telephone and stated that the Admiral did not think any further warning necessary since all the forces had already been several

times alerted. General Miles and I nevertheless urged General Marshall to send the warnings. General Marshall then wrote out in pencil the warning message. There was some discussion at this time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines should be included.

General Marshall again got Admiral Stark on the telephone and read to him the message he had just written out. Admiral Stark apparently concurred and asked that the naval forces be also informed. General Marshall added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled warning.

At about this time General Gerow and Colonel Bundy [79] arrived. General Marshall again asked us in succession, beginning with General Miles, our opinion as to the significance of the Japanese message. General Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some significance, and that warning messages to our people should be sent. General Gerow, Colonel Bundy, and I concurred.

General Marshall then gave me the message in his handwriting and instructed me to take it immediately to the message center for transmittal. As I was about to go out of the door there was some discussion as to whether it should go to General Gerow's office for typing first, but it was decided that as time was an important factor I was to take it in its draft form to the message center. As I left the room General Gerow made a statement to the effect that, if there was any question of priority involved, to give first priority to the Philippines.

I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority. Colonel French said that he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message would commence immediately.

I then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel [80] French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 a. m. I returned to the Chief of Staff's office and reported to him the information as to speed of delivery that had been given me by Colonel French.

General RUSSELL. When was the the memorandum prepared from which you are just reading, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. On or about the 10th of December, 1941, I would say, sir. It was prepared by General Miles, with my assistance, as a memorandum for the record, of what happened.

General FRANK. Did you say with your assistance or assistant?

Colonel BRATTON. Assistance, t-a-n-c-e. He asked me to go over it with him and make such corrections as were necessary, so that it would be a memorandum for the record, of our recollection of what took place in General Marshall's office that morning.

General RUSSELL. Where has that memorandum from which you have just read been since the date of its preparation, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. I may say, sir, that what I have just read is an extract of testimony given by me before an investigation being conducted in G-2 by Colonel Clarke, who allowed me to read into the record the statement that I have made from the memorandum that I have referred to. The memorandum referred to—a copy has, to the best of my knowledge [81] and belief, been in the possession of General Sherman Miles and a carbon copy in my possession since then.

General RUSSELL. Has the memorandum been in the files of G-2 of the War Department as well as in the possession of General Miles and of yourself?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief. It was made primarily to leave in the files of G-2 for the record.

General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel Clarke directed this hearing on or about the 10th day of December, or this investigation, as it might be called; is that true?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't know, sir. I appeared as a witness before his investigation first on the 14th of December and on several—

General FUNK. What year?

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

General FRANK. The 14th of December what year?

Colonel BRATTON. This year.

General FRANK. Oh.

Colonel BRATTON. Of 1944, and I have been questioned by Colonel Clarke and his assistant, Colonel Gibson, several times since that date.

Colonel TOULMIN. Do you mean of this year? December of this year?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. I think I have got the story. Is it true, or not, Colonel, that in 1941—

General FRANK. Wait a minute.

Colonel TOULMIN. Let us get this thing straight.

[82] General FRANK. Let us get this straight.

Colonel BRATTON. You are familiar with the investigation being conducted by G-2, are you not?

General FRANK. No.

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, you must be, sir. Colonel Clarke has communicated with you a number of times, I am sure.

Will you please read my original answer?

The Reporter (reading):

"I don't know, sir. I appeared as a witness before his investigation first on the 14th of December and on several—"

Colonel BRATTON. That should be the 14th of September.

General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, I think we can straighten this out. Our dates have just gone a little awry here.

Now, on or about the 10th day of December, 1941, you and General Miles, acting together, prepared a memorandum, and you kept a carbon copy of it, and General Miles took a copy, and a copy you think was left in the records of G-2 of the War Department?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. That was about three or four days after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, the language which you have just read into the record a minute ago was extracted from that original December 10, 1941, memorandum; that is true, is it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. The initial memorandum setting forth what occurred on the morning of December 7, 1941, was prepared about [83] the 10th of December, 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. By you and General Miles. Recently you were called by Colonel Clarke, who is conducting an independent investigation?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And in reply to questions by Colonel Clarke you read the extract from the December 10, 1941, memorandum into the Clarke record?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. And this morning you have read from the Clarke record, but it contains the language of the December 10, 1941, memorandum?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. All right.

Now is anyone helping Colonel Clarke with his investigation, or is he just making it alone?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. He has a Lieutenant Colonel Gibson of the M. I. S. assisting him.

General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, on the morning of December 7 when you received the short message that we are discussing now, did you have the long message in completed form at that time, which was about 8:30 a. m.?

Colonel BRATTON. I had had the bulk of it since the evening before, sir. It came in fourteen parts, I believe. Thirteen of those parts were received the afternoon and evening of the 6th and were delivered by me to the office of the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S. G-2, the office of the Secretary of State. The last part didn't come in, as I [84] remember, until very late at night or very early in the morning of the 7th, and it was delivered at that time to those same agencies.

General RUSSELL. Do you remember the hour that the latter part of that long message was delivered to the agencies?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir, I do not.

General RUSSELL. And you have no record from which you could tell that?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, the thing that caused your agitation and provoked activity was this message which reached you about 8:30 on Sunday morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. After receiving this message, which I believe you testified came to you deciphered and translated and in English, you immediately began your effort to locate the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And you finally were in touch with him some three hours later, at 11:25, in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. When did you initiate your efforts to get in touch with the G-2 about this message?

Colonel BRATTON. Immediately after telephoning to find out where General Marshall was.

General RUSSELL. Well, when did G-2 get to the office that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is, sir, that he came [86] in at about the same time General Marshall reached his office. I had been waiting in the anteroom or in the hall so I could catch them the minute they got there, and my recollection is that General Miles came in right on the heels of General Marshall, and I followed them both to the latter's office.

General RUSSELL. Now, so far as I am concerned, I have about exhausted what I wanted on December 7th.

General FRANK. When you gave this short message to General Marshall was it all by itself?

Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my recollection now, it was. He had on his desk all fourteen parts of the long Japanese reply.

General FRANK. But the only thing that you brought in at the time that you first saw him was this short message about something happening at one o'clock?

Colonel BRATTON. I think so, yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Colonel, we will clear up one matter. As I got your testimony, you said that at 8:30 in the morning of December 7th, here in Washington, you first received this message; is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. Between 8:30 and 9, yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. And what was the exact time, if you recall, when you first called General Marshall's quarters, in your first endeavor to reach him?

Colonel BRATTON. It was at about 9 a. m., sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

General RUSSELL. That is all.

General GRUNERT. Any other questions?

[86] General RUSSELL. I will ask you very hurriedly, Colonel, about some messages that are represented to have been sent to the War Department from naval sources, to the effect that:

(Messages alleged to have been sent to the War Department from Naval sources are as follows:)

On the 24th of November we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds.

Do you know anything about the Navy telling you that we were to go to war or that large-scale offensives would be begun by the Japanese on the 29th of November?

Colonel BRATTON. You said 24th, didn't you, sir (indicating)?

General RUSSELL. On the 24th they were told that the 29th was the definite date.

May I ask you this, Colonel, in order to facilitate the examination: Do you have any independent recollection of it, or would you have to refer to the document which you have with you?

Colonel BRATTON. I would have to refer to the documents I have with me, sir.

General RUSSELL. Well, suppose we then just confine ourselves to what we can recall, and we shall attempt to have [87] the document placed in evidence.

On November 26 we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States.

Independently of records, do you know whether or not such a message as that was received by the War Department from the Navy Department?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. On page 34 of this Summary of Far Eastern Documents you will find under "G-2 153" this statement:

(Excerpt from "Summary of Far Eastern Documents," page 34, is as follows:)

G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that O. N. I. reported a concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward towards Formosa and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands.

General RUSSELL (reading):

On December 1st we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia.

Do you know anything about that message?

General GRUNERT. That is continuing quotation from the document.

General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Let the record show that that is continuing quotations from the document.

[88] General RUSSELL. Yes. I will identify the questions. That is the December 1st message, Colonel.

Colonel BRATTON. I have nothing on the 1st of December, General. My only record as of about that time is on page 35 of this Summary of Far Eastern Documents:

(Excerpt from "Summary of Far Eastern Documents," page 35, is as follows:)

FE 360 The Singapore military observer advised G-2 on 2 December that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activities over Malaya were reported.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I am asking you now about messages which Navy Intelligence has stated that they delivered to the War Department. But this did not come from Naval Intelligence?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. I don't remember any message of that nature being delivered to the War Department by the Navy on that day.

General RUSSELL. We have discussed the December 4th message which we have referred to as the "Wind" message.

December 6th message, and this is coming from the record, as suggested by General Grunert, which we have referred to earlier:

We received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter.

That was 9 o'clock Saturday morning, the War Department is supposed to have gotten that information from the Navy. [89] Do you have any report of a December 6th message that Japan was going to declare war on the United States, at a time later to be determined?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. And I think the message that you have just referred to must be the "Winds" code message that the Navy admits that they received on or about the 6th of December.

General RUSSELL. But they did not send it to you?

Colonel BRATTON. Did not send it to me.

General RUSSELL. The record from which we have been reading to you, Colonel, states that:

Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington time) December 7, '41, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at one p. m. (Washington time) that date.

Now, we have gotten into a conflict.

Colonel BRATTON. Well, this is a faulty memory on the part of whoever made that statement. The record shows something entirely different, sir.

General GRUNERT. That is what I want to get at.

Colonel BRATTON. The record shows clearly that the message was received during the night of the 6th-7th of December and translated in the Navy, and we were given a copy of the naval translation. You can get the original document on that, sir.

General RUSSELL. Where from?

[90] Colonel BRATTON. From G-2.

General RUSSELL. It is not in the Summary of Far Eastern Documents which you have with you and to which you have referred previously?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General FRANK. Since this document entitled "Summary of Far Eastern Documents," which is a part of the files of G-2 of the War Department, contains so much essential information of the situation in the Pacific in 1941, it is highly desirable that this document be made in its entirety available to this Board. It is requested, therefore, that upon your return to the War Department you request G-2 to furnish the Board with a copy of this.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. And to further identify this document I would like to make a statement for the record as to how it came into being: It was prepared in G-2 as the result of a request made upon the Chief of Staff by the President on July 14, 1943, in which the former requested copies of the dispatches of our military attaches which estimate or express any opinion regarding the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war or which refer in any way to the estimates of potential military strength of any of the countries involved. The countries which concerned the President were Germany, Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium, England, and Russia. He indicated his interest in dispatches from January 1, 1937, until such time as our military attaches left the first seven named countries. His interest in similar dispatches from England dated from January 1, 1937, to the [91] outbreak of the war in September 1939, and his interest in dispatches bearing on this subject from Russia dated from January 1, 1937, until the present time, that is, the time of his letter of July 14, 1943.

This letter of the President was transmitted to me by the then A. C. of S. G-2, General Strong, who instructed me to start work on a compilation of the desired documents. I was at that time the Chief of

the Intelligence Branch, M. I. S., G-2. I detailed Colonel McGuire to exercise general supervision over the assembly of European documents, and Colonel Pettigrew over the Far Eastern documents.

As stated in the explanatory note which you will find on page 1 of the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, the yearly summaries which follow on successive pages are based on information contained in intelligence documents consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, et cetera. The summary itself was written in a chronologically arranged narrative form, supported by photostats of the original documents in the files of G-2. It was arranged in this way to facilitate the use of the document by historical researchers. The European summaries were similarly compiled and supported by photostats of the original documents. All summaries were transmitted to the Chief of Staff by a covering memorandum signed by the A. C. of S. G-2, General Strong, 20 August 1943. With the covering memorandum was transmitted a memorandum for the President, subject: Axis War Potential, for the signature of the Chief of Staff, which read as follows—

General FRANK. Is this the original document?

Colonel BRATTON. This is a carbon copy of the original [92] document.

General FRANK. Yes. How many pages are in it?

Colonel BRATTON. 37 pages, and it is supported by 15 volumes of photostats.

General GRUNERT. The Board desires that the witness, in transmitting the Board's request to G-2 for a copy of that document, inform G-2 that that document will be considered as top secret before the Board.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. In other words, it will be considered and so handled as is your testimony.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? Can you think of anything else you want to develop with him?

Colonel TOULMIN. Here is this message, if you want to ask questions about that.

Major CLAUSEN. The Mori message.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I hand you a transcript of a telephone message and ask that you read it as a basis for a question or two I wish to ask. I will tell you before you read it that it is supposed or it comes to us as having been intercepted by agencies in Hawaii, and it purports to be a telephone conversation between a Dr. Mori, or someone representing him, in Honolulu, and a Japanese official in the homeland of the Empire.

Major CLAUSEN. Do you wish to identify the document by exhibit number, sir?

General RUSSELL. It is our exhibit, sir, whatever it is there in the corner (indicating): Exhibit No. 21.

[93] Colonel, have you just read the exhibit which I handed you a moment ago?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. There are references in there to flowers and some other things. Do any of the terms of this telephone message indicate to you that they might have been code words that were at that time

being used by the Japanese Government on their telephonic conversations?

Colonel BRATTON. Not at this late date, sir. I would have to study the message in conjunction with the code itself. I may say that the code, that telephone code, is on file in G-2, and I am sure you can obtain it from them.

General FRANK. Is it a fact that there is on file in G-2 in the War Department a code that was used by the Japanese in telephone conversations?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir, and the same should be on file in O. N. I. and in the S. I. S. of the Signal Corps.

General FRANK. Did this code apply to the period just prior to the Pearl Harbor incident?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. I have no further questions.

General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not General Miles is fully acquainted with just what you have been testifying about, the general trend, and the information that you have given us?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. General Miles was given copies of every intercept that I gave to the Chief of Staff or to the Chief of the War Plans Division or to the Secretary of State.

[94] General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

General FRANK. Yes.

When this message from the Navy was sent over to G-2, what was the channel through which it was communicated?

Colonel BRATTON. Which one, sir?

General FRANK. The "Winds" message, for instance.

Colonel BRATTON. I don't recall ever having gotten a "Winds" message from the Navy. You mean the message giving the Wind code?

General FRANK. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Or implementing the code?

General FRANK. Well, any information coming from naval sources: how did it get to you? Did it come direct to you from the Navy, or did it come through the Signal Corps?

Colonel BRATTON. That varied, sir. Sometimes, when the message was considered of sufficient importance, it was brought straight to me. Normally they channeled it through the S. I. S., who assembled them all and brought them to me in a large manila envelope, by an officer courier.

General FRANK. And "S. I. S." stands for?

Colonel BRATTON. Signal Intelligence Service, I believe.

General FRANK. Were those messages filtered in any way down in S. I. S.?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. They were filtered by me.

General RUSSELL. On occasions a courier would come to you directly from the Naval Department, as did occur on the morning of Sunday, December 7, with the short message about which we have talked? That was a channel of communication between the Navy and you?

[95] Colonel BRATTON. I believe so, sir.

General FRANK. All right.

General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that you think of that you might want to tell the Board for its consideration of these subjects?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. How long are you going to be here, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't know, sir. I was told General Marshall had left instructions that I was to remain here in Washington until this was over. I don't know what he means by "this."

General GRUNERT. The Board hopes that the invitation for you to tell us anything that you might have in mind will bear more fruit than it has for other witnesses.

So you think of nothing else that you think the Board should have?

Colonel BRATTON. I would like to make a statement with respect to this document (indicating) if I may, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Identify what you mean by "this document."

Colonel BRATTON. The document previously identified as the Summary of Far Eastern Documents.

The allegation has been made, in the press and elsewhere, in connection with the disaster at Pearl Harbor, that if G-2 had been on the job we would not have been caught so unprepared for our war with Japan. In point of fact, G-2 in general, and the Far Eastern section in particular, were very much on the job, as evidenced by the written record of [96] estimates, staff studies, memoranda, et cetera, with which G-2 served the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S. G-2, W. P. D., O. N. I., the State Department, and other planning and policy-making agencies of the Government, to warn them of the increasing menace of the Japanese war potential and Japan's intentions.

G-2 can stand on this record and has no defense to make. I feel, however, that a part of this record as presented in the document entitled, "Summary of Far Eastern Documents," with its supporting papers, should be taken cognizance of by this investigating committee, if for no other reason than to give a clearer perspective of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

General GRUNERT. In that event we hope that you will use your best endeavors to get G-2 to give us such a copy.

Are there any other questions? (No response.)

If not, thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General RUSSELL. I introduce in evidence a memorandum dated September 29, 1944, addressed to Lt. General George Grunert, President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.

I introduce in evidence, also, memorandum dated September 30, 1944, also from Mr. Fly, similarly addressed to General Grunert, with attached papers.

[979] The documents are as follows:

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington 25, D. C., Sep 29 1944.

Lt. General GEORGE GRUNERT,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Room 4743, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL GRUNERT: I am enclosing a memorandum entitled "Communications by wire and radio to and from Japan which were and were not tapped or intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941," which General Russell requested of me several days ago for your Board's information.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ James Lawrence Fly,
JAMES LAWRENCE FLY,
Chairman.

Enclosure.

[98]

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. General George Grunert, President Army Pearl Harbor Board.
 From: James Lawrence Fly, Chairman Federal Communications Commission.
 Re: Communications by wire and radio to and from Japan which were and were not tapped or intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

1. *Communications over point-to-point circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan.*—Normal communication routes between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan in operation on December 7, 1941 prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor are shown on the attached map. The routes shown are limited to the most direct circuits. Such possible indirect routes for communicating between United States and Japan as via London are not shown.

The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (Section 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the [99] Commission did not intercept any messages over the radiotelegraph, cable telegraph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to December 7, 1941.

2. *Communications over point to point circuits between Japan and other foreign countries.*—The prohibition of the Communications Act against the interception of communications does not include communications transmitted between two foreign countries. Accordingly, the Commission has intercepted messages both before and after December 7, 1941 over foreign radio circuits including those between Japan and some other foreign country. The Commission, however, has no use itself for such intercepted messages in the discharge of its duties, except for purposes of identifying the traffic. Other government departments have had an interest in copies of such traffic, and the Commission has cooperated with them both in bringing to their attention any unidentified or suspicious traffic which the Commission's monitors detected in the course of their monitoring of the spectrum in order that such agencies might take appropriate action, and in making intercepts of traffic over foreign circuits which they requested.

"No request of the Commission by any government agency for traffic between Japan and any other country was outstanding on December 7, 1941 or immediately prior thereto. In February 1941, [100] however, Commission monitors detected the transmissions of two stations employing the calls WER and NVB, both of which were within the block of calls assigned to the United States by international agreement. Commission long range direction finding bearings indicated that WER was in Germany and NVB in Japan. It was subsequently established that these stations were in the Japanese military attaché circuit between Japan and Germany. Promptly after detection of this circuit, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was notified of its existence, and copies of intercepted traffic were furnished to it until October 3, 1941 when the Commission was informed that further intercepts were not desired by the Bureau. The Commission also notified the War Department of the existence of this circuit, but was advised that monitoring by the Commission was not necessary for War Department purposes.

3. *Broadcasts originating in Japan.*—The receipt, publication and use of the contents of radio broadcasts are excluded from the prohibition in the Communications Act against the interception of communications, referred to above. Following arrangements with other government departments in early 1941, the Commission was delegated the task of intercepting and reporting foreign broadcasts audible in the United States to various government agencies which had use for them. From April 1941 on, [101] the Commission's monitoring station at Portland, Oregon, intercepted an increasing volume of shortwave broadcasts from Japan in English, Japanese and other languages beamed to North America, Hawaii, Asia, Europe and elsewhere. These broadcasts were translated and reported, either in summary or verbatim form, to the War, Navy and State Departments and other government agencies, at first by occasional reports and beginning in September, 1941 by a daily report.

4. *Special weather broadcast from Japan.*—One particular intercept activity carried on by the Commission consisted of monitoring Japanese shortwave broadcasts for a special weather message from November 28, 1941 through the

time of the attack. The request by the War Department and the messages intercepted and relayed to the War or Navy Departments by the Commission are set forth in a certificate by the Secretary of the Commission dated August 18, 1944 transmitted by my letter of August 22, 1944 to Lt. Commander Powers, Judge Advocate's Office, Navy Department.

September 29, 1944.

/s/ James Lawrence Fly,
JAMES LAWRENCE FLY, *Chairman,*
Federal Communications Commission.

[102]

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington 25, D. C., Sep 30, 1944.

Lt. General GEORGE GRUNERT

President, Army Pearl Harbor Board
Room 4743, Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL GRUNERT: I am enclosing a certified copy of the certificate referred to in paragraph 4 of my memorandum of September 29, 1944, to you, which General Russell has requested.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ James Lawrence Fly,
JAMES LAWRENCE FLY,
Chairman.

Enclosure

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., September 30, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached is a true copy of the certificate of the Commission consisting of five sheets dated August 18, 1944, transmitted with covering letter dated August 22, 1944 of James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, to Lt. Commander Robert Powers, Judge Advocate's Office, Navy Department, and referred to [103] paragraph 4 of a memorandum dated September 29, 1944 from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission to Lt. General George Grunert, President of Army Pearl Harbor Board.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this 30th day of September, 1944.

(SEAL)

/s/ T. J. Slowie,
T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, [104] 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JYW3, intercepted by Commission monitors, at 2130 GMT, December 5,

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1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p. m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

The seal of the Federal Communications Commission.

(Signed) T. J. Slowie,
T. J. SLOWIE,
Secretary.

[105]

DOCUMENT No. 1

Group one is east wind rain

Group two is north wind cloudy and

Group three is west wind clear stop

Groups repeated twice in middle and at end of broadcast

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941

DOCUMENT No. 2

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean surface calm

Weather message from Tokyo station JVV3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

[106]

DOCUMENT No. 3

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow north wind and later from south. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JVV3 transmitted at approximately 2130 GMT December 5, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 4

English

This is in the middle of the news but today, specially at this point I will give the weather forecast:

West Wind, Clear

West Wind, Clear

This is in the middle of the news but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast:

West Wind, Clear

West Wind, Clear

Romaji

Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga honjitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho wo moshlage masu

Nishi No Kaze Hare

Nishi No Kaze Hare

Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo wa koko de toku ni tenki yoho wo moshlage masu

Nishi No Kaze Hare

Nishi No Kaze Hare

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

[107] General GRUNERT. The Board now goes to other business (Whereupon, the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, at 1 o'clock p. m. proceeded to other business.)

[108]

[TOP SECRET]

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¹Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[TOP SECRET]**[109] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD**

MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1944.

**MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 30, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President, Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN L. F. SAFFORD, UNITED STATES NAVY,
OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASH-
INGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. Captain, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Captain SAFFORD. Present station?

Colonel WEST. Present station.

Captain SAFFORD. L. F. Safford, Captain, United States Navy, Office of Naval Operations, Navy Department. [110]

General GRUNERT. Captain, in this particular part of our investigation I shall ask General Russell to lead with the questions, and the other members will interject any that occur to them. This is General Russell here.

General RUSSELL. Captain, what duties were you performing during the calendar year 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. I was head of the Communications Security Division in Naval Operations. The name "Communications Security" was a very short term used to cover communication intelligence as well. We had direction finders and all other organizations and other activities which are comprised under the heading of communication intelligence; also had charge of preparation of codes and ciphers and surveillance over the security of naval communications.

General RUSSELL. Your duties, then, involved familiarity with the information which was obtained by Navy Intelligence and the protection of that information; is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. As such, would you have been familiar with information which was being received or gotten by Naval Intelligence Service relating to the Japanese Empire, including its interchange of communications with other nations and its instructions to its armed forces?

Captain SAFFORD. I was.

General RUSSELL. Captain, we have had already, I believe, from Commander Rochefort a description of the agencies which have been established to intercept Japanese information, and hence I will omit that from your examination.

[111] General GRUNERT. At this time I might tell the witness that his testimony here will be top secret, that it will be treated as such by the Board, and so there need be no hesitancy on that score.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, thank you, sir. I was a little bit uncertain of that point, and that is the reason I was a little bit ambiguous in my first reply, to cover it without naming it.

General RUSSELL. Captain, the evidence before the Board indicates that there were intercept stations in both the 14th and 16th Naval Districts in the Pacific; that is true, is it not?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. During November 1941 did you obtain from the units in the 14th and 16th Naval Districts estimates covering the organization and distribution of the Japanese naval forces?

Captain SAFFORD. I would like to refresh my memory on one point, if I may, to get the exact date.

General RUSSELL. You may.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. That was on the 26th of November. We received, early in the morning, a message from the Commandant, 14th Naval District, reporting his estimate of the disposition of Japanese naval forces and the belief that carriers were present in the mandated islands. This message was sent for the information of the Commandant 16th Naval District. Later that day—I'd like to check that one point again—about twelve hours later that day we received a message from the Commandant 16th Naval District, which was also sent [112] to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commandant 14th Naval District, disagreeing in part with Com. 14's estimate, particularly with reference to the carriers in the mandated islands.

General GRUNERT. May I put in the record here: the 16th was at Cavite, and the 14th at Honolulu.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

General FRANK. And this date is what?

Captain SAFFORD. It is the 26th of November.

General RUSSELL. Captain, have you a copy of the messages which you received on that date and to which you have just referred?

Captain SAFFORD. I have, before me.

General RUSSELL. From what sources did you obtain the copies of these messages?

Captain SAFFORD. These were copies given to me by Op20G.

General RUSSELL. Now will you interpret that for us?

Captain SAFFORD. Op20G is the communication intelligence section, or communication division, of Naval Operations.

General RUSSELL. Is that the official source from which these messages just referred to came?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; they were the official custodians.

General RUSSELL. They were the official custodians.

Captain SAFFORD. I gave a receipt for my copy.

General RUSSELL. Would you read those two reports into the record for us, please, Captain?

[113] Captain SAFFORD. Before giving those messages, I would like to give the background for them.

On the 24th of November the Director of Naval Intelligence released a message to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, information to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, and 16th Naval District, stating:

Orange naval movements as reported from individual information addressees perhaps have been conflicting because of necessarily fragmentary nature. Since Com 16 intercepts are considered most reliable, suggest other reports carefully evaluated be sent to Com 16 for action, OpNav for information; after combining all incoming reports Com 16 direct dispatches to Opnav info CINCPAC based on all information received, indicating own evaluation and providing best possible continuity. Request CINCAF issue directive as necessary to fulfill general objective.

General FRANK. CINCAF is Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet?

Captain SAFFORD. Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet; yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now let us determine whether or not we properly digested the information which you have just read. This was a message which was sent to certain addressees from the Naval Department in Washington?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. That is true. Now, who were those addressees?

Captain SAFFORD. The full addressees: the action addressee [114] was the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet. The information addressees as listed were: Commandant 16th Naval District; Naval Attache, Chungking; Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai; Naval Attache, Tokyo; and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, are we correct in interpreting that message, briefly, as meaning that the Naval Department here was somewhat confused in its thinking about what was going on out there, because of conflicts in messages which were reaching it from numerous Pacific sources? Is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And then you did say there in that message that you regarded the information coming from the 16th District as being the most reliable, more so than any other?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And you cautioned the addressees to be careful about evaluating data before forwarding it to the Navy Department; is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. We went beyond that and told them that anything they had to send to the 16th District for action Navy Department only, information, and Com 16 would evaluate it and send it on with his own interpretation of the evaluation.

General RUSSELL. All right. Now, then, Captain—

Captain SAFFORD. I haven't got to these other two yet, but I thought that ought to come first because it came there logically.

General RUSSELL. I was going to ask you now if you would give us the messages to which we referred in the beginning.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. The first message was from [115] the Commandant 14th Naval District to Naval Operations, Information Commanders-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet, and Commandant 16th Naval District, and the time group was 260110. This message stated:

For past month Commander Second Fleet has been organizing a task force which comprises following units: second fleet, third fleet including first and second base forces, and first defense division, combined air force, destroyer division three, air squadron seven, submarine squadron five, and possibly units of battleship division three from first fleet. In messages concerning these units South China Fleet and French Indo-China Force have appeared as well as the naval station at Sama, Bako, and Takao, the Third Base Force at Palau, and resident naval officer Palau have also been engaged in extensive communications with Second Fleet Commander. Combined air force has assembled in Takao with indications that some components have moved on to Hainan. Third Fleet units believed to be moving in direction of Takao and Bako. Second Base Force appears transporting equipment of air force to Taiwan. Takao radio said to be traffic for unidentified second fleet unit and submarine division or squadron. Cruiser division seven and destroyer squadron three appear as an advance unit and may be en route South China. There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines [116] and air groups in the Marshalls which comprise air squadron 24, at least one carrier division unit, plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palau and Marshalls.

For information, these air squadrons were all flying boats, scouting planes, patrol planes: long-range patrol planes. They were not carrier-based planes, but they did say, "at least one carrier division unit." That is one or more carriers. It is awkwardly expressed. They mean one or more carriers, by that.

General GRUNERT. In those carrier division units they usually had two carriers, did they? That would mean the carrier and the accompanying plane guard?

Captain SAFFORD. What we now call a carrier task force. That would be the carrier and protecting cruisers and some destroyers for plane guards.

General RUSSELL. I think General Grunert's question, in effect, was to inquire as to the number of carriers in a division.

Captain SAFFORD. The number of carriers in a division would vary from two to four.

General RUSSELL. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. That was that one. The other message—

General RUSSELL. That concludes the first message?

Captain SAFFORD. That concludes the first message from Pearl Harbor.

[117] General RUSSELL. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. Now, the second message, which came from Cavite, was from Commandant 16th Naval District, for action Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Naval Operations, Commandant 14th Naval District, Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, and time group was 261331:—1331 of the 26th. The first group is the date; hour; minutes:

Morning comment Com 14 to 110 of 26th.

That is reference this other one.

Traffic analyses past few days indicate Commander-in-Chief Second directing units of first, second, third fleets and submarine force in a loose knit task force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections. For purposes of clarity, units expected to operate in South China area will be referred to as "First Section" and units expected to operate in Mandates will be referred to "Second Section." Estimated units in First Section are Cruiser Division seven, Air Squadron six, Defense Division one, Destroyer Squadron three, and Submarine Squadron six. Second Section, Cruiser Division five, Carrier Division three, Ryujo, and one Maru, Destroyer Squadrons two and four, Submarine Squadron five, Destroyer Division twenty-three, First Base Force of Third Fleet, Third Base Force at Palau, Fifth Base Force at Saipan, and lesser units unidentified. Cruiser Division six and Battleship Division three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively, but status cannot be [118] clarified yet. Balance Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Destroyer Squadron five will take station in Formosa Straits or further south. There are slight indications today that Destroyer Squadron three, Cruiser Division seven, and Submarine Squadron six are in Takao area. Combined air force units from Empire are at Pakhoi, Hoihow, Saigon, Takao, and other bases on Taiwan and China coast. Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in Mandates. Our best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo Kure area. Our lists indicate Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in Nagato, Commander-in-Chief First in Hyuga, and Commander-in-Chief Second in Atago, in Kure area, Commander-in-Chief Third in Ashigara and Sasebo area, Commander-in-Chief Fifth in Chichijima area, Commander-in-Chief Sub Force in Kashima and Yokosuka area, but this considered unreliable. South China Fleet appears to have been strengthened by units from Central or North China, probably torpedo boats. Southern expeditionary force apparently being reinforced by one base force unit. Directives to the above task forces, if such, are directed to individual units and not complete groups. Special calls usually precede formation of task force used in area operations. Commander-in-Chief Second, Commander-in-Chief Third, and Commander-in-Chief [119] Southern expeditionary fleet appear to have major roles. Traffic from Navy Minister and Chief of Naval General Staff to Commanders-in-Chief of Fleet appear normal. Evaluation is considered reliable.

And that is the end of this message.

General RUSSELL. Now, Captain, as I have listened to those two messages the distinction between them seems to be in the fact that one stated rather positively that carriers were in the mandated islands, and the other regarded that bit of information as debatable; is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. As more than debatable; as erroneous.

General RUSSELL. As erroneous. So there was a report that carriers were in the Mandate, and a report on the same say that carriers were not in the Mandate?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. Yes. Has the consideration of any data reaching the Naval Department subsequent to the 26th day of November 1941 enabled the Naval Department to determine which of those two reports was accurate?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. There were copies of the daily intelligence bulletin which were furnished—

General RUSSELL. I am afraid you didn't understand the question. Now does the Naval Department think that carriers were in the Mandates at that time or that they were not?

Captain SAFFORD. They were not.

General RUSSELL. Now, when did you get an additional message relating to the Japanese probabilities after these two of November 26, 1941?

[120] Captain SAFFORD. That was the last word that we heard from our advance bases up until the time of the attack.

General RUSSELL. Now, Captain, in order to hurry the examination along, I have before me the testimony which you gave during the investigation conducted by Admiral Hart. I refer to page 358 of that testimony. There is a statement in the testimony:

On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature.

Apparently there is no further explanation in this testimony. Now, would you enlighten the Board on just where this information came from, what record exists of such information, and so forth?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. What date was that?

General RUSSELL. This was the November 24th date where the 29th of November was fixed as the governing date for offensive military action.

Captain SAFFORD. That was from the series of messages, the first of which we received on November 5th, and it may be identified by S. I. S. 24373 (that is the Army identification number) which says:

It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

And added in parentheses:

Of utmost secrecy.

On November 12th S. I. S. No. 24373 told us:

The United States still not fully aware of the [121] exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The date set is a definite deadline. The situation is nearing a climax. Time is indeed becoming short.

Those were two messages from Tokyo, incidentally.

On November 22nd, from S. I. S. No. 25138, we learned that Tokyo had informed Ambassador Nomura:

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if the signing can be completed by the 29th—

and he repeated it in words, to make certain of no mistake.

—we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.

And on November 24th, in S. I. S. 25178, Tokyo stated, referring to the previous message I just quoted from:

The time limit is in Tokyo time.

General RUSSELL. Will you define "S. I. S." for us?

Captain SAFFORD. That is an abbreviation for "Signal Intelligence Service," and that is the number put on these documents which were in the files of the Signal Intelligence Service in the Army, and I think later on they were turned over to G-2 for final custody.

General RUSSELL. The S. I. S., Signal Intelligence Service, was an agency of the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. That was an agency of the Army; yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. How does it come to pass that this [122] information furnished by S. I. S. is in your files?

Captain SAFFORD. The communication intelligence organization of the Navy and the S. I. S. of the Army were working in cooperation on

this matter for over a year. We had divided up interception of Japanese messages to insure that no circuits were left uncovered and that we had a minimum of duplication consistent with adequate coverage. We exchanged the messages between the interested services. Then there was arrangement made on the diplomatic messages that the Army processed them on the even days of the month, and the Navy processed them on the odd days of the month, but both services got copies of the translations and handled their own dissemination of intelligence from that point.

General RUSSELL. Captain, you have been reading to the Board from a record which you have before you. Who prepared that record?

Captain SAFFORD. I prepared that message myself.

General RUSSELL. From what source or sources did you derive the information which you have placed in that record?

Captain SAFFORD. This was prepared by me back in November, December of last year, and about January to March of this year, and this was prepared from original sources. I borrowed the files from Op20G, went through the stuff, and prepared these briefs which have served to prompt my memory on this or anything else that might be coming at the same time. Most of those messages at the bottom had both the S. I. S. number and the Navy's identification number, which is a JD number. So we have those complete.

[123] General RUSSELL. It is true, then, that you had access to the original messages which came to the Navy from S. I. S. when you prepared this memorandum?

Captain SAFFORD. I had access to the original copies which have been distributed for information and then returned to file.

General RUSSELL. The information which you are testifying about this morning and data that you are giving to the Board—you can certify that this is the information in those original files?

Captain SAFFORD. I can certify that this is the information and that it is my interpretation of the brief. I would have to get the meat of maybe a five-page message boiled down to a single sentence.

General RUSSELL. All right. Now, the record from which I was reading a moment ago states that:

On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States.

Now, would you give to the Board the sources of the information upon which that statement was made to Admiral Hart?

Captain SAFFORD. Let me look this over.

General RUSSELL. Have you found it?

Captain SAFFORD. I am sorry I cannot explain that now. I do not have before me the brief that I had before Admiral Hart. I had a longer brief before him, and I to a certain extent pruned this one, at a time that I thought that a great deal of information would not be allowed to come before either the Army Board or the Navy Court of Inquiry. I cannot find [124] anything now that would set anything that specific as November the 26th.

General RUSSELL. Have you any independent recollection of the data upon which you base that statement to Admiral Hart?

Captain SAFFORD. Will you please read me the statement again?

General RUSSELL. The statement is:

On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States.

And, of course, the thing the Board is interested in is, What was that specific evidence?

Captain SAFFORD. On November 26 we received—we had information that Japan was contemplating offensive action against England and the United States and possibly against Russia, though no commitments.

That is contained in S. I. S. No. 25392. That was a message which was sent from Tokyo on November 19, 1941, the day before Tokyo delivered its note of November 20th to Washington, and this said that—I will check that more carefully. That if diplomatic——

General RUSSELL. What are you reading from there?

Captain SAFFORD. I am reading from a dispatch we got two days later, but I have not got a copy of this other with me. I did not bring in any of these original sources with me.

General RUSSELL. All right.

Captain SAFFORD. I can tell you——

General RUSSELL. Now, let us not——

Captain SAFFORD. It said that——

[125] General RUSSELL. What said?

Captain SAFFORD. This message, which is S. I. S. No. 25392, said that Japan would announce her intentions in regard to war or possibly breaking off diplomatic relations with Russia, England including the Netherlands East Indies, and the United States by means of a word sent five times in the middle and at the end of their information broadcast, which is in Morse code; and in a later message they sent the schedule on which this warning would be broadcast; and the specific words were: "East" meant United States; "West" meant England including the Netherlands East Indies; and "North" meant Russia. We had that. The 26th (I think it was seven days old at the time we got it) we were able to work it out.

Two days later——

General RUSSELL. Two days later from what date?

Captain SAFFORD. On November 28th, 1941, we read another message dated November 19, which is S. I. S. 25432—I have that Navy translation, incidentally—giving a "Winds" code to be used in their voice broadcasts; and that said Japan-United States was "East wind rain"; Japan-Russia, "North wind cloudy"; and Japan-British including Netherlands East Indies, "West wind clear."

The voice was longer than what is set up for the Morse.

We also received on the 28th, from the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, their message to the Navy Department, information Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, the Commandants 14th and 16th Districts, No. 281430:

Following Tokyo to net. Intercept. Translation received from Singapore. If diplomatic relations are [126] on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcast will have significance as follows:

Higashi higashi: Japanese-American

Kita kita: Russia

Nishi nishi: England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Netherlands East Indies.

On Japanese-language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences, repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of the broadcasts, will be used:

America: Higashi no kaze komura

England: Nishi no kaze hare

British and Com 16 monitoring above broadcasts.

And that is the end of the message.

Incidentally, there is a mistake in the message, because they apparently left out a whole line in coding, and there is no mention of Russia, and the word set up for America was a combination of what started for "America" and ended up for "Russia"; but that doesn't matter, because we understood that perfectly, already having decoded the messages ourselves and translated them.

In connection with that, on the 3rd of December the Navy Department handled a message from the Naval Attaché of Batavia that was originated by Colonel Thorpe in Batavia and addressed to General Miles in the War Department, and he gave a version of the "Winds" code in a tip-off as given to him by the Dutch authorities, and it was much stronger, and the Dutch translation says their reference is to war, not a question of [127] diplomatic relations becoming critical. That message was from Alusna, Batavia (Naval Attaché in Batavia) 031030.

And on the 4th—

General RUSSELL. Now let us see. 4th of what?

Captain SAFFORD. The 4th of December.

General RUSSELL. When? '41?

Captain SAFFORD. '41. Similar information came from the State Department, having been submitted by Consul General Foote, in Batavia, message No. 220, dated 4 December 1941, to the State Department.

General RUSSELL. Now, Captain, let us summarize what we have just been discussing. The testimony which you have just given us in response to my question about specific evidence on this November 26 message, to this time, relates, as I understand it, almost in its entirety, to the intercept of certain information, which information defined the Japanese code words to be flashed for information as to the relation between the Japanese Empire and the United States, Russia, and the British, with certain other people lined up with the British; is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. To this time nothing has been testified as to any implementing message on this code? And by "implementing" I mean: if your record stopped at the point to which you have testified now, there would be nothing in that to indicate what disposition the Japanese Empire had at that time toward the United States, Britain, or Russia?

Captain SAFFORD. Nothing that I have testified.

[128] General RUSSELL. Till this time?

Captain SAFFORD. To this time.

General RUSSELL. Yes. It is true, however, Captain, that the fact that these codes about which you have testified, existed, and the purposes for which they were brought into existence, indicated the possibility, if not the probability, of break in diplomatic relations or the waging of offensive war against one or more of the three powers,

to wit, the United States, the British and her sources, and Russia; is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct as to any or all of the three named.

General RUSSELL. And that, of course, is particularly true on the subject of the deadline message about which you testified?

Captain SAFFORD. That made the deadline message mean a lot more, and the deadline message made that mean a lot more.

General RUSSELL. Now, am I correct in stating that this information about which you have testified, relating to this code and its possible meaning, all came from S. I. S. or these other sources which you have described?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; all of it came through S. I. S. or the Naval Communication Intelligence organization.

General RUSSELL. A moment ago when I interrupted you, you were about to read a message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Will you return to that message and read that now, please, sir?

[129] Captain SAFFORD. That is the message from Colonel Thorpe, and this is Naval Attaché Alusna, Batavia (That is just the abbreviation addressee) 031030, addressed to Naval Operations. Message reads:

From Thorpe for Miles, War Department. Code intercept. Japan will notify her Consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcast as weather report at end. East wind rain: United States. North wind cloudy: Russia. West wind clear: England, with attack on Thailand, Malaya, and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

That is the end of the message. This message combined the information of two messages sent out from Tokyo.

I will see if I have Foote's message there now. Yes, I have Mr. Foote's also, on the 4th, and this is headed: "Batavia," dated December 4, 1941, received 9:19 a. m., Secretary of State, Washington, No. 220, December 4, 10 a. m. The message follows:

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo: When crisis leading to worst arises, following will be broadcast at end weather reports:

1. East wind rain: war with the United States.
2. North wind cloudy: war with Russia.
3. West wind clear: war with Britain, including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies.

If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers. [130] Same re following: From Japan Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia: When threat of crises exists, following will be used five times in text of general reports and radio broadcasts:

1. Higashi, east: America.
2. Kita, north: Russia.
3. Nishi, west: Britain, with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch East Indies.

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attached little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

Signed "Foote."

That is the end of the message.

General RUSSELL. Then, it is true that from S. I. S. and from those two messages which you have just read the same information came,

and the S. I. S. information apparently was sent to you or you received it on two or three different occasions there, two or three different reports, as I recall your testimony.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, except they were Navy translations, and we gave them to S. I. S.

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. They happened to be Navy translations.

General RUSSELL. Where did they pick them up?

Captain SAFFORD. We intercepted the messages at Bainbridge Island, Washington, near Bremerton, and they were forwarded to Washington by teletype.

General RUSSELL. Whom were those messages from and to [131] whom were they being sent, if you recall?

Captain SAFFORD. They were from the Foreign Office in Tokyo and addressed to Jap Consuls all over the world. These particular ones which we got I think were addressed to America. I am not just certain. I know that message was relayed all over the world.

General RUSSELL. Where are those messages now, Captain, those S. I. S. messages to which you have referred?

Captain SAFFORD. The S. I. S. messages I believe are in the custody of the G-2, General Staff, and the same messages except filed under the Navy number are out at 20G, that communication annex on the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and Nebraska Avenue.

General RUSSELL. In other words, your testimony is now to the effect that, insofar as you know, copies or the originals of these messages which we will describe as the S. I. S. messages are filed both with the Navy and the Army?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, in order to keep the record more or less logical, before we deal with the Nomura message to our state, the paper of November 26, I am going to ask you to tell us about the follow-up on this code about which you have been talking, whether or not on or about December 4th you did receive information which indicated that the Japanese Empire had employed this code and the intercepted messages indicated final decisions affecting the United States, Russia, Britain; one or more of these powers.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, we did. That was received in the morning of Thursday, December 4, 1941. It was received [132] about 8 o'clock at one of our East Coast intercept stations and sent in to the Navy Department by teletype. I saw it when I first came to the office. I, it seemed, had no more than sat down to my desk when Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who was our senior language officer, and Lieutenant (junior grade) Murray, who was the watch officer from my section, came into my office, and Murray held up a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is," and they put it on the desk for me, and it was a message, oh, I would say of 200 words or so, in Japanese, with this "Winds" code, you might say, contained in it and underscored, and the writing at the bottom in lead pencil in Kramer's handwriting, "War with England, war with America, peace with Russia."

The message as received was not the way we expected it, because they had mixed up their voice procedure with the Morse code message. It was the full thing; it wasn't just the one word; it was the "East wind rain" and all the rest of it. And to further confuse it they

gave a negative form of "North wind cloudy." What it was I don't know, but it didn't look like anything we had sent, and there was some confusion as to what they meant by it; but we knew from other sources that they were definitely not going to attack Russia at that particular time, and that was very clear. And that original message was immediately taken up by the watch officer, Lieutenant (junior grade) Murray, and given to Admiral Noyes, in accord with some special orders which had been issued for the occasion.

General RUSSELL. Where is that original message now, Captain?

[133] Captain SAFFORD. That original message cannot be located and has not been seen since the time it was given to Admiral Noyes, unless it was given to the Roberts Commission and filed with their papers.

General RUSSELL. What record of that message was made in the office with which you were associated at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. Unfortunately, we cannot find any written record of the message. We have looked now for more than six months.

General RUSSELL. What was done in connection with the delivery of that message to the War Department, if anything?

Captain SAFFORD. The duplicate copy from the teletype was taken and translated in normal fashion, and four copies of the translation interpretation made. Two were sent out to the War Department and I presume sent over that morning, because we made two or three delivery trips a day, and we were then in the Navy Department, and the Army unit was in the Munitions Building, so we were very convenient to each other. In fact, we had a special telephone line, a trunk line which did not go through any switchboards; so, anything important, we would pick up the receiver and talk right to the other party, get them immediately, which we used if we couldn't have a special courier or if anything hot came up. And also I know that in the Navy Department that copy was distributed around noon, in connection with the daily routine distribution of translations, and that went to the Chief of Naval Operations, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Director of Naval Communications, Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Director of War Plans Division, also went to the State Department and to the White House.

[134] General FRANK. And this was on what date?

Captain SAFFORD. On the 4th of December 1941.

General RUSSELL. Have you helped or been active at all in this search which has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original message.

Captain SAFFORD. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the officer in charge, who was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little harder and see if they couldn't make one more search and discover it. And when Captain Stone discovered it couldn't be found, he called for—required written statements for anybody who might have any notice of that; and though the written statements disclosed a lot of destruction of other messages and things—not messages, but the intercepts; not the translations—nothing ever came to light on that message, either the carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been filed with the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the translation should have been filed under the JD num-

ber, which I think is 7001, because that number is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls very close to the proper date. It actually comes in with the 3rd, but things sometime got a little bit out as far as putting those numbers on was concerned. And the other should be filed under the date and with the translation. We had a double file.

The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and Kramer [135] assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones; and that "Winds" translation, the "Winds execute," was included in those. I do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.

We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could run it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact date of it and the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down and not make the thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory of Kramer or the memory of Murray, who do distinctly recall it.

General FRANK. To what specific office in the War Department was that message delivered; do you know?

Captain SAFFORD. That message and all messages were delivered to the people in the Signal Intelligence Service. It probably went to Major Doud, who was in charge of the Japanese section of the S. I. S. at that time.

General FRANK. It was not transmitted to G-2? It was transmitted to the Signal Intelligence Service?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; and from them to G-2 and any other distribution they made. They usually gave those to Colonel Bratton, who was the head of their Far Eastern Section. He normally handled the dissemination and distribution himself.

General GRUNERT. This message originated on the East Coast, didn't it? Have they any record of it?

Captain SAFFORD. All of this—

[136] General FRANK. West Coast.

Major CLAUSEN. West Coast.

General GRUNERT. Where did it originate?

Captain SAFFORD. It came from Tokyo, but it was intercepted on an East Coast station.

General GRUNERT. East Coast.

Captain SAFFORD. And all the station logs unfortunately had been destroyed sometime during '43. The ones that had been sent into the Navy Department had all been burned up. Every time they moved in connection with expansion a lot of stuff got burnt.

General GRUNERT. That is S. O. P., is it? Standing Operating Procedure?

Captain SAFFORD. More or less. And the station logs had been retained for some time, but they had all been destroyed within the year. When we started looking for it, the only station logs that remained intact were those from the Bainbridge Island, Washington, station, and we looked through there on the off chance they might have had it, but they didn't.

Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask him a question? Are you through?

General GRUNERT. I have a question here, but you may proceed.

Colonel TOULMIN. Captain, you stated in your last long answer that a copy of this December 4th message, this final message from Japan, was sent to the White House. What proof have you of the fact that it did go to the White House?

Captain SAFFORD. Everything we got from November 4th— [137] I mean, from November 12th on, was sent to the White House.

Colonel TOULMIN. To whom was it sent in the White House?

Captain SAFFORD. It was taken over personally by Commander Kramer and was given by him to the Naval Aide to the President, Admiral Beardall, and Admiral Beardall took it in to the President, and when the President was through with them and returned them he gave them back to Kramer. Sometimes Kramer gave them to Admiral Beardall in the Naval Department; sometimes he took them to the White House.

Colonel TOULMIN. And the copies that were shown to the President came to the White House from the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. It was the same copy that everybody else saw in the Navy Department.

Colonel TOULMIN. It was circulated copy?

Captain SAFFORD. It was circulated copy.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did the President get it first or did he get it last?

Captain SAFFORD. Normally he got it last.

Colonel TOULMIN. What date would you say that under that procedure he would have gotten the December 4th message?

Captain SAFFORD. On December 4th.

Colonel TOULMIN. Not later than that date?

Captain SAFFORD. Not later than that. There was a regular routine that we went through, including a trip to the downtown post office to pick up the messages, have them photographed, and return, and it was all worked in on that trip. There were several more messages such as that, in addition to the White House, and Commander Kramer went downtown and picked them up on the way back. If he gave [138] them to Admiral Beardall here, why, he took a little bit longer coming back. Sometimes he was late coming back from the White House, didn't come back until late in the evening.

Colonel TOULMIN. Was the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, on this circulatory list?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

- Colonel TOULMIN. But he was shown them by the Army through a special arrangement?

Captain SAFFORD. At one time we had taken a month's duty on it, and that had gotten them into trouble, and all orders were based on that arrangement. Now, from the 12th of November the orders were made by the Navy Department. From then on we would show everything to the President, and then in turn the Army would show everything to Secretary Hull. Colonel Bratton took those in to him, and so again it was a matter of a routine daily delivery of everything.

Colonel TOULMIN. Was the showing of such message by the Army to Secretary Hull coincident with the showing of the message to the President by the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. Coincident but independent; might be quicker, and might be later.

Colonel TOULMIN. But it would be substantially within the same period?

Captain SAFFORD. But it would be substantially within the same day.

Colonel TOULMIN. That is all.

General GRUNERT. In that connection, I am interested in a statement made by you that indicated to me that at sometime in the not too distance past it was not intended to give the Navy Court of Inquiry and the Army Board certain secret information. Were there any instructions on that subject? [139] And, if so, what instructions lifted that ban?

Captain SAFFORD. It is a rather long story. Admiral Kimmel's counsel or Admiral Kimmel requested the Secretary of the Navy to furnish him a copy of Admiral Hart's report, which was done, and on the basis of that he requested permission for his counsel—I think it was Captain Lavender who actually did it—to inspect all the files out at 20G, communications intelligence files, to see what information had been in existence in the Navy Department. This was done, and Captain Lavender submitted a request for certified translations, photographs of roughly sixty of these messages. They were prepared and turned over to the Director of Naval Communications; and in the meantime, since the Army had an interest in it, somebody in S. I. S. was notified, and they protested; and I can't recall the names, but a Colonel and a Major came over from G-2 to see Admiral Sherman and protested against permitting top secret stuff to be made a part of any official record; and I was called in on the thing. So were Captain Rochefort and Captain Murphy, who was Acting Director of Naval Communications, and all interested parties.

Admiral Sherman said that he would recommend to uphold the objection, and Secretary Forrestal issued an order in writing—or Acting Secretary Forrestal—that this stuff was not to be made available to this inquiry. And I went on leave at that point, and when I came back from leave, or some time, the Secretary—excuse me. I am mixed up. It was Secretary Bard who disapproved it, and when Secretary Forrestal came back from London he reversed the decision and said to make [140] this stuff available, and so it was all introduced as evidence before the Navy Court of Inquiry, these selected sixty-odd messages, before I appeared on the witness stand, but I know all about it because I was called in before Admiral Sherman to give my opinion as to the advisability, and so forth.

Colonel TOULMIN. Was anything further heard from the Army in protest of this decision of Secretary Forrestal?

Captain SAFFORD. Not that I have ever heard.

General FRANK. Who has official custody of these sixty messages at the moment?

Captain SAFFORD. The Recorder of the Navy Court of Inquiry. That is Commander Harold Biesmeier.

General FRANK. If it was the desire of these Boards to get a copy of those sixty messages, to whom should the request be made?

Captain SAFFORD. I would state, to the Secretary of the Navy, in the case of the Army.

Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask him just one question :

In these sixty messages will we find this message of December 4th which you said heretofore was missing, or is it still missing?

Captain SAFFORD. That is still missing.

General RUSSELL. I want to ask a question about that: When it went to 20G it was filed?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And now it is out of 20G's files; is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. The original distribution copies were collected for the Roberts Commission, at Admiral Noyes' order, [141] because a great many of them had initials of at least Admiral Ingersoll, who used to very frequently initial something. He was the only one who ever did. I don't know why he did it, what it indicated, but his initial is on them, showing that at least he saw them, and those were the originals that he has. There should have been a duplicate made to take its place. They were trying to turn loose of everything because there were duplicates prepared of everything. That is the only message in the whole file that is missing that couldn't be located.

General RUSSELL. Well, now, let us have JD 7001. Tell us what JD 7001 is.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, the JD was just an arbitrary designation for a file among the S. I. S. files, put on Army copies, and they were all given a serial number for quicker use and identification, so we can refer them to that then and not spill any beans.

General RUSSELL. Well, what I mean now, Captain, is: Was there a file over there in the Navy Department which was called the JD file in which you had papers?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. That is at 20G too. That file is complete from the very first one, from No. 1 up until the time that the Navy gave this up and turned the whole thing over to the Army sometime in '42.

General RUSSELL. What is the point, then? In 20G you have a 20G file where you put all these messages; and also in 20G you have a JG file where you put duplicates of all these messages; is that right?

[142] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. One set, the original distribution copy—they were all filed by date of origin, and they were the ones that we used for dissemination, that were circulated; and then very often, if a previous message was referred to, that message would be taken out again and appended to the original message, so the higher authority could see exactly what they were talking about, and not have to be talking on our briefs.

General RUSSELL. Well, now, let us talk cases.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other place you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I have just discussed.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. But you had messages over there in the JD file?

Captain SAFFORD. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct.

General RUSSELL. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, but they were in a different order.

General RUSSELL. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it went to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony, of 7001?

Captain SAFFORD. It probably was.

General RUSSELL. You don't know that?

Captain SAFFORD. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence.

General RUSSELL. Well, in JD 7000 in that file now?

[143] Captain SAFFORD. JD 7000 is there, and 7002.

General RUSSELL. But 7001 just isn't there?

Captain SAFFORD. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is present or accounted for except 7001.

General RUSSELL. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place in this office. Is this December 5th message the only one that is out of those files?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the only one that we looked for that we couldn't find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we haven't looked for, but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked all through the month to make certain. That is the only one that is missing or unaccounted for. The Army had a similar system. They filed their paper on a similar idea.

General RUSSELL. A little while ago, in response to questions from Colonel Toulmin about the delivery of copies of this message of December 4th to the White House and to the State Department, your response was to the effect that this was a normal routine procedure on and after November 4, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. November 12, sir.

General RUSSELL. November 12, '41. Now, you are testifying, Captain, that this particular message of December 4th went over there because of routine, or do you have any knowledge of this particular message as having gone over there?

Captain SAFFORD. I have no particular knowledge of that message having been circulated other than it was the routine to circulate everything. Also, that was included when Kramer collected the messages which had been distributed before; that message was among those present, and that was turned over to [144] Admiral Noyes about the 15th of December, 1941, for the purpose of presenting to the Roberts Commission as evidence.

General RUSSELL. The last time, then, that you have seen the message, you say, the message of December 4th about which you are testifying now, was on or about the 15th of December, 1941, when Admiral Noyes was collecting certain information to deliver to the Roberts Commission?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. And did you see this message of December 4th among the messages that had been collected by Admiral Noyes to deliver to the Roberts Commission?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; that was among those.

Colonel TOULMIN. Where is Kramer now?

Captain SAFFORD. He is in the Pacific somewhere.

Colonel TOULMIN. You don't know?

Captain SAFFORD. I think he is at Honolulu. I am not certain. He was at Noumea.

General RUSSELL. Did anyone other than Commander Kramer deliver these messages to the White House, that you know of?

Captain SAFFORD. During the month of December—from November 12 on, all deliveries to the White House were made by Kramer or by Admiral Beardall—or through Admiral Beardall. I think Kramer saw the President himself on only one or two occasions.

General RUSSELL. Captain, you have no doubt in your mind that that "Wind" message of December 4th contained information as to the disposition of the Japanese Empire toward the American Government?

[145] Captain SAFFORD. I am absolutely convinced now, and I was at the time.

General RUSSELL. Yes, sir.

Captain SAFFORD. This isn't second guessing at all.

General RUSSELL. In your testimony before Admiral Hart, which I will show you, you gave the Japanese expressions which apparently were those in that message of December 4; is that right?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Reference to that record, the Hart record, which I have just shown you, indicates that you testified before Admiral Hart on or about what date?

Captain SAFFORD. Late in April, as I recall.

General RUSSELL. I think it is there somewhere, (indicating).

Captain SAFFORD. April 29th.

General RUSSELL. Now let us turn back to the message. From what source did you obtain these Japanese expressions or words which are found in your evidence given to Admiral Hart?

Captain SAFFORD. I got those from the messages setting up the "Winds" code, plus my recollection of the events: that two came exactly as we expected them, that is, the one for America and for England, and also the negative form of the Japanese for "North wind cloudy." I do not know enough about Japanese to be able to give that from memory. I mean, I remember that it was exactly what we expected to get on those two occasions, and garbled up on the Russian business.

General RUSSELL. Then, the memorandum from which you refreshed your recollection at the time that you testified [146] before Admiral Hart, as a matter of fact, was the code that you had discovered prior to November 28, 1941, and you took that language from that Japanese code and compiled from recollection the message of December 4th and gave that to Admiral Hart as being the message of December 4th; that is the truth?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, it being the essential or the substance of what we were interested in, because there was a lot more which was just straight Japanese news, and I couldn't make head or tail of it.

General RUSSELL. You don't know of any reason why, when this message reached the War Department, a different construction should have been placed upon it to the effect that nothing was in the message as to the probable intentions of the Japanese Empire with respect to the United States Government?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not, and I had never heard that any such thought existed.

General RUSSELL. If I am stating that that thought did exist or that we have evidence to that effect, this would be the first time that you have ever heard it?

Captain SAFFORD. This would be the first time that I have heard of it. I might say that we often differed on translations of Japanese messages, and the very important ones were always retranslated by the other service independently, as a checkup; and if there was a marked difference both translations were given to higher authority to let them make their choice. But we received nothing back from the War Department indicating that they were not satisfied with our translation.

[147] General RUSSELL. At about the time that these messages were being received, say in December prior to Pearl Harbor and shortly thereafter—and I have reference now to this message of December 4th—do you recall having discussed that message with any officer of the Army who was charged with the receipt of such messages and their evaluation?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recollect any discussion of it with Army officers. I do know that somebody from my office discussed the interception with the Army, because when Colonel Guest requested the F. C. C. to watch for that message at their intercept station at Portland he gave them the telephone number of the 20G watch officer so that if it came at night he could get it in without losing any time. As a matter of fact, again next night, on the evening of the 4th, the F. C. C. did pick up a message that was apparently just part of a routine weather broadcast, and that was phoned over to the watch officer, Brotherhood, Lieutenant (junior grade) Brotherhood, about 9 o'clock on the evening of December the 4th, and that caused a lot of confusion because talking in veiled language we got the two things mixed up. The false "Winds" message was mixed up with the true one. There was a lot of confusion in our minds until Brotherhood came back from Honolulu and we had a chance to talk with him in the last couple of weeks, and we were straightened out in a moment on that one.

General RUSSELL. Could that have confused the thinking in the War Department as to the full force and effect and meaning of the "Winds" message of December 4th?

Captain SAFFORD. I don't see how it could have, because [148] our message came in and came twelve hours before the other one; but, as I say, they might have disagreed with our translation or they might have disagreed with our evaluation. The evaluation was out of our hands, and that is a function of Naval Intelligence, and they were supposed to discuss that with Military Intelligence, and if they disagreed with us they never told us.

Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask him a question there?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Captain, as I understood your testimony, the Japanese Ambassador in one message indicated that the United States statement of its position on the 26th of November, 1941, as given by Secretary Hull to the Ambassador, was an ultimatum. Was I correct in understanding your testimony something to that effect?

Captain SAFFORD. Will you please give the question again?

General RUSSELL. Before we answer that, Colonel Toulmin has gone into a subject I was about to go into that is wholly dissociated

from the "Winds" message. Now, is there anything else we want to develop on the "Winds" message?

General GRUNERT. What I want to find out is: Have you ever talked to Kramer about this message since, about its being missing or about its interpretation or about its delivery to the President?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer has been gone from the country for more than a year and a half. In fact, he has been gone for some time. I discussed it at length just before he left. We didn't know it was missing then, and I have written to Kramer [149] about it since, to refresh my memory on things I wasn't clear on; but with censorship and everything, and top secret stuff, the information which was sent had to be extremely vague both ways. I didn't discuss that particularly with Kramer. I never asked Kramer particularly if he showed that particular message to the White House or not. He never said it hadn't been.

General RUSSELL. In your discussions of this message with Kramer was there ever expressed by Kramer any doubt as to its existence and as to the interpretation of the message which you have placed on it?

Captain SAFFORD. There never has by Kramer, and Murray has also assured me of its existence, because for a while it looked as though my memory had been playing me tricks, because a lot of the people knew about it by hearsay but had not seen it themselves. It was kept very secret and was rushed through very fast.

General RUSSELL. Well, the question I asked: Were you and Kramer, in all of these conversations, in agreement that the message came in as you have described it to us, and were you in agreement as to its interpretation and as to its general effect?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; Kramer and I were in complete agreement.

Colonel TOULMIN. I should like to find out to whom this "Colonel and Major" refers.

Major CLAUSEN. Sir, you mentioned that certain information you assumed was not going to come before the Army Board or the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

Major CLAUSEN. And that later on you discussed or there [150] were discussions with a Colonel and a Major from G-2. You do not recall those names at this time?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not recall the names.

Major CLAUSEN. Did you talk with these men yourself?

Captain SAFFORD. Only generally, in the presence of Admiral Sherman. Generally everybody addressed their remarks to Admiral Sherman.

Major CLAUSEN. Could you ascertain from the records who these men were?

Captain SAFFORD. I believe I can.

Major CLAUSEN. Will you do that, and let us know?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I think Biesmeier was there.

Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; if you will do that.

Now, you assumed that that information would not come before this Board or the Navy Board of Inquiry. Is there other information that you assumed would not come before the Boards?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. That was objected to because it was top secret classification and that if it became public it would be very detrimental to the war effort.

Major CLAUSEN. Is there other information of the same character that has been withheld, to your knowledge?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

General GRUNERT. I suggest we have a short recess at this point.

(There was a brief recess.)

Colonel TOULMIN. Would you read my question to the Captain, please?

[151] The REPORTER (reading):

Captain, as I understood your testimony, the Japanese Ambassador in one message indicated that the United States statement of its position on the 26th of November, 1941, as given by Secretary Hull to the Ambassador, was an ultimatum. Was I correct in understanding your testimony something to that effect?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. I am sorry if I created that impression. I said that Kramer and I regarded that message as an ultimatum, and that Ambassador Nomura sent a message in which he said that he had failed his Emperor again and that his humiliation was complete.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that message of Nomura was sent after the 26th meeting?

Captain SAFFORD. It was sent after the message, I believe: the message after the one in which Nomura transmitted Secretary Hull's note of November 26, 1941.

Colonel TOULMIN. That is all I want.

General RUSSELL. Was that all, as you recall, that was said in Nomura's message at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. If you let me check on that, sir (examining papers).

Speaking entirely from memory, Nomura made some comment to the effect that Tokyo, of course, could not accept America's proposal.

General RUSSELL. Was a record made in the Navy Department of this particular message of Nomura's at that time?

Captain SAFFORD. No more so than for the other message [152] of the same time. The official evaluation of all of this was the function of Naval Intelligence, and I have no idea what they might have done.

General RUSSELL. That is not the point. Is there any reason why we couldn't obtain a copy of Nomura's message, about which you are now testifying, from the records of the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. Oh, yes, sir; they are in existence.

General RUSSELL. Do you think that this particular message is among those sixty messages to which reference has been made already?

Captain SAFFORD. I think it very likely, but I couldn't say for certain.

General RUSSELL. In your testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain, you stated that:

At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter.

Could you give the Board the basis for that statement?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. It is contained in two messages dated December 6, 1941, one of which may be identified as JD No. 7149, I

believe (I am giving that from memory; it isn't quoted here); and the other one is S. I. S. 25843. The first message stated that the Japanese Government—

General FRANK. Will you identify it?

Captain SAFFORD. What?

General FRANK. Will you identify it as to which one it is?

Captain SAFFORD. The one which I have as JD No. 7149 also [153] can be identified as Tokyo Serial No. 901; it advised Nomura and Kurusu that the Japanese Government's reply to the American Government's memorandum of November 26, 1941, would be contained in Serial No. 902, which would be very long, in fourteen parts, and in English; that this was to be typed smooth and held extremely secret, and was to be delivered to the American Government only on further orders which were to be given in the case.

S. I. S. 25843, which is Tokyo Serial No. 902, was the Japanese declaration of war, which was presented to Secretary Hull in the afternoon of December 7, 1941, about three-quarters of an hour or so after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. By 9 p. m. on December 6, 1941, we had received the first thirteen parts of that, and they were very abusive in language, accused the United States of all kinds of plots against Japan, and there was no doubt in our minds that that was a declaration of war, and we couldn't see the reason for withholding the fourteenth part. The fourteenth part came in somewhere around four or five a. m., it was enciphered about twelve hours later and that was distributed about 10 a. m.

General RUSSELL. Wait a minute.

Captain SAFFORD. It wasn't filed. It was filed about twelve hours after the other thing. We will put it that way. The Jap Government held that fourteenth part up specifically.

General RUSSELL. Now, Captain, you stated that the early message indicated that the later message, which was the long reply of the Japanese Government, would be received and would be sent in English?

Captain SAFFORD. In English, yes, sir.

[154] General RUSSELL. Well, did it actually come in in English?

Captain SAFFORD. It came in in English, so there was no delay on translation, no question as to meanings.

General RUSSELL. And then your testimony is that at 9 o'clock on Saturday on night before the attack at 1:30 p. m. the next day, you had thirteen-fourteenths or the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, then, you state that the remainder or the fourteenth part came in at four or five a. m., which was Sunday morning preceding the attack at one o'clock on the same day?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Is that true?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. How did it come in, the fourteenth part? Was it received in plain English too?

Captain SAFFORD. That was also in plain English.

General RUSSELL. So this entire message which was the reply of the Japanese Government to the Secretary of State's message of No-

vember 26, '41, was in the possession of the Navy Department at four or five a. m. on December 7, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. In plain English?

Captain SAFFORD. In plain English.

General RUSSELL. I regard that information as material, and want to develop it just a little further.

[155] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. As this message about which we are talking now appears in the book issued by the State Department, commonly referred to as the "White Paper," page 832 et sequentia, it has numberings which apparently are somewhat different from those referred to by you in your previous testimony. I am going to read paragraph 7 at page 838 of the book to which I have just referred, and then ask you whether or not you recall that paragraph as being the fourteenth part of the message which was received on or about four or five a. m. on the morning of December 7th.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. I am reading from the book, paragraph 7, at page 838.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. (Reading:)

(Excerpt from message of Japanese Government published in "White Paper" page 838, is as follows:)

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve [156] and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

Paragraph not numbered:

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

From your memory can you, or not, identify that as the fourteenth part of the message to which you have referred?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the fourteenth part, and the "part" referred to the way that it was broken up for coding and radio transmission, not to the way they were numbered inside.

Paragraph 7 and the other unnumbered paragraph, in other words, were part 14th of that long message.

General RUSSELL. Yes. As it was broken up for sending?

Captain SAFFORD. For convenience in coding and sending.

General RUSSELL. You couldn't be mistaken about the fact that this language which I have just read you was in the possession of the Navy Department as early as four or five o'clock on that Sunday morning, could you?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. The intercepted message was received by them and was broken down and decoded and written smooth by about seven a. m.

General RUSSELL. What did you mean a moment ago when you used the term "twelve hours"? I am somewhat confused about that.

[157] Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese filed the first thirteen parts of the message twelve hours before they filed Part 14, so they were in and coded and distributed a long time before the Part 14 ever reached us. In fact we were afraid that we had missed Part 14, and the people on watch put in some very worried hours until it came in.

General FRANK. If it came in plain English, what do you mean by saying that it was coded?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, it came in in the Japanese code, I mean, but it wasn't in Japanese, and we had to break down their cipher and strip it all off and then clear it up with the garbled and the abbreviations and everything. But it came out in English; it didn't come out in Japanese that had to be translated by a language officer. It wasn't in clear.

General RUSSELL. Oh, all right. Now, what time did you have the first thirteen parts in clear?

Captain SAFFORD. We had them and typed up smooth ready for distribution about nine p. m. on the evening of December 6, 1941.

General RUSSELL. When did you have the last or the fourteenth section typed and ready for distribution?

Captain SAFFORD. At seven a. m. December 7, 1941.

General RUSSELL. Were they distributed?

Captain SAFFORD. The first thirteen parts were distributed that evening. Major Doud, who came down to assist, was given one or more copies for the War Department, and he was the authorized representative of the War Department; and what happened beyond that, we do not know, except that Colonel Bratton got a copy into the hands of the Secretary of State [158] by about ten p. m.

General RUSSELL. On December 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. On December 6, 1941, Kramer telephoned, phoned to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, and was told to be at the White House and deliver a copy there and then come right out to Admiral Wilkinson's house. Kramer got an official car and made that trip. The President was in a conference or holding a dinner party or something, so Kramer gave a copy to the White House aide and told him it was very urgent and to get it in to the President at the earliest possible moment.

Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson's house about ten and found Admiral Beardall, the Naval Aide to the President, there at a dinner party. Admiral Turner, the Director of War Plans, was given a copy a little later. I am not certain of the circumstances, though I think Kramer went to his house.

Kramer got to Admiral Ingersoll's house about midnight and showed him a copy which Admiral Ingersoll read and initialed, I believe. Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark about the thing, and also Admiral Turner phoned Admiral Stark about the thing, but so far as I know Admiral Stark did not see it that night and did not see it until the next morning.

When Kramer left he was given orders to be present with the message in Admiral Stark's office at nine o'clock Sunday morning, and then Kramer came back to the Navy Department about one a. m. to see if by chance Part 14 had come in, and to see if there were any

other developments, and told them about his appointment, told them to give him a call the next day and that [159] he would be down, and then went home and got some very much needed sleep, because he had been up on his feet since eight a. m. the previous morning.

When Part 14 came in, and another message which I haven't referred to here, but it may be identified as S. I. S. 25850 and was marked in the heading, "Urgent—Very Important," and said, when translated, "Submit our reply to the United States Government one p. m. on the 7th, your time," the men on watch realized that they had something particularly urgent, and they were restricted by orders signed by Admiral Noyes from sending out any information on their own authority. So all they could do was call Kramer and urge him to get down as soon as he could, and Kramer got down there sometime before nine o'clock and took all the information on hand up to Admiral Stark's office.

There is some question as to this S. I. S. 25850, just when that was ready for distribution. Lieutenant Pering, who was on watch, insisted that that had been sent over to the Army as soon as decoded, translated by Major Doud over there, and returned and was ready for delivery by 7:15 a. m., and that Kramer took it with him on his first trip.

Kramer told me—or as I remember from nearly two years—that he took that message on his second trip. It only makes a difference of an hour when they got the thing.

After delivering the message to the Chief of Naval Operations or to his aide, Kramer went over to the White House and left a copy for the President with Admiral Beardall, who was there then, and then went to Secretary Hull's office and sent in a copy for Secretary Knox.

[160] General RUSSELL. Captain, you have testified rather definitely about the delivery of these first thirteen parts early in the evening of December 6th.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Thirteen parts of the message in the early evening, and you stated that all those deliveries were made by Kramer?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer personally.

General RUSSELL. Yes. You weren't with him?

Captain SAFFORD. I was not with him; no, sir.

General RUSSELL. He was alone?

Captain SAFFORD. He was alone except for the driver of the car.

General RUSSELL. So your testifying as to that delivery is based on hearsay?

Captain SAFFORD. On Kramer's statements; the statements of Kramer and the driver of the station wagon who took him around.

General RUSSELL. When did he make these statements upon which you base your evidence now?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer made his statements the 8th or 9th of December immediately after the event, when I discussed it fully with him. I called for statements. I talked to everybody concerned, to see if my people had been negligent in any way, that this thing had in any way been our fault. I made a very careful investigation.

General RUSSELL. Did you make any records of that investigation, Captain?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

[161] General RUSSELL. No written record at all?

Captain SAFFORD. No written records.

General RUSSELL. You filed no report of that investigation with anyone?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, you have been testifying this morning quite considerably from this typewritten report which you have before you. I believe you have already sworn as to when you prepared that, haven't you?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, I did, except for one thing. I will have to correct that. The original brief was prepared as stated. This final brief was prepared in August 1944, and is a condensation from the longer record prepared earlier. There is no new matter in it.

General RUSSELL. Now I think we have cleared up the long message, the incidents surrounding the receipt and delivery of the message which we will refer to as the reply message of the Japanese, which was the long 14-part message; and then you have testified as fully, I assume, as you can about the receipt of S. I. S. 25850, which you received in the Navy Department and which instructed the Japanese Ambassadors to deliver the long message at one p. m. that day.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. We have cleared those things up rather fully.

Now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart, before us, appears this language which I think we must explore to some extent to clarify our record.

[162] Colonel TOULMIN. Are you going off this subject?

General RUSSELL. I was going off this subject.

Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask a question?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. We would like to be very clear about this, Captain, and for that reason I am going to ask one more question:

As I got your testimony as to the delivery of the first thirteen parts of this message from the Japanese, that copy of thirteen parts was delivered to Major Doud on the evening of December 6th shortly after seven p. m., at which time it was written out smooth?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir; nine p. m.

Colonel TOULMIN. Nine p. m. All right. So we have, now, Major Doud visiting the Navy Department and receiving the thirteen parts just after nine p. m. on December 6; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

Colonel TOULMIN. Was anybody with Major Doud?

General FRANK. And this was given to him all translated and written out in English at nine p. m., December 6?

Captain SAFFORD. December 6; correct, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And was anybody with him?

Captain SAFFORD. Major Doud came in somewhere around four o'clock, I believe, and brought over a War Department stenographer who helped type these messages, and he stayed around until the job was done, and then started the distribution. So Army and Navy began, or could have begun, dissemination simultaneously. I have the young lady's name somewhere, but I [163] don't know it right now. I could find it out for you.

Colonel TOULMIN. Will you supply it to the Recorder of this Board, please?

Captain SAFFORD. I will get that. And also Mr. Rowlett, who was a civilian then but is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve now, came down, who was working over in the War Department, and he had two or three assistants helping him, and they took out two parts of the message and sent them over to us.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now let us go to the part that Colonel Bratton played on the evening of December 6, 1941. You have stated that Colonel Bratton got a copy of these thirteen parts in English, translated, and delivered them to the Secretary of State prior to 10 p. m.

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. I said about 10 p. m.

Colonel TOULMIN. Well, on or about 10 p. m. on December 6 Colonel Bratton delivered a clear English copy of the first thirteen parts of this Japanese message to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Do you know whether he delivered it to him in person?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not, sir. That's all I know about it.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now, did Colonel Bratton come to the Navy Department to pick up this copy for this delivery to the Secretary of State?

[164] Captain SAFFORD. No, he did not. He did not come near the Navy Department that night.

Colonel TOULMIN. How do you know that Colonel Bratton did this?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me that the only thing he knew about Army dissemination was that Major Doud was given a copy, the Army copies, at 9 p. m., and that by 10 or 10:30 p. m. Bratton somehow had got a copy to Secretary Hull, and that's all he knew about it.

Colonel TOULMIN. Where did he find Secretary Hull?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not know, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. How many copies were delivered to Major Doud, on the evening of December 6, of these thirteen parts?

Captain SAFFORD. At least two and probably more, because this was the only occasion on which we made more than four copies of the translation. Personal copies were made for everybody who Kramer and Major Doud thought would require them.

Colonel TOULMIN. And approximately what time did Kramer get to the White House with the copy of the thirteen paragraphs in English?

Captain SAFFORD. Approximately between nine-thirty and ten.

Colonel TOULMIN. On December 6th?

Captain SAFFORD. On December 6, 1941.

Colonel TOULMIN. And then he went to the home of Admiral whom?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Wilkinson.

[165] Colonel TOULMIN. Admiral Wilkinson.

Captain SAFFORD. The Director of Naval Intelligence.

Colonel TOULMIN. And there he met the President's Naval Aide?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that was approximately ten p. m. on December 6, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And thereafter Kramer went to Admiral Ingersoll and arrived about twelve p. m.?

Captain SAFFORD. About twelve p. m.

Colonel TOULMIN. And then nothing more was done with the Admirals and the copy until nine a. m. the following morning, in Admiral Stark's office; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Except that Admiral Turner got a copy before midnight, either at his home or at Admiral Wilkinson's home.

Colonel TOULMIN. All right. Now, to make the record clear, will you please state the official position of each one of these Admirals that you have just now mentioned in this sequence of events?

Captain SAFFORD. Admiral Beardall was Naval Aide to the President, Admiral Wilkinson was Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Ingersoll was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark was Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Turner was Director of War Plans.

Colonel TOULMIN. When was this information as to the thirteen parts of the Japanese message first transmitted to [166] Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor?

Captain SAFFORD. That was never transmitted.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now will you give a similar history of the movements and deliveries of the fourteenth part of this message, that is, the concluding part?

Captain SAFFORD. The fourteen part: Kramer left his office shortly before nine a. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, with Part 14 of the long message and all other translations which were on hand at that time; and according to one man's memory that included the message which said, "Deliver this to the State Department at one p. m., your time." According to my memory of what Mr. Kramer told me, that was not delivered—picked up—until an hour later. Kramer first went to Admiral Stark's office and gave the message either to Admiral Stark in person or to his Aide. He then went to the White House and gave the messages to the Naval Aide to the President. He then went to the State Department and gave the messages to Secretary Knox, or at least sent them in to Secretary Knox.

The previous evening Secretary Hull had called Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox on the telephone and arranged a conference at his office in the State Department at ten a. m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, and requested that Kramer and Bratton be there.

Kramer left the State Department shortly after ten a. m. and returned to the Navy Department about ten-twenty a. m. There he found some messages which had come back from the War Department translated, and also another message, which may be identified as S. I. S. 25856; and the translation of that, as distributed, stated, "Relations between Japan and England are [167] not in accordance with expectations."

That was another secret way of getting the news around to the Japanese Consuls. That was sent to every Japanese Consulate in North and South America. The translation unfortunately was incorrect. It should have included America and should have been much

stronger than that. But this was not called to the Navy Department's attention until long afterward. The War Department again did not agree with our translation. Kramer took this message around, and possibly the other message which said, "Submit our reply to the U. S. Government at one p. m. on the 7th, your time," and reached the Chief of Naval Operations around ten-thirty, and then next the White House, where he again gave the copy to Admiral Beardall for the President, and finally reached the State Department about 11 a. m. with it.

There is another matter which I would like to add: that at the time Kramer submitted SIS 25850 to Secretary Knox he sent a note in with it saying, in effect, that this means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila.

General RUSSELL. How do you know that?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me.

General RUSSELL. When did he tell you?

Captain SAFFORD. Kramer told me that just before he left Washington to go to Honolulu for duty. He had not dared—

General FRANK. Which was when?

Captain SAFFORD. Which was the spring of 1943, as I recall. He had not dared to let anybody know that up until that time.

[168] General RUSSELL. Are there any further questions about these messages now, before we go to December 7th, the other message?

Colonel TOULMIN. I am content.

General RUSSELL. Captain, I will repeat the question which I withdrew from the record a little while ago.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Reading now from your evidence to Admiral Hart:

Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) that date.

Do you recall that testimony?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Would you please give the Board the basis of that statement?

Captain SAFFORD. The basis of that is the translation of this document, S. I. S. 25850, and it also may be identified as Tokyo Serial No. 907, dated December 1941, addressed to the Embassy, Washington.

General RUSSELL. Now, that is S. I. S. 25850?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. A moment ago when you testified from that message, the only substantial thing that I recall was to the effect that the Japanese Ambassadors had been instructed to [169] deliver the message at one p. m.

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. Now, therefore, your statement to Admiral Hart was based exclusively on S. I. S. 25850?

Captain SAFFORD. And 25843, which was the 14-part message.

General RUSSELL. Oh, yes. Then, this message 25850 did not reach you until about 10:15 A. on Sunday?

Captain SAFFORD. That is according to my recollection of what Kramer told me. And yet, Pering and Brotherhood stated, and both

insist, that that was available for distribution by 7:15 a. m. and that Kramer took it on his first trip, an hour earlier. It only makes a difference of an hour either way.

General RUSSELL. With Part 14?

Captain SAFFORD. Part 14.

General RUSSELL. Well, all right. Now I want to ask you about another message, then, which apparently you did not testify about. That clarifies the record on that.

There is information in this record to the effect that on or about 8:30 A. (8:30 A. M.) on the 7th of December there was delivered to Colonel Bratton, about whom you have testified and whom you apparently know, from the Navy or by the Navy (it was delivered to Colonel Bratton by the Navy) a message to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to deliver the ultimatum at one p. m. December 7, '41, and to destroy their code machine.

Captain SAFFORD. Their remaining code machine; that is correct, sir.

General RUSSELL. Their remaining code machine. Now, with this statement from me, do you now associate [170] what I have just stated with S. I. S. 25850, or was that an entirely different message?

Captain SAFFORD. I recall a message directing the destruction of their code machine, and I believe that was included as a second sentence of 25850, but could not swear to it. It might have been a separate message.

General RUSSELL. Then, Captain, there is some confusion as to whether or not the Navy sent this message to Bratton or whether Bratton sent it to the Navy, assuming that we are discussing only one message, to wit, S. I. S. 25850. Could you throw any light on that?

Captain SAFFORD. About four or five messages came in between four and five a. m.; that we broke them down into the raw Japanese and then sent them over to the Army for translation. No. 25850 had already been translated by Lieutenant Brotherhood, who got the correct meaning out of it and realized how important it was; but Brotherhood was just a beginner in Japanese, and his translations could not be trusted, and it had to go over to the War Department for translation by a qualified language officer.

General RUSSELL. If the record here shows that a message similar to 25850 was received in the War Department about eight-thirty, would that or not be consistent with the facts as you now remember them as they developed in the Navy Department?

Captain SAFFORD. I think that would be consistent, on the whole, and more consistent with Kramer's recollection than with Pering's recollection of it.

General RUSSELL. Where now is there a record of S. I. S. [171] 25850?

Captain SAFFORD. That is on file in the Navy under the JD 7145, and I believe it is also on file in the War Department.

General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not this message is one of those which has been referred to as the sixty messages recently delivered to the Board of Inquiry of the Navy?

Captain SAFFORD. Very definitely; yes, sir; that one was. Also 25843 and the other one which is identified as Tokyo Serial No. 901.

General RUSSELL. Captain, have you a list of these sixty messages about which you have testified?

Captain SAFFORD. Let's see. I have a list, I believe, of the numbers of 29 of them, the ones which I had thought important, which I had briefed: in other words, on my going over it about half the ones I thought important, and half I didn't see the significance at all of being briefed. I haven't got it here, but I have got it in my office. I can send the list over if you would like it, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now let me ask you this: Have you got the original list of sixty, as well as the list of 29 selected messages, over there in your office?

Captain SAFFORD. I do not have it, but I believe that the Judge Advocate of the Court must have it, and I believe the Director of Naval Communications has a copy. I haven't a personal copy of it.

General RUSSELL. But you do have the list of 29 that you selected?

Captain SAFFORD. I do have the ones that I thought were [172] important, because I had to check them over.

General RUSSELL. Does that list contain descriptions of sufficient clarity and definiteness and fullness for us to identify the messages and get some conception of what they contain?

Captain SAFFORD. The list merely gave the JD file number of them. That was done on purpose so as not to let anything out of the bag on it, and I have them briefed here.

General RUSSELL. Captain, you have now no record at all which contains the contents of this "Wind" message of December 3rd or 4th, 1941?

Captain SAFFORD. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. You tell the Board that you do not know whether that message is in existence or not?

Captain SAFFORD. There is a possibility that the original distribution copy of that message is in existence in the Navy Department in the hands or in the safe of some high official, probably the Vice Chief of Naval Operations if it is in existence, possibly the Secretary of the Navy. Admiral Hart made a statement to me which implied that he had sighted it and that I was not justified in the statement that all copies of the "Winds" message had been destroyed, or all the Navy Department copies had been destroyed.

General RUSSELL. Are you in a position to tell this Board that that message, to wit, the "Winds" message of December 3rd or the 4th of December, '41, is not included in the sixty messages recently submitted to the Court of Inquiry of the Navy now investigating the incidents surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

[173] Captain SAFFORD. That is correct, sir; that is not included in those sixty messages. A separate request was submitted for the "Winds" message, and they were unable to find it. I was called in at the time to tell everything I knew about it, and I advised them they had better check first with the F. C. C. for the original because I thought at the time the F. C. C. had actually intercepted and got something that was pretty much like it but not the real thing. So I happen to know about that. They were not able to find it. A determined search was made for it.

General RUSSELL. General, I think this about exhausts my examination of this witness.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Major CLAUSEN. I have one, sir.

General GRUNERT. All right.

Major CLAUSEN. In connection with the answer that you just gave to General Russell you stated that Admiral Hart informed you he had cited a distribution list. Do you recall that?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. That he had sighted the actual "Winds" message.

Major CLAUSEN. That he had cited the message in a written report that he rendered?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir. He said to me, "I have just come from the front office, and I have seen your 'Winds' message. Now, don't make statements that you can't verify." This is of the time I came in to verify my testimony, so I withdrew from my testimony any statement to the effect relative then to other copies having been destroyed, because I didn't [174] know where I stood then.

Major CLAUSEN. Is it clear from the record what portion of the message containing fourteen parts was the fourteenth part?

General RUSSELL. I read the language, and he testified that that was the fourteenth part.

Captain SAFFORD. It was the last numbered paragraph plus the unnumbered paragraph where they got polite.

General RUSSELL. In order that we might be definite about it, I will show you the book to which we referred in connection with that message.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; and I have checked this same book against the original, so it begins at paragraph 7.

General FRANK. Paragraph 7 was the fourteenth part received?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Paragraph 7 in this book?

Captain SAFFORD. And was labeled "Part 14" in the heading.

General RUSSELL. Captain, you have had long association with this work that you have testified about this morning; is that correct?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. About what time did you go into this work?

Captain SAFFORD. In 1924.

General RUSSELL. '24. You have had approximately twenty years thereafter?

[175] Captain SAFFORD. Except as broken by sea duty; I have had about fourteen years of it.

General RUSSELL. Yes. Now, some question has arisen—or probably that is not accurate; the Board is debating the effect on the war effort of a public disclosure of the contents of the "Winds" message. Assuming that the Japanese Empire knew that the American Government was in possession of those facts which are contained in that "Winds" message, would it indicate anything to them which might cause them to make changes which would make it more difficult for us to obtain Japanese information now?

Captain SAFFORD. No, sir, not the "Winds" message or this other so-called hidden-word or stop-code message. The setup for those two was sent in what they call a low-grade cipher held by all their Consuls. Everybody was solving that. The Dutch solved it, the British solved it in Singapore, and we solved it ourselves—both of them—and they

must know that we have been reading those messages, and I believe that that particular system is not in use any more, anyhow. It is not the high-class machine which is a literal gold mine at the present time. This other stuff it would be very bad to let public, but there were two things—

General RUSSELL. Identify "this other stuff" right now for us.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, I mean such as 25843 and 25850.

Colonel TOULMIN. What are they?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the declaration of war and "Submit our reply to the U. S. Government at one p. m. on the 7th, your time." Now, that is in their machine which they [176] think no one can read, and they are still talking their fool heads off in it, particularly from Germany.

But this other message, this 25856, if we will insert the proper translation instead of the erroneous one, which the Navy did, and the "Winds" message were in the clear, because those were on their J 19, which even the Dutch were reading.

General RUSSELL. That is the "Winds" message?

Captain SAFFORD. That is the "Winds" message and this other one.

General RUSSELL. Now, have you testified on the record, Captain, as to the messages which you received which you believe we should not permit the Japanese Empire to know that we know about?

Captain SAFFORD. The Japanese Empire should not be permitted to know about any messages thus far mentioned except the "Winds" message and No. 25856.

General FRANK. Which is?

Captain SAFFORD. Which is, according to the Army translation: Relations between Japan and England and Japan and America are serious, on the verge of crisis, or on the verge of war.

General RUSSELL. Well, of course, the fact that we know about their sending us their reply of December 7th—that is published in the book here.

Captain SAFFORD. That has been hinted at.

General RUSSELL. It is in this book.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, unfortunately.

General RUSSELL. How about, Captain, this Nomura [177] statement when he transmitted to the Japanese Government Secretary Hull's message of November 26?

General FRANK. In which he spoke of his embarrassment.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes. That was in a separate message. That was in a high-class system.

General RUSSELL. That was in their high-class system?

Captain SAFFORD. High-class system. Nomura used that exclusively. The only times the low-grade system was used were to Conulates or minor Embassies that did not hold their high-grade system.

General RUSSELL. It seems now, Captain, that the probabilities are that this message of December 7th and which came here sometime in the early morning hours, that they were going to deliver the ultimatum at one o'clock, and told them to destroy the code machines, must be this message 25850, which is JD 7145.

Captain SAFFORD. 7145; yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. May I ask the Captain a question?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Captain, I would like to ask you: What messages which were reported in the Roberts printed report were those that emanated from Japan in their highest type of code?

Captain SAFFORD. Every one that was mentioned in the Roberts report was sent in the Japanese highest-cipher system.

Colonel TOULMIN. Therefore, the fact that those messages were known through this publication of this Roberts report would indicate to the Japanese that somebody had been reading their code, would it not?

[178] Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, and so would——

Colonel TOULMIN. What was the answer?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. And I was going to add: and so would Ernest Lindley's book, "How War Came." That lets a lot more secrets out of the bag.

Colonel TOULMIN. When was that published?

Captain SAFFORD. I think that was 1943.

Colonel TOULMIN. If these two, the book and the report——

Captain SAFFORD. Maybe it was 1942. 1942 or '43.

Colonel TOULMIN. I am puzzled. If the report of the Roberts Commission that has been published and this book that has been published contain messages which are translations and therefore a breakdown of the highest code of the Japanese, isn't it a fact that the Japanese are fully advised that somebody has been reading their code, and that somebody being the United States?

Captain SAFFORD. That was my personal belief at the time it came up for decision. In fact, all four Navy members stated that they did not think that release of these messages to investigation would jeopardize the conduct of the war.

Colonel TOULMIN. What point is there now, therefore, in suppressing any of these messages if the fact of their translation is now known to the Japanese?

Captain SAFFORD. There is an implication in that that I would rather not go into.

Colonel TOULMIN. I am content.

General GRUNERT. Well, it appears to me that the Japanese are not so dumb as all that. If they think that we [179] have broken one or more of their high codes, then why do they continue to use those codes and allow us to do damage to them through knowledge gained by those codes? It doesn't make sense.

Colonel TOULMIN. That is what puzzles me.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? No response.)

If not, Captain, do you think of anything else that you might open up on that would be of interest to the Board?

Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir; I have two or three things I would like to mention.

In the first place, to go back to the "Winds" message, when that one came in and was sent up to Admiral Noyes, it is my opinion and my belief that Admiral Noyes phoned it around to all interested parties. He phoned personally. I have no proof of it, but I mean that was presumably the reason it was sent up to him and not being taken around in the ordinary method, so he could save time by phoning it.

General GRUNERT. Was that phoning secret?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, we had an interphone in the Navy Department. He could talk to anybody there without going through any switchboards, which is used for all secret messages.

General GRUNERT. All right; go ahead.

Captain SAFFORD. And let's see. I have some more points.

Another point of great interest: that afternoon of the 7th of December, after the attack, we translated this message, which is S. I. S. No. 25866 and in the lowest-grade system that they had. This came from Budapest, incidentally, and it said:

[180] On the 6th the American Minister presented to the Hungarian Government a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

General RUSSELL. What was that?

Captain SAFFORD. It is on the 6th. This is the Jap Minister in Budapest reporting back to Tokyo:

On the 6th the American Minister presented to the Hungarian Government a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

That is, it may have no relation, and it may have significance with stuff I don't know. I am just telling you for that.

The next thing is: in connection with S. I. S. 25843 and its real meaning and significance, we learned the following on December 15th, which is contained in S. I. S. No. 26308. That was the 15th of December, 1941. Tokyo was referring to Nomura's presentation of the Japanese declaration of war to the U. S. Government (which, incidentally, they called a "declaration of war") and the part I am quoting says:

We really supposed that the negotiations had been broken off first and the shooting had taken place after this. The President's speech was trying to hide the fact that the United States had been taken by surprise and failed in the first step.

That was being circulated to their embassies for propaganda purposes.

There is another message which wasn't translated until November 25, 1943, although it was dated December 9, 1941, [181] and that was an Army message distributed in "magic" summary No. 609, and bears a further short title of "SSA. No. D-3108." This is a discussion of events leading up to the war, in three parts, of the negotiations April to July. "B" is preliminary decision for war. They began preparations for all-out war in September 1941. And "C" the final decisions; and, referring to the American note of November 26, 1941, it is stated:

In short, the United States proposals agreed with everything that we regarded as inconsistent with the preservation of peace in the Pacific areas. They also would have made the Tripartite Pact a dead letter. This United States answer at one fell swoop showed us how utterly ridiculous and useless had been the conferences which had been held since April, and completely swept away all understandings reached. We saw now that future negotiations would be of no purpose or could only fit in with the delaying policy of the United States. Consequently the supreme war command immediately decided upon war. On 1 December the imperial decree was issued.

General RUSSELL. Where did that come from?

Captain SAFFORD. That was from the War Ministry, Tokyo.

General RUSSELL. "Magic"?

Captain SAFFORD. "Magic." That is an Army investigation. The Navy has not got this, at least as far as I know. They may have got it by now.

In the Roberts report there is reference on page 8, in the last paragraph, to three messages sent by the Navy [182] Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in early December 1941. I was in on them all, and I would like to state what happened, as a matter of record, if you are interested.

On December 1, 1941, we received a message, S. I. S. No. 25606, stating:

The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan.

That, incidentally, was the high-grade machine which we have been discussing. It also gave some instructions on destroying surplus copies of other things which are not important. No action was taken on that.

On December 3rd, an S. I. S. No. 25640. We learned from the message sent the previous day that Washington had also been ordered to destroy everything they had except one copy of their high-grade machine; and on the 3rd we received a signal from Admiralty London that London had already complied.

I knew from conversations with Kramer, who was attached to the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence under Commander McCullom though actually working down in my office under me, that McCullom was greatly worried by the lack of information that was being sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet; and on the 3rd somehow I learned or discovered that no warning of this had been sent, so I called McCullom on the phone and I asked him if he had read the messages which we had been getting in the last three days, [183] and he said he had, and I said, "Do you appreciate their significance?"

And he said, "I do."

And then I said, "Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?"

And McCullom said, "We," emphasizing it, "are doing everything that we," again emphasized, "can to get the news out to the Fleet."

That was the end of the conversation, but as a result of that McCullom finally succeeded in getting a message sent, which is referred to in the Roberts report as the war warning of December 3rd, and the message reads:—oh: message was released by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, and may be identified as OpNav No. 031850, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Commandant 14th Naval District, Commandant 16th Naval District:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Then it adds in the second sentence, which has been crossed through by pencil and I do not know whether it was sent in the coded outgoing copy or not:

From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia.

[184] Well, this destruction of codes immediately threw the "Winds" message into prominence. Before, we couldn't understand why they had this setup arranged. It seemed a foolish thing to do, excepting we never can understand the Japs, but they had this in mind, I think: Well, all right, one step short of war. They are destroying their codes to play safe, but they are still reserving the decision as to peace or war to come in the "Winds" message, which was the reason that, from the first on, we thought the "Winds" message was so highly important, and yet that information did not get out to either Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet or Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet until 48 hours after we had the news, and then only because of some back seat driving on my part and turning the screws on McCullom to make one more desperate effort to get the information released.

As a result of the "Winds" message I wrote out four messages which were released that afternoon between 3 p. m. and 3:19 p. m. The first was released by Admiral Noyes and the other three by Admiral Ingersoll.

General RUSSELL. On what date?

Captain SAFFORD. On December 4, 1941. And these instructed the Naval Attaches at Tokyo and Peiping and also at Bangkok and Shanghai. It said—are you interested in that? I will give you the whole text then. That was from OpNav No. 042019:

Supplementing my 040330 action addresses also destroy all secret and confidential files except those essential for current purposes and all other papers [185] which in the hands of an enemy would be a disadvantage to the United States.

That was sent to information Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet but was not sent to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

042182—

General FRANK. On what date was it sent to the Asiatic Fleet?

Captain SAFFORD. On the 4th of December.

Another one the 4th of December from OpNav to Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, and the Serial No. 042018:

Communications room should now be stripped of all secret and confidential publications and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be a disadvantage to the United States, retaining for essential purposes the minimum number of cryptographic channels at your discretion. Report those retained.

General FRANK. Did those go to the Asiatic?

Captain SAFFORD. Those went.

General FRANK. Did information copies of that go to the Pacific Fleet?

Captain SAFFORD. No, that also did not go to the Pacific Fleet.

Then we sent this message from Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commandant 16th Naval District, Commandant 14th Naval District, Naval Station Guam, and Naval Station Samoa. This is 4 December 1941:

[186] 042000 CSP 903, 905 and RIP 66 less changes 1 and 2 effective immediately with indicators GONID secret and JYREC confidential available all purposes communications with Guam and Samoa. Guam and Samoa destroy RIP 65 plus changes to RIP 66 immediately. Other addresses may continue to use except with stations mentioned.

That, incidentally, was sent priority. It was sent to the complete distribution list for RIP 66 and RIP 65, which was a special cipher

which we were using between our intercept and direction finder stations in the Pacific Ocean area; and, knowing that the Japs were about to hit us and that Guam was only a hundred miles or so from Jap territory, and not to be defended except against sabotage, according to War Plans, we wanted to clean house early there. That was the message as written by me, and bears my initial.

General FRANK. And it was sent?

Captain SAFFORD. It was sent priority. This other message was sent following time 17 minutes later and was sent with deferred priority.

This next message which I will read was reference in the Roberts report:

From OpNav to Navsta Guam, December 4, 1941. Information Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Commandant 14th District, and Commandant 16th District, and reference number 042017. Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that [187] essential for current purposes and special intelligence, retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Commandant 14th, and Commandant 16th Naval District, and Naval Operations. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain. Report cryptic channels retained.

Now, that is referred to in the Roberts report as a war warning.

General FRANK. And that was sent to whom?

Captain SAFFORD. That was sent to Navy Station Guam for action, and for information of the Commanders-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Districts. That was sent deferred because it was sent in the new RIP 66 which had just been made effective by the previous message, and we had to send it slow so the other message would get there first and they could be able to read this message. We were putting a new cryptographic system into effect; and by Navy regulations or by communication instructions deferred messages are not expected to be delivered until the beginning of working hours the next morning. In other words, any message which comes in in deferred priority automatically is not going to be considered a war warning, regardless of how you stated it. The original—the message as transmitted was a rewrite by Admiral Noyes. My original message said: Guam destroy all cryptographic aids except this system and current edition of direction finder code, which was what would be necessary to [188] keep them going the next two or three days. My message might have contained a degree of warning which is lacking in this one, and the reason for sending it was this "Winds execute" message; and that is why I know that the "Winds execute" message was received on the 4th and not on the 3rd or the 5th, because when I finally was able to get my hands on copies of these messages it placed me with the date, because these messages were written up and released as a direct consequence of that "Winds" message.

The final message was on the 6th, if I can see that (examining papers). The night before, just about closing hours, one of the girls in the Registered Publication Section discovered that a force had been sent to reinforce Wake Island, and they just had a lot of registered publications with them; and I asked them to make a complete inventory, and they stayed up until about one o'clock, one officer or two

officers and two civilians, and the next morning they gave me an inventory of 150 different registered publications on that little island where, you see, they had almost nothing. And at that time war was right around the corner, and I wrote a message which said in substance, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and information of the senior officer on Wake:

In view of imminence of war destroy all registered publications on Wake Island except this system and current editions of aircraft code and direction finder code.

General FRANK. And that was sent on what date?

Captain SAFFORD. That message was not sent, sir. That [189] message was rewritten; and when I took that up to the Director of Naval Communications for his release, or at least approval, he said, "What do you mean by using such language as that?"

And I said, "Admiral, the war is just a matter of days, if not of hours."

He says, "You may think there is going to be a war, but I think they are bluffing."

I said, "Well, Admiral, if all these publications on Wake are captured we will never be able to explain it."

And thereupon he rewrote the message and left out any reference to Wake Island or the 150 publications exposed to capture, which included all our reserve publications for the next six months, and this is what actually was sent out:

OpNav to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, information Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, 061743.

It is released by Admiral Ingersoll and dated December 6, 1941, and when this was sent up for release the inventory of publications on Wake went with it.

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of the outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater urgency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should, of course, be maintained until the last moment.

And that was sent deferred precedence, which meant delivery [190] by nine o'clock on Monday morning, December 8, 1941.

General FRANK. Now wait a minute. That is across the international date line, isn't it?

Captain SAFFORD. Well, it would be—No, sir; Wake is this side of the international date line, I am quite certain.

General FRANK. All right.

General RUSSELL. I don't know.

Captain SAFFORD. But we know this was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet. He still had to relay the news out to Wake. I don't know what time it got there, but no action was taken on it until long after the attack on Pearl Harbor; and then, because we had sent an ambiguous message, the fleet communication officer sent another ambiguous message. The net result was that when Wake was captured, I believe the 24th of December, some of the cryptographic aids fell into Japanese hands, and it was reported at the time by Commandant 14th Naval District, and later on some of the alphabet strips were captured at Kiska in some of the abandoned Japanese dugouts.

Now, that message was referred to as a war warning in the Roberts report, and also they changed it around and took the liberty of inserting, I think the word was "acute." Let me check that. No. "Tense."

In view of the tense situation.

I have read you the exact wording of the message that went out.

General RUSSELL. Will you refer to the Roberts report? I find that reference to "tense situation," Captain. I don't find handily the reference to the December 6 message being a [191] war warning. It may be there.

Captain SAFFORD. Well, it said at the top of the page:

The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids.

General RUSSELL. Very well. I see what you are talking about.

Captain SAFFORD. Yes.

General GRUNERT. That appears to cover about all that we are after. We thank you very much for giving us this entire morning.

Captain SAFFORD. Just may I add one thing to the statement?

General GRUNERT. Yes.

Captain SAFFORD. If you have not called Colonel Sadtler as a witness, I think he should appear before the Board, because he knows a great deal, which I prefer not to put in his mouth, as to the inside happenings.

General GRUNERT. Colonel S-a-d-t-l-e-r?

Captain SAFFORD. Otis K. Sadtler. He probably will not thank me for mentioning his name, but—

General RUSSELL. He is down at the Army Ground Forces now, isn't he?

Captain SAFFORD. I think he is at Army War College. He was on duty in the Signal Corps Headquarters at the time of Pearl Harbor, and he does know a great deal of what went on.

(Thereupon at 12:30 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of the testimony of the witness, proceeded to other business.)

[192]

AFTERNOON SESSION

PENTAGON BUILDING, *Washington, D. C.*

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.—Resumed

Colonel WEST. General Marshall, the witness is here on rehearing. It will not be necessary to swear him again, but the witness is reminded that he is still under oath.

General GRUNERT. General, probably the best way to continue this would be, if you so desire, to take that list of questions we sent over, and answer them one after the other, or any way you want.

General MARSHALL. That is agreeable to me.

General GRUNERT. I think that would be probably the quickest way to wind this thing up.

General MARSHALL. The first question given me is this:

Will you state the reasons, if any, which prompted you to select General Short to command the Hawaiian Department?

My answer is: From the evidence we possessed, General Short had demonstrated his fitness for command. He had served overseas in the First World War, he had served in the Philippines, in Alaska, in Puerto Rico, and had been an instructor at the Infantry School and the Command and General Staff School. During the five years which preceded his [193] assignment to the Hawaiian Department, he had commanded successively infantry brigades at Fort Ontario, New York, and Fort Wadsworth, New York, the First Division at Fort Hamilton, New York, the First Army Corps at Columbia, South Carolina, and the larger force in the first of the extensive Army maneuvers of the 1940-43 period. The officers under whom he had served since 1937 had recommended him for a division command in time of war; 1940, General Drum recommended him to command a division or a corps.

That is his efficiency report. In other words, that statement of General Drum is from the efficiency report.

The next question was:

Are you sufficiently acquainted with the services rendered by him in the capacity of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from the date of his assignment until the 6th day of December 1941 so as to express an opinion as to the character of such services?

I had reason to believe that he was performing his duties in an energetic and efficient manner. This view was based upon the letters and reports which I received, many of which have been recorded by the Board.

Another question:

If you have the bases for rating those services, will you please state to the Board whether or not you regarded them entirely satisfactory?

I regarded his services as entirely satisfactory.

[194] Another question:

On the 20th day of October 1941, the War Department sent to General Short the following radiogram:

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in foreign policy seems imminent."

Do you know of any other information sent to General Short by the War Department from the date of this radiogram until the 27th day of November 1941, at which time Message No. 472 was dispatched to him? If you know of any other information on the Japanese situation sent to General Short during that period of time, won't you please give the Army Pearl Harbor Board the benefit of it?"

My answer: The Navy message of November 24th to Admiral Kimmel, one of the addressees, stated that I had seen it and concurred in it, and asked that General Short be informed. This message warned of the possibility of a surprise aggressive movement by the Japanese.

On the 27th of November War Department G-2 sent to Hawaii some additional data from its continuing political, economic, and combat digest of Japan. Nothing in the nature of a warning was sent by G-2 during this period except for their message of November 27.

[195] Another question:

Do you believe that you were kept fully informed by the State Department on the development of the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government?

I do.

Another question:

When were you informed of the delivery by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassadors of the memorandum of the 26th of November 1941, which memorandum was described as an outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan?

My answer: I do not recall.

Another question:

When did you first know that the Secretary of War was told by the Secretary of State on the morning of 27 November 1941 that he had broken the whole matter off, as he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy"?

I do not recall.

Question:

It is in the record that you left Washington for the Carolina Maneuvers on the 26th day of November 1941. Did you prepare or direct the preparation of a message to be sent to overseas commanders prior to your departure for the Carolina Maneuvers?

Answer: My recollection is that on the morning of the [196] 26th of November, before leaving Washington, Admiral Stark and I agreed, at a joint board meeting, on the necessity for dispatching a further warning to Commanders on the Japanese front, particularly to the Philippines, and that we there discussed the draft of such a message. In my previous testimony I stated that I had a rather distinct recollection of considering two of the statements in the warning or alert message of November 27. More recently I found a memorandum from General Gerow dated the 27th of November, 1941, which indicates that the sending of such a message had been discussed at a joint board meeting the morning of November 26th. This quite evidently was the basis for my recollection of having some knowledge of the November 27th message prior to its dispatch.

Another question:

Do you recall when you first saw the message to General Short of November 27, 1941, No. 472?

Answer: I do not recall when I first saw the message, but it almost certainly was shown to me on the 28th, on my return from the Carolinas. The files show that a copy of the message to the Philippines was sent to my office by General Gerow on the 27th and received there on the 28th. They also contain another copy of the same message, with an attached note reading: "Show to the C S"—that is the Chief of Staff—"when he returns. S. W"—that is the Secretary of War—"approved sending this." Near it in the files is a copy of the message sent to Hawaii, initialed by me, but bearing no stamp or other mark to indicate when I saw it. The presumption [197] is that I saw it on the 28th.

Question:

Do you recall under what circumstances and by whom this message was shown to you?

I think my previous answer gives whatever I have on that subject. Another question :

Do you regard that message as containing all of the information with respect to the Japanese and instructions necessary to be sent to General Short for the accomplishment of his mission in the Hawaiian Department at that time?

The answer is : I do.

In further reference to that question, I have here the headings for the secret, ultrasecret information for the Far East, for Europe, and for the diplomatic summary. They all have this general heading, "Top Secret," which means the extreme of secrecy observed by the War and Navy Departments, and so understood by the British.

They have, under the heading, "Note:" four paragraphs alternating red and black. The first one reads :

No one, without express permission from the proper authorities, may disseminate the information reported in this Summary or communicate it to any other person.

Now, in black is another paragraph :

Those authorized to disseminate such information must employ only the most secure means, must take every [198] precaution to avoid compromising the source, and must limit dissemination to the minimum number of secure and responsible persons who need the information in order to discharge their duties.

The next is in red :

No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence of the source to the enemy.

I might state, in connection with that paragraph, that there have been cases where convoys have been permitted to go into the most serious situations rather than diverting them from the assemblage of the so-called wolf packs because of the fear that that would convey to the Germans that we had some means of knowing just how this was managed. Here at the present time, the German submarine activity in the Atlantic being on the decided decrease, we have a series of sinkings going on in the Philippines and elsewhere in that general region which are timed entirely on this particular information. The hazard is to what extent we can continue uninterruptedly proceeding on that basis without conveying to the Japanese the fact that we have some means of reading the schedule for the convoy. We are continuing to use it for the reason that from this secret information, secret source of information, we learn of the Japanese thought as to how we are obtaining knowledge of these convoy movements. They think it is done by spies and by observation posts in the Philippines and along those other coasts, of which we had a great deal in the Solomons, and Australian lookout posts, and in New Britain, [199] New Ireland, and New Guinea. So long as they show they think that it is some such methods as that, we feel free to go ahead; but if there is any danger of our giving away our sources, then we would have to hold off somewhat on seizing each opportunity, for fear we would lose tremendous long-term advantages. That is what is meant in these instructions when it says, "No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage."

General GRUNERT. Those instructions come from where?

General MARSHALL. That is in agreed instructions between ourselves in the War Department and the Navy Department and the British. It was necessary for us to show them, in the most positive manner, how we would guard their information, which they were very reluctant to give to us. They would give us the results, just as we gave it to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, without giving us their source on which these statements were based; and we were, oh, I guess a year and a half or two years breaking down their reluctance to tell us that.

I might say, we have had a continuing very delicate situation with the Russians where we have told them that we had good reason—not good reason—we had the best evidence that certain actions were going to be taken by the Germans against them, but we couldn't tell them why, and there was quite a long debate as to whether we should not go into the whole thing, but that was felt most dangerous from two points of view. One was, we were spreading the thing out, and we didn't know who all would become involved in it; and, more particularly, they would probably get infuriated because they [200] hadn't had it from the start. So it has been a matter all the time of guarding this thing so that we have it tomorrow and do not expend it today and lose tomorrow.

The fourth paragraph, which is in black, says:

The enemy knows that we attempt to exploit these sources. He does not know, and must not be permitted to learn, either the degree of our success or the particular sources with which we have been successful.

If you would care to have one of these, here it is.

I might further add to that that we have a cover like this (indicating); it looks different from anything else; of which a copy will be given you.

General RUSSELL. All three of those were alike, weren't they?

General MARSHALL. They were all different; the headings were different. There are three different headings there. One is "Europe," one is "Diplomatic," and one is "Far East."

Question:

Upon your appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Monday, 7 August 1944, you testified about the Report of General Short in response to the direction in the message of 27 November to report measures taken. In this testimony you were not certain as to whether or not you saw General Short's Report. Your language is "I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it."

Have you in any way refreshed your memory on this subject so as to change the answer just quoted?

[201] I have not.

Another question:

The message from General Short making such report indicates that it was stamped in the Office of the Chief of Staff with the following entry: "Noted—Chief of Staff." It does not contain your signature. Will you please state to the Board who was authorized to place this stamp upon the message?

Answer: The Secretary of the General Staff and his commissioned assistants. The replies from General MacArthur and General Short in the files appear stapled together, the one from General Short underneath. My initials appear on the MacArthur message but not on the Short message. Whether or not I saw the Short message I could not say.

Question :

Would the placing of this stamp upon the message indicate to others in the War Department that you had seen the message and noted its contents?

It would.

Did you know that General Short had ordered his Command into an alert for sabotage only, and that this condition of readiness obtained during the entire period 27 November-6 December inclusive?

No.

Question :

Is it now apparent that the message of 27 November 1941 from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department (No. 472), was [202] misunderstood or misconstrued by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and did not accomplish the desired and intended results?

I know that it did not accomplish the desired results.

Question :

Is it now apparent that the Report of General Short to the War Department, in compliance with the instructions in the above message to report measures taken, was misunderstood or misconstrued by the War Department and did not accomplish the desired and intended results?

Answer : The message was quite evidently misunderstood. The term "liaison with Navy" evidently meant one thing to General Short and another to the War Department.

Another question :

Were any steps taken by the War Department between 27 November and 7 December 1941 to determine the state of readiness of the Command of the Hawaiian Department?

the

27 No. previous testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board you read into addressed joint statement signed by you and Admiral Stark which was dated

ment are 21. It is on the subject of the Far Eastern situation and is a. Do you President? President. The following questions relating to that joint agree-

[203] I do date when this joint statement was delivered to the morning of Novem.

that afternoon, would the fact of a joint board meeting on the 26th, or on my return on 24, and my departure from Washington

Question :

Did you know at the time of its're probably the latter. of State's memorandum of 26 Nove. bassadors?

I must have known, I think, ad bee. ident that the Secretary negotiations were nearing an impasse, 26th of N the Japanese Am. evidently directed the preparation of, be use Admira. draft of the 27th or 28th I warning on that day, the 26th.

I will repeat that: I must have known the negotiations were nearing an impasse the 26th of November I. and I evidently directed the preparation because Admiral Stark November warning on that day, the 26th. draft of the 27th of

The following is quoted from that statement :

"After consultation with each other, United States, British authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military coup Dutch military action against

Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands." [204]

Question :

Who constituted the military authorities representing the United States in entering into this agreement?

The agreement was reached in the so-called American-British-Dutch staff conversations held at Singapore in April of 1941. United States Army officers participated on my instructions and with the approval of the Secretary of War. U. S. participants were:

Captain Purnell, U. S. Navy; Chief of Staff of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

Colonel A. C. McBride, United States Army; Assistant Chief of Staff of the military forces in the Philippines.

Captain A. M. R. Allen, U. S. Navy; the U. S. naval observer in Singapore.

Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Brink, U. S. Army; U. S. military observer at Singapore.

Question:

What was the extent of his authority to bind the United States to take counter action against Japan in event the contingencies described in the above quotation or any one of them should come to pass?

The United States participants, of course, had no authority to bind their Government to any particular course of action.

The following recommendations were made by you and Admiral Stark in this joint agreement:

[205] "It is recommended that:

"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcements, military action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

"In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned. The United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint action be taken.

"steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the Government for the issuance of such warning."

the Secretary of State was described above, in

Question:

Was the sending of the memorandum to the Japanese Ambassadors, by the State Department did not conflict with these recommendations. The position from which we

The answer is: Not merely to threaten the Japanese with a proposal.

Question: Were the instructions given to the commanders in the Pacific area to avoid disclosure of the first act, [206] the result of instructions from such sources?

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, and I advised the President on the 1st of November and again on the 27th of November that in our present war with Japan should be avoided while we were building up our defensive forces in the Far East. It was essential

that we gain all the time that we could. While the instructions to avoid commission of the first overt act and alarming the population were in accordance with the policy of the Government, it is also true that this policy was in harmony with the recommendations Admiral Stark and I made to the President.

Upon whose decision was General Short relieved of Command of the Hawaiian Department?

Mine, in conjunction with the desire of the Secretary of War.

Would you furnish the Army Pearl Harbor Board a copy of the order for his relief?

Copy of the order is furnished herewith.

General RUSSELL. Do you know of any evidence to indicate that the Japanese have up until this time broken our code to the point that they are obtaining the same information relatively that we are, by observing—

General MARSHALL. What was the first of your questions?

General RUSSELL. Do you know of any evidence to this time to substantiate the fact that the Japanese may have broken our codes and may be obtaining information from us?

General MARSHALL. We have no evidence of that nature that [207] I can recall.

General RUSSELL. There has been some evidence—this is covering a detail which is apparently new—to the effect that when Nomura sent the memorandum of the 26th to Japan, that along with it he sent some statement to the effect that he had failed the Emperor, or words to that effect. Do you know anything about that message?

General MARSHALL. I don't know whether I have a faint recollection or not. I've got something wandering in my mind, but that ought to be obtainable right here in the records.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions regarding the questions that have been asked by the Board and answered? There appear to be none.

General, have you anything else that you would like to give to the Board that may be of assistance to the Board in coming to conclusions under its mission? For instance, you just started to mention something when we asked the last few questions.

General MARSHALL. I do not know of anything else I might give the Board to help them in arriving at a conclusion, other than to comment on the fact that at the time all this happened we were always confronted with the Japanese method of infiltration, taking advantage of our apparent reluctance to become involved in war and the British inability to give any strength to their garrisons in the Far East. We always had to guess or estimate as to what the procedure would be, whether they would proceed to an open rupture or whether they would pile up advantages to such a point that all the cards would be in their hands when the actual rupture occurred. We on our [208] side were confronted with the problem of preparing ourselves, particularly in the Philippines, Panama, and Alaska, as rapidly as possible before any break might occur. So our state of mind was measured between those general considerations throughout all of this procedure.

Further, our facilities, of course, at that time were not vaguely to be compared to our facilities and organization today, in the matter

of this secret material. We can get a mass of that culled through in a few hours by these thousands of people we have employed: some 10,000 by us and 6,000 by the Navy and 30-odd thousand by the British. No such forces as that were available in those days, and no machinery of the nature they have now.

In some respects the remarkable part about this procedure was that the critical messages were absorbed so quickly. That is the most astonishing part of it. Also, the tragic part that a message which became available—that is, monitored, transmitted, deciphered, and translated, pertaining directly to Hawaii and the Harbor—was not available, didn't come in to us until the following day.

The picture, the procedure, and of course the state of mind all have changed greatly through the period of the war. Once war is declared, you know your enemy is your enemy. The cards, as it were, are on the table and you can proceed at top speed with regard to all matters. Any problems at this time were those of uncertainty, a repetition of such incidents in the past, from the past, and our fears of what might be done in the way of a general planned arrangement or agreement between the Germans and the Japanese which would cover the [209] United States as well as our foreign garrisons.

For example, we expected, and so far as we could we were fully prepared for, a general sabotage program throughout the United States. To be of any real effect it had to happen practically all at one time, because we would suppress it, of course, wherever it arose. But we rather anticipated that would be done, and when virtually no act of any kind anywhere occurred we concluded this was held in abeyance for some more critical moment, and to that extent we became even more suspicious as to just when this, what we regarded as almost certain effort, would be made.

I do not think that helps very much toward your conclusions, but it is merely an effort of mine to reconstruct the state of mind of all of us at the period regarding which your Board is investigating.

General GRUNERT. Has the Board any subjects which they would like to bring up wherein the Chief of Staff could assist us?

General RUSSELL. It is suggested by the other members of the Board, General Marshall: there are two or three things that I shall ask about.

The Board is in possession of information recently relating to certain messages that apparently were picked up through this source that you have discussed with us rather fully, one particular message on or about December 4th which has been described as the "Winds" message. What information did you have at that time, if you can recall, about this particular message?

General MARSHALL. Well, as nearly as I can reconstruct [210] what I think my recollection is, in opposition to what I have refreshed my mind with from records since, I would say that my recollection at this time was merely that there was a "Winds" message which indicated that certain things were to be done when it was received, and there were certain phases of it that related to different nations.

General RUSSELL. Well, may I interject: On your last appearance before the Board, on Friday last, wasn't there read into the record at that time a memorandum which set forth the details about that "Winds" message?

General MARSHALL. That is correct. And I thought you were asking me about by memory?

General RUSSELL. No.

General MARSHALL. That isn't so much memory. I had gotten ahold of the records from which I was reading.

General RUSSELL. I recall that now.

Well, our second question is along the same line, and we shall just explore those phases briefly.

It has come to the attention of the Board that on Saturday night, December 6, probably as early as 9 p. m., thirteen of the fourteen sections of the Japanese reply to our memorandum of November 26 were in the possession of the Naval Department and translated and ready for delivery; that the probabilities are that that message was in the hands of some agency of the War Department on that evening of December 6. Do you recall being shown that message prior to your arrival in your office at approximately 11:30 a. m. on the morning of the 7th?

General MARSHALL. No, I don't recall that. And, [211] incidentally, I am quite certain I arrived at the office before 11:30 on that morning. My recollection is merely what I was told that morning about the deciphering and translating and preparation of this message. It was not—I don't believe it was—until I was before the Navy Court here recently that I knew this had come in, had been made available to the Secretary of State, the larger portion of that message, the night before. I may have known it at the time of the Roberts Commission, but I have no recollection of knowing that early.

General RUSSELL. The evidence which is before the Board at this time is to the effect that as early as 8:30, possibly not later than 9 a. m., on the morning of December 7th, the message which indicated that the ultimatum would be delivered by the Japanese Ambassadors at one o'clock on that day, and that the code machines were being destroyed, was in the hands of a Colonel——

General MARSHALL. Bratton?

General RUSSELL. Bratton of G-2, the General Staff, and that his energies from that time until your arrival in the office and General Miles' arrival in the office were devoted exclusively to locating you and General Miles.

Now the question: Was there anyone of the General Staff other than yourself with authority to have dispatched to the overseas departmental commanders a message which would have told them of these recent developments, and including the reply of the Japanese to our message of November 26, and particularly as to the substance of this message of December 7th relative to the delivery of the ultimatum and the destruction of the code machines?

[212] General MARSHALL. That would depend, I think, entirely on the officer concerned. There is no specific regulation about who, of those in charge of principal affairs, can do what in time of great emergency. It depends on the judgment of the individual. If the Deputy Chief of Staff were here, if the head of the War Plans Division were here, if possibly the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 were aware of this and of the possibilities of delay, they might have acted. It is very hard to answer, because you are inevitably involved in hindsight regarding a great catastrophe, and I can only answer it in that way.

I remember very distinctly the message from Colonel Bratton because it came to me as I was coming out of a shower, as my habit was to ride at 8:30 on Sunday morning, and it takes me about fifty min-

utes to go around the only available loop to ride in. It takes me about eight or ten minutes to get a shower and dress. And when the message came from Colonel Bratton he wanted to come out there, and I said, "No. I am on my way down to the War Department." And it couldn't have been more than five or ten minutes at the outside before I had left to come down here. I have a very clear recollection of that because naturally I thought about it at the time.

General GRUNERT. From one source of evidence it appears that in the Navy there were definite instructions that such things had to come to the Chief of Naval Operations and could not be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet without his O. K. We wanted to find out whether or not any such instructions were issued to the Army.

[213] General MARSHALL. We had no rules of that kind here at all, and we have no rules yet. These matters of the higher officials of the War Department are based on good common sense, for which the man is selected. If some particularly critical thing comes up—it is generally a local affairs of great political import—we will sometimes say that will not be touched.

General GRUNERT. Well, isn't this also of great political import? Was it not?

General MARSHALL. No, not—well, not political on the outside.

General GRUNERT. International, in foreign countries?

General MARSHALL. The political import I am talking about pertains purely to the home front.

General GRUNERT. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. And not to international affairs; talking about local reactions to specific things, and there is no immediacy involved in that.

General FRANK. Here was a message, however, where the time of its delivery by two hours would have made an awful lot of difference.

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes.

General FRANK. And they waited for the one top man to get it.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General FRANK. And the Board wondered if there were any restrictions imposed on topside organization.

General MARSHALL. None that I know of. We haven't any such restrictions now. As a matter of fact, you will see on [214] the War Department side that two messages were sent about sabotage without my knowledge at all.

General FRANK. And by the same token by which good common sense ought to have handled it, it would seem that good common sense ought to have told somebody to have gotten that thing out.

General GRUNERT. Colonel Bratton didn't have any such authority, did he?

General MARSHALL. No, I would say that he did not.

General GRUNERT. And General Miles did not get to your conference until after you had been in the office for some time; is that right?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that. I would say again that I do not think that Colonel Bratton could have acted on that evidence. I will say now, he certainly would not have been reprimanded for doing it, but I think that it would be expecting a good bit of him, a man who was not on the operative end at all but was merely on the transmittal end, to have taken such action.

General FRANK. There was a Major Doud the night of December 6, and copies of that message that night and the President.

General MARSHALL. Yes. Was that a part of the translation very distinct recollection of their English? Because I have this particular morning that they were explaining to me at the time during the night doing translating here had spent quite a bit of time a naval deciphered message.

General FRANK. But the Navy had delivered it in English at 9 p. m. the night before, and any translation that ensued was—

[215] General MARSHALL. Consisted of the Army checking on the naval translation. General FRANK. Therefore, it was available and delivered to the Secretary of State in the manner in which the Navy had sent and then it would seem that somebody over in the War Department was a little skeptical about the Navy translation. Yet it was a hot message and might have been used the night before.

General MARSHALL. What is your question?

General FRANK. I just wondered what, if any, check had been made on the reason for not delivering that the night before. Why was it held up from the War Department when it was delivered to the Secretary of State and the President?

General MARSHALL. I think I said, a little bit before, that I was not aware of the fact that this message had been available the night before, until, I think, the time of the Roberts Commission, and maybe not until more recently. So far as I personally was concerned, from the instant this thing happened my attention was entirely focused on recovering the situation rather than investigating and setting up things in the past, insofar as related to a defect of War Department system.

General RUSSELL. What investigations have been conducted in the General Staff—and this question is suggested by your last remark—looking to errors of omission or weaknesses in the system here in the War Department since Pearl Harbor?

[216] General MARSHALL. There have been investigations from time to time, particularly by the Secretary of the General Staff, as to procedure. He is involved in that constantly in the various sections of the General Staff of the War Department and sometimes things outside of that. There was one board consisting of about ten members, and then a steering committee consisting of Mr. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, General McNarney's principal man, that is, General McNarney's executive officer, and one or two others. Hence there was a searching examination, covering several months, on organization and procedure, matters of that sort.

I have sent memorandums from time to time to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, particularly General Strong, in regard to improving their set-up, the rapidity of action; not directed solely to this, but to the general operations of the G-2 section; and finally it culminated in this very heavy Board that spent several months going through it. But it has been, like all the other branches of the War Department General Staff, under a pretty continuous investigation and changes all the time. But handling of this secret information, as I explained here a little while ago, has been an evolution where we struggled for the most

effective way of p.

viduals, to what extent it for the rapid unde...
 sibility of really getting it should be screened so that...
 that you did nothing but the facts and not being so...
 doing it in a way that protected things and didn't operate...
 of course, have been relieved from source. From time to time...
 they were not quick enough on the General Staff where we thought...
 display the requisite judgment in what [217] their feet and didn't.

General RUSSELL. We had in mind what did.

as my question went, I did have in mind—particularly, I assume—so far
 might have been provoked by the Pearl Harbor investigation which
 say in that connection there is some evidence being incident. And I will
 has not been evaluated to this time, that G-2 made the Board, which
 over there, but we do not have a copy. We are going to make an effort
 to get it. I didn't know whether there was any other investigation

General MARSHALL. You dropped your voice at the not.
 tence. I didn't get it. You did not know—

General RUSSELL. I say, we have not seen the investigation of the sen-
 nor do we know whether any other investigation similar in nature
 the one that we have heard about in G-2 has been made.

General MARSHALL. What was the one you have heard about?

General RUSSELL. It was our information that shortly after Decem-
 ber 7, 1941, G-2 did record a lot of things that had happened; and
 sometime later—and my impression now is, in the comparatively
 recent past—a rather thorough investigation of the situation was made
 over there.

General MARSHALL. I don't remember.

General GRUNERT. It appears to have been engendered by questions
 asked by the Board of G-2 witnesses.

General MARSHALL. Well, you mean very recently?

General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes. I thought you were talking about in
 the past here.

[218] General GRUNERT. And during what we know of that
 investigation it appears that as a result of that investigation they
 have found a lot of things that they did not transmit to the Board and
 that are just coming to the knowledge of the Board here in the last
 week.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Not intentionally withheld, I suppose, unless
 they thought that the Board should not have these top secret matters.

General MARSHALL. The present Chief of Staff G-2 (of course, who
 was not here at the time, or was here I think in the War Plans Divi-
 sion; I don't remember; he wasn't connected with G-2) investigated,
 I believe, to determine what was the procedure at the time, because
 he couldn't answer any direct questions; and we brought Bratton
 back from overseas because he was present in the section at the time
 and, of course, General Miles was available up in Boston. That, I
 presume, is what you refer to.

General GRUNERT. Well, in a way, but we gave each one of the G-2
 witnesses an opportunity to tell the Board anything in their mind, of
 their knowledge, that may assist us in coming to conclusions. We
 have given every witness that opportunity. Now, evidently they

either forgot or didn't recall, or else at least they didn't tell us this information which we have gotten of late.

General MARSHALL. These were men that were in the G-2 at the time?

General GRUNERT. One is General Miles, included.

[219] General MARSHALL. And who?

General GRUNERT. General Miles was one of them.

General MARSHALL. Oh, yes. Well, I don't know. I have never seen Miles or talked to him.

General GRUNERT. In the Navy and the Naval witnesses we also developed the fact that at one time there was an inclination on the part of one Acting Secretary of the Navy to deny such information to the Court of Inquiry, but later on that was overruled by the Secretary of the Navy when he came back, and they therefore loosened up on that information. Of course, naturally, the Board thought that, well, if they held out from the Board information which is now coming up, what do we know but what something else is being held out?

General FRANK. And information that is rather vital, too.

General MARSHALL. Well, I don't know.

General GRUNERT. I cannot imagine that it is intentional.

General MARSHALL. The only thing that I can think of in connection with that is that everybody that is concerned with this top secret thing is very cagey about saying anything about it.

General GRUNERT. That is what I attribute it to.

General MARSHALL. And naturally he feels no freedom whatever to speak about it unless he is specifically authorized.

I have nothing else I can think of.

General GRUNERT. The memorandum of September 30, 1944, submitted to General Marshall, is as follows:

[220]

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.,
30 September 1944.

Memorandum for: General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff.

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. Enclosed herewith is the list of questions which the Army Pearl Harbor Board requests be answered by you either by a signed statement (to be returned to the Board by Monday 2 October 1944) or at a rehearing (now scheduled for 1400 Monday 2 October 1944).

2. The Board has decided to record your hearing of 29 September 1944, together with any future testimony or evidence bearing on top secret matters, in a separate record as a supplement to the main record. Further, any report made by the Board with reference thereto will be separated from the main report.

3. It is requested that the Board be informed by 1200 hours Monday, 2 October 1944, whether you desire to submit a signed statement or be reheard as scheduled.

For the Board:

GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieut. General, U. S. A.,
President.

1 Incl.

[221] Will you state the reasons, if any, which prompted you to select General Short to command the Hawaiian Department?

2. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the services rendered by him in the capacity of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from the date of his assignment until the 6th day of December 1941 so as to express an opinion as to the character of such services?

3. If you have the bases for rating those services, will you please state to the Board whether or not you regarded them entirely satisfactory?

4. On the 20th day of October 1941, the War Department sent to General Short the following radiogram:

"Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in foreign policy seems imminent."

Do you know of any other information sent to General Short by the War Department from the date of this radiogram until the 27th day of November 1941, at which time Message No. 472 was dispatched to him? If you know of any other information on the Japanese situation sent to General Short during that period of time, won't you please give the Army Pearl Harbor Board the benefit of it?

[222] 5. Do you believe that you were kept fully informed by the State Department on the development of the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government?

6. When were you informed of the delivery by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassadors of the memorandum of the 26th of November 1941, which memorandum was described as an outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan?

7. When did you first know that the Secretary of War was told by the Secretary of State on the morning of 27 November 1941 that he had broken the whole matter off, as he put it, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy"?

8. It is in the Record that you left Washington for the Carolina Maneuvers on the 26th day of November 1941. Did you prepare or direct the preparation of a message to be sent to overseas commanders prior to your departure for the Carolina Maneuvers?

9. Do you recall when you first saw the message to General Short of November 27, 1941, No. 472?

10. Do you recall under what circumstances and by whom this message was shown to you?

11. Do you regard that message as containing all of the information with respect to the Japanese and instructions necessary to be sent to General Short for [223] the accomplishment of his mission in the Hawaiian Department at that time?

12. Upon your appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Monday, 7 August 1944, you testified about the Report of General Short in response to the direction in the message of 27 November to report measures taken. In this testimony you were not certain as to whether or not you saw General Short's Report. Your language is "I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it."

Have you in any way refreshed your memory on this subject so as to change the answer just quoted?

13. The message from General Short making such report indicates that it was stamped in the Office of the Chief of Staff with the following entry: "Noted—Chief of Staff." It does not contain your signature. Will you please state to the Board who was authorized to place this stamp upon the message?

14. Would the placing of this stamp upon the message indicate to others in the War Department that you had seen the message and noted its contents?

15. Did you know that General Short had ordered his Command into an alert for sabotage only, and that this condition of readiness obtained during the entire period 27 November–6 December inclusive?

16. Is it now apparent that the message of 27 November 1941 from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department (No. 472), was misunderstood or misconstrued by the Commanding General [224] of the Hawaiian Department and did not accomplish the desired and intended results?

17. Is it now apparent that the Report of General Short to the War Department, in compliance with the instructions in the above message to report measures taken, was misunderstood or misconstrued by the War Department and did not accomplish the desired and intended results?

18. Were any steps taken by the War Department between 27 November and 7 December 1941 to determine the state of readiness of the Command of the Hawaiian Department?

19. In your previous testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board you read into the record a joint statement signed by you and Admiral Stark which

was dated 27 November 1941. It is on the subject of the Far Eastern situation and is addressed to the President. The following questions relating to that joint agreement are submitted:

a. Do you know the date when this joint statement was delivered to the President?

b. Did you know at the time of its delivery to the President that the Secretary of State's memorandum of 26 November had been sent to the Japanese Ambassadors?

c. The following is quoted from that statement:

"After consultation with each other [225] United States, British and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter action against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East of or south of 10° North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands."

(1) Who constituted the military authorities representing the United States in entering into this agreement?

(2) What was the extent of his authority to bind the United States to take counter action against Japan in event the contingencies described in the above quotation or any one of them should come to pass?

d. The following recommendations were made by you and Admiral Stark in this joint agreement:

"It is recommended that:

"prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcements, military counter action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British or Dutch territory as above outlined:

"in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such [226] warning no joint military opposition be taken.

"steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning."

Was the sending of the memorandum of 26 November by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassadors, which memorandum was described above, in conflict with these recommendations?

20. Were there any restrictions imposed upon the War Department relating to its activities in the Pacific by either the President or the State Department? Specifically, were the injunctions to commanders in the Pacific area to avoid commission of the first overt act, alarming the population in Hawaii, disclosing intent, etc., the result of instructions from such sources?

21. Upon whose decision was General Short relieved of Command of the Hawaiian Department?

22. Would you furnish the Army Pearl Harbor Board a copy of the order for his relief?

(Thereupon the witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[227]

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUFUS S. BRATTON—Recalled

Colonel WEST. As the witness, Colonel Bratton, is appearing again, or being recalled, and he has already been sworn, it will not be necessary to swear him again, but he is reminded he is still under oath.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Colonel, I think General Russell has some questions to ask, and I will turn you over to him.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, when you were here as a witness before the Board recently, you referred to a document, which you described as a secret summary of Far Eastern documents. The Board at that time

requested that you take steps to make that document available to us, as evidence; is that true?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Have you brought that document into the Board meeting with you today?

Colonel BRATTON. I have brought a photostat copy of the original summary, dated 20 August 1943, which is on file in War Department G-2. In addition to this document you have before you, there are 16 volumes of photographs, or photostats, of the original documents which were used in preparing this summary. They will be made available to you later, sir.

General RUSSELL. What can we obtain from those additional documents which you have referred to as 16 in number, that is not briefed and condensed in the document which you are submitting to the Board?

Colonel BRATTON. Nothing except verification of the statements contained in this summary, and knowledge as to the [228] distribution given the documents themselves. In most cases the officers or offices to whom copies of the original documents were routed are indicated on the document itself. While the distribution is not indicated on the original documents, it may be assumed that copies were sent to OPD and to ONI in every case, as that was our standard operating procedure at the time. Those documents that were thought to be of interest to the State Department, copies were sent to the State Department; those of particular interest for the Chief of Staff were shown to him; documents of interest to the Department of Commerce, copies were sent to that Department; and so on; but in every case, copies went to OPD and to ONI.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I don't know that it is clear in the record, or to all Members of the Board, just what the relation is between the document which you have brought here, and which we are going to tender in evidence, and these 16 other volumes that you have described.

Colonel BRATTON. The 16 other volumes are the original documents upon which this summarization was based. The documents themselves in many cases have a distribution list thereon which indicates the routing of the various copies of those documents. Where no such distribution list is shown, it may be assumed that copies went always to WPD and to ONI. Occasionally, when the matter was considered sufficiently important, copies were sent to the Chief of Staff, and to the President.

General FRANK. Does this volume contain all the basic information?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. And, in the back of this volume, is a list [229] of the volumes that are on file in G-2 of the War Department, the 16 volumes?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; but do not misunderstand me, it does not contain the list of all of the documents bearing on the Far East that are on file in G-2.

General FRANK. No; I am talking about the 16 volumes.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. So that if, at any time, in reading this summary, this Board, or any other agency, wanted to refer to any of those 16 volumes, they could be obtained from G-2 of the War Department?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. I introduce this document in evidence, which was produced, here, at the request of General Frank, as a Member of the Board, on September 30, 1944.

(The Summary of Far Eastern Documents, requested by General Frank, page 90, volume "B", was marked as Exhibit "A", and was received in evidence.)

General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, let us spot these documents that are over in G-2, for a minute, that are not in this memorandum that you have just given us, these critical messages that are described as having reached G-2, and the critical messages sent by G-2, in November and early December, 1941. Where are they, now?

Colonel BRATTON. The translated intercepts, you refer to, are on file in G-2, War Department.

General RUSSELL. Do these translated intercepts indicate the time that they were received in the office of G-2 and the delivering agency?

[230] Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; they indicate in each case, however, the date of transmittal, the date and agency by whom translated.

General RUSSELL. What do you mean by the term "transmittal"—transmittal to G-2, or transmittal from G-2?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; from the sender to the receiver; a message from him.

General RUSSELL. I understand.

Colonel BRATTON. Just like any other telegram or cablegram would show.

General GRUNERT. Would that record also show the time that the translation was completed?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; and in practically every case that date will be approximately the day of receipt in G-2. A message might have been translated by the Navy, last night, and it would be received by G-2, the following morning; but there would be no longer gap than that.

General RUSSELL. Is there an index in G-2's office of these messages about which we are talking now?

Colonel BRATTON. That, I don't know, sir.

General GRUNERT. How, then, could they find any particular message that they are after, if the files do not show such index?

Colonel BRATTON. I cannot answer this, first-hand, General. I don't know, of my own knowledge.

General FRANK. Who is the custodian?

Colonel BRATTON. Since some time in 1942, I think.

General FRANK. Who was the custodian previous to him? Were you ever custodian of these files?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

[231] General FRANK. When?

Colonel BRATTON. Up until some time in the early part of 1942, when the so-called "special branch" was set up in G-2 for the handling of this type of material.

General FRANK. Didn't you have them filed, indexed, and catalogued?

Colonel BRATTON. I did, sir.

General RUSSELL. What has happened to those files and indexes?

Colonel BRATTON. I assume that with the machinery they now have set up to handle this material, it is filed, indexed, cross-indexed, and catalogued in every possible way.

General RUSSELL. Have you seen any of those documents that we are now talking about since you came back to the States recently?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. How did you find them?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not find them, sir. They were handed to me, one by one, to ask if I remembered seeing such and such a document, did I have knowledge of it, and so on, and so forth.

General FRANK. Was that when you were a witness before this G-2 investigating board?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. You have not been allowed to get into the file by yourself?

Colonel BRATTON. I have been given everything that I asked for.

General FRANK. But you have not been roaming around in [232] those files?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Well, let us be a little more specific. When you were here last, Colonel, you talked about the message that went out to Colonel Fielder on about the 5th day of December 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. I may be incorrect, but, as I recall, you stated that you would look up that message for us and see if you could get it for us; is that true?

Colonel BRATTON. I did, sir; but I was not able to get it.

General RUSSELL. Did you see it?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I saw it.

General RUSSELL. It is there?

Colonel BRATTON. I saw it as late as this morning.

General RUSSELL. And it is over there in the files, but they won't let you have it?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, they wouldn't let me bring it over here, if that is what you mean, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, do you know who has issued the instructions that we are not to be given those messages, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir. I mean by that, I don't know the ultimate authority.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, we do want to talk to you about one or two other things, about which you do know. You were over in G-2 on the morning of December 7, 1941, weren't you?

[233] Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you recall what time you got into the office that morning? I think you have testified that, before, but I have forgotten.

Colonel BRATTON. I reached the office, that morning, some time between 7 and 8 o'clock, I believe, sir.

General RUSSELL. Did you know a Major Doud?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Was Major Doud in the office, that morning, when you reached it?

Colonel BRATTON. Not that I recall. I saw him later on in the day.

General RUSSELL. When you first reached the office, that morning, did you find the 13 of the 14 parts of the Japanese reply to Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26, 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is not very clear on that, sir. We kept a 24-hour watch in my section of G-2 around about this time, for obvious reasons. Certain trusted assistants of mine helped me in receiving and combing out these intercepts and arranging them for distribution, and at that time or at about that time they were coming in at all hours of the day and night, and it may be that a part of that document you refer to had reached my desk before I got there. I remember that a long message, which was the Japanese reply, in 14 parts, about 20 pages, started coming in, the afternoon of the sixth, and I delivered, that night, the parts that had come in by that time. I believe that I didn't get the last part—that is, the 14th part—until the morning of the 7th.

General RUSSELL. Whom did you deliver them to that night?

[234] Colonel BRATTON. To the office of the Chief of Staff: the ACofS; G-2; WPD; and the State Department. I gave the Secretary of State's copy to the watch officer in the State Department, with the request that it be gotten to Mr. Hull immediately.

General RUSSELL. Did you do that, personally?

Colonel BRATTON. I gave it personally to the watch officer in the State Department, in a locked pouch.

General RUSSELL. About what time?

Colonel BRATTON. I would say about half past ten, although I am not certain.

General RUSSELL. Do you recall when you placed the parts that did come in, on the desk of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Was it before midnight?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember, sir.

General RUSSELL. Was it during the night?

Colonel BRATTON. It must have been, because he had it on his desk when I saw him on the morning of the 7th.

General RUSSELL. You stated, a moment ago, that you made distribution on the night of the 6th to G-2, the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of State; was not that the effect of your testimony a moment ago?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you have any independent recollection of when you put this document on the desk of either G-2 or of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; I don't remember.

General RUSSELL. Are there any records in the office of G-2 now which will show when that was done? [235]

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, I believe you state that the next morning you saw that on the Chief of Staff's desk, referring to this long message.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; he had a copy on his desk.

General RUSSELL. And that was about 11:25, when you saw that, there?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Was your testimony, on Saturday, to the effect that you waited for the Chief of Staff in the outer room of his office on that morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I was either in the office of the Secretary to the General Staff, or out in the hall, waiting for the Chief of Staff to arrive.

General RUSSELL. How do you fix the time so accurately as being about 11:25 a. m.?

Colonel BRATTON. I kept looking at the clock on the wall and at my watch. I was anxious for the Chief of Staff to get there.

General RUSSELL. Then, I believe that later on, about the 10th of December, which was three or four days later, you wrote a memorandum of the occurrences, and, as I recall, there appears in that memorandum which you dictated into the record, the statement that the Chief of Staff came in, about 11:25.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Or at least, you went in to the Chief of Staff, at 11:25—which, or was it both?

Colonel BRATTON. Both. I saw him as soon as he got there. [236] I was waiting for him.

General RUSSELL. Now, when was this Clarke investigation made, that we are talking about, now? Recently?

Colonel BRATTON. It has been going on for some days, sir. I appeared before this "board", I presume it is, in G-2, on the morning of the 14th of September, for the first time, and I have talked to the members of the Board practically every day since then.

Colonel TOULMIN. Colonel, I would like to get an answer to this important question. When you got the 13 parts of this vital message from Japan, on the evening of the 6th, about 9 or 10 o'clock as I understand, and you placed a copy on the Chief of Staff's desk, why was it the Chief of Staff was not called by you or somebody else and immediately advised of the receipt of this important message, instead of waiting until some time the next morning, before his attention was called to it?

Colonel BRATTON. Those of us who had been reading these intercepts knew that this long statement from the Japanese foreign office was on the way. We suspected that it was in the nature of an ultimatum. The ultimatum itself was actually in part 14 of the message, which I didn't get until the early morning of the 7th of December.

Colonel TOULMIN. I am aware of that, but you don't answer my question. Why weren't the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough by the Navy to be delivered to the President and to every one of the important Admirals in the Navy Department, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it, so he could [237] have taken some action upon it? That's what puzzles me.

Colonel BRATTON. You are referring, now, to the Japanese reply?

Colonel TOULMIN. To the 13 parts.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes—not to the short message?

Colonel TOULMIN. Not to the short message. I am talking about the evening of December 6, and they were in English by 9 or 10 o'clock. The President of the United States and the leading Admirals of the Navy Department all had that message before midnight, most

of them by 10 or 11 o'clock. You had it in the early evening, also. What I am trying to find out is why it was that the Chief of Staff was not called and advised, as were others, that this important document had been received. In view of the tenor of its contents, it hardly needed the 14th paragraph, to be conclusive as to its intent and contents; and why did not the Chief of Staff get that message?

Colonel BRATTON. I am trying to remember, sir, what I did with the copies that went to General Miles and General Marshall and General Gerow. I can't verify it or prove it, at this time, but my recollection is that those three officers got their copies the evening of the 6th.

Colonel TOULMIN. By "the three officers," you mean whom?

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall, General Miles, and General Gerow. Now, it was my practice to deliver to them their copies before I went to the State Department.

Colonel TOULMIN. That was your practice?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you deliver this copy, for instance, to General Marshall, personally, on the evening of the 6th?

[238] Colonel BRATTON. No; I very seldom delivered it to him, in person. I gave it to his secretary, in a locked bag.

Colonel TOULMIN. And you gave it to General Miles in what way, on the evening of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. I generally took them into his office and handed them to him, and if he wasn't there, I left it with the executive officer, Major, now Colonel Smith.

Colonel TOULMIN. We are now talking about the evening before, Saturday evening, December 6.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your recollection you handed this important, long, 13-part message to General Miles on that evening?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Is it your recollection that you handed that long, 13-part message, on that evening, to the Secretary to the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And it is your recollection that you handed it on that evening of December 6 to General Gerow, or some representative of General Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you hand it to General Gerow directly, or to his Secretary?

Colonel BRATTON. To his executive officer.

Colonel TOULMIN. Who was he?

Colonel BRATTON. The executive?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Gailey.

[239] Colonel TOULMIN. And what is the name of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRATTON. Colonel Smith, Bedell Smith, now Lieutenant General.

Colonel TOULMIN. And after this, you then went over and delivered it to the Secretary of State in the locked pouch, for and on his behalf, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, to the watch officer in the State Department.

Colonel TOULMIN. To the watch officer, about 10 or 10:30, on that Saturday evening, December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now, having made these deliveries, Colonel, to these four recipients, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of G-2, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Secretary of State, did you get any reaction to that message, until the following day?

Colonel BRATTON. What do you mean by "reaction," Colonel?

Colonel TOULMIN. Did they answer it, did they act upon it, did they mention it, did they discuss it, did they call you, did they look at it, to your knowledge? Or, put it in the negative—did they do nothing about it, so far as you know?

Colonel BRATTON. I had some discussions of the message, as I remember now, with General Miles, indicating to him that the final part was yet to come. It did not come in until the following morning. The reaction from General Marshall was a reading and a discussion of the entire communication.

General FRANK. That night?

Colonel BRATTON. No.

[240] General FRANK. Or the following morning?

Colonel BRATTON. The following morning.

Colonel TOULMIN. Let us confine ourselves to the night of December 6, now.

Colonel BRATTON. Sir?

Colonel TOULMIN. Let us confine ourselves to the night of December 6, for the moment, at least. Now, did you talk to General Miles?

Colonel BRATTON. I did not talk to General Marshall the night of the 6th.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you talk to General Miles on the night of the 6th?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is that I did, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. You talked to him on the phone, or in his office?

Colonel BRATTON. No, I believe I talked to him in his office.

Colonel TOULMIN. And did he read this document in your presence, then and there, on the night of December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. My recollection is that he did; yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And at about what time did you hand it to him and he read the document?

Colonel BRATTON. That, I don't remember.

Colonel TOULMIN. Was it about 9 or 10 o'clock, or something of that sort?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember, sir.

General FRANK. Was it before you went to the State Department?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

[241] Colonel TOULMIN. Then it must have been somewhere between 7 and 10:30 o'clock on the evening of December 6, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. It must have been.

Colonel TOULMIN. And did General Miles comment upon the message after he read it, to you?

Colonel BRATTON. Oh, yes! We discussed it at some length.

Colonel TOULMIN. And was anything done so far as you know about it at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. That night?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes, that night.

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir; not that I know of.

Colonel TOULMIN. General Miles took no action in your presence to call the Chief of Staff, then, did he?

Colonel BRATTON. Not that I know of; not in my presence.

Colonel TOULMIN. Now, that leaves General Gerow. Did you have any contact with General Gerow, other than to hand it to his executive officer?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that I did, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you get any reaction from General Gerow, that evening?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And how about General Smith? Did you get any reaction from him, or any action, rather?

Colonel BRATTON. No. General Smith did not have access to these pouches. You mean General Bedell Smith?

Colonel TOULMIN. Yes.

Colonel BRATTON. He didn't have a key to the bag.

[242] General RUSSELL. What was his relation?

Colonel BRATTON. General Marshall's secretary.

General RUSSELL. Well, he is the man to whom you gave General Marshall's copy, was he not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes; but it was in a locked pouch, to which General Marshall had the key.

General RUSSELL. Do you know what Bedell Smith did with it?

Colonel BRATTON. No, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. Did you tell him that it was an important document in the locked pouch?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that the Chief of Staff should know about it?

Colonel BRATTON. Should see it right away.

Colonel TOULMIN. What was General Smith's response—that he would get in touch with the Chief of Staff, or would not?

Colonel BRATTON. It must have been, because if it had been otherwise, it would have registered on my memory.

Colonel TOULMIN. And about what time in the evening was it when General Smith was told there was an important document in that locked pouch for General Marshall, and that his attention should be called to it?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. And that was on the evening of December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

[243] Colonel TOULMIN. 1941?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel TOULMIN. That is all on that, I think.

Major CLAUSEN. I have one question to the same point. Did you, after this evening of December 6, receive verification that it had been given to the Chief of Staff on the evening of the 6th of December?

Colonel BRATTON. No. I don't know whether it was or not.

General GRUNERT. In your discussion of this long message, the 13 "chapters," we will call them, with General Miles, did General Miles

personally attempt to find out what the Chief of Staff wanted to do about it, that night?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't know, sir.

General GRUNERT. I have no further questions.

Is there anything else that you think of that you now would like to acquaint the Board with? We always give every witness an opportunity to get something off his chest if he has something that he is waiting for a chance to tell.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. If you have in evidence this particular message, I strongly recommend that you secure the 30 or 40 other messages which preceded it; that is, the exchanges between the Ambassador in Washington and the foreign minister in Tokyo.

General GRUNERT. And that would lead us where?

Colonel BRATTON. And consider the picture that lay before all of our policy-making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State down through the Secretary of War, to the Chief of the War Plans Division. They all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of [244] weeks, if not months.

General BRUNERT. But this culminating bit of information appeared to put the finishing touch on that picture.

General RUSSELL. There was one other "daub," as I get it—the short message which told them to destroy their code machines and to deliver the ultimatum at 1 o'clock. That was the final one, was it not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. I think the Board has the picture. Just how far we will go from here, we will decide.

All right. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5:30 p. m., the Board proceeded to other business.)

[TOP SECRET]

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[TOP SECRET]

[246] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL
HARBOR BOARD

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1944.

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9:10 a. m., pursuant to recess, conducted the further hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.

Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.

Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF OTIS K. SADTLER, 03577, COLONEL, SIGNAL CORPS,
GROUND SIGNAL OFFICER; WAR COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel SADTLER. Otis K. Sadtler, 03577, Colonel, Signal Corps; Ground Signal Officer; War College, Washington, D. C.

General GRUNERT. Colonel, in this special part of our investigation, General Russell will propound the questions, and the other Members of the Board will fill in wherever they see fit.

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

[247] General RUSSELL. Colonel Sadtler, as suggested by General Frank, I want to advise you that the evidence which you give this morning will be regarded as top secret testimony, that it is being impounded in a separate file, and is being made available to a very limited number of selected people who are on the Board or closely associated with the Board, in this investigation, with such other people as may be designated by the War Department.

What is your present assignment, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. Signal officer of the ground forces.

General RUSSELL. How long have you been in the Signal Corps as a signal officer?

Colonel SADTLER. About 27 years.

General RUSSELL. Where were you and what was your assignment, in 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. From January 1, 1941, until about the 7th of August 1941, I was signal officer of the Second Corps, at Wilmington, Delaware. I was then ordered to duty in the Chief Signal Office, and had charge of military codes and ciphers, the message center, training, the schools, pictorial publicity, photographic work—in general, the military end of the Signal Corps.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, in connection with the duties which you have just described as having been performed by you in the year 1941, after you came to Washington, did you see the messages concerning the relations between the American Government and the Japanese empire, which passed through the office over which you had supervision?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir. In general I saw most all of [248] those messages. In other words, I saw most of the information that was obtained through our code-deciphering department.

General RUSSELL. Did you give attention to the substance of those messages at any time, or were you primarily or solely interested in a proper deciphering, interpretation, and delivery?

Colonel SADTLER. In general my position was one of operations only. In other words, we were concerned primarily with the collection of data that came to our attention through various intercept means, and we were not concerned with the evaluation or the analysis of the content of those messages.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, what agencies were in operation, intercepting data, which were placed in the messages with which your office had contact, after your coming to Washington in 1941?

Colonel SADTLER. I am not sure that I quite understand your question, General.

General RUSSELL. Well, let me express it another way. It was rather broken down into parts.

The Army had certain means for intercepting information, the Navy had certain means for intercepting information, and the information thus intercepted reached the agency over which you had control, for processing; is that true?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir. The two agencies that had a complete exchange of information, due to agreements that were made between the two services, were the Army and Navy. The Federal Communications Commission had an intercept service, as also did the Coast Guard, but that was under the Navy at the time, so I suppose you can call them a Navy agency.

General RUSSELL. You have referred to a working plan or agreement between the Army and Navy. Briefly, what was that?

[249] Colonel SADTLER. That any information we obtained, we gave them a copy, and anything which they obtained, they gave us a copy; and whenever our translators were on duty and theirs were not, or theirs were on duty and ours were not, the stuff would be exchanged, for processing.

General RUSSELL. What was the history as it relates to the number of messages reaching you, or those associated with you, for processing, late in November and early in December 1941, relating to the Japanese-American negotiations? Did they become more numerous, or fewer?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; the messages regarding the relations between Japan and the United States did increase materially.

General FRANK. On what date? Leading up to what date, about?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know. It seems to me that when I first came to the office, I was warned that the messages beginning to come, on the relations between Japan and the United States, were getting more tense, the condition.

General FRANK. Who warned you of that?

Colonel SADTLER. General Mauborne, the retired Chief Signal Officer at that time. The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and strained relations between the two countries, and the number of messages about warnings of conditions that might obtain in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November, to such an extent that we were of the opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday, November 30. This, as you all know, proved to be a [250] "dud," and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive. If I recall correctly, that word was "Haruna." It is the same name as that battleship that Colin Kelly was alleged to have sunk.

About December 3, Tokyo notified the embassy pertaining to the destruction of their codes, at once.

General FRANK. The embassy in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. The Japanese embassy in Washington, regarding the destruction of their codes. Now, those messages were important as showing the trend of conditions.

Along about November 20—this date I am not sure about—somewheres after November 20 there was a message I think intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission, one in voice, and one in CW, to the effect that the Japanese were notifying their nationals of possible war between Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia. This message stated upon the advent three code words would be broadcast; one meaning "north wind cold," "east wind rain," "south wind fair," or anyhow, there were three messages that had meteorological data contained therein, and these three messages, the first word meant "Japan and United States," "Japan and Russia," "Japan and Great Britain," would go to war, and they were notifying their nationals throughout the world that when this "Winds" message as it has been now called was implemented, war would be declared between Japan and one of those three countries.

I made arrangements at that time, through Colonel Wesley [251] Guest, who was one of my officers, to contact the Federal Communications Commission to ask that their intercept service listen in, in Japanese broadcasts, for the implementation of that particular message. The Federal Communications Commission complied, and arranged for a telephone communication between their broadcast station and Colonel Bratton, who was the liaison officer between our Code and Cipher section and G-2, and, if I remember rightly, he was the officer in charge of the Far Eastern force at that time.

General FRANK. Just for the purpose of keeping the record straight, he was the liaison officer between G-2 and your Code and Cipher section, is that correct?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes. In other words, all information that we obtained we turned over to Colonel Bratton.

General FRANK. Go ahead.

Colonel SADTLER. We paid a great deal of attention to that message, and then when the directive came from Tokyo regarding the destruction of codes, that message began to assume some importance, or a great deal of importance.

General FRANK. That is, in the estimation of the people who were handling it?

Colonel SADTLER. That was in the estimation of General Miles, Colonel Bratton, and myself; others, maybe; I don't know.

On the morning of the 5th of December, Admiral Noyes, who was Chief of Naval Communications at that time, time, called me, about 9:30, with words to the effect, "Sadtler, the message is in!" I asked him which one it was, and he said he didn't know, but he thought it was the one that meant war between Japan and Great Britain. I asked him for the Japanese word, and he said he [252] didn't know it, but to please tell G-2.

I went immediately to General Miles's office and told him that the word was in. He said, "Wait a minute, I will call Colonel Bratton," and in a very short while Colonel Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General Miles's desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some officer, I don't know who it was. I think he has since been identified as General Roderick, who is now dead; and myself.

I then reported what General Noyes had told me, and Colonel Bratton took out his little notebook, and he said, "Which one of these three words is it?" And I said, "I don't know, but Admiral Noyes says it is the one meaning war between Japan and Great Britain." "Well," he said, "do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." I says, "I will go back and call Admiral Noyes on the secret phone."

I got Admiral Noyes, and he said, "I don't know," and I said, "Can you verify it?" He said, "I can't do it right now, as I have to attend a meeting in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations," or some place, I don't know where; but he was unable to verify that at the time, "and," he says, "I will do it later." I says, "I think 'later' will be too late!" I went back to General Miles's office and told them that Admiral Noyes was unable to verify the word at that time, that he had to go to a meeting, but he was positive that it was the word meaning Japan and Great Britain, and it was the implementation of that "Winds" message. I would like to add here that my memory is a little bit faulty as to whether it was not Japan and Great Britain. It may have been Japan and Russia, but I am positive it was not Japan and the United States.

[253] I went back to my office. Rather, General Miles said. "Well, I don't know what we will do. You keep on the lookout for anything that comes in and let us know just as soon as possible."

I went back to the office, and then I went down to see General Gerow, who was head of the War Plans, told him to the effect of what Admiral Noyes had said, and didn't he think we should send a message to Hawaii. I don't mean Hawaii—to Panama, the Philippines, and Hawaii. He says, "I think they have had plenty of notification." And the matter dropped.

I then went in to the Secretary of the General Staff and talked to Colonel Smith about the same thing, and he asked me what I had done, and I told him I had talked to G-2 and War Plans; and he didn't want to discuss it further.

Some time about—I don't know whether it was the 5th or 6th of December, or at that period, Tokyo notified the Japanese embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes, which was done on Saturday afternoon, and duly reported in the Sunday STAR on December 7.

General RUSSELL. Have you finished that line, Colonel?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir; I think that is enough.

General RUSSELL. I wanted to ask one or two questions about it. Now, Colonel, as I understand your testimony, you had accomplished your mission or fulfilled your job when you delivered these messages to the office of G-2, is that correct?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. On this particular day of December 5, 1941, you went further, and discussed the message with Gerow, of the War Plans Division, and Smith, who was Secretary of the [254] General Staff?

Colonel SADTLER. Secretary of the General Staff.

General RUSSELL. Would you tell the Board why you went the "second mile" and discussed this message with the War Plans Division and Secretary of the General Staff?

Colonel SADTLER. I was sure war was coming, and coming very quickly. On December 4—that's Thursday—I represented the Chief Signal Officer at the Defense Communications Board, which was composed of Mr. Fly, Mr. Breckinridge Long; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Gaston; the Chief Signal Officer, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Just before that meeting, Mr. Gaston asked me what I thought about war being declared, and I said that I thought they would have war within 48 hours. He turned to Captain Redmont, who represented Admiral Noyes at that meeting, and asked him what he thought, and he said he agreed with Colonel Sadtler.

General RUSSELL. Then your reply to the question that I asked, requesting the reason for your going to Gerow and Smith, is that you felt that war was very imminent, and, prompted by that feeling, you communicated with these two operating officers?

Colonel SADTLER. That's about right; yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. And in the conversation with Gerow, you suggested action, which he gave his reasons for not taking?

Colonel SADTLER. Which were to the effect that they had had plenty of warning.

General FRANK. Was there anybody besides Miles, Bratton, Gerow, and Bedell Smith, with whom you talked about this matter?

Colonel SADTLER. Except that unknown officer, who was in General Miles's room, that day.

[255] General FRANK. That you thought was Roderick?

Colonel SADTLER. Which I thought was Roderick.

General FRANK. That constitutes the whole coterie with whom you had any discussion about this?

Colonel SADTLER. I think so.

General GRUNERT. And, of course, the Navy.

General FRANK. I am talking about the Army.

General RUSSELL. Now, about one or two other messages, Colonel. Do you have any recollection of messages which may have reached the agency that you were controlling and have described, on the evening of December 6 and the morning of December 7? I will identify them a little further.

It has come to the attention of the Board that some time on the evening of December 6, probably around 9 or 10 o'clock, there were received by some government agency the first 13 of 14 parts of the reply of the Japanese government to Mr. Hull's note of November 26, 1941. Did that clear through your agency?

Colonel SADTLER. I don't know, sir.

General RUSSELL. It is also in the record that some time in the morning, December 7, the last, the 14th part of this reply reached War Department agencies, and the time for delivery of the entire reply was received in a message, as well as some further instructions about the destruction of codes or code machines. Do you have any recollection of those December 7 messages which I have described?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I did not go to work on the morning of December 7.

General GRUNERT. How about the night of the 6th? Were you there?

[256] Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I was not. I heard about these things after that, on about the 8th or 9th, General. I did not know anything about them at the time.

General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, in order that the questions which I am about to ask may be intelligible to you—and you may supply in your answers such deficiencies as exist in my questions, because I am unfamiliar with the subject—I want to state to you that on the 5th day of December 1941, G-2 states that a message was sent to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, Colonel Fielder.

The substance of that message may be material or immaterial. It was to the effect that Fielder contact Rochefort, of the Navy. It has come to the attention of the Board, informally, to this time, that Colonel Fielder, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, has denied rather recently that he received that message.

Now, the questions. Would there be in the records of the transmitting agency, to-wit, the signal set-up here at Washington, any information, or the lack of information, which would indicate the delivery or non-delivery of that message which I have just described?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. At the time of the sending of the message, assuming that it was December 5, 1941, would there have been in the message center or elsewhere in Washington information indicating that this alleged message had reached the receiving agency in Honolulu?

Colonel SADTLER. Yes, sir.

Colonel RUSSELL. Had that message not reached the receiving agency in Honolulu, what would have been its impact [257] on the system here in Washington?

Colonel SADTLER. There would have been a number missing, in the series of messages sent on that trick.

General RUSSELL. What steps would have been taken to determine just what happened to the missing message, on this end?

Colonel SADTLER. There would have been a complete search made of everything, to find out where that message had been mislaid.

General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not there was a missing message to Honolulu on that day, and whether or not a search was made to determine the facts surrounding such missing message, if one in fact developed?

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir. I did not know, nor did I hear, of anything concerning a missing message on that date.

General RUSSELL. Is it possible for you at this time, or for anyone else, to make an investigation in the message center or signal service in Washington and determine whether or not there was a missing message to Honolulu on that day?

Colonel SADTLER. I doubt if that information could be obtained today, in so far as the Signal Corps, there, is concerned.

General RUSSELL. Do you think that if a message, transmitted from your agencies in Washington on the 5th of December 1941 to Honolulu, had not reached the receiving agency—I am referring to the receiving signal agency, now, in Honolulu—that such fact would have been called to your attention, had such message not been discovered?

Colonel SADTLER. I doubt it. It would probably have been—it was Colonel French's business to keep track of those [258] messages. He was actually in charge of the message center, at the time.

General FRANK. He was the man immediately in charge?

Colonel SADTLER. That is right; the man immediately in charge of the message center at that time.

General RUSSELL. Is there anything else you might say on that line which would enlighten us on this investigation which we are now making, as indicated by our questions to you?

Colonel SADTLER. As far as that message is concerned, I think there is a presumption of law, isn't there, that a letter mailed is always received at its destination? I think there is less chance of the message being lost, less chance of messages being lost, than of a letter mailed being lost.

General RUSSELL. I believe those are the questions that I had outlined to ask this witness. There may be something else.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Is there anything else that you think of along this subject, that you think you ought to unburden yourself on to the Board? Ofttimes there exists something that the witnesses would like to say that they sometimes do not say, because they have not been asked questions.

General FRANK. Or, it may be, they have not been asked the right question.

General GRUNERT. Probably true. And if there is any other information that you could volunteer that might help us, we would be glad to get it.

Colonel SADTLER. No, sir; I don't think of anything, right now.

General GRUNERT. All right.

[259] Colonel SADTLER. I can do a lot of talking, General, on things that I don't know anything about.

General GRUNERT. That is what people usually do.

All right. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

2434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

General GRUNERT. At this time I would like introduce into the secret record a series of communications, the first of which is a letter of September 29, 1944, addressed to the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, signed by Walter C. Short.

(The letter from Walter C. Short to Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, dated September 29, 1944, is as follows:)

Copy

(Stamped:) SECRET

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas 5, Texas, September 29, 1944.

Honorable HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The testimony which was taken before the so-called Roberts Commission and that currently being taken in the hearing now pending before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was recently made available to me. Upon examining these records, to which none of the exhibits have been attached, I fail to find a disclosure of certain vital information which high Washington officials appear to have had prior to December 7, 1941, of the imminence of an attack by the Japanese. Such [260] information was not made available to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islands. As I understand that the Army Pearl Harbor Board is now about to complete its hearings and since this important factual data is not included in the testimony of the Board thus far furnished to me, I feel compelled to call this matter to your attention.

From statements in the records of these two hearings, it is to be noted that a knowledge of pertinent facts which are not later disclosed in the record is inferred. This important factual information is essential to a full appraisal of the situation. I specifically refer to the following instances: On pages 318 and 319 of the testimony taken before the Roberts Commission the questions asked by Justice Roberts indicate that as chairman of the commission he was in possession of facts of the utmost importance to this case which pointed to a definite warning of an attack against Pearl Harbor which apparently was known to officials in Washington from certain intercepted Japanese code messages. So far as I have been able to learn these facts are not a part of the record of these hearings.

Again in the testimony of Admiral Kimmel before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. XVI, page 1811) it is clearly indicated that certain vital information was in the hands of the War and Navy Departments regarding the imminence of an attack, which information was certainly not transmitted to me. The information upon which he based this statement is likewise not a part of the record of the hearings. Without a doubt he would not have made such a statement if he did not have evidence to support it.

[261] It is also respectfully pointed out that General Marshall had some important information on which he relied at the time he sent me the coded telegram (referred to at Vol. IV, page 309, of Pearl Harbor Board testimony) under date of December 7, 1941, which unfortunately did not reach me until seven hours after the attack. The information upon which General Marshall must have relied in sending this message likewise does not appear in the record before the Board thus far furnished me.

The facts upon which these actions and statements were based clearly go to the very essence of the present inquiry. I believe, therefore, you will readily agree that a full and complete disclosure of all the information which was in the hands of Washington officials prior to December 7, 1941, with regard to the imminence of an attack, should be obtained and made a matter of record in the proceedings of the current investigation as they are of the utmost importance in appraising this entire situation.

As the perfecting of the record in this investigation is of course of great importance to me personally, I urge that no steps be left unturned to make a complete investigation of the same, so that all of the evidence concerning this matter is in the record of the hearings of the Board. It is therefore urgently requested that the Board delay the completion of its proceedings until such time as this can be accomplished. In this connection I request also that my counsel be given access to all War Department records which would be pertinent to this matter.

Furthermore, if a thorough investigation of the War [262] Department records by the Board and by my counsel do not disclose the facts and evidence upon which the statements and actions above referred to were made, I request

that an appropriate call be made upon any other source which might have such pertinent information, particularly the Navy Department, and that they be required to furnish and make all such evidence available to the Board and to my counsel.

The War Department has denied my request to have a representative at the Board proceedings and to cross-examine witnesses and therefore unless my requests herein is granted there is no means available to me by which I may be assured that all the pertinent evidence will be made available to the Board and to me.

Sincerely.

/t/ WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

(Stamped:) SECRET.

General GRUNERT. The next is a letter of October 2, 1944, to Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. A., Retired, signed by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

(The letter from Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, to Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. A., Retired, dated October 2, 1944, is as follows:)

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

OCTOBER 2, 1944.

Major General WALTER C. SHORT, USA, Retired,
3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
[263] Dallas 5, Texas.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Your letter of 29 September 1944 is being placed in the hands of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This Board was appointed by my order to ascertain and report to me the facts relating to the attack upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper. You may therefore rest assured that the Board is exploring all sources of evidence bearing upon the subject.

I am directing General Grunert to permit your Military Counsel to examine its exhibits in the presence of a member of the Board. No copies of these exhibits, however, may be made.

I am also directing that appropriate warnings relating to military security be given to your counsel for the information and guidance of all concerned.

Sincerely yours.

(Stamped) HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL.

General GRUNERT. The next is a memorandum of October 3, 1944, "WDOSA 201 Short, W. C. (2 Oct. 44)," entitled "Memorandum for General Grunert," from the Deputy Chief of Staff.

(The "Memorandum for General Grunert," from the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated October 3, 1944, is as follows:)

[264] (Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington 25, D. C., October 3, 1944.

WDOSA 201 Short, W. C. (2 Oct 44)

Memorandum for General Grunert:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated September 29, 1944, signed by Major General Walter C. Short, Retired, along with a reply to General Short which has been signed by the Secretary of War.

The Secretary of War directs that these be forwarded for appropriate action by your Board.

/s/ Joseph T. McNarney,
/t/ JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Enc.

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL.

2436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

General GRUNERT. The next is a top-secret letter dated 3 October 1944, to the Deputy Chief of Staff, from the President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

(The letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, from the President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 3 October 1944, is as follows:)

(Stamped:) TOP SECRET.
[265]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
4747 Munitions Building, Washington, 3 October 1944.

SECRET.

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor records.

To: Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

1. Reference: Memorandum of October 3, 1944 (WDOSA 201 Short, W. C. (2 Oct. 44) to me as President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, with which you inclose a copy of a letter dated Sept. 29, 1944, from Major General Walter C. Short, retired, along with a copy of the reply thereto by the Secretary of War, and in which it is stated: "The Secretary of War directs that these be forwarded for appropriate action by your Board."

2. The Secretary of War in his reply of October 2, 1944, to General Short, states in part:

"I am directing General Grunert to permit your Military Counsel to examine its exhibits in the presence of a member of the Board. No copies of these exhibits, however, may be made."

"I am also directing that appropriate warnings relating to military security be given to your counsel for the information and guidance of all concerned."

3. In the course of its investigations the Board, only recently, ran across some leads to information pertinent to the issue which when developed resulted in testimony and some exhibits concerning matters which in the past have [266] been and continue to be of the utmost secrecy, the disclosure of which might disrupt and at least seriously delay our war effort.

To guard these secrets and to avoid any possible disclosure thereof by the Board in its basic report and exhibits, the Board informed the Chief of Staff that all testimony and exhibits relating thereto, together with the Board's report thereon, would be placed in a secret supplement (stamped:) TOP SECRET

(Page:)

-2-

to the basic report, and that all stenographic notes would be impounded and filed therewith. Further, from inception to completion such records are known only to members of the Board and to three reporters and not to others connected with the Board and one member of the Board has been specially charged with their safeguarding.

4. In view of the above the Board requests authority to withhold from General Short and his counsel the records referred to, both as to copies of transcripts of testimony and exhibits.

5. It is requested that the decision with reference to the subject matter of this letter be communicated to the Board in writing.

6. *Please expedite.*

For the Board.

[t] GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army, President.

GG/ehp

[267] General GRUNERT. The next is a memorandum of 4 October 1944, to the President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, from the Deputy Chief of Staff.

(The memorandum for the President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, from the Deputy Chief of Staff, dated 4 October 1944, is as follows:)

(Stamped:)

CONFIDENTIAL.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington 25, D. C., 4 October 1944.

Memorandum for the President, Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Records.

1. In your letter of 3 October 1944, subject "Army Pearl Harbor Records", the Board requested authority to withhold from General Short and his counsel

certain highly secret records. This request in effect asked that the Secretary of War reverse the decision which he made in his reply of October 2, 1944, to General Short, particularly that part of the reply which you quoted in your letter.

2. You are informed that the Secretary of War thoroughly considered this question prior to his reply to General Short and is not disposed to reverse his considered opinion.

3. It is desired, therefore, that the Army Pearl Harbor Board comply with the instructions of the Secretary of War as issued.

[s] Joseph T. McNarney,
[t] JOSEPH T. MCNARNEY,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

(Stamped :) CONFIDENTIAL.

[268] General GRUNERT. The final one is a statement of warning issued to Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Green, Military Counsel for General Short, in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of War, as contained in the last paragraph of his letter of October 2, 1944, to Major General Short, Retired.

(The statement of warning to Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Green, military counsel for General Walter C. Short, is as follows:)

Statement of warning issued to Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Green, Military Counsel for General Short, in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of War as contained in the last paragraph of his letter of October 2, 1944, to Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. A. Retired. (Transcribed on page ----, volume ----, this record.)

General GRUNERT. General Green, I hand you for perusal a copy of the Secretary of War's letter of October 2, 1944, to General Short, the last two paragraphs of which read as follows:

"I am directing General Grunert to permit your Military Counsel to examine its exhibits in the presence of a member of the Board. No copies of these exhibits, however, may be made.

"I am also directing that appropriate warnings relating to military security be given to your counsel for the information and guidance of all concerned."

In my capacity as President of the Board I wrote the Deputy Chief of Staff in effect to ascertain whether this directive of the Secretary of War included the Board's top-secret file. He replied in effect that it did.

[269] So I now inform you concerning this file.

The Board has taken testimony and has some exhibits which deal with ultra-secret matters. These are in a separate file and record.

I explain to you briefly that the matters so considered as top secret are of the utmost value to the United Nations' war effort. Any disclosure concerning them or even a suggestion of their existence may cause a serious disruption of the war effort and at the least may delay the winning of the war for many months.

These secrets pertain primarily to the breaking of the enemy codes and ciphers and intercepts thereof of which the enemy does not appear to have knowledge and which are daily in use and which periodically result in victories for our side. They are as vital now as in 1941.

But very few persons have this knowledge, which is most zealously guarded, and every additional admission to the group having such knowledge adds to the danger of leaks.

This is the "warning" which applies to the paragraph referred to in the Secretary's letter. In addition thereto I warn you regarding the necessity of safeguarding other secret information which you may glean from the files of other exhibits.

A strict interpretation of the authority granted by the Secretary of War in his letter of October 4, 1944, to General Short limits this authority only to you as General Short's Military Counsel. While I realize that you may desire to communicate with General Short on information gleaned, I must caution you that General Short has not been granted the [270] authority to know what has been disclosed to you in this warning to you nor to be informed of what you glean by an examination of the secret records and files. If such authority is desired I can only refer you to the Secretary of War.

Now do you solemnly swear that you have been appropriately warned relating to the military security concerning these matters. So help you God. If so, please sign this statement.

Done at Washington, D. C., this 5th day of October, 1944, and signed in the presence of the co-signed, Lieutenant General George Grunert, President Army Pearl Harbor Board.

/s/ Thomas H. Green,
/t/ THOMAS H. GREEN,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Military Counsel for General Short.

/s/ George Grunert,
/t/ GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

(Brief recess.)

[271] **TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. ERNEST W. GIBSON, GENERAL STAFF CORPS; M. I. S., G-2, PENTAGON BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel GIBSON. Ernest W. Gibson, Serial No. 0175884, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps; at present on duty in M. I. S., in G-2, Pentagon Building, Washington.

General GRUNERT. Colonel, in this particular part of developing just a few points in our investigation, General Russell will propound the questions, and the other members of the Board will ask such as may occur to them.

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. General Russell.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, within the past few days have you been given a special assignment by G-2 to develop certain information relating to the Japanese-American relations in the year 1941?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Have you examined the files of G-2 for the purpose of developing that information?

Colonel GIBSON. I have examined some of the files of G-2; I should hate to say I had examined them all, because they are pretty well spread around, but I have made or caused to be made a rather extensive search of the files.

General RUSSELL. Have you had a conference with me, or conferences with me, in the last two or three days for the purpose of giving to me the benefit of that search and aiding [272] me in selecting from that the data which I thought should be brought to the attention of the Board?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir. Day before yesterday, in the first instance, and yesterday a rather lengthy conference in which certain lines of evidence were indicated to be desired, and we agreed on what you would like to have, and I went to work to get it together for you.

General RUSSELL. You did have copies furnished of the information which I requested, and have delivered those copies to me?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir. You delivered two letters yesterday that were for the approval of General McNarney, and the material requested by you in those two letters, save for an analysis that Colonel Clarke and myself are in the process of making, has been delivered to you.

General RUSSELL. Is it your expectation to deliver us that analysis as soon as it is completed by you and Colonel Clarke?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Specifically, Colonel, I made a request about the existence in the files of the G-2 section of a message which is referred to at times as the implementing "Wind" message.

Colonel GIBSON. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Would you please state for the record whether or not you made a search for such implementing message in the records of G-2?

Colonel GIBSON. Sir, we made an exhaustive search. When the "Winds" message so-called was first received by G-2, the [273] records indicate that the F. C. C. was asked to monitor for that message; and shortly thereafter, early in December, I think the second—my memory may be faulty, but I think it was the second—the Army Signal Corps itself started to monitor for the "Winds" implement message, and there is absolutely no record or absolutely no evidence of any kind to indicate that either the Army Signal Corps or the F. C. C. received an implementing message to the "Winds" message prior to the instant of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

General RUSSELL. Thank you.

Before we go to the second request, do you want to ask him on this?

General FRANK. No.

Colonel GIBSON. I might go on further on that same line. There is no record either, of any shape, that the Army G-2 or the Army Signal Intelligence, which was then working very closely with Naval Communications, ever received from the Navy any implementing message. That is, in the ordinary course of procedure at that time the Navy furnished the Army copies of messages, and they were numbered. There are no missing numbers; there is nothing to indicate that any such thing was ever furnished the Army by the Navy.

General RUSSELL. Go to another message.

General FRANK. Just a minute. Is there anything to indicate that there was any message sent over there by the F. C. C.?

Colonel GIBSON. There were certain messages sent by the F. C. C., General, but they were not, upon analysis, implements of the "Winds" message. They were—I believe on two occasions the F. C. C. sent over messages that they had intercepted, but [274] they were not in the "Winds" code, when analyzed. And so my answer to you is: No, there was nothing ever received by the War Department from the F. C. C. prior to Pearl Harbor which was an implementation of that "Winds" message.

General RUSSELL. Well, Colonel, in order that this may be general and all-inclusive, I will ask you whether or not in your search you have discovered any record at all in the office of G-2 which might be construed as implementing the "Winds" message.

Colonel GIBSON. Absolutely none.

General RUSSELL. Now, there was a second message to which attention of G-2 was directed, that related to information on the presence in the Mandated Islands at some time shortly before December 7, '41, of a Japanese task force in which were aircraft carriers. Did you make a search for a record of that sort of information in G-2?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir. There is a record of a document prepared by the A. C. of S. G-2 for the Chief of Staff based on information furnished by O. N. I. of the Naval Department, which indicates some naval concentrations in the Marshalls and at certain other areas as well.

General RUSSELL. Does that memorandum to the Chief of Staff indicate aircraft carriers in that task force or in that assembly of naval strength in the Marshalls?

Colonel GIBSON. May I look at this book to refresh my recollection? I am not sure whether it does or not. I am not even sure that this is in there. Yes, here it is.

No. The answer is "No."

General RUSSELL. "No." All right. Thank you.

[275] Colonel GIBSON. I might say, searching the records for that information, most of that information came to O. N. I. from the—in fact, all of it from the 14th Naval District, which is at Hawaii.

General RUSSELL. I have no further questions of the Colonel.

General FRANK. There is information available that there was an implementing message flashed by the Japanese. Are you conversant with the fact that such information exists?

Colonel GIBSON. I have got it second-hand, General, from sundry reports in the Navy Department, that such did exist. I have no first-hand knowledge of it; no, sir.

General FRANK. Do I understand that you are making an investigation, a survey, on the messages that were passed along about the time war was declared?

Colonel GIBSON. We are making, for G-2's own purposes, studies for future use and analysis of the sources that were available to G-2 between October 1, '41, and Pearl Harbor, what those sources revealed, what dissemination or use was made of the information revealed from those sources.

General FRANK. Well, the facts seem to be, from testimony before the Board, that Admiral Noyes received a report with respect to the reception of an implementing message. Do you have that information?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir; I have heard—I have it second-hand; yes, sir. I have a story from the Navy that is entirely second-hand, sir. I am perfectly willing—

General FRANK. Now, another thing: There was an arrangement through which the Army received a copy of every [276] message—they were supposed to receive a copy of every message pertaining to this situation that was received by the Navy, and the Army sent to the Navy a copy of every message pertaining to this situation that was received by the Army.

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir. We have searched the numbers very thoroughly to see if there is anything missing, and, General, there isn't.

General FRANK. Therefore, the only information available seems to be verbal information on the memory of the people who are here who were concerned with that at the time?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. Is that correct?

Colonel GIBSON. Yes, sir. And the only information I have been able in my investigation to dig up is information that Colonel Sadtler

and Colonel Bratton have testified—and I assume they have testified here—except I have a story from the Navy Department.

General FRANK. What is that?

Colonel GIBSON. It is hearsay.

General FRANK. Well, that is all right. Let us have it as hearsay, then.

Colonel GIBSON. The story is, as it was told to me, that an implementing message did come in the night of 3-4 December to the Navy Department, was picked up by a naval station on the East Coast; that on seeing it either Commander McCullom, who was in O. N. I. at the time, or Admiral Wilkinson became greatly disturbed and drafted a serious warning message of about 500-word length; that Admiral Wilkinson took that message to Admiral Noyes, and Noyes said, in substance, "They [277] have been alerted enough," and disapproved sending that. Wilkinson disagreed with him thoroughly and said, "It ought to be sent, and I am going higher." And he left Admiral Noyes' office and went to either Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll and whatever happened after that I don't know, I didn't get, but the message apparently was never sent.

General FRANK. But so far as any written, typewritten, or printed record is concerned, there is absolutely nothing existing that can be located on this subject?

Colonel GIBSON. As far as I know. And I assure you we have made a very careful search. I can even give you a written certificate of the search that we had made in certain places.

General GRUNERT. And your search indicated to you, because of the lack of any missing numbered files, that probably that message, if there was such a message, had never been received by G-2?

Colonel GIBSON. That is what it indicated to me, sir. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Do you think of anything else that you might want to tell the Board?

Colonel GIBSON. No, sir.

General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

Colonel GIBSON. I wasn't here at the time, thank goodness.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[278] **TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUFUS BRATTON, 03726, INFANTRY, HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT, COMMANDING OFFICER, SPECIAL TROOPS, HEADQUARTERS, THIRD ARMY, E. T. O.—**
Resumed

Colonel WEST. As Colonel Bratton, the witness, has appeared before the Board before and already been sworn, it will not be necessary to swear him again, but the witness is reminded he is still under oath.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Colonel, I shall let General Russell go ahead on his particular subject to be developed for this hearing.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, you were here and testified before the Board on the 30th of September rather fully, and a number of details were cleared up in that testimony as to your relation to things which I shall not go over again today. I do want to place in the record now, for emphasis, if it is necessary, just what your specialties were with

respect to the relations between Japan and America in the fall of 1941.

Colonel BRATTON. I was the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of War Department G-2.

General RUSSELL. Before we ask you some general questions, Colonel, I want to ask you whether or not, since your former appearance before this Board September 30, 1944, you have studied the records of G-2 and have found some data that you did not have when you were here before.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I should like to say at this time that all this happened three years ago, and my memory as to my actions and reactions to any specific paper or [279] incident may not be as clear and accurate as it should be, but I have found that in going through certain files and records in G-2 my memory has been refreshed on a number of incidents through the discovery of documents that I had forgotten about, and I have a number of such documents here this morning to present to the Board.

General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, there are two messages that I want to talk to you about. I first want to ask you whether or not since refreshing your memory and since the further study of the records of G-2 you desire to change in any way or add to your discussion of what is known as the "Wind" implementing message which is alleged to have been in existence on or about the 4th or 5th of December, '41.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. When I last appeared before the Board I was somewhat puzzled by what I considered at that time an over-emphasis placed by the Board on two messages. One was the implementation of the winds-weather code. The other was this 14-part ultimatum. I was considerably puzzled at the time by the insistence of the Board that these were vitally important documents, and I had the feeling that there was something missing, that they had no longer the significance after the 3rd of December, in my mind, that the Board attributed to them. I find, I think I know now why I had this feeling.

A search of the files in G-2 as of the day before yesterday and yesterday brought to light a carbon copy of a chronologically arranged series of extracts from intercepted Japanese communications which I prepared sometime after Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Staff. In glancing through this document I find that there was a message which I had forgotten [280] when I appeared before you last: dispatch from Tokyo on the 2nd of December, to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. It was interpreted, or rather it was translated on the 3rd and presumably placed in my hands on that date.

General FRANK. During what month?

General RUSSELL. December 3, 1941, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. December 1941, sir. And it is listed here on my paper as S. I. S. 25640, and the extract that I have on this paper reads as follows:

(Extract from message of December 2, 1941, Tokyo to Japanese Ambassador in Washington, is as follows:)

Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn those now being used in connection with the machine. Burn every old code. Stop at once using the machine and destroy it completely. Burn all the codes Kosaka brought you.

After the receipt of this translation any further intercepts that were brought to me would simply contribute toward the climax that I saw coming. This was it.

General RUSSELL. The construction which you placed on that message, in your official capacity, was that it meant war?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, there has been evidence before the Board—and I address myself again to the implementing "Winds" message, for purposes—there has been evidence before the Board of a rather extensive search through the records of [281] G-2, the War Department, to locate, if possible, some written documents or some written data relating to that implementing message. Do you know anything of that search?

Colonel BRATTON. I know that the search was made, sir, at my insistence, and I know that it has been unsuccessful. They have not found any such message has come through the Army communication system or the F. C. C.

General RUSSELL. Or any other. Now, you were called into General Miles' office to discuss the information which had reached the War Department from the Navy Department relating to this "Wind" implementing message, were you not?

Colonel BRATTON. I have a vague recollection of meeting Colonel Sadtler in General Miles' office, I think on the morning of the 5th of December, sir.

General RUSSELL. Yes. I am re-asking you that; it is in your evidence already, but for emphasis, and I will go away from it now.

Now, a message about which some evidence has been given, but the actual message itself is before the Board now for the first time. I am going to show you this message and ask you to identify it, and after you have identified it I shall ask you some other questions in connection with it.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I am familiar with this message. I wrote it.

General RUSSELL. You wrote that message?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. For the purpose of identification of the message which the witness has just stated that he wrote, it is a secret cablegram signed "Miles," addressed to the [282] Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department. It is numbered 519 and directs G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to contact Commander Rochefort of the Navy. It is dated December 5, 1941. A photostatic copy of the message is brought to the Board in two parts, one part showing the front of the message, the other part showing the back of the message. On the back of the message is entered, "1941, December 5, a. m. 11:47."

Now, Colonel, in connection with your further investigation to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the sending of this message of December 5th which we have just discussed, to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, have you discovered any confirmation of that secret cablegram?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Would you tell the Board what it is, and read it into the record for us, please?

Colonel BRATTON. I find in the G-2 files a paraphrase of this message bearing the stamp, "Mailed G-2 WDGS December 5, 1941. Our No. 32."

General RUSSELL. Will you now read what was said in that confirming letter?

Colonel BRATTON. This, as I say, is a paraphrase of the actual message. It is addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory. It is No. 519, sent out December 5, 1941, and it reads as follows:

[283] (Paraphrase of message dated December 5, 1941, to Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District, has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I want to ask you why it came to pass that this message was sent from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, and not from some agency of the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

Colonel BRATTON. Upon receipt of the translated intercept which I have read, S. I. S. No. 25640, I took copies of this intercept to General Miles and to General Gerow and discussed it at some length with both of them. I had a feeling that further warnings or alerts should be sent out to our overseas commands. General Gerow felt that sufficient warning had been sent out. General Miles felt that he couldn't go over General Gerow's decision to send no additional warning, because of a policy which was then in effect that War Department G-2 would send out no intelligence to the G-2s of tactical commands or overseas departments which might produce an operational reaction, without the complete concurrence of the War Plans Division.

I still felt uneasy about this thing and went over to the Navy where I had a conference with Commander McCullum, the head of the Far Eastern Section in O. N. I. He felt as I did, that further warnings should be sent out, and said that he [284] was going to write one up and try to get the Chief of Naval Operations to dispatch it.

I discovered from Commander McCullum that their S. I. S. man in Honolulu, a Commander Rochefort, knew everything that we did about this, had all the information that we had, and was listening for this Japanese winds-weather broadcast. He suggested that as a way out of our difficulty I instruct our G-2 in Hawaii to go to Rochefort at once and have a talk with him, as in a short period of time Rochefort could tell Colonel Fielder, our G-2, exactly what was going on and what we knew.

I managed to get General Miles to O. K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that we could get that message out without violating any of the policies that were then in effect about getting concurrences from OPD.

I also had a message sent to the Canal Zone on the night of the 5th, to the G-2 out there. I had forgotten about this message until I found it in the file this morning. The document that I lay before you now is in the files of G-2. It is a paraphrase of an outgoing message, No. 512, sent December 5, 1941, to G-2, Panama Canal Department. It reads as follows:

[285] (Message dated December 5, 1941, to G-2, Panama Canal Department, is as follows:)

In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near, this office will notify you. Japanese-U. S. relations are now very difficult.

Signed, "Miles"

This paper bears the stamp, "Mailed G-2 WDGS December 5, 1941," and it has our number 86 on it, I think.

I can't find the message in the files, but I am morally certain that a similar message went to Manila. So that in any case Manila, Hawaii, and Panama had been alerted by us on the 5th.

[286] General RUSSELL. Colonel, this action on the 5th, the message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, and the message to the Panama Canal Zone, resulted from the code-destruction message of December 3, and the conversations about the "wind" implementing message of December 5, is that true?

Colonel BRATTON. To the best of my recollection and belief they were the results of my receipt of this order to the Japanese ambassador to destroy his code and his machine.

General RUSSELL. In your message to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department you make a reference to a "weather" reference—"broadcast reference weather"?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. So apparently, when you said that, you had in mind not only the destruction of the machines in Washington but also the possibility of the implementing "weather" messages, is that true?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. As you see, I had been told by Commander McCullum that Commander Rochefort had the same intercepts that we had, and this was just a device on my part to bring Fielder and Rochefort together.

General FRANK. After you had been prevented from sending a warning message, by Gerow?

Colonel BRATTON. I couldn't get it out any other way.

General RUSSELL. Colonel, I want to clarify another message of his.

Colonel BRATTON. General, may I interrupt you just a moment, sir? I am not quite through with the 5th, yet. There is another action that I took, that I did not bring out, yet.

General RUSSELL. All right, go ahead. We will come back [287] to November 3. We will date back.

Colonel BRATTON. On December 3, I also sent the military attache in Tokyo instructions to destroy his codes and ciphers. I find confirmation of this fact in the files of G-2, in the paraphrase of an outgoing message, No. 40, sent December 3, 1941, addressed to the military attache, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, reading as follows: (Message, Dec. 3, 1941. Col. Bratton to Attaché, Tokyo:)

Memorize emergency key word No. 2 for use of SIGNUD without, repeat without, indicators. Destroy document STOP SIGNNQ SIGPAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort. When these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD used STOP Destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB STOP Early rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed. You may advise ambassador.

A similar message was sent to the military attache in Peiping, China, on December 3, and information thereof given to our military observers in Hong Kong and Chunking.

2446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

General RUSSELL. Colonel, when you finish this period, December 5, I want to go back to this information which was sent to the Hawaiian Department on November 3, 1941. Are you through now with your November?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. I have here, Colonel, a memorandum dated November 3, 1941:

"Subject: Information Received from the Orient.

"Distribution: All Corps areas, all Departments, Alaska, FBI, ONI, State."

[288] What is meant by "State"—State Department?

Colonel BRATTON. State Department, sir.

General RUSSELL. The last item of the distribution list is "File." To that was attached, when it was delivered to me by G-2, the letter of transmittal:

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

That is dated November 5, 1941, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department; the letter of transmittal being in the following language:

(The letter of transmittal, dated November 5, 1941, from Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, is as follows:)

(Photostat) (Stamped:) TOP SECRET
MID 336 (11-3-41 w. Dept.

G2/
WAH
/s/ WAH

(Notations on right margin:) 53 MID 336. 11-5-41 (11-3-41)

(Pencil number in lower right-hand corner:) 16

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(Typed:) CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

/s/ Sherman Miles
/t/ SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

[289]

1 Enclosures:

336. (11-3-41)—MID Summ. of Info. re Information received from the Orient :
dtd. FMH

(Stamped:) MAILED g/2 W**S. NOV 5 1941

Reg #910405

(Stamped:) RECORD SECTION COPY

1b

(Stamped:) CONFIDENTIAL

(Stamped:) TOP SECRET

General RUSSELL. The summary of information being in the following language, in symbols, to-wit:

(The summary of Information, dated November 3, 1941, is as follows :

(Photostat) (Stamped:) TOP SECRET
MID 336. 11-3-41

G2/C**
/t/ FMH
(Initialed) P

(Notations on right margin) : 53) MID 336. 11-3-41
(Stamped:) RECEIVED BACK BY RECORD SECTION NOV 6 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

M. I. D.

NOVEMBER 3, 1941.
(Date)

Subject : Information Received from the Orient.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is considered reliable :

[290] 1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Distribution :

All Corps Areas
All Departments
Alaska
FBI
ONI
State
File (checked)

(Pen and ink notation:) Source: Dr. Cho
Date of original paper 10-28-41

I. B. COGNIZANT (Initials illegible)

[291]

—of course

Evaluation

x Reliable
Credible x
Questionable
Undetermined

—of information

(Stamped:) INITIAL FOR FILE

(Initialed, but illegible)

pms

CONFIDENTIAL

(In pencil) 17

(Stamped:) TOP SECRET

(Stamped:) RECORD SECTION

General RUSSELL. I will ask you if that was given to me from the files of G-2, and if you have seen it before this morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. I can identify this as a photostat of the document in the files of G-2. I have seen it, prior to this morning.

Colonel TOULMIN. You mean you have seen the original document prior to this morning?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes—the original document of which, I have seen prior to this date.

General RUSSELL. I have here one other letter which relates to the Hawaiian Department—and I am questioning you particularly about the Hawaiian Department, now. This is a letter which purports to have been written by Kendall J. Fielder, Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry, Acting Assistant [292] Chief of Staff, G-2; subject, "Summaries of Information." It is dated 6 September 1941, and is addressed to the War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, D. C. The stamp indicates that it was received by G-2 September 17, 1941, and I will read it into the record. I believe I will introduce it as an exhibit, later.

(The letter from Kendall J. Fielder to War Department General Staff, dated September 1941, is as follows:)

(Photostat) (Stamped:) TOP SECRET
(Initials, some illegible:) B KKK McC P
(Notations on right margin:) (13) MID 350.05 (9-6-41)

CONFIDENTIAL

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, for
Military Intelligence,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 6 September 1941.

In reply refer to:
350.05 (G-2)

Subject: Summaries of Information.

To: War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division G-2, Washington, D. C.

(Stamped) : REC'D—G-2 SEP 17 1941

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the [293] Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your Office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

/s/ Kendall J. Fielder
/t/ KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

1150
File:

(signature illegible)

18

CONFIDENTIAL

General RUSSELL. Did you see the original of that in the office of G-2 of the War Department at any time, Colonel?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; I have seen the original of this in the files.

General RUSSELL. So much for specific messages, Colonel.

Now, there have been furnished to this Board not only the messages and letters about which I have interrogated you in the past few

minutes, and not only the secret summary of Far Eastern documents, which was identified by you on the occasion of your last appearance before this Board, 3 October 1944; but there have been furnished to the Board from the same source approxi- [294] mately 45, maybe 46, other messages, which I have not discussed with you in detail, and which I will not read to you at this time.

Now, Colonel, in connection with my investigation of these G-2 records, in the last two or three days, I prepared letters which were submitted to the Chief of Staff over the signature of the President of this Board, General Grunert, in which I requested in addition to the messages which you have just discussed with me a number of other messages, some 45 in number, all of which have been delivered to us and are now in our possession.

I also asked for a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated September 2, 1941, subject, "Conversation between the military attache and the Chief, Far Eastern Section." Have you got that with you?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Would you make that available to the Board at this time, and read it into the record?

Colonel BRATTON. This is the original document, dated September 2, 1941:

(The memorandum dated September 2, 1941, for the Chief of Staff, relative to "Conversation Between Military Attache and the Chief, Far Eastern Section," is as follows:)

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Conversation between the Japanese military attache and the Chief of the Far Eastern Section.

Coincident with the Japanese Ambassador's call on the President on the morning of August 28, 1941, Maj. Gen. Saburo Isoda, Japanese military attache, called by appointment on Colonel R. S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, this division. The following [295] are notes of Colonel Bratton on the visit:

"I have known General Isoda and been associated with him under various circumstances for 18 years. In consequence our conversation was friendly, informal, and entirely off the record. General Isoda stated that, like the ambassador, he was exploring ways and means to relieve the Japanese-United States tension and bring about better relations between the two countries.

"During the course of a conversation which lasted for an hour and a half, General Isoda made statements to the following effect:

"a. Due to restrictions imposed by our Export Control, the Japanese have begun to use a portion of their war reserve of petroleum.

"b. He, the naval attache, the ambassador, and the entire embassy staff are in accord in an earnest desire to better United States-Japanese relations.

"c. Japan made a great mistake in joining the Axis.

"d. The Army frequently gets out from under control of the civilian government and has to be restrained by imperial command.

"e."

This is the important paragraph:

"e. Japan has her back to the wall. She can be pushed just so far, then will have to fight us to save her national honor and integrity, though war with the United States is the last thing desired by Japan."

[296] Now, begin my quotation again:

"When asked flatly my opinion as to what assurances on the part of Japan would be acceptable to the United States Government at this time, I told him that Prince Konoye (then premier of Japan) if he comes to talk with the President must come with imperial sanction and armed with authority to speak for and on behalf of the armed forces of Japan, as well as on behalf of the civilian government. I said that in my opinion nothing short of this would be productive of lasting results or be acceptable to the President. General Isoda received this statement of opinion on my part with entire good will, expressed

his pleasure over the opportunity of having a frank talk, and stated his desire to have other and more frequent talks in the future. I in turn assured him that I would be glad to meet him in a private and unofficial capacity at any time."

2. General Isoda's visit clearly parallels the conversations now in progress between the Japanese ambassador and the State Department. In effect he speaks for the Japanese embassy, the entire staff of which is sincerely working for the betterment of Japanese-American relations. He obviously did not feel empowered to speak for the Japanese Army.

[S] **SHERMAN MILES,**
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution: Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, Office of Naval Intelligence.

[297] General RUSSELL. Colonel, a great deal of documentary evidence has been submitted to this Board within the past two or three days by the G-2 section of the General Staff of the War Department, all of which documentary evidence relates to the negotiations between the American and Japanese Governments, and the general situation in the Pacific in the year 1941. The data which have come to our attention indicate that the G-2 section of the War Department, in the fall of 1941, did have in its possession a great deal of information touching the relations between the Japanese government and the American Government. The question now is what actions were taken on this information, including the dissemination of the information, as to whom it was sent, the compilation of estimates based on such information, and so forth.

Colonel BRATTON. All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy-making and planning agencies of the Government.

General RUSSELL. Would you please define them or name them at this time?

Colonel BRATTON. The officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought.

As to the intercepts, and in translations of Japanese intercepts, they were handled in a special way, which I think should be stated at this time. In 1941, certainly in the latter part of it, I was the custodian and the disseminator of this type [298] of intelligence. In previous years, I had used these translated intercepts as the bases for memoranda to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of State, the Chief of the War Plans Division, or whatever person I considered most interested in the contents of the original document; but in the latter part of 1941 the system that we were following, by order of the Chief of Staff, was as follows:

The translations, made either in the Signal Corps SIS section or in the corresponding section of Naval Communications, were sent to me in sextuplet, six copies of each one. Out of the mass of material that came to my desk in this form, say 10 to 20 percent was of intelligence value; the remainder dealt with administrative or personal matters, at the embassy, or dealt with requests and requisitions for stationery or this, that, or the other thing, and that material I de-

stroyed by burning. The remaining "fimsies" containing military intelligence of value to our Government officials was arranged in cardboard folders, which in turn were placed in locked dispatch cases, one for the Secretary of State, one for the Secretary of War, one for the Chief of Staff, one for the ACofS, G-2, and one for the ACofS, WPD.

I delivered these pouches in person to the officers concerned, who had keys to the pouches. In the case of the Chief of Staff, he frequently was not in his office; in which case I left the pouch with one of his secretaries, generally the head secretary, who at that time was Colonel Bedell Smith.

Toward the latter part of November, or in November and December 1941, these translated intercepts were of such value and importance that it was my practice in each case to remind [299] the secretary, General Staff, that these were important documents and should be shown to the Chief of Staff without any delay.

General FRANK. And that secretary was Colonel Bedell Smith?

Colonel BRATTON. He had a number of secretaries in there. There was Major Max Taylor, Colonel Bedell Smith, Colonel Sexton, and one or two others, but at that time Colonel Smith was the senior secretary. I dealt with him whenever possible. On numerous occasions I would go to the Chief of the War Plans Division and to the ACofS G-2, and stand by while they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to question me about any of them. And I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, the Secretary of the General Staff, as to how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the Chief of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them.

The folder which went to the Secretary of State I delivered in person to his confidential secretary, and obtained a receipt therefor. I collected all of these pouches on my next visit, or on my next round the following day, and destroyed the contents of them by burning, and retaining in my file a complete copy of everything that had been seen by all of these officials.

At this time the Navy was serving the President; that is, they took a locked pouch over there and gave it to the naval aide to the President, who in turn would take the contents of the pouch into the President, see that he read it, bring it back out, and return the book to the Navy.

During this period the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief, the ACofS G-2, and the Chief of the War Plans Division all saw the same material, they all [300] read the same translations, as fast as I could get them to them.

General RUSSELL. Does that plan of dissemination apply, Colonel, to this collection of photostatic messages which have been delivered to the Board by ACofS G-2's office at the War Department?

Colonel BRATTON. It does, sir; in every case.

General RUSSELL. Prior to making this last answer, you had taken the photostatic copies of these, some 45 messages, out and looked at them, is that true?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, you have testified about the distribution which you made on these messages and related data which were described in the question. I am going to ask you whether or not any estimates were made on this information and sent to any-

one, in the nature of summaries, or reports, with expressions as to the attention that should be given to such data, indicating any probable Japanese action.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; we always used this material, sometimes separately, as the base of a special memorandum or staff study, but always in our over-all strategic estimates and studies there was incorporated therein the knowledge that we had secured therefrom.

General RUSSELL. I will ask you if on yesterday, 5 October 1944, in an office of the G-2 section in the Pentagon building, you exhibited to me a number of folders, possibly a dozen in number, in which you stated that copies of such documents as I have just asked you about were contained?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. These volumes that I showed you yesterday are G-2's file of what at that time were known as [301] "intelligence bulletins," and they run in number from one on up into the hundreds. Some of these bulletins, but by no means all of them, have been extracted and are incorporated in the summary of Far Eastern documents which you have before you.

There are many others, however, which I feel would be of interest to the Board, as indicating the trend of thought in G-2 as to the possibilities of war with Japan. As an illustration of the contents of these documents, not incorporated in the summary, I cite two instances: IB No. 20, which is a memorandum for ACofS WPD, dated January 27, 1941, which gives G-2's estimate of Japan's intentions with respect to Alaska and the Aleutians. G-2 therein informed WPD that in its opinion if we did not occupy and hold the outer Aleutians, the Japanese would, upon the outbreak of hostilities. WPD took no action upon our estimate and recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska.

As another illustration, IB 48, dated March 19, 1941, a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, informed him that strong pressure was being put on Japan by Germany to cause her to attack Britain in Asia, with the ultimate intention of involving us in a declaration of war. This came right out of the intercepts. The intercept was the basis for this, and G-2 went on to recommend that the Department Commander in the Philippine Department, General Grunert, at that time, be designated Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Army forces in the Far East, with a temporary rank of Lieutenant General, as a means of improving civilian morale in the Philippines and enhancing out prestige in the western Pacific, with consequent deterrent effect on Japan, and so on.

[302] General GRUNERT. What was the date of that?

Colonel BRATTON. March 14, 1941.

General FRANK. What was the distribution given to those things?

Colonel BRATTON. Very wide. Here is a symbol of that. Here, for instance, is IB 122. Its subject is, "The effectiveness of foreign air forces in performing strategic missions," which went to the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the Army Air Forces, the Chief of the Air Corps, the War Plans Division, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and to Major General Embick.

General GRUNERT. In other words, the distribution on those matters was to the higher-ups in Washington, but not to the lower echelons not in Washington?

Colonel BRATTON. They did not go out to the field, sir. On numerous occasions, copies of these went to the President and to the Secretary of State.

General FRANK. At any time was there any consideration given to sending special envoys or special representatives for personal conference with the commanders in the theatres like Hawaii and the Philippines, to advise them of the information that was picked up in these "hot" messages?

Colonel BRATTON. I don't remember that there was, sir. We felt considerably hampered in G-2 by two restrictions that were placed upon us. The first I have mentioned as the policy which prevented us from giving out intelligence to G-2s in tactical units or in overseas departments, which might have the effect of bringing about operational results. The other re- [303] striction was imposed on us by the Navy, who refused to allow us to send any of this intercept intelligence out to any of our people in the field over the Army net, using any Army code or cipher. Our procedure in cases of that sort was for General Miles to go to the head of ONI and request through him that the Navy communicate certain information to their opposite numbers in the field, in Manila, in Hawaii, or in Panama.

General FRANK. Do you know how much of that actually was communicated to the commanders in the field?

Colonel BRATTON. I cannot answer that definitely at this time, sir. I remember a number of occasions where I instigated, myself, the dissemination of certain vital information in that way. I can't be more specific than that.

General RUSSELL. How did it come, then, Colonel, that on the 7th of December we sent out that hurry-up mid-day message without the Navy's consent?

Colonel BRATTON. It was with the Navy's knowledge and consent. If you will examine the record, you will find General Marshall called Admiral Stark on the telephone and told him of the message which he proposed to send, and that Admiral Stark later asked that a sentence be added, in his behalf.

General RUSSELL. I know, but wasn't that message of December 7 sent in Army code?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. So, if it became urgent enough, we disregarded our Navy request and sent the stuff?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes.

General FRANK. In this information that was available as a result of this "hot" information, did there exist parts of it [304] that were of value from an operating point of view?

Colonel BRATTON. From a naval operating point of view, yes, in many cases.

General FRANK. How about it, from an Army air operating point of view?

Colonel BRATTON. From an Army air operational point of view, in some cases.

General FRANK. And you were not allowed to communicate this to the commanders?

Colonel BRATTON. Well, I never received a definite prohibition on the thing, but every time that I tried to send a message of this sort, and the Navy found out about it, the Chief of Naval operations would call up the Chief of Staff on the telephone and object most vociferously and emphatically. He in turn would call the ACofS G-2 and object strenuously, and by the time it got to me, who had sent the message, it was disapproval expressed in no uncertain terms—put it that way. And I in each case would be instructed not to do it again.

General GRUNERT. What do you suppose was back of it? Fear of the code?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir; and fear of the Japanese breaking our Army code, and finding out that we were reading their own. It was a security measure.

General FRANK. Information did then exist and was available here in the War Department, which was not communicated to the commander in the field, that would have been of value to him to carry out his operations, is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. That was the function of the War Plans Division, not of G-2.

[305] General FRANK. But you had the information?

Colonel BRATTON. So did they.

General FRANK. I think the record takes care of that.

Colonel BRATTON. And I may say that on numerous occasions I would go in to confer with General Gerow, one of his principal section chiefs, about certain information that we had, and I have frequently urged that action be taken. General Miles has done the same thing. We used to have repeated conferences with our opposite numbers in OPD about the vital information that we had. Sometimes OPD reacted favorably to our recommendations, sometimes not, but we were concealing nothing from them. We were not sitting on this information. It was there for anybody to read and act on.

General GRUNERT. I have one question here. In the Roberts Commission report, it states, here:

(Excerpt from Roberts Commission Report, *re* 3 messages:)

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The first, of December 3, 1941, stated that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents. The second, of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in the event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only) and the third, of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation, the naval command on the outlying islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later under conditions of greater emergency, and that those [306] essential to continued operation should be retained until the last moment.

Were those three messages, in your opinion, based on what they could get through this intercept file?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. If they went to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was supposed to have been informed through the Commander-in-Chief

of the Pacific Fleet? That was a general understanding on all those messages that went from one to the other, or that went to one or the other; they were supposed to inform their opposite numbers so as to avoid the same kind of message going to two recipients for fear of damaging or breaking the code, is that right?

Colonel BRATTON. That was my understanding of the relations that existed at the time; yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. So there was some information that go to Hawaii concerning warnings, as to these intercepted messages?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Although you didn't get any particular ones through?

Have you anything else?

General RUSSELL. I have one specific question, then I will be through.

You have discussed with us heretofore, Colonel, this delivery of those 13 parts of the Japanese reply of December 6.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. As I recall your testimony, you stated [307] that you delivered it to this man Smith on Saturday night, is that correct?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir, to the best of my knowledge and belief. My recollection is that I found Colonel Smith in his office. It may have been one of the other secretaries, but my recollection is that it was Colonel Smith, and that I told him that this was a very important paper, and that General Marshall should see it at once. My recollection is that he said he would send it out to the General's quarters by courier. In any event, my mind was at rest about the Chief of Staff, I didn't worry about him any more that night.

General GRUNERT. Had this occurred frequently in the past?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. So it was just a normal thing to say, "Here is a pouch that has got important stuff in it"?

Colonel BRATTON. No. When I thought that the Chief of Staff should see it at once, I made a point of telling Smith so, and he would say, "All right, I will send it out by a special courier."

General GRUNERT. Did that happen very frequently?

Colonel BRATTON. It happened several times; yes, sir.

General GRUNERT. Now, about this time, most everything was important?

Colonel BRATTON. Most everything was important; and I was further urged on by the fact that if the Chief of Naval Operations ever got one of these things before General Marshall did and called him up to discuss it on the telephone with him, and the General hadn't gotten his copy, we all caught hell.

General GRUNERT. I suppose it worked the other way, too.

[308] Colonel BRATTON. I saw to it that General Marshall got his copy just as fast as I could get it to him.

General RUSSELL. I believe your testimony was to the effect that the short message of December 7th came and you sat with it in your hand outside the General's office until he came in, and you handed it to him. That was on Saturday.

Colonel Bratton. I handed it to him, that morning.

General RUSSELL. That is all I have.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

Major CLAUSEN. I just wondered if the Colonel would make available to the Board this chronological summary from which he has testified, which apparently is in such shape as to show these messages very vividly.

General RUSSELL. So far as I am concerned, I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions of this witness? If not, this is the third time we thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General RUSSELL. I desire at this time to introduce a copy of the telegram referred to in my questioning of Colonel Bratton, it being a telegram dated December 5, 1941, signed "Miles," and addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department.

(The telegram signed "Miles", to the Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, dated December 5, 1941, is as follows:)

(Photostat) (Stamped:) SECRET #519

(Stamped:) TOP SECRET

(Stamped:) By authority of A. C. of S., G-2.

Date (stamped) Dec 5 1941 /s/ RSB /t/ RSB
Initials

[309] From: War Department

Bureau: -----

For the Acting A. C. of S.,

/s/ RALPH C. SMITH,

/s/ CHE

Colonel, G. S. C.,

Executive Officer, G-2.

TELEGRAM

Official Business—Government Rates

Sent No. 519, 12/5

DECEMBER 5, 1941.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, HEADQUARTERS

G-2, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES.

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

(Stamped:) SECRET

SECRET CABLEGRAM

las

/s/ RALPH C. SMITH

/s/ CHE

Executive Officer, G-2.

19

(Stamped:) TOP SECRET.

[310] General RUSSELL. I introduce, as Exhibit "B", the file heretofore referred to, containing the following numbered SIS messages, procured from the files of the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the War Department:

23260 Sept. 24, 1941

23570 Oct. 14, 1941

23516 Oct. 14, 1941

23631	Oct. 16, 1941
23859	Oct. 22, 1941
24373	Nov. 5, 1941
25322	Nov. 14, 1941 (2 sheets)
25644	Nov. 15, 1941
24878	Nov. 16, 1941
25773	Nov. 18, 1941
25817	Nov. 18, 1941
25392	Nov. 19, 1941
25040	Nov. 19, 1941
25432	Nov. 19, 1941
25138	Nov. 22, 1941
25435	Nov. 26, 1941
25344	Nov. 26, 1941 (2 sheets)
25349	Nov. 26, 1941
25480	Nov. 26, 1941
25436	Nov. 26, 1941
25145	Nov. 28, 1941
25496	Nov. 29, 1941
25554	Nov. 30, 1941
25553	Nov. 30, 1941
25552	Nov. 30, 1941
[311]	25497 Nov. 30, 1941 (2 sheets)
25555	Nov. 30, 1941
25787	Dec. 1, 1941
25605	Dec. 1, 1941
25545	Dec. 1, 1941
25727	Dec. 1, 1941
25783	Dec. 1, 1941
25659-B	Dec. 2, 1941
25660	Dec. 2, 1941 (2 sheets)
25640	Dec. 2, 1941
25785	Dec. 3, 1941
25807	Dec. 4, 1941
27065	Dec. 2, 1941
25843	Dec. 4, 1941
25836	Dec. 5, 1941
25838	Dec. 6, 1941
25843	Dec. 6, 1941 (13 sheets)
26158	Dec. 6, 1941
25846	Dec. 6, 1941
25854	Dec. 7, 1941
25850	Dec. 7, 1941
25856	Dec. 7, 1941.

(The file of SIS messages referred to, procured from the office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, marked Exhibit "B", was introduced in evidence.)

(Whereupon, at 1:10 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses, proceeded to other business.)

×

44.831: P31 Pt. 30

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 30

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

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HARBOR ATTACK

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(After January 14, 1946)


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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.



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HEARING
PEARL HARBOR EXHIBIT NO. 145, VOL. 4

EXHIBITS OF
ARMY PEARL HARBOR
BOARD

EXHIBITS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 1

[SECRET]

[a] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS
AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK,
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[1] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received October 16, 1941—Exhibit "A":

Note for commanding general Hawaiian department:

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you quote:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities *you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x.*

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received 2:22 P. M., November 27th—Exhibit "B":

"Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, TH:

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as *not* comma repeat *not* comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned the Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL,
116P/27.

[2] Upon receipt of the above radiogram, I gave consideration to the type of an alert which I should order, and, after talking the matter over with the Chief of Staff, Alert #1 was ordered by telephone and put into effect at once.

Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941.—Exhibit "C":

"SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph f (8) below.

2460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

14. **ALERT NO. 1.** *a.* This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations), in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 *h* (2) below.

Command and Fire Control Cable System.

Railway and Highway Bridges.

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.

WAI'AU Generating Plant.

Telephone Exchanges at WAI'PAHU, WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA (in HALE-IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO AND EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.

[3] Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(4) the 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts of OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the Air Corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS OF HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the TERRITORIAL Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations.

[4] 15. **ALERT NO. 2.** *a.* This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1.

Command and Fire Control Cable System.

Railway and Highway Bridges.

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.

WAIAU Generating Plant.

Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHA, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALE-IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the Pumping Stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

[5] (6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 l below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 k (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

[8] (a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing X TWO.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

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g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

- (1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
- (2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
- (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
- (4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
- (5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
- (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 k (1).

i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

- (1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
- (2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

- (1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.
- (2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
- (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

l. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 d (4) and g above.

16. ALERT NO. 3. a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:

(1) All sections of the forward echelon will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

- (1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.
- (2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.
- (3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) Place 240 mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below.

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 m below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Detachment Field [8] Artillery, will:

- (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
- (2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
- (3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

- (4) Support the Infantry Divisions.
- (5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
- (6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
- (7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
- (8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on post and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 l (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

- (1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
- (2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
- (3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
- (4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
- (5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below.
- (6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands.
- (7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
- (8) Disperse bombers with crews.
- (9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
- (10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.
- (11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

g. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:

- (1) Food administration.
- (2) A Labor Procurement Service.

h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS OF HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

- (1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
- (2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
- (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
- (4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
- (5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
- (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 l (2) below.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

- (1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
- (2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

- (1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
- (2) Insure the joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

l. STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the SCHOFIELD Reservation.

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and [10] Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELD[▼] Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 *d* (2) and *h* above."

Alert #1 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands with no threat from without. In addition to the duties prescribed in Alert #1, the Aircraft Warning Service was directed to operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn.

My reasons for ordering Alert #1 rather than Alert #2, which is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert #1, security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprising, were as follows:

1. There was a strong probability of sabotage by the Japanese population in Hawaii.

2. I had no information to indicate the probability of an attack.

3. Alert #2 or Alert #3, which provides for the maximum defense of OAHU and of army installations on outlying islands, interfere very seriously with training.

These three reasons will be discussed in detail:

1. Defense against sabotage can be carried out better where there is not too much dispersion of the command. Where the defense is against sabotage only, the planes are grouped on the landing mats and the apron, while in a defense against air attack the pursuit planes would be dispersed in their bunkers and the bombardment planes would be sent to landing fields on outlying islands or placed in the air if time were available. If time were not available, they would remain in their bunkers. From this can be seen that the action for the two different types of defense is quite different. Since sabotage was considered far more probable [11] than air attack, the planes were dispersed to all of the landing fields on the island of OAHU, but were not placed in bunkers. This was especially desirable as man-proof fencing and flood-lights had not as yet been provided for the fields. \$240,000.00 for this purpose was requested on May 15, 1941, and the authorization of \$102,000.00 was made on July 11th and \$91,975.00 on August 12, 1941. Orders for the material had to be placed in the mainland as it was not available in the Hawaiian Islands. Owing to the difficulties of obtaining priorities, both for material and for shipping, the District Engineer has not yet received the material. The Constructing Quartermaster was allotted funds for fencing of other than air fields, and a small amount of the material had been received and installed prior to December 7th.

2. The Hawaiian Department is provided with no means of collecting information as to the location of Japanese or other ships throughout the world and is not responsible for distant reconnaissance. The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District"—Section I, par. 3, 18 and 21, definitely place the responsibility for such reconnaissance upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The following quotation makes this evident:

EXTRACT from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"—Exhibit "D":

"3. *METHOD OF COORDINATION.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 *b*.

* * * * *

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

* * * * *

i. Distant reconnaissance.

* * * * *

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis-

approved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the annexes, Nos. 1 to VII of latter remain effective and constitute annexes 1 to VII inclusive, of this plan."

[12] Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides as follows—Exhibit "E":

"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive Air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When Naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this situation will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission".

These documents make it clearly evident that the Hawaiian Department had no responsibility for distant reconnaissance, and that when army bombardment planes are actually placed under the command of the Navy whenever they operate upon distant reconnaissance missions, they receive their mission and all instructions from the [13] Naval Commander, and report to him upon the completion of their mission. This method of procedure has been followed strictly since March 21, 1941, including the period since December 7th.

3. If upon consideration of the available facts the calling of Alert No. 1 would be sufficient to handle the situation Alert No. 2 or No. 3 should not be called because to do so would seriously interfere with the training of the command. When the troops are in battle positions it is practically impossible to carry on any orderly training. With the number of new men in the command it is highly important to conduct their training regularly. This was particularly true of the Hawaiian Air Force on November 27th due to the fact that they had been given the mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17 planes from the mainland to the Philippine Islands. September 8th the Hawaiian Air Force sent nine (9) trained combat teams to the Philippine Islands. Previous to November 27th eighteen (18) trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland, and seventeen (17) more combat teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes. In addition, twelve (12) combat crews had to be trained for planes that were expected at an early date in this Department. With only six (6) B-17 planes available for training combat teams, it was imperative that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force make the maximum use of these planes for training, and any order that would take them out of training for any considerable period would prevent him from carrying out the ferrying mission that had been assigned to him.

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I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff of November 27th—Exhibit "F":

"CHIEF OF STAFF,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.:

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with navy

SHORT".

Upon receipt of my radiogram of November 28th, I received the following reply from The Adjutant General—Exhibit "G":

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH:

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of [14] War Department Paren See paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five End paren Stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage Stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized Stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm Stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

ADAMS".

This par. of MID SC 30-45 referred to in the above mentioned radiogram is attached as Exhibit "H", and this paragraph refers wholly to subversive activities.

Careful consideration of the radiograms of October 16th, November 27th and November 28th discloses that the War Department emphasizes that action taken would not alarm the civil population, would not disclose strategic intention, constitute provocative actions against Japan, and would avoid unnecessary publicity. Alert #2 or #3 would have disclosed tactical positions and given more publicity to preparations and might have alarmed the civil population.

If the War Department at that time had considered it necessary to alert the Hawaiian Department against air and ground attack, it undoubtedly would have so directed instead of sending a long radiogram outlining the various steps that should be taken in connection with sabotage and subversive activities.

In my radiogram of November 29th I replied to the radiogram of the War Department of November 28th, and explained in detail the steps I was taking to prevent sabotage and subversive activities, and of the authority that I had obtained from the Governor of Hawaii and of the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu to legalize all the steps which I had taken—Exhibit "I":

"THE ADJUTANT GENARL,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.:

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth Comma Full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department Paren Paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five End paren And military establishments including personnel and equipment Stop As regards protection [15] of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants Comma Telephone exchanges and highway bridges Comma This headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides Comma In effect Comma That the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence Comma Invasion Comma Insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage Comma And lawless violence in connection therewith

Comma Being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection Comma At the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department Comma to close Comma Or restrict the use of and travel upon Comma Any highway within the city and county of Honolulu Comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

SHORT"

EVENTS TRANSPIRING FROM NOVEMBER 27TH TO DECEMBER 6TH

From November 27th to December 6th the troops remained on the Alert for sabotage, and carried on routine training with the men not required to be on duty during this Alert. The Aircraft Warning Service operated daily from two hours before daylight until one hour after daylight. It also carried out this usual practice, closing the information center at 7:00 A. M., December 7th. Routine training was also carried out by this Detachment from 7:00 to 11:00 A. M. except on Sunday. Memorandum of the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, states as follows--Exhibit "J":

Subject: Detector Operation.

To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions [16] to Captain TELLIEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, to hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

(Signed) W. H. Murphy,
W. H. MURPHY,
Lt. Col., Sig. C.

During the period November 27th to December 6th I had conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as follows:

November 27th: Conference on the reinforcement of the marine garrisons at Midway and Wake Islands by squadrons of army pursuit planes. I was accompanied on this conference by Major General Frederick L. Martin, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Lt. Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force.

December 1st: Conference relative to the relief of the marine garrisons on the islands of Midway and Wake, and the taking over of the defense of Canton Island by the army.

December 2nd: Conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet with reference to a letter that he was sending to the Chief of Naval Operations relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 3rd: Conference with reference to a radiogram I was sending to the War Department relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 4th: Major Fleming, of my staff, conferred with Col. Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet relative to the use of marine 5" guns at Canton Island.

At these conferences the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had ample opportunity to acquaint me with information of the location of Japanese carriers, which would render possible an attack on the island of OAHU. If they believed carriers so

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located, they unquestionably [17] would have discussed the possible danger to any troops attempting to effect a relief at Midway and Wake. There is at least a strong inference that they had no such knowledge of the location of the Japanese carriers which would have rendered an attack possible. The fact that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did not request the employment under naval command of army bombardment planes for distant reconnaissance, as provided for by the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" indicates that they were satisfied with their information with reference to Japanese carriers, and there was nothing new in the situation to cause me to change from an Alert for sabotage to an Alert for defense against an air attack. The following certificate shows that no request was made by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to the Hawaiian Air Force for long range aerial reconnaissance—Exhibit "K":

HICKAM FIELD, T. H., 20 December 1941.

I, JAMES A. MOLLISON, certify that during the period of 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

(Signed) Jas. A. Mollison,
JAS. A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.,
H. A. F. C/S.

To what extent such reconnaissance was made by the Navy planes is not known.

At the conference on November 27th, a staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet made a statement about the improbability of a Japanese air attack in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. This statement is covered by certificate of Lt. Col. James A. Mollison, as follows—Exhibit "L":

"I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuits planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral KIMMEL: McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?

Captain McMORRIS: I should say none Admiral—.

(Signed) JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.

[18] December 5th one B-24 plane arrived at Hickam Field from the mainland. This plane had insufficient armament for combat, only one .30 caliber and two .50 caliber guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed. In spite of the fact that this plane arrived without being in condition to fire, the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "M":

"COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Ft. Shafter, TH.:

Four six five twenty sixth.

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B*dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General

MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop *Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.*

ADAMS.

The combination of the arrival of the plane in this condition and of the instructions for it to be placed in instant readiness for firing during the remainder of the journey plainly indicates that the War Department considered Honolulu not the subject of a probable attack, and that flying from the mainland to Honolulu the hazard of carrying the extra weight of ammunition was greater than the possibility of being attacked by the Japanese.

After the receipt of radiogram 46526, quoted above, the following radiogram was sent—Exhibit "N":

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.:

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours Stop One of B twenty fours [19] Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam this date short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and accessories semicolon fifty caliber guns comma adapters comma mounts and accessories for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories Stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammunition is available Stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam field Stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed Stop Subject plane has no armor plate installation Stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic Signed MARTIN HAF 141.

SHORT

In spite of radiogram quoted above, airplanes continued to be dispatched from the mainland without ammunition and with guns not in condition to fire. Twelve B-17 airplanes, under orders from the War Department, left the mainland in two squadrons at 9:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (12:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time) and 10:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (1:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time). None of these guns were equipped with ammunition for the defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning gun positions, even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. (Exhibit "O"). The inference is plain that up to 1:30 A. M., December 7th, the War Department felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was greater than the danger of an attack by the Japanese. These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the twelve planes were destroyed by the Japanese without being able to fight. Had the War Department considered an attack by the Japanese probable, these planes would not have been permitted to leave the mainland without ammunition, and without guns in condition to be fired. Up to that moment the War Department had given me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations.

Later in the morning of December 7th apparently alarming news was received and the Chief of Staff sent the following message to me by *commercial radio*—Exhibit "P":

[20] "Hawn Dept.,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL".

The message was filed at 12:18 P. M., December 7th, Eastern time (6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time). It was received by the R. C. A. in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M., December 7th, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 A. M. (Delivery probably delayed by the Japanese attack). The deci-

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phered message was delivered to the Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 P. M., December 7th. Thus this important message was received seven hours after the attack. If the message had been telephoned by secret telephone direct to me as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus, in all probability, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8:00 A. M. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as very probable.

When the Chief of Staff, War Department, was informed by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, by secret commercial telephone of the first attack, he inquired if the message with regard to the Japanese ultimatum had been received prior to the attack. He was informed that it had not been received up to the time of that conversation.

On December 9th the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "Q":

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff officer received.

COTTON, Acting".

The following reply was made by this Headquarters—Exhibit "R":

[21] "Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh Stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general HQ Hawn Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

SHORT.

Two instances occurred early on the morning of December 7th, which, if interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very great result upon the action that followed.

About 7:15 A. M. a two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor and was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack and notified the army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The army was not notified until after the attack at 8:00.

After the Air Craft Warning Service Information Center was closed at 7:00 A. M., December 7th, the OPANA station remained in operation for further practice. At 7:20 A. M. a very significant event occurred, as shown by the following affidavits—

Exhibit "8":

"FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received by [22] the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 192 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:30 A. M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers. Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) GROVER C. WHITE, Jr.
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal
Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. AD 1941, at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lt., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

"FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,

ss:
Territory of Hawaii,

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt. 1cl, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H., and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockhard at the Opana station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler [23] said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone. Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) Joseph P. McDonald,
JOSEPH P. McDONALD,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) Adam R. Huggins,
ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

STATEMENT OF LIEUT. KERMIT A. TYLER

20 DECEMBER 1941.

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was one South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance north of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once

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before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0700 the operator at the OPANA RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian music throughout the night that coincidentally B-17s are apt to come in using the station [24] for radio direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be the navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C., Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

(Signed) Kermit A. Tyler,
KERMIT A. TYLER,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

Had Lieut. Tyler alerted the Hawaiian Air Force instead of deciding that the planes were friendly, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to get them in the air as they were not warmed up. Dispersion, in all probability, would have decreased the loss in planes, but would not have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor.

ACTION AT TIME OF ATTACK

At 7:55 A. M., December 7th, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field. At 9:00 a second attack was made, and a third about 11:00 A. M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. At 8:03 A. M. the Chief of Staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 order had been given to all units (major echelons) by telephone to put Alert #3 in effect.

Antiaircraft Artillery: All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. 3" ammunition had been placed in positions accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA). The first of these batteries began drawing ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater at 8:15 A. M. At 10:15 all these batteries had drawn the initial unit of fire.

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor and Camp Malakole took the enemy planes under firing during the eight o'clock raid. The first 3" gun fire was opened at 8:30, and all batteries of the south group were in action by 10:00 A. M. East group opened fire between 11:00 A. M. and 12:00 noon. (For detailed firing of batteries, see Exhibit "S").

[25] *Hawaiian Air Force:* During the first attack men started pulling planes out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off. At 11:40 A. M. the serviceable bombers took off on a mission under naval control.

Before the attack December 7th status of planes in Hawaiian Department was as follows:

Pursuit planes in commission.....	80	
Pursuit planes out of commission.....	69	
Reconnaissance planes in commission.....	6	
Reconnaissance planes out of commission.....	7	
Bombers in commission.....	39	
Bombers out of commission.....	33	
Damaged in Raid:		
Pursuit planes.....	88	
Reconnaissance planes.....	6	
Bombers.....	34	
Status as of December 20th, 1941:	<i>In commission</i>	<i>Reparable locally</i>
Pursuit planes.....	61	22
Reconnaissance.....	6	2
Bombers ¹	50	13

¹ Includes 29 bombers from mainland.

Exhibit "T"

A comprehensive study of the losses inflicted on the enemy by the army places the number of enemy planes brought down by aviation and antiaircraft fire at twenty-nine (29)

Exhibit "U"

24th Division: Troops of the 24th Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10 A. M. Men with automatic rifles returned the enemy's fire. At 8:30 A. M. the Division started moving to its battle positions, and all units were in position by 5:00 P. M. and had one unit of ammunition on the position. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

25th Division: The 25th Division opened antiaircraft fire at 8:30 A. M. It also started to move to battle positions at 8:30 A. M., and completed movement to position by 4:00 P. M. and had issued one unit of fire. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in [26] standing operating procedure (See Exhibit "B") without confusion. The value of planning and training with everyone made familiar with the plans was brought out very clearly.

At 9:00 A. M. the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler General Hospital.

At 12:00 noon the Civilian Relief Committee began the evacuation of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incomplected underground Interceptor Command Post.

During December 7th the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2 were arrested and confined at the Immigration and Quarantine Stations as follows:

Japanese	370
Germans	98
Italians	14
Total	482

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field as soon as the first attack was over. The fire fighters, while still fighting fire, assisted in moving the debris. During the evening of the 7th the District Engineer began repairing broken water pipes and other utilities at Hickam Field.

Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill in effect on December 7th, and on December 8th declared martial law and requested the Department Commander to assume the responsibility as Military Governor.

December 8th the District Engineer took over all building materials, supplies and equipment, called all construction companies into service and started the construction of bunkers and the extension of runways at the air fields. On the 9th he started construction of evacuation camps for army dependents and civilians. December 8th the Department Engineer distributed material to the troops and got field fortifications under way. December 9th he started construction of slit trenches on posts and in the vicinity of school buildings and parks in the city, and started plans for construction of shelters throughout the city.

Martial law was placed in effect on December 8th, and the following action was taken:

1. Courts were closed.
2. All civilian officials were asked to remain in their positions and carry on the work of their offices.
- [27] 3. An Advisory Committee headed by Governor Poindexter was appointed.
4. A Military Commission and Provost Court were appointed.
5. The sale of intoxicating liquors, beer and wine was prohibited.

[28] EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DEFENSES OF HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

My efforts to improve the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands has a bearing upon all work under me since assuming command of the Hawaiian Department, February 7, 1941. The following are some of the most important items taken up and the action taken by the War Department. Each item is supported by exhibits.

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1. The need for additional facilities and troops in this Department became evident very soon after arrival. On February 19th a letter was transmitted to the Chief of Staff of the Army outlining some of the deficiencies discovered and recommending action which should be taken to correct them. Among these points were:

- (1) Cooperation with the Navy,
- (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft,
- (3) Improvement of anti-aircraft defense,
- (4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery,
- (5) Improvement of the situation regarding searchlights,
- (6) Roads and trails,
- (7) Necessary bombproof construction,
- (8) Increase in the number of engineer troops.

A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "V".

2. On February 19, 1941, a secret letter was submitted to the War Department, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft", file Engr. 452. This letter explains the urgent necessity of providing protective bunkers for bombardment and pursuit aviation in this Department and recommended that funds in the amount of \$1,565,600.00 be allotted for this purpose. This cost included the costs of the necessary taxiways and hard standings to permit the dispersion of planes at Hickam Field. A large part of the ground surrounding the landing mat at Hickam Field is made up of a soft fill and it is not possible to disperse planes onto this ground without the provision of taxiways and hard standings. This correspondence was indorsed back to this Department by the 6th Ind., AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, September 12, 1941, which stated that the plans for revetments had been approved and that funds in the amount of \$1,358,000.00 [29] would be available about January 1, 1942. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no money had been received for this project and it was impossible to adequately disperse the planes at Hickam Field. Construction of these bunkers was initiated immediately after the attack under the Emergency Authority granted.—Exhibit "W".

3. It was apparent that the facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot which had been constructed in a very concentrated area at Hickam Field would be extremely vulnerable to an attack. As a result, a letter was submitted to the War Department on September 10, 1941, file Engr. 600.96, subject: "Underground Repair Facilities Hawaiian Air Depot", which strongly recommended the approval of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft in this Department, and requested funds in the amount of \$3,480,650.00. This correspondence was indorsed back by 1st Ind., file AG 600.12 (9-10-41) MC-G, Adjutant General's Office, October 27, 1941, stating that due to the cost of providing bombproof facilities that it was the War Department's policy not to provide them, and suggesting that splinterproof installations be provided. During the attack of December 7th, the Air Depot was one of the main targets and suffered tremendous damage. Construction of an underground bombproof facility was started under the Emergency Authority subsequent to the attack. Steps have also been taken to decentralize the Hawaiian Air Depot to several smaller shops around the island.—Exhibit "X".

4. Fortifications and Camouflage Funds.—A letter was submitted to the War Department on July 28th, file AG 121.2, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds", requesting that these funds be made available for purchase of fortification and camouflage equipment. This letter was answered by confidential radiogram No. 31, August 12, 1941, stating these special field exercise funds could not be made available for this purpose. This radiogram was followed by letter dated August 13, 1941, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects", in which it was stated that the interest of the Hawaiian Department in providing field fortifications was appreciated by the War Department, but that funds could not be allotted for this purpose. This letter was returned by 1st Ind. this headquarters, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, September 14, 1941, again recommending an immediate allotment of \$125,000.00 for field fortification and camouflage purposes. In 2nd Ind. to [30] the same correspondence September 26, 1941, the Adjutant General stated that the allotment could not be made. Also on this same subject, this headquarters submitted to the War Department a clipper letter on October 28, 1941, file Engr. 400.312, subject: "Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Material", which recapitulated the previous correspondence on this subject, and requested an allotment of

\$1,445,542.00 be made available immediately for the purpose of fortification and camouflage materials. No funds had been received for this purpose at the time of the attack.—Exhibit "Y".

5. Camouflage: The necessity of camouflaging treatment of all airfields in this Department was brought to the War Department's attention in letter File Engr. 000.91, July 15, 1941, subject: "Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field". This letter stated, "There is definite need for camouflage treatment on all airfields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment had been undertaken at any airfield in this Department." This proposal was finally approved in 3rd Ind., file AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC-G from the Adjutant General's Office to the Chief of Engineers which directed that funds in the amount of \$56,210.00 be included in the next budget estimate for Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no funds had been received for this purpose. The question of camouflage was also submitted to the War Department by letter this headquarters February 27, 1941, file Engr. 000.91, subjects "Camouflage of Defense Installations". This project was approved by 4th Ind., AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, Adjutant General's Office June 27, 1941. At the time of the attack, no funds for this purpose had been received, and although considerable work had been done by troop labor to camouflage these installations, its effectiveness was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials.—Exhibit "Z".

6. The revised Roads and Trails Project was submitted by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 611, February 19, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of \$1,370,000.00 be allotted for construction of the military roads, railroads and trails in this Department. At the time of the attack, only \$350,000.00 had been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit "1A".

7. The need for additional airports was brought to the War Department's attention in letters file Engr. 600.12, according to the following [31] Schedule:

(1) Bellows Field.....	April 5, 1941
(2) Barking Sands.....	May 2, 1941
(3) Hilo Airport.....	May 2, 1941
(4) Homestead Field.....	May 2, 1941
(5) Morse Field.....	May 2, 1941
(6) Haleiwa.....	May 22, 1941
(7) Burns Field.....	May 22, 1941
(8) Lanai.....	May 22, 1941
(9) Parker Ranch.....	June 2, 1941
(10) Kipapa.....	May 14, 1941

At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted specifically for construction at these airfields. The War Department disapproved the proposed site at Kipapa and directed construction at Kahuku. This relocation required protracted negotiations with the Fourteenth Naval District which had a bombing range on the Kahuku site. These negotiations were completed only a short time before the attack, but as no funds had been received, no construction had been started. In this connection, several expedients had to be adopted due to the non-availability of funds. Construction work at Molokai, Burns, Morse and Barking Sands was actually done by troop labor using materials provided by the WPA. The need of an additional airdrome on Oahu was recognized as acute. The only possibility for immediate development was in improving the field at Bellows, and the only funds which had been made available for construction work at Bellows Field applied to housing only. The project letter on Bellows Field included a request for funds for improvement of runways, installation of gasoline storage and other facilities to make this a first class operating base. As stated, no funds had been allotted for these improvements. Since the need for these vital facilities was acute, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with their construction, utilizing any funds which might be available to his office. At the time of the attack, provision had been made for gasoline storage at Bellows and a 5000' runway was about half done, and the District Engineer was able to complete this runway by Thursday night following the attack. Bellows Field is now a useable base, but all construction which [32] has been done to make this an operating base has been done without any funds being allotted by the War Department. The improvement of other airdromes on Oahu at either the Kipapa or Kahuku area or at Haleiwa had not been undertaken at the time of the attack because no funds had ever been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit "1B".

8. Kaneohe Bay Defenses: It was recognized that the preceding arrangement under which the Army disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of the new

Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay was a mistake. A letter was prepared and transmitted to the War Department on the 18th of February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381. This letter informed the War Department that this Department had assumed responsibility for the defense of this area. This subject was again covered in letter this headquarters, file Engr. 600.96, dated April 14, 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries" to the Adjutant General, and recommendation was made that a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery Closson be obtained and shipped to this Department for installation in the Kaneohe Bay area. The War Department recognized the need of this protection for Kaneohe Bay, but was unable to supply a 12-inch gun battery for this. The project for the permanent defenses at Kaneohe Bay was submitted by letter of this headquarters 31 July 1941, file AG 381/20 Kaneohe Bay project, subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay", which recommended both additional personnel and additional armament required. This was answered by 3rd Ind. Adjutant General's Office, file AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-D, October 30, 1941, which approved the temporary utilization of armament now on hand in this Department. This indorsement also stated that the reinforcements of peace or war garrison of the Hawaiian Department for the beach and land defense of this area was not contemplated. The project for the utilization of temporary armament was submitted on the 18th of September 1941, file Engr 662/4 x 662/7 which recommended the provision of funds for the construction of Panama mounts for three 155-mm batteries and a railroad gun emplacement, and requested that funds in the amount of \$215,265.00 be allotted for the construction of these positions. This matter was also followed up in radiogram No. 320 this headquarters, September 18, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of \$215,265.00 be made available for the construction at Kaneohe Bay and also that \$117,256.00 be made available for the completion of the project for [33] construction of railroad gun positions. At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted for this construction. Exhibit "1C".

9. The necessity of improvement of the landing strips at Wheeler Field was brought to the War Department's attention by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 686/d, 21 June, 1941. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, from the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, August 25, 1941, question was raised as to the adequacy of the second proposed north-south runway, and the statement was made that no funds were available at that time for the construction and improvements recommended. In 2nd Ind. Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941, to this Department, statement was made that \$25,000.00 had been requested for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack, however, no funds had been received for the improvement of this landing strip. Some improvements had been made utilizing troop labor of the 804th Engineers; however, due to the lack of funds these improvements were limited and did not adequately solve the problem.—Exhibit "1D".

10. The Aircraft Warning Service is probably the most important single project for the defense of Oahu. At the time of the attack, however, none of the three fixed stations in the original project had been completed due to the impossibility of securing materials under the priorities system. The Kaala station, for example, depended for its construction on construction of the cableway approach. In radiogram 3009 on June 10th, this headquarters reported to the War Department that this cableway material could not be delivered unless a higher priority rating was received, and in War Department radio 904, June 26th, the Adjutant General reported that this priority rating had been advanced to an A-1-c rating. With this rating it was not possible to secure the material to install this installation and the others expeditiously. Revised estimates for engineer construction of the superseding project of six fixed stations and six mobile stations and preliminary estimates for the cost of the signal communications involved in this revised project, were submitted by letter this headquarters 29 September, 1941, file Sig 676.3. Pending the allotment of these additional funds, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with construction of AWS stations with any funds available to his office. At the time of the attack, however, due to this priority difficulty, none of the three original fixed stations were in operation.—Exhibit "1E".

[34] 11. The entire construction program in this Department has been delayed due to the situation regarding priorities. It was extremely difficult to secure materials for the construction program, not only those which were ordered specifically for a defense project, but particularly those materials which are ordinarily purchased as an "over the counter" transaction. From a study of

the priorities situation, and also of the shipping situation, it became evident in June that the local dealers who ordinarily maintain stocks and materials necessary for defense projects would not be able to secure delivery from the mainland until after a purchase order from a Government agency had been placed. This meant that after the priority was placed, if the item was not available in local stock that there would be a delay of from six weeks to two months even under the most favorable conditions before mainland delivery could be effected. To remedy this situation a letter was sent to the War Department by clipper airmail, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priorities and Preference Ratings," July 3, 1941. This letter presented the problem in detail and recommended to the War Department that action be taken to correct this situation. The letter was followed up by radio on the 14th of August, and was answered by 1st and 2nd Inds. from the Priorities Committee dated August 18, 1941, and the Adjutant General dated August 26, 1941. The problem was again presented to the War Department by letter dated October 23, 1941, file Engr. 523.07, which recommended that the Office of Production Management be opened in Honolulu. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, the Priorities Committee advised that the Office of Production Management had been requested to establish a field office in Hawaii. This field office had not been established at the time of the attack and due to this difficulty in securing materials, many of our projects were not completed at the time of the attack.—Exhibit "1F".

12. Another effort was made to solve this supply problem by securing funds for the advance procurement of certain essential materials. It was originally requested in clipper airmail letter this headquarters July 28, 1941, file Engr. 600.12, which recommended that a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the advance procurement of essential materials before the specific allotments had been made for individual projects. This letter had not [35] been answered on the 13th of September when a follow-up radiogram was sent to the War Department, and on the same day the matter was brought to the personal attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department, who very quickly secured a solution of the problem by the allotment of \$500,000.00 for the advance purchase of essential materials. Before these materials could be secured, however, the \$500,000.00 was diverted by the War Department for the construction of housing at Kaneohe Bay, with the result that on the day of the attack, no reserve supplies of materials other than lumber had been accumulated.—Exhibit "1G".

13. The following letter shows appreciation by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air of the difficulties in the carrying out of the project for the creation of air fields to permit ferrying of planes to the Philippine Islands, and of the rapidity with which the arrangements were completed.—Exhibit "1H".

NOVEMBER 27, 1941

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SHORT: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

[36] 14. Increase in Engineer Troops:

February 10, 1941.—TAG sent 3d Ind., file AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C saying that 3d Engineer Regiment was to be increased. Regular Army personnel not available to further increase Engineer Regiment. Selectees prohibited from being sent and it was not possible to aid in creating Engineer Battalion here as requested. On 19 Feb. 1941, letter to TAG file Engr. 322.03 requested that War Department

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send an Eng. Regiment (Aviation) and an Eng. Regiment (General Service) here. 1st Ind., May 15th, A. G. 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M; TAG, stated that 34th Eng. Regiment (C) would be activated and that the personnel would probably arrive in June. This Regiment was to take the place of the Regiment (General Service) requested. On June 18th, letter AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MR-MC, the War Department issued orders expanding 804 Eng. Company to the 804th Eng. Battalion. The troops for the 804th Eng. Battalion arrived in this Department 21 July 1941. Previous instructions concerning the activation of the 34th Eng. Battalion had been rescinded with the result that the unit was not activated until 17 October 1941. It had not been completely trained and lacked many items of equipment at the time of the attack. See Exhibit "1 I".

15. Increase in Coast Artillery Troops:

February 18, 1941.—Letter written to TAG urgently requesting two (2) Regiments CA Mobile; 1 Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery); one Regiment CA (TD) 155 mm. gun; AA filler replacements (90 officers and 2064 enlisted men); Harbor Defense Artillery reinforcements (150 officers and 2700 enlisted men). TAG replied by first indorsement May 10, 1941, file AG 320.2 (2-18-41) (55) that the Hawaiian Department CA Garrison would be augmented with a total of 276 officers and 5734 enlisted men between June 1941 and March 1942, as follows: (See Exhibit "1J").

June 1941

- (1) AA fillers, 60 officers, 1337 enlisted men.
- (2) 98 CA 62 officers, 1329 enlisted men
- (3) Second Battalion, 97 CA less Battery H (Gun) Battery E (SL) (17 officers, 359 enlisted men).

[37] November 1941:

- (1) 97 CA less 2 Battalion, 3 Battalion—(48 officers, 885 enlisted men).
- (2) Battery H, 97 CA (4 officers, 134 enlisted men).
- (3) Medical Personnel, 98 CA (7 officers, 49 enlisted men).

March 1941:

- (1) AA fillers (24 officers, 661 enlisted men).
- (2) 3 Battalion, 97 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery M, 3 Battalion, 98 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery M (54 officers, 980 enlisted men).

February 25th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file AG 320.2/57 (Exhibit 1J) requesting increase in enlisted men in 251st C. A. Regiment NG from 1181 to 1450. Disapproved by TAG March 8, 1941 (Exhibit 1J) 1st indorsement, file 320.2/57.

February 25th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file 320.2/58 (Exhibit 1J) requesting following reinforcements of Hawaiian Department:

- (1) That CAC requested February 18th (Exhibit 1J) be given priority.
- (2) That 11th F. A. be organized under T/O dated November 1, 1940.
- (3) One Tank Battalion.
- (4) Two (2) M. P. Companies for guarding air fields.
- (5) Reinforcements of Inf. Regiments so as to be organized under T/O

November 1, 1940.

- (6) That 11th F. A. Brig. (less 11 F. A.) be reinforced and organized under T/O November 1, 1940.

TAG replied by first indorsement, file 320.2 (2-25-41) (58) (Exhibit 1J) that CAC and Engineering increases would be considered separately; that reinforcements for F. A. and Inf. Regiments were not considered urgent; that Tank Battalion and 2 M. P. Companies for Hawaiian Department were disapproved; and that any reorganization of units was to be accomplished by reducing size of existing units and by carrying others as inactive. On May 28th, orders for the shipment of CAC increases were rescinded, file 320.2/70. On July 15, letter from TAG, file 320.2/82m (Exhibit 1J) activated the following units:

[38] 97th CA Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2 Battalions, and Batteries F and G.

98th CA Regimental Headquarters Battery (less band); Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 1st and 2nd Battalions, and Batteries A, B, C, D, F, G and H.

16. Increase in Air Corps Strength:

April 9th, 1941.—Letter from TAG, file 320.2 (3-5-41) (61) (Exhibit 1K) directing that Air Defense Command be set up. First indorsement, May 3, 1941 (Exhibit 1K) to TAG called attention to the fact that the plan was presented to War Department in letter of April 25th, 1941, Paragraph 7 "Reorganization of Forces in Hawaiian Department" (Exhibit 1K).

April 24th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG from COHAF (thru channels) file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) subject "Air Base Group" requesting:

- (1) Bellows Field as permanent Air Corps Station
- (2) Permanent Station 15 Pursuit Group
- (3) A redistribution of Air Base Groups
- (4) That two Air Base Groups be authorized.

By second indorsement TAG to COHD dated June 26th, 1941, file 320.2 (4-24-41) (94) (Exhibit 1K):

(1) War Department stated that Troop Unit Basis FY 1942 provided for two additional material squadrons for HAF. This is believed to provide sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.

(2) Organization of Air Base Unit for 15th Pursuit Group held in obeyance pending decision on new station. By third indorsement CGHD to TAG, file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) request was made for two additional material squadrons to be stationed at Bellows Field. On August 7th, 1941, radio file 320.2/100 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to Chief of Air Corps requesting Headquarters Detachment in absence of Air Base Group. On August 15th Radio No. 380 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to TAG requesting information of status of Air Base Groups for Bellows Field. Administrative situation there very difficult. In answer, Chief of Air Corps sent radio no. 172, file 320.2/108c (Exhibit 1K) stating [39] not favorably considered because it would exceed the 59,000 allotted and also that TAG had been requested to activate Headquarters Detachment. On September 27th, 1941, by letter (exhibit 1K) from TAG, file 320.2/108d, subject "Activation of Air Corps Unit" a Headquarters Detachment was authorized at Bellows Field but personnel had to be furnished by the Department.

On August 30, 1941, Radio No. 779, file 320.2/108 (Exhibit 1K) was received asking:

- (1) What are total AC personnel requirements.
- (2) Total requirements for personnel for arms and services with AC.
- (3) Number AB groups needed and their locations.

On September 9, 1941, Radio No. 272 to TAG, file 320.2/108a (Exhibit 1K) answering Radio No. 779 requesting the following:

- (1) Two AB Groups (one for Bellows, one for Kahuku)
- (2) Air Corps enlisted men now in Department sufficient to organize these groups.
- (3) One Squadron (HB) (Exhibit 1K) consisting of 27 officers, 220 enlisted men to replace 14th Bombardment Squadron transferred to Phillippine Islands.
- (4) Personnel for Bellows. Medical Department (1 officer, 7 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 men) Ordnance Dept. (1 A. B. Co. of 4 officers and 60 enlisted men).
- (5) Personnel for Kahuku Point. Medical Department (3 officers, 12 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 enlisted men) Signal Corps (10 enlisted men specialists)
- (6) Following personnel needed: Air Corps (3871 enlisted men) Medical Corps (6 officers, 36 enlisted men); Dental Corps (1); Quartermaster (4 officers, 70 enlisted men). 3 AB Squadrons one each at Barking Sands, Kauai; Morse Field; Hilo, Hawaii.
- (7) Near Future. Two (2) additional AB Squadrons—(1) Lanai (under construction) (2) Parker Ranch (project to be submitted).

On November 8th Radio no. 786 was sent to TAG, file 320.2/126 (exhibit 1K) requesting immediate assignment.

- (1) Three airdepot Groups to HAF
- (2) Procurement of civilian employees impossible and discharge of enlisted men for employment does not help.

[40] (3) 30% tactical planes grounded due to shortage in depot maintenance. Becoming acute.

(4) Must have personnel and material at once. No personnel available here for activation of units.

On November 15th Radio no. 402, file 320.2/126a, (exhibit 1K) from TAG stating that three Air Depot Groups were under advisement but that groups not available now. If and when available, will it come within strength of war garrison?

On November 19th Radio no. 889, file 320.2/126b (exhibit 1K) to TAG—Increase of three Air Depot Groups will not come within authorized war garrison

but should be furnished as soon as possible due to shortage in personnel. War garrison must be increased to accommodate Air Base Groups.

On November 18th the War Department activated Seventh Airways Squadron from existing personnel in Department, file 320.2/127 (exhibit 1K). On November 18th Radio no. 873, file 320.2/128 (exhibit no. 1K) was sent to TAG requesting Station Complements at Hickam, Wheeler, Morse Field and Barking Sands. Urgently requested. On November 25th 1941 Radio no. 455, file 320.2/128a (exhibit 1K) from TAG stated that until war garrison limitation was lifted, no additional personnel could be sent to the Hawaiian Department.

17. Reorganization Hawaiian Division & Increase in War Garrison April 25th, 1941. Letter written to TAG, file 220.3/37, (exhibit 1L) requesting that two triangular divisions be organized from the Hawaiian Division (Square) and the organization of station complements be made at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter; also Air Defense Command is to be created. By first indorsement dated July 29, 1941, file 320.3 (4-25-41) (37) (exhibit 1L). TAG returned this letter without action.

May 29th, 1941. TAG sent radio no. 837, file 320.3/37a (exhibit 1L) stating that the initial war garrison would be reduced to 58,000. Reductions would come from troops other than Air Corps, Anti aircraft, and Aircraft Warning Service.

[41] June 5th, 1941.—Letter was written to TAG, file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) subject "War Garrison for Initial War Operations" stating

- (1) That Table I, (Exhibit 1L) shows forces recommending totaling 59,425.
- (2) Statement that proper defense of Kaneohe Bay, Airfields, beaches and provisions for mobile reserve cannot be successful with only 59,000 troops.
- (3) Statement of minimum increase for Kaneohe Bay as follows: 1 Regiment Inf; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How (T. D.); 1 Battalion C. A. 155 guns plus one additional battery; 1 Regiment C. A. (AA); 1 Battery C. A. 12" Barbette guns.
- (4) Urgently requested that strength be increased from 58,000 to approximately 71,500 as follows: 2 Inf. Regiments; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM; 1 Battalion CA 155 guns; 1 Battery CA 12" Barbette guns . . . total 11,279.
- (5) Again recommended that station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter be organized. This would give an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.
- (6) Plans are to be submitted in the near future for garrisons each of outlying islands with a force consisting of approximately 1 regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery, all of which will not be within war garrison strength.

On July 22, 1941, 1st indorsement to exhibit 1L file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) TAG said

- (1) War Garrison of 59,425 recommended by CGHD is reduced to 57,429 and augmented by following units: 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM (less 1 gun battalion, band, basics), 1 Battalion CA 155 M guns with 1 additional Battery, 1 Battery CA.
- (2) Recommendation of war garrison for 71,500 officers and men is disapproved.

(3) Troops in excess of 59,690 authorized will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need and if such troops are available.

18. May 2nd, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file 320.3/38 (Exhibit 1M) subject "Organization of Anti Aircraft Artillery Brigade" requesting authority to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 53 CA Brig. and the Intelligence Battery, 53rd CA Brig. about June 1, 1941.

June 12, 1941.—First indorsement from TAG to CGHD, file 320.2 (5/2/41) (38) (exhibit 1M) gives authority to activate.

[42] 19. November 6, 1941.—Radio No. 759 to Chief Ordnance, file 320.2/121 (exhibit 1N) stated that 6-37 mm. batteries now in Hawaiian Department. Plans made for six more by March, 1942, but only twenty (20) guns on hand. When and in what quantities will the one hundred (100) 37 mm. guns listed under 1941 funds be sent? Reply not yet received.

20. *STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE.* Before February 7, 1941, Field Orders No. 1 (Landing Operations) No. 1W (Sabotage) and 1 NS (Naval Security) had been prepared. It was found during Maneuvers, May 1941, that these field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14th, 1941, a tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department was issued to each officer in the Department with instructions that any suggested changes were to be reported to

Department Headquarters by August 15, 1941. During the preparation of the final form of the Standing Operating Procedure, the tentative S. O. P. was in effect. The final form was issued on November 5, 1941. Each unit knew its mission in the event Alert No. 1, 2 or 3 was put into effect. Due to this planning (the S. O. P.) each unit was able to act quickly and promptly when the air raid took place on December 7, 1941.

EFFORTS TO BETTER PREPARE THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY FOR DEFENSE

[43] Soon after taking command of the Hawaiian Department I made a survey with reference to possible defense measures to enable the civilian population to meet any emergency which might arise. I had been asked to speak to the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6th, and decided that this day was the best opportunity to obtain publicity, as practically all the important business men of Oahu were present on this occasion. I proposed the following items of prime importance:

1. Production and storage of food.
2. Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
3. Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.
4. Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.

(For complete remarks on this occasion, see Exhibit "10".)

Production and storage of food: As a result of my talk and support by the papers and certain men of importance in the community, the storage of food in the pantry of the home was put into effect at once, and the purchases from the retailers increased about 20% during the first month.

For some years a study had been made of food production required and possible in the islands. A committee completed this work, and made definite assignment of acreage and crops to all plantations on the Islands. Plantation managers and the five big companies which act as factors for the various plantations all agreed to this plan. Necessary implements for changing from cane and pine-apples to truck gardening were listed for each plantation. Orders for seed for planting the first crop were placed with firms in the mainland, orders to be filled upon telegraphic advice.—Exhibit "1P".

On December 10th, after completion of the inventory of food on hand, a meeting was held with the Presidents of the five big companies and of the Governor's Food Committee. The District Engineer was directed to purchase the seed and equipment at once, as it was believed the matter could be handled in less time in this manner instead of having each plantation make purchases.

The committee on storage of food determined the articles and tonnage of the essential elements of diet necessary to provide for the civil population for six months. The cost of these items was estimated to be \$2,500,000 for human consumption and \$900,000 for feed for dairy cattle and poultry. This matter was taken up with the War Department.

Governor Poindexter and Delegate Sam King gave the storage of food their full support. However, the item was eliminated by the Bureau of the Budget and no action was gotten through Congress. The purchase of this emergency food reserve by the Department of Agriculture and the allocation of shipping therefor was authorized December 17th. Recent press dispatches indicate that the President has made an allotment for food production.

Organization of Doctors and Nurses for care of injured and wounded: The Medical Society of Honolulu got squarely behind my effort to prepare the doctors and nurses for an emergency. Twenty (20) civilian-aid station groups were organized and have had considerable practice in setting up their stations. They actually functioned efficiently on December 7th. Sixteen (16) surgical teams were organized. They started reporting at 9:00 A. M. December 7th, and by 9:30 all were employed. They are representative of the leading surgeons, anesthetists, etc., in the city. The regular operating staff at Tripler General Hospital was operating at 8:45 A. M.

After several conferences the Red Cross agreed to purchase and store in Honolulu \$200,000.00 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment. Much of the equipment and supplies had been received prior to December 7th.

Buildings suitable for hospitals were surveyed, and many of these have actually been equipped and operated since December 7th.

Organization of auxiliary police force: The organization of an auxiliary police force was effected and placed under the command of Major Douglas King by the

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Mayor of Honolulu. This force was given some training in taking over leading utilities and the use of firearms. It proved to be a very efficient force immediately after the raid.

Auxiliary fire fighters and fire wardens have been organized. Requests for fire-fighting equipment have been made to the Office of Civilian Defense, and also sent direct by the Governor to the same organization.

[45]

Evacuation and shelters: Detailed plans were drawn for evacuation camps, for trenches in parks, schools, etc., and for splinter-proof shelters in the vicinity of public utilities. A request for \$2,800,000 for construction of these camps and shelters was made through the War Department and also direct by Governor Poindexter. The funds were not provided until after the attack December 7th. Since that date the President has made funds available to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii for this purpose.—Exhibit "1Q"

M-DAY BILL

At the request of the Senate of the Territory of Hawaii I appeared before that body and explained the value and the necessity for the passage of the M-Day bill. The passage was effected in the next few days and the measure was signed by the Governor. The bill enabled the Governor to organize emergency committees and carry out many things of great benefit in the medical work, evacuation and police work immediately following the attack on December 7th.

LETTERS FROM CIVILIANS WITH REFERENCE TO MY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN DEFENSE

The following copies of letters have been received: Exhibit "1R"

HONOLULU, T. H., December 22, 1941.

The PRESIDENT, *The White House, Washington, D. C.*

SIR: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our "Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de- [46] cision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President, Lewers & Cook,

Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association; H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L. Doty, Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse. Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. (now acting as Food Administrator and Supply Officer).

C. C. to General Walter C. Short.

[47]

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

Office of the Director, Island of Oahu

HONOLULU, HAWAII, December 20, 1941.

Lt. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter.

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Please allow me to express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) T. G. S. Walker,
T. G. S. WALKER,
Director, Civilian Defense, Island of Oahu.

[47a]

SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

TERRITORY OF HAWAII

Executive Chambers

HONOLULU

23 DECEMBER 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

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It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941.

(1) *The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act* by a special session of Legislature called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian [47b] defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) *The production and conservation of food:* Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) *The medical facilities* for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) *Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the [47c] preparation of shelters* for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) *An auxiliary police force* to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) *Legislation authorizing a home guard* was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) *There were many other matters* too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. THIS IS A TRUE COPY.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

L. W. TRUMAN,
Captain, Infantry.

[48] I have presented many of my actions, both with reference to the military defense of the islands and the preparations of the civil community for defense, to show that I have taken both a very active and an intelligent part in this work from the time of my arrival in the Hawaiian Department.

I should be very glad if this Committee would see fit to call before it a number of officers of my command, preferably from officers of high enough rank to know what I have accomplished, and from staff officers who are familiar with the work that has been carried out during the past ten months. I would also like very much to have the Governor and some of the leading business men called before the Commission to tell what the civil community thinks of the work that I have done over the past ten months.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The radiogram from the War Department thru CINCUS fleet UCS of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

[49] During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distance reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers re that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

3. Action of the War Department on December 5th and as late as 1:30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

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4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7, until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary [50] to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

[57a]

[Exhibit A]

[57] Copy

[SECRET]

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

[Paraphrase]

NOTE FOR COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT:

THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU QUOTE:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x

CBO CRJ	DATE 16 OCT 41	SERIAL NO. 10-340
ORIGINATOR	ACTION	
OPNAV	CINCLANT	INFORMATION
	CINCPAC	
	CINCAF	

A TRUE COPY:

Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit B]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

P1 WAR PRTY

WASHN DC 611 PM Nov 27 1941

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop if hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop this policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop prior

to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop report measures taken stop should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

True Copy

O. M. Cutler

O M CUTLER

Lt Col Infantry

MARSHALL

116P/27

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5)

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)—1664 Honolulu 10-10-40 5M.

[Exhibit C]

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure

To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 14 July 1941.

2. Issuing headquarters will collect and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers.

3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters, Standing Operating Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff Sections, HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their supervision.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
*Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.*

1 Inclosure: SOP HD

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure

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By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop,
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
*Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.*

1 Inclosure: SOP HD

RESTRICTED

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[a]

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T H, 5 November 1941.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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[1]

SECTION I—GENERAL

1. **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated in paragraph 159, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, and paragraph 56, FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

2. **UNIT PROCEDURES.**—Conforming to the Department Procedure, subordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operating Procedures.

3. **SHORT TITLE.**—"SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Procedure.

4. **DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.**—Department Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will

consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will be as follows:

a. FORWARD ECHELON.—

Commanding General and Aides
General Staff (less G-1 and G-5)
Secretary to General Staff
Engineer Officer
Signal Officer
Chemical Officer
Ordnance Officer
Surgeon
Headquarters Commandant
Provost Marshal.

b. REAR ECHELON.—

G-1
G-5

Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).

5. *TACTICAL PRINCIPLES*.—See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of OAHU and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:

a. Complete organization of the ground

b. Position to be held lightly

c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them

d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. *SECURITY*.—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5.

7. *LIAISON*.—a. *OFFICERS*.—During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:

24th Infantry Division
25th Infantry Division
[2] Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command
Hawaiian Air Force
86th Observation Squadron
Each Department Reserve Unit.

b. *UNITS*.—Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsibility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operating in areas where coast artillery group stations are in operation will establish liaison with those stations.

8. *ORDERS*.—a. The Department Commander will issue orders covering the action of the Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Air Force, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Department Reserve units and all attached troops.

b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in c below) will be brief written field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order, but this will be confirmed later in writing.

c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from the Department.

d. To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

9. *MOVEMENT*.—a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

b. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions.

c. In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accomplished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maximum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed).

d. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration, FM 25-10, the distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Administrative marches will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement (paragraph 31, FM 25-10). When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (paragraph 94, FM 25-10) will be utilized.

e. All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative.

f. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on *one way* secondary roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

[3] g. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.

10. **ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE.**—a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit. See paragraphs 261-273, FM 100-5.

b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

c. On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

11. **INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.**—All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith.

12. **GUIDES.**—a. In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

b. Whenever units are ordered to another sector for support or attachment, the sector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting or attached units.

SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f (8) below.

14. **ALERT NO. 1.**—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

[4] (2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 *h* (2) below

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1

Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA

WAI'AU Generating Plant

Telephone Exchanges at WAIPA'U, WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA (in HALEI'WA), LAIE and KANE'OH'E

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAI'ALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA-SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 14 *j* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 *g* below.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installation.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS of HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 14 *d* (3) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.

15. *ALERT NO. 2.*—*a.* This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

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(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 15 *h* (2) below

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1

Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA

WAI AU Generating Plant

Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHAU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA,) LAIE and KANEOHE

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

[6] (6) Place 240mm. howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 *e* below.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 *l* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 *k* (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(4) Disperse bombers with crews.

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 *g* below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.

[7] (b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

- (1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
- (2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
- (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
- (4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
- (5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
- (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 *k* (1).

i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

- (1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
- (2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

- (1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.
- (2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

- (3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

[8] 1. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 *d* (4) and *g* above. Instructions will be issued.

16. ALERT NO. 3.—*a*. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:

(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 4 *a*) will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.

(2) All sections of the rear echelon (see paragraph 4 *b*) will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

- (1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.
- (2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 *e* below.

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 *m* below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Detachment Field Artillery, will:

- (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
- (2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
- (3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
- (4) Support the Infantry Divisions.
- (5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
- (6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

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(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
[9] (8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and anti-aircraft defense.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.

(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 *h* below.

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally *bombs* will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands. See paragraph 25 *e* (8).

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.

(8) Disperse bombers with crews.

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

g. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:

(1) A Food Administration.

(2) A Labor Procurement Service.

h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS of HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLO-KAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

[10] (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 *l* (2) below.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of *all* friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

l. STATION COMPLEMENTS.—

(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 d (2) and h above. Instructions will be issued.

SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and b below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

a. MATERIAL READINESS.—

A—All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

[11] B—One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C—Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D—Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.—

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.

1—For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.

2—All types: 30 minutes.

3—All types: One hour.

4—All types: Two hours.

5—All types: Four hours.

SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

18. The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be followed generally where applicable.

19. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.—

a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will his air attacks be accompanied by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases thereon?

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or other acts of assistance?

20. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.—

a. NAVY.—

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.

[12] (b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the composition of supporting Naval units.

(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and/or PEARL HARBORS.

(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

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(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately.

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately.

(g) See paragraph 20 c below.

b. ARMY.—

(1) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUAI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTH-WEST HEADLAND, KAHŌOLAWĒ; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(2) *86th Observation Squadron.*—

(a) Same as for "HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE"—see 20 b (1) above.

[13] (b) Be prepared to provide, on call, observation for the control of long-range artillery fire.

(3) *Interceptor Command.*—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.

(b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

(4) *Each Infantry Division.*—

(a) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed thereafter hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report *enemy front lines* and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report location of *own front lines*. Report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(f) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(g) Report time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. Report at 0300, 0700, 1200 and 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) The 25th Division will assign G-2 personnel to assist the Provost Marshal in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in South Sector.

(5) *Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.*—

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition and course of formation.

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is begun by hostile vessels or by the seacoast artillery, giving location of naval vessels, locality being attacked, and units engaged.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, important damage from hostile naval and air [14] bombardment, and report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval force.

(f) Report, when observed, by Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEOHE BAY.

(g) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damage to use of chemical agents.

(h) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary to avoid delay.

(6) *District Commanders of HAWAII, MAUI and KAUAI Districts.*—Report when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelligence Loop:

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation.

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.

(c) Location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group.

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units.

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.

(f) Time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals.

(7) *Department Signal Office.*—

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.

c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.

(2) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this information may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i. e., attempts at destruction, than to report location immediately, should be taken.

d. MISCELLANEOUS.—

(1) *Transmission of G-2 Information.*—

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. [15] If wire and radio signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand: Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of the information.

21. *MEASURES FOR HANDLING.*—

a. PRISONERS: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War collection points.

b. DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.—

(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Divisions, with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the same means.

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the most expeditious means.

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(4) Liaison officers from the office of G-2, H. H. D., will be assigned to all Examination Stations, and will assist the Provost Marshal in examining enemy personnel, materiel and documents, and in determining destination of reports.

c. MAPS.—Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.

22. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.—

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of Intelligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.

23. THE DEPARTMENT G-2 will:

a. Keep the Commanding General and all interested staff officers informed regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it.

b. Insure that counterintelligence measures are adequately provided for and adhered to.

c. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Department Provost Marshal, with a view to:

(1) Furnishing the Department Provost Marshal with all information gained through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Department Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

d. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

[16] e. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

24. G-2 FORMS.—

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.

b. Periodic Reports, see page 1, Inclosure No. 5. For combat Air Force see page 2, Inclosure No. 5.

SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. SUPPLY (See paragraphs 75-80, FM 100-10).—

a. SUPPLY AREAS.—

(1) Schofield Supply area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a general line extending LAE O KAOIO—PUU KAAUMAKUA—KIPAPA STREAM—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9—91.0)—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION—PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.

(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU and outlying islands.

b. CLASS I SUPPLIES (rations); including QMC class II and IV:

Schofield Supply Area—Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONOLULU.

(1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new supply area as warranted by the situation.

(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the organization is stationed (copy to Dept. QM) by 0800 daily.

(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be set up and copies furnished Dept. QM and G-4, H. H. D.

(4) A standard menu ration is established for Alert No. 3.

c. CLASS III SUPPLIES.—

(1) All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the authorized allowance of gasoline containers filled. Replenishment will be made in the following manner:

(a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS will establish DPs at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS area.

(b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supply Area, except MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE, will establish DPs at their posts for the supply of all units operating in this area. MALAKOLE, BELLOWS

FIELD and KANEOHE will establish a DP at their respective posts for the supply [17] of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of their own post.

(c) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline will be supplied from the DP nearest the unit, regardless of supply area.

(d) Normally, the supply of gasoline from DPs will be by 5 and 10 gallon drums, rather than filling individual trucks.

(e) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the DP. Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers.

(f) 11th Tank Company will draw aviation gasoline from the nearest Air Corps Station.

(g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner. Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be made through Department Headquarters.

(h) Class III supplies on outlying islands will be the responsibility of the District Commanders.

d. CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES (except Quartermaster Corps).—

(1) *Medical Supply*:

Schofield Supply Area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(2) *Signal Supply* (except Signal Corps aircraft radio):

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAFTER.

(3) *Signal Supply*—aircraft radio only:

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD.

(4) *Chemical Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(5) *Engineer Supplies*—all supply areas—Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9-04.2). Credits at DP's to major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders concerned.

(6) *Water Supply*: Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical officer before use except from post and CITY of HONOLULU water systems.

(7) *Air Corps Supply*: All supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD and WHEELER FIELD Branch, when so designated, for types of services announced by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

(8) *Ordnance Supply* (other than ammunition Class V).—

Schofield Supply area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply area—(General Storage and Shop) Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, HONOLULU.

[18] e. CLASS V SUPPLIES:

(1) Schofield Supply Area—all types—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS (See (3) below).

(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.)

(3) Aircraft pyrotechnics and bombs, 8-inch railway and 240mm ammunition and chemical ammunition (other than grenades)—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot—all supply areas.

(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only 1/5 of the "initial issue" and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.

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Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3", 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition—all types.
Other small arms ammunition.

All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the "initial issue" will be drawn.

(7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held available in bomb storage areas.

(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.

f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

26. EVACUATION.—

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) North Sector Division by 24 Medical Bn. to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(2) South Sector Division by 25 Medical Bn. to Tripler General Hospital except for troops in the area west of the line: PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL—EWA JUNCTION. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(3) *Hawaiian Air Force.*—

(a) HICKAM FIELD, by the Surgeon, HICKAM FIELD to Station Hospital, HICKAM FIELD or Tripler General Hospital. [19] Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, will be attached as needed.

(b) WHEELER FIELD and HALEIWA Landing Field, by Surgeon WHEELER FIELD to Station Hospital Schofield. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies will be attached as needed.

(c) BELLOWS FIELD, by Surgeon, BELLOWS FIELD to Tripler General Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, as needed.

(d) Air fields on outlying islands, by vehicle to local hospital or by air to Tripler General Hospital or Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Collection by respective medical detachment. Details of evacuation to be arranged by the responsible commanders for each field.

(e) HCAC, by the Surgeon, HCAC (collection by respective medical detachments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance company to be attached to the command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line: PEARL HARBOR Channel—EWA Junction—LAE O KAOIO Point to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Evacuation from the area south and east of this line to Tripler General Hospital.

(f) KAUAI District, MAUI District and HAWAII District to local hospitals as directed by District Commanders under provisions of letter, this headquarters to each District Commander, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Medical Service."

(g) Elements not included elsewhere: North Sector by 24th Medical Bn., on call; South Sector by 25th Medical Bn., on call.

b. ANIMALS:

(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to Hawaiian Pack Train.

(2) South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER, by provisional Veterinary Detachment, attached to units having animals.

c. SALVAGE: To supply points designated in paragraph 25 above for services indicated.

d. PRISONERS OF WAR.—

(1) Collecting Points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEHOE BAY. To be established and operated by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals, Infantry Divisions.

(2) Prisoner of War Inclosures—Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.

27. TRAFFIC.—

The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.—

a. Motor pools will be established by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. These pools will [20] consist of all available tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to a minimum administrative requirements.

b. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the exception. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.

c. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool, showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position. See paragraph 9 above.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into position which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men which can be moved.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Walter C. Phillips,
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Wm. E. Donegan,
WM. E. DONEGAN,
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Asst. Chief of Staff. G-3.

Inclosures:

- No. 1—Map, Communications Installations.
- No. 2—Map, Bridges and Police Districts.
- No. 3—Map, Electric Installations.
- No. 4—Estimate of Enemy Situation.
- No. 5—Periodic Intelligence Report Forms.
- No. 6—Allowances of Ammunition.
- No. 7—Unit of Fire.
- No. 8—Load of Aircraft Ammunition.

Inclosure No. 1

(Inclosure No. 1 is a map of Oahu showing Communications Installations as of July 7, 1941. This map is reproduced as Item No. 1 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

(Inclosure No. 2, in part, is a map of Oahu showing Police Districts, Railroad Bridges and Highway Bridges. This map is reproduced as Item No. 2 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

Inclosure No. 2

RAILROAD BRIDGES

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
1	0.9 mi. W of Honolulu.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	4. 0'	100'
2	1.0 mi. W. of Honolulu.....	Concrete pile.....	Concrete.....	6. 0'	32'
3	1.9 mi. W of Honolulu.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	4. 5'	160'
4	2.4 mi. W of Honolulu.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	5. 0'	160'
5	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	5. 0'	32'
6	2.6 mi. W of Honolulu.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	5. 0'	12'
9	0.7 mi. E of Alea.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	4. 3'	208'
10	0.2 mi. W of Alea.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	4. 5'	48'
11	0.3 mi. E of Kalaniao.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	4. 0'	96'
12	0.2 mi. E of Kalaniao.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	3. 5'	28'
13	0.4 mi. W of Kalaniao.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	4. 0'	112'
14	Waiau Station.....	Timber pile.....	Timber.....	3. 5'	27'
15	0.2 mi. W of Waiau.....	Timber pile.....	Timber.....	1. 5'	32'
16	0.3 mi. W of Waiau.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	2. 0'	32'
17	0.4 mi. W of Waiau.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	6. 0'	32'
18	0.3 mi. W of Pearl City.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	5. 6'	160'
19	0.8 mi. W of Pearl City.....	Concrete pile.....	Timber.....	3. 0'	16'
20	Waipahu.....	Timber Trestle.....	Timber.....	6. 5'	63'
29	1.3 mi. W of Gilbert.....	Timber Trestle.....	Timber.....	10. 6'	64'
36	2.2 mi. S of Nanakuli.....	Timber Trestle.....	Timber.....	12. 5'	64'
40	0.6 mi. S of Nanakuli.....	Timber Trestle.....	Timber.....	10. 3'	96'
42	1.0 mi. N of Nanakuli.....	Timber Trestle.....	Timber.....	8. 5'	64'
43	2.5 mi. S of Waianae.....	Timber Trestle.....	Timber.....	7. 0'	64'
44	1.1 mi. S of Waianae.....	Timber Trestle.....	Timber.....	12. 0'	96'

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RAILROAD BRIDGES—Continued

Number	Location	Type		Height	Span
		Bents	Girders		
47	0.5 mi. N of Waiānae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	96'
50	3.3 mi. N of Waiānae	Timber pile	Timber	7.0'	64'
51	3.4 mi. N of Waiānae	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.6'	80'
57	0.2 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.8'	62'
58	0.1 mi. S of Makua	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.5'	114'
74	0.7 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	8.0'	80'
75	0.5 mi. W of Mokuleia	Concrete pile	Timber	9.2'	112'
77	0.6 mi. W of Waiālua	Concrete pile	Timber	7.0'	448'
78	Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	8.0'	224'
81	2.1 mi. N of Haleiwa	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	98'
84	0.7 mi. S of Waimea	Concrete pile	Timber	20.0'	272'
87	0.7 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	15.0'	60'
88	1.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	13.0'	90'
89	2.2 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	20.0'	96'
90	2.9 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	14.0'	75'
92	4.0 mi. N of Waimea	Timber Trestle	Timber	10.5'	128'
101	0.6 mi. N of Waipahu	Concrete arch	Timber	23.5'	98'
102	2.0 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	144'
103	4.1 mi. N of Waipahu	Wood Trestle	Timber	11.0'	64'
104	3.4 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	22.0'	224'
105	3.3 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30.0'	160'
106	2.7 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	30.0'	320'
107	0.6 mi. S of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	75.0'	272'
108	0.4 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	115.0'	608'
109	2.0 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	107.0'	448'
110	2.3 mi. N of Wahiawa	Wood Trestle	Timber	55.0'	272'
111	0.2 mi. N of Brodie Junction	Wood Trestle	Timber	13.0'	112'

HIGHWAY BRIDGES—PRIORITY

Number	Location	Coordinates
52	Kam Highway over Walawa Stream	01. 95-84. 12
49	Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream	98. 4 -87. 8
17	Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 46-95. 68
16	Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	96. 37-96. 75
9	Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa	87. 98-07. 98
74	Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea	92. 82-13. 52
15	Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch	95. 27-88. 92
45	Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks	93. 72-86. 96
13	Kam Highway over Opaeula (Twin Bridges) at Waiālua	87. 78-06. 33
127	Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head)	32. 45-70. 22
5	Between Waiālua Mill and Thompson Corner	86. 06-04. 57
6	Between Waiālua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 12-05. 76
7	Between Waiālua Mill and Haleiwa	86. 52-06. 20
61	Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon	11. 76-76. 55
99	Kam Highway at Kahana Bay	14. 34-03. 25
160	East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir	97. 79-95. 34
161	Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu	98. 56-82. 46
57	New Kam Highway over Halawa Stream S. of Aiea	06. 82-50. 30
109	Kam Highway at Heela fish pond	21. 04-89. 11

Inclosure No. 3

(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of Oahu showing Electric Installations and Generating Plants. This map is reproduced as Item No. 3 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

Inclosure No. 4

Title
Place
Date and hour

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
- b. Enemy land operations.
 - (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
 - (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
 - (3) Sabotage.
 - (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.

2. CONCLUSIONS.

- a. Enemy capabilities.—An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.
- (b) (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
- (2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

Chief of section.

Inclosure No. 5

From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)
Issuing unit
Place
Date and hour of issue

PERIODIC REPORTS

No. -----

Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.)

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

- a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements).—Location and nature.
- b. Defensive organization.—Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.
- c. Units in contact.—Composition of units, with identificationis if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
- d. Artillery.—Location and calibers.
- e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.—Locaton, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.
- f. Supply and evacuation establishments.—Location and nature.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

- a. General summary—action of enemy forces as a whole.
- b. Operations of component elements.
 - (1) Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
 - (2) Enemy Land Operations.
 - (a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications).
 - (b) Operations of Land Components.
 1. Antiaircraft artillery.
 2. Antitank units.
 3. Armored forces.
 4. Artillery.
 5. Aviation, combat.
 6. Aviation, observation.
 7. Parachute Troops.
 8. Cavalry.
 9. Chemical warfare.
 10. Engineers.
 11. Infantry.
 12. Tanks.
 13. Administrative elements.

- c. Sabotage.
- d. Miscellaneous.—Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in b above.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

2504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
 - b. Morale.
 - c. Supply and equipment.
 - d. Terrain not under our control.
 - e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation—observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
 - f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
 - g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

AC of S, G-2.

Form G

INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE IN AVIATION UNITS

A form for

Periodic Intelligence Report

for

Air Combat Units

(Adapted to telegraph printer transmission)

Periodic Intelligence Report

From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)
Issuing unit
Place of issue
Date and hour of issue

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES AIR.—(Appropriate resume.)
2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES GROUND.—(Appropriate resume.)
3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES NAVAL.—(Appropriate resume.)
4. OBJECTIVE FOLDERS DATA.—(Additions or changes giving serial number of folder in each case.)
5. IDENTIFICATIONS.—(Additions or changes in enemy units.)
6. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.—(Brief estimate.)
7. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—(list in priority of their probable adoption or, if no priority, so state.)
8. MISCELLANEOUS.—(Any items not covered by above.)

NOTE.—Information contained in previous intelligence reports will not be repeated; only changes or additions thereto. If no change has occurred under a given heading, the number of the paragraph only will be transmitted.

Inclosure No. 6.

ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT) FOR INITIAL ISSUE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon			
		A P	Ball	Tracer	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903.....	CA.....	25	140	20	185
	Eng.....		40		40
	FA.....		32	8	40
	Inf.....	16	112	32	160
	(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40
	QM.....		40		40
	Sig.....		25		25
	Others.....	30	105	15	150
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1.....	Eng.....	48	80	24	152
	Inf.....	24	102	46	232
	(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle Plat.).....	4	28	8	40
	Ord.....		64	16	80
	Sig.....		40		40
	MP.....		48		48
	Others.....	30	105	15	150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	CWS.....		460	120	580
	CA.....	60	560	60	680
	FA.....	960		240	1200
	Inf.....	60	992	120	1,172
	Ord.....		240	60	300
	QM.....	30	30	20	80
	Others.....	150	525	75	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4).....	Eng.....	250	1,500	250	2,000
	Inf.....	500	3,500	1,000	5,000
	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	4,800		1,200	6,000
Machine gun, cal. .30, WC (M1917A1).....	CA.....	7,200		1,800	9,000
	(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.).....	3,600		900	4,500
	Eng.....	250	1,500	250	2,000
	Inf.....	675	4,725	1,350	6,750
	Others.....	600	2,100	300	3,000
Pistol, cal. .45.....	CWS, CA, Eng., Inf.....		28		28
	FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others.....		21		21
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....	Sig. (motorcycles).....		340		340
	Sig. (other than motorcycles).....		250		250
	MP.....		440	110	550
	Others.....		240	60	300
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA).....	CA.....	5,760		1,440	7,200
	(AW Bn.).....				
	CA (except AW Bn.).....	2,880		720	3,600
	Others.....	2,880		720	3,600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	FA.....	600		150	750
	Inf.....	960		240	1,200
	Tanks or Armd. Cars.....	1,568		392	1,960
Shotgun.....	All.....				25
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.).....	Inf.....				150
Signals, ground (asstd.).....	Inf.....				25
	Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.).....				5
	Sig. (Opn. or Tri. Div. Co.).....				30
Lights, Very signal (assorted).....	All.....				24
37mm gun, M1916.....				240	240
37mm gun, Antitank (M3).....	FA.....	200			200
	Inf.....	180		20	200
37mm gun, Antiaircraft.....	CA.....	180		1,620	1,800
60mm Mortar.....	Inf.....			120	120
81mm, or 3" Trench Mortar.....	Inf.....		Light.....	132	150
			Heavy.....	18	
75mm gun, Truck-D.....	All.....				#459
75mm gun, Antitank.....	FA.....				#144
105mm How.....	FA.....				#205
155mm How.....	FA.....				#117

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

2506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT) FOR INITIAL ISSUE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT—Continued

Weapon	Arm or service	No. of rds. per weapon			
		AP	Ball	Tracer	Total
3" AA mobile.....	CA.....	15	-----	285	300
90mm AA mobile.....	CA.....	12	-----	238	250
3" AA fixed.....	CA.....	-----	-----	300	300
155mm gun, M1918M1.....	Alt.....	-----	-----	100	100
240mm How. M1918.....	FA.....	-----	-----	60	60
8" Ry. Gun.....	CA.....	85	-----	-----	85
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY					
3" gun, M1903.....	-----	-----	-----	505	505
6" gun.....	-----	1,000	-----	-----	1,000
8" gun.....	-----	350	-----	200	550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage).....	-----	335	-----	-----	335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage).....	-----	275	-----	-----	275
12" Mortar.....	-----	300	-----	-----	300
14" gun.....	-----	280	-----	-----	280
16" gun.....	-----	250	-----	-----	250

Inclosure No. 7

UNIT OF FIRE (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT)—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

Weapon	No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire				
	AP	Ball	Tracer	HE	Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903.....	30	105	15	-----	150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30.....	150	525	75	-----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle).....	150	525	75	-----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle).....	600	-----	150	-----	750
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1).....	600	2,100	300	-----	3,000
Pistol, cal. .45.....	-----	20	-----	-----	20
Submachine gun, cal. .45.....	-----	160	40	-----	200
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB.....	720	-----	180	-----	900
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries).....	1,920	-----	480	-----	2,400
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries).....	960	-----	240	-----	1,200
Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.).....	-----	-----	-----	-----	180
Projector, signal ground (assorted).....	-----	-----	-----	-----	25
Pistol, Very, MkIII.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	24
37mm gun, M1916.....	-----	-----	-----	120	120
37mm gun, antitank, M3.....	84	-----	-----	36	120
37mm gun, antiaircraft.....	60	-----	-----	540	600
60mm Mortar.....	-----	-----	-----	400	400
81mm Mortar.....	-----	-----	Light.....	234	300
-----	-----	-----	Heavy.....	66	-----
3" Trench Mortar.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	300
75mm Field Gun.....	-----	-----	Super.....	36	300
-----	-----	-----	Normal.....	150	-----
-----	-----	-----	Reduced.....	114	-----
75mm gun, antitank.....	111	-----	-----	39	150
105mm How.....	-----	-----	-----	225	225
155mm How. M1918.....	-----	-----	-----	180	180
3" AA gun, mobile.....	15	-----	-----	285	300
90mm AA gun, mobile.....	12	-----	-----	238	250
3" AA gun, fixed.....	-----	-----	-----	300	300
155mm gun, M1918 M1.....	112	-----	-----	38	150
240mm How. M1918.....	-----	-----	-----	60	60
8" Ry Gun.....	85	-----	-----	-----	85
4" Chemical Mortar.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	300
4.2" Chemical Mortar.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	300

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

Inclosure No. 8

LOAD OF AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION PER AIRPLANE

Type airplane Item.....	Bombers			Pursuit			OBS. (C&D)
	Hv. (B17D)	Med. (B-18)	Lt. (A20A)	(P-40)	(P36A)	(P-26)	1-engine (O-47)
Ctg. AP Cal 30.....							
Ctg. ball Cal 30.....	480	1,280	1,920	1,600	400	800	640
Ctg. tr Cal 30.....	120	320	480	400	100	200	160
Total Cal 30#.....	600	1,600	2,400	2,000	500	1,000	800
Ctg. AP Cal 50.....	60			20	10		
Ctg. ball Cal 50.....	900			300	150		
Ctg. tr Cal 50.....	240			80	40		
Total Cal 50#.....	1,200			400	200		
BOMBS							
Bomb frag. 30# and.....			40			10	
Bomb Demo. 100# or.....	20	32	12				
Bomb Demo. 300# or.....	14	14	4				
Bomb Demo. 500-600# or.....	8	6	2				
Bomb Demo. 1,000-1,100# or.....	6	4	1				
Bomb Demo. 2,000#.....	4	2					
PYROTECHNICS							
Bomb Photoflash.....	14	14					14
Flare M26 ¹	3	3	1				1
Flare M9.....	6	6	6				5
Sig. AC Asstd.....	20	20	20				20
Sig. Drift.....	10	7					

¹ For Reconnaissance squadrons only.² Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.

[CORRECTED COPY]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control. (Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE) added to SOP HD.)

To: Distribution: Special, and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. The attention of all commanders is directed to provisions of Paragraphs 27 and 9f, SOP HD, 5 November 1941, repeated below:

"27. Traffic: The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

"9. f. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others. *Standard blackout light or approved modifications are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission.* On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic."

2. The following additional instructions are published for the strict compliance of all troops in this Department:

Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE), SOP HD.

(1) The civil police (special and regular) and the Military Police will have COMPLETE and EXCLUSIVE control of traffic on the island of OAHU with the following exceptions:

a. Guards on entrances to vital installations operating under special instructions.

b. In case of accidents or other emergencies.

(2) Route markers are authorized for tactical or convoy movements.

(3) Except in case of military necessity and except as otherwise hereinafter provided, the present civil regulations relating to traffic shall remain in force.

(4) Only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and

2508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

0600 (6:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M.), tactical movements excepted. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 P. M. to 6:00 A. M.) shall have standard blackout, or blue lights using Moss Blackout Blue Paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent.

(5) All modified lights must conform to a standard pattern and be visible for a distance of not to exceed 100 feet.

(6) The Military Police assisted by the civil police, will approve and check modified blackout lights and will not permit modified lights to be used that do not conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air. Special instructions and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal.

(7) Persons operating vehicles at night without approved blackout lights will be arrested promptly.

(8) Parking is prohibited on the following streets in Honolulu:

School Street
Lusitania Street
Beretania Street
King Street
Waiialae Street
Dillingham Boulevard
Middle Street

Nuuanu Avenue
Alapai Street between Lusitania and Beretania
Iwilei Road between King and railroad tracks
Queen Street on mauka side between Iwilei Road and Fort Street

(9) During air raids all vehicles are prohibited from operating, except the following:

a. Military vehicles on a military mission.

b. Civilian police cars.

c. Certain civilian vehicles specifically authorized by the Provost Marshal. All other operators will halt their vehicles off the main roads or streets where they will remain until authorized to be moved by the police (civil or military) or until ALL CLEAR is given.

(10) Immediate action will be taken by all commanders to insure that their personnel are informed of the above contents.

(11) The cooperation of all personnel, civil and military, is directed.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., plus 500 for file w/SOP.

[CORRECTED COPY]

(Please destroy all previous copies)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

Forward Echelon,
0500 17 December 1941.

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control (Corrections to Par 9 f and 9 h (tentative) SOP-HD)

To: Distribution, Special, plus one to each holder of SOP-HD and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Reference letter, HHD, Corrected copy, subject "Coordination of traffic control", dated 10 December 1941, SOP-HD is further corrected as follows:

a. "9. f. Motor vehicles operating at night at the discretion of local commanders, will be:

"(1) in convoy with Standard Blackout lights or *approved modifications* with tail light shielded or painted all blue, on all vehicles, or,

"(2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout lights or *approved modifications* on the leading vehicle and a tail light shielded or painted all blue on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others.

"(3) Standard blackout lights or approved modifications are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission.

"(4) On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

"(5) All motor vehicles not having standard blackout lighting equipment shall have modified lights conforming to the following specifications:

"Headlights to be painted all black with the exception of a two and one-half inch circle, slightly below the center of the headlight lens. This circle will be painted with Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or equivalent. Tail lights will be shielded or painted all blue. Sufficient coats of the Blackout Blue paint will be used to insure that the "modified lights" conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air."

b. Par 9 h (tentative), sup-par 4, changed to read as follows:

"(4) only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 0600 (6:00 PM and 6:00 AM), tactical movements except. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 PM to 6:00 AM) shall have standard blackout lights or "approved modifications" using Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent and with tail light shielded or painted all blue."

c. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (5) deleted.

d. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (6) delete the last sentence which reads as follows: "Special instruction and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal."

2. The above corrections will be made on all copies of the corrected SOP-HD (see corrected copy of letter, same subject, HHD, dated 10 Dec 1941).

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

J. LAWTON COLLINS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Wm. Donegan
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941.

Subject: Air Raid Alarm Instructions. (Paragraph 11b, c, d, e and f (TENTATIVE) added to SOP HD.)

To: Distribution Special, Plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Paragraph 11, SOP HD, is repeated below and changed by inserting paragraph a and adding paragraphs b, c, d, e and f.

"11. Installations and Alarm System.—a. All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith."

b. (1) A general Air Raid Alarm will be started by sounding a long blast on the siren in the Aloha Tower. Orders for such Air Raid Alarm will be given only by the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center by direct communication with the Navy Detail at the Aloha Tower.

(2) This alarm will immediately be taken up by units, small groups, patrols and individuals who will immediately sound the alarm by a continuous blast on their alarm equipment until it is picked up and relayed by adjacent groups. Usually one (1) minute duration should be sufficient.

(3) Alarm equipment is listed below and will be used for no other purpose except in connection with Air Raid Alarm and recall therefrom or All Clear Signals.

- (a) Siren on Aloha Tower.
- (b) Stewart type Klaxon Horn.
- (c) Ambulance sirens.
- (d) Fire truck sirens.
- (e) Police sirens.
- (f) All other sirens not covered above.

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c. The "Recall from Air Raid Alarm" or "All Clear Signal" will be relayed by the alarm equipment indicated above, starting with the siren on the Aloha Tower, on instructions from the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center. The signal will be "broken short blasts" repeated until relayed by adjacent units.

d. In addition to the above signals, Air Raid Alarms and "All Clear" instructions will be announced over teletype networks, relayed over tactical communication nets, and announced over KGNB and KGU.

e. The above Air Raid Alarm signals will not be given except as indicated above unless units are actually attacked by enemy aircraft.

f. The above Air Raid Alarms and All Clear Signals will be relayed to the District Commanders of the outlying islands by the Department Signal Officer.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

Wm. Donegan,
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., 500 for file w/SOP.

[Exhibit D]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

[Extract]

• 3. *Method of coordination.* The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b.

18. *Navy.* The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

i. Distant reconnaissance.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCE-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding,
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.

(Signed) C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commandant,
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

True Extract Copy:

O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit E]

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT;
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 March 1941.

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS:—To be included as a part of Annex No. VII, HCF-39, (14-ND-JCD 13) RCT, Joint Security Measures for the protection of the PACIFIC FLEET and PEARL HARBOR BASE, (now in preparation).

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

Approved: 21 March, 1941

(sgd) C. C. Bloch
C. C. BLOCH
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant

(sgd) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

True Copy: O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit F]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CHIEF OF STAFF

War Department, Washington DC

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with navy

SHORT

Enc sec by
Lt Jos Engelbertz SC
5:40 P 27 Nov 41

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O M CUTLER,
Lt Col Infantry

2512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Exhibit G]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

114 War Kr 189 WD PRTY
C G

Signature and Title

WASHN, D. C., 842 Nov 28, 1941.

Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

482 28th critical situation demands that all precaution be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid se thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

ADAMS

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt col Infantry

[Exhibit H]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Extract—MID-SR 30-45]

3. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY. a. (1) By direction of the President, investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of the Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. In accordance with this directive, the War Department assumes responsibility for the investigation of officers, enlisted men, and civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. Similar personnel of the naval establishment is covered by Naval Intelligence. The investigation of other civilians suspected of subversive activities, except in certain overseas possessions, is the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, hereinafter referred to as the F. B. I.

(2) Cooperation with the agencies of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. will be effected by appropriate echelons of our CS system, to the end that full protection may be obtained without duplication of effort.

b. Corps Area and Department Commanders are charged with the supervision of countersubversive operations, in accordance commands, including those of exempted stations and tactical units temporarily present, except the activities coordinated by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

True Extract Copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit I]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

(date)

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority

/sgd/Thomas H. Green,
THOMAS H. GREEN,
Lt. Col. J. A. G. D.,
Department Judge Advocate.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of war department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop as regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continued to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory stop pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop in this connection comma at the instigation of this Headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June Thirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordinance which permits The Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and County of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of National Defense stop the authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters

SHORT

Enc Sec by
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
Lt Jos Engelbertz SC
2:45 P 29 Nov 41
True copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt Col Infantry

2514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Exhibit J]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER

Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December. 1941.

In reply refer to:

Sig.

Subject: Detector Operation.

To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hour before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. until 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

W. H. MURPHY,
Lt. Col, Sig C.

True Copy:

O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

[Exhibit K]

SECRET

HICKAM FIELD, T. H.,
20 December 1941.

AFFIDAVIT

I, JAMES A MOLLISON, certify that during the period 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

JAS. A. MOLLISON,
*Lt. Col., A. C.,
H. A. F. C/S.*

True Copy:

O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

[Exhibit L]

CERTIFICATE

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral Kimmel: McMorris what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu.

Captain McMorris: I should say *none* Admiral.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.

True Copy:

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

[Exhibit M]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

NOVEMBER 26, 1941.

RCA 831 US GOVT

WASHINGTON, DC Nov 26 1941 L149P

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, TH.*Four six five twenty six*

Reference two B Dash Twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline Group Jaluit in the Marshall Group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines Comma airfields Comma aircraft Comma guns Comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great Comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake Then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur Comma Admiral Hart Comma Admiral Kimmel Comma the chief of naval operations Comma and the War Department Stop *Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.*

ADAMS

Decoded by: Lt. G E Haven SC, 147A November 27, 1941.

True copy:

O. M. Cutler,

O. M. CUTLER,

Lt. Col., Infantry.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 465—26th

[Exhibit N]

(Copy)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

/s/ CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.
Adjutant.

Approved for Transmission:

/s/ O. M. McDole,
Major A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,

Washington, D. C.

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours stop One of B twenty fours Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam Field this date short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and acces-

2516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

sories semicolon for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammunition is available stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed subject plane has no armor plate installation stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic signed Martin HAF 141 C

SHORT.

Enc sec by Lt. G. E. Haven, S. C. 225P 5 Dec/41

A True Copy

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2d Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit O]

20 DECEMBER 1941.

CERTIFICATE

On the morning of 7 December, 1941, the 18th Wing had 6 B-17s in commission, with 6 B-17s out of commission for maintenance. Of the 8 B-17s destroyed during the attack, 4 were from those stationed at Hickam Field, 2 from those in commission and 2 from those out of commission. The other 4 were lost while attempting to land upon arrival from the Mainland. These B-17s arrived at Hickam Field between 8:00 A. M. and 8:20 A. M., 7 December, 1941. These planes took off from Hamilton Field, California in two squadrons, one at 9:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (12:30 A. M. December 7, Eastern time) and the other at 10:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (1:30 A. M. Eastern time).

Of the 8 B-17s which arrived safely from the mainland, none had sufficient gasoline to permit dispatching them on missions, nor were they equipped with ammunition for these defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning all gun positions even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition.

The B-24 which arrived at Hickam Field on 5th December, 1941, previous to the attack, had insufficient armament for combat, only 1 .30 cal. and twin .50 cal. guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.

True Copy

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

[Exhibit P]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

1549Ws Washington D C 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P
C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock 251P Dec. 7, 1941

Code Message No. 529 7th

True Copy

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

[Exhibit Q]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

P 3 war L 54 WD 1 extra urgent

WASHINGTON DC 219P Dec 9 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received

COLTON
Acting.

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910AM Dec 9 1941

True Copy

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt Col Infantry.

[Exhibit R]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, D. C.

Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General HQ HAW dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

SHORT

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 380-5).

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)—2892 Honolulu 10-31-41 10M. [72B]

[Exhibit S]

Copy

SECRET

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. Sunday, Decem-

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ber 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A. M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers. Further the deponent sayeth not.

/s/ GROVER C. WHITE, JR.,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

/s/ ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt 1cl, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

JOSEPH P. McDONALD,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADAM R. HUGGINS,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps.
Summary Court.

True copy:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

STATEMENT OF LIEUT. KERMIT A. TYLER

20 DECEMBER 1941.

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interception Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was one South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance North of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0720 the operator at the Opana RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field Bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian Music throughout the night that coincidentally B-17s are apt to come in using the station for radio-direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be a navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C. Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

(s) Kermit A. Tyler,
KERMIT A. TYLER,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

True copy.

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS 53RD COAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AA),
OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December 1941.

Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 December 1941.

To: General Short.

1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1, S. O. P., N. C. A. C., 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun Batteries. All anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.

2. a. Fort Weaver. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (AA).

Alerted 0810
Ready to fire 0813
Engaged enemy at 0814
Amm. fired: 407—.30 Cal. ball.
117—.30 Cal. A. P.
53—.30 Cal. Tracer.
12--Pistol.

South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men.

Battery G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed battery at Fort Weaver.

Alerted at 0810
Ready to fire 0830
Engaged enemy 0830

2520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Fired 30 rds—3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:40 A. M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy planes. Casualties—One (1) Officer dead—Killed while proceeding through Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.

(Basic: Ltr., Hq. 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), dated 20 December 1941. Subject: "Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Dec 1941".)

Battery F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed Battery Closson, Fort Kamehameha, T. H.

Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across Pearl Harbor Entrance.

Ready to fire 0855

Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920

Amm. fired: 27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3.

Approximately 400 rds .30 Cal. ball.

Approximately 150 rds .30 Cal. A. P.

Battery G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point.

Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kamehameha.

Ready to fire 1030

Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030

Amm. Fired: Approximately 50 rds of .30 Cal. ball.

Battery H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort Weaver.

Alerted 0830

Ready to fire 1145

Engaged Enemy 2100

Amm. fired: 40 rds—.50 Cal. ball.

40 rds—.50 Cal. A. P.

30 rds—.50 Cal. Tracer

Marine detachment: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Operations were in cooperation with South Group although not tactically assigned.

Alerted 0800

Ready to fire 0810

Engaged Enemy 0810

Amm. fired: Approximately 8000 rds of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.

Approximately 450 rds of 20 mm A. A.

This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4 engined bomber by causing enemy plane firing on it's tail to pull out and cease it's attack. Much shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.

b. 98th Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks.

Alerted at 0800

The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.

1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the following time:

B—98: 0955

D—98: 1000

C—98: 1030

Battery M 64th, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler Field, and was ready for action at 1155.

2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA). This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the following times:

F—98: 1315

G—98: 1315

H—98: 1330

c. Camp Malakole 251st C. A. (AA). All units were alerted at 0805 when fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

1st Battalion 251st C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action as follows:

B—251: at West Loch, 1145

C—251: Ewa Beach, 1145

D—251: South of Ewa, 1145

2nd Battalion 251st C. A. (AA), was in position as follows:

E—251: Navy Yard

F—251: Navy Recreation Area

G—251: Tank Farm

H—251: Navy Yard

At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one plane. 100 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.

d. Fort Kamehameha. Battery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds of .30 Cal. at one enemy plane offshore at 0835.

e. Sand Island. The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.

f. Fort Shafter.

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—3,000 .30 Cal.

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0900 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—1000 .30 Cal.

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons batteries of the 64th C. A. (AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:

B—64: at Aiea, 1000

C—64: at Aliamanu, 1030

D—64: South of Aliamanu, 1100

F—64: at Pearl City, 1105

G—64: See Par. 2 a, above.

H—64: See Par. 2 a, above.

I—64: at Aliamanu

K—64: at Hickam Field

L—64: at Hickam Field.

M—64: See Par. 2 b, above.

All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 1145. Ammunition expended as follows:

3", 23 rds.

.50 Cal., 2361 rds.

.30 Cal., 2821 rds.

g. Fort Barrette. Battery H, 97 C. A. (AA), was stationed at Fort Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire.

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245.

4. *Ammunition.* Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the Brigade had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition, the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.

C. K. Wing

C. K. WING,

Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Commanding.

2522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Exhibit T]

Status of aircraft of 7 December 1941 before attack

HICKAM FIELD

Name	Total	Out	In
A-20 A	13	7	6
B-17 D	12	6	6
B-18	32	12	20
B-12 A	2	2	0
O-47 B	1	1	0
BT 2 BR	2	0	2
BT-2 CR	1	0	1
C-33	2	0	2
A-12	3	1	2
P-26 A	2	2	0
P-26 B	1	1	0
B-24	1	1	0
	72	33	39

BELLOWS FIELD

O-47 B	10	6	4
O-49	3	1	2

WHEELER FIELD

P40 C	13	4	9	64
P40 B	87	32	55	20
P 36 A	44	24		7-10
P 28A	8-14	1-4		3
P 26B	6	3		1
B 18	1	0		1
B 12	3	2		3
AT 6	4	1		3
OA 9	3	0		1
O 47B	1	0		2
A 12A	2	0		1
OA 8	1	0		0
BT 2	2	2		

Type	Damaged in raid	Percent of damage
HICKAM FIELD:		
A-20	2	18
B-17	10	40
B-18	21	65
B-24	1	100
WHEELER FIELD:		
P-40	67	65
P-36	21	55
BELLOWS FIELD:		
Q-47	4	40
Q-49	2	66

A true copy
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt. F. A.

JAMES A. MOLLISON
Lt. Col. A. C.

Aircraft status as of 1800, 30 December 1941

	B-17	B-18	A-20	P 40	P-36	O-47
In Commission	31	9	10	40	21	5
1st Echelon	6	5		2	3	2
2nd Echelon				3		
3rd Echelon	2			8	6	
Total	39	14	10	53	30	7

12 B-17 on hand Hickam 0600-7 Dec.

1 29 B-17s arrived from the Mainland from 7 Dec. to 20 Dec. inclusive.

A true copy

Edward von Geldern

EDWARD VON GELDERN

2nd Lt. F. A.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,

Lt. Col. A. C.

[Exhibit U]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.,

Forward Echelon, 21 December 1941.

MEMORANDUM TO LIEUT COL. KENDALL J. FIELDER.

The following report of planes shot down, crashing or otherwise destroyed in the attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941, is submitted for your information. All of these losses have as yet not been verified, and it is very likely that some of the reports from different sources will be in reference to the same plane. Verifications are being received daily:

Time	Source	Details	Remarks	Total
0800-1000	6 officers from emergency landing field at Haleiwa.	Accounted for 10 planes	Some of these may appear in other reports.	10
	CO Mil District of Kauai.	1 plane crashed off North shore, 1 wrecked on Niihau.	Verified	2
	Civilian report	1 plane crashed in Gulch, rear Aiea Hgts.	Verified	1
	Group of officers on fishing trip.	3 planes crashing in Honolulu Harbor.	Verified	3
0940	Capt. Ebby, "B" Btry 55th C. A. C.	2 planes destroyed by machine-gun fire.	Verified	2
1922-1130	Btry "F", 55 CAC	2 planes	0922 report not verified, 1130 rpt verid.	2
0805	251st C. A. C	1 plane, 200 yds. off Malikoili	Verified	1
1020	Btry "H" 97th CAC	1 plane crashed flaming 2 mi. SW Ft. Barrette.	Verified	1
0855	98th C. A. C	1 plane shot down near Wahiawa	Verified	1
0630	Hq. Btry 15th CAC	1 plane crashed in Ord shops at Ft. Kam.	Verified	1
1100	35th Infantry	Observed 1 plane crash in sea SW Barbers Pt.	Verified	1
	27th Infantry	Observed 1 plane crash in cane field nr Aiea.	Not verf	1
	298th Inf	1 plane shot down over Bellows Fld. fell in sea.	Verified	1
	24th Division	1 plane down at Brody Camp #4:1 nr Kaawa.	Verified	2
	Haw. Air Force	1 plane at Ft Weaver 1 at Wheeler Field, 1 at Hickam Field, 1 at Pearl Harbor, 1 at Ft Barrette, 1 at Ewa. Witnessed 1 shot down back of Naval Hospital.	2 doubtful	7
	Navy	1 plane by AA at Beckoning Pt, 1 on deck of a ship.	Verified	2
	Total			38

The Navy reports are not available.

T. H. DAVIES,

Lt. Col., Inf, Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.

REMARKS: While some of the planes enumerated are undoubtedly duplications it is believed that a minimum of at least 29 enemy planes were shot down.

KENDALL J. FIELDER,

Lt. Col., G. S. C., A. C. of S., G-2.

2524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Exhibit V]

[SECRET]

A true copy
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt. F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941

In reply refer to
Engr. 660

General GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.

Since assuming command I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should be extremely cordial.

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

- (1) Cooperation with the Navy.
- (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
- (3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
- (4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
- (5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
- (6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
- (7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.
- (8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and Aircraft. These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the letter creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of [2] instructions to the echelon commanders concerning cooperation with the Navy.

Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft. Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exorbitant cost in time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are asking for money to install tanks.

The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on

Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.

Improvement of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute) 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows:

Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T-O 4-11.

One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile (less searchlight battery)) T. O. 4-15.

[3] Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Antiaircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft Artillery personnel, both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery matériel, be furnished to this department with the least practicable delay.

These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for the Harbor Defense Artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.

Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and 2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment, Coast Artillery (T. D.) T. O. 4-31W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest practicable moment.

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the north shore.

Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any prolonged action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will probably be furnished in the near future.

Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engineers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary for the defense of the island.

[4] There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide for this stores of repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.

Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function in these locations before hostilities start.

Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly.

The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication centers and other tactical work.

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battalion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the plantations and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and dates of letters covering these subjects:

Cooperation with the Navy.

Joint letter, HHD 14th Naval District, 14 February 1941, subject: "Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," copy attached, Inclosure No. 1 AG 354.2/JAX-(pencil)

Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.

[6] *Dispersion and protection of aircraft.* Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3.

Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55 copy attached, Inclosure No. 4.

Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.

North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662.7, 19 February 1941, copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.

Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights. a. Beach defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 February 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineer Status Report, Revision 1940." 1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: "Reference Par 1 c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.

Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in Roads and Trails.

Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9.

Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 800.96, following subjects and dates. (Copies attached)

1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941. Inclosure No. 10.

2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 11.

3. Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.

4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13.

[6] 5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 14.

6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 1941, Inclosure No. 15.

7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.

8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17.
9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence 660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.
Increase in number of Engineer Troops.—Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941, subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.
Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

19 Incls.

[Exhibit W]

HEADQUARTERS' HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engineer 452.

SECRET

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. With the present set-up of existing facilities in this Department the pursuit ships are forced to operate to a large extent from Wheeler Field and similarly the bombardment ships are forced to operate from Hickam Field. In times of actual operation some of the bombardment ships will be operating from bases on the outlying islands, but to a large extent the pursuit ships will continue to operate from Oahu due to the limited time and radius of operation without refueling.

2. The concentration of these airplanes at Wheeler Field and at Hickam Field presents a very serious problem in their protection against hostile aviation. Wheeler Field is too small for the operation of the number of pursuit ships to be furnished to this Department and it will be necessary to develop another base for at least one group of pursuit aviation. A site in the vicinity of Barbers Point has been tentatively selected and is now being discussed with the Navy Department in connection with that Department's activities on its new air base in the Ewa Plain Area. The new Army air base will be the subject of a subsequent letter.

3. While this new base will provide some opportunity for dispersion of the pursuit ships this dispersion cannot be counted upon to give adequate protection and it will be necessary to provide protection by means of bunkers in the vicinity of existing fields for both pursuit and bombardment aviation. I have asked the District Engineer of Honolulu to study this problem and to submit cost estimates on the most economical satisfactory means of providing this protection. The District Engineer has recommended that the protection be provided by a rolled fill embankment of dirt and has estimated the cost at \$1,200.00 each for pursuit planes, \$8,000.00 each for two engine bombardment planes and \$15,000.00 each for four engine bombardment planes. In arriving at these figures he has given consideration not only to present unit costs, but has included funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items in this Department; the figures shown include both direct and indirect costs. This bunkering protection will cost about the same regardless of its location; the unit price includes cost of taxi strips and accessories.

4. This protection should be provided for 142 single engine pursuit ships and 121 double engine pursuit ships and for 25 two engine bombers and 70 four engine bombers. Using the unit costs quoted above the total for pursuit planes is \$315,600.00 and the total for bombing planes is \$1,250,000.00. The total for the two types is \$1,565,600.00. It is recommended that funds in this amount be allotted to this Department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of this protection.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A true copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

2528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[SECRET]

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) M 1st Ind

ACW/mme

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., March 3, 1941. To the Chief of the Air Corps
and Chief of Engineers, *IN TURN*.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

2nd Ind

(12)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., March 5, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers.

This office concurs in the recommendations as contained in basic communication. It is recommended that action be taken to provide funds for this project in the next supplemental bill.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive, Building, & Grounds Div.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields)—38

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

3rd Ind.

3-N

Office, C. of E., April 1, 1942.

To the Adjutant General.

1. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of basis letter which gives unit prices for rolled fill bunkers for pursuit planes, two-engine and four-engine bombardment planes. It is noted that the unit prices given include funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items and direct and indirect costs. It is also noted that the unit prices include the cost of taxi strips and accessories.

2. For the reason that the basic letter gave no basis on which this office could check the estimate of cost, a radiogram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, March 25, 1941, requesting detailed information sufficient for checking. A copy of this radiogram is inclosed. A reply was received thereto by radiogram from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated March 29, 1941, copy of which is inclosed.

3. It is recommended that approval in principle of the proposed protective arrangements be granted and that an initial allotment of \$1,000,000 be made at this time, authorizing the preparation of complete plans and initiation of construction with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more fully determined.

For the Chief of Engineers:

WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS,
Lieut. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

2 Incls:

Copy of Radiogram dated 3/25/41;
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/29/41.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd lieut F. A.

Via Air Mail

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E

4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 31, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Authority is granted for the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian Department for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes. This is the total number of airplanes which at present are visualized as an obtainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time.

2. In locating these revetments, "battle stations" of airplanes should be visualized in view of present and projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. Revetments should be dispersed over the widest practicable area around and adjacent to airdromes.

3. In the designs of revetments for use in the present war in the British Isles, provision is made for a splinter-proof shelter for airplanes crews and maintenance personnel who may be caught in the revetments during an air attack. In the British design, this splinter-proof, shelter is placed in the rear wall or back of the revetment. In the construction of the revetments proposed for the Hawaiian Department, it is believed that this feature should be incorporated.

4. It is desired that you submit revised estimates covering the construction of the revetments approved in paragraph 1 above incorporating splinter-proof shelters for plane crews.

5. Funds, in the amount of \$1,358,000 for the completion of this project as finally approved after receipt of your revised estimates, are being included in estimates for funds now being prepared.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General, The Adjutant General.

Incls. w/d

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut., F. A.

Engr. 452

5th Ind

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, *Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.*
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Provisions in plans have been made for splinter-proof shelters for airplane screws and maintenance personnel.

2. Revised estimates based on obtainable objectives are as follows:

a. Personnel shelters 5' x 9' @ \$635.00 each for 85 pursuit planes, bunkers having already been built on Wheeler Field by troop labor.....	\$53, 975. 00
b. 85 Pursuit Bunkers @ \$1,200.00 and 85 personnel shelters, 5' x 9' @ \$635.00 to be constructed at locations other than Wheeler.....	\$155, 975. 00
c. 13 Lt. Bombardment bunkers @ \$8,000 and 8 personnel shelters 5' x 13' @ \$800.00.....	\$114, 400. 00
d. 70 four-engine bombardment bunkers @ \$15,000 and 70 personnel shelters 5' x 17' @ \$925.00.....	1, 050, 000. 00
Total.....	\$1, 374, 350. 00

3. The bunkers for pursuit planes will be built at the new pursuit field and at Bellows Field. These for A-20-A planes will be at Bellows Field and for the 4-engine bombardment planes will be started at Hickam Field. It is not planned at this time to construct any bunker for these 4-engine planes on the outlying airports, but it is possible that when these airports are completed, the installation of some bunkers at these airports with the majority at Hickam may be desirable. This question has been discussed with the District Engineer, Honolulu, who states that the costs at these field will be about the same as his estimate for Hickam.

4. Since the figure of \$1,374,350.00 is so close to the figure of \$1,358,000.00 mentioned in 4th Indorsement, it is recommended that the latter figure included

2530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

in the estimates be adopted and that funds in this amount be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for this purpose.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G 6th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., *September 22, 1941.*

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Plans for revetments proposed in the preceding correspondence are approved.
2. Funds in the amount of \$1,358,000 for the completion of revetments in the Hawaiian Department have been included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 1943. It is expected that they will become available about January 1, 1942.
3. Final design of the revetments is being prepared by the Fortification Division, Corps of Engineers, and will be coordinated with the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon completion.
4. When available, funds will be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for the construction of the required revetments.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General, *The Adjutant General.*

A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lieut., F. A.

[Exhibit X]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Sept. 10, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Engr. 600.96 SECRET

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The provision of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft by the Hawaiian Air Depot is vital to the continued functioning of the Hawaiian Air Force during an attack on Oahu.
2. At present all shop and repair facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot are crowded into a small area at Hickham Field. This area is located close to the entrance channel of Pearl Harbor which is a perfect landmark even during blackouts. Concealment or confusion as to the purpose of this installation by camouflage is impracticable by any means known to this headquarters. In any attack or raid on this island, it is not only probable, but almost unavoidable that the Depot would be put out of action.
3. Considerable study has been made of the problem of insuring continued maintenance facilities for the Air Force and the only logical solution is to provide bombproof shelter for part of the existing maintenance facilities. Provision of bombproof protection for all of these facilities is manifestly impracticable due to the tremendous cost. It is believed that bombproofed space for one complete B-17 type airplane and for two B-17's without wing and tail assemblies, together with required space for all subassembly overhaul and repair represents the minimum space required. The District Engineer, Honolulu, has prepared a preliminary design of this structure and estimates its cost at \$3,480,650.00. Copies of the design drawings and his estimate are inclosed as Inclosures 1 and 2. Proposed location of this repair depot is shown on print, inclosure No. 3. This location has been selected because it is at a considerable distance from any other probable target, because the terrain is adapted to camouflage and because the soil will offer no construction difficulties. Location adjacent to the present facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickham Field is impracticable; rock and ground water are reached only a few feet under ground and this location is close to other primary targets of an air attack.

4. It is recommended that one underground repair depot of the type shown on inclosed plans be approved for construction at Wheeler Field and that funds in the amount of \$3,480,650.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

3 Incls: #1 Design Dwgs. (3 sheets)
2 Estimate
3 Location Drawing

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut., F. A.

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.
AG 600.12 (9-10-41) NC-G 1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., October 27, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The cost of providing bombproof underground repair facilities compared with the advantages to be gained is so great, that it is a policy that such facilities will not be provided.

2. Although the advantages of greater security which could be achieved by the provision of bombproof underground repair facilities must be recognized, the additional cost involved makes it necessary for air base installations exposed to possible bombardment attacks to assume this risk.

3. One hangar being built for our Atlantic base is to provide sidewalls of bomb-splinter proof construction. If you desire installations of this type, due consideration will be given your request, considering funds are available, and the needs of other bases similarly exposed to danger of air attack.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,
Major General, The Adjutant General.

3 Incls n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut., F. A.

[Exhibit Y]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., October 28, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Engr. 400.312

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Materials.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following project letters from this headquarters:

a. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 600.94, 4 February 1941, subject: "Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries," recommending that \$306,000 be allotted to initiate protective shelters for personnel and propellants at antiaircraft and mobile seacoast batteries. In 4th Indorsement, AG 662.1 (2-4-41) M-WPD, 31 March 1941, this headquarters was advised that the recommendation was not favorably considered, and that "protective installations of this type should be improvised by ordinary field fortification methods."

b. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 7 July 1941, subject: "Request for funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field," recommending that an allotment of \$56,210.00 be made for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangers and warming apron at Wheeler Field.

c. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of Defense Installations," recommending that \$29,000 be allotted for camouflage of batteries at Fort DeRussy, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Ruger, and

Fort Barrette. 4th Indorsement, AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, 27 June 1941, approved the project and stated that funds for this purpose would be included in the next estimates and would be made available at the earliest practicable date. Radio from the Chief of Engineer 10 October 1941 advises that \$29,000 for camouflage of coast artillery batteries had been disapproved by the Budget Advisory Committee.

[2] d. Letter of The Adjutant General, Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," recommending that an initial allotment of \$1,565,600 be made for the construction of bunkers for the dispersion and protection of aircraft. 4th Indorsement AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E, 31 May 1941, granted authority for the construction of revetments for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes, and stated that funds in the amount of \$1,358,000 for the completion of the project after receipt of revised estimates would be included in estimates for funds being prepared. 5th Indorsement Engr. 452, 31 July 1941, submitted a revised figure of \$1,374,350, and recommended that it be adopted instead of the \$1,358,000. 6th Indorsement, AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, 22 September 1941, approved plans for revetments, and advised funds in amount of \$1,358,000 for completion of revetments in department were included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 1943, funds expected to become available about January 1, 1942.

e. Letter from the Adjutant General, AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, 13 August 1941, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects," and 1st Indorsement thereon, AG 121/1, 14 September 1941, recommending the immediate allotment of \$125,000 for necessary materials and tools for the construction of field fortifications. This indorsement was followed up by radio 25 September 1941, recommending immediate favorable action on allotment of \$125,000 for execution of field fortifications and camouflage projects. War Department radio, 29 September 1941, advised request was not favorably considered, confirmed by 1st Indorsement War Department 14 September 1941.

f. Letter to the Chief of Engineers, Engr. 121.2, 17 May 1941, subject: "Annual Estimates, Fiscal Years 1942 and 1943," and supporting data under Project 5, which requested \$50,000 each for fiscal year 1942 and 1943 for local purchase of supplies for units of the Hawaiian Garrison other than Engineer troops, these supplies to be used in the construction of fortified works other than command posts for major echelons and camouflage measures, letter, Office, Chief of Engineers, to Department Engineer, 1 July 1941, subject: "Allotment of Engineer Service, Army Funds, Fiscal Year 1942," advised that only \$5,000 was being allotted. It further stated "It is believed the amount of \$50,000 requested for this purpose is greatly excessive. Field fortifications or camouflage to this extent goes beyond the training stage and reaches the status of a construction project. It is suggested that such requirements for the defenses of Hawaii be obtained from construction funds, which should be estimated and appropriated for this purpose."

[3] 2. The field fortification and camouflage works that will be required to insure the adequate defense of this island are of such magnitude that their accomplishment after the outbreak of hostilities is entirely out of the question. All installations located on Government owned or leased land should be constructed at the present time eliminating those tasks from the work that cannot be done until after complete mobilization when it will be possible to enter on and organize private land.

3. The program for immediate construction contemplates semi-permanent emplacements for all coast artillery weapons in the present defense project. These weapons are sited in their most advantageous positions covering all approaches to the island and fixed Naval installations and their movement is not contemplated under any change of situation. Protection for infantry units is based on lightly held beach positions with a strong and highly mobile reserve in accordance with latest tactical principles. Dispersed and camouflaged Bunker protection must be provided for aircraft and airfield installations must be protected by machine gun emplacements and fencing.

4. The peculiar topographic and geologic conditions and the nature of the vegetation of the Hawaiian Islands require a greater expenditure of materials for field fortification than would normally be anticipated. In their maneuvers and field training, troops have constructed many field fortification works. Salvage and local materials have been used to the utmost and many methods have been improvised to take into consideration the coral and lava rock, sand, and peculiar volcanic soil of the islands. This effort has been largely wasted because

of the rapid deterioration of the local materials used. Sand bags and local timbers have a maximum life of about six months in this locality.

5. The War Department has repeatedly directed this Headquarters to construct certain works by Field Fortification methods but neither materials nor funds have been supplied. This letter presents a new computation of all material requirements for field fortification works and camouflage which should be constructed at once. This tabulation does not include those materials which must be used to complete the field fortification works after the outbreak of hostilities. These requirements may be divided into three groups as follows:

a. *The Air Corps requirements.* The airfields in the Hawaiian Islands are limited in number and there are very few places aside from regular airfields where enemy planes might land. Consequently, it is expected that determined efforts would be made to capture existing airfields. To prevent this, protected machine gun positions must be placed to guard the sensitive points on each airfield, and [4] mobile forces provided for counter-attacks on enemy air-borne or sea-borne troops who are attempting a landing or who have landed. Airplanes on the ground must also be hidden and dispersed, to prevent their loss in surprise air attacks, hence camouflage is needed to conceal them. For this purpose, the local vegetation must be augmented by additional planting. In case an airfield on the outlying islands must be abandoned, its runways and other essential features should be destroyed, hence demolition chambers should be installed in advance. These matters cannot be deferred because of the time required for vegetation to grow and the time required to install protection and demolition works.

b. *Coast Artillery requirements.* The Coast Artillery includes permanent fixed defenses, mobile guns in positions prepared in time of peace, and antiaircraft guns protecting fixed Naval or military installations. The Coast Artillery cannot maneuver; the mobile elements, including antiaircraft, are held in fixed positions to defend fixed installations or to cover intervals in the permanent defenses, and the best positions have been prepared. Since these positions are known to the general public, the enemy also knows them. The operating personnel must have shelters to protect them and their ammunition during air attack, and the positions must be camouflaged to prevent accurate aim by enemy bombers. Coast Artillery troops must be constantly on the alert during active operations, and can then spare no men for fortification work after hostilities have begun.

c. *Infantry requirements.* The Infantry divisions will occupy beach positions, very lightly held, and will have highly mobile motorized reserves. The beach positions have additional weapons, beyond table of organization allowances. Emplacements, trench shelters, observation and command posts for the beach positions must be ready when the enemy appears offshore, and field works should be used to develop the maximum efficiency of automatic and heavy weapons and release as many men as possible to the reserve. There will be neither time nor men available to construct beach positions after the enemy arrives; fields of fire must be cleared, barbed wire, road blocks, anti-tank mines, and other obstacles must be installed at that time because these defenses will be placed on private property or will unduly interfere with civilian enterprise if set up in advance.

6. Inclosed are tabulations showing the material requirements of the Air Force, the Coast Artillery Command and the two Infantry divisions.

[5] 7. It is recommended that an allotment of \$1,455,542 be made immediately available for the purchase of fortification and camouflage materials so that the work can be initiated and carried along concurrently with normal training activities.

8. The only alternative for having these positions prepared in advance is to have a large increase in the garrison authorized for the defense of the islands.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 Incl: in six sheets (in dupl.)

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd. Lt., F. A.

2534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

10 WAR TG 61 WD

WASHN, D. C., 252P Aug. 12, 1941.

CG

Haw Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

31 12th

AGMC reurlet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject reallocation of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects stop special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested further information follows by mail

ADAMS

1017A

A True Copy

Edward Von Geldern

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit Z]

[1].

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,

Fort Shafter, T. H., July 15, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Engr. 000.91

Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. There is definite need for camouflage treatment of Air Fields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment has been undertaken at any air field in this department.

2. Attached is a plan for camouflage of Wheeler Field prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). The plan includes photographs of the type of camouflage to be applied to the bunkers, together with itemized estimates of costs and recommendations.

3. In reporting on this proposed plan, Major J. F. Ohmer, Jr., Corps of Engineers, Camouflage Officer, has commented as follows:

The place for camouflage of Wheeler Field as prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (separate) is a good treatment for the field and the bunkers. The plan generally calls for 'blending' the buildings of Wheeler Field into the Schofield Barracks building area and endeavoring to restore the air field proper to the original condition as shown by the present earth scars, such as the old Kamehameha Road, the gully through the field and the pineapple fields, roads and irrigation ditches."

"The plan is practicable and can be readily accomplished by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation."

"The Commanding General, Wheeler Field, has approved the plan and urged that the work be expedited."

"While the air photographs of the two planes in the camouflaged bunkers show the wing tips and the harsh straight shadows of the deciding line between the upper and lower nets, this can be blended by additional garnishing and small nets tying the lower nets under the upper terrace. This work is now being completed."

"It is recommended that the camouflage plans for Wheeler Field be approved."

[2] 4. It is recommended that an allotment of funds be made to this office in the amount of \$56,210.00 for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars, and warning apron at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). An itemized estimate is incorporated as a part of the plan substantiating the amount requested.

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding,

1 Incl: Plan

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[3] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC

1st Ind.

RPM/gt-1712.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. C., July 29, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers and Chief of the Army Air Force, *IN TURN*.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ Carl Robinson.
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c.

A True Copy

Edward Von Geldern,

EDWARD VON GELDERN,

2nd Lt., F. A.

[4] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

600.1 (Wheeler Fld) 71

2nd Ind.

6-C

WAR DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,

Washington, D. C., September 18, 1941.

To: The Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. The proposed plan for the camouflage of Wheeler Field, Hawaii has received careful consideration by The Engineer Board. As camouflage is essentially a local problem long range criticism may be entirely in error. Consequently, the following comments are offered only to supplement and should not invalidate decisions made on the spot by officers with intimate knowledge of local conditions.

2. Specific comments on Part I:

a. *Bunkers*.—The bunkers do not appear in the best arrangement to give maximum protection and to afford natural concealment. Their regular curving alignment throws a great burden on the artificial camouflage measures. The outer berm of the bunkers should be more irregular at the toe of the slope and should not be permitted to appear as a series of parallel lines as seen in photograph (V-112.101). Portions of the light colored pattern which show on the photograph could be continued over the revetment by sand or the native soil and over the net by weaving in appropriately colored garnishing. Extensive planting in native patterns will assist in this blending, and it is suggested that vines could be planted in the bunker tops and trained to grow into the nets to aid in defeating disclosure by means of infra-red photography. If additional dispersal pens are constructed, they should be spaced further apart, be more irregularly arranged, and the outer surface of the earth walls should be more irregular, especially at the toe of the slope.

b. *Landing Field*.—The division of the field boldly into three sections by natural boundaries as described is excellent, and, if carried out as indicated, should be very successful. The following detail criticisms may aid in the execution, but are not arbitrary. The field roads might be made a little more conspicuous by sprinkling a light colored earth, gravel or lava on the stripped surface as noted by contrast in the field roads in lower left corner of photograph (V-109-916-N-18). The same technique may be useful in the reproduction of the old Kamohameha road. If the fertilizer method does not produce dark enough contrasts it may be necessary to use black emulsified asphalts or a mixture of iron sulphate and tannin. The dark areas of the reproduced gully should not be used for taxiing and warming up any more than absolutely necessary, as this will destroy the desired effect.

[5] c. *Hangar Line*.

(1) The effort to make the buildings of Wheeler Field appear as a more homogeneous portion of Schofield Barracks might be more effective if more roads, dummy or real, were built between the two areas.

(2) The athletic track is a dangerous subterfuge, because of its characteristic outline and east-west orientation, and is not generally recommended as it becomes a reference point when detected.

(3) The painting of buildings on the aprons appears satisfactory; maintenance will be required and should not be neglected.

(4) The hangar painting presents a fine appearance. More disruption might be achieved by a larger and bolder plan of painting. The roads which terminate at hangars might be carried over the building successfully and the buildings painted

2536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

on the roof tops might be connected with painted walks and service roads to help create the illusion of a reduced scale of construction. The general trace of the shadows of buildings should be studied and wherever possible, there should be painted, or preferably planted, trees and shrubs to break up their characteristic outline. Planting, which may appear relatively ineffective in vertical views, may help materially against the bombers' approach.

(5) Inasmuch as the concrete hangar line apron is of brighter material and more reflective than other roadways in the area, it should be generally toned down with a thin solution of tar or asphalt in kerosene, in addition to the other treatment suggested.

3. Specific comments on Part II.

a. It is suggested an asphalt emulsion for roofs would be cheaper and more suitable. In general, the type of paint should be selected with regard to the material to be coated, instead of the classification by roofs, walls, etc. Under "Concrete" it is assumed that aprons are included. The American Betumuls Company, which maintains a branch in Hawaii, should be able to furnish asphalt emulsion paints and adhesives more advantageously than Rejuvo. The matter of granules to cover surfaces should be investigated carefully to see whether local materials of indigenous colors or of a nature which will absorb bituminous colors, such as lava, are not more easily procurable.

[6] 4. It is recommended that:

a. That the plan of camouflage be approved.
b. That the camouflage office, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding Officer of the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.) (Sep.) be granted permission to communicate directly with the Engineer Board on matters of materials and technical details to expedite the work.

c. That the Engineer Board be furnished a report to be made upon completion of the work, including photographs of intermediate the final stages. It is suggested that oblique photographs be furnished as well as vertical. The oblique photographs should be taken at 10,000 feet and three to four miles from Wheeler Field from four directions.

d. That the amount of \$56,210.00 be allotted to the Department Commander, Hawaiian Department, for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars and warming aprons at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company.

For the Acting Chief of Engineers:

[s] HOMER SAINT-GAUDENS,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineer,
Acting Chief, Operations and Training Section.

1 Incl

Sub. 1.

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[7] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

AG 007.5 (7-12-41)MC-G.

3rd Ind.

WR-1712.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., October 28, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers.

1. The camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field as outlined in basic correspondence is authorized when funds become available for this construction.

2. It is desired that you take the necessary action to include the sum of \$56,210 in the next available budget estimate for camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c/

Copy to:

Chief of Air Corps w/cy of basic com., 1st Ind., 2nd Ind.

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ref. his basic ltr. 7-12-41, together w/cy of 1st Ind., and 2nd Ind.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

Engr. 000.91

27 FEB 1941.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Investigations conducted by this headquarters have demonstrated that effective measures can and should be taken to reduce the visibility of exposed defense installations to hostile aerial observation. Admittedly these installations cannot be concealed to such an extent that they will be invisible on aerial photographs; at the same time, however, any camouflage which will render visual observation more difficult and will decrease the effectiveness of enemy bombardment is of the utmost importance.

2. Time has not permitted the submission of a comprehensive program for the camouflage of all defense installations in this department which require some degree of concealment; this matter is undergoing continuous study. Fixed sea-coast batteries have received first attention and plans of procedure and cost estimates have been prepared. The following table shows the various installations on which camouflage work should be undertaken immediately with the tentative costs:

Installation	Armament	Inclsure No.	Cost
Ft. DERUSSY:			
Battery Randolph	2-14" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 1	\$6,000.00
Battery Dudley	2-6" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 1	
Ft. KAMEHAMEHA:			
Battery Closson	2-12" (Barbette)	Incl. No. 2	6,000.00
Battery Selfridge	2-12" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 3	5,000.00
Battery Jackson	2-6" (Disappearing)	Incl. No. 3	1,500.00
Ft. RUGER:			
Battery Adams	2-8" (Barbette)	Incl. No. 4	2,000.00
Ft. BARRETTE:			
Battery Hatch	2-16" (Barbette)	Incl. No. 5	8,500.00
Total cost			\$29,000.00

The measures contemplated include construction of various types of overhead cover, dummy positions, extension of roads, painting and the transplantation of trees and shrubbery.

3. Experience in the present World War has shown the very considerable success of the Germans in concealing by camouflage, their long range guns on the channel coasts. The several millions of dollars invested in the installations enumerated in paragraph 2 above and their general value in the defense of this island justify expenditure which will render them less vulnerable to enemy attack. It is therefore recommended that the sum of \$29,000.00 be allotted this department as soon as practicable to permit initiation of this camouflage work.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

Incls. 1-5: Aerial Photos
A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.
AG 007.5 (2-27-41) M 1st Ind.

ACW/lff

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
March 13, 1941.

To: The Chief of Engineers.
For remark and commendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

5 Incls. n/c
C. of E. 618.33 (Oahu) 3

2nd Ind.

6-E

OFFICE, C. of E., May 28, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY.

1. This paper was held in this office to permit direct inspection of the installations by a representative of this office who visited Hawaii on this and other

2538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

fortification matters. Reference is made to Hawaii on this and other fortification matters. Reference is made to memorandum of March 22, 1941, to The Adjutant General, in this connection.

2. The importance of protective concealment for existing seacoast batteries is recognized by this office and a directive bulletin is now being prepared for issue to the field showing methods of such concealment for different type batteries.

3. The estimate submitted is considered an absolute minimum that will be required even omitting from consideration at this time Batteries Hatch and Closson which are to be casemated and more funds will probably be required at a later date. It is recommended that the project be approved and funds be made available at the earliest practicable date.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,
*Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.*

5 Incls.—n/c
A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.

618.3/45-B

3rd Ind.

5

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE, CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY,
June 12, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The need for camouflaging the seacoast Batteries listed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter is evident from inspection of the inclosures, Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive. The program as outlined in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is concurred in, subject to the proviso that the protective concealment of Batteries Hatch and Closson will be coordinated, both in time and character, with the casemating of these batteries.

2. No Seacoast Defense funds are available, at this time, for application to camouflage projects and none are included in current estimates.

3. It is recommended that the camouflage project, described in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, be approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Department Defense Project.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

JOE D. MOSS,
*Major, C. A. C.,
Acting Executive.*

5 Incls—No change.
A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations, Hawaiian Department.
AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E

4th Ind.

BSA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
June 27, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The program for the camouflaging of Batteries Randolph, Dudley, Closson, Selfridge, Jackson, Adams and Hatch, as proposed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. Funds to the amount of \$29,000 for this purpose will be included in the next estimates to be submitted and will be made available at the earliest practicable date.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,
*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

5 Incls. w/d.

5th Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FT. SHAFTER, T. H.,
July 24, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Ft. DeRussey, T. H.

1. To note and return to this headquarters.
2. The Department Engineer will be directed to include this project in the next revision of the Hawaiian Defense Project and to prepare plans for the execution of this work when funds are received.

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. G.
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of Defense Installations.")

000.91 6th Ind.
HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Ft. DeRussey, T. H., July 29, 1941—To CG Haw. Dept.

Noted.

FULTON Q. C. GARDNER,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1A]

[1] [SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February, 1941.

Engr. 611

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, Engr. 611, this headquarters, 8 November 1940, covering the recommendations for the revision of the military Roads and Trails Program. As indicated in paragraphs 5 and 8 of that letter, the revised program was not complete and additional roads and trails were under consideration.

2. A detailed study made by this headquarters indicates that the following additional improvements are necessary:

a. Wiliwilinui road and trail improvement, estimated cost \$33,550.00. Construction covering improvement of the existing 15,000 lineal feet of road at Wiliwilinui Ridge, eliminating sharp curves and providing adequate turnouts. It also covers construction of a 6-foot pack trail extending from the end of the existing road to the main crest of Koolaupoko Ridge area.

b. Improvement of Pupukea-Kahuku trail estimated at \$12,720.00. This project consists of the general widening of the existing trail from 3 to 6 feet along its 13,000-foot alignment. This improvement will provide desirable communication between the northeasterly section of the Island and northern end of Wahiawa-Pupukea trail.

c. Coincidental with the improvement of the Koolau Ridge trail, feeder trails to the ridge should be developed and improved. As a part of its reforestation program, the CCC has constructed several trails from forest reserve boundaries to the main ridge of the Koolaua along the lateral ridges. These trails, shown in the following list, should be partially relocated and improved as 6-foot pack trails:

(1) Poamono trail, 22,800 feet, estimated cost.....	\$35, 100. 00
(2) Kawaihoa trail, 24,000 feet.....	22, 750. 00
(3) Schofield-Waikane, 33,000 feet.....	45, 750. 00
(4) Waiawa trail, 30,000 feet.....	28, 650. 00

2540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

d. A road to Fuu Palailai. This project ———(copy illegible)——— of a 10' class "B" supply road extending from the main government road to Fuu Falai-lai. This road is desired to improve access to a group of fire control stations manned by a detail of from 50 to 100 men. The approximate length of this road is 8,700 feet and estimated cost \$10,000.00.

e. Iunia-Palehua road. This project will connect an existing plantation road with the Palehua spur via the Mauna Kapu and the Honouliuli trails. The need for an alternate route to the Manauhua Defense Area is extremely important, particularly in view of the exposed condition of the Palehua road to hostile observation. This project calls for the construction of 24,000 lineal feet of a 10-foot class "B" road at an estimated cost of \$136,500.00.

f. Radial Ridge roads, Manauhua area. This project calls for the construction of three roads along the ridges, south and west of Fuu Nanauhua as shown on the attached map. These roads serve vital defense areas which must be made accessible to truck transportation. The total length of these ten-foot roads is approximately 20,000 feet and the estimated cost of construction is \$84,900.00.

3. These additional roads and trails have been combined with the 19 items listed in paragraph 7 of letter, this headquarters, file Engr. 611, 8 November 1940, and are shown in the table below in order of their relative priority. The location of each item is shown on the map, scale 1/125,000, Inclosure No. 1 hereto.

1. Fort Weaver 155-mm position Road, 10' Class B	\$8,900
2. Fort Roger Roads, 10' Class B	4,000
3. Barbors Point East 3L Pos. Trail, 3L Trail	1,000
4. Mail Marker 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail	8,000
5. Maililili 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail	1,400
6. Eaena Point 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail	1,000
7. Walloa Point 3L Position Trail, 3L Trail	1,000
8. Completion of Barbors Point Road Net, Class A	133,000
9. North Shore RR Connection, R. R	250,000
10. Improvement Wakiua Pupukea Road, 10' Class A & B	216,000
11. Waimoa-Pupukea Road, 10' Class B	35,000
12. Alternate R.R. Schofield-Wahiuan Bypass, R. R.	70,000
13. Connection-Lellohua Spur to Oahu Sugar Co. tracks (rail only) R. R	48,600
14. Ordnance Magazine Area, Schofield 25' Class A	33,000
15. Feeder Roads Wahiua Pupukea Road, Improvement	111,800
16. Eahuku 155-mm Position Road, 10' Class B	9,500
17. Rahuku CP Trail, CP Trail	2,100
18. Kepuhi CP Trail, CP Trail	8,000
19. Koolau Ridge Trail, 6' Pack Trail	20,000
20. Willwillimoa Road, Improvement	17,900
21. Willwillimi Trail, 6' Pack Trail	15,650
22. Poamoho Trail, 6' Pack Trail	35,100
23. Pupukoa-Mahuhu Trail, 6' Pack Trail	12,720
24. Hawaiian Trail, 6' Pack Trail	22,750
25. Schofield-Wahiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail	45,750
26. Waiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail	28,650
27. Pau Palailai CP Road, 10' Class B	10,000
28. Eunia-Palehua Road, 10' Class B	135,500
29. Ridge Roads, Mamamam Area, 10' Class B	34,900
	1,370,020

4. It is recommended that the roads and trails program shown in the table above be approved in lieu of the present program approved in 4th Indorsement (AG 611 Hawaii) (3-31-38) (Misc.) (X) dated 23 May 1939, on War Department letter (AG 611 Hawaii (3-28-38)) (Misc. WPD) dated 31 March 1938, subject: "Military Priority Highways in the Hawaiian Department". It is further recommended that the sum of \$1,370,020.00 be allotted to this department as soon as possible to permit early completion of this program.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Map
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41)M

1st Ind.

AGW/ric

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,

February 27, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers and Chief of Coast Artillery, *IN TURN*.

For remark and recommendation, reference being made to files C. of E. 611 (Haw) 10 and OCGA 611/45 A 7.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

1 Incl. a/c

C. of E., March 12, 1941.—

To: The Chief of Coast Artillery.

1. Items 1 to 19, inclusive, in this program were approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in 3rd Indorsement dated February 18, 1941, AG 611 Hawaiian Department (11-8-40)M-WPD; OCGA 611/45 A 7; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 10. It was further directed that the Commanding General confer with Mr. Moskowitz, the representative of the Commissioner of Public Roads in Hawaii, with a view to securing the maximum aid permissible from the Public Roads Administration for the accomplishment of the construction authorized Federal Highway Act of 1940. It was also directed that a revised estimate be submitted covering Items 9, 12 and 13. The above action was not available to the Commanding General at the time of preparation of basic paper.

2. Items 20 to 29, inclusive, are new items of work. The estimated cost appears reasonable, and their inclusion in the program is recommended.

3. Attention is invited to letter from the Commanding General Hawaiian Department dated February 19, 1941, subject: "Construction of North Shore Railroad Connection" file Engr. 611; AG 112.05 (2-19-41)M; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 11 in which it was recommended that funds in the amount of \$230,000 be allotted as soon as possible to initiate construction. The item referred to is included in this paper as item 9.

For the Chief of Engineers:

[S] George Mayo,
GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.

611/45A-10

3rd Ind.

5.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY,
March 15, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The remarks and recommendations of the Chief of Engineers appearing in the 2nd Indorsement are concurred in.

2. In addition to the funds referred to in paragraph 1, 2nd Indorsement, \$300,000 is included in current Seacoast Defense estimates for application on items Nos. 9, 12 and 13 (railroad construction projects).

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

[S] E. T. BLOOD,
Colonel, C. A. C., Executive.

1 Incl. n/c

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M-WPD 4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A.G.C.,
April 1, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the preceding 2d and 3d Indorsements.

2. The program for road, trail and railroad construction contained in paragraph 3, basic communication, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in place of the road, trail and railroad program approved by 3d Indorse-

2542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ment, February 18, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaiian Department", AG 611 Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) H-WPD.

3. It is desired that you submit a breakdown of the items contained in the road and trail program approved herein to show the expenditures contemplated for augmentation and for maintenance. In this connection, attention is invited to your 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Maintenance and repairs of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for FY 1943" (Engr. 121.2, Forts), in which you request funds for the maintenance of roads. The breakdown requested is necessary to insure that no duplication will be encountered in the defense of estimates to be submitted for the completion of this program.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General, The Adjutant General.

Incl. w/d

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,

EDWARD VON GELDERN,

2nd Lt. F. A.

Proposed program, tactical items

Priority			Type		Estimated cost by troop constr.
Old	Rec.		Present	Rec.	
25.	1a.	Schofield-Waikana.	Pack Trail.	Motor Trail.	\$170,000
28.	b.	Kunia-Palehua.	Motor Trail.	10' WB Macadam.	75,000
23.	c.	Pupukea-Black Junction.	Pack Trail.	Improve.	12,720
32.	d.	Poanoho Trail.	Foot Trail.	Improve.	10,000
20.	e.	Willwilinui Road.	Dirt Road.	10' Class B.	17,900
21.	f.	Willwilinui Trail.	Foot Trail.	Pack Trail.	10,000
1.	2a.	Fort Weaver-155mm Gun Positions.	None.	10' Class B.	8,900
2.	b.	Fort Ruger Roads.	None.	10' Class B.	4,000
3.	c.	Barbers Point East SL Route.	None.	SL Trail.	1,000
4.	d.	Mali Marker SL Route.	None.	SL Trail.	6,000
5.	e.	Maliuli SL Route.	None.	OL Trail.	6,000
8.	3a.	Barbers Point Road Net Paving.	Coral Roads.	Paved Motor Roads.	75,000
10.	b.	Wahluwa-Pupukea Paving.	Motor Trail.	10' Class A & B.	200,000
6.	c.	Koera Point SL Route.	None.	SL Trail.	1,000
7.	d.	Walea Point SL Route.	None.	SL Trail.	1,000
17.	e.	Fahuhu CP Route.	None.	OP Trail.	2,100
11.	4a.	Walea Pupukea.	Foot Trail.	10' Class B.	45,000
None.	4.	Alternate Crossing S. Faloraun Gulch.	Raised Ford.	Bridge.	6,000
14.	5a.	Ordnance Magazine Area, Schofield Barracks.		22' Class A.	33,000
20.	b.	Mananahua Ridge Route.	Motor Trail.	Water Bound Macadam.	74,900
19.	c.	Koolau Ridge Trail.	Foot Trail.	Improve.	
24.	d.	Kaiwailon Trail.	Foot Trail.	Improve.	
26.	e.	Waiawa Route.	Foot Trail.	Improve.	
15a.	6a.	Haleiwa-Opacula Approach Road.	Dirt Road.	Improve.	111,800
15b.	b.	Fawalloe-Anahulu " "	Dirt Road.	Improve.	
15c.	c.	Ashley Station " "	Dirt Road.	Improve.	
18.	d.	Kopuhi OP Route.	Foot Trail.	Improve.	
16.	7a.	Kahuku-155mm Gun Positions.	Dirt Road.	10' Class A.	9,300
27.	b.	Fua Palailai OP Route.	Foot Trail.	10' Class B.	10,000
		Total.			\$901,020

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,

EDWARD VON GELDERN,

2nd Lt. F. A.

[7] Engr. 511

5th Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 26 May 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:

a. AG 611, Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) M-WPD; Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaii Department.

b. AG 660 (4-19-41) M; Expenditure Program, Seacoast Defense Fund, Fiscal Year 1942.

c. Eng. 121.2 (Forts); Maintenance and Repair of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for Fiscal Year 1943, (cited in Paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement above).

2. a. Road, trail and railroad program submitted in reference a was approved by War Department 3rd Indorsement, February 18, 1941, subject to the following:

(1) That Mr. Moskowitz be contacted to secure a maximum of the unobligated portion of \$446,000.00, previously allotted the PRA for Hawaii, for the construction of the road and trail items in the approved program.

(2) That revised estimates be submitted for the railroad items in the approved program.

b. 4th Indorsement, this headquarters, April 4, 1941, submitted the following:

(1) Recommendation that \$446,000.00 available to the PRA be not diverted from the purpose for which originally allotted, namely, construction of the Wahiamoa cut-off and the Kolokolo-Waiamoa Road.

(2) Revised estimates for the railroad items and reduced estimates for the road and trails portions of the program by the \$70,400.00 made available on December 7, 1940.

(3) Cross-referenced the originally approved program, items 1-19 inclusive, with the additional items, 20-29 inclusive, approved herein and submitted revised estimates in the amount of \$951,020.00 for the road and trail items and \$298,000.00 for the railroad items. The total cost, \$1,249,620.00 supersedes estimate of \$1,370,020.00 reported in basic letter herewith.

[8] 3. Reference b informed this headquarters that regular estimates for Seacoast Defense funds, FY 1942 include \$300,000.00 for the construction of the railroad items and \$50,000.00 for road and trail items. Release of these funds will cover the construction of the railroads (\$298,600.00) and will reduce the required funds for the completion of the roads and trails to \$901,020.00.

4. a. Reference c submitted estimates in the amount of \$286,000.00 for the upkeep of military roads and trails during FY 1943. These estimates were based upon the maintenance of these roads and trails already constructed in this department, since at the time of submission, the augmentation program did not have War Department approval. The great increase in FY 1943 estimates over those of previous years has been due primarily first, to the necessity of procuring new plant and equipment as replacements for outworn units and second, to the necessity supplanting WPA employees with hired labor as a result of the increasing non-availability of the former.

b. The breakdown of the \$286,000.00 estimate showed the proportional amounts of the total which would be expended on existing roads and trails. In view of the approval by 4th Indorsement of the revised road, railroad, and trail program, which contains funds for the improvement of certain existing roads, the original breakdown of FY 1943 maintenance estimates is no longer applicable. Specifically, maintenance funds for the Wahiana-Purukea Road and Barbers Point Road net can be reduced considerably; at the same time, however, the construction of new roads and trails during FY 1943 and ensuing years. Attached as inclosure No. 1 is a revised tabulation of maintenance funds required during FY 1943 for all existing roads and trails and those to be constructed under the approved program. This breakdown shows specifically the purposes for which these funds will be expended. Revised estimates decrease the funds originally requested by \$34,000.00.

c. 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, which forwarded the estimates cited in paragraph 5a, recommended immediate release of \$100,000.00 of the \$286,000.00. This \$100,000.00 is necessary for the purchase of materials and additional plant and the hiring of labor for the maintenance of long neglected existing roads and trails, funds for the improvement of which have not been included in the approved augmentation program.

[9] 5. As explained in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no duplication in the funds still required for the construction of the approved augmentation program, \$1,249,620.00 or \$901,020.00 if the \$350,000.00 in FY 1942 estimates is made available and the funds, totaling \$252,000.00, required for maintenance: the \$1,249,620.00 construction estimate includes no funds for maintenance and the \$252,000.00 maintenance estimate includes no funds for new construction.

6. It is recommended:

a. That in accordance with the revised estimates cited in paragraphs 3b (3) and 4, above, funds in the amount of \$901,020.00 for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program be included in FY 1942 estimates to supplement the \$350,000 expected to be released.

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(b) That the revised estimates in the amount of \$252,000.00 be substituted for the \$236,000.00 now included in FY 1943 estimates for the maintenance and repair of military roads and trails and that \$100,000.00 of this amount be released to this department during FY 1942.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Revised estimate.

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[10] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) MC 6th Ind. 21-H/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 9, 1941.

To: Chief of Coast Artillery and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl. n/o

Adjutant General.

611/45-A-10

7th Ind.

3.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,
June 12, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

1. The records of this office indicate that the necessary action has been taken with a view to accomplishing the recommendations appearing in paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement, assuming that that portion of the recommendation reading "FY 1942" was intended to read "Fy 1943"

2. With respect to the recommendation appearing in paragraph 6 b of 5th indorsement, preliminary estimates for FY 1943 do not now include a specific item for maintenance and repair of military roads and trails. The total sum now appearing in the preliminary estimates FY 1943 under Project 11—Alteration, maintenance and repair of fortifications—is \$225,000. Fy 1942 estimates for Project 11 total \$173,710. The portion of these funds to be applied to maintenance of roads and to strictly fortification works appears to be discretionary with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. However, the basis for estimating these funds for FY 1941 included specifically \$59,000 as applicable to road maintenance.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

LEONARD L. DAVIS,
Lt. Col., C. A. C.,
Assistant.

1 Inclosure
(Dup. w/d).

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[11] C. of E. 611 (Hawaii).

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

8th Ind.

6-E
OFFICE, C. OF E.,
July 1, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. Reference paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement and paragraph 1 of preceding Indorsement, it is recommended that authority be granted to include the \$901,020 required for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program in the supplemental estimates for Fiscal Year 1943 at the first opportunity.

2. The remarks of the Chief of Coast Artillery in paragraph 2 of 7th Indorsement are concurred in.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.
CG of OCCA

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[12] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 (2-10-41) MC-K 9th Ind. EGA
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., July 18, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Funds in the amount of \$300,000 for railroads and \$50,000 for roads and trails are now available from FY 1942 appropriations for construction contained in the approved Road, Trail, and Railroad Program. These funds will soon be released to the District Engineer. Additional funds in the amount of \$900,000 have been included in tentative estimates, FY 1943 for the completion of the approved Road and Trail Program. This latter amount will be requested at an earlier time in the event that further supplemental FY 1942 estimates are prepared.

2. General maintenance funds to the amount of \$173,710 are now available from FY 1942 appropriations and a substantial amount thereof has been released to the District Engineer, Honolulu. The portion of these funds to be applied to the maintenance of roads is discretionary with you. Additional general maintenance funds to the amount of \$223,000 have been included in preliminary estimates, FY 1943.

3. An additional amount of \$140,000 will be included at the first opportunity in estimates to be submitted to provide further funds for maintenance of roads and trails in your department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Incl. w/d

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1B]

Via "Clipper"
Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 April '41

[EXTRACT]

Subject: Construction at Bellows Field, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indoresment, The Adjutant General's office, file AC 370.5 (2-15-41) M-D, dated 5 March 1941 which authorized the permanent assignment of the 86th Observation Squadron and the 58th Bombardment Squadron at Bellows Field.

* * * * *

5. The improvement of the runways consist in lengthening the present runway from about 2800' to 3400' and widening from 150' to 300'. The new runway is 5000' long and 300' wide. Cross-connection the existing and the new runway is a paved taxi strip and parking strip 300' wide and 2200' long with a servicing mat 300' x 600' adjacent to the taxi strip. All runways, servicing mats and taxi strips will be asphaltic concrete. Other installations required are an airdrome control tower and an aqua-gasoling system of 600,000 gallon capacity. The necessary tanks for this gasoline system are on hand. A complete system of airport lighting and sewer, water, and power utilities will be necessary. Miscellaneous installa-

2546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

tions include man-proof fences around vital installations, improvement of the drainage of the camp area, pistol and 1000' machine gun ranges, and roads and sidewalks.

* * * * *

7. The improvements recommended are all necessary. Funds for improving the runways in particular should be expedited. The District Engineer has informed me that it is possible at this time to secure on the mainland the necessary plant and equipment for this paving but that unless contracted for in the very near future, it will not be much longer available.

* * * * *

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:

- No. 1 Tabulation of Housing Needs
- 2 Layout Map*
- 3 Tabulation of Cost Estimates

*(Filed in Drafting Room; Bellows Field #1)

No R/S was prepared. Verbal approval of C/S and signature secured by Major Fleming, 5 April 1941.

Copy to Hawaiian Air Corps 4/8/41

Copy to District Engineer 4/17/41

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Additional funds for Completion of Authorized Mobilization Housing Project, Hawaiian Department

2nd Ind. (12-P3)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., June 26, 1941

To: The Quartermaster General.

1. Reference is made to Paragraph 1.c. of basic communication which indicates that funds in the amount of \$990,769 will be included in future estimates for the projects at Wheeler, Hickam, and Bellows Fields, as requested in Paragraph 2.a,b, and c of basic communication.

For the Chief of the Air Corps

FRANK M. KENNEDY
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Buildings and Grounds Division

Copied from Project Letter B-1

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F.A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Barking Sands Field, Kauai, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Barking Sands Field on Kauai be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Barking Sands for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed at all times at this field. The total garrison at Barking Sands including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings will be necessary and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation showing the buildings, built and building by the WPA and the additional buildings required which include administration buildings, shops, warehouses, recreation buildings, mess halls, officers' quarters and other structures. Complete utility system should be provided for this camp. All buildings to be mobilization type.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying conditions by the grading of two runways 5000' by 500' and the paving of a 200' strip on each runway for a length of 5000', the construction of a servicing mat and the installation of a complete airport lighting system. Storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline will soon be installed by the District Engineer with funds now available to him; in this storage nine of the eighty [2] 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks are now designed for the aqua system; at this time, however, the tanks are being installed for storage only and if at a later date the necessity develops, this storage system can be readily converted into the aqua system. Also included in the cost estimates are miscellaneous items such as an airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000'' ranges and man-proof fencing around vital installations. Roads within the camp area have also been included in the cost estimates; an improvement to the access road to this military reservation from the nearest point on the Kauai belt road has been the subject of discussion with the local public roads administration under the provision of Section 18 of the Federal Highway Act of 1940. Surveys of this road are now being made by the Territorial Highway Department; these surveys have not been completed. The local Public Roads Administration officials, based on a reconnaissance, estimate that this access road will cost about \$150,000. As it is doubtful whether either territorial or Federal Highway funds will be available for construction on this amount has also been included in the estimates. Telephone costs have been estimated at 2½% of building costs as directed in Chief Signal officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs.

5. There are inclosed as Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3, a layout drawing of this field and a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. These cost estimates were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include not only direct but also the indirect costs of the job. The total required to complete the installation is \$1,772,220.

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Barking Sands be authorized and that funds in amount of \$1,772,220.00 be released to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to initiate this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls: #1—Bldg tabulation
#2—Layout drawing
#3—Cost Estimate

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

2548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Hilo Airport.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Hilo airport be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 2 National Guard companies to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men each, total 12 officers and 382 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and 206 men from Hickam Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Hilo therefore will be 49 officers and 588 men.

3. Some buildings are now being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Hilo airport will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 9 of the 80 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

[2] 5. There are inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates and as Inclosure No. 2 a layout map of the field. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at the Hilo airport be authorized and that funds in the amount of \$670,140 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

2 Incls: #1 Cost Estimates
#2 Layout map

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941

In reply refer to:

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Construction at Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 560 (3-7-41)M-G-M, 14 March 1941, Subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H., be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 1 National Guard Company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one pursuit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men from Wheeler Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Homestead Field therefore will be 41 officers and 323 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being built at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Homestead Field will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 350,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 7 of the 30 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[2] 5. There is inclosed a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at Homestead Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of \$407,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

1 Incl: Cost Estimates.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

2550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.

Engr. 600.12

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Construction at Morse Field, Hawaii

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating condition. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Morse Field on Hawaii be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Morse Field for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed a large part of the time at this field. The total garrison at Morse Field including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been built at this station by troop labor. Other buildings have been and are being built by the WPA. Additional buildings and improvements are necessary; I believe that the requirements of training preclude any extensive use of troop labor and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material money nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. These additional buildings will all be of mobilization type construction for use as operations buildings, shops, administrative and supply buildings, barracks, mess halls, magazines, etc. A complete system of utilities should be provided.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying facilities by the paving of a main runway 3400 feet long and 300 feet wide, and its extension by grading, leveling and light paving to a length of 4150 feet and width of 400 feet. Because of prevailing wind conditions, only one paved runway is considered necessary by the Commanding General, [2] Hawaiian Air Force. Necessary taxi mats, service mats and warming up aprons will be graded and paved. A complete airport lighting system will be installed. Gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons utilizing nine of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be installed; because of the shortage of water at this field, this will be plain storage and not the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1, a layout map of this field. It will be noted that considerable areas in the vicinity of the runway are shown for light paving. This is necessary; the soil at this field is very fine and with the prevailing high velocity wind there is a serious dust problem as this dust affects the engines of the planes. The shortage of water makes stabilization by sodding or vegetation impracticable, and the most practical way that this problem can be solved is to stabilize by light paving.

5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. In addition to the items already mentioned, miscellaneous items such as roads, pistol and 1,000 inch ranges, an Airdrome Control tower, and telephone installations have been included. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ percent of building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by troop labor and the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include the indirect as well as the direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Morse Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of \$1,687,530 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2. Incls: #1—Layout Map
#2—Cost Estimates

A true copy

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Engr. 600.12

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has under lease an unimproved landing field located at Haleiwa, on the north shore of Oahu, about ten miles airline distance from Wheeler Field. There are no paved runways, and no installations other than boundary marking lights. No permanent detachment is quartered there. The field is used for practice landings, etc. by the pursuit aviation at Wheeler Field.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of one runway 4000' by 300' and by the installation of other facilities for flying operations. These will include an operations building and airdrome control tower and storage for 100,000 gallons of gasoline using two of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. This storage will utilize the aqua system. A small galvanized warehouse for oil storage will be provided.

4. The only garrison at this field will consist of a small permanent detachment to refuel and handle planes on the ground and to operate radio and control installations. For this detachment a combined barracks and mess hall will be provided.

5. It is recommended that the improvement of Haleiwa Airport be authorized as outlined above and that funds in the amount of \$450,000 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu for this construction.

1 Incl: Cost Estimate

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2d Lt. F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC

RPM/agb-1712

1st Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 27, 1941.

To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c

2552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2nd Ind.

(9)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., May 31, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

Approval recommended.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

[S] Edward P. Curtis,
EDWARD P. CURTIS,
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.

• 1 Incl. n/c

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

300.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. (Let. from Hawaiian Dept. H", to AGO, 5/22/41)

3rd Ind.

3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E., June 10, 1941.

To the Adjutant General.

1. Approval recommended.

2. It is assumed that the District Engineer at Honolulu collaborated with the Hawaiian Department Commander in preparation of the estimate inclosed with the basic communication. Further delay in verification of this estimate is not considered advisable inasmuch as the funds required can be rectified if necessary in the future.

3. Funds for this construction at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. are available in this office under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve provided this construction is of a high priority, the urgency for which is not known in this office.

4. If authorized it is requested that the amount of \$450,000 be approved for allotment from funds reserved under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve for construction of the buildings, gasoline storage and runways as specified in the inclosed estimate.

For the Chief of Engineers:

JOHN R. HARDIN,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.

Inclosure: Sub 1

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-D

4th Ind.

RPM/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 25, 1941.

To: Chief of Air Corps.

1. You are authorized to proceed with plans for construction of an airfield at Haleiwa, on the island of Oahu, as indicated in basic communication.

2. You are authorized to include in the next available estimates, funds for the accomplishment of this project, in the amount of \$450,000, as recommended in basic communication.

3. The allotment of Miscellaneous Construction Reserve Funds for this project, as recommended in paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement, is not favorably considered as these funds are required for other purposes.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.—n/c

Copies to:

Chief of Engrs. Ref. his 3rd Ind., 600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1.
6-10-41, to TAG.

Commanding General, Haw. Dept. Ref. his basic ltr., Engr. 600.12,
5-22-41, to TAG, w/cys. of 1, 2, & 3 Inds.

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1] [CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,

22 May 1941.

In reply refer to:

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Burns Field, Kauai, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Burns Field be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 enlisted men. In addition to this garrison, one heavy reconnaissance squadron of 43 officers and 233 men will be sent to this field for training. Either this squadron or a heavy bombardment squadron will be stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at the field will therefore consist of 51 officers and 399 men.

3. Some buildings have been erected at this field by soldier labor. Other buildings are necessary and soldier labor is not available for their construction. These buildings have been tabulated in the cost estimates, Inclosure No. 1. All buildings will be of mobilization type construction. The installation of a complete system of utilities is recommended.

4. The runways at Burns Field are authorized for improvement by a CAA project. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline; for this four of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can be readily converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

[2] 5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000-inch range and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2 1/4% of the building costs as directed by the Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. The estimates include direct as well as indirect costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction be authorized on the present military reservation at Burns Field and that funds in the amount of \$636,163.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 Incl: Cost Estimates

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,

EDWARD VON GELDERN,

2nd Lt. F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,

Fort Shafter, T. H.

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Engr. 600.12

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, the Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective."

2554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. Included in the plan for dispersion of facilities is a proposed airport on the Island of Lanai. A location has been selected and preliminary negotiations for leasing have been made. The land is owned by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company which is willing to lease it to the government on a twenty-five (25) year lease in return for one dollar a year rental and the use of the flying field. The location of the field, barracks area, and a proposed bombing range are shown on map, scale 1/62,500 inclosed as Inclosure No. 1. Project letter for the bombing range has already been submitted by letter to The Adjutant General, subject: "Construction of Night Bombing Range, Island of Lanai" file Engr. 686 dated 16 May 1941.

3. It is proposed to improve this field by the grading and paving of two 5,000' runways 300' wide and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These will include the necessary operations buildings and shops, airdrome control tower and storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline using four of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, although all the necessary fittings for later conversion to the aqua system will be installed.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this garrison, a pursuit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While this squadron will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison, therefore, will be 41 officers and 323 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is \$1,990,000.00.

6. The following is recommended:

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of this site.

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 2 be authorized.

c. That funds in the amount of \$1,990,000.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls: #1 Map; #2 Cost Estimates.

A True Copy.

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC

1st Ind.

RPM/agb-1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 27, 1941.

To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, *IN TURN*:

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

2 Incls. n/c

Adjutant General.

2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C. June 2, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

Approval recommended. Attention is invited to the Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, (WPD 2550-22), 6-10-41, Subject: Estimates for the Construction of Airports for Hawaiian Air Force.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

EDWARD P. CURTIS,
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.

2 Incls. n/c

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 83

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

3d Ind.

3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E., June 16, 1941.

To the Adjutant General.

1. Approval recommended.

2. The estimate of cost as given in the basic communication was prepared by the District Engineer at Honolulu, T. H.

3. If authorized, it is requested that the amount of \$1,990,000 be approved for allotment to the District Engineer at Honolulu for the construction of buildings, utilities, runways, and other installations on the Island of Lanai, as recommended in the basic communication and inclosure thereto, from funds reserved under the Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Pilot Training Schools Reserve), approved April 5, 1941.

For the Chief of Engineers:

JOHN R. HARDIN,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.

Inclosures: Subs 1-2

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Construction of Airfield at Lanai, T. H.

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-G

4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., August 8, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of the site referred to in basic communication.

2. The construction as recommended by you is authorized except that "Theatre Operations Type of Construction" be substituted for the "mobilization type" requested.

3. It is desired that funds required be included in the next budget estimates.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

2556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[1]

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Proposed Airport, Parker Ranch Area, Hawaii, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. There has been for some time a realization that an additional field was necessary on the Island of Hawaii, and extensive studies have been made on its location. The best location found was about four miles from the town of Waimea on land owned by the Territory of Hawaii, and at present under lease to private cattle interests. The site consists of about 1,360 acres, and it is believed that the land can be transferred to the Federal government under Section 91 of the Organic Act. Preliminary negotiations to this end have been opened with the Territory. The location of the field is shown on map, scale 1/62,500, inclosed as Inclosure No. 1.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of three 5000-foot runways and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These will include the necessary operations buildings, and shops, airdrome control tower, and storage for 300,000 gallons of gasoline, using 6 of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, as the shortage of water will preclude use of the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a print of Department Engineer Map No. 11-1-25D41 which shows the boundary of the land and the location of the three 5000-foot runways.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, a heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and [2] 206 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While these squadrons will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison therefore will be 45 officers and 372 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 3 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is \$1,992,600.00.

6. The following is recommended:

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the acquisition of this site.

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 3 be authorized.

c. That funds in amount of \$1,992,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:

#1 Map

#2 Print, Map No. 11-1-25D41

#3 Estimated Costs

A True Copy

Edward von Geldern,

EDWARD VON GELDERN,

2nd Lieut. F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Engr. 600.12

Subject: Additional Airdrome, Hawaiian Department

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The recent and anticipated increases in the Pursuit Wing of the Hawaiian Air Force have emphasized the need of an airdrome to supplement the existing facilities at Wheeler Field. The latter field is now badly overcrowded with the planes stationed there.
2. A very thorough study has been made of the location of this additional air field by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Department Engineer and the District Engineer. At least five separate locations were given serious consideration; one of these in the Barbers Point area was discarded first because of its proximity to the beach and second, because of objections by the Navy to interference with the new carrier aviation base in the Ewa plane area. Another location at Kahuku was discarded because of its proximity to the beach. A third on the flat ground about three miles north of Wahiawa was discarded by the Hawaiian Air Force because of bad flying conditions from turbulent air conditions. A fourth location in the general area to the east of the crossing over Kipapa Gulch by the Kamehameha Highway was discarded for similar flying reasons. The area finally selected between the Kipapa and Waikakalua Gulches and west of the Kamehameha Highway is believed to be the best possible location of this airdrome on the island of Oahu. There is inclosed a map on the scale of 1/20,000 showing the location of this field.
3. The garrison to be stationed at this field will consist of the 15th Pursuit Group of 84 officers and 729 enlisted men, an air base group (single) 28 officers and 490 men, and miscellaneous detachments of 5 officers and 75 men. Total strength 117 officers and 1,294 men. Complete construction with mobilization type facilities must be provided for the housing of this garrison. The present construction authorized for Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields is insufficient for the needs of those three stations and it will be impossible to transfer any of the existing authorization to this new field.
4. It is estimated that at least 75% or 88 of the officers will be married and of this number 10% or 9 will be senior officers. Since there are no locations in this vicinity where these officers can be placed upon commutation and live in private quarters and also because of the tremendous housing shortage on Oahu, it is believed that Government quarters should be provided for these married officers. Recognizing that this [2] field must be constructed under emergency appropriations, it is proposed that these quarters not be as elaborate as usually constructed on Army Posts. With the unit costs estimated, houses similar in construction to the average in Honolulu can be provided. In addition it is also estimated that there will be 135 married noncommissioned officers in this garrison. Adequate quarters will also be provided for these married enlisted men and it is recommended that the War Department secure from the Federal Building Administration authorization for the construction of 135 low cost housing units at this field.
5. The improvement for flying operations consists of the installation of three runways each 5,000 feet long with a graded width of 400 feet and a paved width of 200 feet; the paving of taxi strip 200' x 5,000' and a servicing apron 300' x 600'. A complete installation of airport lighting is proposed. Bunkers for the protection of airplanes against hostile bombardment will be installed as part of the airport and the cost of these bunkers and necessary approaches are included in the cost estimates. It is also proposed to install storage for 900,000 gallons of gasoline with the aqua system. In this storage 18 of the 80 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized.
6. The housing proposed will be mobilization type construction. It will include barracks, mess halls, and recreation facilities for the men, buildings for flying operations such as an airdrome control tower, Air Corps technical schools, supply rooms, and housing for maintenance facilities. In addition mobilization type construction is proposed for the necessary post overhead, buildings such as a fire station, a guard house and an infirmary and warehouses for commissaries, etc. A complete system of utilities is covered in the estimates. In designing the water supply and sewage disposal systems provision has been made for the

2558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

eventual expansion of the garrison to 4,000 men. This increase in capacity is proposed to take care of the possibility of assigning an anti aircraft regiment as part of this garrison. Shown on the map accompanying this letter are two areas shaded in blue. The area near the runway will be used for the construction of the service buildings incidental to flying operations. The 40 acre tract shown to the north of the runways will be utilized for construction of housing facilities for both officers, married noncoms, and enlisted men. The land where the runways and the adjacent blue area are located is now cultivated cane land. The area of the 40 acre tract is cultivated pineapple land; the cane land involved is about 250 acres minimum. If these sites are secured by lease it is estimated that the cane land will cost \$30.00 per acre per year and the pineapple land \$25.00 per acre per year, or a total annual rental of \$8,500. If this land is purchased the cane land will cost about \$1,000 and the pineapple land about \$500.00 per acre; a total cost of about \$270,000.

7. There is inclosed a tabulation showing the buildings which should be constructed with cost figures and cost estimates on runways and other flying facilities and on utility systems. These estimates show a total estimated cost of \$4,668,950 not including cost of land. As stated shows if the land is leased there will be a yearly rental of \$8,500. If the land is purchased the total cost is estimated at \$4,938,950.

[3] 8. It is recommended that the proposed location of this new field be approved and that funds in the amount of \$4,668,950 be allotted for construction if the War Department decides that securing the land on a lease basis is satisfactory. It is further recommended that if the War Department decides that this land should be purchased, additional funds in the amount of \$270,000 be made available.

(s) WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls:

#1 Map

#2 Tabulation

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

PARAPHRASE OF RADIO FROM T A G:

Fifteenth Pursuit airbase at Kipapa is disapproved Stop Base is to be located at Kahuku Stop Personal letter twenty one July (?) from General Marshall to General Short covers this subject.

ULIO.

True copy.

Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1C]

[1]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.96

Subject: Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to your secret radiogram No. 708, 4 April 1941, which was on the subject of protection for the seacoast defense batteries in this department and which suggested a conference with Mr. J. C. Letts of the Office of the Chief of Engineers during his recent visit in this department.

2. This radiogram stated that a letter covering this construction was being forwarded by mail. This letter has not as yet been received in this department. In order to save time, however, we're submitting recommendations without waiting for the arrival of this letter as its subject matter was explained in general by Mr. Letts.

3. There are three batteries involved in this protection; these are the two 16-inch gun batteries, Battery Hatch at Fort Barrette and Battery Williston at Fort Weaver and a 12-inch barbette gun battery, Battery Closson at Fort Kamehameha. A study of this problem has been made jointly by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the District Engineer and Mr. Letts. They recommend the casemating of Battery Hatch and Battery Closson and provision of a tunnel type shield for Battery Williston. There is inclosed a chart showing the fields of fire of these batteries after the protection is installed. From this chart it will be seen that Battery Hatch has a field of fire from azimuth 295 to azimuth 80; and Battery Williston, a 360° field of fire. The red shading on this chart indicates the area in which the fire of four 16-inch guns can be placed. The yellow shading shows the additional area which can be covered by the fire of two 16-inch guns at Fort Weaver. The existing range circle of Battery Hatch is shown by the red line and Battery Williston by the black line. The chart indicates that there is an area about 5,000 yards in range west of Oahu which is now covered by the fire of Battery Hatch and which is not covered by the fire of Battery Williston. On the east side of the island the area now covered by fire from Battery Hatch, which is sacrificed by the casemating is well in the field covered by Battery Williston. The only loss in coverage is in the 5,000 yards to the west of the island and in the fact that the general area is now covered by the fire of only two 16-inch guns while under present arrangement this area is in part covered by the fire of four 16-inch guns.

[2] 4. I do not believe that this loss in coverage is at all important when compared to the necessity of providing protection for Battery Hatch in particular, and therefore concur in the recommendations of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

5. Your radio also referred to our letter, subject: "Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver," dated 4 February 1941. The recommendations contained in this letter are reiterated. Since the recommendation is made that Battery Williston should have tunnel type shield protection which does not provide any protection for ammunition, a bombproof magazine for at least one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery. Also due to the exposed position of Battery Hatch and the impossibility of camouflaging the existing magazines, it is believed that a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery in addition to the bombproof storage for 50 complete rounds in each casemate.

6. Reference is now made to letter, this headquarters, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneche Bay, Oahu, T. H." dated 18 February 1941, file 381, in which the War Department was advised that this department was assuming responsibility for the defense of the Kaneche Bay Area. It is believed that the growing military and naval importance of Kaneche Bay area makes it essential that a major calibre seacoast battery be installed for its protection. The need for this battery is urgent and its installation should not wait upon the manufacture of the armament. It is understood that there are some 12-inch long range gun batteries similar to Battery Closson on the mainland where the need for them no longer exists and it is recommended that the armament of one of these batteries be shipped to this department and funds provided for its emplacement in the Kaneche Bay area.

7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. That protection be provided for Battery Hatch by the construction of casemates and overhead cover, at Battery Closson by the construction of overhead cover, and at Battery Williston by the installation of tunnel type shields.

b. That a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges be authorized for Battery Williston and a similar magazine be authorized for Battery Hatch in addition to the storage of 50 rounds in each of the casemates.

c. That the armament of a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery [3] Closson to be obtained from a location on the mainland where it is no longer needed and shipped to this department and installed to cover the Kaneche Bay area.

(s) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Chart (Orig of Incl No1, is on file at H S C A B)

A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

2560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.

[1]

in reply refer to:

AG 381/20

Kaneohe Bay Project.

Secret

Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:—

A Secret letter HHD to TAG, 14 April 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries" file AG 662.1 (4-14-41) MC-E, HD Engr 600.96, with 4 indorsements.

B Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st indorsement HHD to TAG dated 16 June 1941.

2. The attached study was prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade in accordance with the directive contained in the 4th indorsement to reference A. In considering this study, reference should be made to a similar study which was submitted as an enclosure to 1st indorsement, reference B.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the attached study of the seacoast and antiaircraft defenses required for the protection of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Base (Incl. #1) are approved with the following exceptions:

a. It is believed a large proportion of the 15 AA searchlights recommended in paragraph 6a. should be equipped with SCR 268 sets instead of the M2 sound locators. The severe limitations imposed by the terrain and normal atmospheric conditions present in this area make mandatory the early detection of hostile aerial targets.

b. In order that personnel may be available to establish a headquarters for the Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that instead of augmenting the seacoast personnel, as recommended in paragraph 6d. (2) by one battalion (TD) and three separate batteries (HD), that the increase should consist of one Coast Artillery regiment (HD), type B, (T/O 4-71, Nov 1/40), less band and one battalion. This organization will provide the necessary command and staff and attached medical personnel to permit the proper tactical organization of the defenses. The 155mm battalion can take the place of the second battalion of the Harbor Defense Regiment.

[2] 4. It is recommended:

a. That the eventual project for defense of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Bellows Field, based on the installation of fixed armament, be as follows:

(1) Armament:

(a) Seacoast:

2 155 mm Gun Batteries (latest type).

2 6" Fixed Gun Batteries (2 guns each).

1 16" Long Range Casemated Gun Battery of 2 guns on Barbette Carriages.

(b) Antiaircraft:

3 90 mm AA Gun Batteries.

3 37 mm AA Gun Batteries to consist of 10 guns each.

48 Caliber .50 AA Machine Guns.

15 AA searchlights together with a minimum of 6 SCR 268 sets and 9 M2 sound locators.

(2) Personnel:

(a) Seacoast Artillery:

1 Battalion Coast Artillery (TD), 155 mm guns, (T/O 4-35, Nov 1/40).

1 Regiment Coast Artillery (HD), type B, less band and one battalion, (T/O 4-71, Nov 1/40).

(b) Antiaircraft Artillery:

1 Regiment Coast Artillery (AA), semi-mobile, less one gun battalion, (T/O 4-111, Nov 1/40).

b. That initially based on armament now available in the Hawaiian Department, the defense be constituted as shown below. The seacoast armament and personnel to be used in this defense must be moved from previously assigned positions in other parts of the island, thereby weakening the defense in other areas.

(1) Considering only personnel now present and available:

- 1 155 mm Gun Battery.
- 1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
- 1 8" Railway Gun Battery.
- 2 3" Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
- 1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.

(2) Assuming that personnel under paragraph 4 a (2) (a) above will be made available at an early date and using armament now available in War Reserve, the defense can be organized as shown below. Under this plan no movement of armament from present assigned positions is required:

- 2 155 mm Gun Batteries
- 1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
- 1 8" Railway Gun Battery.
- 2 3" Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
- 1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.

[3] c. That the increase in personnel and in major items of armament recommended in paragraphs 6 a and b, reference B, insofar as they relate to the Coast Artillery be amended to conform to paragraph 4 a. above.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1-Incl: Revised Study on Seacoast and Antiaircraft Artillery Defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station (Secret) in trip.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1] Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaiian Department.

AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-E

3rd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., October 30, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to:

a. Letter, this office, April 8, 1941, AG 381 (3-13-41) N-WPD, subject: Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

b. Radio No. 320, your headquarters, September 13, 1941.

c. Letter, your headquarters, September 18, 1941, Engr. 662/4 x 662/7, subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

2. The following temporary measures for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area are approved:

a. Movement of one battery of 8" railway guns now in storage at Fort Kamehameha to Mokapu Peninsula and temporary installation at site designated by you in reference c subject to local coordination of site with the Navy.

b. Installation of two batteries 155-mm guns on Panama mounts at sites to be selected by you.

3. Immediate personnel and armament requirements will be set:

a. By the transfer to the Hawaiian Department of the following units at their allotted strengths:

(1) One battalion, 57th Coast Artillery, TD, with battalion section, supply platoon T/O 4-32, and battalion section, medical detachment (T/O 4-31), attached, less guns and fire control equipment.

(2) 95th Coast Artillery (AA), Semimobile (less one gun battalion), with armament and equipment on hand. Authority is granted for the reorganization of the 37-mm gun battalion of this regiment into three [2] 37 mm gun batteries (8 guns each) and one (1) Caliber .50 MO battery (AA) (12 guns).

b. By the local activation of one 8" railway battery (R/O 4-47) from personnel available in the Hawaiian Department.

2562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

4. Guns and fire control equipment for the battalion of 155 mm guns and the 8'' railway battery will be furnished from defense reserves on hand in the Hawaiian Department. Shortages will be filled in accordance with approved War Department priorities.

5. Personnel and equipment mentioned in Paragraph 3 a. above will be dispatched to the Hawaiian Department by first available shipping. It is estimated that troops will begin to arrive in your department about December 1, 1941. The shipment of the major items of organizational equipment and armament for reinforcing units is dependent upon the availability of bottoms of which no accurate forecast can be made at this time.

6. Theater of operations type housing is authorized for the personnel listed in paragraph 3 above. It is desired that estimates covering housing for this increased garrison be made the subject of separate correspondence.

7. Ultimate approval of one 8'' seacoast battery (fixed) in lieu of the 16'' battery recommended by you, and of two 6'' seacoast batteries (fixed) to replace the two batteries of 155 mm guns authorized for temporary defense is probable. The 8'' seacoast guns will not be available before July, 1942, and the 6'' seacoast guns not before December, 1942.

8. In view of the expected approval of fixed armament for the Kaneohe Bay Area the plan submitted by reference c for the installation of the 8'' railway battery on Mokapu Peninsula and for the construction of 155 mm gun positions is considered too elaborate. Plans should be revised to provide for temporary installation of the 8'' railway battery, and for construction of Panama mounts for two 155 mm gun batteries. Provision should be made for splinterproofing magazines and plotting room only and should be confined to that which can be constructed by field fortification methods and materials.

9. A revised project, to include detailed estimates of cost, is desired for the defense of Kaneohe Bay based on two batteries of two 6'' BC guns, and one battery of two 8'' BC guns, all shielded type.

[3] 10. No change in the eventual project for the antiaircraft defense of Kaneohe Bay over that prescribed for the temporary defense Paragraph 3 a (2) above, is contemplated.

11. Reinforcement of either the peace or war garrisons of the Hawaiian Department by additional troops for the beach and land defense of Kaneohe Bay is not contemplated at this time.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[s] F. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls:

#1 Memor from Ch. of Eng. to Ch. of Coast Artillery, C. of E. 662B (Oahu), August 26, 1941.

#2 1st Ind. frm Ch. of Coast Artillery, to A. C. of S, WPD 663/45-F-1, July 23, 1941. (added)

Original Incl. #1 w/d)

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

Paraphrase

Radio 320—13th

SEPTEMBER 13, 1941

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Additional funds needed to complete railway gun position project also funds needed to erect positions in Kaneohe Bay area as para four B paren two paren letter this headquarters thirty one July nineteen forty one subject coast artillery armament for naval air station Kaneohe Bay paragraph due added costs of materials and labor in this area railway gun positions in approved project could not be built with funds allotted last fiscal year Stop Estimates prepared by district engineer Honolulu aver that one hundred seventeen thousand two hundred fifty six dollars required to add to funds received last fiscal year for railway gun

positions Stop Building of positions for one four gun eight inch railway battery and three four gun one fifty five batteries in Kaneohe Bay area estimated to cost two hundred fifteen thousand two hundred sixty five dollars Stop Above amounts include direct and indirect costs and are for sites recommended as first priority by commanding general Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command in which I agree for immediate construction paragraph project will follow Stop District engine Honolulu is submitting cost estimates to chief of engineers by radio Stop Pending the receipt of this letter strongly recommend that money in amount of three hundred thirty two thousand five hundred twenty one dollars be contained in pending appropriation bill.

SHORT.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 18 September 1941.

In reply refer to:

Engr. 662/4 x 662/7

Via "Clipper" Air Mail

Subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the Defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:

a. Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 18 June 1941.

b. Secret letter HHD to TAG, 5 June 1941, Subject: "War Garrison for Initial War Operation", file AG 320.3/37b, with 1st Indorsement TAG to HHD, dated 22 July 1941.

c. Secret letter HHD to TAG 31 July 1941, Subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay", file AG 381/20.

2. Reference a. directs that the Army assumes the responsibility for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area. A study by this headquarters of the armament requirements for the defense of Kaneohe Bay and submitted by my 1st Indorsement to reference a. requested the inclusion of the following items of Seacoast Defense Armament in the Hawaiian Defense Project for this purpose:

3 Batteries of 155-mm guns.

1 Battery of two 12-inch barbette guns with related equipment

3. A restudy of the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area submitted by reference b. recommended that the following armament be provided:

Two 155-mm gun batteries

Two 6-inch fixed gun batteries of two guns each

One 16-inch long range casemated gun battery of two guns on barbette carriages.

[2] 4. A realization of the fact that it will be at least two years before these items of fixed armament, namely, the two 6-inch batteries and the one 16-inch battery, can be installed, makes it necessary that some provision be made immediately for the employment of mobile artillery to defend this area. The 1st Indorsement from The Adjutant General's Office to reference b. authorized the following additional units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:

One battalion of Coast Artillery, 155-mm guns with one additional gun battery.

One Harbor Defense Battery.

Pending the installation of the fixed batteries, it is recommended that the Seacoast Defenses of the Kaneohe area consist of the following items of mobile artillery:

Three 155-mm gun batteries.

One 8-inch railway gun battery.

The proposed locations and fields of fire of these batteries are shown on map, Inclosure No. 1.

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5. Since there is no railroad running from Honolulu to Kaneohe Bay, it will be necessary to move this railway battery to Kaneohe Bay by truck trailer, and it is proposed to install this battery on fixed mounts similar to those of Battery Granger Adams on Black Point.

6. Each of the 155-mm battery positions should include the following:

- (1) 4 Panama mounts.
- (2) 4 splinterproof ammunition shelters for 25 rounds at each gun position.
- (3) 4 gun bunkers.
- (4) 4 splinterproof personnel shelters.
- (5) 2 splinterproof propellant shelters for 150 charges each.
- (6) 2 splinterproof projectile shelters for 150 projectiles each.
- (7) 1 splinterproof plotting room.
- (8) The roads and ramps necessary for the occupation of the position.
- (9) Camouflage treatment of all the above listed installations.

Considering the urgent need for combat training and the large amount of labor required to complete field works now being constructed by the troops of this command, it is believed advisable to construct these positions by contract.

[3] 7. The cost of installation of the three batteries of 155-mm guns including the acquisition of land has been estimated at \$93,630.00. The cost of the transportation and installation of the 8-inch railway battery in an emplacement similar to that of Battery Granger Adams has been estimated at \$121,635. These estimated costs include both direct costs and indirect costs. Inclosure No. 2 is a tabular breakdown of these cost figures.

8. It is recommended that the installation of these three batteries of 155-mm guns with the necessary field fortifications and the construction of one 8-inch gun battery position be approved, and that funds in the amount of \$215,265.00 be allotted to the U. S. District Engineer, Honolulu, for construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls:

- (1) Map
- (2) Breakdown

A True copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1D]

[SECRET]

27 AUGUST 1941.

Deslege Brown
1st Lieutenant, Corps of Engrs.
Assistant Department Engineer.

To: The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

Beurad anno fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway at three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill Stop Thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation Stop Reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing Stop Strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred foot runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible Stop Main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run Stop Auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being leveled recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

SHORT.

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieutenant, F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Landing Facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind.

(12-E10)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., August 25, 1941.

To The Adjutant General *THRU* Chief of Engineers.

1. Attached hereto is a copy of the radiogram transmitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. on July 15, 1941.

2. In explanation thereof, you are advised that this office concurs with the opinion that the uneven areas in the runways, referred to in the basic communication, should be eliminated in the interests of safe operation.

3. This office considers runways of 4,500 feet in length to be an absolute minimum for military airports at sea level, with an additional 500 feet of length for each 1,000 feet of elevation or fraction thereof. This minimum likewise meets the requirements for the future installation of an instrument landing facility, if there is provided that the same time forty to one clear angles of approach at both ends of the runway in question.

4. If such clearances are not available at the north end of the present N-8 runway, or of the proposed new N-8 runway, because of quarters built at that end of the field, then the runway lengths should be extended on the southerly ends sufficiently to insure that a 4,500 foot length of runway will exist south of a point where a forty to one clearance angle may be realized.

5. There is no objection to the runway crossing the railroad spur, if necessary, providing the runway pavement is kept flush with the top of the rails and there is; no break in the runway grade, and providing, of course, rail traffic is controlled. If a difference in grade exists, the rail grade should be brought to that of the runway, or the spur relocated.

6. It is requested that the District Engineer be advised of these considerations, and that his new estimates be made accordingly.

7. No funds are available at this time for the construction and improvements recommended in the basic communications. The recommendation, however, will be placed in our "Suspense File" for further consideration upon receipt of a revised estimate, and when funds therefore become available.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Asst. Chief, Bldgs. & Grounds Div.

Incl. Cy, Radio 8/21/41

cc: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

For information only

This is not an authorization

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER
ROOM 3441, MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

56 WTJ 125 WD

Pt Shafter TH 1057 A Aug 27

THE AG

Washington DC.

Reurad agmo fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway as three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill stop thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation stop reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing stop strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred feet runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible stop main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run stop auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being levelled . . Recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

SHORT.

2566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

305 AM

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

IMMEDIATE ACTION

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington.

1st Ind.

AG 580.82-Wheeler
Field (8-27-41) NO

JJF 1r

War Department, AGO, August 28, 1941—To the Chief of the Air Corps.

In connection with letter your office dated July 11, 1941, file 611.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] JOHN B. COOLEY,
Adjutant General.

A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Landing facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind.

(12 E10)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. With reference to your radiogram dated August 27, 1941, attention is invited to 2nd Indorsement of basic letter dated June 21st, subject as noted above, a copy of which is attached hereto.

2. A request has been made this date that \$25,000.00 be included in the funds estimated to be required for use in future airfield development. This sum is to be used for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field.

3. No request will be made for the inclusion of funds for the construction of the auxiliary runway, pending receipt of the revised estimate as requested in the 2nd Indorsement referred to above.

By order of the Chief of the Air Corps.

FRANK M. KENNEDY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Building & Grounds Division.

Incl. Cy 2nd Ind. 8/25/41

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1E]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 June 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is routine.

ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

A true copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Division engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering contract W dash four one four ENGR seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now a dash one dash G stop This contract is the one for furnishing all materias for cableway to Kaala aircraft Warning station Stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to General Electric Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be delayed about fifteen weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this Department Stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to a dash one dash B

[S] SHORT.

ENC-SEC by Capt. C. J. Harrison SC—715P June 10 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

75 War EM 61 WD

WASHN DC. 740P June 26 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.

904 26th

Agmc reurad three zero zero nine priority contract W dash four one four Engr seven eight four kaala AWS Station advanced to A dash one dash C Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results under this priority be unsatisfactory

ADAMS.

616P

True Copy

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2d Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1]

29 SEPTEMBER 1941.

SIG 676.3

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service Installation Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, file AG 660.2 A. A. (7-5-41) MC-E, 8 July 1941, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service Philippine and Hawaiian Departments." A report of a Board of Officers convened at this headquarters to restudy the AWs project is being transmitted to the War Department by Clipper mail under separate cover. This board has considered the employment of the six fixed and six mobile stations allocated to this Department by the War Department. The increased number of stations now available has necessitated some adjustments in both type and location of the stations in the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile units, as well as new locations. The results of this restudy are covered fully in the report being submitted, and are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Locations a. Kauai. There have been no changes in the fixed station now approved at Kokee. In the former project the mobile station on Kauai was planned for operation on the Waimea Kokee road. This mobile station is now recommended for operation on the coast north of Kilauea Village at latitude 22°13'50", longitude 159°23'54". There is no change in the base camp at Kauai which is now under construction at Kokee for the personnel of both the fixed and mobile stations.

b. Maui. No change has been made in the previously approved fixed station which is now under construction at Red Hill on Haleakala. Formerly approved project contained a mobile station to operate along the road up Haleakala. The project now being submitted makes no change in this mobile unit.

2568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

c. Hawaii. The former project contained a mobile station for the Island of Hawaii, which was to be operated from the upper terminus of the Mauna Loa truck trail, with a base camp for personnel at the Kilauea Military Camp. This station has been eliminated in the restudy and has been replaced by a fixed station in the vicinity of Pahoa at latitude 19°26'50" and longitude 154°57'5", and by a mobile station to operate from an initial position near Kahuku Ranch at latitude 19°30'30", longitude 155°41'40". A base camp similar to that on Kauai will be constructed near the fixed station for the personnel of both that station and the mobile unit.

d. Oahu (1) There is no change in the previously approved fixed station for Mt. Kaala.

(2) The formerly approved mobile station at Manawahua is to be replaced by a fixed station.

(3) Opana. Under the former project, there were not sufficient [2] stations to emplace one on the north shore of Oahu. With the increase in the number of stations allowed, this is now possible and it is recommended that a fixed station be installed at the Opana Triangulation station at coordinates (98.655-19.182).

(4) The increase in the number of stations has also made advisable the consideration of other locations for mobile units on Oahu. This reconsideration indicated that a location at Makapuu Point had many advantages over the former approved Pali location, and it is accordingly recommended that the Makapuu Point Station be considered as an initial operating position in lieu of the former Pali location.

(5) The increase in the number of stations allowed has also made possible the provision of units in reserve against the possibility of failure of one of the primary stations. Since Oahu is the central point in the islands for which protection must be secured, it has been decided to concentrate the reserve units on this island. For this purpose two mobile units are recommended as a mobile reserve and for general operations on Oahu and on other islands if necessary. These stations will be utilized as needed to either replace the other Oahu stations or reinforce the coverage in certain sectors. Locations on Oahu which have been considered for their employment are the Pali location discussed above, on the high ground along Tantalus Road, at Fort Shafter, and at various points along the coast.

(6) Information center. There has been no change in the previous location for the Information Center which is now under construction at Fort Shafter. In compliance with other directives, this installation has been combined with various command posts into an air defense command post.

(7) No base camps are being provided for the stations on Oahu as the personnel will be housed in construction already approved for the Signal Area, Fort Shafter. The same construction, however, will be built at the Manawahua and Opana fixed stations as is now approved for Kaala.

2. Reference is made to 2d Ind, Hq Haw Dept, OSigO, 31 May 1941, to the letter Sig. 676.3 (AWS) dated 17 October 40 in which Signal funds totalling \$75,281.84 were requested for the installation of radio and wire facilities for the original three fixed and five mobile stations. Due to the abandonment of the mobile station at the Nuuanu Pali on Oahu and the Moana Loa Station on Hawaii, this sum can be reduced by \$2,296.00 to \$72,985.84. The allocation of additional stations has necessitated increased demands for Signal communications. These additional communication facilities are summarized as follows:

a. Radio facilities for the control from the Information Center of pursuit task forces. This includes a station at the control airdrome with four satellite stations at the principal pursuit fields on Oahu.

Total cost..... \$55,000

b. Emergency power for pursuit radio control transmitters. This power is to allow the operation of pursuit control during commercial power failure.

Total cost..... \$12,000

c. Commercial power extensions to include provision of adequate commercial power for the base camps and the principal alert stations at locations where this is economically feasible.

Total cost..... \$39,000

[3] d. AWS radio communication facilities to include additional transmitters and receivers at the new fixed stations, receivers at the Information Center and allied antenna and control equipment as established by standard practice.

Total cost..... \$18,000

e. AWS wire and cable facilities to include additional cable extensions for the added stations on Oahu, together with additional telephone and teletype equipment. This item also includes a cable installation from the Hawaii base camp to the detector unit at Pahoa.

Total cost..... \$10, 900

f. Commercial wire facilities to include leased lines from all base camps to the nearest commercial exchange, leased lines from the principal alert stations to the nearest exchanges, together with the yearly rental charge.

Total cost..... \$10, 463. 67
Total Sig funds..... 145, 400. 00

3. Estimates for the internal wire facilities of the Information Center and the allied Air Defense wire facilities are being held in abeyance pending more reliable information upon which to estimate the necessary funds. It is believed, however, that estimates for the Information Center should be included in the next available appropriation bill. Information Center layouts and schematic diagrams of the Information Center Wire Net have been forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer for review. This data is being transmitted as an inclosure to the aforementioned board proceedings.

4. Funds in the amount of \$890,804 have been made available to the Dist. Engr., Honolulu, to complete the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile stations. Some of these funds were for stations which are being superseded by other stations in the revised program. The tabulation below shows cost estimates on the new stations, less the amounts available from the superseded stations, and the total of engineer funds supplementing those now on hand required to complete the revised projects.

Item No.	Description	Oahu Manawahua	Opana	Makapuu	Kauai Kilauea	Hawaii Pahoa	Kahuku
1	Cost of Site.....	\$2, 000	\$2, 000		\$2, 000	\$7, 500	\$500
2	Clearing.....	300	200			300	
3	Grading.....	2, 700	800	\$500	500	700	200
4	Right of Way-Access Road.....	500	500		500	1, 800	200
5	Road Constr.....	58, 470	28, 000	5, 700	24, 800	9, 000	3, 000
6	Bldg. Constr.....	26, 260	29, 250	11, 965	12, 300	74, 720	12, 070
7	Fuel Storage.....	1, 900	1, 900			2, 700	
8	Water Supply.....	2, 970	4, 400	200	2, 000	9, 000	1, 000
(4) 9	Sewage Disposal.....	900	1, 000	1, 000	500	2, 970	500
10	Man Proof Fence.....	2, 000	2, 000			3, 000	
		98, 000	70, 050	19, 365	42, 600	111, 690	17, 470
					Oahu	Kauai	Hawaii
Subtotals by Islands.....					\$187, 415	\$42, 600	\$129, 160
Funds now available from superseded sites.....					76, 735	12, 600	36, 217
Supplemental funds required.....					110, 680	30, 000	98, 943

Total..... \$233, 623

Mobilization of Personnel and Plant at 3%..... \$7, 010

Total direct costs..... 240, 633

Contingencies, Contractors Fee, Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Insurance at 15%..... 36, 100

Engineering, Surveys, Inspection and Auditing at 18%..... 19, 250

General Office Overhead at 8%..... 19, 250

Grand Total Engineer funds..... 315, 283

5. Secret radiogram No 321, this hq, 13 September 41, submitted for advance consideration the above cost estimates with the exception of those which had been previously submitted as stated in par 2 above. Since no information has been received concerning the previous recommendation, those estimates are being added to the figures submitted by the radiogram cited.

6. I strongly recommend that funds in the amount of \$315,233 for engineer construction, and \$218,400 for signal communications and one year's rent of

2570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

leased wire facilities, total \$533,633, to be included in pending appropriation bills, and made available as soon as possible for the completion of the revised project.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

True Copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit 1F]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT ENGINEER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 3, 1941.

Via Clipper Airmail
Engr. 523.07

Subject: Priorities and Preference Ratings.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. On 4 June 1941 I wrote a letter, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priority in Shipping Space for the Hawaiian Electric Company", in which the question of securing shipping space priorities for this company was discussed. A copy of this letter is inclosed for ready reference. At that time the main problem was the securing of shipping space; since then it has developed that difficulties are also arising concerning the procurement of materials. I have directed that an investigation be made of this priority question, and the results of this investigation indicate that some clarification and coordination is highly desirable.

2. At the present time priorities and preference ratings for Army activities are assigned by the various procurement agencies and contracting officers. There is now no coordination in the Department between these various agencies, each of which is dealing direct on priorities questions with its Chief in the War Department. This is satisfactory as long as only one procurement agency or contracting officer is involved. There are cases, however, in which more than one agency is involved, and the number of these will undoubtedly increase in the future; I believe it is advisable to have a coordinating agency in the Department to not only coordinate these cases locally, but also to bring to the attention of the War Department the advisability of similar coordination between the Chiefs of the respective agencies. Also there are many procurement problems on which the establishment of priorities and preference ratings is necessary which no agency is now handling. The 14th Naval District has already established a central priority office in the local bureau of supplies and accounts where priorities information is kept available, and where preference ratings on all Navy orders are issued.

3. The following outlines in greater detail some of the problems on which difficulty has already been encountered:

a. We have some projects in which more than one supply or construction branch is interested. While there is no complaint with the present system by which each agency handles priority matters with its Chief in the War Department there is a probability that desirable action by one agency may be overlooked with the result that the second agency might be held up in its work even thou it had taken all action necessary.

[2] b. Hawaii presents a special problem in procurement as do the other overseas departments, due to the shipping situation. The present priorities instructions are concerned with procurement; in this Department, however, priorities on shipping space are important. There are large quantities of essential materials transported on commercial shipping. These shipments involve not only government shipments but also shipments by private concerns of materials which are to be incorporated in defense installations.

c. Practically all construction materials must be imported into the island. The various constructing agencies are, of course, anticipating their needs and are having materials procured on the mainland and shipped to the department. It is impossible to anticipate every item needed, and in the past the various supply houses in the department, such as the Honolulu Iron Works, the Hawaiian Electric Company, and others, have maintained local stocks from which small items could be procured as they were needed. These local stocks are now becoming a matter of concern. For example, the mainland agents of the Hawaiian

Electric Company have advised the company that it can not expect to obtain replacements for its ordinary warehouse and operations stocks unless a preference rating is placed on this procurement. Practically all of our defense contracts demand electric power and unless the company's local stocks are maintained it will be impossible to install power connections without waiting for the arrival of necessary materials for each connection from the mainland. A specific example of this occurred recently where a sub-contractor on the Hickam Field low-cost housing had to import by Clipper air express at an expense of \$1,000.00, some plumbing items which under normal conditions could have been obtained from local stocks.

d. As stated above shipping priorities are also important. To our knowledge there is now no coordinated shipping priorities, although the Matson Navigation Company, which handles the bulk of the shipments, is granting unofficial priority to items on which a procurement priority has been obtained. As far as government bought and shipped materials are concerned there has been no great difficulty although considerable detail work has been involved in radioing about specific shipments. There are large quantities of materials, however, which are being ordered by private firms either for direct supply to government agencies or for incorporation in defense works directly or indirectly, and these private concerns are encountering great difficulties in securing shipping space for this material.

4. To meet this increasing problem I propose to set up an office in this department to be responsible for coordinating all priorities matters, and I have selected the Department Engineer's office as the section in which this control can best be established. Additional officers, not necessarily engineers, will be placed on duty in that office to furnish needed assistance. [3] The following is a preliminary outline of the duties of this section:

a. To establish an information bureau where request for information on priorities can be promptly filled.

b. To keep me informed of the priorities and preference ratings assigned by regular supply branches to their own procurement in order to insure that these are coordinated. In this work with the regular supply branches and construction agencies it is not intended that the coordinating office will assume any control over these agencies; it is intended, however, that the coordinating office keep informed of what action these agencies are taking in priority matters.

c. We assign preference ratings covering procurements which are essential to defense work and which are not now covered by existing instructions.

5. In the directive of the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, 27 November 1940, it is noted that all Panama Canal defense projects are placed in priority classification A-1-b. There is no similar blanket coverage for devents projects in this department; and the rating which can be assigned to any project in this department depends upon its classification as a general project under the other entries in this directive. The aircraft Warning Service project is the most important single project in the department, and under the general classification in this directive the highest priority which could be assigned to it would be A 1-f. It is believed that the conditions facing this department are similar to those in Panama and that a similar blanket priority classification for our defense projects should be authorized, and that this rating should be high. If this is done it would not be necessary to assign this high a rating to all projects and this department could reserve the high rating for the exceptional projects which were considered absolutely essential.

6. As stated above, the maintenance of adequate local stocks by local supply firms is essential. Existing instructions on the issuance of preference ratings are predicated on the fact that the firm to whom the rating is issued is a government contractor. The local supply firms who must obtain preference ratings to maintain stocks are not actually government contractors at the time they place their mainland orders. These firms become contractors, however, when a government agency orders materials from their stocks. The question involved here is one of time; and obviously we should not wait until the specific need for a stock item arises to issue a preference rating then delay the job while the item is being procured and shipped. It is believed that some authority should exist for us to give preference ratings for the procurement of any items which we, through experience and knowledge of future projects, select as essential.

[4] 7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. The establishment of a blanket priority for Hawaiian defense projects as has been done for Panama Canal defense projects, and authorization to this headquarters to apply this high rating to cases of exceptional importance.

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b. Waiving of the requirement that preference ratings can be issued only to government contractors and authorization to this Headquarters to issue these ratings for the procurement of those items which we anticipate will be essential to the defense program.

c. Consideration of the establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies on the West Coast to insure that defense materials ordered by private firms receive proper priorities in shipping space.

It is further recommended that prompt consideration be given to subparagraphs a and b above and this headquarters advised by radio of the War Department's attitude.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 incl: C/Ltr. Engr 523.07 4 Jun 1941

Record copy Engineers

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

114.14-18-C-32 RGC/amw
(8-18-41)

1st Indorsement

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE,
ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD,
WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.)

1. The following information is submitted in answer to the recommendations on page 4 of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short:

2. The establishment of a blanket priority specifically to Hawaiian Defense Projects is not considered necessary inasmuch as the Directive, Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, established the preference rating A-1-c for "Construction, equipment, defense and development of outlying bases, not included in the Continental United States". This Directive is the cumulative result of an exhaustive study of the military importance of the various items required by the military and naval forces of the United States, and has received the approval of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.

3. Attention is invited to a copy of communication of July 31, 1941, from the Army and Navy Munitions Board to "Supply Arms and Services of the Army and Bureaus and Offices of the Navy", which explains the procedure covering the issuance of project rating orders to Army and Navy construction projects outside of the Continental United States. It will be noted that the project rating orders issued in accordance with these instructions will not be confined to items on the Critical List, but will include all items necessary to complete the construction of a particular project. These ratings may be extended in the usual way, and it is believed should cover the recommendation as made in paragraph 7 b.

4. Attention is invited to the "Defense Supply Rating Plan" recently inaugurated by the Office of Production Management. This is a plan developed whereby the manufacturers who supply so-called "Off the shelf" items to defense industries are permitted to get material with which to manufacture additional stock so as to make a supply available to defense customers. This plan may be of value to some of the concerns in the Hawaiian District and is mentioned for your consideration.

5. The establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies of the West Coast has been referred to the Division of Emergency Shipping, Maritime Commission. That Commission has a record of the situation as it exists and as it has been for some time. They are further checking into the situation, but definite decision to establish a liaison agency has not been made.

For the Priorities Committee:

ROBT. G. COOK,
Major, Ordnance, USA.

1 Incl. no change.

A True Copy:

Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTONVia Air Mail.
AG 523 Priority
(7-7-41) MB

2nd Ind.

JAU

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., August 28, 1941.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.
By order of the Secretary of War:

*Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.*

1 Incl. n/c.

A True Copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

14 AUGUST 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Relet this headquarters third July file engr five two three point zero seven subject priorities and preference ratings stop. This question of priorities becoming more pressing and many local supply houses are now advised by mainland agents that no shipment can be made until priority is secured stop. Request radio advice as to action on recommendations paragraph seven of letter cited.

SHORT.

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Oct. 23, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Engr. 523.07

Subject: Office of Production Management Field Service.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter dated 13 August 1941 from the Army and Navy Munitions Board, a copy of which is inclosed. Reference is also made to letter from this headquarters, file Engr. 523.07, subject "Priorities and Preference Ratings," and 1st Indorsement from Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, 18 August 1941, file 114.14-18-C-32-RGC-amw (8-18-41).

2. The conditions as to securing priorities for materials needed in the Hawaiian Islands are growing worse steadily, and a large part of the difficulties encountered can be traced to lack of information and to failure of field offices, whose region includes this Territory, to make themselves known to local Federal officials and business men. The long distances involved in travel, the difference in time, and the high cost of telephonic communication, all make contact with any regional office difficult.

3. Governor Poindexter has already submitted a request to Washington for the establishment of a local office of the Priorities Division, OPM, and at his request I concurred in his suggested action. A copy of my letter of September 13, 1941 to the Governor is inclosed for your information.

4. It is therefore requested that the War Department propose the establishment in Honolulu of a field office of the Office of Production Management, to

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include the Priorities Division, initially, with provision for adding representatives of other divisions later, if required.

(s) WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls: (1) Cy of ltr Army & Navy Munitions Board, 8/13/41; (2) Cy of ltr to Gov. Poindexter, 13 Sept 41.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board
(10-23-41) MB 1st Ind

IG/mm-1713

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
October 31, 1941.

To: The Under Secretary of War.

2 Incls. No change.

A true copy.

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

2d Indorsement

18-C-32 RGC/amw
(11-13-41)

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE

ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD

WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, War Dept., Washington, D. C.)

1. Recommendation has been made to the Office of Production Management and a field office of the Office of Production Management be established in Hawaii at an early date. They have requested to advise this Committee as to the action contemplated or already accomplished in this direction. Such information will be forwarded when received.

For the Priorities Committee:

(/s/) ROBT. G. COOK,
Major, Ordnance, USA.

2 Incls. No change.

3rd Ind.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board (10-23-41) MB

IG:wc-1713

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
November 17, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(/s/) E. L. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c.

A true copy.

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1G]

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 28, 1941.

VIA "CLIPPER" AIR MAIL

Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The delay in securing necessary materials for our construction program has become a matter of serious concern. Experience indicates that from three to four months are necessary to procure construction materials from the United States after funds for projects are allotted, and increasing transportation difficulties may lengthen this time.

2. The following is the situation of the two constructing agencies:

a. The District Engineer has no revolving fund for advance procurement of materials. Among the first Engineer projects approved, however, were two large projects; one the additional ammunition storage facilities, and the other the Air Corps mobilization housing. As soon as these allotments were received, the District Engineer immediately ordered all or a large part of the necessary materials to complete the entire project. With his construction crews now well organized, the rate of using these materials has greatly accelerated and the stock is being depleted because the rate of use is greater than the rate of arrival from the mainland.

b. The Constructing Quartermaster is in somewhat the same situation. While the Quartermaster General has authorized the establishment of a stock pile of lumber, no funds have been advanced for the procurement of other materials. These other materials are not available for local purchase in any appreciable quantities, and as a result, there will undoubtedly be delays.

3. I understand that the Division Engineer, San Francisco, has recommended to the Chief of Engineers that a revolving working fund of \$1,000,000.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to permit that officer to procure materials in advance. This fund would be a revolving fund. All expenditures from it for materials would be reimbursed from other projects funds as these projects were approved and utilize the materials.

4. I think that this materials situation may become critical. As stated in previous communications, a large part of our construction forces have been imported from the mainland on contracts which require either their continued employment or return to the mainland at Government expense. It is obvious that if there is any lack of materials not only will the jobs be delayed, but also the cost to the Government will be increased. I therefore strongly recommend that the suggestion of the Division Engineer, San Francisco, be adopted, that the District Engineer, Honolulu, be allotted a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00, and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster to permit him to stock materials in addition to lumber.

(s) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.

AG 600.12 Hawaiian Dept.

1st Ind.

ET/rm

(7-28-41) MO

WAR DEPARTMENT, AGO,
August 1, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers AND The Quartermaster General, IN TURN.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

_____,
Adjutant General.

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,

EDWARD VON GELDERN,

2nd Lt., F. A.

2576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

400.31 (Honolulu) 335.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.

2nd Ind.

3-N

OFFICE, C. OF E.,
August 7, 1941.

To The Adjutant General (Through The Quartermaster General.)

It is recommended that a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00 be authorized for the purposes indicated in the basic letter. If the necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, it is believed that this amount could be advanced from the Fifth Supplemental, 1941, Deferred Storage Program, (Air Corps), Items a & b, Parking Storage Areas, Reserve Airplanes. As a final resort, the sum of \$1,000,000.00 now reserved for construction at the Mobile Air Depot, (Brookley Field) could be advanced for this purpose. In either case, reimbursement should be effected upon the appropriation of funds for construction in Hawaii under the 1943 Construction Program.

For the Chief of Engineers:

(s) John R. Hardin,
JOHN R. HARDIN,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

20 AUGUST 1941.

FRED W. HERMAN,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Dept. Engineer.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Reference clipper letter this headquarters July twenty eighth file Engr six hundred point one two parenthesis gen period parenthesis subject revolving fund for purchase of materials Stop Information has been received from district engineer Honolulu that allotment of one million one hundred thousand dollars has been received which can be utilized for advanced purchases of materials as recommended in letter cited Stop Constructing quartermaster has not repeat not received similar allotment as revolving fund to permit advance purchases of materials nor any information thereof Stop Strongly recommend revolving fund allotment similar to that established for district engineer be made to constructing quartermaster to permit advanced ordering of materials for defense contracts

SHORT

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

QM 411.1 C-P
(Hawaiian Dept.)

3rd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., August 21, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The Quartermaster Corps has established a stock-pile reserve of lumber in Hawaii in the amount of \$600,000.00. It is therefore recommended that a revolving fund in an amount not to exceed \$500,000.00 be authorized. If the necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, funds in allotted status to the Quartermaster Corps can be made available.

For the Quartermaster General:

(s) L. R. Groves,
L. R. GROVES,
Colonel, Q. M. C.,
Assistant

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials—Hawaiian Department
AG 600.12 Haw. Dept.

(7-28-41) MO-D

4th Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, AGO.

September 27, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

The establishment of revolving funds as requested in basic communication is not favorably considered. The Quartermaster General will, however, augment the lumber stock pile now maintained in the Hawaiian Department sufficiently to meet requirements for War Department approved projects for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. A similar stock pile of other classes of construction materials will also be established by The Quartermaster General without delay. The materials used from these stock piles will be replaced from applicable funds of projects for which used as soon as such funds become available to local constructing agencies.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., September 13, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)

Major General R. C. MOORE

Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR DICK:

The situation surrounding the obtaining of materials for defense contracts is becoming more and more critical. On many items a delay of between three and four months occurs between the time an allotment of funds for a project is received and the materials necessary are obtained from the mainland. We have recently received word on some electrical equipment which indicates that delivery cannot be made for six months.

In a conference with Colonel Hannum, Division Engineer in San Francisco, when he was here sometime ago, he mentioned that he had recommended to The Chief of Engineers that a revolving fund of \$1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the District Engineer to make advance purchases of materials and plant. I followed up Hannum's recommendation to the Chief of Engineers with a strong letter to the War Department urging that this revolving fund be set up for the District Engineer and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster. The District Engineer informed me today that he had received an allotment of \$1,100,000.00 from the Chief of Engineers which could be utilized for the advance purchase of materials. The Constructing Quartermaster, however, has not yet received similar information, and while he is authorized to stock lumber locally, he has no revolving fund for which to make advance purchases of materials other than lumber.

I am following up my previous recommendation by radio to The Adjutant General today. I think that the matter is sufficiently important to bring it to your attention, and I will appreciate it if you would have someone look into this matter. A copy of my letter of July 28th and of the radio follow up of September 13 are inclosed for ready reference.

Very sincerely.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

2 Incls: Cy. ltr. Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 28 Jul 41, Cy. rad. 20 Aug 41.

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

2578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, September 29, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR WALTER:

I have your letter of the thirteenth relative to the establishment of revolving funds in connection with construction in Hawaii.

Owing to legal restrictions we cannot approve your request for revolving funds. However, it appears that the wording of the appropriation from which the Quartermaster General maintains the lumber pile you mention is such that those funds may be used to make advance purchases of other materials required for construction.

The Quartermaster General will take immediate measures to establish a stock pile of construction materials other than lumber, sufficient to meet requirements for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. The conditions under which these stock piles will be reimbursed will be covered in the reply of the War Department to your official request of July 28, 1941.

The Chief of Engineers advises that the allotment of \$1,100,000 made to your District Engineer, to which you refer, is from funds now available for approved projects. This allotment should not be construed as making these funds available to you as a revolving fund, nor for advance purchase of materials, except for the projects to which the funds apply.

I believe that when these stock piles have become established the situation you outline will be greatly relieved.

Sincerely yours.

[S] R. C. Moore,
R. C. MOORE,
Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff.

A true copy.

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[Exhibit 1 H]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, November 27, 1941.

Air Mail via Clipper

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., Office of the Department Commander.

DEAR SHORT: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards.
Sincerely.

[S] H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

A true copy:

Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 11]

Subject: Increase in the Strength of the Third Engineers.
AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C 3rd Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., February 10, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department

1. Action is being taken to increase the allotment of Regular Army enlisted men for the Corps of Engineers, Hawaiian Department by 107. This allotment will permit the organization of the 3rd Engineers in accordance with Table of Organization 5-11, November 1, 1940. Regular Army personnel are not available to increase further the strength of this regiment.

2. Since War Department policy forbids sending trainees to the Overseas Departments it will not be practicable to aid you in creating an Engineer Battalion (Separate) as recommended in your radio of January 23, 1941.

3. As previously advised, plans provide for the activation of a separate Engineer Company (Avn) for your Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., February 19, 1941.

In reply refer to:

Engr. 322.03

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, Engr. 322.03, 23 August 1940, which recommended the assignment to the Department of an Engineer regiment (Aviation) less one battalion, and to letter, Engr. 210 x220.03, 1 November 1940, which recommended an increase in the strength of the Third Engineers, and to letter, Engr. 322.03, 5 February 1941, recommending a redesignation in the Third Engineers from a combat regiment, Division, to a combat regiment, Corps.

2. These previous recommendations for an increase in the Engineer component in the Department were based upon the assumption that some civilian labor would be available. It has been necessary with the various agencies involved in defense construction to import skilled labor from the mainland. A recent increase in the defense contracts of the Navy will now necessitate the importation of unskilled labor as well. This development now makes it impossible to assume that any appreciable local labor will be available and requires that previous estimates of the minimum force of Engineers necessary be revised upwards.

3. I consider it essential that a regiment of Engineers (Aviation) be furnished this Department as an integral part of the Hawaiian Air Force and that a regiment of Engineers, General Service, be furnished this department as Department Engineer troops. There is sufficient work immediately on hand in connection with Air Corps activities on the outlying islands and on Oahu to keep a regiment of Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with military roads and trails in department units to keep a regiment of General Service Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with the Hawaiian Division such as bombproofing of Division command posts and communication centers, road blocks and other tactical employment to keep the Third Engineers continuously occupied.

4. It is therefore recommended that one regiment of Engineers (Aviation) (T. O. 5-411) and one regiment of Engineers, General Service, (T. O. 5-21) be authorized for this Department and that these units complete with personnel and equipment be furnished as soon as possible..

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

Record copy: Engineers.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

2580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops. Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
May 15, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. a. The 34th Engineers (Combat), will be activated in your department with an allotted strength of 1127 enlisted men under T/O 5-171, November 1, 1940, less band and basic privates, on June 1, 1941 (AG 320.2 (4-8-41) M-C, radio April 9, 1941).

b. The regiment will be organized with cadres to be furnished by units now in your department, as directed by you, and with selectees to be dispatched from the Continental United States.

c. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of the available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so that they can complete their training in Hawaii. Under the present tentative schedule, it is proposed to dispatch the full quota except thirty-six attached medical, in June. The Medical Department personnel will be dispatched in November.

d. The actual date of activation of the regiment will conform to the arrival of personnel in your department.

2. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 34th Engineers (and the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) is allotted a full quota of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this attached medical personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.

3. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:

a. The actual date of activation of the 34th Engineers.

b. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in engineer units in connection with the organization of the 34th Engineers.

4. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of change in status reports—Defense Reserves, Overseas Departments.

5. Your request for aviation engineers is being considered separately.

6. The allotment of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings of enlisted personnel will be made separately.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

3 Inclosures—

Incl. 1.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to C. G., Third Corps Area.

Incl. 2.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to C. G., New York Port of Embarkation.

Incl. 3.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to The Quartermaster General.

A True Copy:

H. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, June 18, 1941.

AG 320.2
(6-5-41) MR-M-C

Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units (804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), and Personnel for Engineer Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force).

To: The Commanding Generals, Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

Extract

1. The 804th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate), now in Hawaii, will be disbanded at the earliest practicable date and concurrently therewith the 804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), will be constituted and activated with, an authorized strength of 21 officers and 625 enlisted men, including 10 attached medical. The personnel, unit funds, and equipment of the 804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate).

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] E. S. ADAMS,
*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

A True Copy:

H. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, May 28, 1941.

AG 320.2 (5-28-41) MC-C-M

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops and Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.

To: The Commanding General, Third Corps Area.

The Sailings of USATs Manhattan, Washington, and Wood for Hawaii have been indefinitely postponed. So much of letters, this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, and May 10, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M, subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison Hawaiian Department, as pertains to movement of trainees to Ports of Embarkation and overseas movement is rescinded. Instructions covering final disposition of trainees earmarked by the two letters mentioned above will follow this communication.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

Copies furnished:

The Commanding Generals, First Army, GHQ Air Force, Hawaiian Department, San Francisco and New York Ports of Embarkation;
The Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Quartermaster General; and
The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:

H. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, June 23, 1941.

AG 320.2 (6-16-41) MC-C-M

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department.

To: The Commanding Generals, Hawaiian Department, Third Corps Area and the New York Port of Embarkation;

The Quartermaster General.

Letter this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area, the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, and The Quartermaster General, respectively; and 1st Indorsement this office,

2582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, same subject, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, are rescinded. Letters, this office May 23, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-23-41) MC-M, May 24, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-24-41) MC, and May 27, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-26-41) MC, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area are also rescinded.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General

Copies Furnished:

Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Commanding Generals, First Army, and S. F. P. of E
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Chief of Finance
The Surgeon General

A True Copy:

H. W. Truman,
H. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (4-21-41) MC-C

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
May 21, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Radio No. 721, this office, April 9, 1941, requested your views on the practicability of securing additional selectees locally, and it was not intended that an appeal be made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure 1,127 additional selectees in excess of the existing quota.

2. In connection with your remarks on labor shortage in Hawaii, a resolution recently passed by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, copies of which were sent to the Secretary of War and other governmental heads, protested the organization of a port company in Hawaii on the grounds that the supply of labor was ample and that needs of National Defense projects could be met without importation of additional personnel from the United States. This matter is brought to your attention for information only. No further action appears necessary or desirable at this time.

3. Personnel for the 34th Engineers will be provided from the Continental United States in two increments. Details have been communicated to you in separate correspondence.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 21 April 1941.

In reply refer to:

AG 381

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. War Department radio No. 721, of 9 April 1941, proposes activation in this Department of the 34th Engineer Regiment (C) in June with a strength of 1127, including 36 attached medical personnel. It further proposes that the 3d Engineers (C) will furnish the cadre; the balance to be local selectees.

2. As the existing Territorial quota of 1400 Selectees has already been exceeded by approximately 500, and those now inducted assigned to organizations, an appeal was made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure the additional personnel required to activate this new unit. The Governor's reply, attached, states that he is without authority to call additional quotas of trainees, and even if such authority existed, he is opposed to providing additional manpower at the expense of National Defense projects and local industry which have already absorbed all available labor.

3. The labor shortage in Hawaii is acute. Skilled labor for work on National Defense projects is now being imported and it is quite likely that the importation of unskilled labor will become necessary to maintain defense work schedules.

4. In view of these circumstances it is urged that the War Department provide personnel from the Mainland U. S. for the activation of new or expansion of existing units in the Hawaiian Department.

[sgd] Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls.

1. Letter to Governor, T. H.
2. Letter from Governor, T. H.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1J]

[7]

[SECRET]

18 FEBRUARY 1941.

AG 320.2/55

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Letter the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated 24 January 1941, with reference to the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against a surprise attack, copy forwarded to this headquarters as inclosure to letter TAG to HHD, 7 February 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," file AG 381 (1-24-41) M.

B. Letter HHD to TAG, 5 September 1940, subject: "Additional Antiaircraft Troops for the Hawaiian Department", file 320.2/49.

C. Letter TAG to HHD, 27 September 1940, subject: War Reinforcements, Hawaiian Department", file 320.2 (9/27/40) M-WPD, with 1st and 2nd Indorsements thereon.

2. The increasingly critical international situation, together with the vital need, as expressed in Reference A, for adequate provision for the best defense which can be provided for the security of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet against surprise attacks makes it essential that the antiaircraft artillery garrison of Oahu be placed upon a war footing without delay. While not specifically mentioned in Reference A, there is a similar requirement for a sound defense of the Fleet and its base against raids by surface ships. This would have special importance if the fleet should be withdrawn from Pearl Harbor. An adequate defense, ready for prompt action, can not be provided with the present garrison because of the necessity for dual assignments of Coast Artillery batteries to anti-aircraft and harbor defense missions. The reinforcements required for the anti-aircraft artillery and harbor defense garrisons to provide the degree of defense considered essential are discussed below.

3. Antiaircraft Artillery.

a. The approved defense project provides for twenty-five (25) gun batteries, five (5) searchlight batteries, and sixteen (16) automatic weapons batteries manning a total of seventy-two (72) mobile and twenty-six (26) fixed AA guns, seventy-five (75) searchlights, one hundred and twenty (120) 37 mm AA guns, and two hundred (200) cal. .50 AA machine guns. (NOTE: Three hundred and

[2] forty five (345) cal. .50 AA machine guns are provided in the defense project, of which two hundred (200) are manned by antiaircraft artillery and the remainder by other troops.) With the present garrison, including the assignment of all but two (2) harbor defense artillery batteries to antiaircraft assignments, only nineteen (19) gun batteries, three (3) searchlight batteries,

2584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

no 37 mm batteries and six (6) machine gun batteries can be manned because of the shortage of both personnel and equipment. The major shortages in anti-aircraft artillery armament are sixteen (16) three inch AA guns and associated equipment (of which six (6) guns are understood to be enroute to this Department), all one hundred and thirty-five (135) 37 mm AA guns, two hundred and thirty-six (236) cal. .50 machine guns, and thirty (30) sound locators.

b. To man the entire anti-aircraft artillery defense project, avoiding dual assignments to all but four harbor defense batteries, requires an increase in the existing garrison of the following anti-aircraft artillery personnel:

2 Regiments Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) T/O 4-11.

1 Battalion Gun Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) T/O 4-15.

Approximately ninety (90) officers and two thousand (2000) enlisted men as individual filler replacements to activate three (3) gun batteries and three (3) 37 mm batteries of the 64th CA (AA), now in active, and to bring to war strength the active elements of this regiment.

c. In paragraph 10 a of 2nd Indorsement of Reference C, the War Department provided for only one half of the reinforcements of the peacetime garrison of anti-aircraft artillery which, at that time, were considered essential to provide a reasonably effective anti-aircraft defense prior to the date unit reinforcements from the mainland could effect the situation. With the increasingly critical international situation at this time, it is urgently recommended that all war reinforcements of anti-aircraft artillery personnel, both unit and filler reinforcements described above, together with the existing shortages in anti-aircraft artillery material be sent from the mainland with the least practicable delay.

4. Harbor Defense Artillery.

The status of the defense which can be established with existing personnel of the peace garrison of harbor defense artillery is described in detail in par 6f, of the basic document, Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940. Briefly, only one 16-inch battery and the seacoast searchlights of the Ulupau Group can be manned by batteries with harbor defense as their only mission. By employing the undesirable expedient of dual assignments to harbor defense and anti-aircraft missions, and of harbor defense and Field Artillery missions, both 16-inch gun batteries, the one 14-inch battery, one of the two 12-inch gun batteries, none of the three mortar batteries, three of the five 8-inch batteries (fixed and railway), six of the twelve 155mm batteries (two manned by Field Artillery personnel) and none of the two 6-inch and two 3-inch [3] batteries can be manned upon initial deployment. As shown in Table I, par. 7 to HDP-40, an increase of approximately 165 officers and 3400 enlisted men as individual filler reinforcements and One Regiment Coast Artillery (TD, T/O 4-31W) is required to fully man the harbor defense artillery. By not manning the three fixed seacoast mortar batteries, which are not essential to a defense against raids, the total number of individual filler reinforcements may be reduced to approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men. This increase in the garrison will be sufficient to provide only one relief as manning details for harbor defense guns, but will be adequate so that key observation stations, air guards and similar details can be maintained continuously.

5. Summarizing, it is urgently recommended that:

(a) The Coast Artillery garrison of this Department be brought to substantially war strength by the dispatch from the mainland of the following reinforcements:

(1) Two Regiments CA (AA) Mobile, T/O 4-11.

(2) One Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery), T/O 4-15.

(3) One Regiment CA (TD), 155mm gun, T/O 4-31W.

(4) Individual anti-aircraft artillery filler reinforcements to include 91 officers and 2064 enlisted men.

(5) Individual harbor defense artillery reinforcements to include approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men.

b. Existing major shortages in the armament of the approved anti-aircraft artillery projects, as set forth in par. 3 above, be filled as soon as practicable.

WALTER C SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[1]

[SECRET]

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 10, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, will be augmented by approximately 276 officers and 5,734 enlisted men between June, 1941, and March, 1942, in three increments paralleling the estimated delivery of material, as follows:

a. June, 1941:

(1) AA filler replacements, 60 officers and 1,337 enlisted men.

(2) 62 officers and 1,329 enlisted men required to activate the following units in the Department:

98th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), Battery E (Searchlight), basic privates and attached medical, under T/O 4-111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(3) 17 officers and 359 enlisted men to activate the 2d Battalion, 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less Battery H (Gun), Battery E (Searchlight) and basic privates, under T/O 4-115, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

b. November, 1941:

(1) 48 officers and 885 enlisted men to activate the 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 2d Battalion (Gun), 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), and basic privates, under T/O 4-111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(2) 4 officers and 134 enlisted men to activate Battery H (Gun), 97th Coast Artillery, less basic privates, under T/O 4-17, November 1, 1940.

(3) Attached Medical personnel, 98th Coast Artillery, 7 officers and 49 enlisted men.

[2] c. March, 1942:

(1) AA filler replacements, 24 officers and 661 enlisted men.

(2) 54 officers and 980 enlisted men to activate the 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), 97th Coast Artillery and 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), 98th Coast Artillery, each less Battery M (Gun) and basic privates, under T/O 4-125, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

2. Cadres for the new units will be furnished from existing units in the Hawaiian Department; their source, strength and composition will be determined by you.

3. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so the individuals can complete their basic training in Hawaii.

4. The actual activation of the various units will conform to the arrival of personnel in the Department.

5. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments (and the 34th Engineers whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) are allotted full quotas of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.

6. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:

a. The actual dates on which various units are activated.

b. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in Coast Artillery units in connection with activation of new units.

c. List of all Coast Artillery units and installations in the Department including allotted strengths and tables of organization under which organized; this report to be submitted upon completion of the activation of all new units and distribution of the last increment of AA filler replacements.

[3] 7. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of Change in Status Reports—Defense Reserves, Overseas Departments.

8. The allotments of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings for enlisted personnel will be made separately.

9. Recommendation for augmentation of harbor defense artillery is not favorably considered at this time because the additional personnel is not available.

2586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The antiaircraft reinforcements will strengthen the seacoast defenses by the relief of all but four harbor defense batteries from dual antiaircraft missions.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) E. S. ADAMS,
*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

3 inclosures—Added.

Incl. 1—Copy of Ltr., 5/10/41.

AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-N, to C. G., Third Corps Area.

Incl. 2—Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to C. G.s, N. Y. & San Fran. Ports of Emb.

Incl. 3—Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to The Quartermaster General.

Copies furnished:

The Commanding Generals, Third Corps Area and New York & San Francisco Ports of Embarkation:

The Chief of Staff, GHQ;

The Chief of Chaplains;

The Chief of Coast Artillery;

The Chief of the Air Corps;

The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service;

The Chief of Engineers;

The Chief of Ordnance;

The Chief Signal Officer;

The Quartermaster General;

The Surgeon General; and

The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

[1]

AG 320.2/57

25 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Increase of enlisted strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard (California).

To: The Adjutant General.

1. On January 9, 1941, the then Department Commander, Lieutenant General Herron, radioed for authority to increase the enlisted strength of the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from Ninth Corps Area. On January 17, 1941, the War Department replied by radiogram to the effect that the recommendation made in January 9, 1941 radiogram was not favorably considered and that the policy of the War Department is that selective service personnel in overseas garrisons will be limited to those procured within the overseas department itself and that no additional selective service personnel will in time of peace be sent from the continental United States to overseas departments.

2. I am again submitting this request as I am of the firm opinion that the situation here is different than in the United States, and that this is a special case which deserves further consideration. The facts are:

The 251st National Guard is the only National Guard organization on duty outside of the continental limits of the United States;

This regiment is composed of white officers and enlisted men;

The selective service trainees now in being in this Department are composed of 469 Japanese out of the quota 700. The next draft quota of 700 which is to be inducted in March will undoubtedly be composed of approximately the same ratio of Japanese; namely, about 67%;

The selective service trainees are of varied mixture, such as Japanese, Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian, Filipinos, Chinese, Korean, and other mixtures;

Any assignment of the selective service trainees to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) would result in a mixture of races, largely Japanese, being assigned to a white organization, which is contrary to War Department policy, as stated in War Department Letter AG 291.21 (10/9/40) M-A-M, October 16, 1940, Subject: "War Department Policy in regard to Negroes", paragraph g;

The Colonel, Commanding the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), states that because of the feeling in California against orientals, any assignment of selective service trainees from this Department to his command would cause dissension, and lessen the efficiency of his command fully 50 percent.

[2] All replacements now coming from the mainland are required for the Regular Army troops here.

All the selective service trainees in this Department will be needed to fill the Hawaii National Guard units which are composed of races of the same type as in the selective service draft.

3. In view of the above, the only justifiable solution of this problem is to assign selective service trainees from the mainland, and preferably from the 9th Corps Area, to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard. It is my opinion that it will be contrary to the best interests of all concerned to assign selective service trainees in this Department to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) to increase its strength.

4. Since this is a special situation incident to this Department. I do not believe the present War Department policy, as stated in WD Radiogram, January 17, 1941; i. e., of not sending any additional selective service personnel from the continental United States to overseas departments, should apply to this Department.

5. I therefore again request that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, be increased from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selective service trainees from the 9th Corps Area.

(sgd) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Increase of Enlisted Strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard (California).

AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
March 8, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Your recommendation that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) be increased from its present allotted strength of 1181 to a strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from the Ninth Corps Area is not favorably considered.

2. As stated in radiogram from this office, January 17, 1941, all selective service personnel to be procured in the current fiscal year have already been allotted to units and activities. Additional personnel could be allotted to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) only at the expense of other units or activities.

3. If trainees were sent to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) at the present time, it is not considered that they could be of great value to the regiment or to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands due to the short period of time they would be available after completing their basic training. Selectees inducted now would probably reach the Hawaiian Department some time in April 1941. Their basic training would require approximately three months making them fully available about July 1941. As the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) is scheduled to be returned to the United States for return to an inactive status of September 16, 1941, it appears that any selective service personnel sent at this late date would be available to the regiment for a maximum of two months.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy.

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

2588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[SECRET]

[1]
AG 320.2/58

25 FEBRUARY 1941.

Subject: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Letter, TAG to HHD, 4 February 1941, subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments", file AG 320.2 (1-17-41)P(C):

B. Letter, TAG to HHD, 27 December 1940, Subject: "Equipment for Field Artillery Units", file AG 320.2 (12/20/40) P.

C. Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/55.

D. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Additional Engineer Troops", file Engr. 322.03.

2. The requests for troop reinforcements as stated in Reference C and D, hold priority over the requests given herein. The following reinforcements are requested for this Department at the earliest possible date and in the priority in which they are listed.

a. In accordance with Reference A, authority is requested to organize the 11th Field Artillery under WD T/O 6-41, dated November 1, 1940. The 11th Field Artillery (less 3d Battalion) is now organized under Standard War Department, Tables of Organization with units organized and maintained at war strength, as follows:

(1) 11th Field Artillery (less 3d Bn), T/O 6-41, January 3, 1939.

(2) Hq & Hq Btry, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-42, January 3, 1939.

(3) 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-45, December 7, 1938.

(4) Hq & Hq Btry, 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-46, January 7, 1938.

(5) Four (4) batteries, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-47, December 7, 1938.

b. That one Infantry Battalion, Light Tanks, be authorized for and the necessary personnel and material to organize same, be furnished this Department. The number of possible localities for hostile beach landings make the availability of a mobile reserve having the characteristic of light tanks of [2] great tactical importance for counterattacks. The 11th Tank Company (Light Tanks) organized under Standard WD, T/O 7-8, dated March 17, 1938, is the only tank unit in this Department and could be the nucleus for the Infantry Battalion of Light Tanks, requested herein.

c. That the organization of two (2) Military Police Companies, under WD, T/O 7-55, dated November 1, 1940, (Military Police Battalion) be authorized and that the necessary personnel be furnished from the Mainland for organization of the two (2) companies in this Department. The technical duties required of Air Corps enlisted personnel are retarded due to the required training for and actual performance of interior guard duty at both Hickam and Wheeler Fields. It is believed that an organized Military Police Company stationed at each of these fields would release Air Corps personnel for necessary air activities and also render more efficient interior guard and military police duty. The Military Police personnel could be efficiently trained in anti-sabotage work and also in close-in defense without disrupting scheduled training. It is the intention to use the Military Police personnel to perform similar work at outlying air fields under the control of the Commanding Officers of Hickam and Wheeler Fields and also to accompany Air Corps Units to those outlying fields when either Wing is operating under its Dispersion Plan.

d. That the necessary reinforcements be furnished so that the Infantry Regiments of the Hawaiian Division, be organized under WD, T/O No. 7, dated November 1, 1940: Infantry Division (Square). These regiments are now organized under Standard WD, T/O 7-11, dated December 6, 1938, as modified to fall within the "Allotment of Grades and Ratings for Enlisted Men, and authorized Recruiting Strength" as published in mimeograph letter, TAG, August 7, 1940, file AG 221 (8-7-40) E. Approval of this request would permit compliance with Reference A, above, and also make available the necessary personnel and material authorized by current standard, War Department Tables of Organization.

e. That the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery) be organized under WD, T/Os dated November 1, 1940 and that the necessary reinforcements be furnished this Department. That War Department, Tables of Basic Allowances for Field Artillery, No. 6-1, dated November 1, 1940, be made applicable to the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery).

3. A Study is now being made of all Special Tables of Organization at present in use by units in this Department, with a view of submitting recommendations for changes that will permit organization and functioning under current Standard WD, Tables of Organization.

[sgd] Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[SECRET]

SUBJECT: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.

G 320.2 (2-25-41) 1-C 1st Ind. WVC
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
April 11, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The augmentation of Coast Artillery and Engineer components of the Hawaiian Department is being considered separately, and you will be advised in the near future of the action taken thereon.

2. The augmentation of the Field Artillery and Infantry components of the Hawaiian Division, and the addition of a Tank Battalion and two Military Police Companies to the peace garrison are not considered urgent, nor is it practicable to provide the personnel at this time. It is believed the necessary guard duties can and should be performed by troops in the Department without organizing Military Police Companies for this purpose.

3. The reorganization of Infantry and Field Artillery elements of the Hawaiian Division under latest War Department tables of organization is approved. This can be accomplished without additional personnel. The majority of the units in other foreign garrisons and in the Continental United States are below table of organization strengths yet conform to standard tables. As stated in letter, February 4, 1941, AG 320.2 (1-17-41) P (C), subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments", this can be accomplished by reducing the size of component elements of a unit or by carrying certain elements inactive.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) W. V. Carter,
W. V. CARTER,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1K]

[SECRET]

AG 320.2 (3-5-41) M-WPD ACW/1f
APRIL 9, 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service and Air Defense.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to letter, this office, December 15, 1939, AG 676.3 (12-15-39) M-WPD, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department", to subsequent communications on the same subject; to letter G-2/183-316, February 12, 1941, subject: "Final Report of Commanding General, Air Defense Command"; and to letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, subject: "Defense Plans, Continental United States".

2. It is suggested that you consider the advisability of organizing your department for air defense, along lines similar to those described in letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, i. e., charging your senior air officer with functions corresponding to those of the Commanding General,

2590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

GHQ Air Force in the United States. These functions would include the peacetime organization and training of both fixed and mobile Aircraft Warning Services and of Interceptor pursuit aviation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-23-41.

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/61

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 May, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Considerable study has been given to the organization of a Hawaiian Air Defense Command and the proposed plan was presented in paragraph 7, secret letter, this headquarters to TAG, dated 25 April 1941, subject: "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department."

For the Commanding General:

CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

(IG-24)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 24 April 1941.

In reply refer to: 320.2

Subject: Air Base Group.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., (thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.).

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, recently requested the War Department to designate Bellows Field, T. H., a permanent Air Corps station under the jurisdiction of Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

2. A further request is being prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to have the War Department authorized the creation of a separate Air Corps station for the 15th Pursuit Group on Oahu, T. H.

3. Subject to the approval of the above mentioned recommendations, a redistribution of Air Base Group units will be necessary and the following is recommended:

a. The 18th Air base Group (R) (tentative T/O 1-411) Wheeler Field, T. H., be redesignated an "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single).

b. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for Bellows Field, T. H.

c. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for the new station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

SUBJECT: Air Base Group
AG 320.2 (4-24-41) MC-C

2nd Ind.

RPM/ihw-1217
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
June 26, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Troop Unit Basis FY 1942, provides for two additional materiel squadrons for the Hawaiian Department Air Force. It is believed that this provides sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.

2. Action on your recommendation for the organization of an additional air base group for station, with the 15th Pursuit Group is held in abeyance pending decision on the new station.

3. It is desired that you submit without delay your recommendations for station and construction for the two additional materiel squadrons.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. B. VAN SICKLE,
Adjutant General.

A true copy:

L. W. Truman,
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/94

3rd Ind.

OMM/ajk

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 22 July 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, WarDepartment, Washington, D. C

Reference paragraph 3, 2nd Indorsement, it is recommended that the two additional material squadrons be stationed at Bellows Field. Construction to care for these squadrons has been included in letter this Headquarters to the War Department dated 5 April 1941, Engineer file 600.12, subject: "Construction at Bellows Field, T. H."

For the Commanding General:

O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

7 AUGUST 1941.

CHENNEY L. BERTHOLF,
Lt. Co., A. G. D.,
Adjutant General

CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C.

Request authority be obtained for the activation of Bellows Field of a headquarters detachment to provide officer and enlisted staff for the post commander Stop Absence of an air-base group in the Bellows Field set-up necessitates the above Stop Minimum personnel for Hq Bellows Field now being furnished on DS from Hickam and Wheeler Fields Stop First two grade personnel available locally Stop Request for allotment of grades and ratings for the above follows by airmail Stop Request radio reply signed Martin.

SHORT.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

2592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Confidential

380-22

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Request information as to status of air base group for Bellows Field Stop
Seven hundred troops now station thereat and the administrative situation is
becoming difficult Stop Refer thirty nine August fifteen Signed Martin

SHORT.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Confidential

From

6 War WD

Washington, D. C., Sept. 27, 1941.

C G, Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.
172-27th

The activation of the air base group for Bellows Field reurad three eighty was
not favorably considered by Secretary War because this would exceed the garrison
strength now allotted Hawaii Stop The Adjutant General has been requested
to activate a headquarters detachment in accordance with your letter August
fifteen same subject A one dash seven.

ARNOLD.
316P/27.

Decoded by Lt Jos Engelbertz SC 10:00A, 29 Sept. 41.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, September 27, 1941.

AG 320.2 (8-15-41)

MR-M-AAF

Subject: Activation of Air Corps Units.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Headquarters Detachment, Bellows Field, T. H., is constituted and will be activated by you at the earliest practicable date.
2. Grades and ratings for this detachment will be as indicated on the attached inclosure.
3. Personnel for this detachment will be furnished from personnel now available in the Hawaiian Department with no increase in strength of the Hawaiian Air Force.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(S) OTTO THUSON,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. Copies furnished:

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force
Chief of Staff, GHQ.
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Chief of the Air Corps
Divisions of the War Department General Staff.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

56 WAR RC WD

Washington, D. C., 554P, AGU 30, 1941.

C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Seven Nine Thirtieth Air base group at Bellows Field and URAD August
Seven reference hdqrs Bellows Field reulst April Twenty-four Stop Desired
that following information be furnished by most expeditious means to this office

Stop One what are total Air Corps personnel requirements for Hawaiian Dept query two what are total personnel requirements for arms and services with Air Corps query three number of air base groups and location that will be required for Hawaiian Dept.

ULIO.
352P.

Decoded by: Capt. C. J. Harrison, SC. 1030A, Aug. 31, 1941.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

9 September 1941.
[S] CHEMEY L. BERTHOLF
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General.

272-9

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Following Air Force requirements submitted re your seven nine thirtieth Stop Following units and personnel required at present two air base groups paren single paren comma one for Bellows Field and one for Kahuru Point semicolon Air Corps enlisted personnel now in department sufficient to organize these units Stop One heavy bombardment squadron consisting of twenty seven officers and two hundred twenty enlisted men required to replace Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron transferred to Philippine Department Stop Other services required as follows Bellows Field colon Medical Corps one officer seven enlisted Dental Corps one officer semicolon Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Ordnance Department one air base company of four officers and sixty men Stop For Kahuru Point colon Medical Corps three officers twelve enlisted one Dental Corps comma Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Signal Corps ten enlisted specialists Stop In order that the Hawaiian Air Force may be brought to the strength necessary to enable that force to provide the air defense of Oahu it is necessary that the following additional personnel be provided as soon as possible colon Air Corps three thousand eight hundred seventy one enlisted comma Medical Corps six officers one officer six enlisted one, Dental Corps comma Quartermaster four officers seventy enlisted Stop Also three air base squadrons one each at Barking Sands Kauai comma MORSE Field and Hilo Hawaii Stop In the near future two additional air base squadrons will be required one at Lanay paren under construction paren one at Parker Ranch paren Project to be submitted paren Stop This need covered in full detail in confidential letter commanding General Hawaiian Air Force to Chief Army Air Forces dated twenty August forty one forwarded from this headquarters twenty-fifth August Stop The above increased personnel both Air Corps, arms and services was not repeat not included in my letter ag three twenty zero point three slant thirty seven 2 dated June fifth forty one

SHORT.

EMC secret by Lt. G. Lennox S. C., 1146A Sept. 9, 1941.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

126 WAR EM WD

Washington, D. C. 731 P Oct 17, 1941.

C. G., HAWN DEPT Ft. Shafter T. H.

17th Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron H is relieved from assignment to Eleventh Bombardment Group H and from permanent station at Hickam Field and assigned to Commanding General U S Army Forces in the Far East Manila P I for permanent station to be designated by him

ADAMS,
1101P.

Decoded by Capt. C. J. Harrison, 1138P Oct 17 1941.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

2594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

8 NOVEMBER 1941.

CHENBY L. BERTHOLF,
Lt. Col., A. G. D., Adjutant General.

786-6th

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Request immediate consideration be given to the assignment of three repeat three air depot groups to the Hawaiian Air Force Stop Procurement of sufficient civilian employees for the Hawaiian Air Depot is impossible Stop Discharge of enlisted men at the convenience of the Government for the purpose of accepting employment in the Hawaiian Air Depot fails to remedy the shortage in personnel Stop At present our depot maintenance is far behind schedule Comma resulting in the grounding of thirty percent of our tactical planes Stop Lack of both personnel and material is becoming increasingly acute Stop From a standpoint of second and third echelon maintenance we are poorly prepared for any augmentation in airplane strength Stop We must have maintenance personnel and material at once Stop No no personnel is available here for the activation of these groups signed Martin

SHORT.

ENC secret by LTCR Tiemah SC 310PM Nov. 8, 1941.

A True Copy:

F. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

59 WAR MC WD

Washington, D. C., 748P Nov. 15, 1941.

C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Four zero two fifteenth. Reference your radiogram number seven eight six of Nov eighth for additional air depot groups period This matter is now under advisement period Answer will be made in the immediate future period At the present time the air depot groups are not available for transfer to your department period When depot groups can be made available to your dept will this increase in Air Force personnel come within the authorized war garrison strength now approved for the Hawaiian Dept period From Arnold.

ADAMS,
120A/15/16.

Decoded by: Capt C. J Harrison SC 435P Nov. 16, 1941.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

18 NOVEMBER 1941.

WM E DONEGAN,
Lt. Col. G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-3

889-19th

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Reference your four zero two fifteenth of November fifteenth increase of Air Depot groups will not repeat not come within authorized war garrison strength now approved for Hawaiian Department Stop Request that personnel for Air Depot groups be furnished as soon as possible Stop Air groups urgently needed due to difficulty in procuring civilian employees Stop Hawaiian Air Force will be severely handicapped in proposed augmentation in airplane strength Stop Demands for depot maintenance will be unlimited Stop Authorized war garrison strength must be increased to accommodate air depot groups End

SHORT.

Enc see by Lt J H Babcock, 137P Nov. 19, 1941.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 18, 1941.

AG 320.2 (11-1-41)

MR-M-AAF

Subject: Activation and Redesignation of Air Corps Units.

To: Commanding Generals,
Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal,
Hawaiian and Philippine Departments,
Newfoundland Base Command and
U. S. Forces in Far East
Chief of Army Air Forces.

1. The following units are constituted and will be activated at the earliest practicable date by the Department commanders concerned:

Unit	Source of Personnel	Station of Activation	Permanent Station
5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications, (Regional Control).	Existing Units in Phil. Dept.	Phil. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
5th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Phil. Dept.	Phil. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
6th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Caribbean Defense Command.	P. C. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Albrook Field, Panama, Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.
7th Airways Squadron.....	Existing Units in Haw. Dept.	Haw. Dept....	Sq. Hq. Hickam Field, Haw., Airways detachments as directed by Dept. Commander.

2. The initial strength of the 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will be 19 officers and 110 men. Grades and ratings will be issued in a separate communication.

3. The 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will furnish the servicing detachments for Airways stations in the Pacific Area. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the appropriate Department commander.

4. These units will be activated from personnel now available to the respective Department commanders.

5. Further replacements for the 5th Airways Squadron and 5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications, will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in Far East.

6. Attached is a Manning table for an Airways station.

7. The following units are redesignated as indicated:

OLD DESIGNATION	NEW DESIGNATION
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Philippine Islands.	5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Squadron, Communications, Caribbean.	6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Panama.	6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Hawaii.	7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Hawaii.	7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Newfoundland Base Command.	8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (regional control).
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Newfoundland Base Command.	8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional Control).

2596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

8. Assignment of units:

Caribbean Air Forces:

6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.

All Communications detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Communications detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.

6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.

All Weather detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Weather detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area

Far East Air Force:

5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.

All Communications detachments in the Far East Area. 5th Air Corps squadron, Weather (Regional Control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.

All Weather detachments in the Far East Area.

Hawaiian Department Air Force:

7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.

7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.

Newfoundland Base Command:

8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.

All communications detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.

8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.

All Weather detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.

9. Weather Sections and Communications Sections now assigned as a part of Airways detachments are removed from assignment thereto and reassigned as a Weather or Communications detachment to the appropriate Weather or Communications squadron of that area. The detachments will remain at their Airways stations.

10. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces on receipt of a requisition from the Department commander concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] OTTO JOHNSON,
Adjutant General.

Copies furnished: Chief of Staff GHQ, Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, Chief of Air Corps, Divisions of the War Department, General Staff. 1 Incl.

A true copy:

L. W. Truman,
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

873-18

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Request that authority be obtained to activate station complements of a strength in grades and ratings equal to those at present organized on the mainland at the following Air Corps Fields within this department colon Hickam Field Wheeler Field Morse Field Barking Sands Stop No provision has been made for personnel for Base and Post functions with the result that the wings at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field are forced to provide administrative personnel for the posts in addition personnel from the Eighteenth Wing Hickam Field and from the Air Base Group Hickam Field are required to man Barking Sands and Morse Field comma both major outlying fields. Personnel for post administration must be obtained somewhere and it is now being obtained at the expense of our

tactical organizations Stop If the tactical organizations should be moved into the field post administration would collapse Stop It is urgently recommended that the authority requested above be obtained immediately signed Martin

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

144 WAR WE

Washington, D. C., 219A, Nov. 26 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

455-25th

Until such time as present initial war garrison limitations imposed upon Hawaiian Department have been lifted additional personnel can not repeat not be sent to that department Stop With view to securing an increase in the air strength for that station action has been initiated and you will be advised when final action is taken Stop Referring to your eight seven three

ADAMS,
730A/25/26/1PM.

Decoded by Lt. Jos Engelbertz SC, 3:15 P, 26 Nov 41.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1L]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 April 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 230.3/37

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, 25 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/58.

B. Secret radio, TAG to HHD, 19 April 1941, 744-18th and reply thereto, HHD to TAG, 22 April 1941. AG 325/18-18a.

C. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, number 2645-18, dated 18 April 1941, in connection with Medical Department Enlisted Reinforcements. On file in Department Surgeon Office.

2. It is recommended that authority be given this headquarters to organize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) separate and independent Triangular Divisions. Under War Department, tables of Organization, No. 70, dated November 1, 1940, current shortages exist in both personnel and material but it is believed that a desirable reorganization can be accomplished without increases in present strength other than the expansion of certain units as requested in my References A, C, and D, and requested reinforcements to organize a Reconnaissance Troop in each of the proposed Triangular Divisions. In paragraph d, Reference A, I requested the necessary reinforcements to organize the Infantry Regiments of the Hawaiian (Square) Division under current War Department, Tables of Organizations, No. 7, dates November 1940, and assuming favorable action on the recommendation, the reinforcements requested herein for the expansion of existing units are in accordance with Reference A. A summary of the proposed reorganization with tables showing personnel shortages hereto as Inclosure No. 1.

3. Primary reasons for this request are as follows:

a. For tactical purposes the Defense of Oahu is conducted in two sectors, they are, the North Sector and the South Sector. Two (2) Triangular Divisions are considered more flexible to accomplish defensive operations in the two separate sectors.

2598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

b. The proposed reorganizations presents no serious problems as to organization, command, staff and tactical unity.

c. The Hawaiian (Square) Division, as now organized and employed, constitutes a separate channel of command. Due to present organization it is less flexible than the proposed two (2) Triangular Divisions and also retards the prompt execution of missions requiring the employment of one or more units of the Division in coordination with units of the other echelons under the control of the Department Commander.

d. As now constituted the land defense is assigned to the Division Commander as the Beach and Land Defense Officer, with the result that it permits the Department Commander to play no part in the defensive action, if and when, the air and coast defenses are knocked out.

4. National Guard and Selectee Units.

a. It is proposed to assign one of the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service to each of the Triangular Divisions.

b. If the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service are demobilized upon completion of one year's training and the Department's full yearly quota of three thousand (3,000) selectees are authorized, then it is planned to form two Infantry regiments from the selectees and assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions. See Reference B.

c. Should the two (2) National Guard regiments now in Federal Service and two (2) tentatively planned selectee regiments be in Federal Service at the same time then, it is planned to assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions and one or both of the National Guard regiments to defense missions on the Outlying Islands or retain one National Guard regiment as a Department reserve unit on Oahu.

d. By employing one National Guard regiment with each of the Triangular Divisions it will forestall an expected request for a Brigade organization of the two Hawaiian National Guard Regiments.

5. Station Compliments

a. Schofield Barracks.

(1) It is recommended that a Brigadier General be assigned to Schofield Barracks for duty as an administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with a staff and commissioned assistants, warrant officer, nurses, enlisted men and civilian employees as shown in Inclosure No. 2, attached hereto, which lists the net minimum requirements desired in addition to permanent personnel now on duty at Schofield Barracks and not assigned to units of the present Hawaiian (Square) Division.

b. Fort Shafter.

(1) It is recommended that a Lieutenant Colonel be assigned to Fort Shafter as the Administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with the officer and enlisted Station Complement personnel as shown in Inclosure No. 3, attached hereto. The necessity for a station complement for the post of Fort Shafter is predicted upon operational missions of its garrison, the 64th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) regiment. When thus employed the regiment is absent from its station and because of post and administrative requirements is deprived of its maximum fighting strength. It is believed this serious handicap could be eliminated by employment of a Station Complement at Fort Shafter.

c. Station Complements are not requested for stations under control of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for the following reasons:

(1) Hawaiian Air Force: The duties of units of the 18th Bombardment Wing (Hickam Field) and the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler Field) necessitate maximum operation, maintenance and control from Air Fields under the control of the Wing Commanders and from which the Post Administrative Staff and enlisted assistants will not be moved. With full consideration of the anticipated complement of three hundred (300) airplanes, no need for Station Complements exists.

(2) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Practically all of the field operational functions will be performed in the vicinity of the permanent station and no necessity for Station complements is considered except for Fort Shafter, as noted above.

6. After preparation of this letter, your 1st. Indorsement to our reference A was received. This request is being forwarded with a view of having it available for reference in the War Department, under the following conditions:

a. That this communication with its request for reinforcements as listed in Inclosure #1, be given reconsideration at the earliest date it is practicable to provide the reinforcements requested.

b. That authority be granted me to reorganize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) Triangular Divisions by using the present available personnel and material. This can be accomplished in accordance with the last of your paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement, dated April 11, 1941, to my Reference A.

7. Organization of Air Defense Command.

a. In order that maximum coordination in all activities pertaining to the Air Defense of Oahu may be accomplished, I propose to create an Air Defense Command to be commanded by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who will continue control of the 18th Bombardment Wing. I propose to constitute the Air Defense Command as follows:

- (1) Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
 - (a) Headquarters and Staff, Hawaiian Air Force.
 - (b) 18th Bombardment Wing.
 - (c) Air Defense Command.
 1. Aircraft Warning Service.
 2. 14th Pursuit Wing.
 3. Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

b. In the organization of an Air Defense Command no interference with normal antiaircraft training is contemplated. Only while actually performing operational missions is it planned to place the antiaircraft Artillery under the control of the Air Defense Commander. Furthermore, no increase in the numbers of the Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force is believed necessary in order to create an air defense Command for this Department. It is planned to have the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and his staff also perform the duties of the Commander and the Staff of the Air Defense Command. In order to avoid divided responsibilities due to the dual missions now required of some beach defense batteries, no action will be taken to form an Air Defense Command until the first increment of the antiaircraft artillery reinforcements, described in secret radiograms War Department, 25 and 26 April, 1941, have been received.

c. An Air Defense Command for the Hawaiian Department is believed peculiarly adaptable to this theater and will best meet the needs for defense against attacks from the air.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incl.

- #1—Summary of Proposed Reorganization
- #2—Station Complement, Schofield Barracks.
- #3—Station Complement, Fort Shafter.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (4-25-41 MC-C

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
July 29, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, this office, July 22, 1941, AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MC-E, subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.

2. In view of the action taken on the correspondence referred to above, basic communication is being returned without action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General.
The Adjutant General.

3 incls. n/c

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

2600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[SECRET]

17 WVV MX 109

Wahn D. C. 610A May 29 41.

CG

Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter T. H.

Eight three seven twenty ninth Secretary of War has decided that in connection with other vital needs total war repeat war garrison of your department for initial war operations must be reduced to approximately fifty eight thousand officers and men stop It is not believed advisable to reduce Air Corps combat comma antiaircraft and AWS units now set up stop Therefore a reduction must be made with respect to other troops stop Recommendations desired as expeditiously as possible as to manner of effecting required reduction

ADAMS.
657A

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

AG 320.37/37B

5 June 1941.

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Secret Radio, TAG to HHD, 29 May 1941, 837-29th.

B. Secret letter HHD to TAG, 25 April, 1941, subject: "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.37/37.

2. In compliance with instructions contained in Reference A, the composition of the war garrison for initial war operations has been studied. Table I herewith, shows the forces recommended, totaling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses, and enlisted men, but not including the civilian employees now shown in Table I, par. 7, HDP-40.

3. The proposed war garrison consists of the following major units:

a. Two Triangular Divisions, less reconnaissance troops, with the Infantry and Signal Corps personnel at reduced strength.

b. Corps troops consisting of a light tank battalion, the existing 11th Ordnance Company, Division Pack Train, and Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, and the recently authorized 34th Engineers, Combat, and the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.).

c. The Hawaiian Air Force with service elements at present strengths.

d. Harbor Defense Coast Artillery as now provided in the approved defense project reduced by the personnel required to man three fixed seacoast mortar batteries and three 155-mm GPF batteries.

e. Antiaircraft Artillery with no reduction from the approved defense project.

f. Service, elements, with reductions in the mobilization strengths as shown in par. 7 HDP-40, and with many units entirely eliminated.

4. (a) The necessity for the defense of existing military air fields on the outlying islands of the Hawaiian group, together with the recently assumed responsibility for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, Oahu, directed by secret letter WD to HHd, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.", file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-NPD, and provision of a suitable mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu are three vital missions which can not be performed with any degree of success with an initial war garrison of approximately 59,000 troops.

b. The 299th Infantry recently has been transferred from Oahu to the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, Molokai, and Maui for the defense of air fields, thus leaving the proposed North Sector division short one Infantry Regiment.

c. Plans for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, now in preparation in this headquarters, indicate the minimum increase in the war garrison for this mission will include the following:

1 Regiment Infantry.

1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155mm How., truck drawn.

1 Battalion C. A., 155mm guns plus one additional battery.

1 Regiment C. A., (AA), (semi-mobile) (less one gun battalion).

1 Battery C. A., 12-inch barbette guns.

d. Assuming that two Infantry regiments will be furnished, one to replace the 299th Infantry and one for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that the

mobile reserve for the beach and land defense should be comprised of the light tank battalion now included in Table I herewith, and Infantry units detached from one or both of the triangular divisions recommended in Table I herewith.

e. It is therefore urgently recommended that the strength of the war garrison for this department be increased from approximately 58,000 to approximately 70,600 men so as to provide the following unit reinforcements from the mainland, not now shown in Table I herewith:

2 Infantry Regiments, T/O 7-11 Nov. 1, 1940-----	8, 898
1 Regiment F. A. 155mm How T/O 6-41 Nov. 1, 1940-----	1, 733
1 Regiment C. A. (AA) Semi-mobile (less 1 gun bn) T/O 4-111 Nov. 1, 1940-----	1, 797
1 Bn C. A. 155mm guns, w/1 additional gun btry, T/O 4-35 Nov. 1, 1940-----	694
1 Btry C. A. 12-inch barbette guns, T/O 4-67 Nov. 1, 1940-----	157
Total-----	11, 279

5. Reference is invited to par. 5 and inclosures 1 and 2 of reference B in which it was recommended that station complements be provided for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. Table I herewith includes provisions for the Quartermaster Corps, Finance Dept., Medical Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance personnel required for these station complements. It is highly desirable that the war garrison be increased sufficiently to provide the complete station complements for these two stations, an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.

6. Summarizing, in Table I herewith the war garrison for this Department has been reduced to a strength of 59,425. To provide a mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu, and to defend the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe and military air fields on outlying islands, an increase to approximately 70,600 officers and men is essential. A further increase of about 860 officers and men is highly desirable to furnish station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. I therefore recommend that the war strength of this command for initial war operations be fixed at approximately 71,500 officers and men.

7. Recent operations in Europe, particularly the failure of the British to hold the island of Crete, indicate the vital importance to the defense of Oahu of the nearby air fields on the other islands of the Hawaiian group. Hostile use of any of these air fields, considering modern methods of air warfare, would be extremely hazardous to the defense of Oahu. While not yet included in the war garrison recommended for this Department, it is probable that in the near future, plans will be submitted for the garrisoning of each of the outlying islands by a force consisting of approximately one regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1-Incl.—Table I.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (8-5-41)MC-E

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., July 22, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The war garrison recommended in paragraph 2 of the basic communication, totalling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses and enlisted men, reduced to 57,249 as shown in inclosure 2, and augmented by the following units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:

1 Regt CA (AA), semi-mobile (less one gun Bn, band and basies)-----	T/O 4-111	11-1-40----	1, 590
1 Bn CA 155 MM Guns with 1 addit. gun btry-----	T/O 4-35	11-1-40----	694
1 Btry CA-----	T/O 4-67	11-1-40----	157
Total-----			2, 441

is approved. Paragraph 7, HDP-40 will be amended accordingly.

2602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2. The recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of the basic communication to establish a war garrison of 71,500 officers and men for initial war operations in your department is not favorable considered. Troops in excess of the 59,690 authorized in paragraph 1, above, will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need therefor and provided such additional troops can be made available in connection with other requirements.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Signed) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls;

#1—N/c.

#2—Initial War Garrison, Haw. Dept. (Added)

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,

Capt. Inf.

12-22-41

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
a. Department Headquarters:							
Gen & Spec Staff Sections			144	30		152	326
Hq Sp Troops			7			41	48
Hq Company			3			59	62
MP Co Haw Dept	7-7	11- 1-40	5			170	175
QM Co (Car)	10-87P	11- 1-40	2			70	72
Total Dept HQ			161	30		492	683
b. North Sector Division (Triangular).	70	11- 1-40					
Div Hq	70-1	10- 1-40	26	2		74	102
Hq & MP Co	70-2	10- 1-40	7			123	130
Reconn Troop					Omitted		
Div Sig Co	Sp		4			114	118
19th & 21st Inf	7-11	10- 1-40	206	2		4,000	4,808
299th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E		10-12-40					
and WD radio.		5-11-41	65			1,577	1,642
Div Arty	6-80	10- 1-40	121	1		2,563	2,685
Engr Bn	5-75	10- 1-40	18			616	634
Med Bn	8-65	10- 1-40	38			482	520
QM Bn	10-15	10- 1-40	16			296	312
Total Div			501	5		10,505	11,011
Attached Med			43			380	423
Attached Chap			11				11
Aggregate			555	5		10,885	11,445
c. South Sector Division (Triangular).	70	11- 1-40					
Div Hq	70-1	10- 1-40	26	2		74	102
Hq & MP Co	70-2	10- 1-40	7			123	130
Recon Troop					Omitted		
Div Sig Co	Sp		4			114	118
27th & 35th Inf	7-11	10- 1-40	206	2		4,000	4,808
298th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E & Radio.		10-12-40					
		5-11-41	50			1,308	1,358
Div Arty	6-80	10- 1-40	121	1		2,563	2,685
Engr Bn	5-78	10- 1-40	18			616	634
Med Bn	8-65	10- 1-40	38			482	520
QM Bn	10-15	10- 1-10	16			296	312
Total Div			486	5		10,236	10,727
Attached Med			43			380	423
Attached Chap			11				11
Aggregate			540	5		10,616	11,161

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
d. Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force:							
Hq & Hq Sq HAF	1-10-1	8- 1-39	70			336	406
18th Bomb Wing							
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing	1-10-1	6- 1-41	13			122	135
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Grp (Hv)	1-112	6- 1-41	21			232	253
23d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
31st Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
72d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
4th Recon Sq (Hv)	1-215	6- 1-41	43			229	272
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Gp (Hv)	1-112	6- 1-41	21			232	253
14th Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
16th Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
42d Bomb Sq (Hv)	1-115	6- 1-41	37			217	254
50th Recon Sq (Hv)	1-215	6- 1-41	43			229	272
19th Transport Sq	1-355	8- 1-39	40			182	222
17th Air Base	1-411	6- 7-40	40			682	722
Haw Air Depot			18				18
Total			531			3,546	4,077
Attached Med			17			95	112
Attached Chap.			1				1
Service Units:							
53d Sig Maint Co	11-227	12- 1-40	3			44	47
324th Sig Co (Air Wg)	11-247	12- 1-40	3			71	74
328th Sig Co (Avn)	11-217	12- 1-40	3			71	74
Sig Sections (HAF)			2			7	9
Sig Sections 18th Wing			2			2	4
12th Sig Plat (Air Base)	11-237	3-19-40	1			21	22
Ord Sect Hq HAF			3			10	13
740th Ord Co Avn (AB)	9-167	12-16-40	3			38	41
481st Ord Co Amm (Bomb)	9-157	12-16-40	5			125	128
482nd Ord Co Avn (Bomb)	9-167	12-16-40	5			123	128
QM Sec Hq HAF & 18th Wing						4	4
13th QM Co (Truck)	10-57	11- 1-40	3			70	73
259th QM Co (AB)	10-357	4-18-40	3			102	157
39th QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	2			60	62
Total attached			56			841	897
e. 14th Pursuit Wing & Attached Units:							
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wing	1-10-1	6- 1-41	13			122	135
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Grp (I)	1-12	6- 1-41	23			209	232
6th Pur Sq (I)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
19th Pur Sq (I)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
78th Pur Sq (I)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
44th Pur Sq (I)	1-15	6- 1-41	35			201	236
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Grp (F)	1-12	6- 1-41	13			122	135
45th Pur Sq (F)	1-12	6- 1-41	33			279	312
46th Pur Sq (F)	1-15	6- 1-41	33			279	312
47th Pur Sq (F)	1-15	6- 1-41	33			279	312
86th Obs Sq	0-255	1- 1-41	21			137	158
58th Bomb Sq	1-135	8- 1-39	25			196	221
18th Air Base Grp	(Tentative 1-441)	6- 7-40	30			499	529
Total			364			2,926	3,290
Attached Med			17			84	101
Attached Chap.			1				1
Service Units:							
Sig Sed 14th Wing			2			2	4
307th Sig Co (Air Wing)	11-217	12- 1-40	3			71	74
45th Sig Plat (AB)	11-237	3-19-40	1			21	22
258th QM Bn (AB)	10-357	4-18-40	2			102	118
14th QM Co (Truck)	10-57	10- 1-40	3			70	73
741st Ord Co (AB) (Avn)	9-167	12-16-40	3			38	41
674th Ord Co AVN (Pur)	9-157	12-16-40	4			50	54
696th Ord Co AVN (Pur)	9-157	12-16-40	4			50	54
Total Attached			40			498	538
Total Hawaiian Air Force (Air Units).			895			6,472	7,367
Total Hawaiian Air Force & Attached Units.			991			7,811	8,802

2604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
f. Harbor Defense Troops:							
Hq & Hq Btry HSCAB	4-10-1	11- 1-40	10			75	85
15th CA (HD) (Less 1 gun btry).	4-41	11- 1-40	46	1		1,122	1,169
16th CA (HD) (Less 2 gun btry).	4-71	11- 1-40	42	1		969	1,012
41st CA (RY) (Less 1 gun bn) (Less Bd).	4-41	11- 1-40	49			1,108	1,157
55th CA (TD) (Less bd).	4-31	11- 1-40	67			1,678	1,745
Nth CA (TD) (Less Hq & CTn 2d & 3d Bns & Btrys D, E, & F, SL Btry & Band).	4-31	11- 1-40	37			800	837
Total Harbor Defense			251	2		5,752	6,005
Attached Med:							
16th CA			6			37	43
15th CA			6			37	43
41st CA			6			35	41
55th CA			7			46	53
Nth CA			4			26	30
Attached Chaplains			5				5
Total Attached			34			181	215
Total Harbor Defense & Attached Troops			285	2		5,933	6,220
g. Anti-aircraft Artillery:							
Hq & Hq Btry AA Brig	4-10-1	11- 1-40	10			75	85
Intelligence Btry AA Brig Spec.	4-08	1- 1-39	4			134	138
64th CA (AA) (Rein)	4-11 & 4-13	11- 1-40	97			2,451	2,549
		W Date 12-12-38					
251st CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	69	1		1,807	1,877
97th CA AA (Less Band SL and one (1) 37mm Btry and basies in part plus 1 AA MG Btry).	4-111	11- 1-40	87			1,979	2,066
98th CA AA (Less Band SL and one (1) 37mm Btry and basies in part plus 1 AA MG Btry).	4-111	11- 1-40	87			1,979	2,066
Total AA Coast Artillery			354	2		8,425	8,781
Attached Medical:							
64th CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	6			41	47
251st CA (AA)	4-11	11- 1-40	6			41	47
Xth CA (AA)	4-111	11- 1-40	7			48	56
Yth CA (AA)	4-111	11- 1-40	7			49	56
Attached Chaplains	4-11	11- 1-40	6				6
Total Attached			32			180	212
Total AA & Attached			386	2		8,605	8,993
h. Department Troops:							
11th Tank Co.	17-57	11-15-40	5			106	111
Xth Tank Bn (Less 1 Co)	17-55	11-15-40	26			406	432
11th Ordnance Co.	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
Haw Div Pack Train	Sp		3			82	85
Co A 1st Sep Chem Bn	3-17	11- 1-40	2			168	170
Total			42			902	944
i. Chemical Warfare Service:							
Chemical Depot & filling Plant	Sp		3			32	35
Engineer Corps:							
34th Engrs (Less Band & Basies).	5-171	11- 1-40	39			1,090	1,129
Attached Med & Chap	5-171	11- 1-40	7			35	43
804th Engr Bn Avn	5-435	4-22-40	21			625	646
Engr Depot	Spec		5			51	56
Total Engrs			65			1,766	1,831
Total Engrs plus attached Med & Chap			72			1,802	1,874

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

Organization	T/O	Date	Mobilization strength				
			Off	WO	ANC	E. M.	Total
k. Ordnance Department:							
Ordnance Depot	Spec		12			9 ²	104
61st Ord Co (Amm)	9-17	11- 1-40	2			50	52
62nd Ord Co (MM)	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
63rd Ord Co (MM)	9-7	11- 1-40	6			140	146
74th Ord Co Depot	9-18	11- 1-40	6			180	186
Ordnance Personnel Attached to Units			6				6
Total Ordnance Department			38			602	640
l. Finance Department:							
Finance Officer USA Hon			3			10	13
Mis Fin Est			8			38	46
Total Finance Department			11			48	59
m. Quartermaster Department:							
QM Depot			24	2		212	236
QM Det Scho Bks			15	2		227	244
QM Det (Ex Scho)			15	1		300	316
Co B 90th QM Bn (HY M)	10-47	11- 1-40	3			224	227
32nd Sep QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	4			185	189
33rd Sep QM Co (LM)	10-27	11- 1-40	4			185	189
15th QM Co Truck	10-57	10- 1-40	3			110	113
16th QM Co truck	10-57	10- 1-40	3			110	113
72nd QM Co (Bakery)	10-147	11- 1-40	5			158	163
Co A 395th QM Bn (Port)			4			196	200
School, Bakers & Cooks			1			121	22
Total QM			81	5		1,928	2,014
Attached Med QM Depot			1			15	16
Total QMC and Attached			82	5		1,943	2,030
n. Signal Corps:							
Signal Co (Depot) (Less Dets)	11-107		2			60	62
9th Sig Serv Co	Spec		3			230	233
2nd Sig Co. (Det)	Spec		1			30	31
Xth Sig Bn	11-15	11- 1-40	20			542	562
Aircraft Warning Co	11-157	11- 1-40	12			357	369
Total Signal Corps			38			1,219	1,257
Attached Medical			3			11	14
Total Sig Corps & Attached Units			41			1,230	1,271
o. Hospitalization Forces:							
Tripler Gen Hosp	(SP) 8-507	7-25-40	73		120	500	693
Scho Bks Gen Hosp	(SP) 8-507	7-25-40	73		120	500	693
Vet Gen Hosp			2			8	10
Haw Med Depot			4			31	35
School Farriers & Horseshoers						6	6
2 Gen Hosps	8-507	7-25-40	146		240	1,000	1,386
8th Amb Co	8-118	2- 1-40	3			90	93
9th Amb Co	8-118	2- 1-40	3			90	93
Total Med Corps			304		480	2,225	3,009
p. Districts Hawaiian Department:							
OAHU District Hq (Dept Ser Comd)			25	1		2	28
HAWAII District Hq			12			19	31
MAUI District Hq			12			5	17
KAUAI District Hq			5			2	7
Total (Less Dets 299th Inf)			54	1		28	83
Recapitulation:							
Department Headquarters			161	30		492	683
Beach & Land Defense			1137	10		22,403	23,550
Hawaiian Air Force			991			7,811	8,802
Harbor Defenses			285	2		5,933	6,220
Anti-Aircraft Artillery			386	2		8,605	8,993
Service Organizations			247	5		5,657	5,911
Hospitalization Forces			304		480	2,225	3,009
Service Command			54	1		28	83
Total			3565	50	480	53,114	57,241

A True Copy:
 L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
 12-22-41

2606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Exhibit 1M]

2 MAY 1941

AG 320.3/38

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington D. C.

1. References:

A. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 739, 24 April 1941.

B. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 760, 26 April 1941.

C. Letter CO, RECAB to CG, Reun. Dept, dated 16 April 1941, subject: "Constitution and Activation of Antiaircraft Intelligence Battery," forwarded to the War Department by 1st. Indorsement dated 21 April 1941, file RECAB 320.3, IHD 320.3/36.

D. Letter FED to TMG, subject "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department", dated 25 April 1941, file 320.3/37.

E. Letter VD to FED dated 2 April 1941, subject: "Coast Artillery units for Hawaiian Department", file AG 3GC.2 3G26-41_M (Ret) M-C. —D 320.2 straight Misc.

2. Upon the arrival of the first increment (Ref. A) of the war reinforcements of the Antiaircraft Artillery Garrison of this Department in June 1941, the organization of the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade will be required. This brigade will be composed of all Antiaircraft Artillery Units in the Department except the one or two batteries of harbor defense artillery regiments which still have dual assignments to harbor defense and Antiaircraft Artillery missions. The organization of this brigade is mandatory not only because of the strength of the units involved but also because of the organization of the Air Defense Command (Reference D) this brigade will be required to function independently of the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for tactical operations and in training therefore.

3. It is proposed that the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Hawaiian Department, will be organized as follows:

53rd C. A. Brigade (AA) (RRF.N.).

Hq. and Hq. Btry, 53rd CA Brigade (Ref.H.).

Intel. Btry, 53d CA Brigade (T/O 4-08 (a) HAD) (Ref. C & R).

64th C. A. (AA)

251st. C. A. (AA)

"Tch" CA (AA) semi-mobile (less 3d Ea) (Ref. A)

"Eth" Rs, AA gun, semi mobile (less searchlight battery and one gun Battery) (Ref.A); to be expanded into the "8th" Regt. upon arrival of the remainder of the reinforcements (Ref. B)

4. Accordingly it is recommended that:

a. Authority be granted to activate the Hq. and Hq. Btry, 53d CA Brigade (T/O 4-10-1, 1. Nov. 40) and the Intel. Btry. 53d. CA Brigade (T/O 4-06 (c) New), on or about 1 June 1941.

b. A brigadier General be assigned to this Department to command the 53d CA Brigade.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

AC 340.2 (5-2-41)

MR-O

1st. Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. O., June 12, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Intelligence Battery, 53rd. Coast Artillery Brigade, within the recently authorized organization of Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, by 1998 filler replacements. No additional personnel can be made available at this time.

2. It is desired that the date of activation of these units and report showing the allotment to units of grades and ratings of your present allotment, Coast Artillery Corps, to include these units be furnished this office.

3. Separate action will be taken on the allotment of additional grades and ratings and on the recommendation to assign a brigadier general to the Department.

4. Table of Organization 4-06 (S) (HAD) is approved as submitted, and is being reproduced and distributed.

By order of Secretary of War:

*Major General,
The Adjutant General.*

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1N]

DOO 320.2/141
W A GARRON COL ORD DEPT
759-6th
CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
Washington, D C

Attention invited to fact that there are six each activated thirty seven MM AA btrys at present in Haw Dept comma that present plans contemplate six additional of this type battery by March nineteen forty two comma and that only twenty guns are on hand Period Radio information therefore requested as to which and in what quantities we may expect the one hundred each thirty seven MM AA guns listed as under procurement from by nineteen forty one funds in 00 secret file six six zero point two slant eleven capron.

SHORT.

ENC TIEMAN

Nov. 6, 1941

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1 O]

TALK GIVEN BY GENERAL SHORT TO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON ARMY DAY

GENTLEMEN:

I am especially pleased to be able to come before this representative gathering of Honolulu business men on the occasion of the celebration of Army Day. Today our military establishment is being brought closer to the view of the general public throughout the entire United States by exhibits and various demonstrations, in order that the people may become better acquainted with some of our equipment, methods and procedures, and now I am afforded the opportunity of discussing some of our plans which will demand close and active cooperation on the part of the civil community and by various departments of your civil government.

You are all aware of the tremendous effort being expended by industry, labor and all departments of the government toward the accomplishment of a gigantic program of national defense. While there are many evidences of this activity here in Hawaii, through defense projects being carried on both by the Army and by the Navy, the tempo of action has not reached as deeply into the private life of the average citizen as has been the case in many cities on the Mainland. Conditions are changing overnight and procedures and practices of today may be changed by the plans and activities of tomorrow. None of these matters are being handled, or even considered, in the light of actual warlike moves nor with any feeling of hysteria, but simply as carefully considered plans which are to be effected for the future security of each and every individual, including the youngest child and the oldest adult, of our nation.

I have been asked many times what the community can do to assist National Defense. The following items are of prime importance:

- (a) Production and storage of food.
- (b) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
- (c) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.

(d) Preparation of plans and making of provisions for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in vicinity of essential industries.

These islands are in no way self sustaining in the matter of food. This is due not to lack of fertility of your soil but to your specialized agriculture.

All of you are vitally interested in the food supply of these islands. In any emergency, which might include the possibility of a disruption of communications with the Mainland, a most important safety measure would be to begin at once the planting of basic food crops which are known by actual practice to be the most easily grown in this soil and climate. Such produce might include sweet potatoes, string beans, lima beans, Chinese cabbage, peanuts and some other local varieties of vegetables. The plantations have done important development work and are prepared to produce these articles in quantity should the necessity arise. An immediate increase in the stocks of such items as rice, flour, canned milk, fats and oils would be a great safety factor and with rising prices is sound economy. Shortage of storage for the food shipped in is now a problem. This condition can be materially alleviated if housewives will well stock their cupboards with non-perishable items. This action would operate to clear needed space on retail and wholesale merchant's shelves for further storage of additional foods. This plan is good present day economy because of steadily rising food prices. There is at present a plan on foot for the construction of large warehouse storage by government subsidy and I believe that this plan should have the support of us all as a defense measure. In the pursuit of this project speed is all important.

Along this same thought I read with much interest in the local press of March 19, 1941, an item which referred to the possible repeal of the personal property tax which so greatly affects the merchant or importer who desires to cooperate in holding large stocks of food available in his warehouse or store. I would like to voice my approval to such an Act, or other similar legislation which would freeze the tax for any corporation or individual at an amount not to exceed that paid in the past year. This would make it possible for more adequate and plentiful stores of food stuff to be maintained without imposing a hardship on any individual or organization.

It is further important that the local fishing fleet be kept in operation, as it supplies a very large proportion of our daily subsistence. Increased cold storage for meats should be provided. Existing dairy herds on Oahu should be conserved and feed stored.

In the general defense measures for these islands there is no civilian effort of higher importance than preparedness now for an adequate food supply for all the people in time of emergency.

The preparation of your emergency medical service in the case of an extreme emergency such as an air attack or actual assault upon the city is of vital importance. The functions of the military forces under such conditions or control, would be to take measures to insure that civilian agencies, expanded as required, continued to function and not to displace them by a military operating agency. It is therefore definitely necessary that prompt action be taken to organize your medical service into the maximum possible number of teams with mobile equipment capable of being rapidly moved from place to place and set up in existing buildings. Staffs of doctors, nurses, technicians, and others required for the stations should be selected and trained and be ready at any time for immediate duty.

Adequate initial medical supplies for these stations should be obtained, classified, packed, and stored in a manner making them readily available. Necessary vehicles must be on hand by loan or otherwise. Suitable trucks, of the delivery type, for rapid conversion to use as ambulances should be listed and obtainable at once. Necessary personnel for the immediate expansion of hospitals properly located to the extent at least of the porches, dayrooms, etc., should be listed by each. All of these preparations should be accompanied by the preparation of shelters, from air attack, of the best types available. Suitable buildings should be selected to replace hospitals in the zones of probable bombardment. Preparations of this nature should be made in cooperation with the Red Cross.

The organization of a force of ex-service men to supplement the police force in guarding utilities and preventing sabotage I understand is under way. This move

will release troops for defense purposes. Consideration should be given to the employment of the R. O. T. C. of the University of Hawaii for the same purpose.

Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified Island. Many residents have their homes well within the limits of actual military fortifications, docks, arsenals or many other types of legitimate military targets. Should we ever be faced with a military operation by any enemy against this island (which we fervently hope may never come true), the residents in these areas must be cared for and protected. Plans for such care and protection quite properly come under the jurisdiction of your civil governmental agencies, and I believe these should now receive careful, detailed and mature consideration. I repeat that these matters are not to be viewed with alarm or hysteria, but simply as defense projects and exactly in the same classification as any of the present housing activities which you see around you every day. If you, as civilian organizations, are making plans for adequate warehouse and pier space for the handling of defense materials should you not give some degree of the same effort toward the security and protection of your families from any possible contingency? I believe that you already have a Defense Committee, under the leadership of the Governor of the Territory and the Mayor of Honolulu which has given, or is about to give, some consideration to these matters, and I advance, for the consideration of this committee, some of my ideas on this subject.

There has been considerable information in the New York newspapers as to the plans which are being formulated and discussed by the Mayor of that city for the protection of its inhabitants from any possible air raids. Elaborate measures have been suggested for shelters, fire protection, and other phases of which you are well aware. It is my suggestion that some such plans be initiated for the city of Honolulu. My belief is that any such proposals should be considered not only from a possible wartime condition but also with a view of fitting into the plans for the expansion, betterment and improvement in the civil facilities. In other words, why should we not make plans which will not only form the nucleus for protective measures and which will, at the same time, furnish additional recreation centers for our civil and military population. My plans envision a recreational center for each precinct, or perhaps smaller section of the city, which would be located somewhere in the highlands away from military targets. There might properly be selected by the Forestry Service, the City Planning Commission or other appropriate body. These camps would be located where a source of fresh water is available, some degree of natural shelter and with a view of accessibility. Here would be installed, in the following order of importance, water, sanitary facilities, outdoor grills and other cooking installations, and mess halls. The Forestry Service, National Parks Administration, and the CCC have already had considerable experience in the construction and laying out of such installations as many such recreational camps already exist on the Mainland. You yourselves have seen some of the results of these activities in your National Park on Hawaii.

Thousands of you people spend your hours of leisure and recreation at the beaches. Why would it not be feasible as well as healthful to divert a portion of such time to comfortable and attractive camps in the hills? Forming the habit of such excursions to adequate and well planned camps would accomplish a dual purpose in establishing not only additional recreation features but at once establishing the basis for evacuation camps should they ever be required in the future.

In case of actual hostilities, which involved this community, all able-bodied males would be utilized by industry or by the military services in one manner or another. Normal business routine would be continued to the greatest extent possible. Any evacuation camps would thus be dedicated to the use of women, children, and male citizens who would not be qualified for other duties. The Army has definite plans to go ahead immediately on the construction of similar camps for the use of the families of Army personnel should such an occasion ever demand that drastic action. In the meantime the camps will be utilized as recreation centers by all of our personnel.

I take this opportunity of laying before you the foregoing plan as deserving your consideration. I believe the evacuation of the women and children from the area of probable bombardment the most essential and difficult problem confronting the community. Without advance planning the greatest confusion and loss of life might result.

I again repeat that the foregoing suggested plans are to be considered as important defense measures with the same priority as given other defense plans. They are not to be thought of as indications of any immediate pending threat, but rather as carefully considered measures to safeguard our homes and families

2610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

in case of any future dangers. The bill now before the Legislature creating a major Disaster Relief Department, if enacted, will put you in a position to complete these plans and preparations. The Army is ready to do all within its power to help you and you must feel free to call upon us for advice at any time.

My thoughts have been expressed to you quite frankly, as I believe we must understand each other on all questions and work out our common plans together. Army Day was inaugurated with such an ideal as its basis and I am pleased to have had this opportunity of bringing before you some ideas and suggestions which may have material work to you now and in the uncertain days of the future.

I thank you.

[1]

[Exhibit 1P]

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT IN CONNECTION WITH PREPAREDNESS OF THE CIVIL POPULATION TO MEET A FOOD EMERGENCY IN HAWAII.

- Item No. 1 Letter from General Short to Governor Poindexter, re storage facilities for Food Supply. General Short states that after a conference with a civilian committee on food supply and facilities for storage, he is in hearty accord with action taken to date. He feels strongly that the problem is of vital interest to both the civil population and the military. The civil authorities should take the initiative for their own supplies, and their actions will receive his utmost support. (See Inclosure No. 1).
- 21 Mar 41
- Item No. 2 Letter from General Short to War Dept. asking authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii, stating serious problem of food supply under emergency conditions, and stating his objective is to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 2).
- 4 Apr 41
- Item No. 3 Radio from Gen. Short to War Dept. referring to his letter of 4 April 41, and asking priority radio advice as soon as decision has been reached. (See Inclosure No. 3).
- 12 May 41
- Item No. 4 1st Indorsement to Gen. Short's letter of 4 April 41, from War Dept., granting authority to contract for Hawaiian-grown potatoes, providing price does not exceed 2¼¢ per pound. (See Inclosure No. 4).
- 2 May 41

[2]

- Item No. 6. Memo to Board of Directors, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce from the Executive Secretary, John A. Hamilton:
- 5 May 41
- 1. Prior to April 7, 1941, there was very little buying of food supplies for emergency use. However, on April 7, Lt. General Walter C. Short, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, United States Army, suggested the desirability of purchasing additional food supplies for use during a possible emergency.
- 2. Beginning with April 7, the consumer began to purchase additional food supplies in quantities ranging from an extra can of milk to as much as \$800.00 per family as reported by one retailer. Retail merchants report that 20 to 30 per cent of their customers have purchased additional food supplies in the last 30 days. This means that the retailers' stocks on hand would be depleted rapidly.
- 3. It would be expected that the retailer, when food stocks are moved rapidly from the shelves as a result of heavy consumer purchases, would reorder quickly from the wholesaler or the manufacturer. This has been done. In fact it would appear that retailers have increased their purchases by 20 to 25 per cent above normal.
- 4. Wholesalers generally support the report of the retailers with regard to the increase of consumer buying as reflected in the increase in the buying done by the retailer from the wholesalers.
- 5. Of the three wholesale firms visited, two reported large stocks of foodstuffs on hand as a result of additional warehousing space secured to care for the additional demand and the prospective needs in the event of an emergency. Also these firms report a satisfactory replenishment of stocks although additional time is required to get merchandise from the manufacturers to the docks in Honolulu.

Note. The direct result of Gen. Short's public address of 7 April 1941 was to increase the supply of food in storage in Hawaii from 20 to 35%.

[3]

Item No. 7 In a published statement prior to a general meeting of agriculturists thru-out the islands at the University of Hawaii, Gen. Short said, "All efforts to increase local food production are steps toward increased security for Hawaii".

16 June 41

Item No. 8 At an address to the University Assembly on Aug. 13th Gen. Short stated:

13 Aug 41

"Among defense projects which I have publicly emphasized has been that of the home production of food to sustain the civilian population during an emergency. I regard this project of local food production as of primary importance to the defense of Hawaii."

"So far as food supply is concerned, the military organization here is self-sufficient as to its reserves of essential items. It will look after itself in time of war, and it is now projecting food production on military reservations to supply its needs—so far as is practicable.

"I have also supported shipping priorities for all foods—cattle, dairy and poultry feeds, as well as food for human consumption. This support includes farm machinery which is important for large-scale crop production."—(From the Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Aug 41)

Item No. 9 Copy of radiogram from Delegate King to Gov. Poindexter stating the War, Navy and State Departments and the Budget Bureau were lukewarm in their interest in procuring food reserve stocks for Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 5 attached).

16 Sept 41

For reply to Delegate King, stating Gen. Short's continued support, see Inclosure No. 6.

[4]

Item No. 10 The Food Production Plan for Hawaii was formally presented in complete form to the Directors of the Hawaiian Sugar Planter's Association and accepted by them as the basic operating plan for local production of food crops, cattle and dairy products. This plan covers production not only of Oahu but of all the out-islands as well, setting up acreage and crops allocations to plantations, both sugar and pineapple, which were accepted by them as defense requirements. Small farmers were included in the plan as well. Seed requirements were set up; as well as insecticide, fertilizer and machinery requirements for producing crops sufficient to sustain the entire population for six months.

23 Oct 41

This plan was based on the Army plan and was supported and urged thru-out by Gen. Short. It is now in operation in its initial phases as planned. Gen. Short arranged for the procurement of all seed, insecticides, fertilizer and machinery for harvesting this crop, as well as arrangements for procuring the necessary priority allocations of shipping space required. (See Incl. No. 7.)

Item No. 11 Letter from Gen. Short to War Dept., stating that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget should be brought up for reconsideration, and asking the support of the War Dept. when it comes up. (See Inclosure No. 8.)

3 Dec 41

Item No. 12 Letter from Gen. Short to Gov. Poindexter, stating that he has always regarded a reserve food supply as of primary importance in defense plans, giving supporting data, and asking the Governor to obtain an inventory of food on hand in the Territory, in order to support his request for an emergency reserve food supply. (See Inclosure No. 9.)

3 Dec 41

Item No. 13 Radiogram from General Short to War Dept. stating in detail the immediate requirements of food, seed, livestock feed, farm machinery, insecticides and fertilizers, including shipping space required, for current civilian needs. (See Inclosure No. 10.)

14 Dec 41

[5]
Item No. 14 WD Radio #685, 17 Dec. 41 "Shipment of Food for Civilian Population".

17 Dec 41

2612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In reply to Haw'n Dept. radio #1182, the War Dept. states food will be procured and delivered to civil authorities in Hawaii, first shipment to leave within one week, second shipment following week; every effort to be made to provide critical items indicated by the radios of Gen. Short and of the Governor. (See Inclosure No. 11.)

As a direct result of Gen. Short's letter to the War Department of December 3, 1941, the attached radiogram (Inclosure No. 11) from the War Department, dated December 17, 1941, was received, indicating the immediate shipment of the Food Reserve Supply to Hawaii.

While Gen. Short was not asked for letters of support for certificates of necessity for the construction of storage for the Emergency Food Supply because this was not needed, he has consistently supported such construction, both by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. for the dry storage, and by the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. for the refrigerated storage.

When the Emergency Food Reserve was turned down by the Bureau of the Budget Gen. Short stated publicly that storage completed, or under construction for the Emergency Food Supply would be specifically reserved for the purpose for which the certificate of necessity was granted by the War Dept.

At present the warehouse space of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is ready, and that of the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. will be ready in the very near future.

The Civilian Food Administration, as planned by Gen. Short, is now in full operation under Governor Poindexter's Council of Civilian Defense, which in turn is affiliated with the National Office of Civilian Defense.

Civilian authorities of the Food Administration freely acknowledge the impetus of Gen. Short's consistent urging of plans to implement the Food Administration for an emergency, so that it has been able to get into operation without delay on the basis of plans set up by the Army.

Enclosure No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., March 21, 1941.

Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,
Governor, Territory of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR POINDEXTER: Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kimball, acting as your committee on emergency food storage, conferred with me March 19th relative to storage facilities and food supply, and the adequacy in general of the supply of food stuffs during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed. The conference included the action taken to date to obtain storage facilities, including their meeting with local importers and bankers, the action taken by Delegate King, and your radiogram of March 18th to Delegate King. I assure you that I am in hearty accord with the action taken to date and am in full concurrence therewith.

I strongly feel that the problem of assuring the civil population an adequate supply of food stuff during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed or cut off is of vital interest both to the civilian community and the military. I believe that the civilian community should take the initiative as this problem is primarily and initially the concern of the civil authorities. However, the military cannot be divorced of its concern in this problem as it is relatively of equal vital interest to the military. Any action which you may take to insure such an adequate supply of food for the civil population will be concurred in by me and have my utmost support.

With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely,

WALTER C. SHORT,
*Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.*

Enclosure No. 2

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 April 1941.

[1]

Subject: Authority to Issue Invitations for Purchase of Irish Potatoes Grown in Hawaii.

To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. In view of the present military situation it is of high importance to increase the local production of food within these islands so that they may become self-supporting.

Hawaii at present imports 85% of its food supplies from the mainland. In the event of an interruption of communications the sustenance of the civil population would become a serious problem. Under certain conditions the solution of this problem becomes a mission of this Department.

In view of these conditions it is believed that the subsidizing of local food production by governmental agencies is entirely justified as an emergency defense measure provided that the increase in cost to the government is not unreasonable.

In this connection attention is invited to Radiograms (381) this Headquarters, to the Quartermaster General, 22 and 23 August 1940, and to his reply thereto of 26 August 1940, authorizing this Department to contract for Irish potatoes under conditions as set forth in 1st Indorsement, W.D. -OQMG, July 5, 1938; and to related correspondence over the past four years.

2. Under the authority above quoted 1,929,000 pounds of Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes have been contracted for delivery during February, March and April of this year at an average cost of \$.025 per pound. Mainland-grown potatoes were delivered to the Navy during this period at an average of \$.018 per pound. Therefore, the project of Irish-potato growing in Hawaii for the purpose of increasing local food production as an emergency defense measure was carried out in this case at an increased cost to the Army of \$.007 per pound, or approximately \$13,500 for the total project in terms of money. It is believed that this differential would hold good as an average throughout any year until growers have established a year-around crop when the spread would become less. Actually, the wastage on Island-grown potatoes is nil for shrinkage, loss of weight or spoilage such as occurs with mainland potatoes in their shipment to Hawaii. This fact materially reduces the differential cost to the government as above indicated. The increase in cost is considered justified as a safety defense measure to assure the future expansion of the local crop. This can be accomplished only by this assurance to the grower of the return of his cost of production. Sugar planters—who provide the bulk of the production, are entirely willing to go along on this project and break even.

3. The efforts of this Department during the past year have directly resulted in the increase in production of 1,242,086 lbs of locally grown Irish potatoes over 1940.

4. It is believed that for a part of the first year Island production will not be able to meet the requirements of the Army for Irish potatoes, but the project is still considered well worth the added cost to the government during the period that the requirements can be met. Local producers feel that they can quickly build up the industry to a point where Hawaii can meet the demand throughout the entire year.

5. It is now proposed to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. For this purpose authority is requested to contract for Hawaii-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year 1942, for monthly or quarterly periods, or for periods of six-months, or for one year as seem most likely to accomplish the purpose at the time of the offering.

(Sgd) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Enclosure No. 3.

R. S. BAMBERGER,
Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General,

The ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington D. C.

Remylet four April subject authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii Stop As soon as decision has been reached relative to request contained in paragraph five thereof request priority radio advice

SHORT

2614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Enclosure No. 4

AG 432 Hawaiian
Dept. (4-4-41) M-D

1st Ind.

ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 2, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Authority is granted to contract for Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year of 1942 on the basis proposed in Paragraph 5, basic letter, provided the contract price shall not exceed 2½¢ per pound.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Sgd) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Enclosure No. 5

Poindexter
Warner

September 16, 1941.

Further reference my wire September 15th regarding food storage at recent meeting attended by Maverick Ashby and representatives War Navy Interior State and Budget Bureau spokesman for service departments indicated rather lukewarm interest in program for producing surplus food stocks for Hawaii Period. Would appreciate your asking commanding general and commandant if their letters dated last March endorsing this project still represent their views and wire me this information.

DELEGATE KING.

Enclosure No. 6

September 17, 1941.

Honorable SAMUEL WILDER KING,
Delegate to Congress,
604 House Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

In opinion of local well informed persons recent international developments only increase the likelihood of demand exceeding the supply of cargo space available for carrying civilian food requirements from mainland to the Territory which formed the basis for the original surplus food program Period Commanding general endorses his previously expressed view for the needs of this project as stated in his letter to Governor Poindexter March twenty first Period Admiral Bloch presently on off island vacation and unavailable Period Opinion of governors food commission made plain in radiogram to you of August twenty second Period Regardless of current situation in Pacific personally feel that as we approach shooting operations with accelerated local defense construction projects the shipping facilities for civilian supplies to the islands are more likely to be restricted than when plan was originally drawn Period Your suggestion that Maverick appraise local problem himself as soon as possible is receiving hearty support of interested parties and strongly urge you to persuade him make such a trip to obtain first hand information on this matter

WARNER (Poindexter).

H. H. WARNER,
Director Agricultural Extension Service
University of Hawaii and
U. S. Department of Agriculture Cooperating

Enclosure No. 8

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER.

Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 December 1941.

In reply refer to:
AO430

Subject: Emergency Reserve Food Supply for the Civilian Population of Hawaii.
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The present military situation in this area has engendered a strong feeling among the civil authorities that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which has lately failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget, should

be brought up again at this time for reconsideration based on new data to be presented.

2. It is my feeling that this project should be progressed as a sure way to meet any food shortage with which the Territory may be confronted in emergency, and for this reason I have written a letter to the Governor of Hawaii in support of this project. A copy of this communication is enclosed.

3. In view of the necessity of a reserve food supply as indicated above, and in the enclosure herewith, I request the support of the War Department for this project when it comes up for reconsideration by the Bureau of the Budget.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl —
Let. Gov. of Hawaii re
food storage dated
12-3-41.

Enclosure No. 9

DECEMBER 3, 1941.

AG-430

Honorable JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: The present military situation in the Pacific indicates the necessity of advancing certain plans for the care and protection of the civil population of Hawaii in the event of an interruption of normal shipping between the Islands and the mainland.

I have always regarded the accumulation of a reserve food supply for Hawaii as of primary importance in our defense plans, and I have publicly announced this view on appropriate occasions.

I feel strongly that the project for the reserve food storage which has lately been refused approval by the Bureau of the Budget, might well be again advanced at this time.

In support of this view I should like to quote from the annual report of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association transmitting the final Food Production Plan for Hawaii to the Trustees of that organization:

"We think that our year of work on these plans has given us a sufficiently clear understanding of the various phases of the problems of emergency food supply to enable us to express an opinion. And that opinion is, that no stone should be left unturned in the effort to have adequate supplies of essential basic foods stored here against an emergency."

Additionally I should like to quote in part from a radiogram from Delegate King of October 24, 1941, addressed to yourself and to Mr. H. H. Warner of your Emergency Food Commission, on the subject of the refusal of the Bureau of the Budget to approve the Food Storage Plan. This communication was submitted at the time as information to the members of the commission, including the Army representative present.

"Perhaps appeal by Governor addressed to President through Interior Department supported by inventory of specified food commodities and length of time such supplies could meet local needs would help bring about further consideration this program.

"Direct appeal from local administration based on factual data would bring quicker action."

It is apparent from the above that the surety of a food supply during the initial phases of a war situation and prior to any supplementary local food production, can be safely predicated only upon the presence of a reserve of food stored here, and that the chance of getting the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for this project rests largely upon the ability of local authority to submit factual data as to amounts of food currently in Hawaii.

This requirement cannot be met with any degree of accuracy except by data obtained through a physical inventory of food on hand.

It is my feeling that as a matter of safeguarding the public welfare against the coming emergency, the project of a defense reserve of food for Hawaii should be again advanced at this time, and that it should be supported in this case by a factual statement of the amount of food currently on hand in the Islands.

For this purpose it is believed that the local importers and others concerned would voluntarily take an inventory to supply the required data in response to a

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request from you. It would seem that an appropriate date for this inventory might well be the end of this calendar year to tie in with other legal inventory requirements of the territory, or even sooner in view of the time element involved in assembling the figures.

May I take this opportunity to assure you of my continued wish to be of any assistance in the present emergency.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Copy of this let. furnished War Department

Enclosure No. 10

[Radiogram]

14 December 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Oahu food inventory of December ninth shows thirty seven days of essential foods on hand for two hundred fifty five thousand civilian population Stop This reserve must be constantly maintained by immediate shipments to supply current consumption Stop Thirteen days rice comma eighteen days potatoes and onions are most serious deficiencies Stop One hundred thirteen thousand head of cattle equal to one hundred fifty two days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory comma and twelve thousand head swine equal to ten days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory are on hand Stop Important that this reserve be maintained by no more than normal slaughter Stop Food store inventories on outlying islands being taken Stop Sugar and pineapples on hand ample for Territory Stop Shipment of twenty thousand net tons of food for civilians in Territory per month for current needs requiring one million two hundred and fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month Stop It is expected that commercial firms will place orders on mainland for necessary subsistence for current needs of civilian population providing there is an allocation of shipping made available Stop It is essential that allocation for this shipping space be made immediately Stop In addition shipments of seven thousand two hundred net tons of food for Army personnel per month requiring four hundred fifteen thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month comma first shipment immediately comma are urgently needed Stop Shipment of emergency food reserve for storage to value of two million five hundred thousand dollars for human food and nine hundred thousand dollars value of animal and poultry feed comma total three million four hundred thousand dollars equal to forty eight thousand net tons requiring two million seven hundred fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space is urgently needed Stop Letter will follow showing items for purchase for this emergency food reserve for storage Stop Requisition has been already communicated by Governor Poindexter to Swope Department of Interior and Delegate King Stop Orders have been placed for seed comma insecticides comma fertilizer comma and agricultural implements through Division Engineer South Pacific Division San Francisco Stop Forty thousand weight tons and fifty five thousand ship tons of shipping required for these items Stop This must be shipped immediately Stop Request War Department obtain shipping spaces or Government shipping for all shipments covered in this communication both for immediate shipment and future monthly shipments.

SHORT.

Enclosure No. 11.

[Radiogram]

Washn D. C. 403 A Dec 17 1941

C G

Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

685 16th Department of Agriculture will procure and deliver to civil authorities in Hawaii food for civilian population comma URAD one one eight two period First shipment planned to leave within one week followed by second shipment following week period Every effort will be made to provide critical items indicated in URAD and that of Governor.

ADAMS.

346A

[Exhibit 1 Q]

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 11, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 383

Subject: Protection of the Civilian Population against Air and Other Attack.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to radiogram from Delegate Sam King to me, a copy of which is inclosed for ready reference. This radiogram raised questions concerning funds to be allotted to Hawaii under the Lanham Act for the protection of the civilian population against air and other forms of attack. These questions are answered in this letter which is submitted to the War Department in accordance with request in the radiogram. A copy of this letter and all inclosures is being forwarded direct to Dr. C. E. Fronk, in care of Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior. Dr. Fronk is now in Washington as the Governor's representative in this matter.

2. Evacuation camps will be built in units designed to care for 240 people. This size is determined by the capacity of the standard mess hall (Fig. 74, FM 5-35) which will serve 120 people at one sitting. The ideal unit would be built in a quadrangle 100 yards wide by 120 yards long. This arrangement will facilitate guarding against prowlers, contribute to privacy, and shorten average distances between shelters and latrines, mess hall, baths, and wash rooms. See typical layout plan inclosed herewith (Incl. No. 1).

a. This typical layout will be modified as necessary to adapt it to ground forms, streets, etc.; but the general principle of using shelters to form a partially inclosed communal area will be observed.

b. The design has been made extremely simple to permit erection by unskilled labor, and the use of any type of building material. Materials available in local stocks will be used to the utmost to conserve shipping space. Windows and doors are omitted. Occupants will devise curtains to secure such privacy as they wish. It is proposed to construct all units except bath houses and water served latrines without floors initially. If lumber is available, wooden floors will eventually be laid on wooden sleepers. If lumber is not available, floors will be finished with volcanic cinders, crushed rock, or sand stabilized with portland cement if available. If floors cannot be provided, occupants will have to provide themselves with something to stand on.

[2] c. Canec, a locally available product, will be used to the fullest extent practicable. Studding, rafters, flooring, and probably sleepers supporting flooring will have to be imported if not in stock. Roofs will be made from galvanized iron, if obtainable.

d. All structures have been designed to utilize standard sheets of canec, plywood, and standard lengths of lumber.

e. The mess hall is an adaptation of the standard mess hall shown in Fig. 74, FM 5-35. Construction is greatly simplified by omitting doors and windows which permits spacing all studs uniformly 24" on centers (See Incl. No. 6).

f. All other buildings are simple shed construction. See inclosed sketches of shelters, latrines, bath houses, and wash houses. (Incls. 2 to 5).

(1) 960 lineal feet of living room shelters will be provided for each camp. They will be built in lengths which are multiples of 8'. Standard double bunks (Fig. 71, FM-5-35) will be placed 8' apart. (Incl. No. 2). Partitions will be of canec so nailed that they may be easily removed. Occupants will remove and shift canec partitions to give any length room desired.

(2) The same type construction will be used for latrines, bath houses, and wash rooms as in living quarters. Details of interior arrangements are indicated on inclosed sketches. Latrines will be equipped with water closets when a sewer system is available and the necessary plumbing supplies can be secured. Otherwise pit latrines will be used. Running water will be available at all camps. Plumbing will be installed in mess halls, bath houses, and wash houses in the order named as far as available materials will permit.

g. Protection against bombardment will be provided by slit trenches as indicated in the typical layout sheet (Incl. No. 1) when camps are on flat ground. Camps in gulches will be provided with conveniently located alcoves dug into deep slopes.

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h. Dispensary buildings and administration buildings will not normally be built. In the general instance sufficient space in permanent residences or other buildings will be available for those purposes.

i. Protection of funds and valuables may be made a function of a central administration service. No provision will be made for that in construction plans.

[3] 1. Evacuees will be encouraged to bring small articles of furniture such as mirrors, chairs, hammocks, mattresses, curtains, etc. They will also be encouraged to bring simple hand tools. It is presumed that subsequent to evacuation a systematic collection will be made of abandoned articles required for camp comfort.

3. a. Camp locations have been selected with a view to the following. For locations see Incl. 7.

(1) Utilizing existing roads, utilities installations, and community service units such as stores, post offices, churches, etc.

(2) Avoiding ground at present under cultivation.

(3) Placing a large percentage of evacuees near areas suitable for growing vegetables.

(4) Securing dispersion.

b. The equivalent of 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be constructed as extensions of existing permanent plantation villages. In addition to this extension many villages will be increased by one mess hall, latrine, bath house, and wash house to permit increasing the number of occupants in the permanent buildings which will be utilized solely as dormitories. Plantation villages in the higher altitudes are usually built on the edges of gulches. The camp extensions will, in the general instance, be sited in these gulches and will vary greatly in size and layout, depending on terrain conditions. These camps will be spread throughout the central valley in areas least subject to probable enemy activity. Distances from Honolulu will vary from 8 to 26 miles. The estimated average distance is about 20 miles. Locations are shown on Incl. 7. These camps will have running water, but will not have sewer connections. The following advantages are characteristic of these units:

(1) Provide a high degree of dispersion.

(2) Sited in excellent locations for protection.

(3) Well located for utilization of occupants in food production.

(4) Adaptable to race segregation which will be desirable to present communal discord.

(5) Can readily be amalgamated with existing village administrations which will facilitate government.

(6) Utilize existing installations.

[4] c. 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be located at Wahiawa, north of the Schofield Barracks East Range boundary and south of the North Fork of Wahiawa Reservoir. The distance from Honolulu is about 21 miles by Kamehameha Highway. This location offers the following advantages:

(1) Will be an extension of an existing city in areas fairly well supplied with roads.

(2) Can readily be supplied with sewer facilities if materials are available.

(3) Will be included in anti-aircraft defense of Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.

(4) Is in an area of rich soil adaptable to utilization of evacuees in food production.

d. 21 units (240 persons each) with capacity for 5,040 people will be located in four valleys leading into the Koolau Range from the evacuated areas. For location see Incl. 7. They will be between 2 and 3 miles of the evacuated area.

e. 21 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 5,040 people will be located in gulches west of Aiea. For location see Incl. 7. They will be an average of about 13 miles from Honolulu.

4. The projected air-raid shelters are intended to protect 6,000 persons other than military personnel whose continued presence in the danger area is essential to the defense of Oahu. The number is based upon reports submitted by essential governmental agencies, public utilities, and commercial firms.

b. The proposed locations of shelters is shown on the inclosed map of Honolulu (Incl. No. 8). These locations have been determined from reports of probable distribution of personnel submitted by the organization affected.

c. It is proposed to construct the shelters of reinforced concrete and to limit the normal capacity of each shelter to from 10 to 15 persons which can shelter from 16 to 25 people for short periods. However, other materials will be sub-

stituted for reinforced concrete if cement and steel are not available in sufficient quantities. When practicable existing structures will be utilized by increasing protective characteristics. Tunneling will be practicable in some locations. Enclosures 9 to 12 show details of the various types to be used, depending on conditions.

[5] d. The cost of reinforced concrete shelters has been estimated at \$100.00 per person to be sheltered. That is each shelter will cost from \$1,000 to \$1,500. To estimate of unit cost can be made for shelters built of substitute materials. Should shortage of materials limit the number of concrete shelters built, the available funds will be applied to building as many shelters of substitute materials as possible.

e. It is presumed that the shelters provided for personnel essential to defense will be supplemented by private individual shelters and by shelters erected by commercial interests not essential to defense. The costs of these shelters should be borne by the individual.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

13 Incls:

- Incl. #1 Layout plan
- #2-5 Sketches
- #6 Fig. 74
- #7 Map
- #8 Map of Hono.
- #9-12 Drawings
- #13 Radio, 4 July 41

A True Copy:

Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN, 1st
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

ND DJ 243 Govt REP

ZPN 1 Radio, WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4 0128 1941.

Govt Rep Lt General Walter C. Short,

Fort Shafter, TH Oahu

Following from Doctor C. E. Fronk quote Reurletter June twenty reference number three eight one War Department considering whether problem lies purely within military jurisdiction or should be responsibility of civilian agency period in latter case Office of Civilian Defense may be made responsible for program of Federal Works Agency with funds from Lanham Act period In conference with General Lorenzo D. Gasser Army representative on LaGuardias committee I as requested obtain as soon as possible full details proposed evacuation period m advised allocation of funds according to estimate submitted by Colonel Lyman in memorandum dated June nineteenth reference number three eight three would not be made on basis data so far available here period More explicit information regarding number and exact location of camps comma number of persons at each camp comma together with areas to be evacuated and distances from city to proposed camp sites will be required substantiated with maps period Recommend provision for shelters be included in which case character and material of shelters should be incorporated in your estimates period Referring to splinter shelters exact location and number also necessary together with any other data that may be pertinent period Would greatly appreciate your forwarding this material by fastest mail through War Department with copy direct to me addressed care Division of Territories and Island Possessions Department of Interior period Outlook encouraging letter follows unquote Delegate Sam King.

TOD,
1628
610A/4

A true copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

2620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Exhibit 1R]

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: I have the honor to present an entirely unsolicited expression of interest from many leading men of Honolulu.

There are a hundred more who I am sure would have felt honored to sign this, if time had been available. I wished to place a copy of this letter in your hands without further delay.

Yours very truly,

FRANK E. MIDKIFF.

A true copy:

Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst. to G-4.

HONOLULU T. H., December 22, 1941.

The PRESIDENT,

The White House, Washington, D. C.

SIR: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or other wise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President, Lowers & Cook, Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poin-dexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Assn.; H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank

E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L. Doty, Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; (now acting as Food Administrator and Supply Officer).

c. c. to General Walter C. Short.

A true copy:

Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
ROBERT J. FLEMING, Jr.,
Major, G. S. C.
Asst. to G-4.

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, ISLAND OF OAHU,
Honolulu, Hawaii, December 20, 1941.

Lt. General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter

DEAR GENERAL SHORT,

Please allow me express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical Committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minutes notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realizes the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be Prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) T. G. S. Walker
T. G. S. WALKER, *Director,*
Civilian Defense,
Island of Oahu.

True Copy

O. M. Cutler
O. M. CUTLER
Lt. Col. Infantry

[1] [SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII]

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
Executive Chambers,
Honolulu, 23 December 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) *The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act* by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire

civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) *The production and conservation of food:* Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since [2] December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) *The medical facilities* for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) *Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters* for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) *An auxiliary police force* to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) *Legislation authorizing a home guard* was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) *There were many other matters* too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) J. W. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

This is a True Copy.

L. W. Truman

L. W. TRUMAN,

Captain, Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF A. C. OF S., G-4
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 2

4A-e

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 28, 1941.

EMUEL B. SCHOFIELD, *Special Assistant,*
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General,
Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SCHOFIELD:

The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Los Angeles, California; Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California; Gunther and Shirley Company, Los Angeles, California, and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H. pursuant to Engineer Corps Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, one of the principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Company, applied to the U. S. District Court at Los Angeles, California on January 15, 1941 for his final citizenship papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding ability, excellent judgment and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Arizona for the Indian Service and miscellaneous dams, tunnels and other heavy construction in the State of California. To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for government defense projects because of his alien status.

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the aforementioned defense construction project because of his peculiar qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be expedited.

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. KINGMAN,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 3

Stamped:)

SECRET

Auth.: C. G., Haw. Dept.

Initials O M M, A. G.

Date 31 Dec 1941

In reply refer to:

Sig. 676.3 AWS

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Signal Officer,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 December, 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service.

To: Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C.

1. Inasmuch as five out of six radio sets SCR 270 were operating from 4:00 to 6:00 A. M. on 7 December, 1941, and one station, namely the Opana station, remained in operation thereafter until 7:39 A. M., it is believed that the following two inclosures may be of some interest:

2. Inclosure No. 1 is a composite based on the written records of ranges and azimuths kept at the following stations: KOKO HEAD, KAAAWA, OPANA, LA WAILOA, and FORT SHAFTER. Attention is invited to the close agreement of data secured on aircraft north of OAHU between 6:48 and 6:54 A. M.

2624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

3. Inclosure No. 2 is the graphical record made on the OPANA station plotting board. This record includes the period covered in Inclosure No. 1 and subsequent hours of 7 December, 1941. Attention is invited to the plot beginning at 7:02 A. M. near the top of the chart and ending at 7:39 A. M. as it developed that this was the hostile flight which attacked PEARL HARBOR at 8:10 A. M.

C. A. Powell
C. A. POWELL,
*Lt Col, Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.*

2 Inclosures: Charts
(Stamped:)

RECEIVED
JAN 29 1126 AM '42
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 3A

(Exhibit 3-A is a map of the Hawaiian Islands bearing notations from Radar Detector Station Records. This map is reproduced as Item No. 4 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 3B

(Exhibit 3-B is a map showing record of Opana Radar Detector Station 7 December 1941. This map is reproduced as Item No. 5 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4

SUMMARY

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

Mt. Kaala (Oahu, T. H.).

Job Order #2.1 March 5, 1941.

Construct 9,000 feet of access road from Kole Kole Pass Road to proposed site of Cableway at Mt. Kaala.

Est. Cost \$78,825.00.

Commencement date: March 6, 1941.

Est. date for completion: May 6, 1941.

Supervision by J. J. Kestly, Area Engr., 3rd Field Area.

Job Order #2.0 Feb. 6, 1941.

Construct Cableway Mt. Kaala.

Est. Cost \$71,451.00.

Commencement date: Feb. 6, 1941.

Est. date for completion: June 1, 1941.

Supervision John J. Kestly, Area Engr., 3rd Field Area.

Addendum #1 Feb. 19, 1942 Cable Warehouse.

Addendum #2 Feb. 26, 1942 Splinter Proof Tunnel.

Job Order #2.2 Oct. 17, 1941.

Construct A. W. S. Camp and install utilities—Mess Hall, Barracks, Power House, Radio Communication Bldg., etc. Also erect 100 ft. Radio Tower and install equipment.

Est. Cost \$31,120.93.

Commencement date: Dec. 1, 1941.

Est. date for completion: Mar. 1, 1942.

Supervision Area Engr. J. J. Kestly 3rd Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., March 5, 1941.

JOB ORDER No. 2.1

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. **PROJECT TITLE:** Access Road from Kole Kole Pass Road to base of proposed Cableway at Mt. Kaala.
2. **LOCATION:** Island of Oahu, T. H.
3. **OFFICE FILE REFERENCE:** C. of E. 665 (Oahu) 505. July 31, 1940.
4. **WORK TO BE DONE:** Construct approximately 9,000 feet of access road from Kole Kole Pass Road to the proposed site of the Cableway at Mt. Kaala, together with all necessary culverts and drainage facilities.
5. **WORK REQUESTED BY:** Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. **DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES:** See Para. 1-03 Specifications.
7. **APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE:** 21010605 Signal Service of the Army 1940-41.
8. **ESTIMATED COST:** \$57,225.00.
9. **COMMENCEMENT DATE:** March 6, 1941.
10. **ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION:** May 6, 1941.
11. **ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE:** 14,200 man hours.
12. **PLANT REQUIRED:** See detailed estimate attached.
13. **MATERIALS:** See detailed estimate attached.
14. **SUPERVISION BY:** J. J. Kestly, Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,

Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, District Engineer.

Approved: March 20, 1941.

For and in the absence of the Division Engineer:

J. R. D. MATHESON,

*Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Executive Assistant.***ESTIMATE OF COST**

To Accompany Job Order No. 2.1

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: Access Road From Kole Kole Pass Road to Base of Proposed Cableway at Mt. Kaala, Island of Oahu, T. H.**DISTRICT:** Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done is on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and includes the furnishing of all necessary labor and equipment, and the performing of all work necessary to construct a 10' roadway approximately 9,000 feet long, together with all necessary culverts and drainage facilities. Unit prices are stated in the following schedules:

1. Materials to be furnished:

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit Price	Amount
1	Dynamite	15,000	lbs.	\$0.125	\$1,875.00
2	Blasting Caps, Electric (Lump Sum)				400.00
3	Cement	460	bbl.	3.04	1,398.40
4	Fine Aggregate	170	cu. yd.	2.70	459.00
5	Coarse Aggregate	260	cu. yd.	3.00	780.00
6	1" ϕ Reinf. Steel	7,210	lbs.	0.045	324.45
7	3/4" Reinf. Steel	8,420	lbs.	0.045	378.90
8	5/8" Reinf. Steel	27,580	lbs.	0.045	1,240.20
9	1" x 6" Shiplap—Lumber	9,500	bf.	55.00M	522.50
10	2" x 4" Studding—Lumber	3,000	bf.	55.00M	165.00
11	4" x 4" Whaling—Lumber	3,500	bf.	53.00M	185.50
12	2" Black Steel Pipe and Fittings	9,000	lin. ft.	0.30	2,700.00
13	Wire #14	100	lbs.	0.10	10.00
14	48" R. C. Pipe	608	lin. ft.	6.30	3,830.40
15	Tar Paper	1	roll	3.00	3.00
16	Nails	300	lbs.	0.08	24.00
17	18" Reinf. Concrete Pipe	240	lin. ft.	3.15	756.00
Total Cost of Material					15,052.35

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2. Day Labor:

(a) Clearing and Grubbing:			
60 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	\$90. 00
1,400 man hours	-----	0. 50	700. 00
(b) Hauling and Handling:			
16 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	24. 00
320 man hours	-----	1. 00	320. 00
320 man hours	-----	0. 50	160. 00
(c) Excavation and Fill (Road):			
800 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	1, 200. 00
480 man hours	-----	1. 00	480. 00
2,400 man hours	-----	0. 75	1, 800. 00
1,200 man hours	-----	0. 50	600. 00
(d) Excavation and Backfill (Drainage Structures):			
24 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	36. 00
400 man hours	-----	0. 50	200. 00
(e) Drilling and Blasting:			
300 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	450. 00
1,200 man hours	-----	0. 75	900. 00
800 man hours	-----	0. 50	400. 00
(f) Shaping and Rolling:			
16 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	24. 00
280 man hours	-----	1. 00	280. 00
240 man hours	-----	0. 50	120. 00
(g) Forming, Stripping and Curing:			
40 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	60. 00
320 man hours	-----	1. 00	320. 00
320 man hours	-----	0. 50	160. 00
(h) Mixing and Placing Concrete:			
40 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	60. 00
80 man hours	-----	1. 00	80. 00
320 man hours	-----	0. 50	160. 00
(i) Trenching, Laying and Backfilling Concrete Pipe:			
64 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	96. 00
100 man hours	-----	1. 00	100. 00
100 man hours	-----	0. 75	75. 00
420 man hours	-----	0. 50	210. 00
(j) Rock Masonry—Channel Work:			
64 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	96. 00
120 man hours	-----	1. 00	120. 00
300 man hours	-----	0. 50	150. 00
(k) Maintenance Crew, Watchmen, etc.:			
240 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	360. 00
480 man hours	-----	1. 00	480. 00
480 man hours	-----	0. 65	292. 00
480 man hours	-----	0. 50	240. 00

Total Cost of Day Labor----- 10, 843. 00

3. Plant Operation.

(a) Rental of Equipment:

1 Caterpillar w/dozer	60 da.	@ \$22. 50	\$1, 350. 00
1 Grader	15 da.	6. 00	90. 00
1 Shovel—2½ yd	2 mo.	3, 115. 00	6, 230. 00
3 Trucks—9 yd	2 mo.	584. 00	3, 504. 00
1 Truck—1½ ton	2 mo.	180. 00	360. 00
1 Pick-up Truck	2 mo.	69. 00	138. 00
1 Concrete Mixer—¼ yd	20 da.	2. 50	50. 00
1 Compressor	2 mo.	695. 00	1, 390. 00
3 Jackhammers	2 mo.	45. 00	270. 00
1 Roller	1 mo.	360. 00	360. 00
1 Motor truck Crane	½ mo.	942. 00	471. 00
1 Sedan	2 mo.	76. 00	152. 00
1 Bar bending Machine	6 da.	2. 50	15. 00
1 Bar Shear	6 da.	3. 50	21. 00
Small Tools (lump sum)	-----	-----	500. 00

Total Plant to be Leased----- 14, 901. 00

(b) Fuel, Oil, and Supplies-----	\$900. 00
(c) Temporary buildings, shelters-----	200. 00
Total Plant Operation Cost-----	<u>16, 001. 00</u>

Part 4.

Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:

Cost of Material-----	15, 052. 35
Cost of Day Labor-----	10, 843. 00
Cost of Plant Operation-----	16, 001. 00

Total Plant Operation Cost-----	<u>41, 896. 35</u>
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5. *Total Cost of Work:*(a) *Direct Cost:*

Total Plant Operation Cost-----	41, 896. 35
Contingencies—15%-----	6, 284. 45

Total Direct Cost-----	48, 180. 80
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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Mobilization & Demobilization-----	\$1, 500. 00
Survey, Inspection, Engineering—10%-----	4, 818. 08

Total Indirect Cost-----	6, 318. 08
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Total Field Cost-----	54, 498. 88
General Office Overhead—5%-----	2, 726. 12

Estimated Grand Total Cost by Hired Labor and Government Plant-----	57, 225. 00
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THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

UNSKILLED LABOR

CLASS 1—\$0.50 per hour.

Shovelers
Concrete Placers
Slopers—Roadway
Material Handlers
Brush Cutters
Water Boy

CLASS 2—\$0.65 per hour.

Carpenter's Helper
Crane Operator's Helper
Air Compressor Men

SEMI-SKILLED LABOR

CLASS 3—\$0.75 per hour.

Truck Drivers
Drillers
Steel Tiers

SKILLED LABOR

CLASS 4—\$1.00 per hour.

Carpenters
Tractor Operators
Crane Operators
Cement Finishers

CLASS 5—\$1.50 per hour.

General Foreman

JUNE 24, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 2.1
Contract No. W-414-eng 602

WORK TO BE DONE: Pave Mt. Kaala Access Road, with 4" Water Bound Macadam Base Course and 2½" Asphaltic Concrete Top Course.
DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Mt. Kaala Access Road, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific item:

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1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to pave Mt. Kaala Access Road with a 4" water bound Macadam base Course and 2½" asphaltic concrete top Course, in accordance with the Specifications to be issued and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 2.1 is additional work and does not alter Job Order No. 2.1.

The total Cost of the Work shall not exceed \$21,600.00.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost

1. Total Cost of Work.

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$21,600.00
Contingencies—10%-----	2,160.00

Total Direct Cost-----	\$23,760.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$1,728.00
Total Indirect Cost-----	\$1,728.00
Total Field Cost-----	\$25,488.00

General Office Overhead-----	1,728.00
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Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	\$27,216.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., February 6, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 2.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Sea Coast Defense, Cableway Mt. Kaala.
2. LOCATION: On the island of Oahu, T. H., east slope of Mt. Kaala.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: C. of E. 665 (Oahu) 505. July 31, 1940.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete a cableway, as specified and in conformity to the approved plans and drawings.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As enumerated. (see Para. 1-03 of attached specifications).
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: S. S. S. A. 1940-1941, Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department SC1450 P99 A0605-01.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$71,451.91 (see detailed estimate attached).
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: (See para. 1-05a of attached specifications.)
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: (See para. 1-05b of attached specifications).
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: 11,620 man hours (See detailed estimate sheet).
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.
13. MATERIALS: See detailed estimate attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: John J. Kestly, Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

(d) <i>Drilling and Blasting for Excavation:</i>			
120 man hours	----- @	\$1. 50	\$180. 00
240 man hours	----- @	0. 75	180. 00
240 man hours	----- @	0. 65	156. 00
(e) <i>Erection Structural Steel and Stringing Cable:</i>			
400 man hours	----- @	1. 50	600. 00
1200 man hours	----- @	1. 00	1,200. 00
1200 man hours	----- @	0. 65	780. 00
(f) <i>Installing Electrical Equipment:</i>			
100 man hours	----- @	1. 50	150. 00
200 man hours	----- @	1. 00	200. 00
200 man hours	----- @	0. 65	135. 00
(g) <i>Operators for Rented Equipment:</i>			
360 man hours	----- @	1. 25	450. 00
1800 man hours	----- @	1. 00	1,800. 00
600 man hours	----- @	0. 75	450. 00
(h) <i>Miscl. Form and Scaffolding, etc.:</i>			
480 man hours	----- @	1. 00	480. 00
960 man hours	----- @	0. 65	624. 00
(i) <i>Clearing and Grubbing for Cableway:</i>			
80 man hours	----- @	1. 50	120. 00
400 man hours	----- @	0. 50	200. 00
Total Labor Cost			9,805. 00
3. <i>Plant to be leased:</i>			
(2) Truck	60 da. @	\$5. 00	600. 00
(1) Tractor with blade	60 da. @	2. 50	150. 00
(1) ¼ yd. Concrete Mixer	50 da. @	2. 50	125. 00
(2) Compressors #210	50 da. @	10. 00	1,000. 00
(2) Jack hammers	50 da. @	1. 50	150. 00
(1) 2-Drum Hoist	60 da. @	3. 50	210. 00
(1) Water Wagon	60 da. @	2. 50	150. 00
(1) Welding Machine	45 da. @	18. 00	810. 00
(1) Pump	50 da. @	1. 50	75. 00
(1) Vibrator	50 da. @	1. 00	50. 00
Small Tools, Gas, Oil & Supplies (Lump Sum)			500. 00
(1) Pick-up Truck	60 da. @	3. 50	210. 00
Total Plant Cost			4,030. 00
4. <i>Field Cost:</i>			
Materials	-----		33,280. 50
Plant Rental	-----		4,030. 00
Labor	-----		9,805. 00
Total Field Cost			47,095. 50
5. <i>Total Cost to Work:</i>			
(a) <i>Direct Cost:</i>			
Total plant operating cost	-----		47,095. 50
Contingencies — 20%	-----		9,419. 10
Total Direct Cost			56,514. 60
(b) <i>Indirect Cost:</i>			
Mobilization and demobilization	-----	\$500. 00	
Engineering and inspection—12%	-----	6,781. 75	
Total Indirect Cost			7,281. 75
Total Field Cost			63,796. 35
General Office Overhead—12%	-----		7,655. 56
Grand Total Cost by hired labor and Government plant			71,451. 91

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

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FEBRUARY 19, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 2.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 2.0 (Cable Warehouse at Mount Kaala) authorizes the construction of necessary housing to protect the hoist equipment serving the Mount Kaala Cable Warehouse. All work is to be done in accordance with plans and instructions furnished the Area Engineer.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JO4 3-20

MARCH 16, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1 (Revised)

To Accompany Job Order No. 2.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 (Revised), to accompany Job Order No. 2.0 (Cableway at Mount Kaala) authorizes the construction of necessary housing to protect the hoist equipment serving the Mount Kaala Cableway. All work is to be done in accordance with plans and instructions furnished the Area Engineer.

For the District Engineer:

/s/ H. B. NURSE,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

FEBRUARY 26, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2.

To Accompany Job Order No. 2.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2, to accompany Job Order No. 2.0, (Cableway at Mt. Kaala) provides for the construction of a splinter-proof protection for Bombardment Tunnel, Mt. Kaala, in accordance with plans and specifications furnished the Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

MARCH 13, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2 (Rev.)

To Accompany Job Order No. 2.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2 (Revised) to accompany Job Order No. 2.0 (Cableway at Mt. Kaala), authorizes the construction of a protection tunnel for personnel at

Mt. Kaala, in accordance with plans and specifications furnished the Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

For the District Engineer:

/s/ H. B. NURSE,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant,

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., October 17, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 2.2

Contract W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. **PROJECT TITLE:** Construct A. W. S. Camp and Install Utilities
2. **LOCATION:** Mt. Kaala, Oahu, T. H.
3. **OFFICE FILE REFERENCE:** ND 676.3—A. W. S. Mt. Kaala
4. **WORK TO BE DONE:** Construct and complete with necessary utilities, 1 Mess Hall, 1 Barracks Building, 1 Power House, 1 Caretaker's Quarters, 1 Radio Communications Building, 1 Power House Building for Radio, 1 Foundation for Transmitter Building and Tower, 1 Water tank. Also erect 100-ft. Radio Tower, clear and grade Camp Site, and install equipment.
5. **WORK REQUESTED BY:** Commanding General—Hawaiian Department
6. **DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES:** As enumerated in Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 2.2
7. **APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE:** SC 1450.
8. **ESTIMATED COST:** \$31,120.93.
9. **COMMENCEMENT DATE:** December 1, 1941.
10. **ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION:** March 1, 1942.
11. **ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE:** See detailed estimate attached.
12. **PLANT REQUIRED:** " " " "
13. **MATERIALS:** " " " "
14. **SUPERVISION BY:** The Area Engineer—Third Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 2.2

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct A. W. S. Camp and Install Utilities

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Mt. Kaala, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete the following structures:

- (a) 1 Mess Hall (33'-0"x52'-0")
- (b) 1 Barracks Building, Thirty-Man (22'-0"x83'-0")
- (c) 1 Power House (16'-0"x16'-0")
- (d) 1 Caretaker's Quarters (40'-0"x42'-0")
- (e) 1 Radio Communications Building
- (f) 1 Powerhouse for Radio
- (g) 1 Foundation for Transmitter Building and Tower
- (h) 1 Erect 100-ft. Steel Tower (Tower furnished by Signal Corps)
- (i) 1 20,000 gallon concrete water tank.

2. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to clear and grade site for structures and facilities, and install necessary equipment.

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3. Furnish all labor and equipment and do all work necessary to install, complete, all necessary utilities for the Camp.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$31,120.93.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

COST TO CONTRACTOR

1. Construction A. W. S. Camp—Mt. Kaala

A. 1 Mess Hall (33'-0" x 52'-0") :

(a) Materials	\$2, 275. 46
(b) Labor	2, 423. 61
(c) Plant Rental	100. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Office Overhead	191. 96
(e) Mobilization & Demobilization	479. 91

Total \$5, 470. 94

B. 1 Barracks Building, Thirty-Man (22'-0" x 83'-0") :

(a) Material	\$2, 667. 43
(b) Labor	2, 438. 29
(c) Plant Rental	100. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	208. 23
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	520. 57

Total 5, 934. 52

C. 1 Power House (16'-0" x 16'-0") :

(a) Material	\$526. 09
(b) Labor	819. 10
(c) Plant Rental	50. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	55. 81
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	139. 52

Total 1, 590. 52

D. 1 Caretaker's Quarters (40'-0" x 42'-0") :

(a) Materials	\$2, 388. 93
(b) Labor	2, 513. 96
(c) Plant Rental	100. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	200. 04
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	500. 00

Total 5, 700. 93

E. 1 Radio Communications :

(a) Labor	\$1, 874. 40
(b) Materials	2, 359. 92
(c) Plant Rental	100. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	173. 37
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	433. 43

Total 4, 941. 12

F. 1 Power House for Radio (18'-0" x 24'-0") :

(a) Material	\$798. 96
(b) Labor	1, 033. 58
(c) Plant Rental	50. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	75. 30
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	188. 25

Total 2, 146. 09

G. Foundations for Transmitter Building & Tower:

(a) Material	\$810. 73
(b) Labor	390. 68
(c) Plant Rental	35. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	49. 46
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	123. 64

Total \$1, 409. 51

H. Erect 100-ft. Radio Tower:

(a) Labor	\$725. 00
(b) Plant Rental	50. 00
(c) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	31. 00
(d) Mobil. & Demobil	77. 50

Total 883. 50

I. One 20,000 Gallon Concrete Water Tank:

(a) Materials	\$600. 00
(b) Labor	1, 100. 00
(c) Plant Rental	200. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	76. 00
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	190. 00

Total 2, 166. 00

J. Clearing of Site & Grading:

(a) Material	\$20. 00
(b) Labor	300. 00
(c) Plant Rental	50. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	14. 80
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	37. 00

Total \$421. 80

K. Install Equipment:

(a) Material	\$50. 00
(b) Labor	300. 00
(c) Plant Rental	50. 00
(d) Contractors Field & Off. Overhead	16. 00
(e) Mobil. & Demobil	40. 00

Total 456. 00

Total cost to the contractor 31, 120. 93

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost**1. Total Cost of Work:****(a) Direct Cost:**

Total Cost to Contractor	\$31, 120. 93
Contingencies—10%	3, 112. 09

Total Direct Cost 34, 233. 02

(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering	\$2, 849. 67
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Total Indirect Cost 2, 489. 67

Total Field Cost	36, 722. 69
General Office Overhead	2, 489. 67

Estimated Total Cost to the Government 39, 212. 36

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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4A

Summary

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

Contract W414-eng-602

Kokee (Kauai, T. H.)

Job Order #23.0 April 28, 1941 (revised) Sept. 3, 1941.

Construct a 12 foot road approximately 11,500 feet long (AWS Service Rd., Kokee).

Est. Cost: \$79,030.00.

Est. Cost (Rev.): \$69,363.00.

Commencement date: May 1, 1941.

Est. date for completion: Jul 15, 1941.

Revised date for completion: Sept. 25, 1941.

Supervision by Area Engr. 4th Field Area.

Job Order #23.1 June 18, 1941 (revised) Dec. 17, 1941.

Construct—complete structures at Base Camp and Station X with utilities and fence National Palikona Forest Reserve.

Est. Cos: \$82,800.00.

Est. Cost (rev.): \$87,124.15.

Commencement date: June 23, 1941.

Est. date for completion: Sept. 23, 1941.

Revised date for completion: Dec. 1, 1941.

Supervision by Area Engr. 4th Field Area.

Addendum #1 June 2, 1941 \$300.00 shed.

Addendum #2 Oct. 10, 1941 Construct Radio Shelter and Garage \$14,081.57.

Addendum #3 Feb. 5, 1942 Construct Bombproof Shelter for Radio Communications.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., September 3, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 23.0 (Revised)

Contract No. W-414-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Aircraft Warning Service Road, Kauai, T. H.
2. LOCATION: Na Palikona Forest Reserve, Kauai, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2014.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct a twelve foot road approximately 11,500 feet long complete with penetration macadam paving and all necessary drainage facilities.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As enumerated in Specifications, "Access Road to Kokee, Job Order No. 23.0".
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: S. S. A. 1940-41 SC1450 P23-A0605-01.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$55,050.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 1, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: September 25, 1941.

11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed Estimate Attached.
 12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " "
 13. MATERIALS: " " "
 14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Fourth Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
 THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 23.0 (Revised)

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct a 12 foot road approximately 11,500 feet long, complete with penetration macadam paving and all necessary drainage facilities.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located on the Na Pallkoma Forest Reserve, on the Island of Kauai, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct a twelve foot road approximately 11,500 feet long, complete with penetration macadam paving and all necessary drainage facilities.

All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with the Specifications, "Access Road to Kokee, Job Order No. 23.0", and the details on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$55,050.00.

2. Job Order No. 23.0 is revised on the basis of a detailed cost estimate.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
 THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

KOKEE ACCESS ROAD

1. Material.

Item	Quantity	Unit	Unit Cost	Total Amount
1. Cement (201 cu. yds.)	305	bbl.	\$2.93	\$893.65
2. Fine Aggregate	100	cu. yds.	5.50	550.00
3. Coarse Aggregate	180	"	5.50	990.00
4. 1/4" # Reinforcing Steel	4,800	lbs.	0.0293	140.64
5. 3/8" # " " "	10,700	"	0.0293	313.51
6. 1/2" # " " "	12,600	"	0.0293	369.18
7. #14 Ga. Black Wire	200	"	0.08	16.00
8. 1" x 6" T. & G. Sheeting	4,200	MBM	66.00	277.20
9. 2" x 4" #1 Comm. Lbr.	4,200	"	66.00	277.20
10. 4" x 4" #1 " " "	2,100	"	66.00	138.60
11. Nails 6s-8s-10s and 20d	6	Kegs	6.60	39.60
12. 2 x 4-12'-16' #1 Comm	15,400	MBM	66.00	1,016.40
13. 1 1/2' x 2" x 18" Stakes (Wood)	4,650	Ea.	0.08	372.00
14. Form Oil	25	Gal.	0.21	5.25
15. 24" Diam. R. C. Pipe	264	lin. ft.	2.70	712.80
16. 18" " " " "	372	"	2.02	751.44
17. Emulsified Asphalt	27,250	Gal.	0.125	3,406.25
18. #2 Crushed Rock	971	cu. yds.	5.50	5,340.50
19. #3/4 Crushed Rock	324	"	5.50	1,782.00
20. #4 Standard Crushed Rock	220	"	5.50	1,210.00
21. 50# Rubble Rock	15	"	5.50	82.50
22. Dynamite-60%	4,000	lbs.	0.105	420.00
23. Electric Detonating Caps	1,000	ea.	0.10	100.00
24. #10 Galv. Iron Wire	200	lbs.	0.09	18.00
25. Boat Freight & Stevedoring	200	Tons	7.01	1,402.00
26. Miscellaneous Supplies	Lump sum			225.28
Total Cost of Material				20,850.00

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2. Labor:

(a) <i>Clearing and Grubbing:</i>			
60 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	\$90. 00
80 man hours-----	@	1. 25	100. 00
160 man hours-----	@	1. 00	160. 00
1,700 man hours-----	@	. 50	850. 00
			\$1, 200. 00
(b) <i>Handling and Hauling:</i>			
40 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	60. 00
60 man hours-----	@	1. 25	60. 00
120 man hours-----	@	1. 00	120. 00
1,560 man hours-----	@	. 50	780. 00
			1, 020. 00
(c) <i>Roadway Excavation.</i>			
360 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	540. 00
440 man hours-----		1. 25	550. 00
720 man hours-----		1. 00	720. 00
240 man hours-----		. 75	180. 00
960 man hours-----		. 50	480. 00
			2, 470. 00
(d) <i>Drilling and Blasting.</i>			
120 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	180. 00
240 man hours-----		1. 25	300. 00
1,000 man hours-----		. 50	500. 00
			980. 00
(e) <i>Structure Excavation:</i>			
40 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	60. 00
60 man hours-----		1. 25	75. 00
100 man hours-----		1. 00	100. 00
1,600 man hours-----		. 50	800. 00
			1, 035. 00
(f) <i>Rolling & Compacting Backfill:</i>			
60 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	90. 00
80 man hours-----		1. 25	100. 00
320 man hours-----		1. 00	320. 00
660 man hours-----		. 50	330. 00
			840. 00
(g) <i>Placing Drain Pipe:</i>			
24 man hours-----	@	1. 50	36. 00
32 man hours-----		1. 25	40. 00
400 man hours-----		. 50	200. 00
			276. 00
(h) <i>Assembling & Placing Concrete Forms:</i>			
40 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	60. 00
300 man hours-----		1. 30	390. 00
380 man hours-----		. 50	190. 00
			640. 00
(i) <i>Placing Reinforcing Steel:</i>			
20 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	30. 00
40 man hours-----		1. 25	50. 00
360 man hours-----		1. 00	360. 00
			440. 00
(j) <i>Mixing, Placing & Curing Concrete:</i>			
40 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	60. 00
80 man hours-----		1. 25	100. 00
120 man hours-----		1. 00	120. 00
3,600 man hours-----		. 50	1, 800. 00
			2, 080. 00
(k) <i>Placing Rock Masonry RipRap:</i>			
10 man hours-----	@	\$1. 50	15. 00
10 man hours-----		1. 25	12. 50
60 man hours-----		1. 00	60. 00
41 man hours-----		. 50	20. 50
			108. 00

(l) *Grading & Rolling Sub Grade:*

25 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	\$36.00
24 man hours-----	1.25	30.00
160 man hours-----	1.00	160.00
160 man hours-----	.50	80.00

\$306.00

(m) *Setting Header Boards:*

80 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	100.00
160 man hours-----	1.25	100.00
320 man hours-----	1.00	320.00
320 man hours-----	.50	160.00

780.00

(n) *Placing and Rolling Emulsified Asphalt Pavement:*

69 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	90.00
80 man hours-----	1.25	100.00
320 man hours-----	1.00	320.00
640 man hours-----	.50	320.00

830.00

(o) *Maintenance and Repairs:*

100 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	150.00
120 man hours-----	1.25	150.00
320 man hours-----	1.00	320.00
320 man hours-----	.75	240.00
320 man hours-----	.50	160.00

1,020.00

Total Cost of Labor----- 14,025.00

3. *Plant Operation:*

	Time required	Rental	Total amount
(a) Rental of Equipment:			
1 1/4 Cu. Yd. Power Shovel-----	1 Mo-----	\$1,174.00	\$1,174.00
3 5 Cu. Yd. Dump Truck-----	2 "-----	407.00	2,442.00
1 Caterpillar Dozer-----	1 1/2 "-----	869.00	1,303.50
1 Road Patrol Grader-----	1 1/2 "-----	513.00	769.50
1 12-Ton Roller-----	2 "-----	513.00	1,026.00
1 8-Ton Tandem Roller-----	2 "-----	412.00	824.00
1 Power Broom-----	1 "-----	130.00	130.00
1 Water Wagon-----	2 "-----	412.00	824.00
1 3/4 Ton Pick-Up-----	2 "-----	132.00	264.00
1 10-Ton Flat Rack Truck-----	2 "-----	407.00	814.00
1 Service Truck-----	2 "-----	407.00	814.00
1 Sedan-----	2 "-----	132.00	264.00
1 Asphalt Spreader Tank & Truck-----	1 "-----	869.00	869.00
1 405 C. F. Air Compressor-----	1 1/2 "-----	132.00	66.00
3 Jackhammers-----	1 1/2 "-----	100.00	50.00
Hand Brooms, Shovels, Small Tools, Etc-----	Lump Sum-----		234.00
1 1/4 Cu. Yd. Concrete Mixer-----	1 Mo-----	132.00	132.00
(b) Gas, Diesel Oil, Grease, Lub. Oil, Etc-----	Lump Sum-----		1,750.00
Total Cost of Plant Operation-----			13,750.00

4. *Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:*

Total Cost of Material-----	\$20,850.00
Total Cost of Labor-----	14,025.00
Total Cost of Plant-----	13,750.00
Contractors Field & Off. Overhead-----	1,675.00
Mobilization & Demobilization-----	4,750.00

Total Plant Operation Cost of Job to Contractor----- 55,050.00

[s] Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
 THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
 Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
 District Engineer.

2638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$55,050.00
Contingencies—10% -----	5,505.00

Total Direct Cost-----	60,555.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$4,404.00
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Total Indirect Cost-----	4,404.00
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Total Field Cost-----	64,959.00
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General Office Overhead-----	4,404.00
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Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	69,363.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

[s] Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., April 28, 1941.

JOB ORDER No. 23.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Aircraft Warning Service Road, Kauai, T. H.
2. LOCATION: Na Palikona Forest Reserve, Kauai, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2014
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct a twelve foot road approximately 11,000 feet long complete with 2' asphaltic concrete paving and all necessary drainage facilities.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: To be furnished later.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: S. S. A. 1940-41 SC1450 P23-A0605-01.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$79,030.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 1, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE OF COMPLETION: July 15, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: To be furnished later on a detailed estimate.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: To be furnished later on a detailed estimate.
13. MATERIALS: To be furnished later on a detailed estimate.
14. SUPERVISION BY: Area Engineer, Fourth Field Area.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

Distribution:

JUNE 2, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 1.

To Accompany Job Order No. 23.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete a Wood frame Tool Shed and Store Room.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, and provided for herein, is located at Kokee Road on the Island of Kauai, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific Item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to Construct and Complete a Wood frame Tool Shed and Store Room Building. The work to be done shall be as directed by the Area Engineer, Fourth Field Area.

The total Cost of the Work to be done shall not exceed \$300.00.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost

1. *Total Cost of the Work To Be Done:*

(a) *Direct Cost:*

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$300. 00
Contingencies—10% -----	30. 00

Total Direct Cost-----	330. 00
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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$24. 00
Total Indirect Cost-----	24. 00

Total Field Cost of Job-----	354. 00
General Office Overhead-----	24. 00

Grand Total Cost to the Government-----	378. 00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., December 17, 1941,

JOB ORDER NO. 23.1 (Revised)

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: A. W. S. Base Camp and Field Station.
2. LOCATION: Kokee Road, Na Palikona Forest Reserve, Kauai, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: ND 676.3 Kokee.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete structures at Base Camp and Station "X", together with the installation of necessary utilities and manproof wire fence.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Drawings enumerated in the Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 23.1.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: SC 1450 (\$77,333.10) Eng. (\$9,791.05)

2640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

8. ESTIMATED COST: \$87,124.15.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 23, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: December 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.
13. MATERIALS. See detailed estimate attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer—Fourth Field Area.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers.
District Engineers

SEPTEMBER 27, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 23.1 (Rev.)

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete One Utility Truck Shelter And One Garage Building.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done as provided for herein, is located at A. W. S. Camp, on the Island of Kauai, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and complete one (1) Utility Truck Shelter. All of the work to be done in accordance with the details shown on Drawings, "Fixed Station Kauai and Maui, Utility Truck Shelter", Sheets No. 1 and No. 2, File Numbers, F-24/58, F-24/59.

2. Furnish all labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and complete one Garage Building No. 1.

Total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$14,081.57.

Addendum No. 1 to Job Order Order No. 23.1 is additional work and does not alter Job Order No. 23.1.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

COST TO CONTRACTOR

1. One Utility Truck Shelter:

Labor.....	\$1, 829. 36
Material.....	1, 875. 83
Plant Rental.....	75. 00
Mobil. & Demobilization.....	378. 02
Contractors Field & Office Overhead.....	132. 31

Total \$4, 290. 52

2. One Garage Building No. 1:

Labor.....	\$3, 777. 78
Materials.....	4, 698. 69
Plant Rental.....	150. 00
Mobil. & Demobilization.....	862. 65
Contractors Field & Office Overhead.....	301. 93

Total 9, 791. 05

Total Cost to Contractor..... 14, 081. 57

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers.
District Engineer.

*Recapitulation of estimated cost**Total Cost of Work:*(a) *Direct Cost:*

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$14,081.57
Contingencies—10%-----	1,408.16

Total Direct Cost-----	15,489.73
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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$1,126.53
Total Indirect Cost-----	1,126.53

Total Field Cost-----	16,616.26
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General Office Overhead-----	1,126.53
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Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	17,742.79
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(s) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Oct. 10, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 23.1 (Rev.)

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct One (1) Utility Truck Shelter, and One (1) Radio Shelter Building.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at A. W. S. Camp, on the Island of Kauai, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete one (1) Utility Truck Shelter. All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with the details shown on the Drawing, "Fixed Station on Kauai and Maui, Utility Truck Shelter", Sheets No. 1 and No. 2, File Numbers, 24/58, and F-24/59.

2. Furnish all labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and complete one (1) Radio Shelter Building.

Total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$14,081.57.

Addendum No. 2 to Job Order No. 23.1 supplants Addendum No. 1.

Charge \$4290.52 to SC 1450. Charge \$9701.05 to Eng. 993.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

COST TO CONTRACTOR

1. *One Utility Truck Shelter:*

Labor-----	\$1,829.36
Material-----	1,875.83
Plant Rental-----	75.00
Mobil. & Demobilization-----	378.02
Contractors Field & Office Overhead-----	132.31

Total-----	\$4,290.52
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2642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2. One Radio Shelter Building:

Labor	\$3,777.78
Material	4,608.69
Plant Rental	150.00
Mobil. & Demobilization	862.65
Contractors Field & Office Overhead	301.93
Total	\$9,791.05
Total cost to contractor	14,081.57

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost

1. Total Cost of work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor	\$14,081.57
Contingencies—10%	1,408.16

Total Direct Cost	\$15,489.73
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering	\$1,126.53
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Total Indirect Cost	1,126.53
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Total Field Cost	16,616.26
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General Office Overhead	1,126.53
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Estimated total cost to the government	17,742.79
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

FEBRUARY 5, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 3

To Accompany Job Order No. 23.1 (Revised)

Contract W-414-eng-602.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 3 to Job Order No. 23.1 (Revised), (A. W. S. Camp—Utilities & Fence), authorizes the construction of a bombproof shelter for Radio Communications with necessary appurtenances, in connection with A. W. S. Station, Kokee, Kauai Base Camp, Kauai, T. H.

All work is to be done in accordance with plans and instructions furnished the Area Engineer.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., June 18, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 23.1.
Contract W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: A. W. S. Camps, Utilities, and Fence, Kokee Road.
2. LOCATION: Kokee Road, Na Palikona Forest Reserve, Kauai, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2014.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete Structures at Base Camp and at Station X, together with the installation of Necessary Utilities and Manproof wire fence.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Drawings, "Base Camp, Kokee Road," File No. F-4/85, and F-4/87 to F-4/90 inclusive. And additional drawings to be furnished.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: S. S. A. 1940-41 SC1450-P23-AO 605-01.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$82,800.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 23, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: September 23, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
13. MATERIALS: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Fourth Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved: June 27, 1941.

(Signed) Warren T. Hannum,
WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 23.1

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete Structures at Base Camp and Station X, together with the installation of necessary Utilities and manproof wire fence.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Base Camp, and Station X, Kokee Road, on the Na Palikona Forest Reserve, Island of Kauai, T. H., and is limited to furnishing all labor and equipment and performing all work necessary for the following Specific Items:

1. Construct and Complete the following Structures at Base Camp.
 - (a) 2 Barracks Buildings.
 - (b) 1 Mess Hall.
 - (c) 1 Officers Quarters.
 - (d) 1 Radio Communications Building.
 - (e) 1 Generator Station Building.
 - (f) 1 Headquarters Supply Building.
2. Construct and Complete the following Structures at Station X.
 - (a) Tower foundation for Station X.
 - (b) 1 Building.
 - (c) 1 Power house for 3 units.
 - (d) Erect 100 ft. Steel Tower. (Tower furnished by Signal Corps).
3. Install Complete, all necessary utilities and equipment, together with installation of manproof wire mesh fence around vital installations at Base Camp and Station X.

2644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with "Specifications To Accompany Job Order No. 23.1", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total Cost of the Work to be done shall not exceed \$82,800.00.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total cost of work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$82,800.00
Contingencies—10%-----	8,280.00

Total Direct Cost-----	91,080.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering (8% of Total Cost to Contractor)-----	\$6,624.00
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Total Indirect Cost-----	6,624.00
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Total Field Cost-----	98,704.00
General Office Overhead—8%-----	6,624.00

Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	105,328.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4B

WAR DEPARTMENT

Summary

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

Contract W414-eng-602

Haleakala (Maui, T. H.).

Job Order #41.0 June 14, 1941 (Revised) December 11, 1941.

Construct. A. W. S. road on Haleakala together with A. W. S. camp and fixed station.

Est. Cost: \$105,086.00+Add #1, 2, 3.

Est. Cost (Rev.): \$121,160.90.

Commencement date: June 25, 1941.

Est. date for completion: Sept. 25, 1941.

Revised date for completion: Nov. 30, 1941.

Supervision by Area Engr. 6th Field Area.

Addendum #1 Oct. 10, 1941 Est. cost \$14,081.57.

Construct Radio Shelter bldg. and garage.

Addendum #2 Feb. 5, 1942 No est. cost given.

Construct bombproof shelter for Radio Communication with necessary appurtenances.

Addendum #3 Aug. 20, 1942 No est. cost given:

Construct underground telephone line from A. W. S. at Haleakala and base station.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., December 11, 1941.

ORDER NO. 41.0 (Revised—Orig. June 14th.

Contract W-414-eng-602.

Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

PROJECT TITLE: A. W. S. Road, Camp, and Fixed Station.

LOCATION: Haleakala, Maui, T. H.

OFFICE FILE REFERENCES: ND 676.3 Haleakala.

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete A. W. S. road on Haleakala, together with construction of base camp and fixed station.

WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.

DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As enumerated in the Specifications to accompany Job Order No. 41.0.

APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: SC 1450 (\$111,369.85) Eng. 993 (\$9,791.05).

ESTIMATED COST: \$121,160.90.

COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 25, 1941.

ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: November 30, 1941.

ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.

PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.

MATERIALS: See detailed estimate attached.

SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer—Sixth Field Area.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

OCT. 10, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 41.0

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct One (1) Utility Truck Shelter and One (1) Radio Shelter Building.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at A. W. S. Camp, on the Island of Maui, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete one (1) Utility Truck Shelter. All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with the details shown on the drawing, "Fixed Station at Haleakala and Maui, Utility Truck Shelter", Sheets No. 1 and No. 2, File Numbers, F-24/58, and F-24/59.

2. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct one (1) Radio Shelter Building. (Radio Shelter Building replaces Storage Building No. 1 shown on General Plan, F-4/86).

Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 41.0 is additional work.

Total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$14,081.57.

Charge \$4290.52 to SC 1450. Charge \$9791.05 to Eng. 993.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

FEBRUARY 5, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 41.0 (Revised)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2 to Accompanying Job Order No. 41.0 (Revised) (A. W. S. Road and Camp, Haleakala, Maui, T. H.) authorizes the construction of a bombproof

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shelter for Radio Communication with necessary appurtenances, in connection with A. W. S. Station at Haleakala, Maui, T. H.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

AUGUST 29, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 3

To Accompany Job Order No. 41.0 (Revised)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of the Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 3 to accompany Job Order No. 41.0 (Revised) (A. W. S. Road, Camp and Fixed Station, Haleakala, Maui) authorizes the construction of Under-ground Telephone Line between Base Camp and the A. W. S. Station at Haleakala. Work has been completed.

For the Department Engineer:

(s) JOSEPH MATSON, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., June 14, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 41.0.

Contract W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: A. W. S. Road and Camp.
2. LOCATION: Haleakala, Maui, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2014.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete A. W. S. road on Haleakala, together with A. W. S. Camp.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: To be furnished later.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: SSA 1940-41 SC1450 P23-A0635-01.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$105,086.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 25, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: September 25, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
13. MATERIALS: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Sixth Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 41.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete A. W. S. Road on Haleakala, together with A. W. S. Camp.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Haleakala, on the Island of Maui, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all necessary labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to Construct and Complete an A. W. S. Road together with an A. W. S. Camp, in

accordance with the "Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 41.0", and the details shown on the drawings, enumerated in the Specifications.

The Total Cost of the Work Shall not exceed \$105,086.00.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:	
(a) Direct Cost:	
Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$105,086.00
Contingencies—10% -----	10,508.60
Total Direct Cost-----	115,594.60
(b) Indirect Cost:	
Survey, Inspection, Engineering (8% of Contractor's Cost)-----	\$8,406.88
Total Indirect Cost-----	8,406.88
Total Field Cost-----	124,001.48
General Office Overhead-----	8,406.88
Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	132,408.36

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Oct. 10, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 41.0

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct One (1) Utility Truck Shelter and One (1) Radio Shelter Building.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at A. W. S. Camp, on the Island of Maui, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete one (1) Utility Truck Shelter. All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with the details shown on the drawing, "Fixed Station Kauai and Maui, Utility Truck Shelter", Sheets No. 1 and No. 2, File Numbers, F-24/58, and F-24/59.

2. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct one (1) Radio Shelter Building. (Radio Shelter Building replaces Garage Building No. 1 shown on General Plan, F-4/86).

Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 41.0 is additional work.

Total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$14,081.57.

Charge \$4290.52 to SC 1450. Charge \$9791.05 to Eng 993.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

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COST TO CONTRACTOR

1. One Utility Truck Shelter:

Labor.....	\$1, 829. 36
Material.....	1, 875. 83
Plant Rental.....	75. 00
Mobil. & Demobilization.....	378. 02
Contractors Field & Office Overhead.....	132. 31

Total..... \$4, 290. 52

2. One Radio Shelter Building:

Labor.....	\$3, 777. 78
Material.....	4, 698. 69
Plant Rental.....	150. 00
Mobil. & Demobilization.....	862. 65
Contractors Field & Office Overhead.....	301. 93

Total..... 9, 791. 05

Total Cost to Contractor..... 14, 081. 57

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor.....	\$14, 081. 57
Contingencies — 10%.....	1, 408. 16

Total Direct Cost..... 15, 489. 73

(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering.....	\$1, 126. 53
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Total Indirect Cost..... 1, 126. 53

Total Field Cost..... 16, 616. 26

General Office Overhead..... 1, 126. 53

Estimated Total Cost to the Government..... 17, 742. 79

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4C

Summary

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

Contract No. W414-eng-602

Mauna Loa (Hawaii, T. H.)

Job Order #46.0 June 30, 1941

Construct new AWS Road, Buildings, Water System, etc., including improvement of present road.

Est. Cost \$39,300.00

Commencement date: July 1, 1941

Est. date for completion: Sept. 1, 1941

Work suspended 7-14-41.

Job order cancelled 5-10-42.

Supervision by Area Engr., 7th Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., June 30, 1941.

ORDER NO. 46.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

PROJECT TITLE: A.W.S. Road, Buildings, Water System, Fencing.

LOCATION: Mauna Loa, Hawaii, T. H.

OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2014.

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete A.W.S. Road, portable buildings, building foundations, garages, Fence, Water System, Clearing Site for buildings and foundations, together with improvement of present alignment of existing access road.

WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.

DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Drawing A.W.S. Mauna Loa, Hawaii, T. H. File No. F-24/1 to F-24/16 inclusive and other plans to be issued later.

APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: SC 1450.

ESTIMATED COST: \$39,300.00.

COMMENCEMENT DATE: July 1, 1941.

ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: September 1, 1941.

ESTIMATED LATOR AT SITE: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.

PLANT REQUIRED: " " " " " "

MATERIALS: " " " " " "

SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Seventh Field Area.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 46.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete: A. W. S. Road, Portable Buildings, Foundations, Garages, Fence, Water System, Clearing Site for buildings and foundations, together with improvement of present alignment of existing Access Road.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Mauna Loa, on the land of Hawaii, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to Complete the following items:

- (a) Construct A. W. S. Road, complete with necessary drainage facilities, ve road with 4" rock base Course and 2" asphaltic Concrete top Course.
- (b) Construct Concrete foundations for buildings.
- (c) Construct and Complete 3 portable buildings.
(1—Barracks Building, 1—Mess Hall, 1—No. 2 Latrine.)
- (d) Install Water Supply System.
- (e) Grade Site for foundations.
- (f) Install protective fencing.
- (g) Construction at Base Camp, Kilauea Military Camp, one garage for mobile ility, and one garage for Utility cars.
- (h) Grade and Clear Site for buildings.
- (i) Install protective fencing.

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All work to be done shall be in accordance with the, "Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 46.0", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total Cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$39,300.00.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work.

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$39,300.00
Contingencies—10%-----	3,930.00

Total Direct Cost-----	43,230.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$3,144.00
Total Indirect Cost-----	3,144.00

Total Field Cost-----	46,374.00
General Office Overhead-----	3,144.00

Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	49,518.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., July 14, 1941.

Refer to File No. Cont. 602

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Job Order No. 46.0

Contract W-414-eng-602

All Construction on "A. W. S. Road, Buildings, Water System, and Fencing", authorized by Job Order No. 46.0, shall be suspended pending further orders from the District Engineer.

Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

MAY 10, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 46.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 46.0 (A. W. S. Road, Buildings, Water System, Fencing, Mauna Loa, Hawaii), cancels Job Order No. 46.0.

Cancellation requested By: Department Engineer by memorandum from the Assistant Department Engineer, dated May 7, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

/s/ JOHN C. MEADOWS,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4D

Summary CBR

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

Contract No. W414-eng.-602

BELLOWS FIELD, OAHU, T. H.

Job Order #20.1 May 12, 1941 Revised Sept 15, 1941.

Construct—Fabricate and install twelve (12) each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks and appurtenant work. Note Revised Job Order 20.1 reduced No. of tanks to six (6).

Est Cost: \$144,684.00.

Revised: \$54,968.00.

Commencement Date: May 12, 1941.

Est date for completion: Aug 1, 1941.

Revised: Jan 1, 1942.

Supervision by The Area Engineer, 5th Field Area.

Job Order #20.120.

Commencement Date: Sept 15, 1941.

Est Date for completion: Jan 1, 1942.

Six (6) 50,000 gal gasoline tanks.

Job Order #20.130.

Commencement Date: Sept 15, 1941.

Est Date for Completion: Jan 1, 1942.

Construct Tunnel for Twelve (12) 50,000 gasoline tanks.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., May 12, 1941.

JOB ORDER N. 20.1.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Fabrication and Complete installation (Aqua System) of Twelve (12) each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.
2. LOCATION: Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2021.3.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Fabricate and install twelve (12) each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks, (Aqua System) and all appurtenant work at Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As shown in specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: 21X0640.035 (C of B U & A) No. Year Eng. 715 P99.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$144,684.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 12, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: August 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " "
14. SUPERVISION BY: Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

Distribution:

2652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., September 15, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 20.1 (Revised)
Contract W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Install Complete (Pump System) 6 Each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.
2. LOCATION: Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2021.3.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Install, Complete, (Pump System) 6 Each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As enumerated in the Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 715.
8. ESTIMATED COST: (Present construction limited to \$54,968.00)
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: July 1, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: January 1, 1942.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " " "
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer—Fifth Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised)

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Install, Complete, (Pump System) 6 Each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Bellows Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to install, complete (Pump System), 6 each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks. All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with the Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised) and the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$54,968.00.

Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised) supplants Job Order No. 20.1, dated May 12, 1941, and the Addendums, Numbers, 1, 2, and 3, to Job Order No. 20.1.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor	\$54,968.00
Contingencies—10%	5,496.80
Total Direct Cost	60,464.80

(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$4,397.44
Total Indirect Cost-----	\$4,397.44
Total Field Cost-----	61,862.24
General Office Overhead-----	4,397.44
Estimated total cost to the Government-----	69,259.68

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for Distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JANUARY 1, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised)

Contract No. W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised), suspends work on the installations of six gasoline storage tanks at Bellows Field, T. H.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JANUARY 4, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2 to accompany Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised), voids Addendum No. 1. Work will continue.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
District Engineer.

APRIL 6, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 3

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.1

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 3 to accompany Job Order No. 20.1, (50,000 Gallon Gas Storage Tanks, Bellows), requires expedition in placing and filling gasoline tanks.

Work requested by: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in memo. from Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, dated March 23, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

/s/ H. B. NURSE,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

2654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., September 15, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 20.120
Contract W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to Proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Install Complete, (Pump System) 6 Each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.
2. LOCATION: Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2021.3.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Install complete (Pump System), 6 each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENES: As enumerated in the Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 991.
8. ESTIMATED COST: (Present construction limited to \$50,000.00).
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: September 15, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: January 1, 1942.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " " "
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer—Fifth Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.120

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK To BE DONE: Install, Complete (Pump System), 6 Each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Bellows Field on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to install, complete (Pump System), 6 each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks. All of the work to be done in accordance with the Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 20.120 and the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

Job Order No. 20.120 is additional work and does not alter Job Order No. 20.1 (Revised).

The cost of present construction shall not exceed \$50,000.00.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$50,000.00
Contingencies—10%-----	5,000.00
Total Direct Cost-----	55,000.00

(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$4,000.00
Total Indirect Cost-----	\$4,000.00
Total Field Cost-----	59,000.00
General Office Overhead-----	4,000.00
Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	63,000.00

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JANUARY 1, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.120

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 20.120 suspends work on the installation of gasoline storage tanks at Bellows Field, T. H.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JANUARY 4, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.120

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2 to accompany Job Order No. 20.120, voids Addendum No. 1. Work will continue.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., Sept. 15, 1941.

OB ORDER NO. 20.130
Contract W-414-eng-602

o: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Excavate Tunnel for 12 Each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.
2. LOCATION: Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2021.3.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Excavate approximately 10,000 cubic yards to complete tunnel for 12 each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks, together with placing of necessary concrete tunnel lining and sidewalk, and disposal of excavated material.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H., Gasoline Storage and Dispensing System, File No. F-20/66 and other plans to be furnished.

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7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 991.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$84,000.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: September 15, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: January 1, 1942.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See Detailed Estimate Attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See Detailed Estimate Attached.
13. MATERIALS: See Detailed Estimate Attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer—Fifth Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.130

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Excavate tunnel for 12 each, 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Bellows Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to excavate approximately 10,000 cubic yards to complete tunnel for 12 each, 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks, together with placing of necessary concrete tunnel lining and sidewalk, and disposal of excavated material.

All of the work to be done in accordance with the, "Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 20.130", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$84,000.00.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

1. Material:

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit price	Amount
1	Dynamite	35,000	lbs.	\$0.125	\$4,375.00
2	Elect. Caps—Assorted.....	10,500	ea.	0.17	1,785.00
3	Cement	1,050	bbl.	2.93	3,076.50
4	Coarse Aggregate.....	630	cu. yds.	3.25	2,047.50
5	Fine Aggregate	465	" "	3.00	1,395.00
6	1" x 6" Shiplap	4,500	MBM	55.00	247.50
7	2 x 4s & 6s 4 x 4 #1 Com	8,000	" "	47.50	380.00
8	Reinforcing Steel	50,000	lbs.	0.0293	1,465.00
9	Nails	4	kegs.	6.60	26.40
10	#14 Wire—Black (Tie).....	600	lbs.	0.06	36.00
11	Miscellaneous Supplies.....		lump sum		216.10
	Total Cost of Material				15,050.00

2. Labor:

(a) Handling and Hauling:

36 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	\$54.00
104 man hours.....	1.25	130.00
436 man hours.....	.50	218.00

(b) Drilling and Blasting:		
800 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	\$1,200.00
6,400 man hours.....	1.25	8,000.00
4,800 man hours.....	1.00	4,800.00
3,200 man hours.....	.75	2,400.00
1,600 man hours.....	.50	800.00
(c) Mucking:		
800 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	1,200.00
1,600 man hours.....	1.25	2,000.00
19,200 man hours.....	.50	9,600.00
(d) Muck Disposal:		
200 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	300.00
400 man hours.....	1.25	500.00
1,600 man hours.....	1.00	1,600.00
1,600 man hours.....	.50	800.00
(e) Assembling, Erecting & Stripping Forms:		
40 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	60.00
320 man hours.....	1.25	400.00
320 man hours.....	.625	200.00
(f) Placing Reinforcing Steel:		
40 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	60.00
480 man hours.....	1.25	600.00
480 man hours.....	1.00	480.00
240 man hours.....	.75	180.00
(g) Mixing & Placing Concrete:		
80 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	120.00
600 man hours.....	1.25	750.00
200 man hours.....	1.00	200.00
200 man hours.....	.75	150.00
4,800 man hours.....	.50	2,400.00
(h) Maintenance—Watchmen, Etc:		
160 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	240.00
320 man hours.....	1.25	400.00
640 man hours.....	1.00	640.00
320 man hours.....	.75	240.00
1,600 man hours.....	.50	800.00

Total Cost of Labor..... 41,522.00

Plant Operation.

	Daily Cost	Days Re- quired	Amount
(i) Rental of Equipment:			
2 Air Compressors.....	\$50.00	110	\$5,500.00
1 Receiver.....	1.30	110	110.00
6 Hammers—Col'mns-Arms-Hose.....	7.00	110	770.00
1 2-HP Elect. Motor and Fan.....	3.00	110	330.00
1 Tool Grinder.....	1.00	110	110.00
Air Pipe—Assorted Sizes.....	3.00	110	330.00
1 Mucking Machine.....	5.50	110	605.00
2 Dump Cars and Truck.....	10.00	110	1,100.00
1 5-Cu. Yd. Dump Truck.....	18.00	110	1,980.00
1 10-Ton Flat Rack Truck.....	18.00	110	1,980.00
1 Batching Plant.....	26.00	21	546.00
1 Horiz. Belt Conveyor.....	18.00	21	378.00
1 Incl'd Belt Conveyor.....	26.00	21	546.00
1 Gunit Machine.....	6.00	21	126.00
Concrete Buggies.....	2.00	21	42.00
1 34-Cu. Yd. Pick-Up.....	6.00	110	660.00
1 Sedan.....	6.00	110	660.00
Miscellaneous Small Tools.....	lump sum		250.00
Gas, Oil, Grease, Miscellaneous Supplies.....			1,750.00
Total Cost of Plant Operation.....			17,773.00

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COST TO THE CONTRACTOR

1. Total Cost of Material-----	\$15,050.00
2. Total Cost of Labor-----	41,522.00
3. Total cost of Plant-----	17,773.00
4. Contractors Overhead-----	2,445.00
5. Mobilization and Demobilization-----	7,210.00
Total Cost to the Contractor-----	84,000.00

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost

1. Total Cost of Work.	
(a) Direct Cost:	
Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$84,000.00
Contingencies—10%-----	8,400.00
Total Direct Cost-----	92,400.00
(b) Indirect Cost:	
Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$6,720.00
Total Indirect Cost-----	8,720.00
Total Field Cost-----	99,120.00
Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	105,840.00

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ Theo Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., October 13, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 20.140.
Contract W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Construct and Complete Access Road to Gasoline Storage and Dispensing System.
2. LOCATION: Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: ND 611.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct approximately 8000 linear feet of 18' road complete with necessary bridge and drainage structures, and do all necessary appurtenant work.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Drawings, Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H., Gasoline Storage Access Road, File Nos. F-2/69 to F-2/76 inclusive.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 991.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$26,000.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: October 12, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: November 15, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " " " "
14. Supervisioned by: The Area Engineers—Fifth Field Area.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.140

Contract W-414-eng-602.

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete Access Road to Gasoline Storage and Dispensing Systems.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Bellows Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct approximately 8000 linear feet of 18' road complete with necessary bridge, and drainage structures, and do all necessary appurtenant work.

All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with the specifications to accompanying Job Order No. 20.140 and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the specifications.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$26,000.00.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

*Recapitulation of Estimated Cost***Total Cost of Work:****(a) Direct Cost:**

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$26,000.00
Contingencies—10% -----	2,600.00

Total Direct Cost-----	28,600.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$2,080.00
Total Indirect Cost-----	2,080.00

Total Field Cost-----	30,680.00
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General Office Overhead-----	2,080.00
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Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	32,760.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District Only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H., December 25, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 20.150
Contract W-414-eng-602

to: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Construct Tunnel; Bellows Field.

2. LOCATION: Oahu, T. H.

3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: None.

4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct tunnel and install six gasoline tanks therein, in accordance with plans and instructions to be furnished the Area Engineer.

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5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: To be furnished.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 1067.
8. ESTIMATED COST: Estimate to be furnished later.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: December 26, 1941.
10. ESTIMATE DATE FOR COMPLETION: April 1, 1942.
11. ESTIMATE LABOR AT SITE: Estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: Estimate to be furnished later.
13. MATERIALS: Estimate to be furnished later.
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

(Sgd.) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

APRIL 7, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 20.150

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 20.150 (Construct Tunnel and install six gasoline tanks. Bellows Field) directs that the gasoline storage tanks be dispersed and placed according to revised plan from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Office File Reference: Serial No. 3084.

Change requested by: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department by letter from the Assistant Department Engineer dated March 31, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

/s/ J. C. MEADOWS,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4E

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

Contract NO. 414-eng-602.

Barking Sands, Kauai, T. H.

Job Order #21.1 April 26, 1941

Construct—Fabricate and install nine (9) each 50,000 gallon storage tanks
(Two tanks will be fabricated by the Government)

Est Cost \$114,350.16.

Commencement Date: April 21, 1941.

Est Date for Completion: June 21, 1941.

Supervision by H. E. Helmboldt, Area Engr, 4th Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., April 26, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 21.1

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Fabrication, transportation and complete installation of
9 each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks.
2. LOCATION: Barking Sands, Kauai, T. H.

3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 759.2A1.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Fabricate and install 9 each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks complete, and all appurtenant work, at Barking Sands, Island of Kauai, T. H. Two of the tanks will be fabricated by the Government and furnished to the Hawaiian Constructors at Honolulu, T. H.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As shown in paragraph 1-04 of the specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: 21X0540.035 (C of B U & A) No Year Eng. 715 P99-A-0540.035-N.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$84,081.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: April 21, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: June 21, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.
13. MATERIALS: See detailed estimate attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: H. E. Helmboldt, Area Engineer, Fourth Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 21.1

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: To fabricate, transport and install 9 each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks, complete, at Barking Sands, Kauai, T. H.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Barking Sands on the Island of Kauai, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

(1) Furnish all labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to transport to and install complete at Barking Sands, Kauai, T. H., two (2) each prefabricated 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks and all appurtenant work in accordance with Specifications, "Gasoline Storage and Dispensing System, Barking Sands, Kauai, T. H.," and the details as shown on drawings enumerated in paragraph 1-04 of the Specifications.

(2) Furnish all labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to transport labor, equipment and material to site and fabricate and install complete seven (7) each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks and all appurtenant work in accordance with Specifications, "Gasoline Storage and Dispensing System, Kauai, T. H.," and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in paragraph 1-04 of the Specifications.

Estimated unit costs are as follows:

COST TO CONTRACTOR

"A"

Two (2) Tanks—Fabricated in Honolulu, transported to, and installed at Barking Sands, Island of Kauai, T. H.

1. 2—Tanks:	
Labor-----	\$5,000.00
Materials-----	200.00
Total Fabrication Cost-----	5,200.00

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2. Mobilization and Demobilization:

Transportation Charges.....	\$2,500.00
Plant Rental during Mobilization and Demobilization.....	1,935.00
Labor Charges during Mobilization and Demobilization.....	800.00
Total Mobilization and Demobilization.....	\$5,235.00
3. Excavation.....	4,200 Cu. Yd. @ \$0.35 2,940.00
4. Backfill.....	3,900 Cu. Yd. @ \$0.12 836.00
5. Concrete.....	48 Cu. Yd. @ \$18.00 1,728.00
6. Placing Tanks.....	400.00
7. Gasoline Pumping System installed.....	2,100.00
8. Dewatering Operations.....	1,000.00
9. Contractor's Field and Office Overhead.....	1,000.00
Total Cost to Contractor.....	20,539.00

B

Seven (7) Tanks—Fabricated and Installed at Barking Sands, Islands of
Kauai, T. H.

1. 7—Tanks—Fabrication:

Labor.....	\$21,000.00
Materials.....	2,100.00
Plant Rental.....	3,282.00
Total Fabrication Cost.....	26,382.00

2. Mobilization and Demobilization:

Transportation Charges during Mobilization and Demobilization.....	\$1,800.00
Labor Charges during Mobilization and Demobilization.....	150.00
Plant Rental during Mobilization and Demobilization.....	646.00
Total Mobilization and Demobilization.....	2,596.00
3. Excavation.....	10,230.00
4. Backfill.....	3,276.00
5. Concrete.....	6,048.00
6. Placing Tanks.....	2,100.00
7. Gasoline, Pumping System installed.....	7,350.00
8. Dewatering Operations.....	3,500.00
9. Contractor's Field and Office Overhead.....	2,000.00

Total Cost to Contractor.....	63,542.00
Grand Total Cost to Contractor for Nine (9) Tanks.....	84,081.00

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimate of Cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) <i>Direct Cost:</i>	
Grand Total Cost to Contractor.....	\$84,081.00
Contingencies—20%.....	16,816.20
Total Direct Cost.....	100,897.20
(b) <i>Indirect Cost:</i>	
Survey, Inspection and Engineering—8% (Contractor's Cost).....	\$8,726.48
Total Indirect Cost.....	6,726.48
Total Field Cost of Job.....	107,623.68
General Office Overhead—8% (Contractor's Cost).....	6,726.48
Estimated Grand Total Cost to Government.....	114,350.16

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JUNE 4, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 21.1

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete a wood frame tool shed and Store Room.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Barking Sands on the Island of Kauai, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific Item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete one wood frame tool shed and Store Room Building. The work to be done shall be as directed by the Area Engineer, Fourth Field Area.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$300.00.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost

1. Cost of Work to be Done:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$300.00
Contingencies—10%-----	30.00

Total Direct Cost-----	330.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, engineering-----	\$24.00
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Total Indirect Cost-----	24.00
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Total Field Cost of Job-----	354.00
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General Office Overhead-----	24.00
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Grand Total Cost to the Government-----	378.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 4F

Summary—CBR

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

HONOLULU, T. H.

Morse Field (Hawaii, T. H.).

Job Order #25.0 May 7, 1941.

Construct. Fabricate and install nine (9) each 50,000 gallon gasoline Storage tanks and appurtenant work.

Est. Cost \$116,390.16.

Commencement Date: May 8, 1941.

Est. Date for Completion: August 1, 1941.

Supervision by The Area Engineer, Seventh Field Area.

Addendum #1 dated March 24, 1942 suspends indefinitely all work on Job Order #25.0.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., May 7, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 25.0.
Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Transportation, Fabrication and Complete Installation of Nine (9) each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks.
2. LOCATION: Morse Field, Hawaii, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2021.2.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Fabricate and install nine (9) each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks Complete, and all appurtenant work at Morse Field, Island of Hawaii, T. H.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As shown in paragraph 1-04 of the Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: 21X0540.035 (C of BU & A) No Year Eng. 715 P 99 A-0540.035-N.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$85,581.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 8, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: August 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " "
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Seventh Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved: May 15, 1941.

(Signed) Warren T. Hannum,
WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 25.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: To Transport, Fabricate and Install Nine (9) Each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage Tanks, Complete, at Morse Field, Hawaii, T. H.
District: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Morse Field on the Island of Hawaii, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to transport labor, equipment and material to site, and fabricate and install complete nine (9) each 50,000 Gallon Gasoline Storage tanks and all appurtenant work in accordance with Specifications, "Gasoline Storage and Dispensing System, Morse Field, Hawaii, T. H.", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

COST TO THE CONTRACTOR

1. Nine (9) Tanks—Fabrication:	Unit Cost	Total
Labor-----	\$ 3,000.00	\$ 27,000.00
Materials-----	300.00	2,700.00
Plant Rental-----	470.00	4,230.00
Labor-----	<u>\$3,000.00</u>	<u>\$27,000.00</u>

2. Mobilization and Demobilization:

	<i>Unit Cost</i>	<i>Total</i>
Transportation charges during Mobilization & Demobilization-----	\$260. 00	\$2, 340. 00
Labor charges during Mobilization and Demobilization-----	22. 00	198. 00
Plant Rental during Mobilization and Demobilization-----	93. 00	837. 00
Total Mobilization and Demobilization Cost--	375. 00	3, 375. 00
3. Excavation, 4,200 cu. yds. per unit @ \$0.60-----	2, 520. 00	22, 680. 00
4. Backfill, 3,900 cu. yds. per unit @ \$0.20-----	780. 00	7, 020. 00
5. Concrete, 43 cu. yds. per unit @ \$18.00-----	864. 00	7, 776. 00
6. Placing Tanks-----	300. 00	2, 700. 00
7. Gasoline Dispensing System Installed-----	600. 00	5, 400. 00
8. Contractor's Field & Office Overhead-----	300. 00	2, 700. 00
Total Cost to Contractor-----	9, 509. 00	85, 581. 00

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
 THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
 Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
 District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost**1. Total Cost of Work:****(a) Direct Cost:**

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$ 85, 581. 00
Contingencies—20%-----	17, 116. 20

Total Direct Cost-----	102, 697. 20
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engr. (8% of Contractor's Cost)-----	\$6, 846. 48
Total Indirect Cost-----	6, 846. 48

Total Field Cost-----	109, 543. 08
General Office Overhead (8% of Contractor's Cost)-----	6, 846. 48

Estimated Grand Total Cost to Government-----	116, 390. 16
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
 THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
 Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
 District Engineer.

MARCH 24, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 25.0 Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office, Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 25.0, (Transportation, Fabrication and Complete Installation of nine (9) each 50,000 gallon gasoline storage tanks) suspends indefinitely all work on Job Order No. 25.0.

Suspension requested by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department through the Department Engineer.

For the Department Engineer:

/s/ H. B. NURSE,
 Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers
 Executive Assistant.

2666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4G

Summary

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

Contract W-414-eng-602

Wheeler Field (Oahu, T. H.).

Job Order #5.0 Feb. 24, 1941.

Construct three reinforced concrete bombproof ammunition storage structures, of 30,000 cubic feet capacity each, with appurtenant work and access roads.

Est. Cost \$1,847,000.00.

Commencement date: Feb. 24, 1941.

Est. date for completion: Sept. 1, 1941.

Supervision by John J. Kestly, Area Engr., 3rd Field Area.

Work Authorized by Job Order No. 5.0, Addenda #3 to #7 inclusive:

(a) Construction of six (6) each 30,000 cubic feet capacity bombproof magazines, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.

(b) Construction of three (3) each 10,000 cubic feet capacity bombproof magazines, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.

(c) Construction of six (6) each 5,000 cubic feet capacity bombproof magazines, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.

(d) Construction of all necessary connecting and access roads, complete with paving, culverts, headwalls, and riprapped ditches.

(e) Construction and installation of electrical distribution system for magazines.

(f) The installation of all necessary construction plant, equipment, buildings, and facilities to carry out the construction program.

Work is to be performed under Contract No. W-414-eng-602 (1-A. Ammunition Storage Magazines.)

Est. Cost—\$1,083,473 Addenda 3 to 7 incl.

No date for completion given.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., February 24, 1941.

WORK ORDER NO. 5.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Bomb Proof Ammunition Storage, Wheeler Field, T. H.
2. LOCATION: Wheeler Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 400.1
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete reinforced concrete bombproof ammunition storage structures together with their appurtenant work and all necessary connecting and access roads, as specified in Schedule "A" attached hereto.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As enumerated (See para. 1-03 attached specifications.)
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Seacoast Defenses, Eng 306 P 99 A1204-N.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$1,847,000.00
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: February 24, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: September 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: 375,590 man hours.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.
13. MATERIALS: See detailed estimate attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: John J. Kestly, Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

Corps of Engineers, Division Engineer.

SECRET DOCUMENT

To Accompany Work Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: Bomb Proof Ammunition Storage, Wheeler Field, T. H.
DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done is at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H. The work includes the furnishing of all necessary labor, equipment, materials and supplies, and the performing of all work necessary to construct reinforced concrete bombproof magazine structures complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures, together with necessary connecting and access roads, complete with 2½" concrete bituminous pavement, culverts, headwalls, and riprapped ditches, for ingress and egress to magazine structures.

1. Materials to be Furnished:

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit	To complete 330,000 cu. ft.
					<i>Amount</i>
1	Reinforcing Steel.....	6,000,000	lbs.....	\$0.045	\$270,000.00
2	Structural Steel.....	100,000	lbs.....	0.20	20,000.00
3	Steel Water Stops.....	37,000	lbs.....	0.10	3,700.00
4	Copper Water Stops.....	1,700	lbs.....	0.15	255.00
5	4" Tile Drain.....	6,500	lin. ft.....	0.20	1,300.00
6	Cement.....	60,690	bbl.....	3.04	184,497.60
7	Fine Aggregate.....	20,880	cu. yd.....	2.70	56,376.00
8	Coarse Aggregate.....	30,900	cu. yd.....	3.00	92,700.00
9	30" Reinforced Concrete Culvert Pipe.....	100	lin. ft.....	4.10	410.00
10	24" Reinforced Concrete Culvert Pipe.....	200	lin. ft.....	2.90	580.00
11	18" Reinforced Concrete Culvert Pipe.....	200	lin. ft.....	2.20	440.00
12	12" Reinforced Concrete Culvert Pipe.....	450	lin. ft.....	1.15	517.50
13	Rip-rap stone.....	2,050	ton.....	3.00	6,150.00
14	Lumber.....	350	M.....	45.00	17,750.00
15	Nails, Bolts, Wires.....	10,000	lbs.....	0.08	800.00
16	Electrical wires, conduits and fixtures (lump sum).....				11,000.00
17	Paint.....	140	gals.....	2.75	385.00
18	Dynamite.....	10,000	lbs.....	0.125	1,250.00
19	Hardware.....	2,000	lbs.....	0.75	1,500.00
20	Asphalt Concrete.....	3,750	tons.....	6.00	22,500.00
21	Rock Surfacing.....	4,400	cu. yd.....	2.70	11,880.00
22	3" Galv. Iron Pipe.....	8,000	ft.....	0.54	4,320.00
23	2" Galv. Iron Pipe.....	10,000	ft.....	0.26	2,600.00
24	1" Galv. Iron Pipe.....	2,000	ft.....	0.12	240.00
	Total Cost of Materials.....				710,951.10

2. Day Labor:

		To complete 330,000 cu. ft.	Amount
(a) <i>Clearing and Grubbing:</i>			
800 man hours.....	@ \$1.50		\$1,200.00
1,600 man hours.....	@ 1.00		1,600.00
4,000 man hours.....	@ 0.50		2,000.00
(b) <i>Hauling and Handling Materials:</i>			
1,200 man hours.....	@ 1.50		1,800.00
12,000 man hours.....	@ 0.75		9,000.00
12,000 man hours.....	@ 0.50		6,000.00
(c) <i>Excavation and Backfill Structures:</i>			
7,200 man hours.....	@ 1.50		10,800.00
7,200 man hours.....	@ 1.00		7,200.00
7,200 man hours.....	@ 0.65		4,680.00
43,200 man hours.....	@ 0.50		21,600.00
(d) <i>Road Excavation and Backfill:</i>			
400 man hours.....	@ 1.50		600.00
1,600 man hours.....	@ 1.00		1,600.00
4,000 man hours.....	@ 0.75		3,000.00
4,000 man hours.....	@ 0.50		2,000.00
(e) <i>Culverts:</i>			
120 man hours.....	@ 1.50		180.00
580 man hours.....	@ 1.00		580.00
1,000 man hours.....	@ 0.65		650.00
1,000 man hours.....	@ 0.50		500.00

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		To complete 330,000 cu. ft.	Amount
(f)	Placing Bituminous Concrete Roads:		
	1,200 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	\$1,800.00
	1,800 man hours-----	@ 0.75	1,350.00
	8,200 man hours-----	@ 0.50	4,100.00
(g)	Placing Reinforcing Steel Structures and Burster Course:		
	900 man hours-----	@ 1.50	1,350.00
	20,000 man hours-----	@ 0.75	15,000.00
	20,000 man hours-----	@ 0.50	10,000.00
(h)	Mixing, placing, curing concrete in Structures and Burster Course:		
	3,600 man hours-----	@ 1.50	5,400.00
	30,000 man hours-----	@ 1.00	30,000.00
	120,000 man hours-----	@ 0.50	60,000.00
(i)	Ritrap and Drainage:		
	480 man hours-----	@ 1.50	720.00
	2,000 man hours-----	@ 0.75	1,500.00
	3,500 man hours-----	@ 0.50	1,750.00
(j)	Placing Tile Drain:		
	100 man hours-----	@ 1.50	150.00
	100 man hours-----	@ 1.00	100.00
	400 man hours-----	@ 0.50	200.00
(k)	Electrical Installation:		
	720 man hours-----	@ 1.50	1,080.00
	720 man hours-----	@ 1.00	720.00
	720 man hours-----	@ 0.65	468.00
(l)	Concrete Forms—Framing, Erecting, Stripping:		
	1,800 man hours-----	@ 1.50	2,700.00
	8,000 man hours-----	@ 1.00	8,000.00
	10,000 man hours-----	@ 0.65	6,500.00
(m)	Placing Structural Steel:		
	150 man hours-----	@ 1.50	225.00
	300 man hours-----	@ 1.25	375.00
	300 man hours-----	@ 0.75	225.00
(a)	Painting:		
	100 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	150.00
	100 man hours-----	@ 1.00	100.00
	100 man hours-----	@ 0.65	65.00
(b)	Maintenance, Crew, Warehouseman, etc.:		
	1,400 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	2,100.00
	10,000 man hours-----	@ 1.00	10,000.00
	10,000 man hours-----	@ 0.65	6,500.00
	10,000 man hours-----	@ 0.50	5,000.00
Total Cost of Day Labor-----			252,618.00

3. Plant Rental:

(a)	Plant to be Leased:		
	2 2½ yd. Shovels-----	7 mo. @ \$3,115.00	\$43,610.00
	3 Caterpillar dozers-----	7 mo. @ 869.00	18,249.00
	1 Grader-----	7 mo. @ 558.00	3,906.00
	1 Roller, with tractor-----	7 mo. @ 806.00	5,642.00
	2 Compressors-----	7 mo. @ 695.00	9,730.00
	6 5 yd. Dump Trucks-----	7 mo. @ 407.00	17,094.00
	6 9 yd. Dump Trucks-----	7 mo. @ 584.00	24,528.00
	1 Batching Plant-----	7 mo. @ 653.00	4,571.00
	2 ¾ yd. Shovels-----	7 mo. @ 1,174.00	16,436.00
	3 Tractor w/trailer-----	7 mo. @ 281.00	5,901.00
	1 Sterling Truck and Trailer-----	7 mo. @ 1,521.00	10,647.00
	1 Welding Machine-----	7 mo. @ 93.00	651.00
	4 ¾ ton Pick-up Trucks-----	7 mo. @ 69.00	1,932.00
	4 Sedans, Ford-----	7 mo. @ 76.00	2,128.00
	4 Coupes, Ford-----	7 mo. @ 70.00	1,960.00
	1 Rubber-tired 1 sk. mixer-----	7 mo. @ 113.00	791.00
	1 Concrete Placing Outfit, 7 cu. ft.--	7 mo. @ 168.00	1,176.00
	1 AD4 Auto Crane-----	7 mo. @ 942.00	6,594.00
	1 2 Drum Hoist-----	7 mo. @ 281.00	1,967.00
	2 16" Radial Saws-----	7 mo. @ 81.00	1,134.00
	1 JoInter-----	7 mo. @ 33.00	231.00
	1 Threading Machine-----	7 mo. @ 48.00	336.00

3. *Plant Rental*—Continued.(a) *Plant to be Leased*—Continued.

	To complete 330,000 cu. ft.	Amount
1 Bar Shear-----	7 mo. @ \$109.00	\$763.00
1 Bar Bender-----	7 mo. @ 72.00	504.00
1 250' x 30'' Inclined Conveyor-----	7 mo. @ 690.00	4,830.00
1 200' x 30'' Horizontal Conveyor-----	7 mo. @ 430.00	3,010.00
1 2 yd. Concrete Bucket-----	7 mo. @ 33.00	231.00
1 1 yd. Concrete Bucket-----	7 mo. @ 24.00	168.00
2 Wagon Drill Rigs-----	7 mo. @ 50.00	700.00
2 1 cu. yd. Multifoot Pavers-----	7 mo. @ 837.00	11,718.00
Total Plant to be Leased-----		201,138.00
(b) Fuel, Oil, Small Tools & Supplies-----		15,000.00
(c) Temporary Buildings—Storage-----		5,000.00
Total Cost Leased Plant and Supplies-----		221,138.00

4. *Total Plant Operation Cost to Jobs*

Cost of Materials-----	\$710,951.10
Cost of Day Labor-----	252,618.00
Plant Rental-----	221,138.00
Total Plant Operation Cost-----	\$1,184,707.10

5. *Total Cost of Work.*(a) *Direct Cost.*

Total plant operation cost-----	\$1,184,707.10
Contingencies—15%-----	177,706.06
Total Direct Cost-----	\$1,362,413.16

(b) *Indirect Cost.*

Mobilization and Demobilization-----	\$135,000.00
Surveys, inspection, supervision—10%-----	136,241.31
Total Indirect Cost-----	271,241.31
Total Field Cost to Job-----	1,633,654.47
General Office Overhead—8%-----	146,475.62
Buildings, camp, survey, covered by previous Work Orders-----	66,869.91
Estimated Grand Total Cost by hired labor and government plant-----	1,847,000.00

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

UNSKILLED LABOR

Class 1—\$0.50 per hour:

Shovelers
Concrete placers
Slopers—roadway
Material handlers
Water boy

Class 2—\$0.65 per hour:

Carpenter's helper
Rigger's helpers
Powderman's helpers
Pipefitter's helper
Tractor operator's helpers
Crane operator's helpers
Electrician's helpers

SEMI-SKILLED LABOR

Class 3—\$0.75 per hour:

Truck Drivers
Steel Tiers
Jackhammer man

SKILLED LABOR

Class 4—\$1.00 per hour:

Carpenters
Tractor operators
Crane operators
Cement finishers
Electricians
Pipefitters

Class 5—\$1.50 per hour:

General Foreman.

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SCHEDULE "A"

Work Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

1. The site of the work is at Wheeler Field on the Island of Oahu, T. H.
2. The work authorized to be done under Work Order No. 5.0 includes furnishing, by the contractor, of all labor and performing all work for the construction of ammunition storage magazines and appurtenant work in conformity with plans and specifications and within the limits of available funds.
3. The materials essential to the construction provided for herein, will be furnished by the Government, at a convenient location on the Island of Oahu, from which location the materials will be transported, by the contractor to the site of the work.
4. The work to be done at this time under Work Order No. 5.0 is as follows:
 - (a) Clearing and grubbing the site of the work.
 - (b) Transport material to the site of the work.
 - (c) Perform all excavation for structures.
 - (d) Perform all excation for service roads.
 - (e) Install all culverts.
 - (f) Construct and complete three (3) bomb proof ammunition storage magazines (of 30,000 cubic feet capacity each).

MAY 22, 1941.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ADDENDUM NO. 1

ESTIMATE OF COST: Three (3) Each 30,000 Cubic Feet Capacity Bomb Proof Ammunition Storage Structures At Wheeler Field, T. H.
DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

- (1) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct three (3) 30,000 cubic feet reinforced concrete bomb-proof magazine structures, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.
- (2) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct graded dirt connecting and access roads, complete with culverts, headwalls, and riprapped ditches.

All of the work done shall be in accordance with Specifications, "Bombproof Ammunition Storage and Appurtenant Work to Accompany Job Order No. 5.0," and the details shown on drawings listed in paragraph 1-03 of the Specifications. This addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 5.0 supplements paragraph 4 (f) of Schedule A to Work Order 5.0 and is not authority for additional construction. The estimated cost of the work to be done is as follows:

*Cost to the Contractor*1. *Materials to be Furnished:*

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit price	Amount
1	Reinforcing Steel	1, 335, 900	Lb.	\$0.045	\$60, 115. 50
2	Cement	13, 262	Bbl.	3. 05	40, 449. 10
3	Fine Aggregate	6, 078	Cu. Yd.	2. 70	16, 410. 60
4	Coarse Aggregate	6, 301	" "	3. 00	18, 903. 00
5	Structural Steel	31, 478	Lb.	0. 20	6, 295. 60
6	Steel Water Stop— $\frac{3}{16}$ " x 8"	5, 724	Lin. Ft.	0. 51	1, 389. 21
7	Copper Water Stop—16"—24 oz.	282	" "	0. 40	112. 80
8	Wrought Iron Pipe—2" Diam.	14	" "	0. 26	3. 64
9	Wire— $\frac{1}{4}$ Ga.	4, 540	Lb.	0. 08	363. 20
10	Paint	8	Gal.	2. 75	22. 00
11	Vitrified Pipe—4" Diam.	1, 327	Lin. Ft.	0. 225	298. 57
12	Graded Aggregate— $\frac{3}{4}$ " to 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	81	Cu. Yd.	3. 00	243. 00
13	Lumber	224, 220	M.	45. 00	10, 089. 90
14	Form Oil	275	Gal.	0. 21	57. 75
15	Curing Compound	1, 520	" "	0. 52	790. 40
16	Nails	7, 850	Lb.	0. 08	628. 00
17	Galv. Wire #8 Ga.	1, 323	" "	0. 08	105. 84
18	Reinforced Concrete Pipe—12" Diam.	160	Lin. Ft.	0. 855	136. 80
19	Reinforced Concrete Pipe—18" "	120	" "	2. 02	242. 40
20	Reinforced Concrete Pipe—24" "	80	" "	2. 70	216. 00
21	Reinforced Concrete Pipe—30" "	40	" "	3. 98	159. 20
22	Rock—12" Thick for Drop Inlets	35	Cu. Yd.	3. 00	105. 00
23	Electric Installation Lighting		Lump Sum		970. 00
24	Hardware		" "		120. 00
25	Galv. Iron Pipe—4"	8, 600	Lin. Ft.	0. 7164	6, 161. 04
26	Galv. Iron Pipe—2 $\frac{1}{4}$ "	5, 000	" "	0. 3620	1, 810. 00
27	Misc. Materials and supplies				500. 00
	Total Cost of Materials				166, 698. 58

2. *Day Labor:*(a) *Handling and Hauling.*

320 man hours	@ \$1. 50	\$480. 00
3,200 man hours	@ 0. 75	2, 400. 00
6,400 man hours	@ 0. 50	3, 200. 00

(b) *Clearing and Grubbing (8 $\frac{1}{2}$ Acres).*

56 man hours	@ \$1. 50	84. 00
80 man hours	@ 1. 00	80. 00
80 man hours	@ 0. 65	52. 00
960 man hours	@ 0. 50	480. 00

(c) *Excavation and Backfill Road.*

900 man hours	@ \$1. 50	1, 350. 00
2,160 man hours	@ 1. 00	2, 160. 00
2, 000 man hours	@ 0. 75	1, 500. 00
2, 000 man hours	@ 0. 65	1, 300. 00
5, 760 man hours	@ 0. 50	2, 880. 00

(d) *Culverts.*

80 man hours	@ \$1. 50	120. 00
80 man hours	@ 1. 00	80. 00
160 man hours	@ 0. 65	104. 00
800 man hours	@ 0. 50	400. 00

(e) *Riprap and Drop Inlets.*

40 man hours	@ \$1. 50	60. 00
480 man hours	@ 0. 50	240. 00

(f) *Excavation and Backfill Structures.*

1, 600 man hours	@ \$1. 50	2, 400. 00
3, 200 man hours	@ 1. 00	3, 200. 00
2, 400 man hours	@ 0. 75	1, 800. 00
2, 200 man hours	@ 0. 65	1, 430. 00
5,280 man hours	@ 0. 50	2, 640. 00

(g) *Concrete Forming and Stripping.*

960 man hours	@ \$1. 50	1, 440. 00
3, 600 man hours	@ 1. 00	3, 600. 00
2, 800 man hours	@ 0. 65	1, 728. 00
2, 000 man hours	@ 0. 50	1, 000. 00

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(h) <i>Placing Reinforcing Steel-Structure.</i>			
960 man hours	@	\$1.50	\$1,440.00
4,800 man hours	@	1.00	4,800.00
4,800 man hours	@	0.50	2,400.00
(i) <i>Mixing, Placing, Curing Concrete.</i>			
2,000 man hours	@	\$1.50	3,000.00
3,600 man hours	@	1.00	3,600.00
3,900 man hours	@	0.75	2,925.00
12,200 man hours	@	0.65	7,930.00
20,000 man hours	@	0.50	10,000.00
(j) <i>Structural Steel Placing.</i>			
96 man hours	@	\$1.50	144.00
192 man hours	@	1.00	192.00
192 man hours	@	0.75	144.00
192 man hours	@	0.50	96.00
(k) <i>Laying Drainage Tile.</i>			
16 man hours	@	\$1.50	24.00
120 man hours	@	0.65	78.00
320 man hours	@	0.50	160.00
(l) <i>Electrical Installation.</i>			
320 man hours	@	\$1.50	480.00
400 man hours	@	1.00	400.00
420 man hours	@	0.75	240.00
(m) <i>Cleaning and Painting.</i>			
8 man hours	@	\$1.50	12.00
48 man hours	@	1.00	48.00
72 man hours	@	0.50	36.00
(n) <i>Maintenance—Watchmen, etc.</i>			
2,880 man hours	@	\$1.50	4,320.00
2,160 man hours	@	0.75	1,620.00
1,440 man hours	@	0.50	720.00
Total Cost of Labor			81,017.00

3. Plant Operation:

(a) *Rental of Equipment.*

2 2½ Cu. Yd. Shovel	2 mo.	@	\$3,150.00	\$12,600.00
1 ¾ Cu. Yd. Shovel	3 mo.	@	1,174.00	3,522.00
1 Caterpillar dozer	3 mo.	@	869.00	2,607.00
1 Road Grader	1 mo.	@	558.00	558.00
1 Roller with Tractor	1 mo.	@	806.00	806.00
1 Air Compressor	2 mo.	@	695.00	1,390.00
2 9 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	3 mo.	@	584.00	3,504.00
1 Conveyor—Inclined	2 mo.	@	690.00	1,280.00
2 5 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	3 mo.	@	407.00	2,442.00
2 ¾ Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	3 mo.	@	69.00	414.00
2 Sedans	3 mo.	@	76.00	456.00
1 Coupe	3 mo.	@	70.00	210.00
1 Batching Plant	2 mo.	@	653.00	1,306.00
1 Pug Mill	2 mo.	@	200.00	400.00
1 Concrete Placing Outfit	2 mo.	@	168.00	336.00
1 AD-4 Auto Crane	3 mo.	@	942.00	2,826.00
1 16" Radial Saw	3 mo.	@	81.00	243.00
1 Jointer	3 mo.	@	33.00	99.00
1 Bar Shear	3 mo.	@	109.00	327.00
1 Bar Bender	3 mo.	@	72.00	216.00
1 2 Cu. Yd. Concrete Bucket	2 mo.	@	33.00	66.00
1 1 Cu. Yd. Concrete Bucket	2 mo.	@	24.00	48.00
1 Conveyor—Horizontal	2 mo.	@	430.00	860.00
Misc. Tools and Equipment				500.00
(b) Fuel, Oil, Gas and Supplies			Lump Sum	5,500.00

Total Plant Rental Cost 42,516.00

4. *Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:*

Cost of Materials-----	\$166, 698. 58
Cost of Day Labor-----	81, 017. 00
Cost of Plant Rental-----	42, 516. 00
Mobilization and Demobilization-----	135, 000. 00
Total Cost to Contractor-----	<u>\$425, 231. 58</u>

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

*Recapitulation of estimate of cost*1. *Total Cost of Work:*(a) *Direct Cost:*

Total Cost of Work to Contractor-----	\$425, 231. 58
Contingencies—10%-----	42, 523. 16

Total Direct Cost-----	467, 754. 74
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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Survey, Insp., Engr.—8%-----	\$34, 018. 53
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Total Indirect Cost-----	34, 018. 53
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Total Field Cost-----	501, 773. 27
General Office Overhead—8%-----	34, 018. 73

Estimated Grand Total Cost to the Government-----	535, 792. 00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the contractor.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

MAY 26, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete (5) each 30,000 Cubic Feet Capacity Bombproof Ammunition Storage Structures at Wheeler Field, T. H.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

(1) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct five (5) each 30,000 cubic feet reinforced concrete bombproof magazine structures, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.

(2) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct graded dirt connecting and access roads, complete with culverts, headwalls, and rip-rapped ditches.

All of the work done shall be in accordance with Specifications, "Bombproof Ammunition Storage and Appurtenant Work to Accompany Job Order No. 5.0," and the details shown on the drawings listed in paragraph 1-03 of the Specifications.

Addendum No. 2 to Job Order No. 5.0, supplants and makes void Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 5.0.

Total cost of the work to be one shall not exceed \$585,993.89.

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Cost to the Contractor

1. Materials Required for Magazines:

Item No.	Item	Quantity	Unit	Unit price	Amount
1	Cement.....	21, 225	Bbl.....	\$2.92	\$62, 189.25
2	Fine Aggregate.....	9, 342	Cu. Yd.....	2.70	25, 223.40
3	Coarse Aggregate.....	9, 060	" "	3.00	27, 180.00
4	¾" to 1¼" Graded Aggregate.....	140	" "	3.00	420.00
5	Reinforcing Steel.....	2, 226, 500	Lb.....	0.0283	65, 236.45
6	Structural Steel.....	52, 465	" "	0.1004	5, 267.49
7	Steel Water Stop.....	9, 540	Lin. Ft.....	0.51	4, 865.40
8	Copper Water Stop.....	470	" "	0.40	188.00
9	2" Diam. Black W. I. Pipe.....	24	" "	0.26	6.24
10	#14 Ga. Black Wire.....	7, 500	Lb.....	0.08	600.00
11	#8 Ga. Galv. Wire.....	2, 210	" "	0.08	176.80
12	4" Diam. V. C. Pipe.....	2, 212	Lin. Ft.....	0.225	497.70
13	1" x 6" T & G Flooring.....	112, 620	M. B. M.....	61.50	6, 928.13
14	2" x 4"-4" x 4"-4" x 6" #1 Com. Lumber.....	140, 400	" " "	47.10	6, 612.84
15	Form Oil.....	460	Gals.....	0.21	96.60
16	Curing Compound.....	2, 500	" "	0.52	1, 300.00
17	Nails—20d, 16d, 10d, 8d, 6d.....	100	Keg.....	6.60	660.00
18	Paint.....	13	Gals.....	2.75	35.75
19	Conduit, Wiring and Fixtures.....	Lump sum	" "		1, 940.00
20	4" Diam. W. I. Pipe and Couplings.....	7, 740	Lin. Ft.....	0.7164	5, 544.94
21	2" Diam. W. I. Pipe and Couplings.....	4, 500	" "	0.4125	1, 856.25
22	Miscellaneous Hardware.....	Lump sum	" "		210.00
23	Miscellaneous Supplies.....	" "	" "		850.00
Total Cost of Materials for Magazines.....					217, 883.24

1-A. Materials Required for Access & Connecting Roads:

1	Cement.....	75	Bbl.....	\$2.93	\$219.75
2	Fine Aggregate.....	50	Cu. Yd.....	2.70	135.00
3	Coarse Aggregate.....	48	" "	3.00	144.00
4	Reinforcing Steel.....	3, 500	Lb.....	0.0283	102.55
5	1" x 6" Shiplap.....	2, 400	B. M.....	61.50	147.60
6	2" x 4" #1 Com. Lumber.....	3, 000	B. M.....	47.10	141.30
7	R. C. Pipe 12" Diam.....	160	Lin. Ft.....	0.855	136.80
8	R. C. Pipe 18" Diam.....	120	" "	2.02	242.40
9	R. C. Pipe 24" Diam.....	80	" "	2.70	216.00
10	R. C. Pipe 30" Diam.....	40	" "	3.98	159.20
11	Masonry Stone (50¢).....	35	Cu. Yd.....	3.00	105.00
12	Galv. W. I. Pipe—4" Diam.....	860	Lin. Ft.....	0.7164	616.10
13	Galv. W. I. Pipe—2" Diam.....	500	" "	0.4125	206.25
14	Nails, Wire, etc.....		Lump sum.....		18.50
15	Miscellaneous Supplies.....		" "		150.00
Total Cost of Materials for Access & Connecting Roads.....					2, 738.45

2. Day Labor (Magazines):

(a) Handling and Hauling (6,200 Tons):

1,000 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	\$1, 500.00
1,000 man hours.....	@ 1.00	1, 000.00
1,000 man hours.....	@ .65	650.00
10,670 man hours.....	@ .50	5, 335.00

(b) Clearing and Grubbing (7½ Acres):

32 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	48.00
96 man hours.....	@ .75	72.00
960 man hours.....	@ .50	480.00

(c) Laying Temporary Water Line (7,740' of 4", 4,500' of 2"):

50 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	75.00
120 man hours.....	@ .75	90.00
1,020 man hours.....	@ .50	510.00

(d) Structure Excavation (82,000 Cu. Yds.):

1,500 man hours.....	@ \$1.50	2, 250.00
3,000 man hours.....	@ 1.00	3, 000.00
3,000 man hours.....	@ .65	1, 950.00
9,000 man hours.....	@ .50	4, 500.00

(e) <i>Structure Backfill—Compacted</i> (63,350 Cu. Yds.):		
1,170 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	\$1,755.00
2,340 man hours-----	@ 1.00	2,340.00
2,340 man hours-----	@ .65	1,521.00
6,932 man hours-----	@ .50	3,466.00
(f) <i>Forming and Stripping</i> (Assembling—263 M., Erecting—368½ M., Stripping—368½ M.):		
1,340 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	2,010.00
6,000 man hours-----	@ 1.00	6,000.00
6,000 man hours-----	@ .65	3,900.00
15,200 man hours-----	@ .50	7,600.00
(g) <i>Reinforcing steel—Bind'g & Plac'g</i> (2,226,500 Lbs.):		
2,080 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	3,120.00
20,800 man hours-----	@ 1.00	20,800.00
20,800 man hours-----	@ .65	13,520.00
14,620 man hours-----	@ .50	7,310.00
(h) <i>Placing and Curing Concrete</i> (14,710 Cu. Yds.):		
4,000 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	6,000.00
8,000 man hours-----	@ 1.00	8,000.00
12,000 man hours-----	@ .75	9,000.00
16,000 man hours-----	@ .65	10,400.00
16,000 man hours-----	@ .50	8,000.00
(i) <i>Laying Drainage Tile</i> (2,212 Lin. Ft.):		
28 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	42.00
200 man hours-----	@ .65	130.00
536 man hours-----	@ .50	268.00
(j) <i>Structural Steel Placing</i> (52,465 Lbs.):		
160 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	240.00
640 man hours-----	@ 1.00	640.00
640 man hours-----	@ .75	480.00
960 man hours-----	@ .50	480.00
(k) <i>Conduits, Wiring and Fixtures</i> (Placing):		
160 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	240.00
480 man hours-----	@ 1.00	480.00
480 man hours-----	@ .75	360.00
960 man hours-----	@ .50	480.00
(l) <i>Maintenance</i> (watchmen, etc.):		
2,660 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	3,990.00
2,660 man hours-----	@ 1.00	2,660.00
2,000 man hours-----	@ .50	1,000.00
Total Cost of Day Labor for Magazines-----		147,692.00

2-A. *Day Labor for Access and Connecting Roads:*

(a) <i>Clearing and Grubbing</i> (9 Acres):		
40 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	\$60.00
120 man hours-----	@ .75	90.00
1,540 man hours-----	@ .50	770.00
(b) <i>Handling and Hauling</i> (30 Tons):		
8 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	12.00
16 man hours-----	@ 1.00	16.00
8 man hours-----	@ .65	5.20
96 man hours-----	@ .50	48.00
(c) <i>Laying Temporary Water Line</i> (1,360 Lin. Ft.):		
8 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	12.00
16 man hours-----	@ .75	12.00
104 man hours-----	@ .50	52.00
(d) <i>Excavation</i> (44,260 Cu. Yds.):		
800 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	1,200.00
1,600 man hours-----	@ 1.00	1,600.00
1,600 man hours-----	@ .75	1,200.00
1,600 man hours-----	@ .65	1,040.00
4,800 man hours-----	@ .50	2,400.00
(e) <i>Fill—Compacted</i> (24,500 Cu. Yds.):		
800 man hours-----	@ \$1.50	1,200.00
800 man hours-----	@ 1.00	800.00
800 man hours-----	@ .65	520.00
3,200 man hours-----	@ .50	1,600.00

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(f) Culvert Pipe—Placing (400 Lin. Ft.):		
80 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	\$120. 00
80 man hours.....	@ 1. 00	80. 00
160 man hours.....	@ . 65	104. 00
800 man hours.....	@ . 50	400. 00
(g) Headwalls—Forming and Stripping (5,400 B. M.):		
72 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	108. 00
144 man hours.....	@ 1. 00	144. 00
144 man hours.....	@ . 50	72. 00
(h) Reinforcing Steel—Binding & Placing (3,500 Lbs.):		
24 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	36. 00
48 man hours.....	@ 1. 00	48. 00
20 man hours.....	@ . 65	13. 00
32 man hours.....	@ . 50	16. 00
(i) Placing and Curing Concrete (50 Cu. Yds.):		
16 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	24. 00
32 man hours.....	@ 1. 00	32. 00
48 man hours.....	@ . 75	36. 00
80 man hours.....	@ . 50	40. 00
(j) Drop Inlets—Placing Masonry (35 Cu. Yds.):		
32 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	48. 00
60 man hours.....	@ 1. 00	60. 00
128 man hours.....	@ . 50	64. 00
(k) Riprap Ditches and Culvert Aprons (100 Sq. Yds.):		
16 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	24. 00
48 man hours.....	@ . 50	24. 00
(l) Grading and Shaping Roadway (12,000 Sq. Yds.):		
160 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	240. 00
480 man hours.....	@ 1. 00	480. 00
320 man hours.....	@ . 65	208. 00
540 man hours.....	@ . 50	270. 00
(m) Maintenance (Watchmen, etc.)		
400 man hours.....	@ \$1. 50	600. 00
400 man hours.....	@ 1. 00	400. 00
400 man hours.....	@ . 75	300. 00
400 man hours.....	@ . 50	200. 00

Total Cost of Day Labor (Access Roads)..... 16, 828. 20

3. Plant Operation (Magazines).

	Months required	Monthly rental	Amount
(a) Rental of Equipment.			
2 2½ Cu. Yd. Power Shovels.....	2½	\$3, 150. 00	\$15, 750. 00
1 ¾ Cu. Yd. Power Shovel.....	2½	1, 174. 00	2, 935. 00
1 Caterpillar Dzer.....	2½	889. 00	2, 172. 50
1 Roller with Tractor.....	2	806. 00	1, 612. 00
1 Air Compressor.....	2	695. 00	1, 390. 00
2 9 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks.....	2½	594. 00	2, 920. 00
2 5 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks.....	2½	407. 00	2, 035. 00
2 ¾ Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks.....	2½	99. 00	344. 00
2 Sedans.....	2½	79. 00	390. 00
1 Coupe.....	2½	70. 00	175. 00
1 Batching Plant.....	2½	653. 00	1, 632. 50
1 Pug Mill.....	2½	200. 00	500. 00
1 Concrete Placing Outfit.....	2½	165. 00	420. 00
1 A. D. Auto Crane.....	2½	942. 00	2, 355. 00
1 16" Radial Saw.....	2½	81. 00	202. 50
1 Jointer.....	2½	33. 00	82. 50
1 Bar Shear.....	2½	169. 00	272. 50
1 Bar Bender.....	2½	72. 00	180. 00
1 2 Cu. Yd. Concrete Bucket.....	2½	33. 00	82. 50
1 1 Cu. Yd. Concrete Bucket.....	2½	24. 00	60. 00
1 Inclined Conveyor.....	2½	690. 00	1, 725. 00
1 Horizontal Conveyor.....	2½	430. 00	1, 075. 00
Miscellaneous Small Tools.....		Lump Sum	539. 00
(b) Fuel, Oil, Gas & Supplies.....		Lump Sum	7, 700. 00
Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Magazines).....			45, 832. 00

3-A. Plant Operation (Access Roads):

	Months required	Monthly rental	Amount
a) Rental of Equipment.			
1 2½ Cu. Yd. Power Shovel.....	2	\$3,150.00	\$6,300.00
1 ¾ Cu. Yd. Power Shovel.....	2	1,174.00	2,348.00
1 Caterpillar—Dozer.....	2	869.00	1,738.00
1 Roller with Tractor.....	2	806.00	1,612.00
2 9 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks.....	1	584.00	1,168.00
2 5 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks.....	2	407.00	1,628.00
2 ¾ Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks.....	1	69.00	138.00
2 Sedans.....	2	76.00	304.00
1 Coupe.....	2	70.00	140.00
1 ¼ Cu. Yd. Concrete Mixer.....	1	55.00	55.00
1 A. D.-4 Auto Crane.....	1½	942.00	471.00
1 16 In. Radial Saw.....	1½	81.00	40.50
1 Bar Shears.....	¾	109.00	27.25
1 Bar Bender.....	¾	72.00	18.00
Miscellaneous Small Tools.....		Lump Sum	212.25
(b) Fuel Oil, Gas, Oil and Supplies.....		Lump Sum	2,100.00
Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Access Roads).....			19,300.00

4. Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Magazines):

Total Cost of Material.....	\$217,883.24
Total Cost of Labor.....	147,692.00
Total Cost of Plant.....	46,552.00
Mobilization and Demobilization.....	123,365.70

Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Magazines)..... **\$535,492.94**

4-A. Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Access Roads):

Total Cost of Material.....	\$2,738.45
Total Cost of Labor.....	16,828.20
Total Cost of Plant.....	19,300.00
Mobilization and Demobilization.....	11,634.30

Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Access Roads)..... **50,500.95**

5. Total Cost of Work (5 Magazines & Access Road):

Total Cost of 5 Magazines.....	\$535,492.94
Total Cost of Access Road.....	50,500.95

Total Cost to Contractor..... **585,993.89**

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost**1. Total Cost of Work:****(a) Direct Cost:**

Total Cost to Contractor.....	\$585,993.89
Contingencies—10%.....	58,599.40

Total Direct Cost..... **644,593.29**

(b) Indirect Cost:

Surveys, Inspection and Engr.—8%.....	\$46,879.51
Total Indirect Cost.....	46,879.51

Total Field Cost..... **691,472.80**

General Office Overhead—8%..... **48,879.51**

Estimated Grand Total Cost to Government..... **738,352.31**

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This recapitulation is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JUNE 5, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 3

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0 Contract No. W-414-eng-601

WORK TO BE DONE: Complete necessary excavation for all Ammunition Storage Structures authorized by Job Order No. 5.0, together with Construction of graded dirt Connecting and access roads, complete with necessary culverts, headwalls, and riprapped ditches.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

(1) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to complete necessary excavation for all Ammunition Storage Structures, authorized by Job Order No. 5.0.

(2) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to complete Construction of graded dirt Connecting and access roads, Complete with, culverts, headwalls and riprapped ditches.

All of the work done shall be in accordance with Specifications, "Bombproof Ammunition Storage and Appurtenant Work to Accompany Job Order No. 5.0".

Addendum No. 3 is additional Work and does not alter Addendum No. 2 to Job Order No. 5.0.

The Cost of the Work to be done Shall not exceed \$115,034.10.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

1. Materials To Be Furnished (Excavation for Magazines) :

Item No.	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit price	Amount
1	2 In. W. I. Pipe and Fittings.....	1,950	Ft.	\$0.45	\$877.50
2	Dynamite (Caps & Fuse).....	500	Lbs.	.20	100.00
3	Miscellaneous Supplies.....		Lump sum		72.50
	Total Cost of Material for Magazines.....				1,050.00

1A. Materials to be Furnished (Excavation for Access Road) :

Item No.	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit price	Amount
1	2 In. W. I. Pipe and Fittings.....	3,200	Lin. ft.	\$0.4125	\$1,320.00
2	Cement.....	90	Bbl.	3.19	287.10
3	Fine Aggregate.....	50	Cu. Yds.	2.70	135.00
4	Coarse Aggregate.....	48	" "	3.00	144.00
5	Form Lumber.....	9,000	M-BM	57.50	517.50
6	Wire.....	50	Lbs.	0.08	4.00
7	Nails (20 16 8 & 6ds).....	3	Kegs	6.80	19.80
8	R. C. Pipe—12 In. Diam.....	290	Lin. ft.	0.855	247.95
9	R. C. Pipe—18 In. Diam.....	80	" "	2.02	161.60
10	R. C. Pipe—24 In. Diam.....	120	" "	2.70	324.00
11	R. C. Pipe—30 In. Diam.....	60	" "	3.98	238.80
12	Masonry and Riprap Stone.....	150	Ton.....	3.00	450.00
13	Dynamite (Caps and Fuse).....	500	Lbs.	0.20	100.00
14	Reinforcing Steel.....	5,000	" "	0.0293	146.50
15	Miscellaneous Supplies.....		Lump Sum		103.95
	Total Cost of Material for Roads.....				4,200.00

2. Day Labor (Magazines) :**(a) Handling and Hauling:**

1 man hour-----	@ \$1. 50	\$1. 50
4 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	2. 00

(b) Clearing and Grubbing:

24 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	36. 00
72 man hours-----	@ 0. 75	54. 00
720 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	360. 00

(c) Laying Temporary Water Line:

8 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	12. 00
20 man hours-----	@ 0. 75	15. 00
172 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	86. 00

(d) Structure Excavation:

2,160 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	3, 240. 00
4,320 man hours-----	@ 1. 00	4, 320. 00
4,320 man hours-----	@ 0. 65	2, 808. 00
12,960 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	6, 480. 00

(e) Maintenance:

3,832 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	5, 748. 00
3,832 man hours-----	1. 00	3, 832. 00
3,200 man hours-----	0. 50	1, 600. 00

Total Cost of Day Labor on Magazines----- 28, 594. 50

2A. Day Labor (Access & Connecting Roads) :**(a) Clearing and Grubbing:**

24 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	36. 00
72 man hours-----	@ 0. 75	54. 00
960 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	480. 00

(b) Handling and Hauling:

8 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	12. 00
12 man hours-----	@ 1. 00	12. 00
12 man hours-----	@ 0. 65	7. 80
80 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	40. 00

(c) Laying Temporary Water Line:

12 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	18. 00
24 man hours-----	@ 0. 75	18. 00
148 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	74. 00

(d) Excavation for Access Road:

1,100 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	1, 650. 00
2,200 man hours-----	@ 1. 00	2, 200. 00
2,200 man hours-----	@ 0. 75	1, 650. 00
2,200 man hours-----	@ 0. 65	1, 430. 00
6,600 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	3, 300. 00

(e) Fill—Compacted:

800 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	1, 200. 00
800 man hours-----	@ 1. 00	800. 00
800 man hours-----	@ 0. 65	520. 00
3,200 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	1, 600. 00

(f) Culvert Pipe Placing:

110 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	165. 00
110 man hours-----	@ 1. 00	110. 00
220 man hours-----	@ 0. 65	143. 00
1,100 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	550. 00

(g) Headwalls—Forming & Stripping:

120 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	180. 00
240 man hours-----	@ 1. 00	240. 00
240 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	120. 00

(h) Reinforcing Steel:

36 man hours-----	@ \$1. 50	54. 00
72 man hours-----	@ 1. 00	72. 00
32 man hours-----	@ 0. 65	20. 80
44 man hours-----	@ 0. 50	22. 00

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(i) <i>Placing and Curing Concrete:</i>			
24 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	\$36. 00
48 man hours	-----	@ 1. 00	48. 00
72 man hours	-----	@ 0. 75	54. 00
120 man hours	-----	@ 0. 50	60. 00
(j) <i>Drop Inlets & Aprons—Placing Masonry:</i>			
72 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	108. 00
136 man hours	-----	@ 1. 00	136. 00
288 man hours	-----	@ 0. 50	144. 00
(k) <i>Grading and Shaping Roadway:</i>			
100 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	150. 00
300 man hours	-----	@ 1. 00	300. 00
200 man hours	-----	@ 0. 60	130. 00
340 man hours	-----	@ 0. 50	170. 00
(l) <i>Maintenance:</i>			
500 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	750. 00
500 man hours	-----	@ 1. 00	500. 00
500 man hours	-----	@ 0. 75	375. 00
500 man hours	-----	@ 0. 50	250. 00
Total Cost of Day Labor on Road			19, 989. 60
3. <i>Plant Operation (Magazines) :</i>			
(a) <i>Rental of Equipment:</i>			
1 2½ Cu. Yd. Power Shovels	3¾ Mos.	@ \$3, 150. 00	\$11, 812. 50
1 ¾ Cu. Yd. Power Shovels	3¾ Mos.	@ 1, 174. 00	4, 402. 50
1 Caterpillar Dozer	3¾ Mos.	@ 869. 00	3, 258. 75
2 9 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	2 Mos.	@ 584. 00	2, 336. 00
2 5 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	2 Mos.	@ 407. 00	1, 628. 00
2 ¾ Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	2 Mos.	@ 69. 00	278. 00
2 Sedans	3¾ Mos.	@ 76. 00	570. 00
1 Coupe	3¾ Mos.	@ 70. 00	262. 50
Miscellaneous Small Equipment.	Lump sum		103. 75
(b) Fuel Oil, Gas, Oil & Grease, Lump sum			3, 750. 00
Total Plant Operation (Magazines)			28. 400. 00
3A. <i>Plant Operation (Access Road) :</i>			
(a) <i>Rental of Equipment:</i>			
1 ¾ Cu. Yd. Power Shovel	3¾ Mos.	@ 1, 174. 00	3, 228. 50
1 2½ Cu. Yd. Power Shovel	3¾ Mos.	@ 3, 150. 00	8, 662. 50
1 Caterpillar Dozer	2¾ Mos.	@ 869. 00	2, 389. 75
1 Roller with Tractor	2¾ Mos.	@ 806. 00	2, 216. 50
2 9 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	2¾ Mos.	@ 584. 00	3, 212. 00
2 5 Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	2¾ Mos.	@ 407. 00	2, 238. 00
2 ¾ Cu. Yd. Dump Trucks	2¾ Mos.	@ 69. 00	3, 795. 00
2 Sedans	3 Mos.	@ 76. 00	456. 00
1 Coupe	3 Mos.	@ 70. 00	210. 00
1 ¼ Cu. Yd. Concrete Mixer	1 Mo.	@ 55. 00	55. 00
1 A. D. Auto Crane	½ Mo.	@ 942. 00	471. 00
1 16 In. Radial Saw	½ Mo.	@ 81. 00	40. 50
1 Bar Shears	¼ Mo.	@ 109. 00	27. 25
1 Bar Bender	¼ Mo.	@ 72. 00	18. 00
1 Batching Plant	¼ Mo.	@ 653. 00	163. 25
1 Inclined Conveyor	¼ Mo.	@ 690. 00	172. 50
1 Horizontal Conveyor	¼ Mo.	@ 430. 00	107. 50
1 Power Road Grader	2 Mos.	@ 460. 00	920. 00
Miscellaneous Small Equipment, Lump Sum			166. 25
(b) Fuel Oil, Gas, Oil & Grease, Lump Sum			4, 250. 00
Total Plant Operation (Access Road)			32, 800. 00
4. <i>Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Magazines) :</i>			
Total Cost of Material		\$1, 050. 00	
Total Cost of Labor		28, 594. 50	
Total Cost of Plant		28, 400. 00	
Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Magazines)			58, 044. 50

4A. *Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Access Roads) :*

Total Cost of Material-----	\$4,200. 00
Total Cost of Labor-----	19,989. 60
Total Cost of Plant-----	32,800. 00

Total Plant Operation Cost of Job (Access Roads)-----	\$56,989. 60
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5. *Total Cost of Work (Magazines & Access Roads)*

Total Cost of Excavation for Magazines-----	\$58,044. 50
Total Cost of Excavation for Access Roads-----	56,989. 60

Total Cost to Contractor-----	115,034. 10
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THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

*Recapitulation of estimated cost*1. *Total Cost of Job:*(a) *Direct Cost:*

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$115,034. 10
Contingencies—10%-----	11,503. 41

Total Direct Cost-----	126,537. 51
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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Surveys, Inspection and Engineering, (8%)---	\$9,202. 73
Total Indirect Cost-----	9,202. 73

Total Field Cost-----	135,740. 24
General Office Overhead—8%-----	9,202. 73

Estimated Grand Total Cost to Government-----	144,942. 97
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ADDENDUM NO. 4

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Pave Ammunition Storage Access and Connecting Roads with 4" Waterbound Macadam Base Course and 2½" Asphaltic Concrete Top Course.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific Item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to pave Ammunition Storage Access and Connecting Roads with 4" Waterbound Macadam Base Course and 2½" asphaltic top course. The work to be done shall be in accordance with the Specifications to be issued and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total Cost of the Work to be done shall not exceed \$47,000.00.

Addendum No. 4 to Job Order No. 5.0 is additional work and does not alter Addendum No. 3.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

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Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor.....	\$47,000.00
Contingencies—10%	4,700.00
Total Direct Cost.....	51,700.00

(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection Engineering.....	\$3,760.00
Total Indirect Cost.....	3,760.00

Total Field Cost.....	55,460.00
General Office Overhead.....	3,760.00

Estimated Total Cost to the Government.....	59,220.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JULY 1, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 5

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete 4 each 30,000 cubic feet capacity reinforced Concrete bombproof Ammunition Storage Structures.
DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific Items:

1. Furnish all necessary labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to Construct and Complete 4 each 30,000 cubic feet reinforced concrete bombproof Ammunition Storage Structures, (Structures to be constructed are shown as No. 30-1, 30-2, 30-8, 30-9, on drawing "Bombproof Magazines," General Plan No. 2, File No. F-5/2). All of the work done shall be in accordance with Specifications, "Bombproof Ammunition Storage and Appurtenant Work to Accompany Job Order No. 5.0", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

2. Work shall not be initiated on Construction of Burster Course for structures 30-1, 30-2, 30-8, 30-9, until so ordered by the District Engineer.

Addendum No. 5 to Job Order No. 5.0 is additional work and does not alter Addendums 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The Cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$330,350.00.

(Signed) THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Theodore Wyman Jr.
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer

RECAPITULATION OF ESTIMATED COST

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to Contractor.....	\$330,350.00
Contingencies—10%	33,035.00

Total Direct Cost.....	\$363,385.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering.....	\$26,428.00
Total Indirect Cost.....	26,428.00

Total Field Cost.....	389,813.00
General Office Overhead.....	26,428.00

Estimated Total Cost to the Government.....	416,241.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

AUGUST 14, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 6

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete two (2) each 5,000 cubic feet capacity, and three (3) each 10,000 cu. ft. capacity reinforced concrete bombproof ammunition storage structures.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District—Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete two (2) each 5,000 cubic feet capacity bombproof ammunition storage structures, (Structures to be constructed as shown as No. 5-1, and No. 5-2, on Drawing, "Bombproof Magazines", General Plan No. 2, File No. F-5/2).

2. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete three (3) each 10,000 cubic feet capacity reinforced concrete bombproof ammunition storage structures, (Structures to be constructed as shown as No. 10-1, No. 10-2, No. 10-3, on drawing, "Bombproof Magazines", General Plan No. 2, File No. F-5/2).

All of the work done shall be in accordance with Specifications, "Bombproof Ammunition Storage and Appurtenant work to Accompany Job Order No. 5.0", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

Work shall not be initiated on the construction of Burster Course for structures 5-1, 5-2, 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, until so ordered by the District Engineer.

Addendum No. 6 to Job Order No. 5.0 is additional work and does not alter Addendums 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$230,821.00.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Summary Sheet

1. *Work Authorized by Job Order No. 5.0 Addenda #3 to #7 inclusive:*
 - (a) Construction of nine each 30,000 cubic feet capacity bombproof magazines, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.
 - (b) Construction of three (3) each 10,000 cubic feet capacity bombproof magazines, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.
 - (c) Construction of six (6) each 5,000 cubic feet capacity bombproof magazines, complete with all necessary utilities and fixtures.
 - (d) Construction of all necessary connecting and access roads, complete with paving, culverts, headwalls, and riprapped ditches.
 - (e) Construction and installation of electrical distribution system for magazines.
 - (f) The installation of all necessary construction plant, equipment, buildings, and facilities to carry out the construction program.
2. *Work is to be performed under Contract No. W-414-eng-602. (1-A. Ammunition Storage Magazines.)*
3. *Present Construction is Limited to:*
 - (a) Excavation for all bombproof magazines.
 - (b) Construct access and connecting roads complete with paving, culverts, headwalls, and drainage ditches.
 - (c) Construct and complete nine (9) each 30,000 cubic feet capacity magazines, *except that work on burster courses for magazines No. 30-1, 30-2, 30-8, 30-9, is suspended until further orders by the District Engineer.*

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- (d) Construct and complete two (2) each 5,000 cubic feet magazines, No. 5-1, and 5-2, *except that work on the burster courses is suspended until further orders by the District Engineer.*
- (e) Construct and complete three (3) each 10,000 cubic feet magazines, No. 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, *except that work on the burster courses is suspended until further orders from the District Engineer.*
- (f) Construction, installation, and repair of necessary plant equipment, and facilities for consumation of construction program.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

SEPTEMBER 2, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 7

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete Four (4) Each 5,000 Cubic Feet Capacity Reinforced Concrete Ammunition Storage Structures.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Wheeler Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and complete four (4) each 5,000 cubic feet capacity reinforced concrete ammunition storage structures, (Structures to be constructed are shown as No. 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, on drawing. "Bombproof Magazines", General Plan No. 2, File No. F-5/2). All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with Specifications, "Bombproof Ammunition Storage and Appurtenant Work to Accompany Job Order No. 5.0", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

2. *Work shall not be initiated on the construction of Burster Course for structures 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, until so ordered by the District Engineer.*

Total Cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$157,200.00.

Addendum No. 7 is work authorized under Job Order No. 5.0 and does not alter Addendums, No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

/s/ Theodore Wyman Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost

1. **Total Cost of Work:**

(a) **Direct Cost:**

Total Cost to the Contractor.....	\$157,200.00
Contingencies—10%	15,720.00

Total Direct Cost.....	172,920.00
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(b) **Indirect Cost:**

Survey, Inspection, Engineering.....	\$12,576.00
Total Indirect Cost.....	12,576.00

Total Field Cost.....	185,496.00
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General Office Overhead.....	12,576.00
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Estimated Total Cost to the Government.....	198,072.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

NOVEMBER 13, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 8

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract W-414 eng-602.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 8 *authorizes construction* of burster courses for magazines, numbers: 30-1, 30-2, 30-8, 30-9, 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6, on which work was suspended by Addendum No. 5 dated July 1, 1941; Addendum No. 6 dated August 14, 1941; and Addendum No. 7 dated September 2, 1941.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JANUARY 3, 1942.

ADDENDUM No. 9

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 9 to accompany Job Order No. 5.0 provides for the plugging of holes in all magazines not contemplated for use of personnel.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, U. S. Army,
District Engineer.

FEBRUARY 20, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 10

To Accompany Job Order No. 5.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 10 to accompany Job Order No. 5.0 (Bombproof Ammunition Storage Magazines, Wheeler Field, provides for camouflaging of entrances and approaches to the bomb storage magazines, in accordance with plans and instructions furnished the Area Engineer.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 4H

Summary—CBR

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

HONOLULU, T. H.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

Hickam Field. Oahu, T. H.

Job Order #7.0 April 25, 1941 (Rev) Aug 15, 1941.

Construct—Eight (8) Igloo type reinforced concrete Magazines (26' 6" x 40' 4" inside dimensions). Increased to ten (10) by revised job order.

Est. Cost \$91,062.00.

Revised \$143,406.00 (to Gov).

Commencement Date: May 1, 1941.

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Est. Date to Complete: September 1, 1941.

Revised: November 1, 1941.

Supervision by G. A. Sisson, Area Engr., 2nd Field Area.

Addendum #2 Suspends work on Igloo #8 of Job Order 7.0 (revised).

Job Order #7.1 June 16, 1941 Revised December 1, 1944.

Construct—Access road to bomb storage magazines.

Est. Cost \$38,052.00.

Revised \$74,805.96 (to Gov).

Commencement Date: June 14, 1941.

Est. Date Completion: August 1, 1941.

Revised: December 15, 1941.

Supervision by The Area Engr., Second Field Area.

Job Order #7.2 June 16, 1941 Rev November 26, 1941.

Construct—Railroad to Bomb Storage Magazine at Hickam Field.

Est. Cost \$16,700.00.

Revised \$76,086.08 (to Gov).

Commencement Date: June 14, 1941.

Est. Date to Complete: August 1, 1941.

Revised: December 15, 1941.

Supervision by The Area Engr, 2nd Field Area.

Job Order #7.3 Aug. 15, 1941.

Construct—Four (4) Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines,

Three (3) P. O. #46 Magazines, one (1) P. O. #42 Magazine and one (1)

Block Powder #45 Magazine, and barricades for Magazines.

Est. Cost \$126,000.00 (to Gov).

Commencement Date: Aug. 16, 1941.

Estimate Date for completion: Dec. 1, 1941.

Supervision by the Area Engineer, Second Field Area.

Addendum #1, Dated Aug 18, 1941. Suspends work on all Igloos and Magazines except Igloo #11.

Job Order 7.4. Aug 15, 1941.

Construct—Approx 3410 lin feet Manproof wire fence and relocate 2075 lin feet existing fence.

Est. Cost: \$9,918.70.

Commencement Date:

Aug 16, 1941.

Oct 1, 1941.

Supervision by the Area Engr, Second Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., April 25, 1941.

Contract No. W-414-Eng-602-7.0

Order No.-----

To: Hawaiian Constructors—Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: The Construction of 8 Igloo Type/Concrete Underground Magazines.
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2019
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete 8 reinforced concrete igloo type underground magazines (26'-6" x 40'-4" inside dimensions) together with barricades for each structure.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As shown in paragraph 1-04 of Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: C. B. and U. A. 21 x 0540.062 Construction of Buildings utilities and appurtenances at Military Posts, Eng. 716 P99 A-0540.062-N.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$91,062.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 1, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE: September 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.

13. **MATERIALS:** See detailed estimate attached.

14. **SUPERVISION BY:** G. A. Sisson, Area Engineer, Second Field Area.

Distribution:

/s/ **THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,**
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Col., Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

MAY 22, 1941.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and install Electrical Distribution System For Bomb Storage Magazines, Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickam Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and make complete installation of Electrical Distribution System for Bomb Storage Magazines, in accordance with Specifications to Accompany Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 7.0, and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$2,464.70.

Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 7.0 provides for additional work other than that specified in Job Order No. 7.0 and does not in any manner change the work to be done thereunder.

COST TO CONTRACTOR

1. Materials to be Furnished:

Item No.	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit Price	Total Cost
1	5KVA Transformer.....	1	Each.....	\$128.00	\$128.00
2	Poles—Creosoted—Douglas Fir (35').....	9	".....	24.00	216.00
3	Cross Arms—Douglas Fir.....	13	".....	1.50	19.50
4	Cross Arm Braces—Galv.....	26	".....	0.25	6.50
5	Underground Ties—3 Way.....	7	".....	5.50	38.50
6	Wire—3 Conductor #6RR 600V.....	3,600	Lin. Ft.....	0.30	1,080.00
7	Wire—#6 Solid Primary (316#).....	4,000	" ".....	0.016	64.00
8	Wire—2 Conductor #8.....	200	" ".....	0.18	36.00
9	Primary Cutouts.....	2	Each.....	8.00	16.00
10	Miscellaneous Hardware.....		Lump Sum.....		70.50
	Total Cost of Materials.....				\$1,675.00

2. Day Labor.

(a) Handling and Hauling.

16 man hours..... @ \$1.50 \$24.00
16 man hours..... 0.75 12.00
32 man hours..... 0.50 16.00

(b) Digging Pole Holes and Backfilling.

8 man hours..... @ \$1.50 12.00
48 man hours..... 0.50 24.00

(c) Erecting Poles, Anchors and Cross Arms.

16 man hours..... @ \$1.50 24.00
32 man hours..... 1.00 32.00
32 man hours..... 0.75 24.00
32 man hours..... 0.50 16.00

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(d) <i>Overhead Construction, String Wire.</i>			
16 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	\$24. 00
24 man hours	-----	1. 00	24. 00
24 man hours	-----	0. 75	18. 00
24 man hours	-----	0. 50	12. 00
(e) <i>Excavation and Backfill for Line Trench.</i>			
16 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	24. 00
24 man hours	-----	1. 00	24. 00
24 man hours	-----	0. 65	15. 60
48 man hours	-----	0. 50	24. 00
(f) <i>Splicing and Laying Underground Cable.</i>			
16 man hours	-----	@ \$1. 50	24. 00
32 man hours	-----	1. 00	32. 00
32 man hours	-----	0. 75	24. 00
64 man hours	-----	0. 50	32. 00
Total Cost of Day Labor			461. 60
3. <i>Plant Operation.</i>			
(a) <i>Plant Rental.</i>			
Flatrack Truck	-----	2 da. @ \$18. 50	37. 00
Truck Crane	-----	2 da. @ 42. 80	84. 60
Pick-up Truck	-----	10 da. @ 3. 15	31. 50
Ditching Machine	-----	2 da. @ 25. 00	50. 00
Bulldozer	-----	1 da. @ 25. 00	25. 00
			288. 10
(b) <i>Gas, Oil, and Miscellaneous Supplies</i>			50. 00
Total Plant Operation Cost			278. 10
4. <i>Total Plant Operation Cost of Job.</i>			
Cost of Material			1, 675. 00
Cost of Day Labor			461. 60
Cost of Plant Operation			278. 10
Mobilization & Demobilization			50. 00
Total Cost of Job to Contractor			2, 464. 70

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. <i>Total Cost of Job:</i>			
(a) <i>Direct Cost:</i>			
Total Cost to Contractor	-----	\$2, 464. 70	
Contingencies—10%	-----	246. 47	
Total Direct Cost	-----	2, 711. 17	
(b) <i>Indirect Cost:</i>			
Survey, Insp., and Engr.—8%	-----	\$197. 18	
Total Indirect Cost	-----	197. 18	
Total Field Cost of Job	-----	2, 908. 35	
General Office Overhead—8%	-----	197. 18	
Grand Total Cost to Government	-----	3, 105. 53	

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 15, 1941,

JOB ORDER NO. 7.0 (Revised)

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Construct Ten Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines.
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2019.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete ten (10) Igloo Type Reinforced concrete magazines (26' x 6' x 40'-4", inside dimensions) together with a barricade for each structure.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As shown in paragraph 104 of Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng 716.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$113,815.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 1, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: November 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: 52,570 Man Hours.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: Mixer, trucks, power shovel, pile driving equipment, hand tools.
13. MATERIALS: Building materials, Fuel, Oil Supplies.
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Second Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised)

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete Ten Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickam Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete ten (10) Igloo Type reinforced concrete magazines, (26'-6" x 40'-4" inside dimensions), together with a barricade for each structure. All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with, "Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 7.0", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the specifications.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$113,815.00.

Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised) supplants Job Order No. 7.0 dated April 25, 1941.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor.....	\$113, 815. 00
Contingencies—10%	11, 381. 50
Total Direct Cost.....	125, 196. 50

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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$9,105.20	
Total Indirect Cost-----		\$9,105.20
 Total Field Cost-----		 134,301.70
General Office Overhead-----		9,105.20
 Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----		 143,406.90

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
*District Engineer.

APRIL 18, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Rev.)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Rev.), (Construct ten (10) Igloo type reinforced concrete magazines) suspends work on Igloo No. 8 of Job Order No. 7.0 (Rev.).

Suspension Requested By: 1st Indorsement Department Engineer to G-4 dated April 3, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

/s/ JOHN C. MEADOWS,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

MAY 12, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 3

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 3 to accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised) (Construct 10 Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines, Hickam Field) authorizes additional electrical distribution work necessary to serve all igloo type magazines at Hickam Field.

Office File Reference: Serial No. 4639.

Work Requested By: Department Engineer by letter from Area Engineer, Second Field Area, dated May 5, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

[S] JOHN C. MEADOWS,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

DECEMBER 4, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 4

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Rev.)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 4 to accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised) (Construct 10 Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines—Hickam Field) cancels work author-

ized by Addendum No. 3 to Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised), with the exception of grading work, which will be completed.

Office File Reference FA2-57.

Cancellation Requested by: Area Engineer, Second Field Area. In Inter-Office Memo. dated 11/12/42.

For the District Engineer:

[S] JOSEPH MATSON, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant.

DECEMBER 7, 1942

ADDENDUM NO. 4 (REVISED)

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 4 (Revised) to accompany Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised), (Construction of 10 Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines—Hickam Field) cancels work authorized by Addendum No. 3 to Job Order No. 7.0 (Revised).

Office File Reference: FA-2-57.

Cancellation Requested by: Area Engineer, Second Field Area. In Inter-Office Memo. dated November 12, 1942.

For the District Engineer:

[S] JOSEPH MATSON, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H. June 16, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 7.1.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Access Road—Bomb Storage Magazines
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2019
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete the Access Road to Bomb Storage Magazines.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawainian Department
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Drawings, File No. F-23/19 to F-23/36 inclusive.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng 716
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$30,200.00
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 14, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: August 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed estimate to be Furnished Later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " " " "
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Second Field Area

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

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ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.1

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete the Access Road to Bomb Storage Magazines.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickam Field on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific item:

1. Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and complete the Access Road to Bomb Storage Magazines, in accordance with, "Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 7.1", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total Cost of the Work to be done shall not exceed \$30,200.00.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$30,200.00
Contingencies—10%-----	3,030.00
Total Direct Cost-----	33,220.00

(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering, (8% of Total Cost to Contractor)-----	\$2,416.00
Total Indirect Cost-----	2,416.00

Total Field Cost-----	35,636.00
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General Office Overhead (8% of Total Cost to Contractor)-----	2,416.00
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Estimated total cost to the government-----	38,052.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., December 1, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 7.1 (Revised)

Contract W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. **PROJECT TITLE:** Access Road—Bomb Storage Magazines
2. **LOCATION:** Hickman Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. **OFFICE FILE REFERENCE:** ND-611 Hickman-ND-633
4. **WORK TO BE DONE:** Construct and complete the access road to bomb storage magazines.
5. **WORK REQUESTED BY:** Commanding General—Hawaiian Department
6. **DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES:** Drawing as enumerated in Specifications to accompany Job Order 7.1 (Revised.)
7. **APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE:** Eng. 716
8. **ESTIMATED COST:** \$59,524.00
9. **COMMENCEMENT DATE:** June 14, 1941
10. **ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION:** December 15, 1941

11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.
 12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " "
 13. MATERIALS: " " " "
 14. SUPERVISION BY: Area Engineer, Second Field Area

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN JR.,
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.1 (Revised)

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Access Road—Bomb Storage Magazines.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickam Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete the access road to bomb storage magazines, in accordance with "Specifications to accompany Job Order No. 7.1 Revised," and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN JR.,
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Hickam Field bomb storage magazine access road

1. *Materials:*

	No. of Units	Unit	Unit Cost	Amount
1. Concrete (Ready Mix)	20	Cu. Yd.	\$9.75	\$195.00
2. Reinforcing Steel (½" & ¾")	3135	Lb.	0.0292	92.00
3. Rock (in Place)	3020	Cu. Yd.	3.00	9,060.00
4. Asphaltic Cement (in place)	3825	Tons	7.60	29,070.00
5. 18" Reinforced Concrete Pipe	104	Lin. Ft.	1.80	187.00
6. Collars for R. C. Pipe	11	Ea.	1.71	19.00
7. Lumber—2" x 6" (Header Boards)	27.42	M. B. M.	47.50	1,302.00
8. Stakes—2" x 3" x 18"	5480	Ea.	0.05	274.00
9. Plywood (Forms)	380	Sq. Ft.	0.095	36.00
10. Lumber (Forms)	57	M. B. M.	47.50	27.00
11. Nails (16d, 8d & 6d)	4	Keg	6.70	27.00
12. Wire—#14 Ga. Black	35	Lb.	0.08	3.00
13. Miscellaneous Supplies				100.00
Total Material				\$40,392.00

2. *Labor:*

A. Placing Fill:

512 Man Hours @ \$1.50 Per Hour	\$ 768.00
256 " " " 1.25 " "	320.00
96 " " " 1.10 " "	106.00
112 " " " 1.00 " "	112.00
1536 " " " 0.95 " "	1,459.00
208 " " " 0.90 " "	187.00
256 " " " 0.65 " "	166.00
256 " " " 0.50 " "	128.00

Total

\$3,246.00

B. Finishing Base Course:

20 Man Hours @ \$1.50 Per Hour	\$ 30.00
56 " " " 1.10 " "	62.00
40 " " " 1.00 " "	40.00

Total

132.00

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C. Setting Header Boards:

28 Man Hours @ \$1. 50 Per Hour	\$ 42. 00
224 " " " 1. 25 " "	280. 00
112 " " " 0. 50 " "	56. 00

Total----- \$378. 00

D. Framing & Placing Reinforced Concrete:

24 Man Hours @ \$1. 50 Per Hour	\$ 36. 00
24 " " " 1. 30 " "	31. 00
24 " " " 0. 625 " "	15. 00
106 " " " 0. 50 " "	53. 00

Total----- 135. 00

E. Excavation (Hand—125 Cu. Yds.):

16 Man Hours @ \$1. 50 Per Hour	\$ 24. 00
128 " " " 0. 50 " "	64. 00

Total----- 88. 00

F. Placing Concrete Pipe (104 Ft.):

6 Man Hours @ \$1. 50 Per Hour	\$ 9. 00
8 " " " 0. 95 " "	8. 00
6 " " " 0. 75 " "	5. 00
60 " " " 0. 50 " "	30. 00

Total----- 52. 00

G. Maintenance, Watchmen, Etc.:

128 Man Hours @ \$1. 30 Per Hour	\$ 166. 00
128 " " " 0. 90 " "	115. 00
432 " " " 0. 50 " "	216. 00

Total----- 497. 00

H. Handling and Hauling:

8 Man Hours @ \$1. 50 Per Hour	\$ 12. 00
16 " " " 0. 95 " "	15. 00
128 " " " 0. 50 " "	64. 00

Total----- 91. 00

Total Labor----- 4, 619. 00

3. Plant Rental:

A. 1-1½ Cu. Yd. Shovel	19 Days @ \$90. 00	1, 710. 00
6-5 Cu. Yd. Trucks	" " " 20. 36 Ea.	2, 314. 00
1-Cat Dozer	" " " "	809. 00
1-12 Ton Roller	15 " " "	306. 00
1-Road Maintainer	" " " "	425. 00
1-Water Tank with Truck	" " " "	225. 00
1-Truck with Derrick	1 " " "	38. 00
1-5 Ton Flat Truck	2 " " "	26. 00
1-¾ Ton Pick Up	33 " " "	139. 00
1-Sedan	" " " "	183. 00
1-Welding Outfit	19 " " "	43. 00
Miscellaneous Small Tools		100. 00
B. Gas—Diesel Oil—Lubricants		885. 00

Total cost to the contractor----- 7, 203. 00

4. Total Operation Cost:

Total Cost of Labor	4, 619. 00
Total Cost of Materials	40, 392. 00
Total Cost of Plant	7, 203. 00
Contractors Field & Office Overhead	2, 089. 00
Mobilization & Demobilization	5, 221. 00

Total cost to the contractor----- 59, 524. 00

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

*Recapitulation of estimated cost*1. *Total Cost of Work:*(a) *Direct Cost:*

Total Cost to the Contractor.....	\$59,524.00
Insurance, Taxes, Compensation & Fixed Fee.....	2,380.96

Total Direct Cost.....	61,904.96
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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Inspection and Supervision.....	\$3,095.25
Surveys.....	3,095.25
Overhead—Field.....	1,857.15
Auditing & General Administrative.....	619.05

Total Indirect Cost.....	8,666.70
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Total Field Cost.....	70,571.66
Overhead—District & Division.....	4,234.30

Estimated Total Cost to the Government.....	74,805.96
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

NOVEMBER 5, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.1 (Rev.)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to above Job Order (Access Road to Magazines, Hickam Field), eliminates the asphalt concrete paving of access road from Job Order No. 7.1, effective above date.

Work requested by the Area Engineer, Second Field Area, 1st, Ind. 10/28/42.
Approved by: Dist. Engr.—Operations Officer.

For the District Engineer:

/s/ JOSEPH MATSON, JR.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., June 16, 1941.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

Job Order No. 7.2.

To: Hawaiian Constructors—Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Railroad—Bomb Storage Magazines.
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2019
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete Railroad to Bomb Storage Magazines at Hickam Field.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Drawings, F-23/19 to F-23/36 Inclusive.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 716
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$16,700.00
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 14, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: August 1, 1941.

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11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
13. MATERIALS: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
14. SUPERVISION BY: The area Engineer, Second Field Area.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

Distribution:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., November 26, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 7.2 (REVISED).
Contract W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Railroad—Bomb Storage Magazines
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: ND 617—Ry. Hickam
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete railroad to Bomb Storage Magazines at Hickam Field.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Access Railroad and Highway, F-29/62 and other drawings enumerated in the Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 716.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$60,542.61.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 14, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: December 15, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See detailed estimate attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " "
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer—Second Field Area.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.2 (Revised)

Contract W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Railroad—Bomb Storage Magazines
DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickham Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete a railroad to the Bomb Storage Magazines, in accordance with the Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 7.2 (REVISED) and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

*Hickam Field access railroad to bomb storage***1. Material:**

	Unit	No. of Units	U. cost	Amount
1. 60 lb. Rail-Stand, A. S. C. E. Punched.....	Tons.....	157.13	\$33.33	\$5,237.14
2. #9 Turnout Complete.....	Each.....	1	277.75	277.75
3. Angle Bars.....	Pairs.....	694	1.94	1,346.36
4. 3/4" x 4 3/4" Track Bolts & Nuts.....	Kegs.....	11	13.90	152.90
5. 3/4" x 5 1/4" Track Spikes.....	".....	91	7.78	707.98
6. 60 Lb. Guard Rails—Std. Punching.....	Tons.....	53.58	33.33	1,785.92
7. Verona lock washers.....	Each.....	6470	.01678	108.67
8. Tie Plates—66" x 8"—60#—4 hole.....	".....	12118	.25	3,029.50
9. Rail Braces.....	".....	25	.55	13.75
10. 3/4" x 6" Bolts with Hex. Nuts.....	".....	3590	.099	355.41
11. Pipe—1 1/4" D. S.—3 1/4" long O. D.:1.66".....	".....	3590	.25	897.50
12. 6" x 8" x 6"—9" Cross Ties—Untreated.....	".....	4345	1.12	4,866.40
13. Switch Ties—6" x 8" x 6"—6".....	".....	10	1.24	12.40
14. " " " " " 7'-0" ".....	".....	5	1.33	6.65
15. " " " " " 6" ".....	".....	4	1.43	5.72
16. " " " " " 5'-0" ".....	".....	3	1.62	4.86
17. " " " " " 6" ".....	".....	3	1.62	4.86
18. " " " " " 9'-0" ".....	".....	3	1.71	5.13
19. " " " " " 6" ".....	".....	3	1.80	5.40
20. " " " " " 10'-0" ".....	".....	3	1.90	5.70
21. " " " " " 14'-0" ".....	".....	2	2.66	5.32
22. Crushed Rock Ballast.....	Cu. Yds.....	6140	2.55	15,657.00
23. 18" Reinf. Concrete Pipe.....	Lin. ft.....	48	1.80	86.40
24. Collars for 18" Reinf. Concrete Pipe.....	Each.....	6	1.90	9.50
25. Reinforcing Steel.....	Lbs.....	464	.03	13.92
26. Lumber.....	MBM.....	.2	47.50	9.50
27. 3/4" Plywood.....	Sq. Ft.....	128	.125	16.00
28. Ready-Mix Concrete.....	Cu. Yds.....	2	8.50	17.00
Miscellaneous Material.....	Lump.....			200.00
Total cost of material.....				\$34,844.14

2. Day Labor:**(a) Clearing Site:**

6 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	\$9.00
6 " " " .75.....	4.50
48 " " " .50.....	24.00

(b) Excavation & Embankment:

40 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	60.00
24 " " " 1.25.....	30.00
192 " " " .50.....	96.00

(c) Handling & Hauling & Distributing:

112 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	168.00
64 " " " 1.25.....	80.00
400 " " " 1.00.....	400.00
576 " " " .50.....	288.00

(d) Laying Track (7882 Lin. ft.):

392 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	588.00
9936 " " " .50.....	4,968.00

(e) Installing Guard Rail (5358'):

240 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	360.00
300 " " " 1.37 1/2.....	412.50
300 " " " .90.....	270.00
2400 " " " .50.....	1,200.00
180 " " " .65.....	117.00

(f) Ballasting & Surfacing:

400 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	600.00
10960 " " " .50.....	5,480.00

(g) Reconstruction of Pres. Track:

56 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	84.00
1304 " " " .50.....	652.00

(h) Installing Turnout:

24 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	36.00
224 " " " .50.....	112.00

(i) Installing 18" Concrete Pipe:

8 Man Hours @ \$1.50.....	12.00
8 " " " 1.25.....	10.00
80 " " " .50.....	40.00

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(j) <i>Building Concrete Culverts (2 Cu. Yds. Concrete):</i>			
16 Man Hours @ \$1.50			\$24. 00
10 " " 1.30			13. 00
20 " " 1.25			25. 00
8 " " .50			4. 00
(k) <i>Maintenance, Clerks, Watchmen, Etc. (2 Months):</i>			
208 Man Hours @ \$1.50			312. 00
594 " " 1.00			594. 00
832 " " .75			624. 00
1024 " " .50			512. 00
Total Cost of Day Labor			18, 269. 00

3. Plant Operation:

(a) <i>Rental of Equipment:</i>			
Carryall & Tractor	2 days @	\$40. 00	\$80. 00
Bulldozer	3 " "	28. 40	85. 00
Gasoline Locomotive	2 Mos. "	45. 00	90. 00
Hand Car	2 " "	16. 00	32. 00
Auto Crane	8 days "	42. 80	342. 40
(2) R. R. Dump Cars	1 Mo. "	90. 00	90. 00
(1) Ford Sedan	2 Mos. "	110. 00	220. 00
(1) ¾-Ton Pickup	2 " "	83. 00	166. 00
Misceallaneous Tools & Equipment			500. 00
			1, 605. 60
(b) Fuel, Oil, Ec			200. 00
(c) Rental on R. R. Cars			120. 00
Total Plant Operation			1, 925. 60

4. Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:

(1) Cost of Material	34, 844. 14
(2) Cost of Labor	18, 269. 00
(3) Cost of Plant Operation	1, 925. 60
(4) Mobilization & Demobilization	5, 503. 87
Total Cost to the Contractor	60, 542. 61

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimated Cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) <i>Direct Cost:</i>	
Total Cost to the Contractor	\$60, 542. 61
Ins., Taxes, Compensation, Fixed-Fee	2, 421. 70
Total Direct Cost	62, 964. 31
(b) <i>Indirect Cost:</i>	
Inspection & Supervision	\$3, 148. 22
Surveys	3, 148. 22
Overhead—Field	1, 888. 93
Auditing & General Admin	629. 64
Total Indirect Cost	8, 815. 01
Total Field Cost	71, 779. 32
Overhead—District & Division	4, 306. 76
Estimated Total Cost to the Government	76, 086. 08

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

FEBRUARY 12, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.2 (Rev.)

Contract W-414-eng-602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to Accompany Job Order No. 7.2 (Rev.) (Access Railroad to Magazines) authorizes the rehabilitation of all tracks serving the Hickam Field Bomb Storage Area, in accordance with instructions furnished the Area Engineer.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

APRIL 20, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.2 (REV)

Contract W-414-Eng-602

OFFICE OF DEPARTMENT ENGINEER, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2 to accompany Job Order No. 7.2 (REV) (Railroad—Bomb Storage Magazines) cancels Addendum No. 1 (Rehabilitation of all tracks serving the Hickam Field Bomb Storage Area).

Office File Reference: Serial No. 3963.

Cancellation Requested By: Department Engineer by letter from the Area Engineer dated April 14, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

/s/ JOHN C. MEADOWS,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 15, 1941.

JOB ORDER No. 7.3.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Construct and Complete Four (4) Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines, three (3) P. O. No. 46 Magazines, one (1) P. O. No. 42 Magazine, and one (1) Black Powder No. 45 Magazine.
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2019.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete four (4) Igloo Type reinforced concrete magazines; three (3) P. O. No. 46 magazines; one (1) P. O. No. 42 magazine, and one (1) Black Powder No. 45 magazine, together with necessary barricades.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: To be furnished later.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng 716.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$100,000.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: August 16, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: December 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: Detailed estimated to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.

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13. **MATERIALS:** Detailed estimate to be furnished later.

14. **SUPERVISION BY:** The Area Engineer, Second Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved: August 28, 1941.

/s/ WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineers.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.3

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete four (4) Igloo Type reinforced concrete magazines; three (3) P. O. No. 46 magazines; one (1) P. O. No. 42 magazine, and one (1) Black Powder No. 45 magazine, together with necessary barricades.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickam Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and complete the following structures, in accordance with the Specifications, "To Accompany Job Order No. 7.3", and the details shown on drawings enumerated in the Specifications:

- (a) Four (4) Igloo Type Reinforced Concrete Magazines.
- (b) Three (3) P. O. No. 46 Magazines.
- (c) One (1) P. O. No. 42 Magazine.
- (d) One (1) Black Powder Magazine.
- (e) Necessary barricades for the Magazines.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$100,000.00.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor.....	\$100,000.00
Contingencies—10%	10,000.00

Total Direct Cost.....	110,000.00
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering.....	\$8,000.00
Total Indirect Cost.....	8,000.00

Total Field Cost.....	118,000.00
General Office Overhead.....	8,000.00

Estimated Total Cost to the Government.....	128,000.00
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JOB 4-21

APRIL 18, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.3

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 7.3, (Construct four (4) Igloo Type reinforced Concrete Magazines; three (3) P. O. No. 46 Magazines; one (1) P. O. No. 42 Magazine and one (1) Black Powder No. 45 Magazine together with necessary barricades (suspends work on all Igloos and Magazines authorized by the Job Order No. 7.3 except Igloo No. 11.)

Suspension Requested By: 1st Indorsement Department Engineer to G-4 dated April 3, 1942.

For the Department Engineer.

/s/ JOHN C. MEADOWS,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 15, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 7.4.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Construct and install approximately 3410 lineal feet of Manproof Wire fence, and relocate approximately 2075 lineal feet of existing Manproof Fence.
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: ND 654.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and install approximately 3410 lineal feet of Manproof wire fence and relocate approximately 2075 lineal feet of existing Manproof fence.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: To be furnished later.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 716.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$7,872.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: August 16, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: October 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT STATION: Detailed estimate to be furnished later.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: " " " " " "
13. MATERIALS: " " " " " "
14. SUPERVISION BY: The Area Engineer, Second Field Area.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineers.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 7.4

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and install approximately 3410 lineal feet of manproof wire fence, and relocate approximately 2075 lineal feet of existing manproof fence.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickam Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific items:

1. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to construct and install approximately 3410 lineal feet of manproof wire fence.

2702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2. Furnish all labor and equipment and perform all work necessary to relocate approximately 2075 lineal feet of existing manproof fence.

All of the work to be done shall be in accordance with the "Specifications to Accompany Job Order No. 7.4", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the Specifications.

The total cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$7,872.00.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to the Contractor-----	\$7,872.00
Contingencies—10%-----	787.20

Total Direct Cost-----	8,659.20
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(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engineering-----	\$629.76
Total Indirect Cost-----	629.76

Total Field Cost-----	9,288.96
General Office Overhead-----	629.76

Estimated Total Cost to the Government-----	9,918.72
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 41

Summary

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., March 15, 1941.

Contract No. W414-eng-602

Punchbowl, Oahu T. H.

Job Order #14.0.

Construct—reinforced concrete fire control station at Punchbowl.

Est. Cost: \$3,650.00.

Commencement Date: March 10, 1941.

Est. date for completion: April 10, 1941.

Supervision by J. J. Kestly, Area Engr., 3rd Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., Mar. 15, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 14.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

Tuo: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Fire Control Station at Punchbowl.
2. LOCATION: Honolulu, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2013.4 F.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete reinforced concrete fire control station at Punchbowl.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: See paragraph 1-03 Specifications.

7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: C. A. C. 131 P 90 A 1210-N.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$3,650.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: March 10, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: April 10, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: 1840 man hours.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.
13. MATERIALS: See detailed estimate attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: J. J. Kestly, Area Engineer, 3rd Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers
District Engineer.

Approved: April 3, 1941.

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 14.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: Fire Control Station, Punchbowl, Oahu, T. H.
DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done is at Punchbowl on the Island of Oahu, and includes the furnishing of all necessary labor and equipment and the performing of all work necessary to construct a reinforced concrete fire control station, complete with all utilities and fixtures, all of the work to be done shall conform to the provisions of specification, "The Construction of a Fire Control Station, Punchbowl, and appurtenant work to accompany Job Order No. 14.0 to Contract No. W-414-eng-602", and the details shown on the following drawings:

Sheet No.	Description	File No.
1	Project Location and Index to Drawings.....	F-3/39
2	Detailed Location of Work and Typical Sections.....	F-3/40
3	Instrument Bldg.—Plan, Details, and Bar Schedule.....	F-3/41
4	Miscellaneous Metal—Standard Details.....	F-3/42

The estimated cost of the work to be done is as follows:

1. Materials to be furnished:

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit cost	Amount
1	Cement (From Base Yard Delivered).....	45	bbls.	\$3.04	\$136.80
2	Coarse Aggregate (Local Delivered).....	30	cu. yd.	3.00	90.00
3	Fine Aggregate (Local Delivered).....	15	cu. yd.	2.70	40.50
4	Reinf. Steel (From Base Yard Delivered).....	3,860	lbs.	0.045	173.25
5	Structural Steel (Local Delivered).....	1,640	lbs.	0.10	164.00
6	Lumber (From Base Yard Delivered).....	4,300	b. f.	45.00M	193.50
7	Hardware & Electrical Fixtures (lump sum) (Local at Honolulu).....				50.00
8	Paint (Local at Honolulu).....	1	gal.	2.75	2.75
9	Nails (Local at Honolulu).....	100	lbs.	0.08	8.00
10	Dynamite (From 1st F. A. Magazine).....	200	lbs.	0.125	25.00
	Total Cost of Materials.....				883.80

2. Day Labor:

(a) Clearing Site:

8 man hours..... @ \$1.50 \$12.00
24 man hours..... @ 0.50 12.00

(b) Excavating for Instrument House:

18 man hours..... @ 1.50 24.00
48 man hours..... @ 0.65 31.20
480 man hours..... @ 0.50 240.00

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(c) <i>Placing Concrete and Steel Instrument House:</i>			
16 man hours	----- @ \$1. 50		\$24. 00
32 man hours	----- @ 1. 00		32. 00
32 man hours	----- @ 0. 65		20. 80
160 man hours	----- @ 0. 50		80. 00
(d) <i>Placing Structural Steel and Shutters:</i>			
24 man hours	----- @ 1. 50		36. 00
40 man hours	----- @ 1. 00		40. 00
24 man hours	----- @ 0. 65		15. 60
100 man hours	----- @ 0. 50		50. 00
(e) <i>Backfilling Structure:</i>			
16 man hours	----- @ 1. 50		24. 00
24 man hours	----- @ 1. 00		24. 00
240 man hours	----- @ 0. 50		120. 00
(f) <i>Drilling and Blasting for Excavation:</i>			
20 man hours	----- @ 1. 50		30. 00
80 man hours	----- @ 0. 75		60. 00
80 man hours	----- @ 0. 50		40. 00
(g) <i>Operators of Rented Plant:</i>			
120 man hours	----- @ 1. 00		120. 00
224 man hours	----- @ 0. 75		168. 00
Total Cost of Day Labor			<u>1,203. 60</u>
3. <i>Plant Operation:</i>			
(a) <i>Plant to be Leased:</i>			
1 Concrete Mixer— $\frac{1}{4}$ cu. yd	6 da. @ 2. 50		15. 00
2 Jackhammers	6 da. @ 1. 50		18. 00
1 Compressor #210	6 da. @ 10. 00		60. 00
1 Truck— $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton	21 da. @ 5. 00		105. 00
Total Plant to be leased			<u>198. 00</u>
(b) Fuel, Oil, Hand Tools, Supplies (lump sum)			<u>150. 00</u>
Total Plant Operation Cost			<u>348. 00</u>
4. <i>Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:</i>			
Cost of Materials		\$883. 80	
Cost of Day Labor		1,203. 60	
Cost of Plant Operations		348. 00	
Total Plant Operation Cost			<u>2,435. 40</u>
5. <i>Total Cost of Work:</i>			
(a) <i>Direct Cost:</i>			
(a) Total Plant Operation Cost			2,435. 40
Contingencies—15%			<u>365. 31</u>
Total Direct Cost			<u>2,800. 71</u>
(b) <i>Indirect Cost:</i>			
Mobilization and Demobilization		\$300. 00	
Engr. Inspection and Supervision—10%		280. 00	
Total Indirect Cost			<u>580. 00</u>
Total Field Cost			<u>3,380. 71</u>
General Office Overhead—8%			<u>269. 29</u>
Estimated Grand Total Cost by Hired Labor and Govern- ment Plant			<u>3,650. 00</u>

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

UNSKILLED LABOR

Class 1—\$0.50 per hour.
Shovelers
Material Handlers
Water Boy

SEMI-SKILLED LABOR

Class 2—\$0.65 per hour.
Carpenter Helpers
Class 3—\$0.75 per hour.
Truck Drivers
Jackhammer man
Powder man

SKILLED LABOR

Class 4—\$1.00 per hour.
Carpenters
Cement Finishers
Class 5—\$1.50 per hour.
General Foreman

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4J

Summary
CBR/dw

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., March 18, 1941.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

Diamond Head, Oahu, T. H.
Job Order No. 15.0.
Construct—reinforced concrete fire control station, together with necessary access trail.
Est. Cost: \$5,785.00.
Commencement Date: March 22, 1941.
Est. Date for Completion: April 22, 1941.
Supervision by J. J. Kestley, Area Engr., 3rd Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., March 18, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 15.0.
Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Fire Control Station at Diamond Head.
2. LOCATION: Honolulu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2013.3.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete reinforced concrete fire control station, together with necessary access trail.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: See paragraph 1-04 of Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: CAC 131 p99 A-1210-N.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$5,785.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: March 22, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: April 22, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: 2,910 man hours.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.
13. MATERIALS: See detailed estimate attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: J. J. KESTLEY, Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved: April 3, 1941.

(Signed) Warren T. Hannum,
WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer

2706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 15.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: Fire Control Station Diamond Head.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done is at Diamond Head, on the Island of Oahu, and includes the furnishing of all necessary labor, materials, equipment and supplies, and the performing of all work necessary to construct a reinforced concrete fire control station, complete with all utilities and fixtures, together with the construction of an access trail. All of the work to be done shall conform to the provisions of Specifications, "The Construction of a Fire Control Station at Diamond Head and Appurtenant Work to Accompany Job Order No. 15.0 to Contract No. W-414-eng-602," and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in paragraph 1-03 of the Specifications. The estimated cost of the work to be done is as follows:

1. Materials to be purchased:

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit prices	Amount
1	Reinforcing steel.....	3,340	lbs.....	\$0.045	\$150.30
2	Cement.....	45	bbls.....	3.04	136.80
3	Fine Aggregate.....	20	cu. yd.....	2.70	54.00
4	Coarse Aggregate.....	21	cu. yd.....	3.00	63.00
5	Structural Steel.....	1,648	lbs.....	0.10	164.80
6	3/4" Ø x 8" Anchor bolts.....	8	pcs.....	0.12	0.96
7	1/2" Ø x 8" Galv. bolts.....	6	pcs.....	0.09	0.54
8	2" Galv. pipe.....	6	ft.....	0.23	1.38
9	2" Pipe caps.....	2	pcs.....	0.26	0.52
10	3/4" Conduits.....	2	ft.....	0.10	0.20
11	3" Rock.....	7	cu. yd.....	3.00	21.00
12	Form lumber.....	3,750	b. m.....	55.00M	206.25
13	Electrical Fixtures, etc.....		lump sum.....		75.00
14	Paint.....	1	gal.....	2.75	2.75
15	Nails.....	200	lbs.....	0.065	13.00
16	Curing Compound.....	4	gal.....	0.52	2.00
17	6' x 6'—#10 Ga. Wire Mesh.....	288	sq. ft.....	0.014	4.03
18	#10 Ga. Wire.....	88	lbs.....	0.10	8.80
19	#14 Ga. Wire.....	37	lbs.....	0.10	3.70
20	Dynamite.....	200	lbs.....	0.125	25.00
	Total Cost of Material.....				934.11

2. Day Labor:

(a) Handling and Hauling:

48 man hours.....	@	\$1.50	\$72.00
48 man hours.....	@	1.00	48.00
16 man hours.....	@	.75	12.00
16 man hours.....	@	.65	10.40
1,024 man hours.....	@	.50	512.00

(b) Excavation for Structures:

48 man hours.....	@	1.50	72.00
96 man hours.....	@	.75	72.00
480 man hours.....	@	.50	240.00

(c) Grubbing, Excavation for Trail:

24 man hours.....	@	1.50	36.00
48 man hours.....	@	1.00	48.00
144 man hours.....	@	.50	72.00

(d) Concrete Forms and Stripping:

32 man hours.....	@	1.50	48.00
80 man hours.....	@	1.00	80.00
80 man hours.....	@	.65	52.00

(e) Placing Reinforcing Steel:

14 man hours.....	@	1.50	21.00
48 man hours.....	@	1.00	48.00
48 man hours.....	@	.75	36.00

(f) <i>Mixing, Placing, and Curing Concrete:</i>			
32 man hours	----- @	\$1.50	\$48.00
32 man hours	----- "	1.00	32.00
160 man hours	----- "	.50	80.00
(g) <i>Backfill for Structure:</i>			
16 man hours	----- @	1.50	24.00
240 man hours	----- "	.50	120.00
(h) <i>Erecting Shutters and Door:</i>			
24 man hours	----- @	1.50	36.00
24 man hours	----- "	1.25	30.00
24 man hours	----- @	.70	16.80
(i) <i>Cleaning and Painting.</i>			
16 man hours	----- @	1.00	16.00
(j) <i>Electrical Installation.</i>			
24 man hours	----- @	1.00	24.00
24 man hours	----- @	.65	15.60

Total Day Labor Cost----- 1,921.80

3. *Plant Operation:*

(a) *Rental of Equipment.*

1—5-ton truck, dump	----- 2 da. @	\$11.00	22.00
1—2-ton truck	----- 2 da. @	5.20	10.40
2—Jackhammers—Barco Gasoline	----- 10 da. @	2.50	50.00
6—Pack Mules	----- 16 da. @	5.00	480.00
2—Automobiles	----- 30 da. @	5.00	300.00
1— $\frac{3}{4}$ " ϕ Rubber hose	----- 250 ft.		27.50
Small Tools and Equipment—Lump Sum	-----		100.00

Total Plant Rental Cost----- 989.90

(b) Fuel, Oil Forage, Supplies----- 150.00

Total Plant Operation Cost----- 1,139.90

4. *Total Plant Operation Cost to Job:*

Cost of Material	-----	934.11
Cost of Day Labor	-----	1,921.80
Cost of Plant Rental	-----	1,139.90

Total Plant Operation Cost----- 3,995.81

5. *Total Cost of Work:*

(a) *Direct Cost.*

Total Plant Operation Cost	-----	3,995.81
Contingencies—15%	-----	599.37

Total Direct Cost----- 4,595.18

(b) *Indirect Cost.*

Mobilization and Demobilization	-----	\$300.00
Surveys, Engr. and Insp. 10%	-----	459.52

Total Indirect Cost----- 759.52

Total Field Cost of Job----- 5,354.70

General Officer Overhead—8%----- 430.30

ESTIMATED GRAND TOTAL COST By

Hired Labor and Government Plant----- 5,785.00

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

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UNSKILLED LABOR

Class 1—\$0.50 per hour.
Shovelers
Material Handlers

SEMI-SKILLED LABOR

Class 2—\$0.65 per hour.
Carpenters' Helpers
Truck Driver—2 Ton
Riggers' Helpers
Class 3—\$0.70 per hour.
Structural Steel Helper.
Class 4—\$0.75 per hour.
Jackhammer man
Truck Drivers—5 Ton

SKILLED LABOR

Class 5—\$1.00 per hour.
Carpenters
Reinf. Rodsetters
Electricians
Painters
Mule Skinner
Cement Finishers
Riggers
Class 6—\$1.25 per hour.
Structural Iron Worker
Class 7—\$1.50 per hour.
General Foreman.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 4K

Summary

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE.
Honolulu, T. H., March 22, 1941.

Contract W414-eng-602

Kawailoa Camp, Oahu, T. H.
Job Order #13.0

Construct and equip a reinforced concrete powerhouse and a reinforced concrete fire control station complete with all utilities and fixtures.

Est Cost: \$13,285.00.

Commencement Date: March 15, 1941.

Est date for completion: April 20, 1941.

Supervision by J. J. Kestly, Area Engr. 3rd Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., March 22, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 13.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Fire Control Station at Kawailoa Camp.
2. Location: Kawailoa Camp, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2013.2F.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and equip a reinforced concrete powerhouse, and a reinforced concrete fire control station complete with all utilities and fixtures.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: See paragraph 1-03, attached Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Seacoast Defenses, Insular Departments, 1941, CAC 126 P99 A1210-01.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$13,285.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: March 15, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: April 20, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: 3,446 man hours.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See detailed estimate attached.
13. MATERIALS: See detailed estimate attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: J. J. Kestly, Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved: Apr. 8, 1941.

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 13.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: Fire Control Station at Kawaiioa Camp, Oahu, T. H.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done is at Kawaiioa Camp on the Island of Oahu, and includes the furnishing of all necessary labor, and equipment, and the performing of all work necessary to construct and complete a reinforced concrete building for a power plant together with all electrical and mechanical equipment and all fixtures, and also a reinforced concrete fire control station complete with all utilities and fixtures. All of the work to be done shall conform to the provisions of Specification "Fire Control Station, Kawaiioa, and appurtenant work to accompany Job Order No. 13.0", and the details shown on the following drawings:

Sheet No.	Description	File No.
1.	Project Location and Index to Drawings.....	F-3/25
2.	Detailed Location of Work and Typical Sections.....	F-3/26
3.	Instrument Bldg.—Structural Details No. 1.....	F-3/27
4.	Instrument Bldg.—Structural Details No. 2.....	F-3/28
5.	Instrument Bldg.—Structural Details No. 3 and Bar Schedule No. 3.....	F-3/29
6.	Power Plant Bldg.—Plan Details and Bar Schedule.....	F-3/30
7.	Miscellaneous Metals—Standard Details—No. 1.....	F-3/31
8.	Miscellaneous Metals—Standard Details—No. 2.....	F-3/43

The estimated cost of the work to be done is as follows:

1. Materials to be furnished:

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit cost	Amount
1	Reinf. Steel (Del. from Base Yard).....	11,900	lbs.....	0.045	\$535.50
2	Structural Steel (Honolulu Purchase).....	6,000	lbs.....	0.10	600.00
3	Cement (From Base Yard).....	143	bbls.....	3.04	434.72
4	Fine Aggregate (Delivered).....	68	cu. yd.....	2.70	183.60
5	Coarse Aggregate (Delivered).....	67	cu. yd.....	3.00	201.00
6	Lumber (From Base Yard).....	19,650	b. f.....	45.00M	884.25
7	Nails (Delivered).....	800	lbs.....	0.08	61.00
8	Form Wire #11 (Delivered).....	530	lbs.....	0.05	26.50
9	Tie Wire #16 (Delivered).....	100	lbs.....	0.062	6.20
10	1" Black Pipe (Honolulu Purchase).....	3	ft.....	0.17	0.51
11	Metal Louvers (Honolulu Purchase).....	4	ea.....	7.00	28.00
12	Wire Mesh Reinforcement 6" x 6" (Hon. Pur.).....	1,100	sq. ft.....	0.015	16.50
13	2" Galv. Electrical Conduit (Hon. Pur.).....	22	lin. ft.....	0.26	5.72
14	2 1/4" Galv. Electrical Conduit (Hon. Pur.).....	4	lin. ft.....	0.35	1.40
15	Curing Compound for Concrete (Hon. Pur.).....	50	gal.....	0.52	26.00
16	Electrical Wiring & Fixtures (Lump Sum) (at Honolulu).....				175.00
17	3 KVA Generator Unit (at Honolulu).....				450.00
18	Paint (Local at Honolulu).....	2	gal.....	2.75	5.50
19	Hardware (lump sum) (Local at Honolulu).....				150.00
	Total Cost of Materials.....				3,794.40

2. Day Labor:

(a) Clearing and Grubbing Roadway:

24 man hours.....	@	\$1.50	\$36.00
24 man hours.....		1.00	24.00
64 man hours.....		0.75	48.00
128 man hours.....		0.50	64.00

(b) Clearing and Grubbing Building Sites:

16 man hours.....	@	1.50	24.00
8 man hours.....		1.00	8.00
96 man hours.....		0.50	48.00

(c) Excavation and Backfill—Buildings:

16 man hours.....	@	1.50	24.00
16 man hours.....		1.00	16.00
96 man hours.....		0.50	48.00

(d) Hauling and Handling Materials and Providing Transportation:

8 man hours.....	@	1.50	12.00
240 man hours.....		0.75	180.00
200 man hours.....		0.50	100.00

2710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

(e) <i>Concrete Forms—Framing, Erecting, Stripping:</i>			
160 man hours	----- @	\$1. 50	\$240. 00
480 man hours	-----	1. 00	480. 00
480 man hours	-----	0. 65	312. 00
(f) <i>Mixing, Placing, Finishing, Concrete:</i>			
66 man hours	----- @	1. 50	99. 00
74 man hours	-----	1. 00	74. 00
240 man hours	-----	0. 75	180. 00
438 man hours	-----	0. 50	219. 00
(g) <i>Placing Reinf. Steel in Buildings:</i>			
32 man hours	----- @	1. 50	48. 00
160 man hours	-----	0. 75	120. 00
(h) <i>Installing Doors and Shutters.</i>			
64 man hours	----- @	1. 50	96. 00
128 man hours	----- @	1. 00	128. 00
(i) <i>Electrical Installation.</i>			
32 man hours	----- @	1. 50	48. 00
80 man hours	----- @	1. 00	80. 00
80 man hours	----- @	0. 65	52. 00
Total Day Labor Cost			2, 908. 00
3 <i>Plant Operation:</i>			
(a) <i>Plant to be Leased.</i>			
1—Caterpillar dozer	8 da. @	\$22. 50	180. 00
1—Truck—3 ton	30 da. @	10. 00	300. 00
1—Concrete Mixer— $\frac{1}{2}$ yd	30 da. @	3. 00	90. 00
1—2 Drum hoist	30 da. @	3. 50	105. 00
1—Water Wagon	8 da. @	2. 50	20. 00
1—Skip	30 da. @	0. 50	15. 00
1—Hopper	30 da. @	1. 00	30. 00
1—Compressor	30 da. @	10. 00	300. 00
Total Plant to be Leased			1, 040. 00
(b) <i>Fuel, Oil, Small Tools and Supplies</i>			400. 00
Total Plant Operation Cost			1, 440. 00
4. <i>Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:</i>			
Cost of Materials			\$3, 794. 00
Cost of Day Labor			2, 908. 00
Cost of Plant Rental			1, 440. 00
Total Plant Operation Cost			8, 142. 40
5. <i>Total Cost of Works:</i>			
(a) <i>Direct Cost:</i>			
Total Plant Operation Cost			8, 142. 40
Contingencies—15%			1, 221. 36
Total Direct Cost			9, 363. 76
(b) <i>Indirect Cost:</i>			
Mobilization and Demobilization			\$500. 00
Survey, Inspection, Supervision, 10%			936. 38
Right of Way			1, 500. 00
Total Indirect Cost			2, 936. 38
Total Field Cost to Job			12, 300. 14
General Office Overhead			984. 86
Estimate Grand Total Cost by Hired Labor and Govern- ment Plant			13, 265. 00

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

UNSKILLED LABOR

Class 1—\$0.50 per hour.

Shovelers
Concrete placers
Slopers—roadway
Material handlers
Water boy.

Class 2—\$0.65 per hour.

Carpenter's helper
Rigger's helper
Pipefitter's helper
Tractor operator's helper
Electrician's helper

SEMI-SKILLED LABOR

Class 3—\$0.75 per hour.

Truck Drivers
Steel Tiers

SKILLED LABOR

Class 4—\$1.00 per hour.

Carpenters
Tractor Operators
Cement Finisher
Electricians
Pipefitters

Class 5—\$1.50 per hour.

General Foreman.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4L

Summary
CBR/dw

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., April 30, 1941.

Contract No. W414-eng-602

Ft. Shafter, Oahu, T. H.
Job Order #17.0.

Construct—bombproof addition to radio transmitter station and appurtenant work.

Est. Cost: \$44,907.44 to Gov.

Commencement Date: May 1, 1941.

Est. date for completion: Aug. 1, 1941.

Supervision by J. J. Kestly, Area Engr., 3rd Field Area.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., April 30, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 17.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: The Construction of Bombproof Addition to Radio Transmitter Station at Fort Shafter.
2. LOCATION: Fort Shafter, Island of Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2017.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete bombproof addition to radio transmitter station, including connecting passageway between the existing structures and the new station.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: As enumerated in paragraph 1-04 of Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: 21X1204 Seacoast Defense General Eng. 305 P 13-32 A1204-N.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$35,640.82.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 1, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: August 1, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See Detailed Estimate Attached.

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12. **PLANT REQUIRED:** See Detailed Estimate Attached.
 13. **MATERIALS:** See Detailed Estimate Attached.
 14. **SUPERVISION BY:** J. J. Kestly, Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
 THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved:

WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 17.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

ESTIMATE OF COST: Construction of Bombproof Addition to Radio Transmitter
 • Station at Fort Shafter, T. H.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located on the Government Military Reservation at Fort Shafter, Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

(1) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and complete a bombproof addition to radio transmitter station, including connecting passageway between the existing structures and the new station, all in accordance with Specifications, "The Construction of Bombproof Addition to Radio Transmitter Station at Fort Shafter, T. H., to Accompany Job Order No. 17.0." and the details shown on drawings Numbers F-1/8 to F-1/10, inclusive, listed in paragraph 1-04 of the Specifications.

Unit costs are as follows:

COST TO CONTRACTOR

1. Material to be Furnished:

Item	Designation	Quantity	Unit	Unit price	Amount
1	Dynamite—40%.....	2,000	Lb.....	0.125	\$250.00
2	Elec. Caps #6—6' Lead.....	700	Only.....	0.083	58.10
3	Cement.....	645	Bbl.....	3.19	2,057.55
4	Sand.....	30	Cu. Yds.....	2.70	81.00
5	Fine Aggregate.....	270	".....	3.00	810.00
6	Coarse Aggregate.....	260	".....	3.00	780.00
7	1" x 4" T. & G. Flooring.....	3,800	B. M.....	55.00	209.00
8	1" x 6" T. & G. Sheeting.....	11,000	B. M.....	55.00	605.00
9	2" x 4" and 2" x 12" No. 1 Com.—S2E.....	8,100	B. M.....	46.63	377.70
10	4" x 4" and 4" x 6" No. 1 Com.....	5,100	B. M.....	46.63	237.81
11	Roofing Felt (90#).....	22,350	Sq. Ft.....	0.0165	368.78
12	Asphalt.....	8,400	Lb.....	0.0180	151.20
13	Form Oil.....	30	Gal.....	0.21	6.30
14	5/8" ϕ Reinforcing Steel.....	14,250	Lb.....	0.0275	391.88
15	#14 Ga. Wire.....	300	".....	0.052	15.60
16	Nails—20d, 16d, 10d, 6d, 4d.....	30	Kegs.....	6.60	198.00
17	1/2 x 5" Wide Mastic Joint Felt.....	345	Lin. Ft.....	0.175	60.38
18	#10 Ga. Galv. Wire Mesh 6" x 6".....	1,800	Sq. Ft.....	0.021	37.80
19	2—3' x 7' 1/2" Plate Doors & Frame.....	1,050	Lb.....	0.10	105.00
20	1/4" x 12" Checkered Plate—Cover Angles, etc.....	3,735	Lb.....	0.070	261.45
21	#26 Ga. Galv. Metal Air Duct.....	425	Lb.....	0.15	63.75
22	1/2" ϕ x 8" Anchor Bolts and "U" Stirrups.....	15	Only.....	0.45	6.75
23	#16 Ga. 1/4" Galv. Wire Mesh.....	4	Sq. Ft.....	0.48	1.92
24	1—Robertson Vent. Fan and Hood.....		Lump Sum.....		285.00
25	4" ϕ Concrete Drain-Pipe.....	240	Lin. Ft.....	0.225	54.00
26	Masonry Stone.....	29	Cu. Yd.....	3.00	87.00
27	2" ϕ Galv. W. L. Pipe (18" Cplng. & Plug).....	60	Lin. Ft.....	0.41	24.60
28	Electric Conduit, Wiring and Lighting.....		Lump Sum.....		475.00
29	Paint.....	1	Gal.....	2.75	2.75
30	2" ϕ W. L. Pipe and Fittings.....	1,000	Lin. Ft.....	0.4125	412.50
31	Miscellaneous Equipment.....				300.00
	Total cost of Materials.....				8,775.82

2. Day Labor:

(a) <i>Access Road:</i>			
16 Man Hours	----- @	\$1. 50	\$24. 00
16 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	16. 00
80 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	40. 00
(b) <i>Temporary Water Line Installed:</i>			
8 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	12. 00
48 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	24. 00
(c) <i>Handling and Hauling:</i>			
16 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	24. 00
16 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	16. 00
16 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	12. 00
160 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	80. 00
(d) <i>Excavation—Outside:</i>			
48 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	72. 00
192 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	192. 00
576 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	432. 00
600 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	300. 00
(e) <i>Excavation—Vestibule:</i>			
16 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	24. 00
32 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	32. 00
96 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	72. 00
120 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	60. 00
(f) <i>Excavation—Main Tunnel:</i>			
240 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	360. 00
640 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	640. 00
2,000 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	1,500. 00
3,200 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	1,600. 00
(g) <i>Excavation—Connecting Tunnel:</i>			
16 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	24. 00
48 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	48. 00
144 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	108. 00
232 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	116. 00
(h) <i>Placing Grout:</i>			
60 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	90. 00
180 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	180. 00
96 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	72. 00
236 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	118. 00
(i) <i>Waterproofing:</i>			
96 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	144. 00
320 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	320. 00
320 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	160. 00
(j) <i>Placing Drain Tile:</i>			
8 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	12. 00
40 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	20. 00
(k) <i>Placing Reinforcing Steel:</i>			
48 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	72. 00
192 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	192. 00
116 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	58. 00
(l) <i>Concrete Forming and Stripping:</i>			
64 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	96. 00
672 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	672. 00
420 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	315. 00
720 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	360. 00
(m) <i>Placing Concrete:</i>			
160 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	240. 00
640 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	640. 00
640 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	480. 00
4,800 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	2,400. 00
(n) <i>Electric Light and Power Installed:</i>			
32 Man Hours	----- @	1. 50	48. 00
64 Man Hours	-----	1. 00	64. 00
64 Man Hours	-----	0. 75	48. 00
64 Man Hours	-----	0. 50	32. 00

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(o) Air Conditioning Plant Installed:

24 Man Hours-----	@ \$1. 50	\$36. 00
48 Man Hours-----	1. 00	48. 00
48 Man Hours-----	0. 75	36. 00
48 Man Hours-----	0. 50	24. 00

(p) Structural Steel Installed:

8 Man Hours-----	@ 1. 50	12. 00
32 Man Hours-----	1. 25	40. 00
40 Man Hours-----	0. 50	20. 00

(q) Placing Rubble Masonry.

240 Man Hours-----	@ 1. 50	360. 00
240 Man Hours-----	0. 75	180. 00

(r) Maintenance—Watchman, etc.

480 Man Hours-----	@ 1. 50	720. 00
480 Man Hours-----	1. 00	480. 00
480 Man Hours-----	0. 75	360. 00
1,440 Man Hours-----	0. 50	720. 00

Total Cost of Day Labor----- 15, 697. 00

3. Plant Operation:

(a) Rental of Equipment.

1—Truck—Flat Rack-----	30 da. @	\$18. 50	555. 00
2—Trucks—Dump-----	30 " @	18. 50	1, 110. 00
1—Caterpillar Dozer-----	30 " @	39. 50	1, 185. 00
1—¾ Ton Pick-up-----	90 " @	6. 30	567. 00
2—Air Compressor-----	3 Mo. @	1390. 00	4, 170. 00
6—Jackhammers-----	30 da. @	9. 00	270. 00
2—Water Liners-----	60 " @	8. 00	480. 00
1—½ Cu. Yd. Mixer-----	30 " @	2. 00	60. 00
1—Concrete Placing Equipment-----	30 " ½	7. 00	210. 00
1—Bar Bender Shears-----	5 " ½	6. 00	30. 00
1—16" Radial Saw-----	1 Mo. ½	33. 00	33. 00
1—Jointer-----	1 " @	33. 00	33. 00
1—¾ Cu. Yd. Shovel-----	½ " @	1174. 00	587. 00
1—Ford Sedan-----	3 mo. @	76. 00	228. 00
Miscellaneous Small Tools-----			350. 00

(b) Fuel, Oil, Gas, and Miscellaneous Equipment----- 700. 00

Total Plant Operation Cost----- 10, 568. 00

4. Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:

Mobilization and Demobilization-----	\$600. 00
Total Cost of Material-----	8, 775. 82
Total Cost of Labor-----	15, 697. 00
Total Cost of Plant Operation-----	10, 568. 00

Total Cost to Contractor----- 35, 640. 82

(Signed) THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Recapitulation of Estimate of Cost

1. Total Cost of Job:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$35, 640. 82
Contingencies—10%-----	3 564. 08

Total Direct Cost----- \$39, 204. 90

(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection and Engineering—8% of Contractor's Cost-----	\$2, 851. 27
Total Indirect Cost-----	2, 851. 27

Total Field Cost-----	42, 056. 17
General Office Overhead—8% (of Contractor's Cost)-----	2, 851. 27

Estimated Grand Total Cost to Government----- 44, 907. 44

This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

JO2 3-42

MARCH 19, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 17.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office, Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 17.0 (Bombproof Addition to Radio Station, Fort Shafter) authorizes the installation of additional ventilation equipment in the transmitter section and power room at the transmitter station at Fort Shafter and modification of ventilator shaft. This work shall be done in accordance with plans, (File No. F-41/33 and File No. F-41/10) and specifications furnished the Area Engineer.

Office File Reference: Serial No. 2525.

Work requested by: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department by 2nd Indorsement of the Department Engineer, dated March 4, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

/s/ H. B. NURSE,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

22 JANUARY 1943.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 17.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2 to accompany Job Order No. 17.0 (Bombproof Addition to Radio Station, Ft. Shafter) cancels Addendum No. 1 to Job Order No. 17.0, effective January 18, 1943.

Cancellation Requested by: Operations Officer.

For the District Engineer:

/s/ JOSEPH MATSON, JR.,
Major, Corps of Engineers, Assistant.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 4M

Summary
CBR/dw

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., May 14, 1941.

Contract No. W414-eng-602

Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.

Job Order No. 29.0.

Construct—Armanent, Fire Control, supply and repair building (bombsight) reinf. concrete, (Approx. 67 ft. x 90 ft. in dimensions).

Est. Cost: \$150,000.00 (to Gov).

Commencement Date: May 15, 1941.

Est. Date for Completion: Sept. 15, 1941.

Supervision by Area Engr., 2nd Field Area.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., May 14, 1941.

JOB ORDER NO. 29.0.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building (Bombsight).
2. LOCATION: Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 776.1A1.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and complete an Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building (bombsight), of reinforced concrete design, approximately 67' x 90' in dimension.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: To be furnished later.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Eng. 812.
8. ESTIMATED COST: \$125,000.00.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: May 15, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: September 15, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: To be furnished later on a detailed estimate.
12. PLAN REQUIRED: To be furnished later on a detailed estimate.
13. MATERIALS: To be furnished later on a detailed estimate.
14. SUPERVISION BY: Area Engineer, Second Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Approved: May 23, 1941.

(Signed) Warren T. Hannum,
WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 29.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct and Complete an Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building (Bombsight).

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Hickam Field, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following specific item:

(1) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct and complete an Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building (bombsight). This building shall be in general conformity with Quartermaster Corps drawings for the Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building at San Antonio Air Depot (Duncan Field), Texas, as modified by the specifications, "Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building, Hickam Field," and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in the specifications. The building is to be of reinforced concrete design, approximately 67' x 90' in dimension.

The cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$125,000.00.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

*Recapitulation of estimated cost*1. *Total Cost of Work:*(a) *Direct Cost:*

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$125,000.00
Contingencies—10%-----	12,500.00

Total Direct Cost-----	\$137,500.00
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(b) *Indirect Cost:*

Survey, Inspection, Engr-----	\$ 6,250.00
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Total Indirect Cost-----	6,250.00
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Total Field Cost-----	143,750.00
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General Office Overhead-----	6,250.00
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Estimated Grand Total Cost to Government-----	150,000.00
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This recapitulation is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 4N

Summary
CBR/dw
9 Aug 44

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., May 27, 1941.

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

Ft. Kamehameha, Oahu, T. H.

Job No. 24.0.

Construct—Structural steel tower instrument building and stairway to existing fire control station.

Est. Cost: \$10,026.41 (to Gov.).

Commencement Date: June 1, 1941.

Est. Date for Completion: June 21, 1941.

Supervision by Area Engineer, 3rd Field Area.

Addendum No. 1 dated Feb. 25, 1942.

Transfers supervision to Area Engr, 2nd Field Area.

Addendum No. 2 dated May 3, 1942.

Cancels Job Order No. 24 and work will be done by Work Order.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., May 27, 1941.

JOB ORDER No. 24.0.

Contract W-414-eng-602.

To: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

You are hereby directed to proceed with the following work:

1. PROJECT TITLE: Fire Control Station, Fort Kamehameha.
2. LOCATION: Fort Kamehameha, Oahu, T. H.
3. OFFICE FILE REFERENCE: 2013.5.
4. WORK TO BE DONE: Construct a Structural Steel Tower Instrument Building complete with ladders and stairway together with Structural Steel Connection (Stairway) to existing Fire Control Station.
5. WORK REQUESTED BY: Commanding General—Hawaiian Department.
6. DRAWINGS AND REFERENCES: Paragraph 1-04 of Specifications.
7. APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE: Seacoast Defenses, Insular Department, 1941-CAC-131 P99 A-1210-N.

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8. ESTIMATED COST: \$7,957.46.
9. COMMENCEMENT DATE: June 1, 1941.
10. ESTIMATED DATE FOR COMPLETION: June 21, 1941.
11. ESTIMATED LABOR AT SITE: See Detailed Estimate Attached.
12. PLANT REQUIRED: See Detailed Estimate Attached.
13. MATERIALS: See Detailed Estimate Attached.
14. SUPERVISION BY: Area Engineer, Third Field Area.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

ESTIMATE OF COST

To Accompany Job Order No. 24.0

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

WORK TO BE DONE: Construct Fire Control Station and Appurtenant Work at Fort Kamehameha.

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

The work to be done, as provided for herein, is located at Fort Kamehameha Government Reservation, on the Island of Oahu, T. H., and is limited to the following Specific Item:

(1) Furnish all necessary labor and equipment, and perform all work necessary to construct a Structural Steel Tower Instrument Building complete with ladders and Stairway together with Structural Connection (Stairway) to existing Fire Control Station. The work to be done shall be in accordance with Specifications, "The Construction of a Fire Control Station and Appurtenant Work at Fort Kamehameha to Accompany Job Order No. 24.0 to Contract W-414-eng-602", and the details shown on the drawings enumerated in paragraph 1-04 of Specifications.

The cost of the work to be done shall not exceed \$7,957.46.

COST TO CONTRACTOR

1. Materials to be Furnished:

Item No.	Description	Quantity	Unit	Unit cost	Amount
1	Cement	8	Bbl.	\$2.93	\$23.44
2	Fine Aggregate	2.5	Cu. Yd.	2.70	6.75
3	Coarse Aggregate	5.0	"	3.00	15.00
4	Lumber for Forms	100	M Bd. Ft.	45.00	4,500
5	Lumber for Subflooring	288	" " "	47.00	13,536
6	Lumber for Flooring	288	" " "	55.00	15,840
7	{ Structural Steel	62,620	Lbs.	0.04	2,504.80
	{ Angles				
	{ Plates				
8	Miscellaneous Metals	3,200	"	0.08	256.00
9	1½" Standard Pipe (Galv.)	395	Lin. Ft.	.1695	66.95
10	1½" Extra Strong Pipe (Black)	165	"	.25	41.25
11	Malleable Iron Ball Pattern Fittings	100	Lump Sum		157.57
12	2" Conduits	65	Lin. Ft.	.28	18.20
13	½" Conduits	120	"	.07	8.40
14	Type 1-200 W-Outlets	8	Each	24.44	195.52
15	No. 12 Electric Wire Conductor	240	Lin. Ft.	.10	24.00
16	No. 16 Signal Wire RC	130	"	.055	7.15
17	Paint	29	Gal.	2.75	79.75
18	4 Light Polished Wire Glass Windows	7	Each	17.00	119.00
19	Service Switch Box Electric Toggle	1	"	.30	0.30
20	1½" Conduit	3	Lin. Ft.	.21	0.63
21	No. 0 Copper Bare Wire	24	Lbs.	.313	7.51
22	Copper Ground Rods (¾" x 8')	8	Lin. Ft.	2.66	21.28
23	Entrance Switches	2	Each	0.98	1.96
24	Anchor Bolts (¾" x 18")	12	"	.02	0.24
25	Welding Rods, Filler Metal for Structural Iron	150	Lbs.	0.08	12.00
26	Lumber for Scaffold	1,900	M. Bd. Ft.	60.00	114,000
27	Clamps for Ground Rods	8	Each	0.45	3.60
28	Nails	50	Lbs.	0.08	4.00
29	Miscellaneous Materials & Supplies				163.15
	Total Cost of Materials & Supplies				3,886.33

2. *Day Labor:*

(a) <i>Handling and Hauling Materials:</i>			
32 Man Hours.....	@	\$1. 50	\$18. 00
32 Man Hours.....		1. 25	40. 00
64 Man Hours.....		0. 75	44. 80
128 Man Hours.....		0. 50	64. 00
(b) <i>Excavation:</i>			
1 Man Hour.....	@	1. 50	1. 50
12 Man Hours.....		0. 50	6. 00
(c) <i>Class "A" Concrete for Bases:</i>			
8 Man Hours.....	@	1. 50	12. 00
8 Man Hours.....		0. 65	5. 20
32 Man Hours.....		0. 50	16. 00
(d) <i>Structural Steel Fabrication & Erection:</i>			
150 Man Hours.....	@	1. 50	225. 00
40 Man Hours.....		1. 35	54. 00
700 Man Hours.....		1. 25	875. 00
150 Man Hours.....		1. 00	150. 00
800 Man Hours.....		0. 70	560. 00
150 Man Hours.....		0. 65	97. 50
800 Man Hours.....		0. 50	400. 00
(e) <i>Framing & Carpentry for Structural Steel & Floors:</i>			
16 Man Hours.....	@	1. 50	18. 00
16 Man Hours.....		1. 00	16. 00
32 Man Hours.....		0. 65	20. 80
32 Man Hours.....		0. 50	16. 00
(f) <i>Electrical Wiring System & Signal System:</i>			
16 Man Hours.....	@	1. 50	24. 00
16 Man Hours.....		1. 00	16. 00
16 Man Hours.....		0. 65	10. 40
32 Man Hours.....		0. 50	16. 00
(g) <i>Cleaning & Painting Structural Steel and Stairs:</i>			
32 Man Hours.....	@	1. 50	48. 00
40 Man Hours.....		1. 00	40. 00
40 Man Hours.....		0. 65	26. 00
(h) <i>Maintenance and Field and Office Force:</i>			
80 Man Hours.....	@	1. 50	120. 00
50 Man Hours.....		1. 00	50. 00
150 Man Hours.....		0. 50	75. 00
Total Cost of Day Labor.....			3, 065. 20

3. *Plant Operation:*

(a) <i>Rental of Equipment:</i>			
1-400 Amp. Elec. Welding Machine.....	8 da. @	\$3. 55	\$28. 40
1-Spray Paint Outfit.....	5 da.	1. 00	5. 00
1-Jaeger-1 Sack Mixer.....	1 da.	4. 40	4. 40
1-¾ Ton Pick Up Truck-Ford.....	16 da.	2. 30	36. 80
1-5 Ton Flat Rack Truck-Ford.....	4 da.	13. 57	54. 28
1-Power Shovel-With erecting boom.....	4 da.	105. 00	420. 00
1-Sedan.....	8 da.	2. 53	20. 24
1-Coupe.....	5 da.	2. 33	11. 65
Miscellaneous Small Tools-(Lump Sum).....			100. 00
(b) <i>Gas, oil, and Supplies</i>			75. 00
Total Cost of Plant Operation.....			755. 93

4. *Total Plant Operation Cost of Job:*

Cost of Material.....	3, 886. 33
Cost of Day Labor.....	3, 065. 20
Cost of Plant Operation.....	755. 93
Mobilization and Demobilization.....	250. 00

Total Cost of Job to Contractor..... 7, 957. 46

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
 THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
 Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
 District Engineer.

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Recapitulation of estimated cost

1. Total Cost of Work:

(a) Direct Cost:

Total Cost to Contractor-----	\$7,957.46
Contingencies—10%-----	795.75
Total Direct Cost-----	<u>8,753.21</u>

(b) Indirect Cost:

Survey, Inspection, Engr. (8% of Total Cost to Contractor) -----	\$636.60
Total Indirect Cost-----	<u>636.60</u>
Total Field Cost of Job-----	9,389.81
General Office Overhead (8% of Total Cost to Contractor) -----	<u>636.60</u>

Estimated Grand Total Cost to Government-----	10,026.41
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This estimate is prepared for use in the District only, and is not for distribution to the Contractor.

(Signed) Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

FEBRUARY 25, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 1

To Accompany Job Order No. 24.0

Contract W-414-Eng 602

DISTRICT: Honolulu District, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 1 to accompany Job Order No. 24.0 (Fire Control Station, Ft. Kamehameha) transfers the supervision from the Area Engineer, Third Field Area to the Area Engineer, Second Field Area.

This transfer in supervision conforms to the new-designated boundaries for the two above mentioned Areas.

[s] THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

MAY 3, 1942.

ADDENDUM NO. 2

To Accompany Job Order No. 24.0

Contract W-414-Eng-602

Office of Department Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

Addendum No. 2 to accompany Job Order No. 24.0 (Fire Control Station, Ft. Kamehameha) cancels Job Order No. 24.0 and work will be done by Work Order.

Cancellation Requested By: Department Engineer by Memo. from Assistant Department Engineer, dated April 18, 1942.

For the Department Engineer:

[s] B. L. ROBINSON,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 5
Hawaiian Constructors—contract No. W-414-eng-602-Hawaii

[SECRET]

Job orders included	Description	Date of order to proceed	Estimated date to complete	Percent- age com- plete at estimated date	Percent- age com- plete Dec. 1, 1941	Remarks
ORIGINAL CONTRACT DATED DEC. 20, 1940						
Schedule A:						
No. 5.0	<i>To be completed within 6 months</i>	Feb. 24, 1941	Sept. 1, 1941	22.60	52.59	Schedule A and 7 additions grouped in progress report and were 52.59 complete Dec. 1.
No. 5.0, addition 2	Bombproof ammunition storage magazines for airfield	May 26, 1941	No estimate			
3	5 30,000 cubic feet concrete bombproof magazines	June 3, 1941	do.			
4	Excavation	June 27, 1941	do.			
5	Paving of access road	July 1, 1941	do.			
6	4 30,000 cubic feet concrete bombproof magazines	Aug. 14, 1941				
7	2 5,000 cubic feet and 3 10,000 cubic feet bombproof concrete magazines	Sept. 2, 1941				
Schedule B:						
No. 2.0	4 5,000 cubic feet concrete bombproof magazines	Sept. 2, 1941				
No. 2.1	Cableway	Feb. 6, 1941	June 1, 1941	1.0	37.22	No report on progress, can- celed May 1, 1942.
No. 41.0	Aircraft warning stations camp, utilities, and fence	June 18, 1941	Sept. 23, 1941	2.58	48.49	
No. 46.0	Aircraft warning stations camp and road	June 14, 1941	Nov. 30, 1941	80.53	80.53	
	Aircraft warning stations road, buildings, water system, fencing.	June 30, 1941	Sept. 1, 1941			
Schedule C:						
No. 18, 18.0	Railroad gun position	Apr. 23, 1941	June 21, 1941	22.5	89.0	No report on progress, can- celed May 1, 1942.
No. 22.0	do.	Mar. 4, 1941	June 1, 1941	47.7	100.0	
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT NO. 1, DATED MAR. 22, 1941						
Schedule B:	<i>To be completed within 100 days</i>					
No. 7.0 (see revision)	10 igloo type magazines	Apr. 25, 1941	Nov. 1, 1941	22.82	77.7	300 shed.
No. 7.0, addition 1	Electrical distribution system for magazines	May 22, 1941	do.	41.37	94.99	
No. 7.1	Access road to magazines	June 16, 1941	Dec. 15, 1941	26.0	7.99	
No. 7.2	Railroad to magazines	do.	Aug. 1, 1941	0	7.81	
No. 7.4	Mainproof wire fence and relocation of existing fence	Aug. 15, 1941	Oct. 1, 1941	0	0	
Schedule A:	<i>To be completed with in 90 days</i>					
No. 2.1	Access road to cableway	Mar. 5, 1941	May 6, 1941	77.8	100.0	300 shed.
No. 23.0	Road for aircraft warning installations to be located as directed by the contracting officer.	Apr. 28, 1941	Sept. 25, 1941	60.5	100.0	
No. 23.0 Add 1	Wood frame toolshed and storeroom	June 2, 1941				

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 5—Continued
Hawaiian Constructors—contract No. W-414-eng-602—Hawaii—Continued

Job orders included	Description	Date of order to proceed	Estimated date to complete	Percentage complete at estimated date	Percentage complete at Dec. 1, 1941	Remarks
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT NO. 1, DATED MAR. 22, 1941—con.						
Schedule B:	<i>To be completed within 60 days—Continued</i>					
No. 14.0.....	Fire-control station.....	Mar. 15, 1941	Apr. 10, 1941	0	100	
No. 15.0.....	do.....	Mar. 18, 1941	Apr. 22, 1941	0	100	
No. 24.0.....	do.....	May 27, 1941	June 21, 1941	6	7.18	Not important.
	<i>To be completed within 90 days</i>					
Schedule J:						
No. 20.1 (See Rev.).....	6 50,000-gallon gasoline storage tanks for airfield.....	July 1, 1941	Jan. 1, 1942	0	0	
No. 21.1.....	9 50,000-gallon gasoline storage tanks for airfield.....	Apr. 26, 1941	June 21, 1941	2	67.75	
No. 25.0.....	do.....	May 7, 1941	Aug. 1, 1941	.5	37.97	

[SECRET]

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 6

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

In re : Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Los Angeles, ss:

ALICE ANSTAY, who resides at 938 East Edgemore Road, Los Angeles, California, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I have been employed as a hotel maid by the Biltmore Hotel for fifteen years, and am now employed there in that capacity. During the last four years, I have been working on the ninth floor, and there are apartments on that floor as well as suites.

I first saw HANS WILHELM ROHL about four years ago, when he used to occupy Apartment Z. He usually would have dinner at about 8:30 P. M. About four years ago last February, I know Rohl gave a big dinner party in Apartment Z, and I know the man whose picture you now show me was present. (John H. Weiner shows picture of THEODORE WYMAN, JR. to affiant with Wyman's name covered). I don't recall any other men at that party except Rohl and Wyman, who became extremely drunk. The liquor was brought up there by the case. During the course of the evening there were about twenty young girls who kept coming in and out of the Apartment all evening, and the party was still in progress when I left to go off duty at about 10:30 P. M. The girls appeared to be cheap, commercial party girls of the type that frequent the Main Street bars and night places.

After this first party, I saw Rohl and Wyman on a great many occasions when they had wild drinking parties of the same general type. The same cheap looking type of young girls paraded in and out all evening.

In cleaning up the various suites on the ninth floor, used for the parties, Suites Q, Z and W, there were twin beds, and I always found them pushed together.

[SECRET]

I would find lip-stick on the pillow cases and bedclothes, towels strewn over the floor and hair pins and bobby pins all over the room. At these subsequent parties, there would usually be four or five girls during the evening. While the parties were underway, I could never get into the bedrooms because they were always locked. Mr. Rohl always called Wyman "Ted" or "Teddy". On each and every occasion when these parties occurred, I have seen girls sitting on Rohl's lap and Wyman's lap, and all the indications that would naturally lead me to believe that these girls were simply being hired to cater to the sexual whims of the two men, because different girls were used from time to time, and as I was the maid on that floor, I went in to take fresh supplies of towels and had ample opportunity to observe what went on.

Rohl had a party in Apartment Q on the Ninth Floor about six weeks ago. He had no baggage and registered alone. Rohl had a tall, blond girl with him and said she was his nurse. They had dinner together and he said he had just come from the hospital where he'd had his gall-bladder removed. On this occasion a lot of liquor went up to this Suite, both Rohl and the nurse were drinking and Rohl got drunk.

About two months ago, in Apartment Q, on the Ninth floor, Rohl gave a party and there was a dark little girl who looked like a Mexican. That was after Rohl just left the hospital following the gall-bladder operation. On this occasion he also came in with the same blonde nurse, and the brunette, the blonde nurse and Rohl were all drinking and a great deal of liquor was brought in. On this occasion the twin beds were shoved together and the mattresses were placed crossways on the beds, and on the bed-clothes and pillow-slips were evidences of lip-stick, and there were rouge-stained cigarettes, used towels, hair pins and bobby-pins strewn about the bedroom. At about 10 P. M. the blonde shoved the brunette out of the apartment and into the hall and shut the door. This blonde,

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whom Rohl stated was his nurse, was almost always with him on these many parties.

I saw Wyman alone in the hotel about a year ago and haven't seen him since.

Alice Anstey
ALICE ANSTEY.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 18 day of December, 1943.

FRIEDA SEGEL.

[SECRET]

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
County of Los Angeles, ss:

JUANITA BLACKWELL, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I went to work for Hans W. Rohl approximately sixteen years ago, on Rodeo Drive in Beverley Hills, then to Shaddow Place, then to the Talmadge Apts., then to their present residence. I was cook and cared for the house. At 8159 Hollywood Boulevard, Theodore Wyman, Jr. was a guest. Mr. Rohl often spoke of Wyman when we were living in the Talmadge Apartments in about 1936. It was shortly after we had moved from the Apartments that Mr. Rohl took Dr. Lewis and his wife on a cruise aboard the yacht "Vega," to the Hawaiian Islands.

Major Wyman never remained overnight—he usually discussed business with Mr. Rohl during these visits, and used to stay for dinner. Every other day or so Major Wyman would telephone Mr. Rohl, and I would answer the phone, and he would, of course, tell me who he was. Major Wyman frequently was driven to the Rohl residence by a soldier in an army car.

Werner Plack used to telephone infrequently, would ask for Mr. Rohl, and would, of course, tell me his name when I answered the telephone.

Many times after Wyman went to Honolulu, he and Mr. Rohl would talk for quite a long time on the long-distance telephone, and I have heard Rohl swear at him during these conversations. Rohl certainly wasn't afraid of Mr. Wyman at all. During these long-distance conversations Wyman and Rohl would discuss business, and I heard Rohl speak of hangars, runways, and landing fields. Mr. Paul Grafe also used to phone Mr. Rohl from Honolulu about business, too.

JUANITA BLACKWELL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of December, 1943.

R. E. COMBS,

Counsel for State Fact Finding Committee on Un-American Activities; #ACR59.

JOHN H. WEINER,
W. BRUCE PINE

Mr. T. E. Connolly was interviewed by Mr. John H. Weiner, Investigator for the Committee of Military Affairs, House of Representatives on December 11, 1943 at his office, 461 Market Street, San Francisco.

Question. Your name is T. E. Connolly?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Where do you reside?

Answer. I reside at 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco.

Question. Are you acquainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Answer. I am.

Question. When and under what circumstances did you first meet him?

Answer. I met H. W. Rohl sometime prior to 1925, probably at some contractor's gathering because I knew him as such. The exact date and exact circumstances I don't remember.

Question. Are you acquainted with Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Answer. I am.

Question. When and under what circumstances did you first meet him?

Answer. The year and date I do not have. I first met him when he came to Los Angeles as a captain in the United States Army Engineers and was in charge of construction activities in that area.

Question. Do you remember who introduced you to him?

Answer. It was very possible that I introduced myself. If a formal introduction was arranged, I don't think that was so. I would rather say that I went over there to get some plans or offer a bid. I certainly met him in his office in an official capacity.

Question. In other words, it is possible that you went over to discuss with him contracts, etc.?

Answer. Certainly. I have done that many times.

Question. It is a fact is it not that you are a stockholder in the Rohl-Connolly Co., a Nevada corporation doing business in California?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Where is the principal place of business?

Answer. Los Angeles, California.

Question. Wasn't it formed in 1932 by Frank S. Cliff, F. E. Leader and a man named Peterson? Who are these gentlemen?

Answer. I don't know. Of course, it was formed in Nevada—they may be the attorneys, those must be the qualifying directors—absolutely unknown to me.

Question. Isn't the corporation's principal place of business 511 N. Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada?

Answer. It might be so recorded but our principal place of operations has been Los Angeles.

Question. Didn't the California Commissioner of Corporations in May of 1932 issue a permit for the sale of 40,000 shares of the capital stock of the concern to H. W. Rohl, Irma Dickey and yourself?

Answer. If so, I don't think that was acted upon. My recollection is there is only 20,000 shares out.

Question. What consideration, if any, did you give the corporation for your shares?

Answer. Cash.

Question. How much, what amount, do you remember?

Answer. I think \$200,000.

Question. How many shares were originally issued to you?

Answer. I think 10,000 shares.

Question. What office did you hold in December of 1940?

Answer. The latter half of December, 1940, I was president.

Question. Did Rohl ever state to you that he knew Wyma prior to meeting you?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was it your general custom to confer with Rohl from time to time on important projects in which your firm was engaged?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Are you acquainted with General Virgil Lee Peterson of Washington, D. C.?

Answer. I met General Peterson, who was then Colonel Peterson, when he was in charge of the Los Angeles District when we bid our first section of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.

Question. Were you in Washington on December 18, 1940?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you in Washington on January 17, 1941?

Answer. I was there on the evening of that day. I was in a plane from Los Angeles to Washington during the day on January 17th.

Question. Were you in Washington, January 21, 1941?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. While you were in Washington on these dates, Mr. Connolly, isn't it a fact that you were there discussing the contracts that you had in the Hawaiian Islands?

Answer. No, sir. When I was there in December we were discussing the Hawaiian contracts. When I was there on January 17th to appear before the naval board on January 18th regarding the building of naval bases and Bermuda installation was mentioned, but we had gone there to try and obtain construction of a dry dock at San Diego. We prepared questionnaires and on January 22nd we appeared before the naval board and made our submission regarding the construction of the dry dock at San Diego and refused our consideration of any work in Bermuda or Newfoundland.

Question. While you were in Washington, did you receive any long distance calls from Mr. Rohl?

Answer. Whether I received them or not—I talked to him. If I didn't receive them, I made them.

Question. During your visits to Washington to either negotiate or conclude government contracts for your firm for installation of fortifications in the Hawaiian Islands, Mr. Rohl called you in Washington?

Answer. I had telephonic communication with Mr. Rohl when I was in Washington concerning these contracts. Whether he called or I called, I cannot state, but we did have telephone conversations.

Question. Regarding the contracts?

Answer. Yes. The first knowledge I had of a potential contract in the Hawaiian Islands was on Monday, December 16, 1940, when I was called in Denver, Colorado by Mr. Rohl from San Francisco who stated that Colonel Wyman was here from the Hawaiian Islands seeking contractors to perform certain work over there and that he, Rohl, wished me to meet a certain plane at Cheyenne and go on east with Colonel Wyman and endeavor to get the contracts. I asked what type of contracts they were and Rohl answered that the Colonel would explain that to me. I was unable to get on a plane at Cheyenne so I flew to Chicago and got on a plane with Colonel Wyman and flew from Chicago down to Washington. We went to the Carlton Hotel where we could get no rooms and we were expecting Mr. Paul Grafe. He had not yet arrived so we occupied his room. I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl's attorney, who told me he was in Washington in the interests of acquiring citizenship or furthering citizenship applications for Mr. H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Co. and substitute myself and I so 'phoned him and it was so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the Rohl-Connolly Co. until after he obtained his naturalization papers.

Question. In other words Mr. Connolly, at your insistence he resigned as an officer or a director of the company?

Answer: That's right.

Question. But still retained his stock?

Answer. That is right.

Question. Subsequent to receiving the contract for the Hawaiian Islands, did Mr. Rohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, etc.?

Answer. No. There was no detailed discussion of this contract at all. Personally I never saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it. Rohl and I discussed the necessary financial arrangements, advancement of monies because after all we were financing this. We were building certain airfields. We knew what that meant, just simply movement of materials and stabilization of a base without a blueprint at all. When you are told to run a 7500 runway we knew what it takes.

Question. But it would be most usual for him to discuss with you the nature and type of contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands?

Answer. Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned building an airport there. I don't think that we ever got into some of these installations out there, I don't think Rohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We talked of those warning stations because I was curious as to what they were. That's all that I know that we ever got into any detail about.

Question. I believe that's all, Mr. Connolly.

J. E. CONNOLLY.

Witness

JOHN H. WEINER,
Dec. 11-43.

PASADENA, CALIFORNIA, December 14, 1943.

At the request of Mr. John H. Weiner, investigator for the Committee of Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Mr. E. T. Foley made the following statement:

To the best of my recollection, my first meeting with Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. occurred during the construction of the Fort Peck Dam, ten years or more ago. Our Company was one of a group of contractors that unsuccessfully bid for the spillway of this dam, and Colonel Wyman at that time was one of the engineer officers on this work. I believe he was a captain at that time. This meeting was short and purely in the line of the business at hand.

My next meeting with Colonel Wyman, as I recall it, occurred in about 1937 on completion of the San Gabriel Dam. At that time, Colonel Wyman, then a major, was in charge of the engineering work on the Los Angeles River, and the West Slope Construction Co. rented to the Government a portion of the plant that had been used on the San Gabriel Dam.

I have never had any social relations with Colonel Wyman.

The circumstances surrounding the connection of Foley Brothers, Inc. with the Rohl Connolly Co. in the construction of the Haines Cutoff to the Alcan Highway are briefly as follows:

Foley Brothers, Inc. representatives went to Edmonton early in February at the request of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., the Division Engineer of the Northwest Division of the U. S. Engineers Corps.

Colonel Wyman stated that it was necessary that the Haines Military Cutoff Road be completed in the fall of 1943 and that he desired that Foley Brothers, Inc. undertake the work jointly with Rohl Connolly Co. as that firm owned a considerable amount of floating equipment suitable for ocean transport of personnel, construction machinery and material to Haines, Alaska. Prior to this time there had been no transactions between these firms although Foley Brothers, Inc. knew that Rohl Connolly Co. was a well established and successful firm. It was known that both Mr. Rohl and Mr. Connolly had been actively engaged in construction in the Pacific Coast district for many years and there was no knowledge or suspicion on the part of anyone connected with Foley Brothers, Inc. that Mr. Rohl was anything but an American citizen. It was known that prior to this time he had been engaged on Army work in the Pacific area. The press accounts of the investigation of the California Committee on Unamerican Activities came as a complete surprise. This Haines Cutoff work is the only work on which Foley Brothers, Inc. have ever been associated with Rohl Connolly Co. or with Mr. H. W. Rohl.

After this unfavorable publicity in connection with Mr. H. W. Rohl occurred, representatives of Foley Brothers, Inc. again went to Edmonton and told General L. D. Worsham, Colonel Wyman's successor as Division Engineer, that Foley Brothers, Inc. entered into this association at the Army's insistence, that through no fault of its own, Foley Brothers, Inc. found itself in a very awkward position, and that Foley Brothers, Inc. would withdraw and consent to the cancellation of the letter of intent, if the Army so desired. General Worsham pointed out that the work was urgent, that this procedure would result in unnecessary delay and agreed to the suggestion of both firms that Mr. Rohl be entirely disassociated from the work. Negotiations were completed with General Worsham and contract entered into.

By arrangement with Mr. T. E. Connolly, now president of Rohl Connolly Co. Co. the construction was entirely handled by Foley Brothers, Inc. and Mr. Rohl was never on the work.

The road was completed on schedule and below the estimated cost, a result which is very creditable to everyone connected with the project.

E. T. FOLEY.

Witness

JOHN H. WEINER

Dec. 14-43

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., March 18, 1944.

INTERVIEW

Present: Colonel Earl E. Gessler and H. Ralph Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Please state your name and position that you hold.

Colonel GESSLER. Colonel Earl E. Gessler, Corps of Engineers, at present Division Engineer of the Middle Atlantic Division, Baltimore, Maryland.

Q. How long have you been with the Engineer Corps?

A. Since 1915.

Q. Did you at any time have occasion to participate in negotiations which led up to the awarding and signing of contracts for defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands to the Hawaiian Constructors, Inc?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you have occasion at any time to participate in negotiations in which Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. took part?

A. No, never in any negotiations.

Q. Do you know anything about any contract awarded to the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. I know there were such contracts, I possibly have seen them when I was in the Chief of Engineers Office.

Q. There was a contract for certain installations in Hawaii which was negotiated and finally signed on December 20, 1940, and some of the persons connected with those negotiations were Hans Wilhelm Rohl, Paul Grafe and T. E. Connolly. Do you recall any of these?

A. I recall the names. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever come in contact with any of them?
 A. I never met any of them, no, sir.
 Q. At what place were you stationed in 1940?
 A. I was Chief of the Finance Section at that time, which included the Contracts and Claims Branch.
 Q. Do you recall having any dealings with Hans Wilhelm Rohl, T. E. Conolly, or Paul Grafe?
 A. No, sir.
 Q. Did you ever have occasion to participate in any negotiations leading up to the awarding and signing of a contract for the Canol Project in Alaska.
 A. As a general rule I did not participate in any of the negotiations. I do not remember having seen it before it was executed or after it was executed. I do know there was such a contract.
 Q. You had no personal contact with either the negotiations or the awarding of the contracts for the installation of defense projects in Hawaii, the Pacific Islands, or the Canol Project in Alaska?
 A. That is true. It may be that my assistants may have had something to do with it. I can give you their names and perhaps that would be helpful.
 Q. I would be very glad if you would.
 A. At that time there was connected with the contract work, David Ogden, Now Brigadier General, in the South Pacific, I think; possibly Watler Pincus, a Major, also in the South Pacific; also Brig. Gen. D. L. Newman, but if it were Newman it could not have been Ogden. I forget just what the date of relief was there. They are the only officers who might have had contact in the contract section.

[1] STATEMENT OF MR. CYRIL J. HARRINGTON, 2142 EWING STREET, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. NORMANDY 16774.

Interviewed by: Mr. John H. Weiner, Investigator, Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives.

Question. What is your name?
 Answer. Cyril J. Harrington.
 Question. Where do you live, Mr. Harrington?
 Answer. 2142 Ewing Street, Los Angeles, California.
 Question. Were you ever employed by the Biltmore Hotel, in Los Angeles?
 Answer. Yes.
 Question. How long were you so employed?
 Answer. From September 20, 1936 to November 5, 1940.
 Question. What were your duties?
 Answer. House officer.
 Question. Do you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
 Answer. Yes.
 Question. Do you know Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?
 Answer. Yes.
 Question. While you were employed at the Biltmore Hotel, did you have occasion to meet either of these men there?
 Answer. Yes.
 Question. Do you know of your own knowledge if Mr. Rohl had, from time to time, been a guest at the hotel?
 Answer. Yes.
 Question. Would Mr. Rohl retain a room or a suite?
 Answer. It would be a suite or apartment—an apartment, if available.
 Question. Did you develop quite an acquaintance with Mr. Rohl?
 Answer. Yes.
 Question. For that reason, you had many opportunities to visit his suite?
 [2] Answer. Yes.
 Question. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman there?
 Answer. Yes.
 Question. What would usually be the condition of Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman on your visits?
 Answer. I would say that Rohl, most of the time, was apparently drinking. Of course there was always liquor there and usually Rohl and Wyman would be in conversation.
 Question. Have you ever seen girls in Mr. Rohl's suite or apartment?
 Answer. Numerous times—many times.

Question. Would these parties last late?

Answer. Yes, because I didn't go on duty until 11:30 P. M.

Question. Do you know Mr. Svendrup?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Will you please state the time or times that you saw Mr. Svendrup, while he was registered at the hotel, in the company of Mr. Rohl or Colonel Wyman?

Answer. Mr. Svendrup was in Mr. Rohl's apartment and he called requesting that his suite be cleaned during his absence. Ray Moore, handyman around the hotel, was sent to Svendrup's room to clean it and he found a purse. Ray Moore called me and I found approximately \$3.00 in the purse and I knew that Mr. Svendrup and the girls were visiting in Mr. Rohl's apartment. I took the purse to Rohl's apartment and turned it over to them and Svendrup was very much perturbed, saying that I should have left the purse in his room and that I should not touch anything in the room. At this point, Mr. Rohl ordered Mr. Svendrup to leave his apartment and go back to his own room and take his girl friend. Mr. Rohl resented the fact that Mr. Svendrup talked to me the way he did.

Question. Did Mr. Svendrup leave and take his girl friend?

Answer. I don't know that he left at that moment, but he did leave shortly thereafter.

[3] Question. What was the apartment or suite number of Svendrup on that occasion?

Answer. I believe it was 7315 and 7316.

Question. Had you seen these girls around the hotel previously?

Answer. Yes, three or four times.

Question. What would you say the occupation of these girls might be?

Answer. My opinion is that they were good time girls. I had seen them in the rooms of Rohl and Svendrup at different times.

Question. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman in Svendrup's apartment?

Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I only saw him there once.

Question. Do you recall about what time it was?

Answer. About 7 A. M.

Question. Had he been there all night?

Answer. Apparently.

Question. What was his condition?

Answer. He had been drinking. Of course, I wasn't employed at the hotel at this time, but I had been at the hotel the night before and had met Svendrup who had told me to be at his apartment at 7 the next morning, stating that he wanted to talk to Mr. Rohl about a position I was to get in Honolulu and the reason I had to be there so early was because Svendrup told me he was leaving the city early.

Question. I believe that is all, Mr. Harrington. Thank you.

Cyril J. Harrington

Mr. CYRIL J. HARRINGTON.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of December, 1943.

[SEAL]

FRANCES H. PURTELL,

Notary Public in and for the County of Los Angeles, State of California.

My Commission Expires Oct. 6, 1947.

SECRET

AFFIDAVIT

[1]

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

County of Los Angeles, ss:

WALTER HORNE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is a native born American citizen, now of the age of 53 years, and that he has resided on the West Coast of the United States of America for the past fifty years.

That during said period of time, he owned the German-built yacht, "Contender," formerly known as the "Arm Gaard," which vessel was built and owned by a German Prince, Lippe.

That said vessel during affiant's ownership was known as the Contender with its home port at Long Beach, California and that said Contender was moored along side of a vessel known as the "Pandora" and that the records will disclose that said Pandora was registered in the name of the said Rohl because said vessel was less than 75 feet in length, and therefore could be registered in the name of an Alien German.

That while affiant was the owner of said vessel, Contender, he met the said Hans Wilhelm Rohl and had many conversations with him, including conversations regarding the construction of said Contender, but during said conversations, said Rohl was very arrogant, boastful of all things German, and claimed that his Uncle occupied a high position as Managing Director in the Hamburg-American line and the North German Lloyd Steamship Co.

That in 1928, affiant entertained several persons upon his yacht the Contender, among which was Felix Von Luckner, commonly known during World War No. 1, as the German Raider, that affiant did not invite the said Rohl to said entertainment, and that thereafter, the said Rohl no longer renewed his friendship and acquaintance with the affiant, and that said Rohl represented that he visited with the said Von Luckner, and claimed close acquaintance with all visiting Germans of high rank in business and in Diplomatic Service of the German Republic.

That during the acquaintanceship between the said Rohl and affiant, a large sea going vessel with its home port in New York which affiant was informed was purchased by the said Rohl for \$47,000, was believed to be registered in the name of Floyee Rohl, who was a native born American, and that by said registration any perfunctory examination of the record would disclose that said vessel, the Vega being in excess of 75 feet in length was owned by an American citizen in truth and in fact that said vessel "Vega" was purchased and controlled by the said Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a German alien in violation of U. S. Maritime laws.

That affiant was informed and believes that said Hans Wilhelm Rohl is the same person who secured upon the recommendation of an American Army officer known as Major Wyman, construction contracts from the United States Engineering Department in excess of \$100,000,000.

That affiant is informed and believes that the said vessel, Vega, was chartered by the Engineering Department of the United States Army through said Major Wyman for \$75,001, and that said charter provided that said vessel, Vega, was to be used in the war effort, but instead the said vessel under said charter was used to haul a load of liquor to Honolulu at the instigation of the said Major Wyman, and that said \$75,001 was authorized by the said Major Wyman, and was actually paid by the United States Government to the then wife of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a German alien.

[2] That affiant is informed and believes that said vessel sailing with the said cargo of intoxicating liquor from the harbor of San Pedro was never used for any purpose of National Defense or as set forth in the charter thereof.

That affiant believes that the method of registration of said vessel Vega and the chartering thereof, and the wrongful use of said charter, was and is a fraud upon the United States Government.

That affiant is informed and believes that the said Rohl was at Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, prior to December 7, 1941, and had complete detailed information of all of the offensive and defensive installations of the War Department, and that he knew on said date of the location of American Naval vessels, American planes, fortifications and other vital installations, and that the aforesaid knowledge of the said Rohl at that particular place at that particular time, was too serious to be a mere coincidence, which in affiant's opinion should be thoroughly investigated by officials of the Government high enough not to be biased, prejudiced, or influenced in any manner whatsoever.

Affiant further states that in his opinion, the Government investigators should go deeper than the records disclose upon the surface, so that there may be apprehended all *Alien Spies* working under cover against the best American interests, and in league with agents of Germany or Japan, and that all persons so apprehended should lose their citizenship, and all of their worldly goods and ill-gotten gains available should be confiscated, and that they should be deported to the countries from which they originally came.

And that it should not be forgotten that the fathers and mothers who mourn their dead soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in this war, and who have received Awards of Merit and Distinguished Service Medals, would want to return these Awards to the United States Government so long as the said Major Wyman is allowed to retain any merits or the Distinguished Service Medal granted him, and that he should be subjected to an impartial Court Martial, and

treated as found guilty, according to his just deserts and the best American tradition.

WALTER HORNE.

9425 Wilshire Blvd, Beverly Hills, California.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of December 1943.

AGNES KYLE.

Notary Public for Aforesaid County and State.

SECRET

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS
Washington, D. C.

In Re: Hans Wilhelm Rohl
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
County of Los Angeles, ss:

H. J. KING, who resides at 904 South Oakland Street, Pasadena, first being duly sworn, deposes and says: I was on active service in the Army Engineers from December, 1917 to September, 1919, with the rank of Major when I resigned in 1929. I studied engineering at Northwestern University, where my son is now a professor.

About January 15, 1942 I had completed a project at San Luis Obispo, and learned that a tunnel man was needed in the Hawaiian Islands, and was eventually employed by Paul Grafe for Hawaiian Constructors, and arrived in Honolulu on February 16, 1942, and lived in the Pleasanton Hotel until January 25, 1943.

I met Hans W. Rohl a day or two after I arrived. He was drunk when we met, and although I saw him many times thereafter, I never did see him when he was fully sober; and he was never in the full possession of his faculties during the time I saw him.

The work being done during the period when Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. was in charge, was quite muddled. This was due to a variety of causes, some being the fact that there was a natural state of confusion following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and a constantly-changing tactical situation throughout the Pacific theatre. Among the business people who come in contact with Col. Wyman there was a general impression that he was extremely arbitrary.

After Col. Wyman left, the situation began to improve; more equipment began to arrive and our program was much more definite.

I was there when Rohl's yacht the Vega arrived in February of 1942, and I used to see it tied to the dock from time to time. The U. S. Engineers Department took over the Vega upon her arrival, but so far as I know they never used the boat, because she just remained tied up, and was never sailed at all.

When I arrived I laid around for about thirty days before Rohl got sufficiently sober to put me to work. On about March 15, 1942 I commenced work as Area Superintendent for Area 14, which included the Ewa area. After a little over two weeks had elapsed I was appointed General Superintendent for Hawaiian Constructors—April 3, 1943, and thenceforth until I left I had complete supervision over all field work.

Generally speaking, the work that had been accomplished under the supervision of Col. Wyman prior to December 7, 1941, was pretty lousy; and when the people in the Hawaiian Islands who were familiar with this work—officers and civilians alike—learned that Colonel Wyman had been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal "for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service in the performance of duty of great responsibility as District Engineer, Honolulu (T. H.) Engineer District, from October 14, 1941, to March 15, 1942," it was a source of considerable amusement.

(signed) H. J. King
H. J. KING.

This statement taken, and signature witnessed by JOHN H. WEINER, INVESTIGATOR for The Committee On Military Affairs UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

(signed) John H. Weiner
JOHN H. WEINER.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 18 day of December, 1943, by H. J. King and John H. Weiner.

Frieda Segel.

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SECRET

IN RE HANS WILHELM ROHL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Los Angeles, ss:

Statement of Mrs. Gertrude Marcus

I reside at 2007 W. Third Street, Los Angeles; have been employed for the last seventeen years by the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles; for the last four years have been desk clerk assigned to the ninth floor.

I have known Hans Wilhelm Rohl for several years as a patron; he most usually requested quarters on my floor, since one of the suites has a refrigerator. He most always was drunk, and it was a common practice for him to have cheap looking girls visiting him; they would stop at my desk for directions, but after a while they got wise and came up the back elevator.

His male companion on these parties was the man whose picture Mr. Weiner showed me. Mr. Rohl would sometimes call him Ted and sometimes Mr. Smith. I now know his name is Colonel Wyman, but I have not seen him recently. When Wyman and Rohl would leave together, they would be pretty plastered. When Mr. Rohl was here about a month ago the bellboy, Charles Hays, said: "You ought to see how Rohl is bleeding; you know he was operated on for gall bladder".

MRS. GERTRUDE MARCUS.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this — day of December, 1943.

This statement taken, and signature witnessed by John H. Weiner, Investigator for The Committee on Military Affairs, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

John H. Weiner,
JOHN H. WEINER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of December, 1943.

FRIEDA SEGEL.

[1]

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Los Angeles, ss:

FERMAN K. PICKERING, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I was employed by Bechtel-Price-Callahan in San Francisco as Cost Clerk. I left Oakland, California June 6, 1942, arriving in Edmonton, Canada June 10, 1942. I then proceeded to Waterways, Canada, arriving there June 12, 1942. During my two weeks' stay, I lived at the New Franklin Hotel at Fort McMurray, which is approximately one and one-half miles from Waterways. I arrived in Waterways with my immediate superior, Mr. E. W. Bailey and Mr. J. H. Cooper, Assistant Administrative Manager for Bechtel-Price-Callahan. We were met at the depot by Mr. Robert Hoffman, who introduced himself as the Construction Superintendent for Bechtel-Price-Callahan. After the departure of Mr. Bailey and Mr. Cooper, which took place a few days after their arrival, and when we, according to instructions of both Cooper and Bailey, ordered some office supplies, we learned that Bechtel-Price-Callahan apparently was unknown locally, but that the firm which had established credit was known as Hoffman and Boyce. I learned that the employees were paid in cash and had never heard of Bechtel-Price-Callahan but thought they were working for Hoffman and Boyce. The cash for the payroll was handled by Mr. E. E. Beckett, who also believed he was working for Hoffman and Boyce rather than Bechtel-Price-Callahan. His remark was "Who is Bechtel-Price-Callahan?" I never met Mr. Boyce and in spite of numerous inquiries, never was able to find anyone who knew him.

The two front rooms of the New Franklin Hotel, where I lived, at Fort McMurray, were occupied by Mr. Robert Hoffman and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. of the United States Engineers, who was in charge of the Northwest Division. For a period of two weeks I saw Colonel [2] Wyman nearly every day with the exception of two occasions when he didn't leave his room. Mr. Robert Hoffman seemed to be a very close friend as well as business associate of Colonel

Wyman. Mr. Hoffman told me that he had been with the Hawaiian Constructors and had worked with Colonel Wyman in the Hawaiian Islands. It was general gossip among the men that Colonel Wyman was a heavy drinker and no apparent effort was made to conceal this fact. On several occasions I saw Colonel Wyman when he was, in my opinion, drunk. On several other occasions I saw him when, in my opinion, he had been apparently drinking heavily. Upon another occasion, Mr. Robert Hoffman told me that he was very much worried as Colonel Wyman was out of liquor and had asked him to get some, which was difficult, as Edmonton, the nearest legal source for liquor, was over three hundred miles away.

One night, at Waterways, at the Northern Alberta Railway depot, Colonel Wyman asked the Railway Agent to spot some cars that had arrived that day loaded with prefabricated barges. He was told that it would be a matter of a couple of hours before an engine was available. The Colonel, who obviously had been drinking, told the agent that he and the other Canadians were incompetent and that "If you can't run the God damned railroad, I'll take it over and run it myself."

One evening, while having dinner, seated close to Colonel Wyman's table, the Colonel, who apparently hadn't seen us up to that time, asked Mr. Robert Hoffman who we were. Mr. Hoffman replied that we were administrative employees sent from Edmonton several days prior to that time. The Colonel asked Mr. Hoffman if he had hired us. Mr. Hoffman replied that he hadn't and the Colonel said, blustering, "Send them back to Edmonton. We don't want them here." On another occasion, at the New Franklin Hotel, Mr Hoffman was talking to a man who had approached him in reference to buying a saw mill for \$25,000. Mr. Hoffman replied that he had no authority to spend \$25,000. At that point, Colonel Wyman approached and asked Mr. Hoffman, "Who the hell [3] is going to spent \$25,000.?" Mr. Hoffman replied that no one was; that the man had a saw mill that he wanted to sell for that amount. Colonel Wyman asked Hoffman what use they had for the lumber and was told that it could be used in building barges. Colonel Wyman said, "Go ahead and buy the God damned thing." Earl Harcourt, who was a Bechtel-Price-Callahan Transportation Advisor and who had worked in the surrounding country for a number of years, told me that the saw mill in question wasn't worth over \$5,000, as it had stood idle for some time. Whether or not this deal was consummated, I do not know.

I talked to Mr. Everett Seaberry, whose title was Project Manager on the Canal Project. By way of introduction, I asked Mr. Seaberry if he was not Bechtel-Price-Callahan's Project Manager to which he replied: "I'm supposed to be, but don't have a damned thing to say about anything that is being done."

After being in Waterways for two weeks, I returned to Edmonton on June 27, 1942, where I remained until July 27, 1942. I found the town full of idle men who were drawing salary and subsistence, which in the case of, for instance, a tractor operator, amounted to about \$20.00 per day, with subsistence allowance. From my arrival back in Edmonton until July 27, 1942, I was on a travel status, drawing salary and subsistence allowance with no work assigned.

Robert Finney who wrote "Canada Moves North" was on the Bechtel-Price-Callahan payroll with the title of Chief Expediter at, I was told, a salary of \$1,000 per month. It was my understanding that all administrative salaries of \$200 or more per month had to be approved by the United States Engineers.

Before I left Waterways, I met a Mrs. Cooper and another girl, whose name I cannot recall, who told me they had also worked with Colonel Wyman in the Hawaiian Islands prior to coming to Canada.

Gertrude Campbell, who called herself the Colonel's personal representative, told me that she had been with the Engineers in Los Angeles; from Los Angeles she had gone to Hawaii, where she worked directly under Colonel Wyman and had gone to Canada from [4] Hawaii. I flew from Edmonton to White Horse in the same plane with Miss Campbell. After staying in White Horse for two days, we proceeded to Skagway, Alaska, by train, also accompanied by Miss Campbell, who was the Colonel's personal representative on the Canal Project #2 at Skagway, Alaska. Miss Campbell told me, in the presence of my wife and others, that on the morning of December 7, 1941, in the Hawaiian Islands, Colonel Wyman, who was then District Engineer, came to the office after the Japanese attack, in a drunken condition and in civilian clothes, and changed to his uniform in full view of the girls in the office. Colonel Wyman meantime

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shouted directions to those in the office and passed out guns to anyone who seemed to be able to operate firearms.

Ferman K. Pickering,
Mr. FERMAN K. PICKERING.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7 day of January, 1944.

MARIE A. DODGE,
Notary Public in and for the County of Los Angeles, State of California.

My Commission Expires May 28, 1947.*

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

In re: Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Los Angeles, ss:

Lieutenant L. M. STAUB, 11166 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U. S. Navy, Reserve, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I first met Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. about 1938; I have seen him on H. W. Rohl's yacht, the Vega, four or five times, and on each and every occasion Wyman was so drunk that he was utterly obnoxious and incapable of transacting any business; when I was first introduced to him, Colonel Wyman criticized my appearance and was very insulting to me; he would pour whisky on the floor and drop his burning cigarettes on the carpet.

Mrs. Floy Rohl once stated to me that she didn't like Wyman, but that H. W. Rohl, her husband, had to tolerate him for business reasons.

I was acquainted with Werner Plack, having met him in about 1935 or 1936, and know that he spent most of his time at Gert Von Gundhardt's home in Beverly Hills. Plack also told me that he visited at Frank Morgan's home in Beverly Hills.

L. M. Staub.
L. M. STAUB.

This statement taken, and signature witnessed by JOHN H. WEINER, INVESTIGATOR for The Committee On Military Affairs UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

John H. Weiner.
JOHN H. WEINER.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of December, 1943.

FRIEDA SEGEL.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

In re: Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Los Angeles, ss:

REA B. WICKISER, whose residence is 1522 Rodney Drive, Los Angeles, California, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I was born in Lima, Ohio, in 1908, educated in that state, and went into tunnel construction work in Michigan, worked on the Boulder Dam project, on the Southern California Aqueduct and Parker Dam, and went to Honolulu on the Alinanau Crater project under the supervision of Major Bruce Hill, then worked running quarries and making estimates for the U. S. Engineers on the California Central Valleys Project, then worked for Mr. H. J. King on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, then on a shaft and tunnel for the Navy in Bremerton, Washington, then to Parker Dam driving penstock tunnels, then to San Luis Obispo.

In about May, 1941, I heard that Territory Airport Constructors had gotten a contract for building five airports in the Hawaiian Islands, and contacted Phil Shirley, of Gunther-Shirley Company, and was hired to take charge of rock excavation in the Islands for Territory Airport Constructors, having signed the contract on July 18, 1941.

I went to the Island of Maui in July, 1941, and started supervising rock excavation work there. Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., was supervising all this work for the Army Engineers. I then worked on an airport on the Island of Hilo as

superintendent for Territory Airport Constructors. No particular difficulties were encountered until the United States went to war, and the engineers bought all our equipment for the Army, and we assigned our contracts over to the Army Engineers, and our personnel went to work for Hawaiian Constructors. My first job was to mine Hilo Airport which consisted of placing boxes of explosives in a definite pattern below the grade of the runways—this being immediately after Pearl Harbor. This was under Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. The grades on the runways were changed nine times by the Army Engineers, necessitating changing positions of the demolition boxes. Since an invasion was feared, I was put to work with a crew of my men to stand by on a 24-hour emergency. Two Army demolition experts were stationed at Hilo as advisors, but in fact I had to instruct them. I was really in charge of the "scorched earth" program. I requested soldiers be assigned to my detail, and this was done.

I was next sent to Pahoa as superintendent to take charge of very secret work. I was instructed by the Engineering Corps, headed then by Wyman, not to leave the dirt in the tunnel and not to dump it outside. My one small blueprint indicated the tunnel's course as making a 62° turn to the right off an exit. I finished the job 2 days ahead of schedule, and was asked drive another one at Pahoa, but the Engineers failed to locate it for me; so I had to locate and drive it, which I did in 15 days; the plan showed a 62° turn to the left, but after we had completed it, the Engineers brought out another set of plans showing the 62° turn to the right instead of the left. This was all under Wyman's supervision.

I then went to Kahuku to drive another tunnel of the same type through rock, necessitating mechanical equipment. Believing the work was needed in a hurry, I asked for equipment, but Wyman's engineers in Honolulu wouldn't give us any equipment, so we did the job by hand.

My wife was then evacuated from Honolulu to the mainland, and I decided that things were in such a mess I would leave, and got a medical release from my contract by the engineers, but I stayed on under Mr. King until we left together on January 25, 1943. Was general superintendent of all underground construction from June, 1942 until our contract was fulfilled.

From the experience I had with Wyman's Engineers, when I found he received the Distinguished Service Medal, I thought somebody had slipped up somewhere along the line, and that Washington just didn't know what had been going on.

Referring to the testimony given by Ray Anderson, where he insinuated that Pleasonton was a place of debauch, but this is not true. The female help in this hotel was never allowed above the first floor.

The food about which Anderson complained was furnished by the Army Engineers, and was a livable ration.

He mentions a vehicular tunnel as being dug by soldiers, whereas I dug it myself in 1935.

(Signed) Rea B. Wickiser,
REA B. WICKISER.

This statement, taken, and signature witnessed by JOHN H. WEINER, INVESTIGATOR for The Committee On Military Affairs UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

(Signed) John H. Weiner,
JOHN H. WEINER.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 18 day of December, 1943, Rea B. Wickiser and John H. Weiner.

FRIDA SEGEL.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 24 September 1942.

In reply refer to: AG-201.22
Re Contract No. W-414-eng-602

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Punahou Campus, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIRS: The Hawaiian Department commends your organization on its achievements as noted below.

The completion of Runway A at Wheeler Field in 30 days is particularly noteworthy. This project was started on the morning of July 24, 1942 and the completed and paved runway, 300' wide by 6,200' long, was turned over to and used by

the Air Force on the morning of August 25, 1942, a record for runway construction which it is believed has never been equaled in this area.

Special credit is due to Herbert J. King, General Superintendent, who, by reason of his training, experience and unselfish devotion to the job, brought about the coordination of forces necessary for these achievements.

Specifically to be commended are your Tunnel Department, headed by R. B. Wickiser, General Tunnel Superintendent, his able assistants, and the organization under his jurisdiction. Within 90 days, not only was this organization perfected, but notable advances were made in tunnel construction which are the more remarkable in view of the difficulties, obstacles and unforeseeable contingencies to be overcome.

The outstanding work of the grading organization headed by John Crockett, Excavation Superintendent, also merits recognition. The grading of Walele Gulch Airfield, involving in excess of 600,000 yards of excavation, was completed in 34 days. At Wheeler Field, the grading and placing of foundation rock base course on Runway A was completed in 20 days.

Special appreciation is also merited by the asphalt paving crew under Donald D. Cook, Asphalt Superintendent. This crew, I am informed, started asphaltting the base course on Runway A at Wheeler Field before more than half of the course had been laid and so coordinated its work with other operations that the entire project could be completed in record time.

Very truly yours,

Delos C. Emmons,
DELOS C. EMMONS,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

[1]

Headquarters,
SAN BERNARDINO AIR SERVICE COMMAND,
SAN BERNARDINO ARMY AIR FIELD, CALIFORNIA.

STATEMENT OF MR. EMIL ZUCCA,

RESIDENCE: 1141 MAGNOLIA STREET, SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA.

Interviewed by John H. Weiner, Investigator, Committee of Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Statement taken at San Bernardino Air Service Command, San Bernardino Army Air Field, California, December 23, 1943.

Q. Please state your name.

A. Emil Zucca.

Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Zucca?

A. 1141 Magnolia Street, San Bernardino, California.

Q. Where are you employed?

A. San Bernardino Air Service Command.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. Senior Aircraft Mechanic.

Q. Were you ever employed by the U. S. Engineer Department, South Pacific Division, Los Angeles District?

A. Yes.

Q. What were your duties?

A. Chauffeur.

Q. To whom were you assigned?

A. District Engineer.

Q. And who was that?

A. Major Theodore Wyman, Jr.

[2] Q. How long were you employed in that capacity?

A. I started in February, 1936, and I worked there until March of 1942.

Q. How long did you actually drive for Major Wyman?

A. About 3 years and 7 months.

Q. Was that a government car?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you acquainted with the first Mrs. Wyman—Ella Wyman?

A. Yes.

Q. Also the second Mrs. Wyman—Ruth Wyman?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you had occasions to drive Major Wyman in the evenings and early mornings?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever have occasion to drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know, from your own knowledge, who he was going there to visit?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you ever had occasion to go up to Mr. Rohl's apartment in the Biltmore Hotel?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What would be these occasions?

A. On different occasions, I have gone to Mr. Rohl's apartment to take Major Wyman cigarettes, and his brief case—on occasions.

Q. Who would be in the apartment on these occasions?

A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, sometimes would be alone; and on other occasions, there would be Mr. Svendrup, and Paul Graffe.

[3] Q. As a rule, would you have to wait for Major Wyman?

A. Yes.

Q. How late, if you remember, would you have to wait for him on some occasions?

A. Oh, anywhere from 9:00 until 2:00.

Q. Where would you then take him?

A. Home.

Q. Do you remember the address?

A. 221 Woodruff, West Los Angeles.

Q. It was also customary, was it not, for you also to drive Major Wyman and his friends around to the various night clubs?

A. I have, on occasion. Yes.

Q. Please name some of the night clubs that you have taken Major Wyman and his guests.

A. Earl Carroll's, Cafe La Maze, Little Jane Jones' club, the Trocadero, and the Ambassador Hotel.

Q. Who would usually be along on these parties?

A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, Mr. Svendrup, Captain George Withers, Captain Clatterbos, Paul Graffe. There was also one man whose name I don't remember . . . medium build.

Q. On these trips, Mr. Zucca, you always used the government car, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Would you then have to wait until the party was over and take them home?

A. Most of the time.

Q. How late would you have to wait to take the parties home?

A. Around midnight or one o'clock.

Q. But there have been occasions that you just took out Mr. Rohl and Major Wyman to the same type of places?

A. Yes, sir.

[4] Q. Would you be paid extra for this work?

A. Occasionally I received a tip.

Q. Please state the various night clubs or country clubs where you took Mr. and Mrs. Rohl and Major and Mrs. Wyman.

A. The Bel-Air Country Club. Different hotels. It is impossible for me to remember all the names.

Q. Please state if there have also been occasions when it was necessary for you to take Mrs. Wyman shopping.

A. Yes, I have taken both of them shopping.

Q. And that, also, was in the government car?

A. Yes.

Q. To the best of your recollection, Mr. Zucca, please state the various banks that you took either Major Wyman or Mrs. Wyman.

A. The Bank of America at Seventh and Figueroa, and the Bank of America at Westwood Village.

Q. On your visits to Mr. Rohl's apartment in the hotel, while Major Wyman and these men were there, did you see evidences of liquor?

A. I have, on occasions.

Q. Have you ever driven Major Wyman down to the Los Angeles Yacht Club?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who he was to meet there?

A. I presume Mr. Rohl.

Q. Have you ever been on the Vega?

A. No. But I have seen it.

Q. Have you ever taken Major Wyman from the hotel to homes other than his own?

A. Yes.

[5] Q. Do you know whose homes you took him to?

A. I drove him to Mr. Rohl's home, and Captain Clatterbos' home, and Captain Withers'. Those are the only ones that I recall.

Q. Would you leave him there, or would you wait for him?

A. Sometimes I would leave him there, and sometimes I would wait.

That is all Mr. Zucca. Thank you very much.

EMIL ZUCCA.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of December, 1943.

EDWARD C. STRUM.

My Commission Expires April 28, 1944.

[1]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., February 3, 1944.

INTERVIEW

Present: Herman J. Galloway, John M. Martin, H. Ralph Burton, Joseph G. Colgan.

Mr. MARTIN. All of the Rohl-Connolly Company work performed prior to the negotiated contract for construction work in the Hawaiian Islands was performed pursuant to an invitation for bids and an award for them at public letting. The first negotiated contract that Rohl-Connolly became interested in was known as the Hawaiian Constructors contract about December 18, 1940. Present were Mr. Paul Grafe, then Vice President of the Callahan Construction Company, Mr. T. E. Connolly, the President of the Rohl-Connolly Company. Mr. Grafe also is either Vice President or Attorney in Fact for the Gunther-Shirley Company.

Mr. BURTON. Could you state just what interest Rohl had in any of the companies making up the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. MARTIN. The same interest as the three had in the Caddoa Constructors, that being 40 percent participating interest; 40 percent participating interest was held by W. E. Callahan and 20 percent by Gunther-Shirley Corporation. The Rohl-Connolly [2] stock was then owned 50 percent by T. E. Connolly through his ownership in the T. E. Connolly Co., Inc., 25 percent was owned by Floy E. Rohl, Rohl's wife, and 25 percent was held by H. W. Rohl, so that Rohl had 10 percent interest in those contracts. That was later reduced by selling a participating interest to Ralph Wooley and the Hawaiian Contracting Company.

Mr. BURTON. I understand that Rohl was the directing head of the Hawaiian Constructors on the Hawaiian contracts.

Mr. MARTIN. That is true only from on or about the 26th or 27th of September 1941 on which date he first arrived. Prior to that date he had nothing to do whatsoever with the Hawaiian Islands contract or with work being performed there. He probably was consulted as to the necessary finances the Rohl-Connolly Co. would have to advance toward an operating fund.

Mr. BURTON. Isn't it true that Colonel Wyman was in Washington in December of 1940 when this contract was negotiated?

Mr. MARTIN. I personally met and talked with Colonel Wyman in Washington, D. C. on December 18, 1940.

Mr. BURTON. You state there were a number of supplements dated December 20, 1940?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes, I served as Attorney for Hawaiian Constructors from the very inception of the contract until the completion of the work about a year ago. By that I mean I personally dictated from Washington to my Los Angeles Office the joint venture agreement.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to ask you to repeat what you said about the Far Eastern Air route.

[3] MARTIN. You asked me about Mr. Rohl's being in charge of the Islands. It is my understanding that on or about the 25th of September, 1941 Mr. Rohl took a clipper to the Islands and immediately took direct charge of a major portion of the project. I understand from him that he was there on December 7, 1941 and that on or about December 10, 1941 he received from the Commanding General

an order to construct for the Government the five ferry command bases from the United States to Australia. Within 35 days after the receipt of such order he had completed those 5 ferry command bases.

BURTON. Do you know anything of the relationship of Leif J. Sverdrup of the firm of Sverdrup and Parcel and later the firm of Sverdrup and Parcel and J. Gordon Turnbull, to the Hawaiian Constructors?

MARTIN. I have spent, as attorney for the Bechtel-Price-Callahan Company, a considerable amount of time on their problems. On one occasion I flew to Edmonton and spent a portion of a month there as attorney for Bechtel-Price-Callahan who had the contract for what is known as the Canol Project. While there were only three names on the contract, there were probably 10 or 12 who had been contributing their efforts to that project. I do not believe a supplemental contract was made so as to bring all those people in as contractors to that project. I did come into contact with that firm in connection with the Canol project. I have never contacted them in connection with the Rohl-Connolly Company. It is my recollection that Sverdrup has served as the consultant in my work with other clients.

[4] BURTON. Do you know whether or not Sverdrup is an associate or close personal friend of Rohl?

MARTIN. I am sure he is not. I never met Sverdrup. I have represented Mr. Rohl as his attorney and I would say also as his attorney in fact for a period of more than 15 years and I don't know the man Sverdrup.

BURTON. Do you know about how many supplements there were to the original contract which was W-414 eng 602 signed December 1940?

MARTIN. Approximately 40.

BURTON. Do you know anything of negotiations which are pending now relating to the termination settlement of the contract with the Hawaiian Constructors? Have you had anything to do with them?

MARTIN. It is my understanding that conferences concerning that matter have been had with my office, probably with my brother, Frank L. Martin, Jr. I have had some discussion with those interested in the Hawaiian Constructors, but I have no detailed information of that now. I can say to you I believe the present status would show that on approximately \$100,000,000 worth of work completed by Hawaiian Constructors, there is a major portion of it on which no settlement has been made either as to determination of fees or the issuance of final estimates of the making of final payments themselves.

BURTON. Are those negotiations taking place in California or in Hawaii?

MARTIN. I am personally not handling them and I can't give you any help on that subject. It is my recollection that a decision was [5] reached by Mr. Connolly, Mr. Grafe, and Mr. Shirley that that matter was to be handled by their partner Mr. Wooley who resides in the Islands and that Mr. Wooley has the assistance of Mr. Middleton who has been in continuous active charge of the office for Hawaiian Constructors in the Islands throughout the entire period of the contract.

BURTON. Will you continue your statement regarding Colonel Wyman?

MARTIN. When I said a few moments ago I personally saw Colonel Wyman in Washington, D. C. about the 18th of December, 1940, I had in mind a joint conference with Mr. Connolly, Mr. Grafe and Mr. Wyman which was prior to the date when the contract was signed for the work. I only spoke to Colonel Wyman in greeting because I had known him in Los Angeles. I don't recall there was any business discussion at all in that conference. I had shortly adjourned to a conference with Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe at which time I learned of their wishes for a joint venture. The negotiations for that contract were handled by Mr. Connolly personally with Mr. Grafe, General Schley and General Robbins in Washington and a Major Neuman. Mr. Rohl was not present in Washington and to the best of my knowledge, knew none of the terms or provisions of that contract or had anything to do with it until on or about September 25, 1941. I make that statement because sometime in 1929 Mr. Rohl had come to my office and handed me his original declaration of citizenship and inquired of me whether there wasn't some means by which he could [6] now proceed to obtain his final papers, I told Mr. Rohl he had waited too long, that the 7 years period had already expired. He said he was quite anxious to expedite the obtaining of his papers and wondered if I didn't know of somebody who knew a way that the procedure could be shortened, calling to my attention the fact that his wife was an American. I told him I would write to Washington, D. C. and try to think of something that would enable him to obtain citizenship without starting all over again. In the early spring of 1941 Mr. Rohl came to my office

and handed me an order of Colonel Wyman, District Engineer, directing that he report as a consultant in the Islands in connection with the work of the Hawaiian Constructors. I at that time discussed with Mr. Rohl the possibility of the Department issuing him a permit authorizing him to go to the Islands. It is my recollection that I thought probably the order by the District Engineer would be sufficient for him to go, but that I felt for him to go in the capacity where the order itself disclosed that the contract was secret, this order showed it was a secret contract, would not be wise. I advised Mr. Rohl he shouldn't attempt to assume responsibility for a secret project at a time when he wasn't a citizen of the United States. Mr. Rohl asked me if I would explain to General Robbins why Mr. Rohl was not obeying that request of Colonel Wyman. I told him [7] I would and I think there was a lapse of probably several months. Other subsequent requests had been made by Colonel Wyman who apparently was rowing with Paul Grafe, in which Rohl was again requested to come to the Islands and it drifted along until about August 1941 when I had come to Washington and handed to General Robbins a photostatic order directing that Rohl go to the Islands and I believe that Colonel Lorange and a civilian attorney for the Chief of Engineers named Stephen were there. It is my recollection that General Kingman, who was then Acting Chief of Engineers, was brought into the discussion and that Kingman thereupon wrote a letter to Mr. Schofield. Was it Schofield? The letter was dated about August 28, 1941, and Mr. Schofield is head of the Department of Immigration in which General Kingman stated that there could be no question of Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States; that his services were badly needed in the islands, and that he understood he had a petition pending with the court in Los Angeles for his naturalization and would they do what they could to expedite the hearing on its merits by the Federal court. It is my recollection that Mr. Stephen delivered that letter by hand to Mr. Schofield and that Mr. Schofield then wired his office at Los Angeles asking that they expedite a hearing of the Rohl petition, and while in Washington I was advised that it had been set for September 15. At that hearing my brother appeared as attorney for Mr. Rohl.

BURTON. Did Mr. Rohl have any one else employed as attorney?

MARTIN. Only as my associate. At that time my brother was ill and [8] I had Mr. Cannon aid me. He was on a number of cases with me and probably had an active part in this hearing on September 15, although I was not personally present. That is just my recollection.

COLGAN. Did I understand he had taken out his first papers?

MARTIN. He took out his first papers at Sacramento in about 1913 to 1915.

BURTON. Do you want to tell of Rohl-Connolly's Company participation in contracts having to do with the Government or is there something you want to say before then?

MARTIN. I previously stated that the first contract for Government work awarded the Rohl-Connolly Company on a competitive bidding basis was for the Hawaiian Constructors. The second contract, and I believe the only other Government contract ever awarded the Rohl-Connolly Company, or in which it participated other than on a competitive bidding basis is what is known as the Haines Cut-off contract, which is a secret contract of the War Department. The contract, I believe, was signed by a General Worsham, Division Engineer of the Northwestern Engineering District. I believe a letter of intent was signed by Colonel Wyman about February 9, 1942. The Rohl-Connolly Company had no active participation in the prosecution of the Haines Cut-off work. That was a highway which was being built to avoid a bottleneck in the Alaskan Highway, about 160 miles long. It started at a place called Haines. The Rohl-Connolly Company had a considerable amount of marine equipment that was then being used under a rental agreement by Navy contractors doing breakwater work and Army contractors doing breakwater work in Los Angeles Harbor. Foley Bros. and Rohl-Connolly Company were asked [9] to join in a 50-50 proposition in the execution of this secret contract. The primary reason for doing this was to gain the permission of the Rohl-Connolly Company to terminate the rental agreements for this marine equipment for the Army and Navy work so that the marine equipment would be available for the Haines Cut-off job, which contract was signed and a very considerable portion of the Rohl-Connolly Company equipment was made available.

BURTON. You mean that the Rohl-Connolly Company retained their financial interest in the contract but did not have any active participation in it?

MARTIN. That is correct.

COLGAN. You spoke of ten or more subcontractors on the Canol project?—or was it supplemental contracts?

MARTIN. What I said was the original contract with the Bechtel-Price-Callahan Corporation—that is, special features of the work were performed by other companies; they were selected to perform those special tasks and it is my recollection that those companies were not made parties to the original contract, with the full knowledge and approval of the contracting officer. Mr. Rohl had no interest either directly or indirectly in the Canol project.

BURTON. Do you know whether Mr. Rohl was over in Alaska during the period of construction work?

MARTIN. I do not believe that he has ever been in Alaska at any time. Not to my knowledge.

BURTON. Is the Bechtel-Price-Callahan one corporation?

MARTIN. The Bechtel Corporation is just one corporation, the W. W. [10] Callahan Corporation is another. The Bechtel-Price-Callahan is the same Callahan Corporation that was interested in the Hawaiian Constructors.

BURTON. What was the name of the Callahan Company which was in the Hawaiian Constructors?

MARTIN. W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

COLGAN. Can you give us some of Mr. Rohl's background prior to 1926?

MARTIN. I can cover that whole field but it would take a little time. Mr. Rohl was educated as a mechanical engineer at one of the universities in Germany. As a young man he went to South America. He had been in South America in charge of a special force there on mining properties. What I think should really happen here, as I can hit just the high points, I will have my brother prepare a statement, or have Rohl come here so that we have accurately all information you want. I have heard so much broadcast against Mr. Rohl that I am beginning to wonder as I do not know any of the things that I have heard broadcast. I have heard Fulton Lewis, Jr. broadcast about the \$75,000 yacht. The yacht belonged to Mrs. Rohl, she received \$1 for the leasing of it and that is all she received. (He here made mention of the Senator Tenney investigation, and stated that he obtained copies of the transcript and personally delivered a copy of it to Major General Roberts and to Attorney General Biddle on March 9, 1943).

BURTON. Do you know how much the Government spent in reconditioning the Vega?

MARTIN. No. It was the best maintained and kept boat on the Pacific [11] coast when the Government took it. I do know this. I know that the object of Colonel Wyman in taking it was to use it in certain South American countries as a survey project, but through the lack of cooperation the original use, to make a survey of the shortest route from these countries to the island, was never realized. It was to be used as a survey boat, a secret survey.

BURTON. Certain South American countries would not cooperate?

MARTIN. That is my information. It is secondhand, I learned during the time that the facts transpired. Colonel Wyman could give you better information than I can. There are certain islands that could have been used, which would have shortened our route, certain South American countries made this impossible. It was to have been used as a survey boat. The boat was subsequently purchased by the Government contract.

BURTON. I think by the Navy.

MARTIN. I am using broad terms.

BURTON. Is Mr. Grafe an American citizen?

MARTIN. I have no information at all. I always assumed he was.

GALLOWAY. I know this. He was going to Rose Polytec in Terre Haute, Indiana, where I lived. I was practising law there before the World War and he was there and was a friend of friends of mine.

MARTIN. So far as knowing it, I do not know. I do know this, I know him well enough to know that he is a very loyal, aggressive man, whose ability is well recognized in the industry. He pushed through and built Madden Dam, and has done a great deal of construction [12] work, tunnels, dams, etc. for the Government, and that he is the manager of the Policy Committee for the Canol Project and has given largely of his personal time. While Lewis was broadcasting about him he was north of the Arctic Circle doing his work, no radio broadcasts could get through there and he did not know what was being said about him. Mr. Rohl and Mr. Grafe are both aggressive men and you cannot be aggressive without stepping on someone's toes. I do know they are loyal to this country and their loyalty cannot be questioned. I do know that one of the

natural effects of the Fulton Lewis broadcasts and activities is to hamper our war effort and our preparedness program. I do know that when you do anything of this nature that you effect the mental punch of a man by destroying his peace of mind and destroying his ability to accomplish construction projects, or anything else. I feel that men who are engaged in putting forth their efforts in that direction under war conditions, should have support and not be interfered with. I will say for Mr. Rohl, Mr. Grafe, and Mr. Connolly, they are willing to come here. All I have to do is pick up the telephone and they will come here voluntarily, without service of subpoena.

BURTON. It is gratifying to know that.

MARTIN. I know something of the difficulties that are being encountered on the Canal project. But it is my understanding that they have discovered one of the largest potential oil fields that have ever been discovered on the North American continent; rich in 100 octane gas, oil, etc. If that is true, it should be worth leveling, and [13] as to the cost of development, maybe their commercial development would be very high in dollars, but if it is to be measured in the human lives saved then the cost is immaterial.

I served as a pilot in the Army 27 years ago, my brother was a pilot, my son is an Army pilot, and I have a daughter who is married to a Naval officer. I am somewhat prejudiced when I see anyone blackmailing, getting publicity for mud-slinging, or for other reasons injuring the fellow who is doing this work. I have to sympathy for him.

I was personally informed by the Speaker of the California State Legislature that the Jack Tenney Committee received appropriations for the calling in of those witnesses and taking of testimony on the representation that it was taking that testimony at the special instance and request of Attorney General Biddle. I received a copy of the transcript, and I personally delivered it to Attorney General Biddle. I advised him of the information I had received from the Speaker of the Assembly. I advised him in the presence of witnesses that Tenney had stated he had taken that testimony at the special instance of Mr. Biddle. Mr. Biddle at once informed me that that statement was not true. That none of the proceedings were being done at the instance or request of the Attorney General or his department.

I know that the petition which the department prepared for Rohl for his citizenship in the Spring of 1941 could not be acted upon, could not get any recommendations or any action of any [14] kind on it. I finally found out that a person in Los Angeles had taken the position, with relation to the Rohl-Connolly Company, who owned the scows, tugs, etc., that these had been licensed by the Bureau of Navigation when Hans Wilhelm Rohl owned 25% of the stock of the Rohl-Connolly Company, whereas the participation of an alien is limited to 15%. I personally came to Washington and submitted all of the facts and all of the data to the Solicitor General for the Department of Commerce, who personally went through all the files and all of the data and reported back that he could find no moral turpitude; that it was not a case for seizure of the vessels. The vessels had been documented by a broker who did not know that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen and signed by a secretary, Irma Dickey, neither of whom knew of the limiting of stock to 85% American and 15% alien. The Rohl-Connolly Company was fined \$25,000. That was promptly paid by the Rohl-Connolly Company. The Department of Commerce in turn communicated direct with Mr. Schofield, head of Immigration and advised Mr. Schofield that so far as the Department of Commerce was concerned, they could find nothing as to why Mr. Rohl's petition should not be promptly acted upon, and with that determination by the Department of Commerce, and letter from General Kingman, Mr. Schofield did expedite the placing of the petition on the calendar. I was told, and I hesitated a moment ago to say, I learned not so long ago that the informer had been paid by the United States Government, a statutory portion of that \$25,000 penalty.

Of course, I assume that you are not interested in any [15] threats that may have been made to any of my clients as to what would happen in the event they did not pay off. I assume that it is your duty to determine any action you may take on the facts.

BURTON. I think it is important that you include in your statement anything that you may know of any threats which have been made to your client.

MARTIN. I do not want to bother you with something you are not concerned with.

BURTON. If there is anything within your knowledge that reflects in any way upon the credibility of a witness who has, or does appear before the Committee, I think it your duty to submit it.

MARTIN. Only recently, prior to coming to Washington, in a telephone conversation with Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, I was informed by him that such threats had been made. He did not give me the details, but I understand that they had been made by person or persons scheduled to appear before your Committee. I asked Mr. Rohl whether he had personally seen such documents. He said that he had. I asked him how many. I think he said two. I asked him if he could furnish me with photostatic copies. He said he could. I told him that if Mr. Burton was interested in them, I would let him know. That is all the information I have on this subject.

BURTON. I think it proper at this point to say to you emphatically, and without qualification or the slightest question, that this Committee as such, or any of the members of the Committee, are absolutely above participating in anything in the nature of persecution of anyone, and if any threats directly or indirectly [16] are involved they should be submitted at once.

MARTIN. That is the reason I just made the statement, summary of my knowledge, my information from Mr. Rohl on that subject. I do not have in my possession or have I seen such threats relating to the telephone conversation I had with Mr. Rohl. I have but one interest here which is paramount, that is our preparedness program.

BURTON. A hearing, or an investigation, so far as this Committee is concerned, is never conducted for the purpose of publicity or smearing any one, and I can say without qualification that I have never encountered any such thing.

MARTIN. If you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Rohl and Mr. Grafe, they could substantiate what I have said. If you could satisfy yourself from the key leads I am giving you here, I think you would be in a position to move with considerable dispatch. I am ready to bring these men here at any time you want them.

HANS WILHELM ROHL

Born in Lubeck, Germany, September 29, 1886.

His last foreign residence was Raneagna, Chile. He emigrated to the United States from Valpariso, Chile, on October 23, 1913, arriving in New York City on the S.S. "Santa Marta" and paid his head tax.

He came to the United States to work for Nevada Consolidated Mining Company. Went to Nevada and worked there for about a year.

In 1914 he went to Sacramento, California, where he was employed by George Pollock, contractor.

He had a common law marriage in Sacramento in 1914. Four children were born of this marriage.

On July 23, 1915, he filed Declaration of Intention in Superior Court at Sacramento. He registered for the draft in 1917. He did not surrender Declaration of Intention or claim exemption because of citizenship. He was given some sort of supervisory position on a project engaged in raising food stuff for the Army during World War I, on which project some 600 were employed.

Later took up residence in San Francisco and in 1925 had a common law divorce, by agreement providing for care of children and common law wife until she remarried. Wife has since remarried and her name is now Mrs. Clark. Mrs. Clark's last residence of which I have knowledge was Sacramento, California.

Married Floy Edith Hubert (nee Adams) in San Francisco on August 26, 1925. Floy Edith Adams was born in Iola, Kansas, on October 27, 1890. She was formerly married but divorced in San Francisco.

On November 27, 1924, sailed from New York on S. S. Deutschland to England. Spent week or less in Germany. Returned New York January 10, 1925 on S. S. France. Had visa from German Consul in San Francisco.

In 1931 made several trips to Mexico in connection with highway construction for Mexican Government.

In 1932 wife purchased Yacht Ramona in New York, and he sailed on boat through Panama Canal arriving at San Diego.

In 1937 Ramona sold, and wife purchased Yacht Vega in New York. He went aboard at Jacksonville, Fla., went through Canal, then to Honolulu, arriving there in January, 1938, and then to Los Angeles, arriving in February, 1938.

Registered under Allen Reg. Act in Dec. 1940.

February 3, 1941, filed preliminary application papers for citizenship with Butterfield.

March 10, 1941, took examination before Butterfield with two witnesses, T. E. Connolly and Dr. Karl Lewis. Filed petition for naturalization and appeared

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before Julge Terrell, who excused the witnesses, but requested certified copies of his divorce proceedings, and of present wife's divorce proceedings.

On September 15, 1941, his petition was heard by the U. S. District Court at Los Angeles, and decree granting citizenship was entered.

On September 25, 1941, left by Clipper for Honolulu in accordance with written order of Colonel Wyman, dated January 22, 1941.

Mr. Rohl's reasons for refusing sooner compliance with Colonel Wyman's order of January 22, 1941, were fully explained to Major General Robins, U. S. Engineer Corps, about August 28, 1941, at which time General John J. Kingman directed a letter to Lemuel R. Schofield, head of the Department of Immigration and Naturalization in Washington. This letter in substance stated that Rohl's services were badly needed in the Islands and that he had declined to make his services available to Colonel Wyman until such time as the U. S. District Court in Los Angeles had heard and determined upon its merits his then pending petition for citizenship.

Mr. Schofield, on receipt of General Kingman's letter, wired his Los Angeles office requesting that Mr. Rohl's petition be placed upon the September 15 calendar for hearing in the Federal Court of Los Angeles. The petition was heard on September 15, decree of citizenship entered and on September 25, Mr. Rohl left by Clipper for Honolulu and for the next 14 months took active charge of work of the Hawaiian Constructors in the Islands.

At no time prior to the entry of his final decree of citizenship did Hans Wilhelm Rohl take any part in prosecution of the work or the performance of the Hawaiian Constructors' obligations, as during the period prior to Mr. Rohl's declaration of citizenship Mr. Paul Grafe was in the Islands in active charge of the work of Hawaiian Constructors. Mr. Rohl had no part in the negotiations or the Hawaiian Constructors contract as such contract was personally negotiated in Washington, D. C., by Mr. T. E. Connolly, president of Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Paul Grafe, vice-president of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, with General Schley, General Robins, and Major Newman.

During the period of these negotiations, Colonel Wyman was then serving as District Engineer in the Islands and was present in Washington for the purpose of making known to the Department his requirements, but the actual negotiations were primarily with the three other officers above-mentioned.

[Confidential]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 23, 1944.

H. RALPH BURTON,
General Counsel, House Military Affairs Committee,
519 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: With reference to your oral request that you be furnished certain information with respect to the equipment which was purchased from Rohl-Connolly Company for use in connection with contract No. W-414-eng-602, there is enclosed a memorandum from the Office of the Chief of Engineers dated May 23, 1944 which, it is believed, contains the information desired by you.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ James P. Murtagh,
JAMES P. MURTAGH,
Major, Inf.

(For Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.)

Enc.
khm

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEERS,
Washington, 23 May 1944.

Address reply to Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.
Refer to File No SPEGS 3335 (Hawaiian Dept).
Memorandum for Mr. Julius H. Amberg,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.

Atten: Major James P. Murtagh, Inf. Room 3D739, The Pentagon.

Subject: House Military Affairs Committee Investigation Rohl-Connolly Company.

1. Reference is to your memorandum for the Chief of Engineers dated 14 April 1944, subject as stated above.

2. Information responsive to the inquiries made by the Chief Counsel of the House Military Affairs Committee, relative to the equipment which was purchased from Rohl-Connolly Company for use in connection with Contract No. W-414-eng-602, has been secured from the Acting District Engineer at Honolulu, T. H., and is furnished below.

a. *A list of the equipment involved.* The following items of equipment were purchased from Rohl-Connolly Company for use in connection with Contract No. W-414-eng-602:

No. of units	Description	Unit price	Total cost
1	80-D Northwest Shovel, Serial No. 5437	\$30,000.00	\$30,000.00
1	80-D Northwest Shovel, Serial No. 5184	25,000.00	25,000.00
1	80-D Northwest Shovel, Serial 3872	20,000.00	20,000.00
2	Sullivan Class Wn. Air Compressors, Serial Nos. 19023 & 19024	4,500.00	9,000.00
1	Palmer International Generator, Serial No. 508186	2,500.00	2,500.00
7	Sterling Trucks, Model HCS, Engine Nos. 13622, 13604, 13701, 13659, 19789, 10398, 13605	9,000.00	63,000.00
1	Rex Double Pumcrete (Model 200)	9,000.00	9,000.00
1	Lot Pumcrete Accessories and Parts	6,982.14	6,982.14
1	Hell Hoist (Model OT-73-S0)	941.03	941.03
	Total		166,423.17

b. *The date on which the equipment was, according to the terms of the agreement, to be delivered.* No written agreement was entered into prior to actual acquisition of the equipment by the Government. Arrangements were made in November, 1941, between Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., then District Engineer, Honolulu, and Mr. H. D. Rohl, of the Rohl-Connolly Company, for the plant in question to be made available for use under Contract No. W-414-eng-602. The transaction was consummated by issuance of Government purchase order to Rohl-Connolly Company 18 March 1942, after the equipment had been in the possession of the United States for approximately four months, i. e., considering both time in transit and time in use.

c. *When the equipment was actually delivered in Hawaii.*—The equipment was received in the Hawaiian Islands early in February 1942.

d. *What caused the delay in transporting the equipment to Hawaii.*—The equipment was originally scheduled for use on construction work being performed at Canton Island under Contract No. W-414-eng-602. The equipment was shipped from Los Angeles, California, on the Army Transport Ludington and was enroute to Canton Island at the time of the enemy attack of 7 December 1941, whereupon the vessel was ordered back to the United States and accordingly returned to Los Angeles. The equipment was then shipped to the Hawaiian Islands under war restrictions, where it was retained for utilization on defense projects.

e. *How much was paid to Rohl-Connolly Company for the equipment and how much additional expense, if any, was incurred in transporting it.*—Total payment in the amount of \$166,423.17 was made to Rohl-Connolly Company on 19 March 1942 for the equipment listed in subparagraph a above as representing its value at time of original possession by the Army. The equipment was purchased f. o. b. Los Angeles, California. Inasmuch as the equipment was shipped from that point via Army Transport, the actual additional cost incurred by the Army in transporting the equipment to Hawaii is not available.

For the Chief of Engineers:

/s/ Douglas I. McKay,
DOUGLAS I. MCKAY,
Special Assistant to the Chief of Engineers.

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, May 22, 1944

H. RALPH BURTON,
General Counsel, House Military Affairs Committee,
519 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: This will acknowledge receipt of two unsigned memoranda, addressed by you to Lt. Colonel Miles H. Knowles under date of March 22, 1944.

in which you requested certain information in connection with the investigation being conducted by your Committee of the award of construction contracts in Hawaii.

The Office of the Chief of Engineers has furnished the seven enclosures listed below which, it is believed, contain the information desired by you. In addition, that office has supplied the following comments with respect to the enclosures:

1. *Information pertaining to basic contract and supplements thereto numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5:*

a. *Dates of the orders to proceed for all the schedules listed in summary.* Copies of all job orders, with addenda thereto, applicable to the basic contract and first five supplemental agreement are enclosed, together with an index identifying the relationship of the various job orders to the schedules of work in the contract and supplemental agreements (Encl. #1). These job orders constitute the notice to the contractor to proceed with the work, and list in each case the proposed commencement date and estimated date for completion of the work. It will be noted from the last column of the index (Encl. #1) that, in many cases, the contractor was directed to proceed with the various items of work under any one particular schedule on different dates.

b. *Progress charts for the same schedules.* Progress charts, as such, were not maintained for the various schedules. In lieu thereof, data covering actual progress of the work were kept on a job order basis, and with respect to the job orders applicable to the basic contract and supplements Nos. 1 to 5 thereto, are reflected in the information furnished in subparagraph 1c below.

[2] c. *Monthly reports showing percentage of completion of the work as determined from estimates made and approved by the Contracting Officer.* Extracts of partial payment estimates pertaining to work under the basic contract and first five supplemental agreements are enclosed (Encl. #2.) These payment schedules show the progressive percentages of completion of the applicable job orders as determined from estimates jointly made and agreed to by representatives of the contractor and the Government and approved by the Contracting Officer.

d. *Record of weekly reimbursements to contractor for payroll and material invoices for the year 1941.* No reimbursements were made to the contractor for payroll and material invoices for the year 1941, since all reimbursable salaries and wages were paid to the contractor's employees directly by the Government and all materials utilized on the projects were either furnished by the Government or payment therefor made directly to vendors in accordance with the direct payment option reserved in the contract.

e. *By whom the air raiding devices were supplied and when they were received by the District Engineer for the District of Hawaii.* The only work performed by the contractor at Aircraft Warning Service locations was the construction of camps, buildings, utilities, roads, tunnels, fencing, and such appurtenant work. The actual furnishing and installation of technical equipment was a responsibility and function of the Army Signal Corps. In connection with Job Order No. 2.0 (Original Contract, Schedule "B"), the cableway erected at Mt. Kaala was purchased from the Interstate Equipment Corporation, 18 West Jersey Street, Elizabeth, New Jersey, under Government Supply Contract No. W-414-eng-784, dated 30 April 1941.

f. *By whom the storage tanks for gasoline were supplied.* The gasoline storage tanks covered by Supplemental Agreement No. 2, Schedule "J", were furnished the District Engineer in plate form by the Army Air Corps. The tanks were then either prefabricated by the contractor at a central point and hauled to the site or the plates were transported to, and welded at, the installation site. Revised work under Supplemental Agreement No. 4, Schedule "G", provided for the substitution of nine (9) 40,000-barrel all welded steel underground gasoline storage tanks for the four (4) 50,000-barrel tanks originally specified. These nine (9) tanks were furnished and installed by the Hammond Iron Works, Warren, Pennsylvania, under Government Lump-Sum Construction Contract No. W-1101-eng-5309, dated 23 October 1941.

g. *Record of any complaints made by the Government concerning delays of the contractor during 1941.*—There is no record in this office (U. S. E. O., Honolulu, T. H.) of any formal complaints registered by the Government concerning delays of the contractor during 1941.

2. *Information applicable to basic contract and all supplements thereto:*

a. *Chart showing the organization of the Hawaiian Constructors as required by Article 16 of the contract.* Three separate charts, reflecting the contractor's organizational set-up as of 31 March 1941, 26 May 1941 and 10 October 1942, are enclosed (Encl. #3.)

b. *Copy of Hawaiian District Order No. 1, dated 1 January 1943, terminating the contract and supplements to that date.* The order mentioned has apparently been cited in error, since District Order No. 1 dated 1 January 1943 has no bearing on the termination of Contract No. W-414-eng-602. It is believed that reference is intended to District Circular No. 4, dated 12 January 1943, copy of which is enclosed (Encl. #4.) There is also enclosed copy of termination notice given the contractor on 11 January 1943 (Encl. #5.) Prior to issuance of the notice (Encl. #5) terminating all work under the contract, as amended, the work provided for under Supplemental Agreement No. 43 (Parts 1 and 2) and Supplemental Agreement No. 23 (Parts 1 and 2) was terminated for the convenience of the Government by Change Order No. 12, dated 5 May 1942, and Change Order No. 13 (Part 1), dated 13 May 1942, respectively. Copies of both of these change orders are enclosed (Encl. #6 and #7.)

Yours sincerely,

/s/ James P. Murtagh
JAMES P. MURTAGH
Major, Inf.

(For Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.)

7 Enclosures:

- 1—Cys Job Orders & Index
- 2—Cys Payment estimates
- 3—Three Organization charts
- 4—Cy Dist. Cir. No. 4
- 5—Cy termination notice
- 6—Cy Change Order No. 12
- 7—Cy Change Order No. 13 (Part 1)

khn

[Air Mail]

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

APO 958

8 FEB. '44 BRW HS.
Officer Assigning.
10 FEB 1944.

Refer to File Engr-CCA-160

Subject: Information concerning contracts with Hawaiian Constructors, Sverdrup & Parcel and Territory Airport Constructors

To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. Information requested in War Department secret radiogram No. 84 dated 6 February 1944, for the House Military Affairs Committee, concerning all contracts awarded under the jurisdiction of this Headquarters to Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.; Sverdrup & Parcel, St. Louis, Missouri; and Territory Airport Constructors, Honolulu, T. H., is given below.

2. *Information relative to Contract No. W-414-eng-602:*

a. Total payments made to date other than reimbursements for supplies, materials and services:

- (1) To Hawaiian Constructors:
\$541,031.35—Fixed Fee
\$124,105.05—Rental and recapture of new equipment
- (2) To Hawaiian Contracting Company, Ltd.:
\$317,128.58—Purchase of used equipment
- (3) To Rohl-Connolly Company:
\$166,423.17—Purchase of used equipment
- (4) To W. E. Callahan Construction Co.:
\$84,000.00—Purchase of used equipment
- (5) To T. R. Connolly, Inc.:
\$57,500.00—Purchase of used equipment

The bulk of the supplies and materials utilized on the contract work were purchased by the Government from independent vendors and paid for directly by the Government to the several vendors. With few exceptions, [2] all personnel employed by the contractor on the work was paid directly by the Government. Of the sums reimbursed or paid by the Government under Contract

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No. W-414-eng-602, Hawaiian Constructors have been requested by the present Contracting Officer to refund to the Government the following:

Date of request for refund	Item	Amount
9 Apr. 43	Legal services	\$110.00
22 Apr. 43		9,833.32
21 Sep. 43	De-luxe subsistence items ordered in connection with operation of Yacht VEGA	146.47
20 Oct. 43	1% per month interest prior to recapture of equipment used on the work	124,105.05
20 Oct. 43	License fees & taxes on equipment used on work	20,929.18
25 Jan. 44	Expenditures in connection with operation of Yacht VEGA	29,518.70
4 Feb. 44	Additional expenditures in connection with operation of Yacht VEGA	10,233.76
	Total	194,876.48

None of these sums has been refunded to date, although a total of \$29,604.83 has been set off against reimbursement payments which would otherwise have been due the contractor under the terms of the contract.

b. *Relative degree of participation by the Joint Venturers.*—The following data from the files of the U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H., are believed to be substantially correct but have not been definitely confirmed.

Period	Joint venturer	Extent of interest
12/20/40 to 5/27/41.....	W. E. Callahan Construction Co.....	40%
	Rohl-Connolly Co.....	40%
	Gunther & Shirley Co.....	20%
[5] 5/27/41 to 12/31/41.....	W. E. Callahan Construction Co.....	32%
	Rohl-Connolly Co.....	32%
	Gunther & Shirley Co.....	16%
	Ralph E. Woolley.....	20%
1/1/42 to 1/31/43.....	W. E. Callahan Construction Co.....	24%
	Rohl-Connolly Co.....	24%
	Gunther & Shirley Co.....	12%
	Ralph E. Woolley.....	20%
	Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd.....	20%

c. *Personalities involved in the work on behalf of each one of the Joint Venturers.*

Name of joint venturer	Name and title of official involved	Nature and extent of participation
W. E. Callahan Construction Co.	Paul Grafe, Vice President.....	Negotiation of contract and supplemental agreements and active supervision of contract work from 20 December 1940 to approx. 31 December 1941
Gunther & Shirley Co.....	J. P. Shirley, President.....	Negotiation of contract only
Rohl-Connolly Company.....	T. E. Connolly, President.....	Negotiation of contract only
" " ".....	H. W. Rohl, President.....	Negotiation of supplemental agreements to contract and active supervision of contract work from about 1 January 1942 to about 24 June 1942
Ralph E. Woolley.....	Ralph E. Woolley, trading as an individual	Participated in supervision of contract work from 22 May 1941 to 31 January 1943
[4] Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd.	H. P. Benson, President.....	Participated in direction of contract work from 3 January 1942 to 31 January 1943

d. *War Department representative engaged in settlement negotiations.* Colonel B. R. Wimer, C. E., Deputy District Engineer and Contracting Officer, U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

3. *Information relative to Contracts Nos. W-414-eng-634, W-414-eng-808, DA-W-414-eng-511, DA-W-414-eng-585 and DA-W-414-eng-842:*

a. Were contracts terminated at same time as Contract No. W-414-eng-602?
No.

b. If not, were they completed or terminated on some other date?

Contract No.	Completed or terminated	Date of completion or termination
W-414-eng-634.....	Completed.....	27 February 1941.
W-414-eng-808.....	Completed.....	24 April 1942.
DA-W-414-eng-511.....	Terminated.....	24 December 1942.
DA-W-414-eng-585.....	Completed.....	1 April 1943.
DA-W-414-eng-842.....	Completed.....	1 January 1943.

c. Amount paid under each contract and to whom paid:

Contract No.	Amount paid ¹	To whom paid
W-414-eng-634.....	Fee—\$1,300.00.....	Sverdrup & Parcel.
W-414-eng-808.....	Fee—\$13,600.00.....	do.
DA-W-414-eng-511.....	Fee—\$101,188.43.....	do.
DA-W-414-eng-585.....	Fee—\$20,469.00.....	do.
DA-W-414-eng-842.....	Fee—\$40,139.00.....	do.

¹ Other than reimbursements for supplies, materials and services.

d. If any of the contracts were terminated has a settlement been reached and full details of the settlement indicating what part of the work under the contract was performed:

(1) Contract No. DA-W-414-eng-511 is the only one of the contracts listed in this paragraph which was terminated prior to completion of all work thereunder. Final settlement has been reached in connection with the termination of this contract.

(2) Details of the settlement and percentages of work completed at each site under Contract No. DA-W-414-eng-511 are as follows:

[5] Site	Fee for design plans, etc.	% compl.	Fee earned	Fee for supervision of constr. & constr.-management services	% compl.	Fee earned
Nandi, Fiji Islands.....	\$21,921	98	\$21,482.58	\$54,914	80	\$43,931.20
Narewa, Fiji Islands.....	5,270	98	5,164.60	13,214	45	5,946.30
Tontouta, New Caledonia.....	1,120	75	840.00	746	75	559.50
Plaines des Gaïacs, New Caledonia.....	15,998	75	11,998.50	10,665	75	7,998.75
Townsville, Australia.....	2,332	100	2,332.00	1,555	160	935.00
	\$46,641		\$41,817.68	\$81,094		\$59,370.75
Total fixed fee earned and paid.....						41,817.68
						\$101,188.43

¹ Approximately 60%.

e. If termination settlement negotiations are current, state present status of such negotiations and whether it is possible to estimate the amount ultimately to be paid. Payments listed under subparagraph 3c above represent final settlement in connection with the termination or completion of all of the above listed contracts.

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f. Information as to the personalities involved in performance of each contract.

Contract No.	Name and title of person involved	Nature of participation
W-414-eng-634.....	L. J. Sverdrup, Partner.....	Negotiated contract and performed contract work.
W-414-eng-808.....	L. J. Sverdrup, Partner.....	Negotiated contract only.
	D. C. Wolfe, Engineer-in-Chief.....	Performed contract work.
6] DA-W-414-eng-511....	L. J. Sverdrup, Partner.....	Negotiated contract and actively supervised contract work from inception of contract to about 25 April 1942.
	D. C. Wolfe, Engineer-in-Chief.....	Supervised contract work from 25 April 1942 to termination of contract.
DA-W-414-eng-585.....	L. J. Sverdrup, Partner.....	Negotiated contract only.
	D. C. Wolfe, Engineer-in-Chief.....	Actively supervised the contract work.
DA-W-414-eng-842.....	L. J. Sverdrup, Partner.....	Negotiated contract only.
	D. C. Wolfe, Engineer-in-Chief.....	Actively supervised the contract work.

g. Name of War Department representative in the negotiation of termination settlement. Colonel B. R. Wimer, C. E., Deputy District Engineer and Contracting Officer, U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H., negotiated the settlement in connection with Contract No. DA-W-414-eng-511, the only one of the above numbered contracts terminated prior to completion.

4. Information as to what part of performance of contracts was supervised by Hans Wilhelm Rohl, Paul Grafe, and Leif J. Sverdrup, and the installations and locations involved. (The following information supplements that contained in paragraph 3.)

Contract No.	Supervised by	Title and company	Approx. period	Nature and location of work
W-414-eng-602.....	Paul Grafe.....	Vice President, W. E. Callahan Construction Co.	20 Dec. '40 to 31 Dec. '41...	(Omission)
	H. W. Rohl.....	President, Rohl-Connolly Co.	1 Jan. '42 to 24 June '42...	
[7] W-414-eng-634.	L. J. Sverdrup.	Partner, Sverdrup & Parcel.	21 Jan. '41 to 16 Feb. '41...	(Omission)
DA-W-414-eng-511.	L. J. Sverdrup.	Partner, Sverdrup & Parcel.	6 Nov. '41 to 25 Apr. '42...	(Omission)

5. Advise whether Hawaiian Constructors still have all of the construction work in the Hawaiian Department; if not, who does have it? Since the termination of Contract No. W-414-eng-602 effective 31 January 1943, Hawaiian Constructors have not performed any construction work in the Hawaiian Department (now Central Pacific Area). From 1 February 1943, all construction work has been and is now being performed by hired labor forces of the United States Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H., with the exception of a few lump sum contracts which have been awarded by the United States Engineer Office to local contractors having available organizations and equipment for construction of temporary buildings and facilities in the Hawaiian Islands.

[8] 6. Advise specifically whether there was any other reason for the termination of construction contracts relating to work in New Caledonia other than the reasons which led to the general termination of Contract No. W-414-eng-602. The arrival of the task force and their taking over the construction prompted the termination of all work in New Caledonia under Contracts Nos. W-414-eng-602 and DA-W-414-eng-511.

7. Information as to all prime contracts and subcontracts awarded in areas of Territory of Hawaii or Southwest Pacific (including Canton Island, Christmas Island, the Fiji Islands, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, the Solomon Islands, Aitutaki, Tongatabu, Norfolk and Townsville, Australia) to the Territory Airport Constructors, or to any other company, corporation, partnership or syndicate in which Hans Wilhelm Rohl, Paul Grafe, or T. E. Connolly were in any way associated.

a. Contractor. Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H., a joint venture composed of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska corporation; Gunther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska corporation; Rohl-Connolly Company, a Nevada

corporation; Ralph E. Woolley, operating as an individual of Honolulu, T. H.; and Hawaiian Contracting Company, Ltd., an Hawaiian corporation.

(1) *Contract No.* W-414 eng-602.

(2) *Amount of contract.* Total estimated cost of all work ordered by the Government prior to termination of the contract (including that not completed at the effective termination date) \$135,891,523.00, and estimated total fixed fee allowance with respect thereto \$1,035,892.00. These figures are approximate only, and are based upon the amounts set forth in the contract, as amended to date, plus the estimated cost of work ordered prior to termination but not yet incorporated into the contract by supplemental agreement and the estimated fixed fee allowance with respect thereto. Amounts included with respect to work not yet covered by contract have been proposed by the Government, but have not been fully or finally accepted by the contractor.

(3) *Date of award of contract.* 20 December 1940.

(4) *Estimated completion date.* Six months for original contract; indefinite thereafter.

(5) *Date of termination prior to completion of work.* 31 January 1943.

[9] (6) *Percentage of work completed at time of cancellation.* Approximately 65%.

(7) *By whom work was completed.* Essentially all projects not completed prior to termination of Contract No. W-414-eng-602 have been or are now being prosecuted by hired labor forces of the United States Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

(8) *Date of completion.* The majority of the individual projects formerly covered by Contract No. W-414-eng-602 have been completed at various intervals since the termination of that contract effective 31 January 1943. A few of the projects are not one hundred per cent (100%) complete by reason of temporary suspension of the work at intervals due to low priority, nonreceipt to date of certain materials required in the work, etc.

(9) *Full details of any termination settlement concluded.* Negotiations are still in progress. No mutually satisfactory settlement is in sight.

(10) *Status of pending termination settlements, and amounts to be paid if that can be estimated.* Contract No. W-414-eng-602, as amended to date, does not cover all of the work ordered by the Government and performed by the contractor prior to termination, nor does it reflect all revisions within the contract which were directed by the Government prior to termination. Reference is made to tabulation entitled "Cost Estimates—Contract No. W-414-eng-602," forwarded to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army by secret letter of this Headquarters dated 21 January 1944, subject "House Military Affairs Committee Investigation—Hans Wilhelm Rohl." Exhibits "A" and "B" of that tabulation cover all work included in the contract, as well as changes in these contract items which have not yet been covered by formal change order. The figures set forth in Exhibits "A" and "B" of the tabulation represent the final agreed estimated construction costs of the work covered by the contract, adjusted to reflect all revisions in these projects which were directed by the Government prior to final termination. All revised estimates listed in Exhibits "A" and "B" of the tabulation have been agreed to by the contractor and by the Government, with the exception noted by the contractor to deduction of \$700,000 from the estimated cost of work performed under Supplemental Agreement No. 4, Schedule G. The figures listed in [10] Exhibit "C" of the tabulation cover direct costs only on the balance of the work ordered by the Government and completed by the contractor as of the effective contract termination date, but not yet covered by supplemental agreement to the contract. The Contracting Officer and the contractor have agreed to these direct cost estimates and to the proportion of the work actually completed at the contract termination date. The Contracting Officer has proposed an allowance of seven per cent (7%) of direct costs to cover the estimated indirect cost to the contractor of performing all work listed in Exhibit "C." This allowance has been appealed by the contractor, but no final decision reached. The Contracting Officer has further proposed to the contractor an allowance of 25% of the maximum allowable fees approved by the Under Secretary of War for work under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction contracts with respect to the work included in Exhibit "C" of the aforementioned tabulation and not yet covered by the contract. The contractor has protested this proposed basis of computing the additional fixed fee allowance. However, based upon the estimates of cost, percentages of completed work and fixed fee allowance on which agreement has been reached, and using the additional amounts which have been proposed by the Government but not

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accepted by the contractor, the total estimated cost of the work completed under Contract No. W-414-eng-602 at the effective contract termination date will approximate \$88,525,609.00 and the fixed fee allowance is presently estimated at \$800,000.

(11) *Personalities involved in work on behalf of each company.* See subparagraph 2c above.

(12) *War Department representative engaged in settlement negotiations.* See subparagraph 2d above.

b. *Contractor.* Territory Airport Constructors, a joint venture composed of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska corporation; Gunther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska corporation; and Paul Grafe, an individual of Los Angeles, California.

(1) *Contract No.* CCA-4140 (W-414-eng-854).

(2) *Amount of contract.* Approximately \$3,594,203.42.

(3) *Date of award of contract.* 19 May 1941.

(4) *Estimated completion date.* 10 September 1942.

(5) *Date of termination prior to completion of work.* 20 December 1941.

(6) *Percentage of work completed at time of cancellation.* (Omission.)

(7) *By whom work was completed.* The Upolu airport project was totally abandoned. The terminated work at the Hilo, Maui and Molokai Airports was completed by Hawaiian Constructors under Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

(8) *Date of completion.* (Omission.)

(9) *Full details of any termination settlement concluded.* Payment was made at the contract unit prices for all work in place as of the effective contract termination date in the total sum of \$679,813.43.

(10) *Status of pending termination settlement, and amount to be paid if that can be estimated.* The amount of the payment stipulated under subparagraph 7b (9) above represents final settlement.

(11) *Personalities involved in work on behalf of each company.*

Name of joint venturer	Name and title of official involved	Nature and extent of participation
W. E. Callahan Construction Co. and Paul Grafe.	Paul Grafe, Vice President of W. E. Callahan Construction Co. and trading as an individual.	Negotiated contract and actively supervised contract work.
Gunther & Shirley Company---	None-----	

[12] (12) *War Department representative engaged in settlement negotiations.* Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E., then District Engineer, U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

8. The original of the report of the Inspector General concerning Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and Rohl-Connolly Company has been forwarded under separate cover via air mail.

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, Jr.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 14 January 1944.

Re: House Military Affairs Committee Investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, and Colonel Lief J. Sverdrup.

H. RALPH BURTON,
Chief Counsel, Truman Committee,
Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: In response to your oral request for a compilation of the contracts held by Colonel Lief J. Sverdrup and associates with the War Department, you will find annexed a compilation of the contracts giving the contract number, date, amount of contract and description and location of the work. These contracts are between the War Department and the following:

L. J. Sverdrup
Sverdrup & Parcel
Sverdrup & Parcel and J. Gordon Turnbull

You will note that several of the contracts listed herein have been awarded on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. The letters "FF" indicate the fee to the Architect-Engineer and the figure shown as "estimated cost of construction" indicates the amount to be paid the constructor under a separate contract.

Your attention is called to the fact that the contracts are all dated with the exception of one before 7 December 1941. Since that date, if any further contracts have been let to Colonel Sverdrup and his associates, they are under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to whom inquiry is being addressed by this office for further information. You will note that this material is classified as confidential by the War Department, and it is respectfully requested that the Committee respect the War Department classification.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Miles H. Knowles
MILES H. KNOWLES
Lt. Colonel, JAGD

(For Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.)

Enc.
Khm

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY,
Washington, D. C., 8 January 1944.

Mr. H. RALPH BURTON,
Chief Counsel, House Military Affairs Committee,
519 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: I refer below to memorandum dated 8 December 1943, from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, regarding the contract with Hawaiian Constructors, in which Rohl-Connally was a joint venturer. This memorandum was transmitted to this Office through another War Department branch and was mistakenly filed in that branch until yesterday, when it was traced and then delivered to this Office. This accounts for the delay.

The above mentioned memorandum gives the following information:

By radio CM-IN-4957 (8 Dec 43) the commanding General, Central Pacific Area has advised that only one contract involving Hans Wilhelm Rohl has been awarded in that area. The number of this contract is W 414 Eng 602. It was awarded by the Honolulu District Engineer to Hawaiian Constructors, in which Rohl-Connally Company was a joint venturer. The contract was dated 20 December 1940 and was approved by the Under Secretary of War on 3 January 1941. It was terminated for the convenience of the Government, effective 31 January 1943, prior to completion of all work thereunder.

The total estimated cost involved in this contract was \$84,436,961 and the contract called for a fixed fee of \$1,014,690. As result of current negotiations in connection with the termination of this contract, these figures are subject to substantial revision.

The contract referred to above covered various construction projects located throughout the Hawaiian Islands, including air fields, fortifications and other defense projects. Airport facilities were also included for Canton Island, Christmas Island, Plaines Des Gaiacs on New Caledonia, and Nandi in the Fiji Islands. All of the above are in the Pacific Ocean.

The Central Pacific Area has entered into no contracts in which Rohl is involved as a subcontractor.

The above mentioned information was received by this Office classified as "Secret" and I request that you respect this classification unless the material is released from the classification by the War Department.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT A. FRIEDLICH,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD,
Assistant.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 4 January 1944.

H. RALPH BURTON,
Chief Counsel, House Military Affairs Committee,
Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: In Colonel Knowles' absence, I enclose herewith copy of 1st indorsement from the Chief of Engineers, dated 1 January, 1944, and addressed

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to Mr. Julius H. Amberg, setting out contract information requested by you in your letter of 20 December, addressed to Mr. Julius H. Amberg.

I note that there is indicated in some of the material under the heading "Approved" that certain contracts were not approved. I presume that under War Department regulations, the contracts indicated as not approved, would not require any approval in addition to the signature of the officer who signed the particular contract in question.

As I know, you are in a great hurry to get this material, I am sending it out to you without checking it.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Herbert A. Friedlich
HERBERT A. FRIEDLICH,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD,
Assistant.

P. S.—I note that there is included in the enclosures, contract No. W-869-eng-7600 with Miller Construction Company, Inc. I doubt very much if this contract should properly be included among those in connection with the Canol project.
H. A. F.

Encls.

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Office, C. of E., 1 January 1944.

To: Mr. Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Room 3-E-739, the Pentagon.

Pursuant to request in basic communication there is attached, in duplicate, a page for each contract giving a brief description of the work required by the contract, names of the contractors or architect-engineers, the amount of the contract and of each supplemental agreement and/or change order, the respective date of the contracts and/or change orders and by whom if they were signed and approved.

For the Chief of Engineers:

O. P. EASTERWOOD, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant, Contracts & Claims Branch.

9 Inclosures: (in dup.)

- 1—Report of Cont. No. W-412-eng-52.
- 2— " " " " W-412-eng-53.
- 3— " " " " W-412-eng-54.
- 4— " " " " W-2385-eng-34.
- 5— " " " " W-2385-eng-39.
- 6— " " " " W-2385-eng-44.
- 7— " " " " W-2385-eng-6.
- 8— " " " " W-869-eng-7600.

9—Itr 20 Dec. 43.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 18 December 1943.

Re: Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.

H. RALPH BURTON,

Chief Counsel, House Military Affairs Committee,
519 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: Annexed is memorandum from Major General Thomas M. Robins, Deputy Chief of Engineers, to Mr. Amberg covering the information requested by you on 11 December 1943 from the office of the Corps of Engineers in regard to the duties of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii and Canada.

It is hoped that this material is sufficiently complete to serve your requirements.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ Miles H. Knowles
MILES H. KNOWLES
Lt. Colonel, AUS

(From Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.)

Enc.

Khm

Address Reply to Chief of Engineers,
U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

Refer To File No. SPEGD

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, 16 December, 1943.

Memorandum to: Mr. Julius H. Amberg, Office of the Secretary of War, Room 3-E-739 Pentagon.

1. Pursuant to telephonic request 1600, 11 December 1943, of Mr. Burton, counsel of the House Military Affairs Committee, the following information is furnished relative to the duties of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., in Hawaii and Canada.

2. In September 1939, Colonel Wyman was relieved from duty in Los Angeles and assigned to duty with the 3rd Engineers, Schofield Barracks, T. H. By War Department orders dated 5 June 1940 he was relieved from duty with the 3rd Engineers and assigned as assistant to the District Engineer, Honolulu Engineer District, effective on or about 1 July 1940, with additional duties as assistant to the Works Projects Administrator for the Territory of Hawaii. Special orders of the Chief of Engineers appointed Colonel Wyman, District Engineer, on 15 July 1940.

3. As District Engineer, Colonel Wyman was charged with the administration of the district which covered the entire Territory of Hawaii, with the execution of any construction projects assigned the district and with the execution of fortification and other military construction under the direction of the local military commander as prescribed in Army Regulations and other War Department instructions. Colonel Wyman as District Engineer was specifically authorized to—

(a) Issue certain permits in the name of the Secretary of War for works in the navigable waters of the United States.

(b) Provide, within prescribed limits of cost, for hire or rental, construction, repairs, and alterations to plants and structures, and procurements.

(c) Approve specifications, awards, contracts, and change orders within prescribed limits of cost.

4. In October 1941, pursuant to a secret War Department directive, which placed the District Engineer at the disposal of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Colonel Wyman was placed in charge of construction of facilities necessary to provide an air route from Hawaii to the Philippines via Australia. This directive was later changed to limit the activities of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to that portion of the route from Hawaii to Australia.

5. Colonel Wyman was relieved from duty as District Engineer, Honolulu Engineer District, by War Department orders dated 10 March 1942 and assigned as assistant to the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division. At the same time all functions of the District passed to the control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in accordance with War Department directives concerning construction activities outside of the continental limits of the United States.

6. From the time of Colonel Wyman's arrival in the United States until May 5, 1942 he was engaged in officer procurement activities in connection with the activation of an Engineer General Service Regiment. On May 5, 1942, Colonel Wyman was designated as Officer in Charge of the Canal Project and was directed to proceed with the necessary surveys and construction incident thereto, reporting directly to the Chief of Engineers. He was vested with all the authority of a District Engineer which carried an automatic designation as contracting officer with full authority to make procurements and to execute contracts necessary for the accomplishment of his mission. District Engineers are empowered to award contracts not exceeding \$3,000,000.

7. As Officer in Charge of the Canal Project, Colonel Wyman was sent on temporary duty to Edmonton, Alberta, Canada and such other points in Canada and the United States as were necessary for the accomplishment of his mission. The period of this temporary duty started on or about 23 May 1942. The temporary nature of the assignment was changed by War Department orders of 21 November 1942 which relieved Colonel Wyman from the temporary duty status and from assignment as assistant to the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, and assigned him as Division Engineer, Northwest Division, with station at Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.

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8. Colonel Wyman was relieved from duty as division engineer by orders issued 25 March 1943. Records of this office show Colonel Wyman now assigned overseas at APO 29, in care of the Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

/s/ Thomas M. Robins,
THOMAS M. ROBINS,
Major General,
Deputy Chief of Engineers
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., 13 December 1943.

Re: Hans Wilhelm Rohl
H. RALPH BURTON,
Chief Counsel, House Military Affairs Committee,
519 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: Annexed is memorandum covering the contracts of the War Department with construction concerns with which Hans Wilhelm Rohl is associated. This material is furnished in conformity with your oral request of 3 December 1943.

In respect to the information on page 2 regarding construction in Hawaii, further information is being secured from the Service Command, and the total amount may be increased somewhat. The material will be forwarded to your office immediately upon its receipt.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Miles H. Knowles
MILES H. KNOWLES,
Lt. Colonel, AUS

(For Julius H. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War):

Enc.

COPY
JPT/aam

Address reply to
Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, 6 December 1943.

Refer to File No. SPEAC

Memorandum for the Office of the Director of Materiel. (Attention: Major Frank W. Xiques, Room 5D-666, The Pentagon).

Subject: House Military Affairs Committee Investigation—Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

In conformity with your verbal request of 3 December 1943, the following information is furnished concerning the request of the House Military Affairs Committee for information relating to contracts with the War Department in which Hans Wilhelm Rohl was (or is) interested, either as contractor or subcontractor, including the amounts involved and the locations where the work was performed (or is being performed):

CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO WITH ROHL-CONNOLLY COMPANY, 4351 ALHAMBRA AVE., LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Contract No.	Date	Amount	Location and type of work
W 509 eng-68.....	10- 4-33	\$1,520,000.00	Construction of breakwater Los Angeles, Long Beach Outer Harbors, San Pedro Bay, Calif.
W 509 eng-85.....	7-26-34	557,790.00	Construction on new enrockments, reconstruction existing enrockment, Newport Bay, Calif.
W 509 eng-4 (ER).....	8-10-35	827,750.00	Construction breakwater, Los Angeles & Long Beach Harbors, Calif.
W 509 eng-103.....	8- 6-36	2,145,000.00	do.
W 509 eng-267.....	12- 3-37	2,600.00	Repair of revetment, Los Angeles, (Harbor) California.
W 509 eng-980.....	1-24-40	23,875.00	Rental of floating derrick, towboat and barge.
W 509 eng-994.....	2-21-40	865,678.25	Improvement of Los Angeles River, Section VII, Downey Rd. to Atlantic Avenue, City of Vernon & Los Angeles Co., Calif.
W 509 eng-4622.....	3- 6-43	50,000.00	Repair of floating plant, any available shipyard.
W 509 eng-979.....	-----	11,250.00	Jetty stone, Newport Bay Harbor, Calif.
W 509 eng-1000 (ER).....	-----	15,770.00	Derrick stone, F. O. B., Railroad cars at Ormand (Riverside), Calif.
W 509 eng-61 Subcontractor. (Contractor is Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co.)	-----	466,410.00	39,307 Tons Class B Stone, and 87,081 Tons Class A Stone.

CONTRACT ENTERED INTO WITH CADDOA CONSTRUCTORS (JOINT VENTURE WITH W. E. CALLAHAN CONSTRUCTION CO., AND GUNTHER & SHIRLEY COMPANY, AND ROHL-CONNOLLY)

Contract No.	Date	Amount	Location and type of work
W 911 eng-487.....	7-19-40	\$7,478,790.41	Construction John Martin Dam and appurtenant works on Arkansas River in Bent County, Colorado.

CONTRACT ENTERED INTO WITH HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS (JOINT VENTURE WITH W. E. CALLAHAN CONSTRUCTION CO., GUNTHER & SHIRLEY COMPANY, ROHL-CONNOLLY COMPANY AND RALPH E. WOOLEY.)

W 414 eng-602.....	12-20-40	\$1,097,673.00	Construction works of National Defense—Hawaiian Islands.
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CONTRACT ENTERED INTO WITH FOLEY BROTHERS, INC., & ROHL-CONNOLLY CO.

W 3416 eng-51.....	2-9-43	\$11,000,000.00	Haines Cutoff, Alaska.
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For the Chief of Engineers:

/s/ John H. Hendren, Jr.,
JOHN H. HENDREN, JR.,
Major, J. A. G. D.,
Acting Chief, Contracts and Claims Branch.

[11] Prior to making this inspection trip, these officers studied directives, communications and other data from the Headquarters, Service of Supply to the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and from the latter to the Division Engineer, Northwest Service Command, and also made a two months intensive study of the Field Progress Reports.

They state that immediate remedial action by higher authority is needed; leadership of Commanding General and the Division Engineers are of a low order; subordinate officers lack respect for their ability and capacity; complete lack of organization, except on paper; lack of respect and cooperation between the various offices, with a low state of morale throughout; lack of, or belated, planning for many important phases of this entire project.

Quotations from report:

"B Northwest Division Engineer Office

"The undersigned, during the course of the past twenty months, has had occasion to study and analyze the construction activity on some 1500 projects and has personally visited and inspected the work on approximately 500 jobs. I say unhesitatingly that the Office of the Division Engineer, Northwest Service Command and, as a consequence, all echelons of command under it and all private constructors and others having contractual relations with it, represent the most confused, frustrated, disjointed, heterogeneous, disorganized, demoralized group of organizations with which we have ever come in contact."

"Sound processes of ratiocination are conspicuous because of their absence; understanding of military concepts and knowledge and information on the basis of which plans must be made and work executed are nebulous, fragmentary and disarranged; designs, plans, and specifications are grandiose, expensive to execute and anachronistic in their preparation; job planning and job scheduling are superficial, fantastic and in many cases child-like; execution of physical work-in-place is pitifully slow, wasteful, lacks balance between labor, material and supervision, and is performed in a sequence lacking common-sense, let alone that complementarity of effort which is ordinarily necessary for efficient, economic and speedy work execution.

"The entire atmosphere at the Office of the Division Engineer (and several of the Districts) reflects mental desuetude, capriciousness, mysticism and insouciance.

"It is my conviction that the construction work, if ever accomplished, will be prolonged for many months, in some cases as much as a year or more; will involve

*Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.

the unnecessary expenditure of many millions of dollars; and will cause the wasteful and misdirected employment of millions of man-hours and the uneconomic use of hundreds upon hundreds of pieces of all types of heavy equipment and vehicles—automotive, truck, etc.

"A few specific illustrations of the many observations upon which the above opinions are predicated are given herewith.

"On the 11th and 12th of February, 1943, conferences were held at the Office of the U. S. Division Engineer between Colonel William C. Henry, assistant to the Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Division Engineer, relative to coordinating and accelerating the work on the construction of the communications system throughout the Northwest Service Command. In attendance were representatives of the Alaska Communications Service, members of the Division Engineer's Office, special assistants to Commanding General, NWSC, and members of the firm and key employees of the Architect-Engineer, Turnbull, Sverdrup & Parcel, and the Prime Contractor, Bechtel-Price-Callahan."

General James A. O'Connor, Colonel James K. Tully, General Staff, Washington, D. C. and Major Lee E. Scheid and Captain William T. Carpenter, Jr., of the Services of Supply, Washington, D. C., attended one of these meetings, at which the undersigned were present.

Quotations from report:

"To anyone who has been over the territory covered by the Northwest Service Command for as little as one week it is obvious that the communications system is to all practical purposes the sine qua non of efficient construction effort. And yet, when Colonel James K. Tully, [13] because of the nature of the conversations, had occasion to express the fact that the General Staff had established the work on the communications system and on the Port of Prince Rupert as the Number One and Two Priorities for accomplishment in the Northwest Service Command, Colonel Wyman registered surprise and stated that it was the first time that such information had been brought to his attention, officially or otherwise.

"It was apparent to everyone in the room that the work on the communications system had been woefully neglected, and what little had been done was not in accordance with Signal Corps standards, design or specifications. . . .

"The inability to get the job done retards the War effort."

"In my opinion, Colonel Wyman does not understand the use of or does not choose to employ the members of an organization in a generally accepted sense.

"I can conceive of a man being a genius, being possessed of a superlative degree of clairvoyance, omniscience, omnipresence, perspicacity, and perspicuity, and having an indomitable will (incidentally, Colonel Wyman does not, in my opinion, possess any of these qualities to a reasonably desirable degree). . . .

"The slow preparation of plans and specifications; the lack of faulty planning and scheduling of many features of work the impractical manner and sequence in which work is executed and the fact that work which should be started and vigorously prosecuted according to common-sense and its important significance to other work is not started; the confusion surrounding the procurement and supply of materials and equipment; the complete lack of transportation means months after all facilities should have been in a state of immediate readiness; the lack of organization on the part of the Architect-Engineer, the Contractors and the echelons of the Division Engineer Office, and the low state of morale and feeling of frustration and despair which pervades almost everyone bespeak but one thing. It is vitally necessary that a leadership of vision, imagination, cooperation-inspiring, and which will produce results in a quick, efficient and economic manner be found at once, in the person of a Division Engineer.

"Planning

"The planning of all construction work in the Northwest Service Command seems to be exceptionally poor in many respects.

[14] "1. The preparation of designs, plans and specifications is far too slow, assuming all other phases of activity were reasonably satisfactory, to consummate all the work at the required completion dates as established by higher authority.

"2. . . . As a consequence, there is over-design, as in the case of proposed rail heads at Dawson Creek, Whitehorse and Fairbanks, and Skagway."

"3. The sequence in which work is planned to be done lacks a sense of understanding of complementarity and integration of all the features of work. . . . The sense of correct relativity, proper timing, and general perspective of all the

elements of the construction program are distorted. This in my opinion is the reason for the over-emphasis on the immediate construction of the elaborately conceived railheads for which an allotment of eighty-one million dollars was requested on Canal Projects #1 and #3, and the under-emphasis on the Ports of Skagway, Haines, and Prince Rupert, on Canal Projects #4 and #5, on the facilities along the Alcan Highway, and on the Haines-Champagne Cut-Off. . . .

"Scheduling

"The scheduling of work to be accomplished as reflected in the Off-Continent Field Progress Reports submitted by the Northwest Division is meaningless and is being prepared unthinkingly and mechanically. The estimated work schedules shown on the bar graphs cannot possibly be met for any of the projects. Notwithstanding the fact that the data is officially submitted by the Division Engineer, it is understood and recognized as being impossible of accomplishment by officers, contractors, and employees in the field.

"If these prognoses are fanciful, so must be the data and calculations on which they are predicated. . . . The same lack of thinking and planning generates a mobilization of field employees without material to work on so as to accomplish physical work-in-place, and leads to the procurement and delivery of materials in the wrong order, and in the wrong place and without men to work on them.

"7. An organization of the Division Engineer and the six District Engineer offices exists but only on paper. The Division Engineer delegates responsibilities to his District Engineers through the issuance of generalized orders based on directives. But nothing has been done as yet to simultaneously establish authority and create the wherewithal in the District Offices on the basis of which the duties can be performed and the responsibilities fulfilled.

"It is imperative that a sensible and workable channel of command and authority for direction, supervision, and control of the work to be established at once. . . .

[15] "If this is not effectuated, all the District Engineer Offices are truly superfluous and should be abolished. * * *

"8. More skillful and learned policy and procedure in the methods and processes of awarding contracts to private firms is essential. * * *

"9-b. Troops are over-taxed because of the assignment of too many missions.

Troops are not as well fed as employees of the private firms with whom they are in close proximity.

Quotations from report:

"10. The field agencies of the Public Roads Administration are possessed, in a measure, of the many deficiencies expressed relative to the organization of the Architect-Engineers, Contractors, and the United States Engineer Offices. The liaison and channelizing through echelons is particularly bad, and direction and supervision are carried on, too preponderantly, at headquarters away from the areas of activity. Because of these conditions, the proper equipment is not at the disposal of Contractors at places and time when it should be, and it takes months to affect the sending and receipt of spare parts by requisition.

"Because there are so many groups in being for the accomplishment of the construction work * * * it will require the highest degree of intelligence and leadership, of which one can conceive to unravel periodic snags, let alone getting the job done. This entire set-up requires immediate remedial action, so that the correct chain of authority is clearly defined, the greatest cooperation is established, and the direction and supervision processes are simplified throughout.

"Personnel, Labor and Morale

"Much of the supervisory, administrative, technical and other key personnel employed * * * is not qualified not competent, to assist in carrying out the missions which have been mandated; a lack of specialized training on the part of employees is aggravated by the poor organizational fabric of which they are made a part; the efficiency of labor is very low on practically all of the construction work. The unusual depth to which it has fallen is mainly attributable to the poor leadership, lack of organization, et cetera.

"3. The morale of a majority of all civilians and officers engaged in the construction task in the Northwest Service Command is as low as has ever come to our personal attention. This is due to all that has been stated heretofore in this report. * * *

[16] "Work requirements and work accomplishment."

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"To date, for the time already consumed, the physical work-in-place accomplishment is meagre and subnormal."

Military Liaison and Cooperation

It would appear that the liaison and cooperation between the different branches of the Services were very poor, especially between the Corps of Engineers and the Signal Corps, and the Corps of Engineers and Army Air Forces, and that the liaison between the Northwest Service Command and the Division Engineer's office were based upon personal acquaintance between General O'Connor and Colonel Wyman, to the exclusion of most of their respective staffs.

This report gives considerable information in regard to railway facilities, and calls attention to their lack of equipment; that they are constructed with light rail, and that the majority of the roadbed is built upon "muskeg", with metal ballast being practically non-existent; that it does not appear that the Division Engineer has made any plans to take care of this situation, although all these railway facilities are badly needed to carry supplies.

There seems to be a lack of planning for housing and storage facilities, water, and sanitation at the various rail heads.

Alcan Highway

Again, this report reveals what appears to be lack of foresight planning. This is readily illustrated by the fact that many of the trestles and bridges are of temporary timber construction and will be washed out by the Spring thaws, with no supply of material [17] being placed adjacent thereto for their repair or rebuilding, which will naturally mean considerable delay caused thereby.

Alcan Telephone Line

Here again is pointed out the value of communication facilities in connection with such a large construction project and the lack of proper planning to have this installed and available for construction purposes.

Skagway

The following relative to this port is interesting:

"Everything done thus far has been 'hit or miss'; it is thought that a comprehensive plan for the use of the port and the available land area should be prepared * * *"

"Canol Project"

"For the period of time during which work has been going on in connection with this entire project, only a moderate amount of physical work-in-place has been accomplished. The required completion dates cannot possibly be met.

"The only jobs on which any substantial amount of work has been done are Canol No. 1A, Canol No. 6, and Canol No. 2. The remainder of the work on jobs Canol No. 1, Canol No. 3, Canol No. 4 and Canol No. 5 is either in the category of 'barely started' or 'not started.'"

Division and District Offices

That part of the report dealing with the Division and District Engineer Offices is severely critical, stating, among other things, that the Division Office at Edmonton is a conglomeration of individuals under headless guidance and direction, with living and working conditions exceedingly poor and conducive of the lowest morale, that the various District Offices, of which there are six, appear to be ineffectual because of lack of proper knowledge of [18] construction facts, authority, control, and specifically defined objectives, which should be given them by the Division Engineer's Office.

This report ends with the following general conclusions and recommendations:

"General Conclusions"

"1. The breaking through of the pioneer road (Alcan Highway) was an outstanding and praiseworthy performance.

"2. The planning, scheduling, methods of arranging for the execution of work, and the conduct of work performance throughout, subsequent to the breaking through of the pioneer road, have been as disgraceful as the work on Alcan was commendable.

"3. The leadership in the Northwest Service Command and in the Northwest Division Engineer Office, particularly the latter, is of a very low order. This leadership and the complete lack of organization which exists have not permitted and will not permit of the rapid, efficient, and economic consummation of the construction task.

"4. The requirements for construction work as embodied in the various directives issued and the capacity for the performance of this work with the instrumentalities and agencies, as they exist, are so out of consonance that they cannot be reconciled.

"5. Any curtailment or deferment of the work authorized, because of changes in strategic and tactical concepts, caused by changes in war conditions, will not solve the problems in the Northwest Service Command. It is vitally necessary to change the leadership and to reorganize, revitalize and catalyze the agencies enjoined or engaged for the work performance. We are fully convinced that the present construction program, regardless of its adequacy or necessity, can be performed more rapidly, efficiently and economically by good organization and under proper leadership than a deleted program can be executed by the present forces and agencies.

"6. The liaison and cooperation between the many commands, divisions and branches of the Army have not as yet reached the stage where they might be termed as completely satisfactory.

[19]

Recommendations

"1. That the Commanding General, Northwest Service Command, be relieved, or alternatively, that the Commanding General be assigned a staff of officers, qualified and trained for this particular type of supply and transportation task, who in turn are further implemented in the form of expert technical assistance.

"2. That the Northwest Division Engineer be relieved. There is no alternative procedure to this recommendation. The retainment of the Division Engineer in his present capacity will and must eventuate in disgraceful performance or failure."

(Report of Horowitz and Helgerson, War Department, dated March 15, 1943.)

It is of pertinent interest that conditions in Alaska, as have been described in the paragraphs just preceding, compare noticeably with those in the islands of the Pacific where defense installations were under the direction of Colonel Wyman, pursuant to contracts with Hawaiian Constructors, Rohl's Company, and Sverdrup and Parcel, architect-engineers, selected by them.

During this period when those defense projects vitally affecting the defense of the United States were being installed in that strategic and vulnerable Alaskan area, Attu and the Aleutians were occupied by the Japanese, causing a continuing threat.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 7 December 1943.

Mr. H. RALPH BURTON,
Chief Counsel, House Military Affairs Committee,
519 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. BURTON: In pursuant of your telephone request, I enclose confidential document of date 15 March 1943, being report of Colonel L. George Horowitz to Colonel F. S. Strong, Jr. of the Corps of Engineers and covering various matters in the Northwest Service Command, with particular reference to the Division Engineer in connection with construction operations.

This document is given to you for the confidential use of the Committee and not for publication.

It represents the views of Colonel Horowitz, but has not been approved as to its findings or accuracy by higher authority in the Department.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Julius H. Amberg,
JULIUS H. AMBERG,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.

Encl.

2762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

MARCH 15, 1943.

REPORT COVERING AN INSPECTION OF ALL CONSTRUCTION WORK AND RELATED FUNCTIONS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE U. S. DIVISION ENGINEER IN THE NORTHWEST SERVICE COMMAND

Col. L. George Horowitz Col. F. S. Strong, Jr.

This report, on the above-named subject, has been prepared on the basis of the following studies and observations:

a. A study of many if not all directives and communications from the Headquarters Services of Supply to the Office, Chief of Engineers, and from the latter to the Division Engineer, Northwest Service Command. Many other documents of a miscellaneous but important and pertinent character have also been carefully scrutinized.

b. An intensive and extensive analysis over a period of two months (December 1942 and January 1943) of all the Field Progress Reports submitted by the Division Engineer, Northwest Service Command, to the Office, Chief of Engineers.

c. Observations made by the undersigned and Major H. C. Helgerson, Corps of Engineers, during the course of an inspection trip throughout the Northwest Service Command, from February 7, 1943 to March 6, 1943. An outline of our itinerary is attached to this report.

Our observations and investigations have developed personal reactions on our part from which have sprung the many opinions and beliefs expressed herein. Because it is our conviction that many matters require immediate remedial action by the authorities charged with the responsibility for executing the construction tasks and corrective action by higher authority in those matters beyond the control of the former, we have decided to treat the subject by an elaboration under the headings which follow. We feel that the presentation in this form will give the most comprehensive portrayal in the simplest, most direct and most graphic manner.

I. Leadership

A. Northwest Service Command

B. Northwest Division Engineer Office

II. Planning

III. Scheduling

IV. Organization

V. Personnel, Labor and Morale

VI. Work Requirements and Work Accomplishment

VII. Military Liaison and Cooperation

VIII. Thumbnail Sketches

[2] IX. General Conclusions

X. Recommendations

I. LEADERSHIP

The leadership on the part of the Commanding General, Northwest Service Command, and the U. S. Division Engineer is, in our opinion, of a low order. This has manifested itself in many ways, such as:

1. Lack of respect and open expression of such lack of respect by many officers in the rank from Captain to Colonel, for the ability and capacity of the two above-mentioned officers to successfully effectuate the construction and supply tasks which have been mandated to them by directives from higher authority.

2. The complete lack of organization, except on paper, after several months, as one understands the meaning and connotation of that word in both a military and construction sense.

3. The vacillation, superficiality, and belated actions involving: thinking in terms of concepts; planning of tasks and procedures; scheduling of work in sound sequence and in an integrated program and accomplishment sense; mobilization of military forces at various locations and the assignment of missions to them; method of awarding contracts to private construction firms; direction and supervision of the efforts of these firms in preparing designs, plans, specifications, procurement of material mobilization of personnel and labor forces, and in the execution of the work.

4. Lack of proper and sufficient liaison and practical cooperation between the Headquarters of the Northwest Service Command and the Office of the Division Engineer; the Office of the Division Engineer and the Offices of the District Engineers; the Northwest Service Command and the Alaska Defense Command; the Corps of Engineers, the Army Air Forces and the Signal Corps; the Engineer for the Commanding General, Alaska Defense Command and the Northwest Division Engineer; and the Office of the Northwest Division Engineer and the Field Representatives of the Public Roads Administration.

5. The low state of morale and spirit of frustration which obtain at Edmonton, Dawson Creek, Fort Nelson, Whitehorse, and Skagway and the sense of helplessness which pervades the hearts and minds of officers and employees at Fairbanks and Prince Rupert.

[3] A. *Northwest Service Command*

Our observations, attendance at conferences, and conversations with many officers and civilians have given us the distinct reaction that General Order No. 44, War Department, Washington, D. C., September 4, 1942, will not prove workable because of the personalities involved and the conditions and circumstances which exist.

The Commanding General, NWSC, has established a hybrid organization which consists of an antiquated Corps Area set-up, infiltrated with task command officers, recently appointed officers from civil life and civilians, all of whom are supposedly to function as specialists. In addition to a Chief of Staff, a Deputy Chief of Staff, the four Staff O's, there is an Alcan Highway Commanding Officer, a Northern and Southern Sector Commander, a Railroad Commander at Dawson Creek, an officer in charge of equipment and parts, an officer in charge of automotive transportation on the Alcan Highway, and, we presume, others.

Whether the organization is orthodox or heterodox is of little moment in the final analysis if there is a high type of leadership, a systematic arrangement of all procedure, and an efficient execution of all work. But unfortunately, the diametrically opposite conditions obtain. The Commanding General seems to vacillate, apparently because of his susceptibility to advice from many and the latest quarters; seems to issue orders which are not properly channelized and about which there is timely lack of knowledge on the part of officers who should know about them; and he is inclined to command spasmodically, so to speak, not on a basis of perspicacity and advance planning but as crucial moments occur or a stalemate or impasse arises. As a result, the entire atmosphere at Whitehorse is one of confusion, frustration, lack of interest, indifference, and low morale. Dynamic, respected and accomplishment-inspiring leadership are imperative.

One of many illustrations of the lack of or belated planning on the part of the Northwest Service Command is the fact that as late as February 13, 1943, a conference was held at the office of the Division Engineer at Edmonton, one of the purposes of which was to arrange for the transportation of construction materials up the Alcan Highway. It was evident, or should have been evident, as early as December 1, 1942, that one of the vitally important tasks was to provide for the movement of construction material up the highway before the April thaw set in, so that physical work-in-place could be performed during the months of April, May, and June, when the road was impassable.

At the conference of February 13, 1943, it was apparent that no workable plans had been formulated until then. The lack of knowledge on the conditions or location of trucks was pathetic. The discussion on lack of gasoline, fuel, kerosene, alcohol, Prestone, spare parts, drivers, facilities [4] for making and shelter under which to make repairs bespoke a completely chaotic state of affairs. It became doubly evident that the data on planning, scheduling, work performance, etc., as contained in and submitted in Field Progress Reports was highly unrealistic and in most cases fantastic. One had no further to look to understand the reason for the jam-up of some thousand freight cars in the Edmonton railroad yards or the large percentage of vehicles and equipment of every description which were on the dead-line or otherwise inaccessible and unavailable.

As a result of this conference, Colonel Glandon, who has superseded Col. Wheeler as the Commanding Officer of the Alcan Highway, was directed to corral, sequester, and what-not all the trucks in the Service Command for the purpose of allocating them for specific uses. One of these truck employments was designated as the movement of construction material up the Alcan Highway. At the time I was leaving Edmonton to return to the United States on March 4, 1943, I was informed by Colonel Henry Woodbury, Asst. Division Engineer, that practically nothing in that direction had been accomplished since the meeting of February 13, 1943.

Coincident with the failure to make plans and preparations for the overhauling, repair and disposition of such trucks, so that tonnage of approximately 68,000 tons could be moved over the highway on or before April 15, 1943, evidence appeared of available trucks not being expeditiously used and trucks being assigned to tasks which very ostensibly were of a priority of performance much below the many purposes to which they could and should have been assigned. As an example of the former, we refer to approximately 150 new White 10-ton Diesel Drive trucks which were at Dawson Creek and not being used (no one seemed to know to whom the trucks belonged and everyone volunteered that they were not running because of lack of winterization, lack of Prestone, etc.). As an example of the latter, we refer to the approximately 25 White Trucks, later increased to 50, which the Metcalf, Hamilton and the Kansas City Bridge co-ventures were apparently able to persuade the Commanding General to allocate to them for the purpose of building their railheads of fantastic preliminary conception and much more fantastic estimated cost.

The reasons for the other statements relative to the manifestations of the low order of leadership expressed in resume form under I. *Leadership*, supra, will become obvious as delineations of facts and conditions are made under headings which follow.

B. *Northwest Division Engineer Office*

The undersigned, during the course of the past twenty months, has had occasion to study and analyze the construction activity on some 1500 projects and has personally visited and inspected the work on approximately 500 jobs. I say unhesitatingly that the Office of the Division Engineer, Northwest Service [5] Command and, as a consequence, all echelons of command under it and all private constructors and others having contractual relations with it, represent the most confused, frustrated, disjointed, heterogeneous, disorganized, demoralized group of organizations with which we have ever come in contact.

Sound processes of ratiocination are conspicuous because of their absence; understanding of military concepts and knowledge and information on the basis of which plans must be made and work executed are nebulous, fragmentary and disarranged; designs, plans and specifications are grandiose, expensive to execute and anachronistic in their preparation; job planning and job scheduling are superficial, fantastic and in many cases child-like; execution of physical work-in-place is pitifully slow, wasteful, lacks balance between labor, material and supervision, and is performed in a sequence lacking common-sense, let alone that complementarity of effort which is ordinarily necessary for efficient, economic and speedy work execution.

The entire atmosphere at the Office of the Division Engineer (and several of the Districts) reflects mental desuetude, physical paralysis, resort to processes of temporization, empiricism, mysticism and insouciance.

It is my conviction that the construction work, if ever accomplished, will be prolonged for many months, in some cases as much as a year or more; will involve the unnecessary expenditure of many millions of dollars; and will cause the wasteful and misdirected employment of millions of man-hours and the uneconomic use of hundreds upon hundreds of pieces of all types of heavy equipment and vehicles—automotive, truck, etc.

A few specific illustrations of the many observations upon which the above opinions are predicated are given herewith.

On the 11th and 12th of February, 1943, conferences were held at the Office of the U. S. Division Engineer between Colonel William C. Henry, assistant to the Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Division Engineer, relative to coordinating and accelerating the work on the construction of the communications system throughout the Northwest Service Command. In attendance were representatives of the Alaska Communications Service, members of the Division Engineer's Office, special assistants to Commanding General, NWSC, and members of the firm and key employees of the Architect-Engineer, Turnbull, Sverdrup & Parcel, and the Prime Contractor, Bechtel-Price-Callahan. General James A. O'Connor, Colonel James K. Tully, General Staff, Washington, D. C., and Major Lee E. Scheld and Captain William T. Carpenter, Jr., of the Services of Supply, Washington, D. C., attended one of these meetings, at which the undersigned was present.

To anyone who has been over the territory covered by the Northwest Service Command for as little as one week it is obvious that the communications system is to all practical purposes the sine qua non of efficient construction effort. And yet, when Colonel James K. Tully, because of the nature of the conversations, had occasion to express the fact that the General Staff had established the work

on the communications system and on the Port of Prince Rupert as the Number One and Two Priorities for accomplishment in the Northwest Service Command, Colonel Wyman registered surprise and stated that it was the first [6] time that such information had been brought to his attention, officially or otherwise.

It was apparent to everyone in the room that the work on the communications system had been woefully neglected, and what little that had been done was not in accordance with Signal Corps standards, design or specifications. Lengthy conversations, much of a superfluous character, ensued between Colonels Henry and Wyman. It is my opinion, the hypotheses, the processes of reasoning, and the constructive intentions and purposes of Colonel Henry were sound, logical, practical and commendable. Colonel Wyman comported himself as one engaged in the art of fencing. The weapons of which he made repetitious and irrelevant use were "the matter of unfortunate personalities and proper or improper jurisdiction". I could not draw any inference other than that, if phobias existed, they were inherent in Colonel Wyman, and it seemed to me that a peculiar psychosis permeated all of Colonel Wyman's reasoning and viewpoints.

The conclusion is inescapable that at least three months of valuable time have been lost during which much of the work on the communications system could or should have been accomplished. The lack of progress on this feature of work will decelerate the efforts of all persons engaged in the construction task, Northwest Service Command, in an inordinately large measure.

The discussions, higgling and haggling, which accompanied the attempts to obtain the signature of the Commanding General, NWSC, and the Signal Corps representatives to a Memorandum of Understanding, have convinced me beyond any shadow of doubt that any accomplishment in the overall construction task that might and should reflect kudos to the Services of Supply, the Corps of Engineers, and others engaged in this effort, will be exceedingly difficult if not impossible.

At the time of my visit to Edmonton, the Office of the Division Engineer had approximately 180 civilian employees and 30 officers, and the Division Engineer was in the process of building up a home organization of approximately 450 persons. If an organization that possessed cohesion and coordination and functioned smoothly and efficiently were to result, little fault, if any, might be found with the set-up, regardless of whether or not it contained a small percentage of supernumeraries. But when disconnected, non-used and misdirected compartmentalization obtains, and it is my opinion that it does and will, deadening effects transcend the considerations of useless expenditure of funds, wasted man-hours, low morale, etc. *The inability to get the job done retards the War Effort.*

In my opinion, Colonel Wyman does not understand the use of or does not choose to employ the members of an organization in the generally accepted sense. Cases have come to my attention where officers have been excoriated in the presence of fellow officers and others for carrying out the duties, functions and missions for the very purpose of which they have been secured as members of his organization.

I can conceive of a man being a genius, being possessed of a superlative degree of clairvoyance, omniscience, omnipresence, perspicacity, and perspicuity, and having an indomitable will (Incidentally, Colonel Wyman does not, in my opinion, possess any of these qualities to a reasonably desirable degree). [7] A lack of understanding of the elementary principles of good leadership, a lack of tactfulness and diplomacy, a lack of the ability to inspire others and win their respect and cooperation would still cause failure in the accomplishment of a mandated objective. Particularly so, if the task is almost superhuman, as is the construction job in the Northwest Service Command.

Most of the officers in the Division Office (and in the District Offices), whatever their individual ability, capacity, resourcefulness, etc., might be, have good educational backgrounds and have had more or less military training and experience, particularly in the Construction Service. They understand the difference between good organization and bad organization, the distinction between active and dynamic leadership as against passive leadership, whereby complacency is mistaken for confidence and self-satisfaction because of sweeping blanket and not properly thought-out delegation of duties and responsibilities by faulty contractual relationships entered into with private construction companies. As a consequence, most of the officers and civilian personnel as well feel that they are superfluous, are almost morbid, and are impelled to express

the fear that they have been relegated to affiliation with a mission which is destined to be a failure.

The slow preparation of plans and specifications; the lack of faulty planning and scheduling of many features of work; the impractical manner and sequence in which work is executed and the fact that work which should be started and vigorously prosecuted according to common-sense and its important significance to other work is not started; the confusion surrounding the procurement and supply of materials and equipment; the complete lack of transportation means months after all facilities should have been in a state of immediate readiness; the lack of organization on the part of the Architect-Engineer, the Contractors and the echelons of the Division Engineer Office; and the low state of morale and feeling of frustration and despair which pervades almost everyone bespeak but one thing. It is vitally necessary that a leadership of vision, imagination, cooperation-inspiring, and which will produce results in a quick, efficient and economic manner be found at once, in the person of a Division Engineer.

II. PLANNING

The planning of all construction work in the Northwest Service Command seems to be exceptionally poor in many respects.

1. The preparation of designs, plans and specifications is far too slow, assuming all other phases of activity were reasonably satisfactory, to consummate all the work at the required completion dates as established by higher authority.

2. Many concepts of a strategic and logistic nature on the basis of which directives are issued and construction planning must predicated are ephemeral in the minds of most persons having a responsibility in the direction, preparation and supervision of design, plans and specifications. As a consequence, there is over-design as in the case of the proposed railheads at Dawson Creek, Whitehorse, and Fairbanks; faulty and under-design as in the case of the communications system; or no design as in the case of many necessary facilities at Edmonton, Dawson Creek, along the Alcan Highway, at Whitehorse, Fairbanks, and Skagway.

[8] *The true significance of the element—TIME—in a construction program having a triple purpose of defense of a territory, supply of an allied nation and means of an offensive operation against an enemy power, is not fully grasped. If the purpose and urgency of the work were correctly visualized, it would be planned and executed in segments and by phases so that at all intervals of time some use could be made of completed facilities in and to at least a limited part of the finally desired capacity sense or in the priority of requirement sense as ordained by higher authority. This procedure would also lend itself to the most rapid, efficient and economic accomplishment of the construction work.*

3. The sequence in which work is planned to be done lacks a sense of understanding of complementarity and integration of all the features of work. For example, motions are gone through, involving proposed transportation of material for Canol #1, as though it had a priority of importance over the communications system and the docks and appurtenant facilities at Prince Rupert and Skagway. Trucks are allocated for the movement of materials for the proposed over-designed railhead at Dawson Creek, but little attention is paid to the preparation for the repair of the several arteries, such as the road from Edmonton to Dawson Creek, Northern Alberta Railway, Alcan Highway, and White Pass-Yukon Railway, which, if neglected, will cause a general stalemate for months. The sense of correct relativity, proper timing, and general perspective of all the elements of the construction program are distorted. This, in my opinion, is the reason for the over-emphasis on the immediate construction of the elaborately conceived railheads for which an allotment of \$81,000,000 was requested, on Canol Projects #1 and #3, and the under-emphasis on the Ports of Skagway, Haines, and Prince Rupert, on Canol Projects #4 and #5, on the facilities along the Alcan Highway, and on the Haines-Champagne Cut-Off. It is the reason for the over-emphasis on warehousing and the under-emphasis on all roads, railways, waterways, and the instrumentalities of transportation leading to and from this warehousing.

III. SCHEDULING

The scheduling of work to be accomplished as reflected in the Off-Continent Field Progress Reports submitted by the Northwest Division is meaningless and is being prepared unthinkingly and mechanically. The estimated work schedules shown on the bar graphs cannot possibly be met for any of the projects.

Notwithstanding the fact that this data is officially submitted by the Division Engineer, it is understood and recognized as being impossible of accomplishment by officers, contractors, and employees in the field.

If these prognoses are fanciful, so must be the data and calculations on which they are predicated. One might argue that this was only the matter of the required submission of a piece of paper and the necessity for technical compliance with an order. But such is not the case. The same lack of thinking and planning generates a mobilization of field employees without material to work on so as to accomplish physical work-in-place, and leads to the procurement and delivery of materials in the wrong order, in the wrong place and without men to work on them.

[9] To a much greater degree than obtains on jobs within the Continental limits of the United States, the distances involved, the many forms of resistance and obstacles encountered, the fight against nature in the raw, require scientifically prepared and precise processes of flow engineering of materials and the vital necessity of obtaining balance and timing of and for materials and labor.

The conditions which obtain to the present time are said to say the least. Employees can be seen at many places with little or nothing to do and materials are jammed up at Edmonton because of lack of transportation facilities. The order in which materials are finally moved out in many cases adds to the already existing difficulties. No other result can be expected without properly and realistically prepared schedules.

If job control is to be had, and it will have to be established, correct planning and scheduling will have to be insisted upon at once.

IV. ORGANIZATION

The organizations of the Architect-Engineers, the Prime Contractors, the Public Roads Administration, and the United States Division and District Engineer Offices, as they are now constituted, are not of the quality, nor have they the direction, the cohesion and the coordination, to accomplish their missions in a rapid, efficient and economic manner.

1. It is our opinion that none of the above-named construction entities have become thoroughly and fundamentally indoctrinated with an understanding of the military concepts involved and with a satisfactory translation of those concepts into design, plans, specifications and physical work-in-place.

2. All of the organizations need more forceful and inspiring leadership. In the case of the private firms and the P. R. A., this can be accomplished with the acquirement of better key personnel. In the case of the Corps of Engineer forces, it is necessary to supplant the present leadership, to obtain a reasonable number of specially qualified officers, and to obtain for civilian personnel the best that can be found in the ranks of the Civil Service Commission employees.

3. In quantity, the supervisory, administrative, and technical employees of the Architect-Engineers and Prime Contractors are much too great in number; in quality, they are distinctly inferior to what obtains on most jobs in the United States and do not measure up to the requirements of the task at hand.

4. The Architect-Engineer and particularly the prime contractor Bechtel-Price-Callahan set-ups are too distended between the United States and Canada and have not been molded so as to possess the direction, cohesion, coordination and smoothness of operation vitally necessary to get the job done.

5. There is a tendency for the Architect-Engineer, the Prime Contractor, and the PRA organizations to cling too tenaciously to civilization. Something must be done to inject in them a pioneer and overcome-hardship spirit. [10] Correlative with the above-named propensity is the failure to establish echelons for direction and supervision in the field.

6. Too much temporization with plans and too much extemporization with work execution maintain. The inauguration of proper planning and scheduling, procurement, supply and balancing of labor and material should cure this defect. The change is necessary forthwith.

7. An organization of the Division Engineer and the six District Engineer offices exists but only on paper. The Division Engineer delegates responsibilities to his District Engineers through the issuance of generalized orders based on directives. But nothing has been done as yet to simultaneously establish authority and create the wherewithal in the District Offices on the basis of which the duties can be performed and the responsibilities fulfilled.

The Division Engineer does not purposefully use his own organization and seems to use the office of the Edmonton District Engineer for a multiplicity

of purposes, such as for supervision of work in the field, administration by a District Engineer over other District Engineers, preparation and consummation of contracts, so-called control functions, preparation and submission of Field Progress Reports, etc. Because of the manner of evolution of the Division Engineer Office, this practice is deleterious in many respects—it causes the District Engineer offices to be useful in only a modicum degree for the performance of many tasks for which they are better qualified than the Edmonton office; it causes the District Engineers to feel superfluous and unproductive and resentful against the Division Office and the Edmonton District Office; it causes the representatives and key personnel of the firms engaged by the Government to neglect and fail to recognize any authority of the District Engineers and to look to Edmonton with a consequent loss of time, efficiency, and coordination.

It is imperative that a sensible and workable channel of command and authority for direction, supervision, and control of the work to be established at once. The organizations of the Architect-Engineer and Contractors must be developed along echelon lines paralleling those of the U. S. Division Engineer, so that each District Engineer can perform his duties efficiently and in the best interest of the Government. Concomitantly, the necessary liaison and cooperation among the six District Engineers must be introduced.

If this is not effectuated, all the District Engineer Offices are truly superfluous and should be abolished. The only alternative to this method of operation, and a very poor alternative, is the direction and supervision of all work by the person and office of the Division Engineer through the instrumentality of assistant operations officers or Area Engineers in the field. With conditions and circumstances as they are, this will in substance be tantamount to running a job bigger than the Panama Canal job from the hat of one man whose head is already befogged.

8. More skillful and learned policy and procedure in the methods and processes of awarding contracts to private firms is essential. This should [11] be done and can be done so as to induce the best features of competitive effort, so as to provide continuous incentives to all who have contractual obligations and so as to generate the highest degree of teamwork and cooperation in every conceivable direction. In my opinion, the Division Engineer is impulsive, superficial, and wasteful in his methods of delegating work through contractual arrangements.

9. Better judgment than now obtains must be exercised in the disposition and administration of troops and in the assignment to them of their various missions.

a. The manner in which duties are assigned to troops is carried out too impulsively and with too much substitution back and forth.

b. The troops are overtaxed because of the assignment of too many missions. This has resulted because of the still existing deficiencies of the private contractors. For example, the troops of one regiment are engaged in providing their own maintenance, digging telephone pole holes, driving a winter road along a proposed pipeline from Brooks brook to Sheldon Lake, the assembly of timber for the rebuilding of bridges along sections of the highway, and what-not. The execution of most of this work, incidentally, is provided for by the contracts with firms such as Bechtel-Price-Callahan, Miller Construction Company, and several contractors under the jurisdiction of the P. R. A.

c. The troops are not only fed more poorly than are the employees of the private firms with whom they are in close proximity, but use is made of troops in such a manner and at such places as leads to the flaunting in their faces of high wages and other beneficial aspects of conditions of work by and under private contractors. This is morale-breaking to say the least.

10. The field agencies of the Public Roads Administration are possessed, in a measure, of the many deficiencies expressed relative to the organization of the Architect-Engineers, Contractors, and the United States Engineer Offices. The liaison and channelizing through echelons is particularly bad, and direction and supervision are carried on, too preponderantly, at headquarters away from the areas of activity. Because of these conditions, the proper equipment is not at the disposal of contractors at places and times when it should be, and it takes months to effect the sending and receipt of spare parts by requisition.

Because there are so many groups in being for the accomplishment of the construction work: employees, foremen, straw bosses, superintendents, subcontractors, contractors, collateral contractors, prime contractors, construction-management contractors, field agencies of the P. R. A., Area Engineer officers and employees, District Engineers and employees, Works Engineer for the P. R. A., U. S. Division Engineer, Commanding General, N. W. S. C., and his equipment and

maintenance transportation specialists, it will require the highest degree of intelligence and leadership of which one can conceive to unravel periodic snags, let alone getting the job done. This entire set-up requires immediate remedial action, so that the correct chain of authority is clearly defined, the greatest cooperation is established, and the direction and supervision processes are simplified throughout.

[12]

V. PERSONNEL, LABOR AND MORALE

1. Much of the supervisory, administrative, technical and other key personnel employed by the Architect-Engineers, Prime Contractors, and U. S. Engineer Offices is not qualified nor competent to assist in carrying out the missions which have been mandated to these agencies.

A lack of specialized training on the part of these employees, which is aggravated by the poor organizational fabric of which they are made a part, causes many mental and physical processes to degenerate to a point where they are meaningless, purposeless, completely mechanical, superfluous, mutually interfering, retardative, and generally confusion-breeding.

The recognition of these facts in the field itself, together with the knowledge of the excessive salaries and wages paid throughout the Command, causes a wide propagation of rumors, innuendos and caustic depreciations. The diatribes and informal indictments have reached a level which is spirit- and morale-shattering to say the least and has resulted in a universal bewailing stated in such terms as "we are bushed, suffering from frustration, destined to failure."

2. The efficiency of labor is very low on practically all of the construction work, when measured in terms of the productivity of labor which obtains in the United States. That the efficiency of the former would be less than the latter was to be expected because of many conditions and circumstances peculiar to work in this part of the world, particularly the hardships caused by distances, climate, temperatures, topography, lack of facilities, etc. However, the unusual depth to which it has fallen is mainly attributable to the poor leadership, lack of planning and scheduling of work, faulty and procrastinated procurement of materials, lack of organization, etc. It is our unmistakable observation that the labor does want to and will put out if all the other elements are placed in congruity. As conditions are, labor is not only non-productive but its turn-over is so great that it is unnecessarily costly and stymies progress.

3. The morale of a majority of all civilians and officers engaged in the construction task in the Northwest Service Command is as low as has ever come to our personal attention. This is due to all that has been stated heretofore in this report. As bad as the morale is, the lack of good morale is not chronic and can be and must be completely restored, the sooner the better.

VI. WORK REQUIREMENTS AND WORK ACCOMPLISHMENT

The volume of construction work in the Northwest Service Command as provided for by the directives issued from higher authority, at the required completion dates embodied therein, and the volume of construction work which can be accomplished in the same respective periods of time by the persons and organizations charged with the performance thereof are at such great variance that they cannot be reconciled. Not to recognize this, the organizations, personnel, [13] facilities, status of materials, the weather and ground conditions being what they are, might make still more difficult the general and complete transmutation of all agencies from organisms of disorder and disruption to those of harmony, cooperation, and attainment.

We feel that a priority of execution of all the work by projects and by phases of projects should be established by higher authority, expressed in definitive form and imposed upon all the agencies engaged in the construction task. Simultaneously, a review should be made of all the projects for the purpose of determining required completion dates which are more in consonance with presently existing conditions and circumstances and hence more realistic. This may appear as a deceleration on paper but, with the institution of corrective measures, will, in our opinion, bring an acceleration of all physical work-in-place in actuality. If the field is left to its own devices and exercises its own judgment based upon what are now fictitious completion dates, the lack of balance between labor and material, the faulty sequence of transportation of material, and the misconception of relative significance and importance of project completions will become more pronounced and retard the over-all effort.

To date, for the time already consumed, the physical work-in-place accomplishment is meager and subnormal. Very little physical work-in-place will be performed during the course of the next three months because of the failure to plan and execute the transportation of materials and related construction work during the months of December 1942 and January and February 1943. A very substantial volume of physical work-in-place can be accomplished during the months of July, August, September, October and possibly November, if measures are taken to insure proper planning for labor, material, equipment and supervision and the preparations are made to supply and transport all possible materials and equipment between now and when the thaw sets in and as soon as feasible after the break-up.

VII. MILITARY LIAISON AND COOPERATION

A number of incidents and conditions came to our attention which reveal that the degree of liaison and cooperation between different divisions and branches of the Army having jurisdiction in contiguous theaters of activity or over functions in the same theater can stand considerable improvement. Cited as examples are: the lack of complete understanding between the Army Air Forces and the Corps of Engineers with respect to the construction of flight strips and miscellaneous facilities; the Signal Corps and the Corps of Engineers with respect to the design and construction of the communications system; the Transportation Corps and the Northwest Service Command with respect to the operation and control of facilities and the methods of administration at Skagway; the Army Air Forces and the Northwest Service Command with respect to the transportation of gasoline and fuel from Fairbanks to Tanana, McGrath and Galena.

Based on hearsay, gleaned from several conversations with a number of officers, it is our opinion that the cooperation between Colonel Wyman, U. S. Division Engineer, and Colonel Tally, Engineer for the A. D. C., is not what it [14] should be, nor is the cooperation between the Alaska Defense Command and the Northwest Service Command developed to a level which a full impregnation of the unity and sameness of purpose should bring forth.

The liaison between the Northwest Service Command and the Division Engineer Office seems to be basically a personal one between General O'Connor and Colonel Wyman, to the exclusion of most of their respective staffs. That between the Division Engineer and his six District Engineers is to all intents and purposes practically non-existent.

The liaison and cooperation between the Corps of Engineers and the Public Roads Administration hangs on very tenuous connections. The difference between the right men and the wrong men in the respective positions of U. S. Division Engineer and Field Manager of the P. R. A. will spell cooperation or conflict and divergence of effort.

VIII. THUMBNAIL SKETCHES

A. *Northern Alberta Railroad and Road from Edmonton to Dawson Creek*

The Northern Alberta Railroad runs a distance of approximately 525 miles in a northwesterly direction from Edmonton, Alberta, to Dawson Creek, B. C. The topography in general permits of easy access but, notwithstanding, the line skirts a number of rivers and wash areas which is perhaps attributable to the desire in the initial construction to keep costs at a minimum. The line was completed to Grand Prairie in 1930 and several years later was pushed on to Dawson Creek. So-called "muskeg" supports much of the road bed; hence, even at this date, the fills are not stable. Previous to the war approximately two trains per week were operated over the line except in the fall when grain was hauled south from the farming regions near the northern terminus.

The entire line was largely constructed from relay rail varying from 85# to 55# with the majority being 65#. At the present time, numerous derailments are caused by cracked rail. The spacing of ties is a maximum for branch line construction, and it is now estimated that 50% to 75% of the ties need immediate replacement. No tie plates were used on tangents or curves and even some of the trestles are without them; hence, numerous cases of spread gauge and tipped rail delay train operations. Metal ballast is for all practical purposes non-existent. Spring thaws cause considerable heaving and shifting of the track over the entire line, with the result that the last portion of the line from McLennan to Dawson Creek will not be in operation in the spring unless sufficient man-power

is available to care for every part of track day by day. Trestles were generally designed for approximately an E40 loading and have not been maintained. E60 loadings are now being moved over the trestle at very reduced speeds from 3 to 5 miles an hour. Short sidings, which are used as passing tracks only with difficulty, are provided at 16 points along the main track.

Roundhouse facilities, passable for the use which the railroad had during peacetimes but no more, exist only at Edmonton and Dawson Creek. The Dawson Creek roundhouse was partially burned out approximately six weeks ago. There [15] is no water supply at Dawson Creek, the northern terminus of the road and all water must be hauled from the Pouce Coupe River approximately seven miles away. There are, however, approximately six sources of water along the line at which tankage on towers has been installed. All coaling except at Edmonton is done by hand-shoveling, although at certain points passenger locomotives are coaled by means of gasoline-operated cranes.

The rolling stock actually owned by this railroad is in poor condition and of negligible quantity. The CPR and the CNR, however, have loaned considerable cars and sufficient locomotives to operate the road and are in a position to provide all rolling stock which the road, as it is, is capable of using.

At the present time, the railroad does not have sufficient labor available to maintain the track even at its now questionable condition. It is recognized that it will be necessary to import labor or to use troops on the maintenance of the section from McLennan to Dawson Creek in the spring if the road is to be kept open at all. With a reasonable amount of maintenance and with good luck, it is estimated that approximately 2000 tons per day may be moved over this road during the summer months. It is, however, questionable, considering the present state of repair, that more than 200,000 tons can be moved over the railroad in one operating year. In order to place the road in a position to carry the estimated capacity of the average single-track line, or approximately 4000 tons per day, a very considerable sum of money must be spent for delayed maintenance and improvements to the right-of-way and operating installations.

At this point it is well to mention the road which now exists from Edmonton to Dawson Creek, with the view of using motor transportation not to supplant but to augment the present facilities of the Northern Alberta Railroad. This road is of regular country-type construction, such as is found in North Dakota and Montana in the United States. The right-of-way is generally narrow. The ditching is sketchy and in a poor state of maintenance. The surface is of a soil generally known as gumbo. The bridges are of light construction such as is found on any country road. During the months of middle summer and the months of middle winter, the road is passable, and it is possible to operate trucks at a speed of approximately 20 to 25 miles an hour. During the two months of freeze-up and the three months of thaw, the road is to all practical purposes impassable. It may be said that although the terrain is relatively easy, the road compares unfavorably with most of Alcan Highway. If trucks are to be operated on this road to any considerable degree, appropriate maintenance operations must be initiated at once. Bridges must be reinforced, ditches cleaned and road metal must be placed at many sections.

B. Dawson Creek Railhead

The Dawson Creek Railhead as it now exists consists of a series of buildings scattered along the Northern Alberta Railroad just inside and just outside the limits of the village of Dawson Creek itself. All construction is frame except for a number of metal huts which are used to house troops. No water facilities, no sanitary facilities, and no fire protection facilities exist. The [16] layout obviously grew like Topsy; that is, additional buildings were added during the course of the construction of the highway and later as needs developed and manifested themselves. The work was accomplished through the use of two PRA contractors, W. E. Elliott Construction Company and Currin & Briggs. The activities of the construction companies were augmented by troop labor furnished by the Second Battalion of the 341st Engineers. Facilities as now existing at this so-called temporary railhead are as follows: troop housing for approximately 2000 men, headquarters group consisting of 6 portable-type buildings; 17 warehouses 50' x 200', each with two 10' x 200' loading platforms; 2 third-echelon-type buildings 95' x 186' with two wings, one wing 47' x 35' and the other wing 60' x 35'; 2 fourth-echelon-type buildings 80' x 240', with one 32' x 40' wing; one telephone repair station; power line and transformer units; flight strip; earth roads; temporary railroad tracks and unloading ramps; and railroad yard with capacity for approximately 150 cars.

At the time of this inspection, underground tank storage for gasoline was in the process of being installed. Power generating equipment was available on the site but not installed. There exists at the site pipe, hydrants and other miscellaneous material for installation of a water system and fire protection system. Unfortunately, potable water cannot be secured from wells driven to any depth at Dawson Creek; hence, if a water system is to be installed, a line must be provided a minimum distance of seven miles from either the Kiskatinaw River or the Pouce Coupe River.

Sanitary conditions and general living conditions in the village of Dawson Creek are deplorable to say the least. The District Engineer, however, is making every effort to influence and to assist the towns people in making a general clean-up.

The proposed site for the permanent railhead lies to the south and east of Dawson Creek. The terrain is generally rolling and no great amount of grading will be necessary. Water, however, must be piped a considerable distance to this site, even as it is necessary to pipe it to Dawson Creek because of the failure of wells as a supply. The proposed construction here provides for the housing of 80 officers and 5000 enlisted men; storage and motor repair facilities consisting of 2,300,000 feet; refrigerated warehouses for the storage of food; necessary roads, railroad track, and fire protection facilities; a 200-bed hospital; dry-cleaning and laundry facilities for the troop strength; and electrical facilities.

We are told that this proposed construction is based on only 28,000 tons of pay freight per month; even so, the quantity of construction materials which must be provided and the number of men which must be employed on the construction will seriously handicap all other activities along the highway to the north. At this point, it is well to state that not only must materials for this project be moved from Dawson Creek Railhead but materials for nearly all other construction will be handled from the same point.

Therefore, it is suggested that a study of the existing facilities be made with the view of determining the means of best using and best adapting the existing construction in providing storage for general use during the next year. [17] It is felt that if one 150-bed hospital, one fire station, 750 KVA electric generating capacity, 15 additional warehouses 50' x 200', necessary cold storage facilities, and necessary water-line and fire protection facilities are constructed immediately, a railhead will be available which will handle all traffic and storage necessary during the next year. It will be noted that such a scheme uses all existing facilities and requires very little additional construction. This will release more materials for Whitehorse and for Fairbanks where the troop housing and storage capacity is more sorely needed at the present time.

C. Alcan Highway

From Dawson Creek to Ft. St. John, a distance of approximately 48 miles, the road is to all practical purposes a boulevard. Ditches are deep, well graded, the surface is smooth and well metaled, and the width is more than ample in every case. In this section, there are two major structures—the bridges over the Kiskatinaw and Peace Rivers. The latter crossing is now made by passage over a single-lane trestle bridge which has already been partially destroyed this winter by ice and, it is expected, will be entirely wrecked during the spring break-up. J. A. Rosbling & Sons Company have moved in and are at work on the necessary tower foundations for the proposed cable bridge to be erected at this point. A conversation with the workmen revealed the fact that it was the intention not to spin the 900' crossing but to draw the entire rope across in one operation. It is estimated that the bridge will not be ready for use at the spring break-up; hence, it will be necessary to assemble materials and plan on repairing and replacing the timber structures for use during the early months of the summer. To date no activity in this direction has been undertaken, and at the site a physical inspection indicated that no materials were available for this work. The road from Fort St. John to Fort Nelson, a distance of approximately 245 miles, is in good condition for a country road. It is possible to drive a car over most of the distance at a speed of approximately 30 miles an hour. Some realignment and grading has been done. However, no improved structures of any type have been installed, and most of the mileage is not metaled. This section of the road will be impassable during the spring break-up, and it will be necessary to rework ditches and small structures and do additional grading and surfacing in order to make the road useable during the summer. One major stream crossing, that of the Sikanni Chief River, is under construction. The trestle bents are in and at the time of our inspection, the PRA representative and

the contractor were waiting for the shipment of the balance of the wood truss timbers. Too, approximately 28,000 pounds of bridge hardware had left Vancouver but had not as yet arrived at Dawson Creek for shipment by truck to the site. If the timber and the hardware have arrived at the site by the date of this report, this bridge will be available for use as soon as the road itself is passable after the spring thaws.

From Ft. Nelson to Watson Lake, a distance of approximately 360 miles, the road passes through difficult construction country. The initial bad spot occurs at Steamboat Mountain, where sight distances are non-existent, grades are very steep, and rock cuts have made ditching impossible. There is sufficient activity at this point to keep a medium-size contractor busy all summer. The second source of trouble is a section of approximately 20 miles along or over [18] McDonald Creek. Within this distance, the creek is crossed nine times and a physical inspection revealed that the road here will probably be entirely non-existent after the spring thaw.

Between Mile 170 and Mile 180, as measured north and west from Ft. Nelson, the road passes on a rock shelf along the side of Muncho Lake. At the present moment, this section of road has a single lane, curves are sharp, and the grades are steep. All work here is in rock and, while this work is being done during the summer, it will probably be necessary to operate a barge service or a ferry service on Muncho Lake in order to allow traffic to by-pass this point. Stream crossings must also be made at the Kledo, Racing, Toad, and the Liard Rivers. In addition, numerous creeks and smaller rivers must be crossed. As nearly as could be determined, no construction has been started and no plans have been placed in operation to erect the permanent structures over these rivers. A physical inspection of all the sites revealed that at this time no materials have been ordered or stock-piled to reinforce or to rebuild the numerous temporary structures which will surely be destroyed with the coming of spring. Considerable realignment work must be done along this entire section—grading, ditching and metaling will be necessary before the trail can be really called a road for use in the summer or through the spring and fall changes. At the present time, however, with the exception of the three difficult points mentioned, the road is readily passable, and an average speed of 25 miles an hour can be maintained with a passenger car. Over the bulk of the distance, the road is two-lane and no difficulty is encountered in the passing of vehicles. The surface of the road is now excellent because it consists of ice and packed snow. Only in a few cases is the surface made dangerous by advancing small glaciers.

From Watson Lake to Whitehorse, a distance of approximately 330 miles, the road generally encounters less difficult terrain. The one major stream crossing exists at Teslin Lake. Construction of this crossing is well underway, and completion should be had as soon as the road itself is available for use in the early summer. Crossing is now made over the ice of the lake. Contractors are working at two points on realignment but, generally speaking, maintenance from Watson Lake to Teslin Lake is not as good as the sections of the highway to the south of Watson Lake. Speed of passenger vehicles over this section can be maintained at an average of approximately 25 miles an hour, but more precaution must be taken in passing other vehicles.

Very few contractors have camps in this section, and as far as is known, little provision has been made for work here during the summer. A physical inspection revealed no stock-piles of material for minor construction, and this section too will certainly be impassable for at least two months in the spring.

The road from Whitehorse to Fairbanks, approximately 650 miles, is generally passable and of the same character as most of the road. The Donjek, the White, the Robertson, the Johnson, and the Gerstle are the major streams crossed by this section of the road. As far as can be determined, no activities to undertake permanent installations over these rivers are visible in the field. The entire highway is generally passable with the exception of the Robertson and Johnson Rivers. These rivers are of a peculiar nature, in that they open and close intermittently. Consequently, it is never possible to estimate accurately when the road [19] will be open and when it will be closed. The river beds change in position and width, as a consequence of which the establishment of permanent crossings presents an unusually difficult if not unsolvable problem. There are no contractors along this section of the road. One PRA representative for the whole 650 miles was on the job, and at the time of our inspection he was concerning himself with the Haines-Champagne Road, hence Alcan itself had no one interested. No stock-piles for the repair or replacement of temporary structures

of any kind are in existence. The only personnel available to maintain and make temporary repairs on this road are Engineer troops (97th Engineers). It is now understood that these troops are to be moved out and used in driving through a road west of Fairbanks.

In summary, it might be said that very little traffic was moving over the entire highway. An average of less than 30 vehicles per day were passed during the three days which we spent on the road. Trucks transporting Alcan or Canol supplies seemed to constitute most of these. The balance of the trucks were about equally divided between civilian contractors' trucking and Army vehicles. The road itself offered no handicaps to the operation of trucks, and the passage of at least 200 vehicles per day over any given section should not be difficult.

Various contractors and troop camps are scattered up and down along the highway from Dawson Creek to Watson Lake. The more recently built contractors' camps between the Liard River Crossing and Watson Lake are much superior to those further south. Experience here is beginning to pay dividends. Rest stations exist as such at approximately each 100-mile point. Generally speaking, it may be said the housing does exist but it has been very poorly established and maintained. Sanitary conditions are not good and camp layouts are neither uniform nor desirable. Troop housing at scattered points is in place between Whitehorse and Fairbanks. In summation, it should be reiterated that limited housing does exist but that it is of such character as to induce low morale and is not safe from a sanitary and fire standpoint.

D. Alcan Telephone Line

The Alcan Telephone Line proper will provide communications between Edmonton and Fairbanks and all intermediate points along the highway. In addition there is a telephone line being constructed from Skagway to Whitehorse as part of the operations of the Canol pipeline between these two points. Caltel (Alcan Telephone Line) is under construction through the agency of Miller Construction Co., of Indianapolis, Ind., and the Oman-Smith Co., of Nashville, Tenn. The line from Skagway to Whitehorse is being constructed by the Hatfield Construction Company.

Caltel is of utmost importance to all operations in the northwest because it is well known that rapid construction of any undertaking is dependent largely on the availability and dependability of communications. Radio communications in this section of the world are not dependable. Conditions change very rapidly, and sometimes a unit can be heard a distance of 50 miles, then again the same unit can handle messages as far as 300 miles. Thus it is evident that an item of first priority in this entire program is Caltel. Contracts have been awarded and the work has been underway since August 11, 1942. The design work is being handled by the Canol Architect-Engineer, J. Gordon Turnbull and Sverdrup & Parcel. After these many months, little progress has been made, and at the time of our visit to Edmonton, the Division Engineer of the Northwest Division and the Commanding General of the Northwest Service Command had just reached an agreement [20] with the Signal Corps so that the design of the line would be according to Army standards and the necessary copper for its completion would be furnished. On the face of it, no matter where the fault lies, this delay is inexcusable.

The pole line itself is now in place, and in operation from Edmonton to Ft. St. John. Poles and wire have been erected for perhaps 100 miles past Ft. St. John toward Ft. Nelson. Poles are in place for an additional 50 miles and holes have been dug for yet another 25 miles. Repeater stations between Edmonton and Dawson Creek are 99% complete and are in operation. This work at the lower end of the line has been accomplished by the Miller Construction Company. Poles and wire have been erected south of Whitehorse for a distance of approximately 50 miles by the Oman-Smith Company. Poles alone have been erected over another 25 miles by the same company. There are, in addition, scattered at some few points along the road stock-piles of poles to supply immediate construction needs. The intention and plan as announced by the Division Office is to have the line complete from Whitehorse to Watson Lake by April 15, and entire Caltel complete by May 31. This, of course, is obviously impossible, and it is even questionable at the present rate of progress and state of organization whether the line will be complete by the end of 1943 construction season. In general, no housing has been accomplished along the line for repeater stations which are to be located at approximately 100-mile intervals. In the one or two cases where structures have been erected, it was found that the floors were not

strong enough to support the equipment to be installed. The materials for construction are available at Edmonton, Dawson Creek, Prince Rupert, and Skagway. Within the week, it is expected that all materials will have been moved from Prince Rupert to either Edmonton or Skagway, so that they may be delivered to the points on the road where they can be used. The contractor has insufficient manpower and insufficient equipment.

E. Whitehorse

Whitehorse, Y. T., is the headquarters for the NWSC. The Northwest Division Engineer maintains a District Office at this location, and the Bechtol-Price-Callahan Company (Canol contractors), the Oman-Smith Company (Caltol contractors), and the Currin & Briggs Company (PRA contractor) all maintain camps at this village. The NWSC offices, the officers quarters, and the civilian quarters are all of portable CCC-type construction. Troop housing is either metal huts or portable CCC-type construction. Warehousing space is extremely limited, and materials and supplies are stored in open lots under canvas or not as the case may be. Additional construction materials and supplies are scattered at various locations all along the highway south for a distance of seven miles where the so-called Fairbanks freight line has a terminal. Water supply is by means of a well or wells of very limited capacity, which constantly go dry. Sewerage disposal system is inadequate and in fact no system at all. At the time of our visit, water was rationed. Sanitary conditions within the village of Whitehorse itself, as well as fire protection facilities, are in a most deplorable state. Unless some extensive activity towards a clean-up is undertaken before spring, control of the health of the community will be most difficult. Whitehorse sprang into existence as a village during the Gold Rush days because of the fact that it was the terminus of the White Pass-Yukon R. R. over the mountains from Skagway and because of the use of the upper river steamboat operations on the Yukon and Lewes Rivers. At the present time, [21] there is practically no additional construction of any type or kind underway in the vicinity of Whitehorse, because nearly all transportation facilities available are required for the mere subsistence of the present population. To reiterate, housing, warehousing, water supply, sanitary disposal, transportation facilities are all very inadequate for the task at hand, and an immediate solution of some character must be undertaken in order to alleviate the present conditions. The NWSC headquarters and the Office of the District Engineer are not in agreement as to what should be the location of the proposed railhead—McRae or Robinson. This should be settled as soon as possible.

F. Fairbanks and Alaska

Fairbanks at the present time is the northern terminus of the Alcan Highway and also the Alaska Railroad. The discontinuance of various mines with headquarters in Fairbanks has placed at the disposal of the District Engineer located here certain facilities such as equipment, housing, and repair shops. There is, however, no storage space, no troop housing, no quantity supplies of building materials. This, however, is not a problem at the present time because there are no troops to speak of and no freight arrives over the highway or the railroad. There are no representatives of any of the contractors, Architect-Engineer, or the PRA at Fairbanks as yet. Ample building sites are available. Lumber can be and is being cut at certain points. The small amount of equipment available is being repaired. This, however, is hampered by the lack of repair parts. An occasional truck comes in over the highway to Fairbanks. There is a train twice a week over the Alaska Railroad. Most of the contact with the outside world is by air.

A number of highways exist in the territory of Alaska which have been constructed in years gone by by the Department of Interior. The Richardson Highway, which is part of Alcan Highway, as far as Big Delta, runs from Fairbanks to Big Delta to Gulkana and thence to Valdez, with a branch that strikes from Copper Center to Chitina. There is also a road which leads from Gulkana to Anchorage. At the time of our visit, the road from Gulkana to Anchorage was open, the road from Big Delta to Gulkana was closed in two places, and from Gulkana to Valdez was closed in one spot. Two rotary snow ploughs properly used can keep the Richardson Highway and the road from Gulkana to Anchorage open through the winter months. Valdez itself is an ice-free port with minor useable docking facilities. These highways are approximately 20' wide with a light metal surface. All structures are of wood. They are generally impassable in the fall and particularly in the spring. At the pres-

ent time, plans are being developed to undertake the construction of winter roads from Fairbanks to McGrath, and from Fairbanks to Tanana. We feel that the traffic facilities in Alaska already in existence are not being improved and maintained as they should be and that they are not being used cooperatively for both the A. D. C. and the NWSC to the degree that will insure the highest mutual results.

G. *White Pass-Yukon Railroad*

The White Pass and Yukon Railroad is a narrow gauge (3'-0") line which runs from Whitehorse, Y. T., to Skagway, Alaska, a distance of 110 miles. Mining in the interior led to the construction of this road between 1860 and 1890 [22] with the bulk of the original equipment having been manufactured in the U. S. around 1889. From five hours to a number of days are required for the passage of a train, depending on weather conditions.

Alignment and grades from Whitehorse to Bennett, a distance of approximately 70 miles, are about those which would be expected on any narrow-gauge installation. The minimum elevation of track in this section is 2083 feet at Whitehorse. A maximum elevation of 2499 feet above sea level occurs at Robinson. From Bennett to Skagway the curves and grades are excessive. It is estimated that the grades run as high as 5.7% and curvature as high as 16°. 2924 feet at Meadows is the maximum elevation in this section, while 15 feet at Skagway is the minimum elevation.

Muskeg provides the foundation for the first 42½ miles of road bed from Whitehorse to Carcross. Ditching in this section is practically nonexistent and, as a result, changes in season cause the track to shift, heave, or sink. Rock provides the foundation for the last 67½ miles from Carcross to Skagway. Rock cuts are tight both vertically and horizontally; hence, all clearances and sub-grade allowances are a bare minimum.

Metal ballast is to all practical purposes non-existent, and as a consequence it is necessary to shim up the rail with blocks of wood placed between the ties and the rails. Rail is blocked in position with wooden wedges to keep it from turning over. Approximately 50% of the ties will have to be replaced. 56# rail is the standard installation. Wood trestles to a height of 256 feet exist in the last 40 miles of the line.

In several locations, the trestles are on both vertical and horizontal curves. Condition of some of the structures is such that it is not known how long they will stay in place. To quote train orders received during our trip: "Proceed at a speed not to exceed 5 miles an hour over ----- trestle on account of a sag in it". Rock slides and snow slides often cover the track, wreck trestles, and stop train service for days. There are nineteen short sidings on the line and one real passing track at Fraser Loop.

Rolling stock consists of equipment originally on the line, new boxcars and flats provided by the Army, and locomotives purchased from the Denver and Rio Grande Western. The Rio Grande locomotives are much heavier than the original equipment and, as a consequence, have increased the rate of deterioration of the track. Insufficient rolling stock causes the rehandling of most freight. Freight is loaded direct from boats to cars because of small dock capacity and then hauled up the valley from ½ mile to a mile where it is unloaded and stored until cars are available to take it over the mountain.

One operating battalion is now running and attempting to maintain the road. They are doing an excellent job as are all troop units in the northwest in spite of almost insurmountable handicaps. If under present conditions the road delivers an average of 300 tons of pay freight per day to Whitehorse, it will be an excellent job.

[23] Two and sometimes four Rio Grande locomotives are now used to deliver a train up the 5.7% grade and over the summit. This operation gives the track a heavy pounding. If Shay-gear-driven locomotives were used on the first 20 miles out of Skagway and the Rio Grande locomotives were used for the balance of the distance when grades are generally less than 3%, the amount of track maintenance could be reduced considerably and the delivery of trains would be more certain.

If the plates could be provided for the trestles, trestle approaches and curves, maintenance effort would be more fruitful and less replacement material would be required. Fourteen side-dump gravel cars, such as every dam builder has used for years, together with a ½-yard Diesel or gas-driven crawler-mounted shovel, would take care of the ballasting and realignment of the most difficult sections. An additional shovel for ditching would help considerably but is not absolutely essential.

Additional box-cars would eliminate the rehandling of freight. Another operating battalion would provide men for the necessary track maintenance.

The adoption of these suggestions on motive power, rolling stock, and maintenance should increase the average pay-load delivery to Whitehorse to 800 to 1000 tons per day or about three times the present estimated average.

H. Skagway

Skagway is the southern terminus of the White Pass & Yukon R. R. and is a small village located in the narrow valley between the two mountain ranges which reach an elevation of 5500 feet. Approximately one-third of the valley is cut by the Skagway River which runs full, of course, only in the spring. A dyke has been thrown up which prevents the spring freshets from inundating the town. There are perhaps 400 to 500 useable acres of land in this valley. This area must take care of the town, the housing of the Army and contractors' forces, railroad shops, and the storage of freight.

If one faces toward the harbor, the river previously referred to is on the far right. On the far left is the old dock built and used by the White Pass & Yukon R. R. This dock has been reworked by the forces of Bechtel-Price-Callahan, and in addition a 240' extension is underway. Approximately 120' of this extension is available for use at the present time, and it is expected that it may be used in its entirety by April 15. The total length of the dock will then be approximately 480'.

In the approximate center of the harbor are a series of dolphins supporting a pipeline and anchorage for tankers and gasoline-bearing barges. The total length will finally be 680'; 380' are now in use and for all practical purposes the 680' may be used if required.

On the right of the harbor is a make-shift sort of pile and earth barge unloading dock constructed by the Transportation Corps. The piles were not driven to any great depth; hence they are now tied with cables over the top of the earth fill. This arrangement is being used, however, some better arrangement will [24] eventually have to be made. Many materials and some rolling stock for the railroad have been unloaded by running temporary track down the beach and erecting barge or scow beds to support the loads when the tide is out.

The 15 steel tanks which provide 150,000 barrels of gasoline storage for the Canol project are in place and are being used. The auxiliary buildings for housing the pumps and the personnel are not as yet complete.

There is no shed storage of any kind available in Skagway; hence, freight is stored in every vacant lot available. The port troops are now hard at work attempting to bring order out of the chaos which has existed. Housing for the Bechtel-Price-Callahan group, the port operating troops, the railroad operating battalion, and the District Engineer is scattered through the town and over the valley. It consists of steel hutments and portable CCC-type buildings. Messing facilities are provided for by the use of former hotels and cafes which existed in the community. Sanitary conditions are about average for a village of this size located in such a section of the country. At the present time nearly all available land is in use; and as a consequence, there is little opportunity or room for much expansion of housing here.

Everything done thus far has been "hit or miss". It is thought that a comprehensive plan for the use of the port and the available land area should be prepared, adjustments made, and a certain small amount of new construction settled upon. This new construction would perhaps include an equipment repair shop, additional office facilities, additional housing and warehousing space. The capacity of the port is very limited; consequently it is essential to control the arrival of boats. No more freight must be brought in by barge or ship than can be carried by the railroad over the mountains to Whitehorse because there is insufficient room for any dead storage. The port can adequately serve the railroad and no more; hence, in the final analysis the capacity of the railroad controls the capacity of the port.

I. Inland Waterways

The trip from Skagway to Prince Rupert along the Alaskan Inland Waterway was made aboard the yacht "Westward". Departure from Skagway was made at 8 p. m. on Wednesday and the boat arrived at Prince Rupert about 2 p. m. on Saturday after a 12-hour layover during the trip on account of fog. In spite of the fact that many aids to navigation in the way of buoys and lights have been destroyed by unwieldy tows, this waterway provides an excellent means of transportation by small boat and barge to Alaska.

During the summer months, the operation of tugs and barges through these waters is relatively easy and few hazards exist. In the winter, however, high seas and excessive and changing winds make the handling of large tows extremely difficult. During the past season several tugs and tows have been lost because of the lack of power and size. It is well known that tides all along the Alaskan and British Columbia coast are excessive, and that the current generated by their changes reach as high as five and six or even seven knots in some places. There [25] is one lake just below Petersburg into which the tides run in both directions from both ends making the handling of tows difficult. Most of the crafts that have been employed on the freighting operation have been underpowered for the job. In most cases, the maximum rate of travel is $7\frac{1}{4}$ to 8 knots. Such a tug with a tow bucking a 6-knot current generated by the tide is in a very precarious position when the wind is blowing. Some of the boats used in the transportation of personnel are fast and have sufficient power to buck these currents but are not of the type of construction to withstand the heavy seas which sometimes develop. That is to say, they were built for pleasure and speed and not for work.

An attempt should be made to transport as much freight as possible during the safe period of navigation—the summer. Also, it might be well to conduct a survey of all the small boats and tugs used in transportation to determine their relative type of construction, their power and their rate of travel. Perhaps by providing a few new heavy-duty engines for the larger boats it will be possible to transfer engines on down the line so that all craft will be equipped with sufficient power. More boats will then be capable of traveling at a sufficient rate to make navigation generally safe through all months of the year. Since the ports thus far available in Alaska are of limited capacity and general storage facilities are not available, it is certainly of interest to attempt to balance water transportation, port facilities, and railroad facilities. This balance should be obtained as much by the adjustment of the amount and kind of equipment as by the control of the operation of the equipment itself.

J. Prince Rupert

The port project at Prince Rupert itself is located on the same island as the city of Prince Rupert. The staging area is located on the mainland, and the ammunition storage and loading docks are being constructed at Watson Island.

The housing for the port troops located on a hill above Prince Rupert is being used and to all practical purposes is complete. The capacity of this group is 1250 enlisted men and 100 officers. The main dock, the transit shed, the railroad track, the refrigeration building, the marine repair building, and the administration building are from 60% to 70% completed and will be ready for use in their entirety on April 15. As a matter of fact, the transit sheds and dock are at the present time being used by the Transportation Corps and have been able to handle all the freight that has thus far been shipped.

The road from Prince Rupert to the mainland where the staging area is located is approximately half complete. Work here has been handicapped by the lack of rock shovels, trucks, and rock crushers. The road from Prince Rupert to the edge of the island was originally built by the Province of British Columbia. The military road running to the staging area begins just across from the bridge leading to the mainland. An examination of the road built by British Columbia reveals the fact that if it is to handle substantial traffic, it will be necessary for certain maintenance and metaling operations to be undertaken. Port operators will probably submit to the District Engineer at an early date a request for this work.

The staging area located on the mainland is approximately 50% complete and will be available for occupancy by the 15th of April. This staging area [26] site is all muskeg which had been cleared some years ago, with the exception of the stumps, for the use of a town site. Slightly more than half of the buildings are now in place, however, no work has been done on the roads and very little has been accomplished on the water and sewer lines. Construction materials are being handled by truck over plank access roads. The terrain is hilly and this fact together with the muskeg and the stumps will make road construction difficult. Here again, lack of or rather no equipment has prevented the beginning of construction on the roads.

On Watson Island work is underway on the construction of the ammunition loading docks. Progress, however, is slow because all pile driving is being handled by skid rigs which must brace and cap after each pile bent has been driven before it can be advanced to the driving position for the next line. On

the island itself, work is underway in removing large quantities of rock which is being used as fill to provide support for the rail classification yard. Construction of the wooden igloos has not as yet been started. Although this ammunition storage yard and loading dock may be available for use before July 15, a visual inspection indicated that that date would probably be the one of final completion. At a site below the staging area, Bechtel-Price-Callahan Company have under construction tank car unloading facilities, tank storage, docks and tanker and oil barge loading facilities. Work on this group is approximately 50% complete. At the present time, the dock is in and tank foundations have been poured; one complete tank out of five has been erected. Construction on the permanent houses for operating and on the pump facilities is just now beginning. The concrete footings for the warehouse have been poured.

K. C. N. R.—Prince Rupert to Edmonton

The return trip from Prince Rupert to Edmonton was made via the C. N. R. The train leaves Prince Rupert at 6:30 in the evening and is due in Edmonton at 9:45 p. m. on the second following day. On our particular trip, we left on a Monday evening and arrived in Edmonton at 5 o'clock Thursday morning.

The railroad leaves Prince Rupert by traveling south to Watson Island, thence to the mainland until it reaches the valley of the Skenna River. It follows the north bank of the Skenna River east and north until it crosses just below Hazelton, B. C. At Hazelton, it leaves the main channel of the Skenna and follows the west bank of a branch which runs due south to Smithers. From Smithers, the road wiggles through the mountains to Prince George and finally Jasper. Just west of Jasper, the line from Prince Rupert makes a junction with the main line of the C. N. R. from Vancouver to Edmonton. The road bed from Prince Rupert to Jasper is generally in poor condition. 50% of the ties should be replaced or are being replaced. No tie plates are used and the rail itself is not in the best of condition. From Jasper to Edmonton regular maintenance has been in force and the entire railroad is generally in good condition. There is a definite limit on the amount of freight that can be handled between Jasper and Prince Rupert because of the fact that a speed limit of 50 miles an hour necessitated by the poor condition of the track is in force. The situation is further aggravated by the lack of passing tracks. It might be well to mention at this point that if any holding and reconsignment points are to be constructed in support of Prince Rupert, it might be best to build them east of Jasper. "Bottle-necks," if they are to occur on this railroad, will occur between Jasper and Prince Rupert.

[27] L. Canol Project

For the period of time during which work has been going on in connection with this entire project, only a moderate amount of physical work-in-place has been accomplished. The required completion dates cannot possibly be met.

We did not have the opportunity to inspect any part of Canol #1A or Canol #6; as a consequence, our information relative to these two jobs is predicated entirely on conversations, statements, verbal and written, and a study of three consecutive monthly Field Progress Reports.

The only jobs on which any substantial amount of work has been done are Canol #1A, Canol #6, and Canol #2. The remainder of the work on Jobs Canol #1, Canol #3, Canol #4, and Canol #5 is either in the category of "barely started" or "not started."

Canol #1A is represented as being 60% done and Canol #6 as being approximately 20% done. On Canol #2, the tank farm and facilities at Prince Rupert are approximately 50% done, the unloading facilities and storage at Skagway are approximately 60% done (but are being used), the pipeline from Skagway to Whitehorse is in place and gasoline is being pumped through it. The line, however, is laid above ground, with no expansion loops, no anchorage, no gate or check valves and with insufficient pumping capacity. In some cases the line is so close to the construction of the railroad that a minor wreck will break the line and cause a damaging fire because of the high pressure under which the line is operated without check valves. Just what will happen to the line after the spring thaw, land slides and glacial movements is not known. Terminal storage exists at both Skagway and Whitehorse. Difficulties have been had, however, with excessive leakage because of the type of gasket material used. Pumping operations have to be handled on a "hit or miss" basis, since the operating communication system is only finished to a point seventeen miles out of Skagway.

Canol #1, the pipeline and appurtenant facilities from Norman Wells to Whitehorse, is only approximately 8% accomplished. This work done consists mainly of the pioneer road being built from both ends; that running from Brooks brook toward Sheldon Lake, of which approximately 50 miles is done, is now the mission of the 35th Engineers, although it is the obligation of Bachtel-Price-Callahan to put it through. No work-in-place has been done on the refinery at Whitehorse.

Canol #3, the pipeline from Carcross to Watson Lake, is approximately 6% done. Work started on this project October 7, 1942 and was required to have been completed as of January 31, 1943. The work done consists mainly of partial surveys and the delivery of some of the material.

Canol #4, the pipeline from Whitehorse to Fairbanks, might be described as 0% accomplished. It is, however, reported to have been started on January 9, 1943 and is required to be completed on April 30, 1943. This performance is manifestly impossible.

[28] Canol #5, the pipeline from Fairbanks to Nanana and thence to Tanana, might also be described as 0% accomplished. As of January 31, 1943, the job was reported as not started and it has a required completion date of May 15, 1943. This will likewise fail to be accomplished.

There are in addition certain wild-cattling operations or oil excavations being carried on in the vicinity of Norman Wells. The exact status of this work could not be ascertained. However, it is known that certain production is already available and that two more wells are in the process of being driven.

The entire Canol Project is characterized by all the deficiencies which have been expressed in this report under the headings from I to VII.

M. Division and District Offices

1. The Division Office at Edmonton might be aptly described as a conglomeration of individuals under headless (brainless would be better) guidance and direction, engaged in perpetual but wasteful notion and esconced in an atmosphere of pandemonium.

Living and working conditions at this office are exceedingly poor, almost scandalous, and conducive of the lowest morale. The new quarters being built are extremely excessive in cost and while they may provide comfort have been erected so close together as to constitute a fire hazard.

We could find no part of the office which might be characterized as having organizational cohesion and coordination.

2. The District Office at Edmonton is hybrid and is in reality a sub-office of the Division Engineer. It is attempting to perform a diversity of functions in the process of which it is losing caste with the other five districts. The office contains some exceptionally good key personnel, who could be used very effectively in a good organization. This District Office should be abolished and parts of it absorbed in the Division Office.

3. The District Office at Dawson Creek has the spirit and willingness to perform its duties and responsibilities but is helpless. Several conferences with the District Engineer, Lt. Colonel Harry A. Schuppper, who incidentally appears to be a capable and enthusiastic officer, convince me that under present conditions it is completely ineffectual. It has no knowledge of construction facts, authority, control, specifically defined objectives, nor the wherewithal to undertake anything intelligently. Most of the work done by this office has been effected on the basis of his own initiative and without instructions; if he had not so done, he and his staff and civilian employees would be homeless. Most of his officers are not particularly qualified for the work for which they have been designated to perform at this station.

4. The District Office at Whitehorse, like the one at Dawson Creek, is also completely ineffectual. Lt. Col. L. E. Laurion is a conscientious [29] and competent officer who is irked by the fact that he wants to do a real job and is stymied in every direction. Being in the shadow of the Northwest Service Command, he receives conflicting instructions, neither of which he can carry out because he lacks the means. The representative of the contractors will not recognize his authority, the Service Command will not permit him to use his initiative. Briefly, he feels and is beginning to act like a marionette. The morale of his officers and civilian employees is dropping very rapidly.

5. The District Office at Fairbanks is similar in nature to those of Dawson Creeks and Whitehorse relative to its efficacy in the construction program. Because Colonel John Moreland, the District Engineer, is an unusually fine person, possessed of high qualities of leadership, judgment and intelligence, and inspires and endears himself to the persons around him, the morale of his organization

and its quality is superior to that of all the other Engineer offices in the NWSC. If this office were part of an organization under which it could function, it would contribute in a superlative measure to any task that had to be accomplished. This office has no plans and specifications by which to supervise construction, has no liaison with Architect-Engineer or Contractor key personnel, has to resort to circuitous means to get facts, and has practically no means at hand in the way of field employees, equipment, spare parts, etc., to undertake its job. The great responsibility which Colonel Moreland feels and his complete lack of authority and instrumentality to perform a job are worrying him considerably.

6. The District Office at Skagway is in the paradoxical position of having a large force of field employees in the vicinity and large quantities of material along the docks and stored in warehouses without being able to direct the building of anything. The Bechtol-Price-Callahan Company has a field employees' camp at Skagway and materials and equipment are being delivered by boat for shipment over the White Pass & Yukon R. R. The fact that the contractor will not recognize the authority of the District Engineer, Lt. Col. Thomas Hayes, makes this office superfluous. As this officer expressed himself in a letter to the Division Office, he has been emasculated. He decries the fact that he has no authority nor the opportunity to use initiative. The disease here is the same one that plagues all the other District Offices. Lt. Col. Hayes is conscientious and, based upon his record, has all the qualifications to perform the job of District Engineer with the highest degree of satisfaction.

7. The District Engineer Office at Prince Rupert is doing a highly commendable job, and in actuality this is the only place in the entire NWSC where physical work-in-place of a substantial amount has been performed during the course of the past three months. The District Engineer, Lt. Col. Gerald R. Tyler, is deserving of much praise. Notwithstanding the fact that he inherited a bad job in mid-stream with contractors who had to be put through a process of catalysis, and not withstanding the fact that the Division Office has given him rather poor cooperation, he has managed to get much of the job done. If he is given immediate assistance in the procurement of some equipment, particularly two 1½ yard shovels, trucks and spare parts, we believe that the job be fully completed by July 1, 1943. The port facilities will be entirely completed by May 1, 1943, possibly sooner. This officer has exhibited exceptionally good business judgment in a number of matters and has demonstrated high administrative ability.

[30] IX General Conclusions

1. The breaking through of the pioneer road (Alcan Highway) was an outstanding and praiseworthy performance.

2. The planning, scheduling, methods of arranging for the execution of work, and the conduct of work performance throughout, subsequent to the breaking through of the pioneer road, have been as disgraceful as the work on Alcan was commendable.

3. The leadership in the Northwest Service Command and in the Northwest Division Engineer Office, particularly the latter, is of a very low order. This leadership and the complete lack of organization which exists have not permitted and will not permit of the rapid, efficient, and economic consummation of the construction task.

4. The requirements for construction work as embodied in the various directives issued and the capacity for the performance of this work with the instrumentalities and agencies, as they exist, are so out of consonance that they cannot be reconciled.

5. Any curtailment or deferment of the work authorized, because of changes in strategic and tactical concepts, caused by changes in war conditions, will not solve the problems in the Northwest Service Command. It is vitally necessary to change the leadership and to reorganize, revitalize and catalyze the agencies enjoined or engaged for the work performance. We are fully convinced that the present construction program, regardless of its adequacy or necessity, can be performed more rapidly, efficiently and economically by good organization and under proper leadership than a deleted program can be executed by the present forces and agencies.

6. The liaison and cooperation between the many commands, divisions and branches of the Army have not as yet reached the stage where they might be termed as completely satisfactory.

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X. Recommendations

1. That the Commanding General, Northwest Service Command, be relieved, or, alternatively, that the Commanding General be assigned a staff of officers, qualified and trained for this particular type of supply and transportation task, who in turn are further implemented in the form of expert technical assistance.

2. That the Northwest Division Engineer be relieved. There is no alternative procedure to this recommendation. The retainment of the Division Engineer in his present capacity will and must eventuate in disgraceful performance or failure.

[31] Itinerary of Colonel L. George Horowitz and Major Howard O. Helgerson

February 7, 1943:

Left Washington, D. C. 5:20 p. m. EWT Pa. R. R.

February 8, 1943:

Arrived Chicago, Ill. 8:45 a. m. CWT

Visited Division Engineer Office

Left Chicago, Ill. 2:45 p. m. CWT Great Western

Arrived St. Paul, Minn. 9:25 p. m. CWT

Left St. Paul, Minn. 10:00 p. m. CWT Soo Line

February 9, 1943:

Arrived Portal, N. D. 3:30 p. m. CWT

Left Portal, N. D. 3:30 p. m. MDT Canadian Pac.

February 10, 1943:

Arrived Calgary, Alberta, Canada 12:00 Noon MWT

Left Calgary, Alberta, Canada 5:00 p. m. MWT Canadian Pac.

Arrived Edmonton, Alberta, Canada 11:00 p. m. MWT

February 11, 1943:

Visited Northwest Division Office

February 12, 1943:

Visited Northwest Division Office

Visited Contractors and Architect-Engineer Offices

Visited FRA and Edmonton District Offices

February 13, 1943:

Visited Northwest Division Office

Left Edmonton, Alberta, Canada 6:00 p. m. MWT N. A. R.

February 14, 1943:

Arrived Dawson Creek, B. C., Canada 8:00 p. m. PWT

February 15, 1943:

Visited District Engineer Office

Visited existing facilities

Visited sites for proposed work

February 16, 1943:

Left Dawson Creek, B. C., Canada 10:00 a. m. PWT

(U. S. E. D. car over Alcan Highway)

Arrived Sikanni Chief River 9:00 p. m. PWT

February 17, 1943:

Left Sikanni Chief River 7:00 a. m. PWT

(U. S. E. D. car over Alcan Highway)

Arrived Liard River 9:30 a. m. PWT

February 18, 1943 Left Liard River 7:30 a. m. PWT

(U. S. E. D. car over Alcan Highway)

February 19, 1943:

Arrived Whitehorse, Y. T. 2:00 p. m. YT (Traveled all of previous night)

Visited Northwest Service Command Headquarters

[32] February 20, 1943:

Visited District Engineer Office

Left Whitehorse, Y. T. 5:00 p. m. YT Army Cargo Pl.

Arrived Fairbanks, Alaska 7:20 p. m. AT

February 21, 1943:

Visited District Engineer Office

Visited local facilities and inspected roads

February 22, 1943:

Visited District Engineer Office

Left Fairbanks, Alaska 9:00 p. m. AT Army Cargo Pl.

February 23, 1943:

Arrived Whitehorse, Y. T. 1:25 a. m. YT
Visited present facilities and sites for proposed work
Left Whitehorse, Y. T. 3:15 p. m. YT White Pass & Yukon R. R.

February 24, 1943:

Arrived Skagway, Alaska 1:45 a. m. YT
Visited District Engineers Office
Visited existing facilities and sites for proposed work
Visited Sub-port Office
Left Skagway, Alaska 8:00 p. m. YT
(Yacht westward via inside passage)

February 25, 1943:

Aboard the Westward

February 26, 1943:

Aboard the Westward

February 27, 1943:

Arrived Prince Rupert, B. C., Canada 2:00 p. m. PWT
Visited District Engineer Office

February 28, 1943:

Visited construction work at Prince Rupert

March 1, 1943:

Visited work at Prince Edward and Watson Island
Visited Sub-port Office
Left Prince Rupert, B. C. 6:30 p. m. PWT Canadian, N. R.

March 2, 1943:

Aboard Canadian Ntl. Railway Train

March 3, 1943:

Arrived Jasper, Alberta, Canada 8:00 a. m. MWT
Left Jasper, Alberta, Canada 2:00 p. m. MWT Canadian N. R.

[33] March 4, 1943:

Arrived Edmonton, Alberta, Canada 4:30 a. m. MWT
Visited Division Engineer Office
Left Edmonton, Alberta, Canada 2:25 p. m. MWT Army Cargo Pl.
Arrived Minneapolis, Minn. 8:30 p. m. CWT
Left Minneapolis, Minn. 11:00 p. m. CWT Chicago, Ill., Milwaukee St.
Paul & Pacific

March 5, 1943:

Arrived Chicago, Ill. 8:30 a. m. CWT
Visited Office of Division Engineer
Left Chicago, Ill. 3:15 p. m. CWT Pa. R. R.

March 6, 1943:

Arrived Washington, D. C. 9:45 a. m. EWT

(There are included as a part of Exhibit No. 6, photostatic copies of a Carlton Hotel, Washington, D. C., registration card dated December 17, 1940, for Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., of Honolulu, T. H.; a guest invoice from the same hotel for Wyman for the period December 17 to December 20, 1940; and a Carlton Hotel ledger sheet for Mr. Paul F. Grafe, Los Angeles, California, for the period November 12, 1939, to May 29, 1942. The registration card is reproduced as Item No. 6, the guest invoice is reproduced as Item No. 7, and the ledger sheet is reproduced as Items Nos. 8 and 9, in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

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SECRET

STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER,
FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, CIVIC CENTER,
San Francisco, California, January 12, 1942

In reply refer to: A4-3/QS1
CF/85-14-Cy

Colonel EDWIN C. KELTON,
Corps of Engineers, United States Army,
U. S. Engineers Office, 751 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, California.

DEAR COLONEL KELTON: 1. This is acknowledgment of your letter of January 8, 1943, requesting clearance of Schooner VEGA.

2. Owing to the importance of the safe arrival of that vessel in connection with Naval Defense Projects in the Honolulu District, it is desired that the VEGA sail with a movement under escort leaving San Francisco about January 15, 1942.

3. The Commandant of the Naval Operating Base, San Pedro, will inform you of the time for sailing, with directions for joining the convoy.

Very truly yours,

W. K. KILPATRICK,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff.

COPIES TO:
Commandant, 11th N. D.
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, San Pedro, Calif.

SVERDRUP & PARCEL
CONSULTING ENGINEERS
Bridges Foundations
Buildings Valuations

RAILWAY EXCHANGE BLDG.,
St. Louis, Mo., February 2, 1944.

Mr. RALPH BURTON,
519 Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR Mr. BURTON: I have waited to send you the information requested in your telephone conversation of Monday, January 31, until I could talk to our Mr. Wolfe who had general charge of our work in the South Seas after Colonel Sverdrup entered the Service.

Our South Seas contracts fall in three groups:

1. Five bombproof personnel shelters near Honolulu—Contract No. W-414-eng-808. This contract involved preparing design plans and furnishing advisory services during construction. Direct supervision was furnished by the District Engineer office. These shelters were built by the Hawaiian Constructors as contractors.

2. First Air Ferry Command—Contract No. DAW-414-eng-511. This originally covered the engineering services involved in planning and supervising the construction of airports and their appurtenances in five locations—Fiji Islands, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, Solomons and Townsville, Australia. The contract was later revised by deleting the work in the New Hebrides and Solomons, and covered five airdromes—Nandi, Narewa in the Fijis, Tontouta and Plain des Gaiac in New Caledonia, and one at Townsville. The construction at Nandi and Narewa was handled by the New Zealand government by a method resembling a force account procedure; at Tontouta the work was similarly handled in co-operation with the Free French government. At Plain des Gaiac the construction was performed by the Hawaiian Constructors. At Townsville, Australia the construction work was performed by forces furnished by the State of Queensland.

3. Second Air Ferry Command—Contract No. DAW-414-eng-585 and Contract No. DAW-eng-842. This comprised the construction of airdromes and

appurtenances at three locations—Penrhyn (Tongareva), Aitutaki and Tongatabu. We had two separate contracts on these projects, one for services as Architect-Engineer and one for services as Constructors—I. e., we were in a sense the contractors.

There was also another contract referred to in our records as Australia No. 1 negotiated with the U. S. A. F. I. A. for the planning and construction supervision of a variety of military installations in Australia. The work was all done with Australian forces, and our contract was taken over by the U. S. Army in June, 1942, after they began to arrive in force.

The work under Group 1 was performed prior to our association with Mr. Turnbull, and he had no connection with it. All other contracts noted, although they were entered into by Sverdrup & Parcel alone on the request of the Army authorities who wanted to avoid the delays involved in getting additional signatures that would be required if placed in the name of the joint venture, were nevertheless recorded on our books in the name of J. Gordon Turnbull and Sverdrup & Parcel, and the participation in these was identical with all other joint venture contracts.

I trust this will give you the desired information, but if you need any further data from us, we will of course be glad to furnish it.

Yours very truly,

SVERDRUP & PARCEL.

By /ss/ JOHN I. PARCEL.

Address reply to Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
Refer to File No.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 28, 1941
4A-e

LEMUEL B. SCHOFIELD,
*Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. SCHOFIELD: The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Los Angeles, California; Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California; Gunther and Shirley Company, Los Angeles, California, and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H. pursuant to Engineer Corps Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, one of the principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Company, applied to the U. S. District Court at Los Angeles, California on January 15, 1941 for his final citizenship papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding ability, excellent judgment and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Arizona for the Indian Service and miscellaneous dams, tunnels and other heavy construction in the State of California. To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government defense projects because of his alien status.

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the aforementioned defense construction project because of his peculiar qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be expedited.

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. KINGMAN,
*Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.*

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EARL G. HARRISON
COMMISSIONER

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Philadelphia 2, December 10, 1943.
246-C-5256161

MR. H. RALPH BURTON,
*General Counsel, Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives,
Room 519, Old House Office Building,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. BURTON: This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 4, 1943, in which you state that you have been directed to obtain, and therefore request for the use of the Committee, a fully detailed statement of the record in the files of this Bureau relating to one Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

The records of this office show that Hans Wilhelm Rohl (John William Rohl), then residing at 8159 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, filed petition for naturalization in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California on March 10, 1941, under the provisions of Section 310 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940. In that petition the alien stated that he was a contractor; that he was born at Lubeck, Germany on September 29, 1886; and that he was of the German race and German nationality. He alleged that he was married on August 26, 1925, at San Francisco, California; that the name of his wife was Floy Edith; that she was born at Iola, Kansas on October 27, 1890; and that she then resided with him. He claimed arrival in the United States at the port of New York, New York on October 23, 1913, on the S. S. Santa Marta, and was legally admitted for permanent residence. He alleged that he had four children, all born in Sacramento, California, in 1916, 1918, 1921 and 1923, respectively. He claimed residence in California continuously since October 1926. His application to file a petition alleged residence in Ely, Nevada, from November 1913 to October 1914; in Sacramento, California, from October 1914 to January 1923; and in San Francisco, California, from January 1923 to October 1926. His [2] petition was duly verified by the affidavits of two witnesses, Thomas E. Connolly, contractor, 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco, California, and Karl Lewis, physician, 9654 Olympic Boulevard, Beverly Hills, California, who averred in their affidavits that they had known the alien at Los Angeles, California, since January 1, 1937.

The record of preliminary examination of Mr. Rohl shows that he testified that his present marriage was his second one. He testified that his first marriage was to Marian Henderson at Sacramento, California, in December 1914, and that his four children were the issue of this marriage. He testified further that he and his first wife separated in 1923, and that she obtained a final decree of divorce at Sacramento, California, in 1924, on the ground of desertion. He testified further that he paid each child \$75 a month and that his first wife had remarried and was living at Sacramento, California. He promised to furnish later the address of his first wife.

Mr. Rohl produced at the preliminary examination his certificate of marriage to his present wife, which certificate was returned to him. Her birth in the United States was proved by the affidavit of her sister and her divorce from her first husband (she had been married one time before her marriage to Mr. Rohl according to the record) was proved by the production of a duly authenticated copy of the court record of final judgment of divorce.

Mr. Rohl called at the Los Angeles Office on March 11, 1941, and admitted that his testimony at the preliminary examination concerning his first marriage was not correct. He asserted that he was not legally married to Marian Henderson but that he had lived with her from 1914 to 1923; that he was the father of their four children; that they had lived together only in California (wherein common-law marriages are not recognized); and that there had not been any kind of ceremony. He asserted further that she was then living at 2371 Portola Way, Sacramento, California, and that their two minor children were living with her. He asserted further that he had entered into a property settlement with her on April 22, 1925, and furnished a copy of the written agreement. This agreement shows that he promised to pay to Marian Rohl \$70 per month during her lifetime or until she should remarry, and that he promised to pay \$45 per month for each of their four minor children, such payments to continue during the minority of each child. Mr. Rohl's first "wife", Mrs. Marian Clark, was interviewed by a representative of this Service at Sacramento on March 29, 1941, and

she confirmed the story of their relations, as admitted by Mr. Rohl, and said that he had done everything he promised in the agreement.

[3] The record shows that Mr. Rohl testified at the preliminary examination that he had never been in the United States before his arrival on October 23, 1913, and disclosed several absences since that time, which will be mentioned below.

He asserted that he left New York on November 27, 1924, on the S. S. Deutschland; that he spent three or four days in Germany and the remainder of his visit abroad in London, England; and that he returned at New York on January 10, 1925, on the S. S. France, in possession of a reentry permit. This return was verified by the New York office.

He asserted that in 1931 and 1932 he made about ten trips to Mexico in connection with construction work on a road between Monterrey and Mexico City; that the longest single absence was not over three weeks; and that he departed and reentered at Laredo, Texas. Efforts to verify these reentries were unsuccessful, the Inspector in Charge at Laredo reporting that the records of that port failed to disclose any record of any kind at any time relating to Mr. Rohl.

The record shows further that Mr. Rohl testified at the preliminary examination that he traveled on the yacht "Ramona" from New York to San Diego, California, in 1933, arriving at San Diego on the day before Labor Day, in September. The journey was through the Panama Canal. He asserted that the vessel stopped at Acapulco, Mexico for ten hours to take on fuel and that there were no other stops en route. The records of this Service at the San Diego office show that the yacht "Ramona" arrived at that port from New York on September 3, 1933, and that the owner of the yacht was H. W. Rohl, 3278 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. His name did not appear on the crew list.

The record shows further that Mr. Rohl testified at the preliminary examination that he traveled on the yacht "Vega" from Jacksonville, Florida, to Honolulu, and thence to Los Angeles. He asserted that he departed from Jacksonville in November 1937; that he arrived at Los Angeles in February 1938; and that the only stop en route was at Honolulu. The records of this Service at the Honolulu office show that the yacht "Vega" arrived at Honolulu on January 21, 1938, from Balboa, Canal Zone, with four passengers and sixteen crewmen. The crew list was visaed at Nassau, Bahamas, and again at Balboa, Canal Zone, since there were five aliens among the members of the crew. The four passengers were manifested and one of them was shown as H. William Rohl, (M), born September 29, 1886, at Tola, Kansas.

Information came to this Service, apparently from the records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, that Mr. Rohl asserted in his income tax return for the years 1938 and 1939 that he was a United States citizen and that in the course of an investigation in 1934 he was [4] asked the question, "Are you a citizen of the United States" and he answered, "Yes, I am. I was naturalized in 1921."

Mr. Rohl was called to the Los Angeles office and was interrogated under oath on April 30, 1941. He was questioned about his marital history and his absences and his income tax returns, among other things. He explained his testimony at the preliminary examination that he had been married to Marian Henderson by the assertion that he believed commonlaw marriages were recognized in California. Concerning his testimony at the preliminary examination that his wife, Marian Henderson, had obtained a divorce from him, he was asked, "Were any divorce proceedings ever had between Marian Henderson and yourself" and he answered, "No, a settlement was made." He was asked further for his reasons for stating that he had been divorced, and answered, "We made settlement and signed an agreement." He asserted that he was never questioned by the officers of this Service at Laredo as to his citizenship when returning from any of his visits to Mexico in 1932, and was merely asked where he lived. He denied making any claim that he was a citizen of the United States during the course of these reentries. He asserted that he purchased the yacht "Ramona"; that it was registered in his wife's name, and that he was not inspected when he landed from this vessel at San Diego in 1933. He also asserted that he purchased the yacht "Vega"; that his wife also purchased it; and that he does not know how it happened that he was manifested as a native of Tola, Kansas, upon arrival of the vessel at Honolulu on January 21, 1938. He asserted that he was not inspected and admitted by an immigration officer; that he was not asked any questions; and that he never said that he was born in Kansas. He admitted that some of his income tax returns had shown him to be a citizen of the United States, but asserted that his income tax forms were prepared by an auditor; that he only went over the work sheets with the auditor; and that he had no knowledge until recently that the returns contained a cross in a box to indicate that he was

a citizen of this country. He denied ever making a statement to the Bureau of Internal Revenue in answer to a question, "Are you a citizen of the United States" that "Yes, I am. I was naturalized in 1921." He asserted that he was not in possession of a reentry permit or an unexpired immigration visa upon any of his reentries from Mexico, or when he landed at San Diego in 1933 from the yacht "Ramona" or when he arrived at Honolulu in 1938 on the yacht "Vega."

Another sworn statement was taken from Mr. Rohl at the Los Angeles office on May 22, 1941, which explored his absences from the United States as mentioned above. Thereafter, on May 27, 1941, the Inspector in Charge at Los Angeles submitted a formal application for warrant of arrest to the Central Office. The application recited Mr. Rohl's last [s] entry into the United States as being at Honolulu, T. H., on January 21, 1938, ex yacht "Vega" and applied for warrant of arrest on the charge that "He is in the United States in violation of the Immigration Act of 1924, in that at the time of his entry he was not in possession of an unexpired immigration visa." The Central Office concluded on July 10, 1941 that no ground for deportation proceedings appeared to exist, pointing out that it did not appear that it was necessary for Mr. Rohl to have any documents at the time of his arrival at Honolulu on January 21, 1938, he having the status of a legally admitted resident of the United States at that time. It was also pointed out that the three-year period of limitation provided by the statute had expired, reference apparently being made to the charge of entry without inspection.

Prior to the hearing on this petition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service received a letter, dated August 28, 1941, from Brigadier General John J. Kingman stating, among other things, that the services of Mr. Rohl were of vital importance because of his peculiar qualifications and the scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. He stated further that it was the understanding of his service that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States was beyond question, and then requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be expedited.

Inquiry was made of the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding this alien immediately following the filing of his petition for naturalization with negative results.

Mr. Rohl's petition for naturalization was heard by the court on September 15, 1941, along with the petitions of two other aliens. It was the practice at that time, when a case had facts to be presented to the court, to prepare a written report to the court reciting the relevant facts. Enclosed herewith is a copy of this report to the court. The facts in the case were presented to the court without objection and without recommendation. After considering the facts, the court entered an order admitting Mr. Rohl to citizenship on September 15, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

Earl G. Harrison
EARL G. HARRISON,
Commissioner.

Petition filed 3/10/41

Enclosures.

83608—Hans William Rohl

No objection will be made to the granting of this petition. For the information of the court, however, the results of the investigation made in connection with the case are herewith presented.

The petition was filed on 3/10/41 under the provisions of Section 310 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which grants certain exemptions from the usual requirements of the naturalization law to the spouse of a United States citizen and which requires proof of good character for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

The petitioner was born in Germany in 1886 and has resided in the United States since 1913. From about 1916 to 1925 he lived with one Marion Henderson in the State of California but they were not legally married and no marriage ceremony of any kind was performed. As a result of this relationship four children were born to them. On April 22, 1925, they entered into a written agreement under the terms of which Marion Henderson was to have the use of the home property in Sacramento, Calif. and to receive \$70 per month during her lifetime or until she should marry. He was also to pay her \$45 per month for the support of each child during minority. The investigation shows that the terms of this agreement have

been fulfilled by the petitioner. He married his present wife, who is a citizen of the United States, on August 26, 1925 and has resided with her continuously since then.

There is some evidence to indicate that the petitioner has represented himself as a United States citizen. The petitioner has stated, however that he has never believed himself to be a citizen and has never wilfully represented himself as a citizen of the United States.

In 1932 the petitioner made 10 or 12 trips to Mexico in connection with a contract which he had to build roads there and on these trips left and reentered the United States at Laredo, Texas. The Immigration Service has reported that it has no record of his inspection upon his returns from these absences. The petitioner states that he was never questioned as to his citizenship but was only asked where he lived and was permitted to reenter the United States.

On September 3, 1933, the petitioner arrived at San Diego, Calif. on the yacht, "Ramona", which was registered in the name of his wife, on a trip from New York. He was not listed on the manifests as a passenger or member of the crew and there is no record that he was inspected as required by the immigration law. The petitioner has stated that the immigration officers came aboard but that he was not asked any questions by them.

On January 21, 1938, the petitioner arrived at Honolulu, T. H., on the yacht, "Vega", which was registered in the name of his wife, on a trip from Jacksonville, Florida. The manifest data on file with the Immigration Service shows that he was manifested as having been born in Kansas and he was, therefore, not inspected. The petitioner has stated that he did not claim to have been born in Kansas and he was not asked any questions by the immigration officers.

All of the facts in connection with the petitioner's reentries into the United States were presented to the Department in Washington and it was decided on July 10, 1941 that, in view of all of the evidence, it was not a proper case in which to institute deportation proceedings.

The records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue show that for the past several years it has been shown on the petitioner's income tax returns that he is a citizen of the United States. The petitioner has stated that his returns were made out by an auditor; that he only went over the work sheets with the auditor and did not know that the completed forms showed that he was a citizen and that he believes the auditor assumed he was a citizen and he is certain that he did not state to him that he was. It is understood that the classification as a citizen would not have changed the amount of the tax.

The records of the Customs Service, Los Angeles, show that the Rohl-Connolly Co., of which the petitioner is the president, owned and operated a number of vessels from 1934 to 1940 in violation of the law in that the petitioner, who was the president of and a stockholder in the company, was an alien. The penalty provided is forfeiture of the vessels. The petitioner, however, made a cash settlement of the claim against the company on 9/4/41 of \$25,000. It does not appear that there was a willful violation of the law and no criminal action is contemplated.

The petitioner is the President of the Rohl-Connolly Contracting Co., located at 4351 Valley Blvd., Los Angeles, and has been awarded a secret contract in connection with a defense construction project in Honolulu. His participation in this project is being held up until he has been naturalized.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 7

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2790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[5719] BEFORE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE'S JOINT FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

In the Matter of HANS WILHELM ROHL, ROHL-CONNOLLY COMPANY, HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS and R. W. ROHL COMPANY. Open session

Met pursuant to the call of the Chairman at 9:30 o'clock a. m., Saturday, February 27, 1943.

Present:

Senator Jack D. Tenney, Chairman, 3207 West 77th Street, Inglewood, California.

Senator Hugh Burns.

Assemblyman Nelson S. Dilworth, Columbia St. at Crest Drive, Hemet, California.

Assemblyman Jesse, Randolph Kellems, 454 Cuesta Way, Bel-Air, California.

Others present: R. E. Combs, Chief Counsel and Investigator.

Reported by: J. D. Ambrose, 322 Wilcox Bldg., Los Angeles, Calif.

[5720]

PROCEEDINGS

The committee met pursuant to the call of Chairman Tenney at Room 707, California State Building, Los Angeles, California, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.

Chairman TENNEY. The committee will come to order. Mr. Reporter, will you be sworn.

(Whereupon, the Shorthand Reporter was sworn as the Official Reporter of the proceedings.)

Chairman TENNEY. We are going to excuse all witnesses and others who might be here for a few moments. The committee is going to have a short executive session.

Will the gentlemen of the press state their names for the record.

Mr. HAGADON. James Hagadon, Herald-Express.

Mr. AUSTIN. Thomas Austin.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Edward Phillips, Herald-Express.

Chairman TENNEY. Gentlemen, the committee has ruled for this hearing the public will be excluded but the press may remain. We are asking the press to be very careful in reporting anything of a military nature or that might have any bearing on military objectives or installations or anything of that nature which might be developed in the course of the examination of witnesses.

[5721] We believe we must be exceedingly careful in reference to that. I believe with that admonition you gentlemen of the press will act accordingly. In other words, we don't want to reveal any military secrets if any should be developed in the examination.

The rest of the material brought out by the examination, of course, will be matters that can be published. We are exceedingly anxious that nothing will be revealed or any secrets made public which might be helpful to the enemy.

You gentlemen are fully in accord with that statement.

Our chief counsel and investigator, Mr. Combs, can elaborate on that statement and give you a better idea of what we have in mind. Mr. Combs.

Mr. COMBS. I thought it might be well to make a brief statement as to what we expect to show by this witness.

This witness came to the United States from Valparaiso, Chile in 1913. He is a German alien born in Lubeck, Germany.

He secured military and naval contracts to build highly strategic installations for the Army and Navy while he was a German alien.

He built Red Hill which overlooks Pearl Harbor.

He did construction work at Hickam Field.

He built anti-aircraft gun emplacements in Wake Island, Midway and Guam.

He built a ring of installations around the island of Oahu, at the southern tip of which is Pearl Harbor.

He bought a yacht in the east that cost him \$40,000 called the Vega. The Vega was built in Kiel, Germany.

[5722] He later turned the Vega over to the Army for use as a patrol vessel at a cost to the Government of \$150,000 a year.

He made many statements to the effect that he was a citizen of the United States when in fact, he well knew he was an alien.

The manner in which he obtained these contracts and how he put them into effect is, of course, what we expect to develop in this examination.

We feel it will be highly important to the public of this country and certainly to this State, to frankly reveal to them that a German alien has installed these highly strategic projects in the most critical war zone that we have.

These matters have never been revealed before and we believe that the Press should slant the story of the hearing in that direction, so that we may accomplish the public service that we are trying to perform.

That is all I have to say.

Chairman TENNEY. Are we ready to proceed?

Mr. COMBS. Yes, sir.

Chairman TENNEY. You may call your first witness.

[3723] Chairman TENNEY. Mr. Rohl, will you come forward, please?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ROHL. I do.

HANS WILHELM ROHL, called as a witness on behalf of the Committee, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Chairman TENNEY. Will you state your full name?

The WITNESS. Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

Chairman TENNEY. Is that spelled H-a-n-s?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Chairman TENNEY. Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

The WITNESS. Yes.

Chairman TENNEY. Have you ever been known by any other name?

The WITNESS. No; only H. W.

Chairman TENNEY. What is your residence address?

The WITNESS. 8159 Hollywood Boulevard.

Chairman TENNEY. Los Angeles, California?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Chairman TENNEY. All right, Mr. Combs.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Mr. Rohl, how long have you lived in California?

A. 1914.

[3724] Q. Since 1914?

A. Yes.

Q. And have you lived in California continuously since 1914?

A. Right.

Q. You came here from Valparaiso, Chile, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On the steamship SANTA MARIA?

A. That is right.

Chairman TENNEY. Will you speak up, Mr. Rohl, so the reporter can hear you?

The WITNESS. Yes.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. And that was in 1913, was it not?

A. Right.

Q. Prior to the time that you were in Chile, had you been in any other South American country?

A. In Peru.

Q. What sort of work did you do in Peru?

A. I was employed by the American Smelting and Refining Company, at Rincagua.

Q. In what capacity?

A. As foreman.

Q. As foreman?

A. Yes.

Q. In one of their mining operations?

A. Yes.

[3725] Q. Now, did you ever hear of the Nevada Consolidated Copper Company of Ely, Nevada?

A. I worked for them.

Q. When did you start working for that concern?

A. When I arrived in the States.

Q. When you arrived in the States?

A. Yes, in 1913.

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Q. Did you go then to Ely, Nevada, to work for that company?

A. That is right.

Q. And you resided in Ely, Nevada, did you not, from November, 1913 to October, 1914?

A. Correct.

Q. And then you lived in Sacramento from October, 1914 until January, 1923?

A. I believe that is right.

Q. And in San Francisco from January, 1923 until October, 1926?

A. Yes.

Q. And in Los Angeles ever since?

A. Yes.

Q. When you went to Ely, Nevada, Mr. Rohl, and were employed by the Nevada Consolidated Copper Company, what sort of work did you do there?

A. I was a construction foreman or superintendent.

Q. And had you made the arrangement for your employment [3726] in that capacity before you left South America?

A. No.

Q. Through whom did you obtain that employment?

A. Through the general manager; I don't remember his name.

Q. Was his name Walker?

A. Walker?

Q. Walker, was that his name?

A. No.

Q. Now, your activities as foreman for the Nevada Consolidated Copper Company consisted of what, generally?

A. Of construction—of making McDougal roasters—they are furnaces.

Q. And did you cease working for that company in October, 1914?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you then went to Sacramento?

A. That is right.

Q. What sort of work did you do in Sacramento at that time?

A. In Sacramento?

Q. Yes.

A. I was employed by the Ross Construction Company.

Q. Did you work on a causeway project there?

A. Yes.

Q. In Sacramento?

[3727] A. Yes.

Q. In what year was that?

A. (No answer)

Q. Was that in 1914?

A. (No answer)

Q. Do you recall whether that was in 1914?

A. I don't know.

Q. You don't remember?

A. That is a long time ago.

Q. If you don't remember, just state so, Mr. Rohl. Now, in Sacramento you resided for a time at 2371 Portola Way, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you first start living there? Can you give me the year?

A. (No answer)

Q. Shortly after you went to Sacramento?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you acquire that property?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you own it at the present time?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, while you were residing in San Francisco you made a trip to Germany, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. On the steamship DEUTSCHLAND?

[3728] A. That is right.

Q. You were a German citizen at that time?

A. That is right.

Q. From whom did you obtain your passport to make that trip?

- A. I obtained a temporary passport from the German Consul in San Francisco.
- Q. I see.
- A. And a re-entry permit from the State Department in Washington.
- Q. Do you recall the name of the German Consul?
- A. No.
- Q. That was in 1924, was it not, that you left?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long were you gone, Mr. Rohl, on that trip?
- A. Offhand I would say between two and three months.
- Q. And at that time did you have any relatives in Germany?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You were born in Lubeck, were you not?
- A. That is right.
- Q. What relatives did you have there at that time?
- A. Three sisters.
- Q. And did you visit with them?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Did you go to any other place in Germany other than [3729] Lubeck on that occasion?
- A. No; I went to Hamburg.
- Q. You also visited in England, did you?
- A. Yes; I probably stayed a week in Hamburg and spent the rest of my time in London.
- Q. And from what port did you leave Europe to return to the United States?
- A. I left from Plymouth.
- Q. And landed where in this country?
- A. New York.
- Q. You came back on the steamship FRANCE?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Did you then return to San Francisco?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was early in 1925, was it not?
- A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.)
- Q. And after returning what sort of work did you do then?
- A. Contracting.
- Q. Your offices were where?
- A. San Francisco.
- Q. Had you met Mr. T. E. Connolly by that time?
- A. No.
- Q. When did you first meet him?
- A. Excuse me, I had met him, yes.
- Q. When did you first become acquainted with him?
- [3730] A. In either 1921 or 1922.
- Q. How did you happen to meet him? Do you recall the circumstances under which you met him?
- A. Probably at a contractors' convention.
- Q. He has been in the contracting business for many years, has he not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And is a graduate of the College of Engineering of the University of California?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And is a member of the Rohl-Connolly Corporation?
- A. Right.
- Q. And his brother handles your insurance business, does he not, for your corporation?
- A. (No answer)
- Q. Mr. Connolly's brother.
- A. Glenn Connolly?
- Q. Yes, Glenn Connolly.
- A. Yes.
- Q. You built the Bay Shore Highway, did you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you also built a road for the Mexican Government, did you not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where did that road have its northerly terminus?
- A. (No answer)

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[3731] Q. In other words, where did it commence?

A. (No answer)

Q. Did it run from Monterrey southerly to Mexico City?

A. It was the Monterrey-Mexico City Highway.

Q. The Pan-American Highway? Is that what it was called?

A. No.

Q. Was there any name for it?

A. They called it the "Laredo-Mexico City Highway."

Q. Did you do the work on that road in your individual capacity or as a member of the corporation?

A. Individual.

Q. As an individual?

A. Yes.

Q. The Rohl-Connolly Company was incorporated in 1932, was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. And prior to that time you operated solely as an individual?

A. That is right.

Q. When did you first enter into the contracting business?

A. In 1922.

Q. You first entered the contracting business in 1922?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have continued in the contracting business [3732] since that date?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Until the present time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you are active, of course, now, are you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The Rohl-Connolly Company was incorporated in Nevada, was it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Carson City?

A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.)

Q. Do you know a man by the name of S. F. Cliff or S. F. Meder?

A. No.

Q. Or L. H. Peter?

A. No.

Q. They were the original incorporators in Carson City. I presume your purpose was to form the corporation there and then set it up to transact business in California?

A. That is right.

Q. So those men were simply what is known as the "dummy incorporators"?

A. Yes.

Q. And thereafter you applied for a permit to issue stock to the Corporation Commission of California, did you not?

[3733] A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that was on May 4, 1932, according to the application.

The application was signed by yourself, by Irma Dickey, your secretary, and by Mr. T. E. Connolly?

A. Yes.

Q. And you applied for a permit to issue and sell 40,000 shares, did you not?

A. I believe that is right.

Q. For \$10 a share?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Is that correct?

A. (No answer.)

Q. I will say for your information that is what the application shows, Mr. Rohl.

A. Well, that probably is correct.

Q. And do you recall how many shares were issued to Mr. Connolly when the corporation was first set up in California?

A. Well, I would have half of it.

Q. Half to you and half to Mr. Connolly?

A. That is right.

Q. And a small percentage of the stock to Irma Dickey?

A. No.

Q. She held no stock?

A. No.

[3734] Who was the first president of that corporation?

A. (No answer)

Q. Do you recall?

A. No. We change every so often.

Q. Well, who is the president now?

A. I am.

Q. How long have you occupied that office?

A. (No answer)

Q. A matter of two or three years? I don't care about the exact date.

A. I believe we changed a year ago.

Q. And who preceded you as the president?

A. T. E. Connolly.

Q. Mr. Connolly?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, where in Los Angeles is the principal office of the Rohl-Connolly Company located?

A. 4315 Valley Boulevard.

Q. Do you have a San Francisco office?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever had one?

A. No.

Q. Do you actively attend to the affairs of the Rohl-Connolly Company in southern California?

A. I do.

Q. And you have always done that since its inception?

[3735] A. (No answer)

Q. Have you been active in handling the business down here?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Did Irma Dickey ever occupy any official position with the Rohl Connolly Company?

A. Why, Irma Dickey is a director and secretary and treasurer.

Q. And she has been for how long?

A. Since its inception.

Q. And still is?

A. Still is.

Q. Your application for a permit to issue stock of the Rohl-Connolly Corporation was filed on May 4, 1931.

It states that you had been engaged in general construction work since 1912. That is correct, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do prior to 1912?

A. I was still in construction work.

Q. Have you done that all your life?

A. Yes.

Q. There is also an H. W. Rohl Company, is there not?

A. H. W. Rohl Company is a fictitious name. It is H. W. Rohl operating under the firm name and style of H. W. Rohl Company.

Q. And is there anyone else interested in that concern [3736] besides yourself?

A. No.

Q. Are you familiar with an organization known as the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes, I am. Rohl and Connolly are members of the Hawaiian Constructors.

Q. Is that a corporation?

A. It is a joint venture.

Q. A partnership, in other words?

A. Yes; I believe there is a little difference between a partnership and a joint venture.

Q. Well, the difference being the technical distinction between individuals as partners and an organization composed of corporations as partners engaged in a joint venture. Isn't that your understanding of it?

A. That is right.

Q. Besides the Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Rohl, what other concerns are engaged in this joint enterprise?

A. Callahan Construction Company.

Q. Of Los Angeles?

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A. Yes, of Los Angeles, Gunther and Shirley Company, Ralph E. Woolley and Hawaiian Contracting Company.

Q. How long has that Hawaiian Constructors company been in existence?

A. I wouldn't say—I know a long time.

Q. With the same component membership?

[5737] A. Yes.

Q. Were they doing business under the name of "Hawaiian Contractors" in 1939?

A. We are talking now about Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Q. You misunderstood me. I meant Hawaiian Constructors.

A. Hawaiian Constructors were awarded, and that is all I can say, the secret contract from the War Department.

Q. About when—what year?

A. December, 1940.

Q. Prior to that time had you individually, or had Rohl-Connolly Company done any work for the Government?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. For the Army?

A. Oh, yes. Rohl-Connolly—the only work Rohl-Connolly have done in the last ten years, ten or eleven years, is work for the War Department.

Q. How much stock in the Rohl-Connolly Company do you own now, Mr. Rohl?

A. 50 per cent.

Q. And have you always owned 50 per cent?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did Rohl-Connolly Company ever own any vessels?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you describe them generally? What did they consist of?

[5738] A. Tugs and barges.

Q. Has any of the stock of the Rohl-Connolly Company been issued at any time to any other persons except you and Mr. T. E. Connolly?

A. No.

Q. Did the Hawaiian Constructors conduct any business in California at any time?

A. Of course, the Hawaiian Constructors, in connection with the Pacific Ocean contracts, had an office in California.

Q. Where was the location of the Los Angeles office?

A. In California the office was in San Francisco.

Q. Didn't the Hawaiian Constructors have a berth at Wilmington in Southern California?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Berth 145, Wilmington?

A. Hawaiian Constructors were operating that berth for the Government.

Q. They operated the berth, however, in the name of the "Hawaiian Constructors"?

A. Yes, Hawaiian Constructors.

Q. And they also maintain an office at 744 Francisco Street, Los Angeles, do they not?

A. That is right.

Q. They don't operate there any more, do they?

A. No.

[5739] Q. How long has that office been closed?

A. I don't know,—I would say a year or more than a year.

Q. A little more than a year?

A. Yes.

Q. The San Francisco office is still open, isn't it?

A. What date is this?

Q. This is the 27th.

A. It was closed day before yesterday.

Q. I see. Were you ever in the San Francisco office yourself?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. When were you last there?

A. Last Saturday.

Q. Your present wife is Floy Edith Rohl?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you married her in San Francisco on or about August 26, 1925?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you been previously married?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall asking a question set forth in your application for citizenship to which you answered that you married in March of 1941 and stated that you were divorced from your first wife?

A. Yes, which wasn't correct.

[3740] Q. That is not true?

A. No.

Q. And you have since corrected it?

A. Yes.

Q. Of whom does your family consist, Mr. Rohl?

A. (No answer.)

Q. What I mean by that is, do you have any children?

A. Yes.

Q. And they are three daughters and a son?

A. Yes.

Q. And one of your daughters lives in Sacramento?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where does your son reside?

A. Where is my son?

Q. Yes.

A. He is in Edmonton, Canada.

Q. And how long has he been in Edmonton, Canada?

A. A little over a month.

Q. And where did he reside prior to that time?

A. In Colorado.

Q. What is his business or occupation?

A. He is a construction foreman.

Q. Is he employed by any concern in which you are interested?

A. No.

Q. He operates entirely independently, does he?

[3741] A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether he is acquainted with a man by the name of Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

A. Theodore Wyman, Jr. is the commanding officer.

Q. Yes, I know he is. He is also in Edmonton, Canada, is he not?

A. Yes.

Q. How long has he been there?

A. Approximately a year.

Q. Do you know whether or not your son is acquainted with Colonel Wyman?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. How long has he known him?

A. Six or seven years.

Q. Did you introduce them?

A. I believe I did.

Q. And you have been acquainted with Colonel Wyman about how long?

A. Since 1936.

Q. He, at that time, was in charge of the United States Army Engineer's office in Los Angeles, was he not?

A. That is correct.

Q. And he then held the rank of major?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He had just gotten it, as a matter of fact, hadn't he?

[3742] A. That is right.

Q. And you did not know him at all prior to that time?

A. No.

Q. Did you know him when he was a captain?

A. Well, yes, sir, I knew him when he was a captain. He was a captain when he came out here.

Q. And he came out here when?

A. In 19—I am pretty sure 1936.

Q. July 20, 1935. Do you recall he came from Kansas City to work on the flood control project here?

A. Yes.

Q. And you met him after that, did you?

A. No, when he arrived here. Rohl-Connolly Company were building the Long Beach—the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater which was under his jurisdiction. That is how I met him.

Q. You met him in that way?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. And your relations with him were of a business nature, were they?

A. That is right.

A. And they continued from that time until the present date?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Did you ever own a boat called the "Pandora"?

A. Yes.

[§743] Q. When did you acquire the Pandora?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Do you recall about how long ago?

A. 1927.

Q. Did you ever sail it to Honolulu?

A. Yes.

Q. It was anchored where?

A. Anchored? Where do you mean, here?

A. Yes.

A. At the California Yacht Club anchorage.

Q. And the boat burned, did it not?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it insured?

A. Yes.

Q. And the insurance was payable to you, was it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you subsequently acquire any other yacht?

A. Yes, I, or my wife did. She bought the Ramona.

Q. Did she also buy the Pandora?

A. I did.

Q. Pardon me.

A. I don't remember who bought the Pandora.

Q. But you do remember the insurance was paid to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, the first boat after the Pandora was the Ramona, which you acquired in 1933?

[§744] A. Yes.

Q. Who paid for that boat?

A. I don't know.

Q. Don't you recall whether or not you paid for it, Mr. Rohl, or did your wife pay for it?

A. I would assume it came—I don't know who paid for it, but I assume it came out of community property and funds.

Q. To whom was the insurance payable?

A. I don't know.

Q. Of course, that boat did not burn, did it?

A. No.

Q. Who hired the crew on the Ramona?

A. The captain.

Q. Who employed the captain?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Didn't you employ him?

A. I suppose I did.

Q. And you paid him a salary, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And paid a salary to the crew?

A. (Nodding head in affirmative.)

Q. Did your wife belong to the Newport Beach Yacht Club?

A. You mean "Newport Harbor Yacht Club"?

Q. Yes, Newport Harbor Yacht Club.

A. I did.

[§745] Q. You did?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you ever Commodore of that club?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. You were?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any regulation requiring you to own a boat in order to be Commodore of the club?

A. No.

Q. There was not?

A. No.

Q. Did you buy the provisions and pay all of the expenses in connection with the operation of the Ramona?

A. You mean personally?

Q. Yes.

A. No.

Q. Who did?

A. It went through the office.

Q. Office of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. No, H. W. Rohl.

Q. And you owned H. W. Rohl Company?

A. Community property again, I suppose.

Q. Pardon me?

A. Community property, I suppose.

Q. Nobody else had any interest in that but you?

A. No.

[3746] Q. So you did pay for those things inasmuch as you were an individual doing business under a fictitious name?

A. That is right.

Q. So, of course, you did pay the expenses?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, you sailed the boat—you bought the boat in New York?

A. The Ramona?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. And you sailed it from New York to the west coast, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall stopping at Acapulco, Mexico?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the boat inspected by immigration officials there?

A. No.

Q. Was it inspected by immigration officials when you arrived at San Diego?

A. If you will go through the records of the Immigration Department here—I mean they have gone through all this before.

Q. Yes.

A. And they have.

Q. Well, I have gone through the records of the Immigration Department and there is no statement on the manifest that you were on the boat at all, and that is why I asked you that question. In other words, there is no record there that you, as a German alien, ever returned from Acapulco, Mexico, to the United States, and I am wondering whether or not the boat was inspected by immigration officials and if so, whether or not you were interrogated about your status.

A. No.

Q. You were not?

A. No.

Q. When did you first purchase the Vega or when was it purchased? I will put it that way.

A. In 1937.

Q. The Vega was built in Kiel, Germany originally, was she not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And owned by a person named Mr. Dicks, is that correct?

A. (Nodding head in affirmative.)

Q. And you bought it in New York?

A. I bought it in New York.

Q. Do you recall how much was paid for it?

A. Yes, \$45,000.

Q. Who put up the \$45,000?

A. That was the \$45,000 Mrs. Rohl got from the Ramona.

[3748] Q. She sold the Ramona?

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- A. For \$45,000 and bought the Vega for \$45,000.
- Q. I see. Who hired the crew for the Vega?
- A. For the Vega?
- Q. Yes.
- A. Mrs. Rohl and Fred Rohl, my son, were back there.
- Q. Do you recall telling anyone in southern California that you intended to sell the Ramona and buy the Vega?
- A. No.
- Q. You never did much such a statement?
- A. I couldn't because I didn't know anything about the Vega.
- Q. Did you have some photographs of the Vega sent out here so you could look at them?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So you did know about the Vega when the photographs arrived?
- A. When the photographs arrived?
- Q. Yes.
- A. Which was some time after the Ramona was sold.
- Q. But before the Vega was purchased.
- A. Yes.
- Q. And after the Ramona had been sold and the photographs of the Vega arrived for your inspection, did you tell anyone you intended to buy the Vega?
- A. I probably did.
- [3749] Q. You probably did?
- A. (No answer.)
- Q. How large a boat was the Vega?
- A. 136 feet.
- Q. 136 feet long?
- A. Yes.
- Q. A steel vessel—
- A. Don't say "was"; I hope she still is.
- Q. The Government is using her now, isn't it?
- A. That is right.
- Q. As a matter of fact, the United States Army Engineers used it as a patrol vessel, did they not?
- A. No. The Army Engineers used it for a while as a survey boat.
- Q. How much rental did you receive for the Vega from the Engineering Corps at that time?
- A. \$1.00—I still have it.
- Q. You received \$1.00?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you ever receive any other compensation from the Government for the use of the boat?
- A. No.
- Q. You are quite sure of that?
- A. I am sure of that.
- Q. Did you apply for permission to have a radio telephone installed on the Vega?
- [3750] A. No.
- Q. Never did?
- A. Never did. That is, there is—not now—there was a commercial Mackay radio wireless station.
- Q. Who applied for that?
- A. Mackay.
- Q. At whose request?
- A. Mrs. Rohl.
- Q. You never participated in that at all?
- A. No.
- Q. And the station was KLVC, was it not, the Mackay station on the Vega?
- A. I believe so.
- Q. And application was also made for permission to use code, isn't that correct?
- A. Permission to use code?
- Q. Yes.
- A. Well, the Mackay code, yes.
- Q. Was that permission granted?
- A. Yes.
- Q. It was?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you quite sure of that?

A. The only thing I am sure of is that Mackay Radio furnished the operator.

Q. But you don't know whether or not you were permitted to use code, do you Mr. Rohl?

[3751] A. No; that is up to Mackay.

Q. As a matter of fact, the records show, those that I have seen, that the application was made and denied you for permission to use code. Why was it desired to use code on the Vega?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know who is listed in Lloyd's register as the owner of the Vega?

A. No.

Q. Did you apply to Lloyd's for them to make periodic inspections of the Vega's machinery and equipment and anchor chains, and so forth? I mean you personally?

A. That was probably handled as a matter of routine on the boat itself. The inspections were generally made once a year.

Q. Automatically, or at somebody's request?

A. Automatically.

Q. Is it a free service?

A. No.

Q. But you don't have to apply for it; they just keep giving you the service periodically and send you a bill, is that it?

A. (Nodding head in affirmative.)

Q. How many members of the crew were there on the Vega?

A. (No answer.)

Q. How large a crew did she carry?

[3752] A. It depends.

Q. Did you ever carry as many as 16 in the crew?

A. Oh yes, on long trips.

Q. Did you ever have a captain on the Vega called "Mathias"?

A. Yes.

Q. What was his first name?

A. Was it "Mathias" or was it "Matthews"?

Q. Matthews, I guess it was.

A. Otto.

Q. Was he a citizen or an alien?

A. A citizen.

Q. Of what extraction?

A. I don't know.

Q. Were there any aliens in the crew?

A. (No answer.)

Q. At any time?

A. I don't know that.

Q. Now, who directed the sailing of the Vega? Who determined where she would go and when?

A. The owner.

Q. Your wife?

A. (Nodding head in affirmative.) Or I did—probably both of us did.

Q. Probably both of you? Now, you sailed the Vega from Jacksonville, Florida, to Honolulu, did you not?

[3753] A. Yes.

Q. Shortly after you purchased it?

A. That is right.

Q. And you arrived in Honolulu on the 21st of January, 1938, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. At this time, for your information, the Immigration manifests shows you to have been born in Iola, Kansas, on September 26, 1886.

How did the Immigration officials get that information?

A. I don't know.

Q. Have you seen that manifest?

A. No.

Q. Did anybody ever tell you that that information appeared in it?

A. No—yes, yes.

Q. The Immigration inspector—

A. Here after I had applied for my citizenship.

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Q. They told you that on that occasion you had been manifested as having been born in Iola, Kansas?

A. That is right. They called it to my attention.

Q. As a matter of fact, that was the birthplace of your wife?

A. Yes.

Q. But she wasn't born there on September 26, 1886, was she?

[3754] A. No.

Q. You were born in 1886, were you not?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. When you went to Honolulu did you go through the Panama Canal?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at Balboa you were examined by an Immigration inspector?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Well, the manifest shows there was an examination made but you were not listed there either as a passenger or a member of the crew, but it shows there were five aliens in the crew.

Does that refresh your memory at all?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall a fight that occurred among the members of the crew while the boat was anchored off Honolulu?

A. (No answer.) (Witness laughing.)

Q. Do you remember that?

A. Not anchored; tied up alongside of the pier.

Q. Tied up alongside of the pier?

A. Yes.

Q. By the way, did you know Mr. Wyman at that time?

A. Colonel Wyman?

Q. Yes.

A. Oh, yes.

[3755] Q. Was he in the Islands then?

A. (No answer.)

Q. You don't recall?

A. (No answer.)

Q. You have no recollection at all of that matter?

A. No.

Q. Is it possible that you may have met him there in 1938?

A. He was still there, wasn't he?

Q. I don't know; I am just wondering whether you know or not.

A. I don't remember.

Q. I see. Now, as a matter of fact, you were negotiating with the Army at that time for contracts with reference to installations in several of the Pacific Islands, were you not?

A. No.

Q. You were not?

A. No.

Q. When did those negotiations commence?

A. December of 1940.

Q. December, 1940?

A. Yes; and they ended in December of 1940.

Q. They were consummated?

A. Yes.

Q. You got the contracts?

[3756] A. Yes.

Q. And those contracts included work on the Island of Oahu, did they not?

A. Yes.

Q. And Midway?

A. No; but I can't tell you what it included.

Q. Well, the records, of course, are available.

A. The records are available.

Q. There is nothing secret about that.

A. I am not permitted to say.

Q. There is nothing secret about the places, is there?

A. There is to me—I mean I am not permitted to tell that.

Q. You are not permitted to say you did any work on the Island of Oahu?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you permitted to say whether you did any work on Wake, Guam, or Midway?

A. I can say I didn't.

Q. You did not?

A. I did not.

Q. Did anyone with whom you were connected do any work on the Island of Midway?

A. No.

Q. Never did?

A. Never did.

[3757] Q. You did work on the Island of Oahu, isn't that true?

A. That's right.

Q. And other islands?

A. Yes.

Q. You worked on other islands?

A. But if you want the specific islands, the Hawaiian Constructors operated on, you will have to get that information from someone else but me because I am not permitted to divulge it.

Q. How about your employees? Are they permitted to disclose where they worked?

A. Not supposed to, but I suppose they do.

Q. They not only do but they have?

A. I suppose they have too.

Q. Do you know Harold Cramer?

A. Harold Cramer?

Q. Yes, Harold Cramer?

A. No.

Q. He was employed on some of those islands by the Hawaiian Constructors. Now, how long did you remain in Honolulu after you sailed over there on the Vega? Did you stay there, Mr. Rohl, about two weeks?

A. About two weeks.

Q. When you left Honolulu to return to the United States who were the passengers on the boat besides yourself? [3758]

A. Well, there was Dr. Lewis.

Q. What is his full name?

A. Carl Lewis.

Q. Who else?

A. And his wife.

Q. What is her first name?

A. Virginia.

Q. Yes; anyone else?

A. Mrs. Winne.

Q. How do you spell that?

A. Ilene Winne, W-i-n-n-e.

Q. She boarded the boat at Honolulu?

A. At Honolulu, yes.

Q. And returned with you to San Diego?

A. Los Angeles.

Q. Pardon me.

A. San Pedro.

Q. Excuse me, San Pedro. Was anybody else on the boat as passengers between the time you left Honolulu and you returned to California?

A. No; of course Mrs. Rohl.

Q. Yes.

A. That is all.

Q. Nobody else boarded the boat between Honolulu and San Diego?

[3759] A. No; the boat didn't go to San Diego.

Q. I mean San Pedro.

A. San Pedro.

Q. Nobody else boarded the boat between the time it left Honolulu and the time it arrived at San Pedro?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Do you know Mr. E. J. Crouse?

A. Yes.

Q. Didn't he board the boat between the time it left Honolulu and arrived at San Pedro?

A. No.

Q. He did not?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Were you ever familiar with his boat, the Marlin?

A. Yes.

Q. Didn't his boat, the Marlin, hail the Vega in the vicinity of Catalina Island, and didn't Mr. Crouse come on board the Vega?

A. No, sir.

Q. You are positive of that?

A. I am positive. He came aboard inside the breakwater.

Q. Where was that?

A. Los Angeles breakwater.

Q. Wasn't that before your boat docked at San Pedro?

A. Before it docked, yes.

[3760] Q. And before it was inspected by Immigration officials?

A. There was no Immigration officials.

Q. Well, didn't somebody tell him that he had better get off the boat because he had no business on there and that you had not cleared Immigration yet?

A. That must have been the bug inspector.

Q. Didn't somebody tell him that, or do you know?

A. I don't know. There is no Immigration inspection.

Q. He did get off the boat, didn't he, before she docked?

A. I don't remember that.

Q. Now, when you went to work—strike that.

When you went in to Mexico to work on this road from Monterey to Mexico City, you went in usually through Laredo, Texas, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many times did you go across the border at Laredo?

A. I don't know—frequently.

Q. More than 10 times?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there an Immigration office at Laredo, Texas?

A. I don't know.

Q. Well, there is one there?

A. Well, on the train—

[3761] Q. You were going to say something about "on the train"?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Go right ahead, Mr. Rohl.

A. On the train someone asks you where you live, that is all.

Q. Do you know Mr. F. H. Crockett who was in charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Laredo?

A. No.

Chairman TENNEY: Mr. Combs, I think we had better take a five-minute recess for the sake of the reporter at this point.

We will stand in recess for about five minutes.

(Short recess.)

Chairman TENNEY: The hearing will come to order.

Mr. COMBS: Will you read the last question and answer?

(Question and answer read.)

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. I believe you stated that to your knowledge there was no Immigration office at Laredo, Texas?

A. I have never seen one. As a matter of fact, I have never been in Laredo, Texas.

Q. How did you go into Mexico?

A. On the train.

Q. Across the border from the United States?

A. (Nodding head in affirmative.)

Q. You were never asked your citizenship status?

[3762] A. No.

Q. Do you recall stating during an interview with the Naturalization Examiner on April 30, 1941, that you had renounced your German citizenship in 1908 or 1909?

A. Yes.

Q. And your reason for that was because you refused to return to Germany for military service?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you felt then you were no longer a citizen of Germany?

A. That is right.

Q. Of what country did you believe you were a citizen from that time on?

A. None.

Q. You had no citizenship status?

A. That is right.

Q. And you thought you had none since 1908?

A. 1908 and 1909.

Q. However, when you returned to Germany in 1924 you obtained a temporary passport from the German consul?

A. That is the only way I could do it.

Q. Did you ever make application—

A. I might add to that that after the last war the citizenships—German citizenships had been revoked—I mean reinstated. I couldn't go back there until after the war anyway.

[3763] Q. You couldn't return to Germany until after the first World War?

A. That is right.

Q. And you felt that because you had refused to return to Germany for military service in 1908 or 1909 that you were from that time on no longer a citizen of Germany?

A. That is true.

Q. Now, did you ever make application for admission to citizenship in the United States prior to 1941?

A. I believe in 1915 or '16, or thereabouts.

Q. You made application?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall stating on your preliminary application for citizenship on March 10, 1941, that you had never made any prior application?

A. No.

Q. You did not so state?

A. No.

Q. Your application shows that you stated that you had never made a prior application?

A. (No answer.)

Q. That was your preliminary application on March 10, 1941?

A. No.

Q. If you examine it you will find that is the fact.

A. Because I showed them my declaration of intention [3764] at the time.

Q. You remember signing the application, of course?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever do any work for the United States Navy?

A. No.

Q. Never did any?

A. Never did.

Q. Now, when you first met Colonel Wyman he was then a major, I believe you testified?

A. (Nodding head in affirmative.)

Q. And that was about 1936?

A. 1935. I must have met him the day he arrived here because at that time Rohl-Connelly, I believe, were the only contractors in this engineering district, or I would say, the only contractors of any consequence.

Q. Did you ever have any private transactions with Major Wyman?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever lend him any money?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever have any social contact with him?

A. Yes.

Q. He came on board your yacht, the Vega, on many instances, did he not?

A. I wouldn't say "on many"—several times.

[3765] Q. Did you ever entertain him in your home?

A. Yes.

Q. Several times?

A. Yes.

Q. During the time that you first knew Major Wyman, say in 1935, '36, and '37, do you know whether or not he was having any domestic difficulties?

A. (No answer.)

- Q. Did he ever tell you about any domestic troubles he was having?
- A. No.
- Q. You knew nothing about that?
- A. I know he got a divorce and re-married.
- Q. Were you acquainted with his present wife?
- A. I am now.
- Q. Did you know that her sister was at one time his private secretary?
- A. I know that now.
- Q. And her name was Perry?
- A. I don't know—I don't remember the name.
- Q. Was Major Wyman a rather heavy drinker when you knew him?
- A. No.
- Q. He wasn't?
- A. (Shaking head in the negative.)
- Q. Did you ever see him intoxicated?
- [3766] A. No.
- Q. Never did?
- A. (Nodding head in the negative.)
- Q. Do you recall an instance when you were entertaining some people on your yacht, some women guests, and that Major Wyman was intoxicated and embarrassed those present in your main salon?
- A. (No answer.)
- Q. Do you recall that instance?
- A. No.
- Q. Are you quite sure that you have never seen Major Wyman or Colonel Wyman intoxicated?
- A. I have seen him drinking.
- Q. But you never saw him intoxicated?
- A. No. That goes back again, of course, to the old question.
- Q. You mean the difference between—
- A. I drink myself. I am not intoxicated until I fall down.
- Q. Would you apply that same rule to Major Wyman's drinking activities?
- A. I apply that same rule to everybody.
- Q. Do you remember when Major Wyman was working on the San Pedro breakwater?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you do any part of that work for the Army?
- [3767] A. I did all of it.
- Q. Do you recall—
- A. Long before—long before Major Wyman was ever here.
- Q. I see. There was an ammunition anchorage in conjunction with that breakwater, was there not?
- A. No.
- Q. Explosives anchorage?
- A. No.
- Q. You are sure of that?
- A. I am sure of that. That explosives anchorage has been there long before they built the breakwater.
- Q. Did you work on that at all?
- A. No.
- Q. Now, in some of your income tax returns, Mr. Rohl, you stated, did you not, that you were a citizen of the United States?
- A. (No answer.)
- Q. Federal income tax returns.
- A. Yes; I found that out—I was told that by—
- Q. By the Immigration officials—pardon me, Naturalization officials?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And did you examine the copies of your Federal income tax returns to ascertain whether or not you had made such a statement?
- [3768] A. I did after they—
- Q. After they called it to your attention?
- A. After they called it to my attention, yes. I don't sign—I do sign it, but I don't prepare my own income tax.
- Q. You don't pay any attention to it?
- A. I don't prepare them myself.

Q. Did you find that on one or more of those income tax returns there was a statement to the effect that you had been naturalized in 1921?

A. No.

Q. You never found any such statement?

A. No.

Q. Did you examine your California State income tax return since 1935 to ascertain whether or not a similar statement was made on that?

A. No, I have never seen them.

Q. You own an automobile, do you not?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And you own it individually?

A. Yes.

Q. You never made application for an operator's license in California, did you?

A. Many years ago. I haven't been driving a car for better than 10 years.

Q. How long has it been since you had an operator's [3769] license?

A. I believe somewhere in the '20's.

Q. Now, when did you obtain your first contract to do construction work for the United States Army?

A. In 1932 or 1933.

Q. And when did you obtain your first contract to do construction work for the Army on the Island of Oahu?

A. 1940.

Q. And how long did that construction work continue from and after 1940?

A. 1940 until January 31, 1943.

Q. Was all of that work done through the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Correct.

Q. Were you active in the enterprise at all?

A. Quite so.

Q. Made several trips there, did you not?

A. No; I spent most of my time there for a period of 14 months.

Q. Where, on the Island of Oahu, was the main office of the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Punahou Camp.

Q. Now, your main office was located there?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know Mr. C. C. Middleton?

A. Yes.

[3770] Q. Who is he?

A. He is the administrator for the Hawaiian Constructors; he is in charge of all of the offices.

Q. Now, at that time—strike that.

Do you know where Schofield Barracks are located?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And do you know that Wheeler Field is a part of or an adjunct to Schofield Barracks?

A. Yes.

Q. And you are familiar with Kapupu Gulch just below Wheeler Field—you know where that is?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Did you ever hear of that?

A. Did I ever hear of it?

Q. Yes, Kapupu Gulch.

A. Yes, near Schofield Barracks.

Q. Do you know where Ewa is?

A. Yes.

Q. There is an airfield there, is there not?

A. Ewa.

Q. Yes.

A. Now, listen, I can't tell you where any airfields are.

Q. Well, it is a matter of common knowledge there is one under construction there.

A. Where?

[3771] Q. Ewa.

A. (No answer)

Q. You don't know?

A. (No answer)

- Q. Do you know where Bellows Field is?
 A. Oh, yes.
 Q. And that is on the east coast of the Island of Oahu, is it not?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And you know where Hickam Field is?
 A. Oh, yes.
 Q. And do you know where Red Hill is?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Do you know where Kahuku is?
 A. Yes.
 Q. And do you know where the Waialeale Base yard is?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At the extreme northwesterly tip of the Island of Oahu?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Do you know where all of those places are?
 A. Oh, yes.
 Q. And you know where Barber's Point is?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Now, as a matter of fact, you can answer this question yes or no: The Hawaiian Constructors did work on [3772] Bellows Field, Hickam Field, Red Hill, Wheeler Field, Ewa and Kiena?
 A. The answer is no.
 Q. They did not do work at any of those places?
 A. Oh, yes.
 Q. But they didn't do work at all of them, is that it?
 A. That is right.
 Q. They did work at Red Hill, did they not?
 A. No.
 Q. No work at all there?
 A. No.
 Q. You are quite sure of that?
 A. Why, certainly.
 Q. Did they do any work at Hickam Field?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At Bellows Field?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At Kiubla Bay?
 A. Kiubla Bay?
 Q. Yes.
 A. No.
 Q. At Kihuko?
 A. Yes.
 Q. At Hiena Point?
 A. No.
 Q. At Ewa?
 [3773] A. At Ewa? You have got that mixed up. It isn't called "Ewa." You are thinking about something else. I am not going to tell you what you are thinking about.
 Q. You are quite sure—are you very positive that they did not work at all at Red Hill?
 A. Yes, because that is a Navy job.
 Q. I know it is.
 A. And we are not Navy contractors.
 Q. You never did any work for the Navy?
 A. No; Army contracting.
 Q. Did any concern with which you have been connected now, or in the past, ever do any work for the Navy?
 A. No. Oh, ever do any work for the Navy?
 Q. Yes.
 A. That, I don't know. The Hawaiian Constructors were the only Army contractors in the Pacific Ocean.
 Q. As I recall your testimony, you said that the Hawaiian Constructors did no work at all at Wake, Guam, or Midway?
 A. That is right.
 Q. Did they do any work at Canton and Johnson Islands?
 A. Now, what is this?
 Q. Pardon me?

A. What is this? I don't know how much I can tell you—I am going to be frank with you.

Q. Yes, I understand, but we have information that you [3774] did do work at Canton and Johnson Islands from several witnesses.

A. All right. We didn't do any work at Johnson Islands; we did not.

Q. Did you do any work at Canton Island?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. You are sure you never did any work at Johnson Island?

A. That is right.

Q. Did you do any work in Australia?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, at the headquarters of the Hawaiian Constructors there is a parking space delineated outside, is there not, with the names of the owners of the various cars that are privileged to park there?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you have such a parking space?

A. There was a name on one, but I never used it.

Q. Your name was on it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But you never used it?

A. No; I had another place to park.

Q. What share did Rohl-Connolly Company own in the Hawaiian Constructors? [3775] A. It varied.

Q. Well, what share did you own in 1940?

A. 40 per cent.

Q. What share did you own in 1941?

A. 40 per cent.

Q. What share do you own now?

A. 24 per cent.

Q. Does the Hawaiian Constructors have any officers—president, secretary, and so forth?

A. No; it is a joint venture.

Q. I understand that.

A. Can't be any officers or directors.

Q. Well, I am not so sure about that, but at least there are none.

A. I am sure about it,—there can't be any.

Q. Who was in charge of construction on the Island of Oahu at the time the contract was first awarded?

A. Now, do you mean?

Q. For the Army.

A. Colonel Wyman.

Q. And was Colonel Wyman in charge of the work there during all the time that these construction enterprises were in progress for the Army?

A. No.

Q. When did he leave there?

A. He left, I believe, the latter part of April, 1942.

[3776] Q. And he was superseded by whom?

A. He was superseded by Colonel Lyman—one is Wyman and the other one is Lyman.

Q. General Lyman—wasn't he a general?

A. Well, he was—he was notified that he would be made a general, but he died the next day.

Q. Do you know whether or not he did anything about the contract that you had for the use of the Vega by the Army engineers? Do you know whether or not he canceled that contract?

A. Whether he canceled the contract?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. He did cancel it?

A. Yes. Now that is all.—That is good enough.

Q. Now, the employees who worked on these various military installations that we have mentioned here, were employees of the Hawaiian Constructors, were they not?

A. That is right.

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Q. And they were employed originally by Hawaiian Constructors, weren't they?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Were they paid by the Hawaiian Constructors?
A. No.
Q. They were paid by the Army engineers, weren't they?
A. By the Army engineers.
[3777] Q. That was the invariable practice, wasn't it?
A. That was the practice at that time.
Q. And is that the practice now?
A. You mean on Army contracts?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. What procedure do they follow now, Mr. Rohl?
A. The contractor pays the men.
Q. How long has that been in effect?
A. I don't know.
Q. Now, who negotiated originally with Colonel Wyman for the initial, basic contract between the Army and the Hawaiian Constructors?
A. Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly.
Q. Mr. Paul Grafe?
A. Yes.
Q. And Tom Connolly?
A. And T. E. Connolly of Rohl-Connolly.
Q. Did you introduce Mr. Grafe to Mr. Connolly?
A. No.
Q. He had an independent acquaintanceship with him?
A. Callahan built the Prado Dam under Colonel Wyman—
Q. Which was under the jurisdiction of Colonel Wyman?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, do you recall receiving a letter from [3778] Colonel Wyman, dated January 24, 1941, addressed to you and which reads as follows:

Via Clipper.
Address reply to District Engineer, U. S. Engineer Office,
P. O. Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H.
Refer to File No. Contract No. W-414-Eng-602.

JANUARY 22, 1941.

Mr. H. W. ROHL,
*Rohl-Connolly Company, 4351 Alhambra Avenue,
Los Angeles, California.*

DEAR SIR: Reference is made to secret Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, with the Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands.

As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract.

You will be allowed transportation either by Clipper or steamboat both ways, and travel allowance not to exceed \$6.00 per day while en route in accordance with existing laws and regulations.

[3779] You will make application to either the District Engineer at Los Angeles or the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, for transportation.

Very truly yours,

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
*Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers.
District Engineer.*

You recall receiving that letter?

A. Yes.
Q. And in response to it did you go to the Hawaiian Islands?
A. I went to the Hawaiian Islands.
Q. The date of that, Mr. Rohl, was January 22, 1941.
A. I went to the Hawaiian Islands the last week of September.
Q. 1941?
A. 1941.
Q. How did you travel on that trip—by water or by air?
A. I went by air.
Q. And did you confer with Colonel Wyman there about the work?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever make an inspection of the work with him?

[3780] A. Oh, yes.

Q. On one occasion or more than one occasion?

A. More than one occasion.

Q. And as a matter of fact, you were in Pearl Harbor on December 6th, were you not?

A. I wasn't exactly in Pearl Harbor, but I was close to it.

Q. Too close?

A. I don't know about "too close." It missed me by about 100 feet.

Q. Were you present there all during the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And immediately afterwards you directed the restoration of some of the damage that had been done, did you not?

A. Yes, all of it except Pearl Harbor proper.

Q. But the other areas that I have mentioned, and that has all been in the newspapers, Mr. Rohl.

A. That is all right; anything in the newspapers I can talk about.

Q. There is nothing strategic about this.

A. But when you talk about the Islands—

Q. That is something else?

A. Yes.

Q. I will stick to the Island of Oahu, is that all right?

[3781] A. That is all right, because that has all been in the papers.

Q. All right. Now, you did repair work at Hickam Field?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. At Bellows Field?

A. Yes.

Q. At Wheeler Field?

A. Yes.

Q. At Kakuku?

A. Kakuku wasn't built at that time.

Q. Were there any other installations that were damaged that I haven't mentioned?

A. Well, on December—of course martial law was declared on December 7th in the afternoon.

Q. Yes.

A. And immediately all work on the Island of Oahu was turned over to the Hawaiian Constructors, being the Army contractors.

Every contract was canceled. I mean other contracts, and it was all turned over to the Hawaiian Constructors.

Q. Under your direction?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you there while all of this work of repairing was under way?

A. Oh, yes.

[3782] Q. How long did you stay on that occasion? I mean immediately after the bombing occurred.

A. Immediately after the bombing? I believe I got out approximately the first of June.

Q. And were you there continually from December 7th?

A. I made—I went over there the latter part of September and I made one trip back here.

Q. Well, the Hawaiian Constructors had all of the work at that time under the 1940 contract, didn't they?

A. No.

Q. Well, who turned all of the work over to them?

A. Well, there were other contractors on the Island.

Q. Yes.

A. I mean there was a contractor building a street, maybe.

Q. Yes.

A. And a contractor building a building here.

Q. I see.

A. And a contractor doing something else.

Q. But those contractors did not participate in any of the reconstruction work?

A. We took over all the contractors and their organizations.

Q. So that all of the other contractors turned the work over to you—that is, turned it over to the Hawaiian Constructors, is that it?

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[3783] A. Hawaiian Constructors, yes.

Q. At whose instance did they do that?

A. At the instance of the Commanding General.

Q. And all of that work was under the supervision of Colonel Wyman?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Now, was the first contract for installations on the Island of Oahu with Rohl and Connolly?

A. No.

Q. Wasn't with Rohl and Connolly.

A. The Hawaiian Constructors.

Q. The Rohl and Connolly Company never had any contracts at all with the Army for installations?

A. In the Pacific Ocean?

Q. Yes.

A. No. When I say "the Pacific Ocean," I mean any islands in the Pacific Ocean.

Q. I understand. After you returned to this country in June of 1941 did you subsequently make another trip to the Island of Oahu?

A. Yes, if I recall right, I stayed over here about two weeks and I immediately returned.

Q. Well, were you requested to go back to do more work?

A. Now, you are talking about 1942?

Q. No, I am talking about—well, strike that.

[3784] As I understand your testimony you said that after the bombing of Pearl Harbor you stayed over there until June?

A. 1942.

Q. Then you returned to the United States.

A. Yes, for two weeks.

Q. I understand.

A. On business.

Q. Then you went back?

A. Immediately.

Q. How did you go back that time—by boat or by Clipper?

A. Now, wait a minute—I made three trips back.

Q. You mean you made three trips from the United States back to Oahu?

A. No, no, from Oahu over here and back, because my work was all in the Hawaiian Islands and not here.

Q. Yes.

A. I made three trips over here and on one of them I returned on the transport.

Q. Did you maintain a residence on the Island of Oahu?

A. Yes.

Q. A home or a hotel, or where?

A. No, we operated a hotel.

Q. And you stayed there, did you?

[3785] Chairman TENNEY. By "we," whom do you mean?

The WITNESS. Hawaiian Constructors for the Army.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. I show you the Encyclopedia Britannica World Atlas, Mr. Rohl, 1942 edition, Map No. 91. Map No. 91 is a map of the Hawaiian Islands, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. In the upper left-hand corner in green is there delineated the Island of Oahu?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to take my own map and indicate on the Atlas map the various localities which I have designated, so we will have them accurately in the record.

Schofield Barracks is shown on the Atlas map.

A. Yes.

Q. Bellows Field is not shown on the Atlas map?

A. No.

Q. But it is shown on this map which I have prepared and which I now show you. (Handing drawing of map to the witness.)

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that the approximate location of Bellows Field?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Hickam Field is not shown on the Atlas but I show it to you on the map which I have prepared and ask you if that is the approximate location of Hickam Field.

A. You are doing pretty good.

[3786] Q. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. I show you Red Hill on the map which I have prepared, and which is not shown on the Atlas map, and ask you if that is the approximate location of Red Hill.

A. Yes.

Q. I show you Wheeler Field, which is designated on the map which I have prepared, and which is not shown on the Atlas map, and ask you if that is the approximate location of Wheeler Field.

A. Well, more or less.

Mr. COMBS: And let the record show I am showing the map which I prepared, to Mr. Rohl, while asking these questions.

Mr. Chairman, this map was prepared by me from data which we have received from an informant, who will later be sworn to testify, and I offer this as Exhibit No. 1 in evidence in connection with the testimony of this witness.

Chairman TENNEY. The map will be marked Exhibit 1 in connection with the testimony of Mr. Rohl.

(The map referred to was marked Committee Exhibit No. 1, Hans W. Rohl.)

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Mr. Rohl, the contract that you had with the Army Engineers for the use of your yacht, was that a contract entered into by Hawaiian Constructors and the Army or by Rohl-Connolly and the Army, or by you individually?

[3787] A. No. Well, sometimes I hesitate because—

Q. Well, it is perfectly all right; I am asking you a great many detailed questions.

A. There are things that I am not permitted to say, I mean you can get the information from another source, but I don't want to be the guilty one.

Q. I don't want you to be.

A. But I can say this, that contracts of that magnitude are handled by "supplements."

Now, a supplement to a contract, cost plus, straight, fixed fee contract means additional work—call it a job or whatever you might call it, but it is handled by a supplement, and the case of the Vega a supplement was issued to the Hawaiian Constructors to charter the Vega as a survey boat from Floy E. Rohl, which is my wife's name.

Q. For a consideration of \$1.00 a year?

A. For consideration of \$1.00 a year; to Hawaiian Constructors to maintain, hold the owner harmless and return it to the owner in as good shape as it was received by them.

Q. Was the Vega to your knowledge ever used by the Navy?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Was that by a supplement to the basic contract?

A. No.

Q. Who was that contract with—

A. You mean over there?

[3788] Q. Yes.

A. No, no, the Navy didn't use it over there.

Q. Did the Navy use it over here?

A. The Navy requisitioned the Vega last July, shortly after she came back from Honolulu.

Q. Did Floy Rohl assign the Vega to the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. No.

Q. Merely leased it?

A. For a dollar.

Q. Mr. Rohl, do you know of any arrangement whereby \$150,000 a year was paid for the use of the Vega?

A. Well, as a matter of fact, it wasn't.

Q. It wasn't?

A. No. Somebody got themselves twisted again. Now, I might explain that.

Q. Yes.

A. We will have to come back again to what a supplement is. When a supplement on a cost plus fee contract—on each supplement issued—you might have 100 of them. You might have 100 of them in one month.

There is an estimate made—an estimate is made and in the supplement it says there was a supplement issued for Hawaiian Constructors to operate,

maintain, return to the owner the survey ship Vega, at a cost not to exceed \$150,000 a year—operation costs.

[3789] Q. And that was the contract?

A. That was the supplement and it was amended, and it was decided—and I can't tell you the reasons why. It was decided not to use the Vega on that particular survey. I mean the survey was abandoned so then the Vega was ordered to be returned on that supplement, and then part 2 was issued to that supplement—that for the period that the Vega was in service to the War Department, Hawaiian Constructors were authorized under Part 2 of the supplement—43, or whatever it was, to do all that and return it to the owner for a cost not to exceed \$75,000, for which Hawaiian Constructors would receive a fee of, I believe, \$570.

Q. And all of that data was contained in the supplemental contracts to the basic contract?

A. To the Hawaiian Constructors Contract No. 602.

Q. Yes.

A. That is right.

Q. Now, going back for the moment to the time when you were working in Sacramento.

Did you ever do any work up on the Bear River?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Strike that. Was the contract for the use of the Vega made between Hawaiian Constructors and Floy Rohl, or was the War Department a party to that contract also?

A. No, the War Department doesn't enter into a contract except with the principal.

[3790] Q. I see.

A. The Hawaiian Constructors.

Q. I see.

A. From then on the Hawaiian Constructors or the contractor, whoever it might be, is ordered to do certain things.

Q. By the Army Engineers?

A. By the Army Engineers, yes.

Q. And was Colonel Wyman the head of the Army Engineers at that time?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And would actually control the movements of the boat, would he not?

A. Oh, certainly.

Q. And did that condition exist until he left the Island of Oahu?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, going back to the time you were working at Sacramento, Mr. Rohl, did you ever do any work on the Bear River?

A. Bear River?

Q. At Sacramento.

A. Where is that?

Q. I don't know; it is in Sacramento County.

A. Bear River in Sacramento County?

Q. Yes.

[3791] A. (No answer.)

Q. Did you ever know a man by the name of William Henry Enright?

A. William Henry Enright?

Q. Yes.

A. I don't know.

Q. You don't remember any such name?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever know a man by the name of Werner Plack?

A. Who?

Q. Werner Plack?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. You never knew Werner Plack?

A. No.

Q. Don't you remember going into the Swing Club with Werner Plack during the summer of 1938?

A. No, I don't.

Q. You have no recollection of Werner Plack at all?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Do you know where the Swing Club is or was?

A. I know where it was.

- Q. 1710 North Las Palmas Avenue, Hollywood.
A. 1710 North Las Palmas, Hollywood? That was down here?
Q. Yes.
[3792] A. Down near 833 Spring, wasn't it?
Q. Well, you know it was a club that opened, usually, after 2:00 o'clock in the morning. Do you remember that?
A. (No answer.)
Q. A night club.
A. (No answer.)
Q. You remember the Swing Club, don't you?
A. Yes, I remember the Swing Club. Wasn't that at 833 Spring, or some place?
Q. I don't know.
A. I don't know myself.
Q. When were you last there?
A. I don't know that.
Q. Well, were you ever there?
A. I suppose I was.
Q. Within the last 10 years says, or can you give us a general idea of when you were last there?
A. (Nodding head in the negative.)
Q. Have you been there within the last five years?
A. Five years—I was younger then.
Q. It was afterwards called the "1710 Club."
A. I probably have been there.
Q. They had a special song, didn't they? Do you remember the song they used to sing about you?
A. No. You must have been there yourself.
Q. I talked to some people that were very recently.
[3793] Now, do you keep copies of your Federal income tax returns, Mr. Rohl?
A. Why, certainly.
Q. Pardon me?
A. Certainly.
Q. You do?
A. Yes. I mean my office does—I do, yes.
Q. Who has the custody of them?
A. Copies of my income taxes?
Q. Yes.
A. It is either Miss Dickey or Mr. Bontems.
Q. What are his initials?
A. (No answer.)
Q. What is his first name?
A. James.
Q. And he works where—where is his office?
A. He has offices in the Security First National Bank Building.
Q. Los Angeles?
A. Los Angeles.
Q. Did he prepare your income tax returns for you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Under your instructions?
A. No.
Q. I mean—
A. I pay him for doing it.
[3794] Q. Who tells him to do it? That is what I am getting at.
A. Well, he has been doing it for so many years.
Q. Oh, I see.
A. More than 10 years.
Q. Yes.
A. He is the auditor.
Q. So those copies of those returns would either be in his possession or in the possession of Irma Dickey?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, you applied for admission to citizenship in 1941, in March, did you not?
A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall Rohl-Connolly paid a fine to the Federal Government of \$25,000 about five days before you were admitted to citizenship?

A. I remember that very well.

Q. That was for what reason?

A. That was a fine because I was, during that time—we owned that building equipment at one time and I was president of the Rohl-Connolly Company which I had no right to be.

Q. And wasn't it because you were an alien and owned more than 40 per cent of the stock, or pardon me, 25 percent of the stock of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. Yes.

[3795] Q. That was the reason, wasn't it?

A. Yes. I mean the fine was assessed and paid and everything forgiven.

Q. I understand. The original penalty was confiscation of all of the boats and launches and tugs and so forth that were registered in the name of Rohl-Connolly, wasn't that it?

A. Yes; but it was at the secretary's discretion.

Q. And the case was settled?

A. Assessed a fine.

Q. For \$25,000?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was paid about five days prior to the time you were admitted to citizenship?

A. That's right.

Q. Now, Mr. Rohl, I am going to ask you a question but I am not going to amplify it. I merely want to get the basic data in the record and I am doing it only for that purpose. I am not going into detail.

When did you first become acquainted with Marian Henderson?

A. In 1914.

Q. And she is now Mrs. Marian Clark or Mrs. Clark?

A. Yes.

Q. And she lives in Sacramento too, does she not?

A. Yes.

[3796] Q. Were you ever acquainted with Lemuel B. Schofield.

A. Schofield? Is it Lemuel B.?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes—I mean—pardon me. I just want some information. That is the Schofield who was superintendent for the contractors in San Pedro?

Q. No, this was the Immigration Commissioner for the Pacific Coast.

A. No.

Q. You never knew him?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever know Mr. Shumaker in the Immigration Department?

A. I believe he—I don't know who had my case up there.

Q. I did not mean in that way. I meant did you have any personal acquaintance with him?

A. No.

Q. That is what I mean.

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Now, you testified, I believe, that you inspected the various projects that were under construction on the Island of Oahu with Colonel Wyman several times. About how many times would you estimate?

A. I made an inspection trip with him the day after I arrived in Honolulu in September—the last part of September.

[3797] Q. What year?

A. 1941.

Q. And was that quite an extensive inspection?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And then did you make other inspections?

A. Yes; made several inspections.

Q. When did you make the next inspection?

A. The next inspection—of course, you must remember after the seventh there were—

Q. You were making inspections all the time, I guess?

A. Making inspections all the time if and when you were able to.

Q. And you made many of them?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Which took you all around the place, I presume?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Your base yard was up in the northwest part of the Island, wasn't it?

A. No.

Q. Your base yard No. 2?

A. No.

Q. Wasn't it?

A. No.

Q. I show you this map, marked Exhibit 1. Isn't this where the base yard was located that was used by the Hawaiian Constructors? (Indicating on exhibit.)

[3798] A. You have got it wrong. It is not there.

Q. Will you indicate where it is on the map (Handing exhibit to the witness and the witness placing a mark near the center of the map).

Q. A little to the west of the center of the Island.

A. (Nodding in the affirmative.) You are talking about base yard No. 9.

Q. Where was your base yard No. 2?

A. There is no such.

Q. Did you start out with No. 9? How did you get No. 9? Where was No. 1, for instance?

A. (No answer.)

Q. I am very serious in asking these questions, Mr. Rohl.

A. Base yard No. 1 is at Fort Camp.

Q. And where is that—what part of the Island?

A. Fort Camp adjoins Hickam Field—Fort Camp is between Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor.

Q. That is where your No. 1 base was?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was your No. 2?

A. (No answer.)

Q. Our information is, and I will tell you frankly, that your No. 2 base yard was up at the northwesterly tip of the Island of Oahu.

A. No, we have no base yard there.

[3799] Q. No base yard at all?

A. No. I mean—now, it all depends on what you call "a base yard."

Q. Well, I mean a base yard—a place where you kept your supplies and equipment for work on these various projects.

A. Well, we probably had 40 of them.

Q. You don't recall, independently, where your yard No. 2 was?

A. No, because it was not a base yard—what we call a base yard. We might take a, which we did take over, a Japanese department store, and called it "a base yard."

Q. And you didn't have any such—

A. Not on that end of the Island.

Q. On that part of the Island?

A. No.

Q. But the others—you had 40, you say?

A. (Nodding in the affirmative.)

Q. Scattered all around?

A. Scattered all over. Even if we find a vacant lot we will grab it and make a base yard out of it.

Q. I understand. In the Hawaiian Construction, Mr. Rohl, you have a general superintendent of construction?

A. Yes, we have had several of them.

Q. And did they work under your supervision?

A. Oh, yes.

[3800] Q. And did you personally direct the activities of the construction in the Island?

A. While I was there, yes.

Q. While you were there?

A. Yes.

Q. And in doing so, did you consult with him from time to time as to the technical engineering problems that were involved?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Did you go over the plans and specifications with them—with your construction superintendents?

A. No.

Q. Never did?

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A. I don't think I ever did. The plans were plans issued to us by the Corps of Engineers.

Q. I see. Then they went to your construction superintendents, did they?

A. Well, they went through the executive committee and then handed down to whoever was in charge of that phase of the work.

Q. And those who were in charge of the separate phases of the work would, I suppose, be your superintendents of construction or construction engineers in charge of those various projects?

A. Yes.

Q. And they, in turn, worked under your supervision?

[3801] Yes. We had a general superintendent there.

Q. Was that the gentleman whose name I mentioned—Mr. Middleton?

A. No, Middleton is the—he is on the administrative end.

Q. And is his office—was his office at your headquarters?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And there was a Mr. Stewart in charge of the Hawaiian Constructors office in San Francisco?

A. Stewart?

Q. Yes; was he in charge up there or down here?

A. Stewart? To my knowledge he wasn't any place.

Q. You never heard of him?

A. I never heard of him.

Q. Did you ever use the name of John William Rohl?

A. John William Rohl?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. When was that? When did you use that name?

A. I used that when I made my—declared my intention for citizenship in 19—when did I say—1915 or '16.

Q. I have forgotten but you went over that.

A. The County Clerk didn't like the name "Hans." He said I better call myself "John."

Q. Well, did you have your name changed to John by any [3802] proceedings?

A. No.

Q. You just used it for a while?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you use it?

A. For about an hour.

Q. For an hour?

A. Yes.

Q. For what purpose?

A. Because the Clerk told me I should write down "John."

Q. What clerk was that—what County Clerk was that?

A. That was at Marysville.

Q. Marysville?

A. Yes—wait a minute.

Q. Marysville is in Yuba County.

A. Yuba County?

Q. That was about when did you say?

A. '15 or '16—I am sure it was Yuba County—no—it was either Yuba County or Sacramento County.

Q. It doesn't make any difference.

A. It was in that neighborhood.

Q. And you signed your application, did you, at that place—your application for citizenship?

A. Yes.

Q. Before the County Clerk in either Sacramento or [3803] Yuba County?

A. Yes.

Q. I suggest to you, Mr. Rohl, very sincerely, for your sake, just to keep the record straight, that you might have somebody examine your application over at the Federal Building and correct the statement that you never made any prior application for citizenship.

I just looked at it yesterday.

A. I had it with me and I showed it to them, I believe they have it over there.

Q. Is it on file in the Immigration Department?

A. Yes, it is on file. I showed it to them.

Q. You stated you never made any prior application?

A. But my prior application is on file over there, too. It is in their records. I am sure it is there or they gave it back to me.

Q. I don't know—it isn't in the file over there now. I have examined the file two or three times.

Now, Mr. Rohl—

A. May I interrupt—

Q. Surely.

A. I remember now. They discounted that over there because I never made an application for citizenship. I declared—I signed a declaration of intent at that time over there.

Q. You mean over in Yuba or Sacramento County?

A. No, here.

[3804] Q. When did you sign that—

A. No, I told them over there.

Q. Told them that you did?

A. That I did, and they said, "Well, that doesn't make any difference."

Q. You are presently engaged, are you not, in negotiating contracts with the Government for the installation of military and naval construction?

A. You mean I am negotiating today?

Q. Yes.

A. No; I have been awarded a contract.

Q. When was that contract awarded?

A. February 9.

Q. And that work will be done throughout the entire Pacific area, will it not?

A. Canada and Alaska.

Q. Colonel Wyman is now stationed at Canada?

A. He is stationed in Canada, yes.

Q. And will go on to Alaska?

A. Yes, Alaska comes under him.

Q. Now, you have visited Schofield Barracks many times, have you not?

A. Oh, yes—not the barracks, no, but we are doing work—

Q. I mean there in the vicinity.

A. Yes.

[3805] Q. You are familiar with the general physical setup there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And Wheeler Field and Schofield Barracks are close together?

A. Yes.

Q. And you are familiar with them?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever go to a place there by the name of Bert Hasby—Bert Hasby's place where they have a bar and the store and all that sort of thing—where they operate the station wagons out of that sell supplies and it is a sort of post exchange?

A. No.

Q. You never did?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever see a man by the name of Bert Hasby?

A. No.

Q. Never knew such a man?

A. Never.

Q. Did you ever visit the post exchange at all at Schofield Barracks or Wheeler Field?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whether or not they ever had one there?

A. Yes; driving by there I could see a post exchange.

Q. A post exchange?

[3806] A. Yes.

Q. Will you describe him, please—will you describe his appearance?

A. I don't know him.

Q. Is it a separate building, or a main building, or is it right at Schofield Barracks?

A. I don't know.

Q. But you know there is a post exchange there?

A. There is a post exchange in every post.

Q. Well, I am only interested in this one. When did you last see it?

A. (No answer.)
 Q. How long ago?
 A. You mean when did I last drive by there?
 Q. Yes.
 A. I don't even know that.
 Q. Well, certainly it was either in 1940 or '41 or '42, wasn't it? You were there in 1942, weren't you?
 A. I was there in 1942.
 Q. Were you out to Schofield Barracks in 1942?
 A. Oh, yes.
 Q. When were you last there in 1942?
 A. At Schofield?
 Q. Yes.
 A. You mean when did I last drive through Schofield?
 Q. Yes.
 [3807] A. I would say August or September.
 Q. Last August or September?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you hear anything about Bert Hasby being shot on the night of December 7, 1941?
 A. No.
 Q. Never heard anything about that at all?
 A. No.
 Mr. COMBS. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.
 Chairman TENNEY. Any further questions of Mr. Rohl by the committee?
 Assemblyman KELLEMS. No questions.
 Chairman TENNEY. Do you have any questions, Senator Burns?
 Senator BURNS. No.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. One more question.
 Mr. Rohl, why didn't you apply for citizenship between 1931 and 1941?
 A. Negligence—busy traveling—never gave it a thought.
 Q. When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of military installations, did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?
 A. I did on the Hawaiian Constructors.
 Q. But you didn't on any other projects?
 A. We don't have it—there are no restrictions—I mean on a Government contract you are not questioned as to [3808] whether you are a citizen or not, but on this particular contract, Contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, I told him—I had to tell him.
 Q. Are you familiar with the provisions of the law regarding such contracts?
 A. Secret contracts?
 Q. Well, secret, confidential, or restricted contracts.
 A. Yes.
 Q. I will read the law to you and see whether or not this is your understanding of it.
 "No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government Department concerned has first been obtained.
 "Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be penalized by a fine of \$10,000 or five years in the Federal Penitentiary.
 "For the purpose of this section the term [3809] 'person' shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation or other business enterprise."
 Is that your understanding of the law?
 A. Absolutely.
 Now, as a matter of fact, before we took this contract the War Department was told, and I didn't see the contract or the plans or specifications purposely until after I was a citizen.
 Q. Did you ever make any inspection of the work before you became a citizen?
 A. No.

Q. Never did?

A. Never.

Q. But you repeatedly made inspections of it afterward?

A. Naturally.

Q. Who did the actual bidding on the contract?

A. You have it in your record. The negotiations were conducted by Paul Grafe and T. E. Connolly.

Q. Are you familiar with the correspondence between Paul Grafe and Major Wyman?

A. You mean pertaining to Contract 602?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, it is in the files—I might.

Q. Are you familiar with it?

[3810] A. I am familiar with the file.

Q. Are you familiar with the correspondence in the file between Paul Grafe and Major Wyman?

A. I am supposed to be.

Q. Well, are you?

A. I don't know.

Q. Your employees, the employees who worked under your direction were working on these very projects, were they not?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were working under your direct supervision, were they not?

A. After October 1, 1941.

Q. And you had nothing to do with them prior to that time at all?

A. Never.

Q. Never had anything to do with the employees at all?

A. No, never, nothing.

Q. You are quite positive that you never made any inspections of any of that work prior to September 15, 1941?

A. I am certain of it because I was not over there.

Q. Did you do any work at Oxnard Beach for the Army?

A. Oxnard?

Q. Yes.

A. Beach?

Q. Yes.

[3811] Do you mean Hueneme? Rohl-Connolly built the jetties for the Oxnard—the Oxnard Harbor District.

Q. And under whose direction was that done?

A. That was under the direction of the—(witness snapping fingers.) A firm of consulting engineers—Hill, Barnard.

Q. Did Major Wyman have anything to do with that work at all?

A. No. That wasn't Army work at all.

Q. Did you build the Newport Beach breakwater?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Was that an Army project?

A. Yes.

Q. Under whose direction was that done? Major Wyman?

A. Yes.

Q. When was it constructed?

A. (No answer.)

Q. About when?

A. '36 or '37—in that neighborhood, I would say.

Q. In 1936 or '37, is that right?

A. I think that is correct.

Mr. COMBS. That is all, Mr. Rohl.

Chairman TENNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohl. We are sorry to have inconvenienced you. We hope you catch your plane.

Before we adjourn for lunch Senator Burns has a motion.

[3812] Senator BURNS. I move, Mr. Chairman, that the chairman of the committee be appointed a sub-committee of one to continue with this investigation this afternoon and Monday, even though the other members of the committee may not be able to attend.

Assemblyman DILWORTH. I second the motion.

Chairman TENNEY. All those in favor signify by saying Aye; contrary, No. It is unanimously carried that the chairman be appointed a sub-committee of one

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to carry on this investigation and hearing in the absence of the other members in the event they are not able to be present.

We will recess at this time until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 1:30 o'clock p. m.)

[3813]

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.

February 27, 1943, 1:30 o'clock P. M.

Chairman TENNEY. The committee will come to order. Is Mrs. Floy Rohl here?

Mr. ROHL. Yes.

Chairman TENNEY. Will you please come forward, Mrs. Rohl. Will you be sworn, please? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mrs. ROHL. I do.

FLOY EDITH ROHL, called as a witness on behalf of the Committee, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Chairman TENNEY. Will you state your full name, please?

The WITNESS. Floy Edith Rohl.

Chairman TENNEY. Where do you reside, Mrs. Rohl?

The WITNESS. 8159 Hollywood Boulevard.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Mrs. Rohl, you are the wife of H. W. Rohl?

A. Yes, sir; I am.

Q. Who testified this morning?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When were you and Mr. Rohl married?

A. In 1925, August, 1925.

Q. In San Francisco?

[3814] A. Yes, in San Francisco.

Q. Had you been married previously?

A. Yes, I had.

Q. To a man by the name of Hubert?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was his first name?

A. William

Q. How did you happen to meet Mr. Rohl?

A. Well, I met him in Sacramento through my sister and her husband. They knew him.

Q. And that was when?

A. About 1922. That was 1922.

Q. What was his business or occupation at that time?

A. He was a contractor.

Q. Was he engaged in any construction work in Sacramento?

A. Yes, he was. He was doing what they called reclamation work out of Sacramento—around Marysville and Colusa and that part of the State.

Q. And do you recall when he left for Germany in 1924 on the Steamship DEUTSCHLAND?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. How long was he gone on that occasion?

A. Well, I think he left New York around Thanksgiving and was back here the first of January.

Q. 1925?

A. Yes.

[3815] Q. Shortly after your marriage in San Francisco you and Mr. Rohl established a residence in Los Angeles, did you not?

A. Yes, I think about that year. We came down here in 1927, yes, in the spring of 1927.

Q. And have you resided here ever since?

A. Yes.

Q. Your sister's name is Edna McMorey?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where does she reside?

A. On Catalina Street, 9th and Catalina Street, Los Angeles.

Q. At the time that you and Mr. Rohl were married did you know that he was an alien?

A. I did, yes.

Q. And did he ever tell you that he had applied for citizenship in the United States?

A. Yes.

Q. When did he make application?

A. I really don't know. It was before we were married.

Q. But he told you that he had made application for citizenship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he tell you why it was it was never consummated?

A. No, he did not.

Q. Did he tell you or did you know that he had resided [3816] at one time in Chile?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he tell you what his business was there?

A. Yes.

Q. What was it?

A. Well, he was in the mining business—building mines.

Q. Yes.

A. Copper mines, and as near as I understand it he did some road work—a survey of a road through—down the Amazon.

Q. Did he do that for the government, or did he do it for some private concern?

A. It was for some concern. I don't—for the Anaconda Copper Company—isn't it the Anaconda Copper Company? That is the way I understand it.

Q. Do you recall his work in Mexico in 1932?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you remember he was building a road from Monterey, Mexico to Mexico City?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he ever mention to you any difficulty he had with the immigration inspectors in going in and out of the United States and to and from Mexico?

A. No, he didn't. I didn't know he had any difficulties.

Q. Did he tell you about any difficulties he had with [3817] the Mexican government while working on that project?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whether or not that project was ever completed?

A. No.

Q. By him?

A. No, it was not.

Q. It was not completed?

A. No.

Q. And why wasn't it completed, if you know?

A. Well, I really don't know why.

Q. Did you, yourself, Mrs. Rohl, invest any of your own assets or capital in the Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. Well, no, I didn't invest any, but I have a share of the company that Mr. Rohl—it is community property, yes.

Q. You mean you have an undivided half interest?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Of whatever part he has?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But none of the actual stock is in your name?

A. Oh, yes, there is stock in my name.

Q. How many shares?

A. Well, half of Mr. Rohl's—25 per cent I would say. Mr. Rohl owns 50 per cent—I mean Mr. Connolly owns 50 per cent and there is 50 per cent that Mr. Rohl and I own.

Q. I see. What you mean, in other words, Mr. Connolly [3818] owns 50 per cent of the stock?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Rohl owns 50 per cent and under the community property law you would own an undivided half of what Mr. Rohl owns?

A. No, Mr. Rohl doesn't own 50 per cent. Mr. Rohl owns 25 per cent and I own 25 per cent.

Q. I see. 25 per cent actually stands in your name?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you pay anything for that 25 per cent of the stock?

A. No, I didn't pay anything for it, not for mine.

Q. Was that 25 per cent transferred to you by Mr. Rohl?

A. Yes.

Q. When was that transfer made, about?

A. Well, I think it was at the beginning of the Rohl-Connolly Company—when they organized.

Q. The Rohl-Connolly Company was originally incorporated in Carson City, Nevada, in 1932, and the permit to issue 40,000 shares of stock was granted in May of 1932, in California. It would be somewhere around there, wouldn't it?

A. Yes, it would.

Q. And you have continued in the ownership of that 25 per cent?

A. Yes.

[3819] Q. Ever since that?

A. That is right.

Q. Now, do you recall when Mr. Rohl purchased his first boat, the Pandora?

A. The Pandora

Q. Yes.

A. Yes; I think it was in 1927. I think it was in the fall of 1927—around October of 1927.

Q. And that boat was destroyed by fire, was it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then did he buy another boat after that?

A. Well, we got the Ramona after that in 1933.

Q. And after the Ramona did he buy a subsequent boat?

A. We got the Vega, yes.

Q. That was in 1937, was it not?

A. '37, yes.

Q. Did you pay for any of those boats yourself?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Which ones?

A. Both of them.

Q. Which ones?

A. The Ramona and the Vega.

Q. Well, the Pandora was insured, was it not?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. And the insurance was payable to your husband?

A. No, it was payable to me.

[3820] Q. So, the insurance company delivered you a check, did they?

A. Yes.

Q. For the amount?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. And did you use that money for the purpose of purchasing the Ramona?

A. I used that, yes, and other moneys, of course.

Q. And those moneys were your own funds, were they?

A. Well, it was the community funds from Mr. Rohl. I have no funds of my own.

Q. And you maintained a community account, did you, a joint account?

A. Not in the bank that we both checked on, but I would get my money from his bank, of course, through his secretary.

Q. And you obtained the funds from his secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. And used them to purchase the Ramona?

A. That is right.

Q. And did you follow the same procedure in purchasing the Vega?

A. Yes. When I sold the Ramona I used the money to buy the Vega, that is right.

Q. Do you recall sailing on the Vega from Jacksonville, Florida, to Honolulu shortly after the Vega was purchased in [3821] the latter part of 1937?

A. Yes.

Q. How many men comprised the crew on that occasion?

A. I think 16. I am not sure, but I think it was 16.

Q. And about how many men normally comprised the crew on the Ramona?

A. About eight here on the California coast.

Q. Who employed the crew on the Pandora?

A. The Pandora?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, we only had two men on the Pandora, and we always had sort of a captain, a head man, but he always hired the crew.

Q. The captain did?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And who employed the captain?

A. I did.

Q. You originally employed him?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also employ the Captain on the Ramona?

A. Yes.

Q. And on the Vega?

A. I signed them on as captains.

Q. Did you pay the crew?

A. No, I didn't personally.

Q. Who did?

[3822] A. Miss Dickey from the office—Mr. Rohl's office.

Q. And did she also pay the captains?

A. Yes.

Q. And paid for the upkeep and maintenance of the ship and insurance premiums and all that?

A. Yes.

Q. The Vega was registered in your name, was it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you make the application for use of a wireless telephone on the Vega?

A. On the Vega?

Q. Yes.

A. I don't remember making it for the Vega. We had one for the Ramona.

Q. Did you have a wireless telephone on the Vega?

A. No, we didn't. We had a radio set—a Mackay radio set but not a telephone.

Q. Was that the one operated under the call letters KLVC, wasn't it?

A. I have forgotten the letters, but we had no telephone on the Vega at all.

Q. You applied for one on the Ramona?

A. Yes.

Q. And who applied for the permit from the Federal Communications Commission to operate the wireless station on the Vega?

[3823] A. Of the Mackay set, you mean?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, we put the man—the man in New York did. If there was any signing of papers, I did.

Q. You signed all the papers?

A. I signed all papers.

Q. When you went to the Hawaiian Islands in 1938, or the latter part of 1937, you arrived there about January 21, 1938, did you not?

A. That is right.

Q. And you sailed through the Panama Canal?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall the occasion when the immigration inspectors came on board the ship at Balboa in the Canal Zone?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they question you about your citizenship status?

A. As I remember, yes.

Q. And who were the other guests aboard the boat at that time? Was Mr. Rohl aboard?

A. Mr. Rohl was aboard and some friends of ours, Dr. and Mrs. Carl Lewis.

Q. Where do they reside?

A. In Beverly Hills.

Q. No one else was aboard as guests?

A. No.

Q. And were you all questioned by the immigration in- [3824] spectors at that time?

A. As I remember it, yes. I guess—we were late at night, very late at night. I don't entirely recall them coming aboard but it was quite late at night. I have kind of forgotten about it.

Q. Did the boat stop at Balboa for any length of time? How long did it stop there?

A. We stopped at the—it wasn't—I always forget. Is it Balboa the first one you come to on the East coast? We didn't stop there at all, we went right on through the Canal.

Q. Well, where did the immigration men interrogate you?

A. Well, we stopped outside before you go through the locks.

Q. And that was where?

A. We anchored outside. We didn't go in. They came out in a boat.

Q. You did not go ashore?

A. No.

Q. You anchored the boat and the immigration men came from shore?

A. Yes. Then we went through the locks on Christmas day and we stayed on the other side until, I think it was, the last day of December.

Q. You were born in Iola, Kansas, were you not, Mrs. Rohl?

[3825] A. Yes, I was.

Q. And your husband was born in Lubeck, Germany?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you present when Mr. Rohl was interrogated, before you went through the Panama Canal, by the immigration inspectors?

A. No, I wasn't—not right in the room, no.

Q. Were you present when Dr. and Mrs. Lewis were interrogated?

A. No.

Q. Where were you when you were interrogated?

A. Well, I imagine we were in the main salon. It was night and we should have been down below.

Q. And you recall that you were asked about your citizenship?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And all that sort of business?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You went through that routine?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you naturally assumed, I take it, that similar questions were asked of the other persons aboard the boat?

A. Yes, I suppose so.

Q. Did you proceed from that point on to Honolulu?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you anchor off of Honolulu and go through a [3826] similar procedure with immigration there?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall that the same questions, in substance, were asked?

A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.)

Q. On that occasion were you present when your husband was interrogated?

A. No; I was on deck and we took turns going down below.

Q. You all took turns in going down below?

A. Yes; we had people waiting outside on a boat.

Q. Oh, you went down one at a time for interrogation.

A. Yes.

Q. And then you all went ashore, did you?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the incident when the trouble occurred among the crew and they were going to throw somebody overboard and they had a fight or something?

A. That was at the dock in the harbor.

Q. That fellow was discharged, was he not, the man who made the trouble?

A. Yes, sir; the Captain discharged him.

Q. Do you know Colonel Wyman?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

A. Yes, sir.

[3827] Q. Was he in Honolulu on that occasion in 1938?

A. No; he was not.

Q. By the way, how long have you known Colonel Wyman?

A. I think I met him in 1933; I think shortly after we got the Ramona, as I remember it.

Q. When you got the Ramona, taking up that subject again for a moment, you sailed that boat from New York back to the West Coast, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember stopping at Acapulco, Mexico?

A. I got off the boat at Panama and came up on the Steamer *Virginia*. I did not come up this side.

Q. So you were not on the boat at Acapulco?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever go aboard the *Ramona* to any other port outside of the United States?

A. No, never.

Q. How about on the *Vega*?

A. No, only to Honolulu, and I would call that the United States.

Q. Back and forth?

A. We only went there the one time.

Q. You just went over there the one time?

A. Yes; and we came back here.

Q. When you returned from the Hawaiian Islands on that occasion—you stayed there about two weeks, did you not, [3828] in 1888?

A. About two weeks, I judge.

Q. And when you returned did you have any other persons or person on board the boat except those who originally made the trip with you?

A. Yes; we brought a friend of ours back, Mrs. James Winne.

Q. And between the time you left the port at Honolulu and docked at San Pedro was anyone else on the boat?

A. No; not until we got into San Pedro.

Q. You are quite sure of that?

A. I am quite sure.

Q. So, from the time you left Honolulu until you docked in the harbor at San Pedro there were only those persons on the boat?

A. That is all, until we got into the dock at the Yacht Club.

Q. Until you docked at the Yacht Club?

A. Yes.

Q. And until after you had cleared immigration here?

A. Yes.

Q. You are quite sure of that?

A. I am quite sure. We dropped anchor out in the breakwater but the inspector came aboard. We call him the "The bug man." He came aboard to see about fruit and stuff, but that is all that came aboard.

[3829] Q. Do you know Mr. E. J. Crouse?

A. Yes.

Q. How long have you known him?

A. Let me see, probably met him in 1937. I really can't remember.

Q. Didn't he come aboard the *Vega* before it docked at San Pedro?

A. No, not to my knowledge he did not.

Q. Didn't you have a conversation with him?

A. Yes. He was on a boat—on his boat, I guess it was his boat.

Q. On the *Marlin*?

A. I don't know the name. It was a power boat and they came out to the breakwater. They had been watching for us all night, expecting us in, and he circled around and around our boat several times with his boat, and after we dropped the anchor he circled around a few times and then he went on back to their slip. I guess.

Q. But he didn't come aboard?

A. No.

Q. Did you have any conversation with him?

A. Yes. We talked back and forth—talked to him.

Q. Did you tell him he should not come aboard because you had not cleared immigration yet?

A. He mentioned that he wanted to come aboard and I called back and said, "No, you can't come aboard."

[3880] Q. Did you give any reason?

A. Yes, because I knew we had to go through immigration and I didn't think he should be aboard.

Q. When did you go through immigration? Was it that night?

A. No, early in the morning.

Q. And did the immigration inspectors board the boat while it was anchored there?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And were you asked in substance, the same question that had been asked by the immigration inspectors on the two preceding occasions?

A. I imagine so—I don't remember.

Q. You were questioned?

A. Yes. We were questioned.

Q. Were you asked about your citizenship?

A. Yes, I guess so. I don't remember it very well.

Q. Were you present when any of the other passengers were questioned?

A. No.

Q. You are familiar with Lloyd's registry, are you not?

A. Well, I know you register, yes, the boat through Lloyd's.

Q. And you know that the register carries the names of the owners of the various boats—various yachts?

A. Yes.

[3881] Q. Do you know from what sources they get their information?

A. Well, no, I wouldn't know.

Q. Do you know that from time to time the representatives of Lloyd's registry make inspections on various yachts?

A. Yes, I know they make inspections.

Q. Do you know whether or not they ever made inspections of the Vega?

A. Well, I am not sure that I know. I don't remember.

Q. I show you, Mrs. Rohl, a 1941 Lloyd's Register of Shipping—Lloyd's Register of American Yachts, a list of the sailing and power yachts, yacht clubs and yacht owners of the United States and the Dominion of Canada, and call your attention to the entry on page 474.

This annual number which appears in column 1 in the left hand side of the page I would like to call your attention to, which is 6678. Following that is the word "Vega." "Steel." and in column 8, the owner is listed as H. W. Rohl. Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And the home port is Los Angeles, and in character 10, under classification, "Character," Port of Survey—for special survey, it shows that the boat was inspected in July, 1933 and in November, 1937.

A. I see that—well, I wouldn't know.

Q. Well, did you know that all of the Lloyd Registers [3832] from 1937 down to and including 1941 have shown H. W. Rohl as the owner of the Vega?

A. Yes, they have always done that, because he belongs. The reason I figured that is because he belongs to the Yacht Club. It is always "H. W. Rohl," and everyone naturally says "Bill Rohl." It is usually called "Bill Rohl's Vega." They never say mine, and I don't go around saying, "It is not Bill's; it is mine." I don't do those things.

Q. And it is your belief that the Lloyd Registry people have just assumed—

A. Just assumed that, yes.

Q. That that must be the case?

A. They had to assume that because—

Q. And wrote that in their book?

A. Because it wasn't H. W. Rohl's—it wasn't in his name.

Q. Do you know whether or not the owner of the boat has to sign any application for periodic inspection by Lloyd's?

A. No, I don't.

Q. I was asking you some questions about Colonel Wyman when we got off on another subject. I would like to go back for a moment.

Colonel Wyman came here to work on the Los Angeles Flood Control project in 1935. Did your acquaintance with him go back that far?

A '35?

[3833] Q. Yes.

A. I thought it was before '35. I thought it was about 1933, but maybe it was 1935.

Q. Well, he came here—he was here before 1935, Mrs. Rohl, but he did come here from Kansas City in 1935 to work.

A. I did not meet him until he came here to work on the flood control, so it was '35, then, I met him, because I did not meet him before. I know that.

Q. Was your acquaintance a business acquaintance or social acquaintance?

A. Social.

Q. And did your husband also know him socially?

A. Yes.

Q. He spent a great deal of time aboard the Vega, did he not?

A. No, I would not say that. I don't think he was ever aboard the Vega but once as a guest, as an overnight guest, and I think he came aboard another time. He was a guest on another boat, and I can't think of the name of the boat or the people, but anyway his host came aboard our boat—spent an hour or so one afternoon, but I don't think he was ever aboard the Vega but once as an overnight guest.

Q. Was he ever aboard the Vega on another occasion or any other occasions, when he did not stay overnight?

A. Well, only that one time that I know of.

[3834] Q. So to your knowledge he has only been aboard the Vega on two occasions?

A. To my knowledge, that I remember.

Q. Is it possible that he might have been aboard the Vega on other occasions without your knowledge?

A. It could have been possible.

Q. Did he ever visit at your home?

A. Yes.

Q. How many times would you say?

A. Well, I could not say. He has been to the house several times—many times in the years that I have known him.

Q. Did you ever observe him in an intoxicated condition?

A. Well, I don't know what you would call "intoxicated." I have seen him have some drinks.

Q. I mean obviously under the influence of liquor.

A. No, I would not say that, no.

Q. Do you recall one occasion in your home when you were giving a Christmas party that he almost had a fight with somebody—a quarrel there?

A. No.

Q. You don't?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall an occasion aboard the Vega when a party was being given when he did have a fight with an individual aboard the Vega?

[3835] A. No, I have never known him to have a fight on the Vega or in our home.

Q. So your testimony is that you, as far as you know, he never indulged to excess?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. As far as his drinking was concerned?

A. No, he was always a gentleman. I have seen him drink, but he was always a gentleman.

Q. Did you ever tell any one of your friends that you did not like Major Wyman because he drank too much and was obnoxious?

A. No, I never have.

Q. You are quite sure of that?

A. Yes, I don't know why I should.

Q. Is it your testimony that you never did?

A. I never did.

Q. Did you know Mrs. Wyman?

A. You mean—which one?

Q. Either one?

A. Well, I knew the first Mrs. Wyman much better than I know the present Mrs. Wyman. Yes, I knew them both.

Q. Did you know his daughter?

A. Yes.

Q. Jane, wasn't that her name?

A. Jane. I have met her several times—not many because she was going to school back East when I first met [3836] her.

Q. Do you recall when Major Wyman and his wife began to have domestic difficulties?

A. No, I don't. I didn't know they were having any. They had a divorce before I knew they were having domestic difficulties.

Q. Did you know the second Mrs. Wyman prior to her marriage to Major Wyman?

A. No.

Q. How long afterwards did you first become acquainted with her?

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A. I met the second Mrs. Wyman when we had them on the Vega for a weekend. That was in the summer sometime. I really don't recall.

Q. The summer of what year?

A. I don't know what year now. It was before, of course, we went to Honolulu. They left for Honolulu shortly after that trip. I really don't know what year it was.

Q. When Major Wyman and Mrs. Wyman spent a weekend on the boat, now, do you know whether or not Major Wyman was ever aboard the Ramona?

A. Oh, yes, he was aboard the Ramona.

Q. How many times was he aboard the Ramona?

A. Well, I really can't recall—possibly three times anyway. I have had them as guests—I had him as a guest [3387] one time. We had Colonel Wyman and a number of officers and their wives and families aboard, and then I think he was aboard also on—I don't know—say three or four times aboard the Ramona.

Q. Did he ever spend several days aboard the Ramona?

A. No, only weekends, was all.

Q. Did he ever take any trips aboard the Ramona with you and your husband?

A. No, no trips.

Q. Just went aboard—

A. Over to Catalina from the mainland—from the mainland to Catalina.

Q. Accompanied you over there, did he?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. About how many times would he make trips over there?

A. Well, he didn't make more than three trips.

Q. And were they simply overnight trips?

A. Possibly two nights. Possibly might have been Saturday and Sunday or Friday and Saturday and back Sunday. I really don't recall. Or come back Monday. May go out Saturday and come back Monday. I really don't recall.

Q. Did you know that the second Mrs. Wyman was the sister of his former office secretary?

A. I heard that but I didn't know because I didn't know her.

[3838] Q. You knew her maiden name was Perry, didn't you?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Are you familiar with the H. W. Rohl Company?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of a concern is that?

A. It is a contracting company.

Q. A corporation?

A. No.

Q. A partnership?

A. No, just H. W. Rohl.

Q. H. W. Rohl, doing business as H. W. Rohl Company?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is purely a construction company?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any interest in that concern?

A. No.

Q. Other than—I know you have a community interest, of course, but no other interest?

A. No.

Q. Are you familiar with an organization known as Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. Do you have any interest in the Hawaiian Constructors, other than the interest you would have by reason of your ownership of the Rohl-Connolly stock?

A. No.

[3839] Q. Rohl-Connolly is a member of the Hawaiian Constructors, isn't that correct?

A. That is right.

Q. And do you know how much of an interest Rohl-Connolly Company owns in the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Where is the Vega now?

A. United States Navy.

Q. The Navy has it?

A. Requisitioned and bought it.

Q. For what price?

- A. \$35,000.00.
- Q. Was that paid to you?
- A. To me.
- Q. And prior to the requisitioning of the Vega by the Navy had the Army made any use of it?
- A. Yes, the Army engineers had it for a short while.
- Q. With whom was that contract consummated, if you know?
- A. The Hawaiian Constructors.
- Q. Did you sign the contract?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You are quite sure of that?
- A. Well, I am not quite sure, no, but I imagine I did. I don't know—to be sure, I don't know.
- Q. If you didn't sign it who would have signed it?
- [3840] A. Well, I don't know.
- Q. You were the owner of the boat?
- A. I know it—I wasn't here at the time, however. I was in Honolulu when they made—
- Q. When the contract was made?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who represented you in the making of that contract?
- A. Well, I suppose Mr. Rohl did.
- Q. With whom did he negotiate?
- A. I don't know—Colonel Wyman, I suppose.
- Q. Was Colonel Wyman the head of the Army Engineers at that time?
- A. In Honolulu, yes.
- Q. And there was a contract between the Hawaiian Engineers and the Hawaiian Constructors, was there not?
- A. There was a contract, yes.
- Q. The basic contract?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the Hawaiian Constructors, of course, was subject to the supervision and control of their operations by the Army Engineers?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And the head of the Army Engineers was Colonel Wyman?
- A. That is right.
- Q. So the negotiations for the contract were made for [3841] you by your husband and you don't remember whether you signed the contract or not?
- A. No, I don't remember.
- Q. How much compensation did you receive for the use of the Vega by the Army Engineers?
- A. Got one dollar, and I have it framed at home.
- Q. How was the boat used? Do you know for what purpose?
- A. No, I don't.
- Q. Patrol boat or something of that kind?
- A. I really don't know, because—
- Q. You don't object to having your picture taken, do you?
- A. I don't know; I take a horrible picture.
- Q. I should think you would take a very nice picture, Mrs. Rohl.
- Now, when you went to the Islands in the Vega in 1937 you stayed there about two weeks and, as you testified, came back to the United States?
- A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Did you subsequently return to the Hawaiian Islands?
- A. I went back, yes.
- Q. When did you make your next trip?
- A. I don't think I went over again until a year ago last September.
- Q. A year ago last September?
- [3842] A. Yes.
- Q. Weren't you over there in 1940?
- A. I was trying to think. I don't know—I can't remember—let me see, 1940?
- Q. Yes. You came back here in 1938 on the Vega. Now, I want to know when you next went to the Hawaiian Islands after 1938.
- A. I don't remember, but I went over in 1940. I can't remember that. It seems to me like I didn't. I don't think I had been over since we were on the Vega. Maybe I did and I don't recall it.

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Q. You don't believe you have been back at all since 1937?

A. I can't remember going back.

Q. You don't believe you have been back at all since 1937?

A. I can't remember going back. I possibly have been, but I can't remember.

Q. When did Mr. Rohl next go back?

A. When did he go back?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, he didn't go back until a year ago last September. I know that.

Q. He did not go back until a year ago last September?

A. No.

Q. You are sure of that?

[3843] A. I am quite sure of that—positive, because I went to Honolulu several times alone or with other people or friends, but Mr. Rohl didn't go with me.

Q. You mean you went back several times with friends after 1937?

A. No, no, I mean I have made several trips to Honolulu.

Q. Before or after 1937?

A. No, before, but I can't think about 1940.

Q. Would it have been possible for Mr. Rohl to have returned to the Islands without your knowledge?

A. No, he couldn't possibly have gone without my knowledge.

Q. Now, when the original contracts between Hawaiian Constructors and the Army Engineering Corps were negotiated, did Mr. Rohl play any part in their negotiations?

A. Well, I really don't know.

Q. You don't know?

A. No.

Q. You do know that he was acquainted with Colonel Wyman well?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that Colonel Wyman was the head of the Army Engineers?

A. Yes.

Q. And that Mr. Rohl owned 40 per cent of the stock [3844] of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. (Nodding head in affirmative.)

Q. The Rohl-Connolly Company was a part of the Hawaiian Constructors and they made the contract with the Hawaiian Constructors. Who would you think would represent the Rohl-Connolly Company in the negotiations of that basic contract?

A. Well, I would imagine Mr. Rohl would be the one.

Q. He was president of the Rohl-Connolly Company, wasn't he?

A. He was for awhile. I don't know that he was president at that time.

Q. He is president now, isn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. How long has he been president, to your knowledge?

A. Well, he hasn't been president only this past year.

Q. This past year?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you recall whether or not an application was made in connection with your Mackay Radio station on the Vega to use code?

A. No.

Q. You don't?

A. No, I don't, but I imagine they used code. I don't know—I don't know. I wouldn't know if it is code.

[3845] Q. You would not know whether such an application was made or not?

A. No, I don't know how they send messages. I think it was in code though.

Q. I want to ask you a question which I covered in a general way, but I want to ask it categorically of you, Mrs. Rohl: Did you, or did you not ever say to any person or persons that you tolerated the company of Major Wyman for business reasons only?

A. Well, I may have made that statement but—yes, I could have said it.

Q. To whom did you make the statement?

A. I don't know who I said it to.

Q. Do you recall making it?

A. I don't recall making it, no, not exactly, but I have made the statement but I don't know to whom.

Q. You have made the statement but you don't know to whom?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you make the statement?

A. Well, I don't know. I just really didn't like Colonel Wyman personally so well. I liked his first wife.

Q. Why didn't you?

A. Oh, I don't know. He just was kind of—he was kind of bossy—he was a kind of bossy type of person.

Q. Arrogant?

[3846] A. Arrogant, although I never saw him fight. He was always kind of—

Q. Quarrelsome?

A. No, he knew it all—kind of knew it all.

Q. I know a lot of people that fit into that same category myself.

A. And I liked his first wife very much and I used, of course, to see them a lot and used to see her because I liked her, but I didn't particularly care about him.

Q. Did your contacts with Major Wyman, and later Colonel Wyman and his two wives originate through the contracts that were theretofore made by your husband?

A. Yes, that's how I met him.

Q. Did you know that your husband had negotiated some Army contracts through Major Wyman—through his acquaintanceship and relations with Major Wyman prior to 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. What kind of contracts were they?

A. He had some breakwater—harbor contracts at the Harbor here.

Q. Which harbor?

A. Long Beach Harbor.

Q. Long Beach Harbor?

A. Yes.

Q. How about the San Pedro breakwater?

[3847] A. That is the one I mean.

Q. That is the one you are speaking of?

A. I always call it "Long Beach." I guess it is San Pedro.

Q. Do you recall any other Army projects that Mr. Rohl worked on through his relationship with Mr. Wyman?

A. No.

Q. Just that one?

A. Just that one, yes.

Q. And that was about when—what year?

A. 1933—no, well he started work in 1933 with other engineers here before Wyman came, but he didn't negotiate the job, no, it wasn't negotiated through Colonel Wyman. He was going on with the work—the work was going on before Colonel Wyman came out here.

Q. Have you ever been at home when Colonel Wyman called your husband on the telephone from the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Yes.

Q. On one occasion or more than one occasion?

A. Well, I know one. I don't remember—I really don't remember any more.

Q. How long ago was that conversation?

A. That was a long time ago—long before we went over there in September a year ago.

Q. Long before September, 1942?

[3848] A. Yes, 1942.

Q. You say, "long before we went over there."

Q. Not 1942, but 1941.

Q. That is what I thought. You said, "a year ago."

Q. This is 1943, it was in 1941.

Q. Long before you went over there in September of 1941?

A. Some time before, yes.

Q. Can you give us an estimate of how long, in months, and of course I don't expect you to be exactly accurate in these matters?

A. Well, I think it was in the spring—possibly June.

Q. Early summer or spring of 1941?

A. Yes, because—

Q. Pardon me. I think I am misleading you there. I don't intend to. My question was, how long prior to the 15th of September, 1941 was it that the telephone conversation occurred?

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- A. Well, that is what I am trying to think.
- Q. Do I understand your answer to be the late spring or early summer of that year?
- A. Summer, I think, of that year.
- Q. That is close enough.
- A. I don't remember—I don't remember that.
- Q. That is the only occasion you recall of any tele- [3849] phonic communication between Colonel Wyman and your husband?
- A. Yes; that is the only one I recall.
- Q. That is, from the Islands?
- A. Yes. There could be others; I wouldn't always know.
- Q. I understand.
- Did your husband discuss with you at any time the nature of the work that Hawaiian Constructors were doing for the Army?
- A. In Honolulu? No.
- Q. Never did?
- A. No.
- Q. How about the other Pacific Islands where there was work going on?
- A. No.
- Q. Never discussed those matters?
- A. No. It was always "a military secret." He never discussed it.
- Q. Do you know whether or not Rohl-Connolly did any work at Oxnard?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What type of work was that?
- A. Breakwater—harbor work—a small breakwater.
- Q. Was that under the jurisdiction of the Army Engineers?
- A. Yes.
- [3850] Q. And that was about when?
- A. I can't recall.
- Q. Well, I mean—
- A. The years or dates either.
- Q. A matter of several years ago?
- A. It was several years ago, yes.
- Q. Prior to 1941?
- A. Yes, prior to 1941.
- Q. Was that under the jurisdiction of Colonel Wyman?
- A. No, I don't think so.
- Q. You don't believe it was?
- A. I don't think he was here.
- Q. Are you acquainted with Harold Cramer?
- A. Cramer?
- Q. Yes.
- A. No, I don't know anybody by that name.
- Q. He was an employee of the Hawaiian Constructors?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Are you acquainted—were you ever acquainted with Mr. Werner Plack?
- A. Plack?
- Q. No, Plack.
- A. Plack?
- Q. Yes, Werner Plack.
- A. No.
- Q. Never knew him?
- [3851] A. No.
- Q. Did you ever know Mr. William Henry Enright?
- A. No.
- Q. What?
- A. No, I don't know the name.
- Q. You are acquainted with Mr. T. E. Connolly, of course?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And you have known him for a number of years?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And he is the Mr. Connolly who is the other member of—I will put it this way, the third member of the Board of Directors of Rohl-Connolly Company?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And maintains an office in San Francisco?
- A. Yes.

Q. And does he have any active control or take any active part in the conduct of the Rohl-Connolly Corporation in Southern California?

A. Well, yes.

Q. He does?

A. Yes.

Q. Does he make frequent trips down here for that purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he active in negotiating or assisting in the [3852] negotiations of the contract between the Army Engineers and Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. He was?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he go to the Islands for that purpose?

A. No, he didn't go to the Islands, but they held meetings, I think, in San Francisco.

Q. Did your husband go to the Islands for the purpose of negotiating the contracts or taking any part in them?

A. He went to the Islands after the contracts were negotiated. He did not go over there to negotiate them.

Q. That was the occasion you mean in—

A. September.

Q. September? Well, if he didn't go over to the Islands to negotiate them with whom did he negotiate?

A. Well, they were negotiated here in San Francisco.

Q. I see. Was Colonel Wyman then in San Francisco?

A. Yes, I think he was.

Q. So that Colonel Wyman and Mr. Connolly and your husband were negotiating in San Francisco instead of in the Islands?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether or not the acquaintance between Colonel Wyman and your husband preceded or succeeded the acquaintance between Mr. Connolly and Colonel Wyman?

[3853] A. I think they—

Q. In other words, who knew him first?

A. I think they both met him at the same time.

Q. Down in Southern California?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever disposed of any of the stock that you acquired in the Rohl-Connolly Corporation?

A. No, I haven't.

Q. Did you know that at all the time that Mr. Rohl owned in excess of 25 per cent of the stock of the Rohl-Connolly Corporation he was a German alien and was violating the law?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall that he paid a fine to the United States government of \$25,000 because of that violation?

A. No, I did not know that.

Q. You did not know that?

Q. No.

Q. Rohl-Connolly Corporation owns several boats, tugs and barges and launches, and so forth, do they not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were they kept?

A. San Pedro.

Q. Kept at San Pedro?

A. Yes.

Q. You are acquainted with—strike that, please. [3854] Are you acquainted with Fred Rohl?

A. Yes; he is Mr. Rohl's son.

Q. How long have you been acquainted with him?

A. Well, I have known him since he was about eight years old.

Q. Do you know where he is now?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is he?

A. He is in Canada.

Q. What part of Canada?

A. Well, he is at Dawson Creek. He is working up there.

Q. That is in the province of Alberta, is it not?

A. Yes, Alberta.

Q. What town is it near?

A. Well, it could be near White Horse.

Q. Where is Colonel Wyman now, if you know?

A. I understand he has his offices at Edmonton, Canada.

Q. Which is in the province of Alberta?

A. Alberta, yes.

Q. And do you know how long he has been there?

A. Colonel Wyman?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I think he has been there a year—no, I guess he hasn't been there quite a year.

Q. And Fred Rohl, as I recall the testimony of his [3855] father this morning, has been there just a few months?

A. Yes. He just went up there since Christmas—in January. The 9th, in fact, I think he left.

Q. Does Fred Rohl have an interest at all in any of your husband's enterprises?

A. No.

Q. None whatever?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever own any stock of the Rohl-Connolly Company to your knowledge?

A. To my knowledge no.

Q. Of course, all of these things are of your own knowledge. I realize you would not know about all of these things.

A. No, he never has.

Q. So far as you know?

A. That is right.

Q. Did he accompany you to the Islands when you went over there on the Vega in 1937?

A. No. He left the ship at Miami and came back by train.

Q. Where did he board the ship?

A. He boarded it in New York, when the boat left New York.

Q. When the negotiations for the purchase of the Vega were in progress, did you tell anyone that your husband was [3856] buying the boat?

A. I wouldn't, no. I might say "We are buying a boat." I possibly did say, "We are buying a boat."

Q. But you don't think you told anybody he was buying a boat?

A. No, no, I didn't.

Q. Did he send back and have photographs of the Vega mailed to him in order to look at it after the Ramona had been sold, and prior to the purchase of the Vega?

A. Yes. After we sold the Ramona we had the broker in New York send us pictures. We did not solicit them, they just sent them because they knew—yacht brokers are like real estate men. They know every deal that is put over and they immediately thought, "Well, we didn't have a boat and possibly we would like another one," and they tried to sell us another one.

Q. As a matter of fact, you are negotiating for another boat right now, aren't you?

A. Well, it was about a month—

Q. Pardon me?

A. We negotiated about a month after I sold the Ramona. I sold the Ramona in September and about the 1st of November—

Q. You are negotiating for the purchase of a boat now, are you not, Mr. Rohl?

A. Oh, now?

[3857] Q. Yes.

A. Oh, no, not now; I thought you meant then.

Q. You haven't approached anybody about the purchase of a yacht or a boat?

A. No; only I called Mrs. Converse about their boat—that the Government wants to buy a boat. They have a boat and I called her to ask her if Mr.

Converse would like to sell his boat to the Government, but not to us. We don't want it—we are not buying any boats.

Q. How did you happen to know the Government wanted to buy a boat?

A. Because Colonel Wyman, or his office in Edmonton—they are starting a new project up there and they want some boats and——

Q. You gained that information from whom?

A. From Mr. Rohl.

Q. When did you gain that information?

A. Just last week. Mr. Rohl got home a week ago today from San Francisco.

Q. And did you make a tentative appointment with anyone for Mr. Rohl to discuss the possibility of acquiring a boat for the Army Engineers?

A. No.

Q. Never did?

A. No; did not talk to anyone but to Mrs. Converse, and I asked her about her boat and that was all.

[3858] Q. Now, you say Fred Rohl boarded the Vega where?

A. New York.

Q. And left it where?

A. Miami, Florida.

Q. He did not make a trip to the Islands with you at all?

A. No.

Q. When you went back to get the Vega in 1937 did you accompany Mr. Rohl?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And did anyone go with you?

A. You mean, when we purchased the boat?

Q. Yes. When he went back to take delivery of it?

A. No.

Q. How did it happen that Dr. and Mrs. —

A. Lewis.

Q. Where did you meet them?

A. Well, we went back to New York in October and Mr. Rohl only stayed a few days and I stayed on until the month of November—practically the month of November, until I got the boat in shape and ready for the trip, and hired the captain and got all of the papers signed and had taken care of everything. Mr. Rohl wasn't there then. Fred was with me, the boy, and then I came back here to bring my trunks and New York clothes that I had, and repack for the boat and for Honolulu and we all left here together on the [3859] train for Jacksonville, Florida. In the meantime we had the captain bring the boat down to Jacksonville. It was in the wintertime and very bad weather—very stormy weather, and we boarded the boat in December—December 10, I believe, and then we went south by train from here, the four of us.

Q. Then you left for Honolulu?

A. Then we left for Honolulu.

Q. As a matter of fact you and your husband had planned to take Dr. and Mrs. Lewis on their wedding trip on the Ramona, did you not?

A. Yes, we promised them that.

Q. And this was sort of a substitute trip?

A. Yes; we promised them a trip to Honolulu on the Ramona, and we were never able to make the trip, so after several years—after they had been married several years we made the trip. It was a very nice trip, too, by the way.

Q. There was one fight; other than that it was all right?

A. That wasn't much of a fight.

Q. Did you pay for the Ramona by a check or by cash?

A. By check.

Q. Did you sign the check?

A. No.

Q. Who signed it?

[3860] A. Miss Dickey, the secretary.

Q. Of what?

A. Mr. Rohl's secretary. She takes care of our money. She issues me my money and Mr. Rohl's money—any money that we want—any money that I want I get through her.

Q. Was the check payable to you?

A. No, I don't believe it was. I think it was payable to the—I don't even know if it was payable to the former owner. I don't know who the check was payable to. It might have to be a bank. I really don't remember.

Q. Did you request Mrs. Dickey to—or is it Mrs. Dickey?

A. Miss.

Q. Did you request Miss Dickey to issue the check, or did Mr. Rohl request her to do it?

A. He probably requested it, because he was here. I talked to Mr. Rohl on the phone often and requested money to be sent to me in New York. I had a bank account at the bank there to take care of all bills and things back there, but I got, of course, all of my money through the office.

Q. Well, Mrs. Rohl, has that been the regular practice, the money that you have required you get through the office.

A. Yes.

Q. That same procedure, in other words—

[3861] A. Yes.

Q. In other words, you ask for the money and Miss Dickey makes the proper entries and issues the check and so forth?

A. That is the way we have always done.

Q. Now, you said you didn't remember to whom the check was made out?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Now, how about the Vega? Did you follow the same procedure with the Vega?

A. We were talking about the Vega—I thought we were talking about the Vega.

Q. No, were speaking of the Ramona.

A. Well, it would be the same procedure, however, but I was thinking of the Vega all the time, but it would be the same.

Q. The same thing in both cases?

A. Yes.

Q. Did anyone tell you—pardon me, strike that. How long a boat was the Ramona? Was it over 100 feet long?

A. It was 110 feet.

Q. How long a boat was the Vega?

A. 135.

Q. Do you know whether or not it was against the law for an alien to own a boat in excess of 75 feet in length?

[3862] A. No, I didn't know that.

Q. You did not know that?

A. No.

Q. You are quite positive that you paid all the bills for the upkeep of the Vega?

A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.)

Q. You paid the crew and the captain and for the provisions?

A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.)

Q. The Vega had Diesel engines, didn't it?

A. Yes, sir; the Vega had Diesel engines.

Q. Did you pay for all the Diesel fuel on the Vega and all the inspections and all of that sort of thing?

A. Well, I did in New York before we started out.

Q. Who directed the sailing of the vessel?

A. The captain.

Q. Who gave the captain his orders?

A. Well, no one. Just tell the captain where we are going and then he has charge.

Q. Who told him where to go?

A. Well, I suppose I told him.

Q. Well, did you tell him?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Did Mr. Rohl have anything to do with that at all or did he just go aboard as a passenger?

A. He just went aboard as a passenger. He never did [3863] anything about the boat.

Q. In other words, he didn't pay the bills?

A. No.

Q. Or direct the sailing of the boat?

A. No.

Q. And he didn't do anything at all except have his name in Lloyd's Register as the owner?

A. He might direct some of the sailings, because he likes sailing, but not the actual sailing of the ship.

Q. Have you discussed Mr. Rohl's testimony with him?

A. You mean today?

Q. Yes; I saw him a few minutes after he left here. I was waiting for him and he had to go to the airport. I did not see him but a few minutes.

Q. You sold the Ramona, I believe you testified?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall to whom you sold it?

A. Yes, to a Mr. Spaulding.

Q. Did he pay you cash or check?

A. He paid by check.

Q. And the check was made to whom?

A. To me.

Q. Individually?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you put the money—what did you do with the [3864] money? What I mean by that is—I am not interested in your personal affairs—

A. I endorsed it and turned it over to Miss Dickey and she in turn deposited it in the bank.

Q. In the account of whom?

A. H. W. Rohl Company or H. W. Rohl—not company.

Q. H. W. Rohl?

A. H. W. Rohl account.

Mr. COMBS. I think that is all, Mrs. Rohl.

Chairman TENNEY. Just one question, Mrs. Rohl. As I understand your testimony you did not know that it was illegal for an alien to own a bottom of any given tonnage?

The WITNESS. No, I did not.

Chairman TENNEY. Or size?

The WITNESS. No, I did not know it until now. If it is, I did not know that.

Chairman TENNEY. That is all. Thank you very much, Mrs. Rohl. We are sorry to have inconvenienced you.

We will take a five minute recess.

(Short recess.)

[3865] Chairman TENNEY. The committee will be in order. Will you call your next witness, Mr. Combs?

Mr. COMBS. Irma Dickey.

IRMA F. DICKEY, called as a witness on behalf of the Committee, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Chairman TENNEY. Miss Dickey, will you please stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee, will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The WITNESS. Yes, I do.

Chairman TENNEY. Will you state your full name?

The WITNESS. Irma F. Dickey.

Chairman TENNEY. D-i-c-k-e-y?

The WITNESS. D-i-c-k-e-y.

Chairman TENNEY. Will you be seated, please. Is it Miss Dickey or Mrs. Dickey?

The WITNESS. Miss.

Chairman TENNEY. And where do you reside?

The WITNESS. 1972 Canyon Drive, Los Angeles.

Chairman TENNEY. All right, Mr. Combs.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Miss Dickey, how long have you resided in Los Angeles?

[3866] A. Well, practically all my life. I was born here.

Q. And how long have you been acquainted with Mr. H. W. Rohl?

A. Since I first started to work for him in 1927.

Q. And in 1927 immediately prior to going to work for Mr. Rohl, what was your occupation?

A. Well, I was doing office work—stenography, bookkeeping—general office work.

Q. In what office?

A. Well, I had been working for J. J. McCarthy in New York, and then I had come out to California and was working for Pathe for one of the men who had been with J. J. McCarthy.

Q. Do you recall when Rohl-Connolly Company made application to the Corporation Commissioner of this state for the issuance of 40,000 shares of its capital stock?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That stock was issued to you, to T. E. Connolly and H. W. Rohl?

A. The stock was not issued to me.

Q. It was not?

A. No.

Q. Who prepared the application for the issuance of the stock, if you know?

A. Well, I believe the attorney did.

Q. Mr. Martin?

A. Yes, I believe so.

[3867] Q. The permit authorizes the issuance of 40,000 shares and the sale of those shares for \$10.00 each, to you and Mr. Connolly and Mr. Rohl but you have never owned any stock in the concern?

A. That is right, I never have.

Q. What are your general duties in connection with the Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. Well, I am secretary of the company, and my work is mostly bookkeeping—general work—just general, whatever there may be to do in taking care of the office.

Q. That is in connection with the Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have any duties in connection with Hawaiian Constructors?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Nothing at all?

A. No.

Q. Do the books of Rohl-Connolly Company reflect the interest of that company in Hawaiian Constructors?

A. They show the investment, yes.

Q. And you have kept all of those entries yourself, have you?

A. Yes.

Q. And at the time the 40,000 shares of the capital stock were issued, were 20,000 shares issued to H. W. Rohl and 20,000 shares to T. E. Connolly?

[3868] A. No. I believe only 10,000 shares were issued.

Q. 5,000 to each one?

A. 5,000 to each one.

Q. And what happened to the other 30,000 shares?

A. Well, they were not issued at that time.

Q. They were authorized but unissued stock?

A. Yes.

Q. How long have you occupied your present position as secretary of the corporation?

A. Since it was first formed in 1932.

Q. How long has Mr. Rohl been president?

A. Well, he has been president—not continually but at various times. He was president and then Mr. Connolly was president and then again I believe Mr. Rohl was president. They take turns.

Q. May I ask you this question: are there any provisions in the—are you familiar with the by-laws?

A. Well, I have read them—not recently. We have them there.

Q. They alternate the presidency between them at regular intervals?

A. No, no. I believe it is just as they are elected—as they choose to elect their president.

Q. Who are the members on the Board of Directors?

A. At the present time?

Q. Yes.

[3869] A. T. E. Connolly, H. W. Rohl and myself.

Q. And have there ever been any other directors to your knowledge?

A. Well, yes, sir, Mrs. Floy Rohl.

- Q. She has been a director?
A. Yes.
Q. When did she cease being a director?
A. Just recently.
Q. Do you have any duties to perform in connection with H. W. Rohl Company?
A. Yes, I do. I keep those books.
Q. That is owned entirely by Mr. Rohl?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. Do you keep a separate account in connection with that company?
A. A separate set of books.
Q. And how often do the Board of Directors of—how often does the Board of Directors of Rohl-Connolly meet?
A. Well, they have a yearly meeting, of course, and other meetings as the necessity arises.
Q. They are called into special meetings?
A. Special meetings are called from time to time.
Q. Now, you have custody of Mr. Rohl's Federal income tax data, do you?
A. Yes, I have copies of it.
Q. Do you keep copies of the returns?
[3870] A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you keep copies of the State income tax return?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You have those available at the office, do you?
A. Yes.
Q. That is at the office of the Rohl-Connolly Company?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you familiar in a general way with the provisions which are undertaken from time to time by Rohl-Connolly Company?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Do you know what type of work the Hawaiian Constructors engage in?
A. Well, I have no special information on that.
Q. I mean in a general way.
A. Just in a very general way.
Q. Do you know where the work is—strike that. Do you know where the work was originally performed when the Hawaiian Constructors first started to function?
A. Where the actual work was?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I do not.
Q. Do you know whether or not the Hawaiian Constructors ever did any work in the vicinity of Honolulu?
A. No, I do not know.
Q. Are you acquainted with Major Wyman or Colonel [3871] Wyman?
A. No, I am not.
Q. You have never seen him?
A. No, I don't believe I have ever seen him.
Q. Have you ever heard of him?
A. Oh, yes, I have heard of him.
Q. Do you write the letters for Mr. Rohl?
A. Yes.
Q. He dictates his correspondence?
A. Frequently, yes.
Q. Has he ever dictated to you any correspondence to Major Wyman or Colonel Wyman?
A. No, I don't believe he has.
Q. Never wrote any letters?
A. I don't believe that he has.
Q. Do you know whether or not he has received any letters that came to Rohl-Connolly Company from Colonel Wyman?
A. No, I don't think that he has ever received one.
Q. You don't think that he ever did?
A. (No answer.)
Q. Do you recall writing the checks when these boats that we have mentioned were purchased?
A. Well, I believe I did. I rather recall—of course, I know the checks were written.

Q. Do you keep cancelled checks?

[3872] A. Well, for a certain period, yes.

Q. How long?

A. Well, about five years.

Q. You keep the checks for about five years?

A. Yes.

Q. You make regular ledger entries when the checks are drawn?

A. Yes.

Q. And you keep those permanently, do you not?

A. Keep them permanently, yes.

Q. Now, just what would the ledger entries and accounts reveal so far as to whom the checks were payable and by whom they were signed and so forth?

A. Well, I sign them. I think I sign all of the checks.

Q. Do you have power of attorney from Mr. Rohl?

A. No, I have power to sign the checks, but not the power to sign his name otherwise.

Q. Do you sign all the checks for him through the H. W. Rohl Company and Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. So the books of those concerns would reflect, would they not, to whom the checks were payable and for what purpose?

A. Yes, they would—that is right.

Q. And those books are available at the office of the [3873] company, are they?

A. Yes, they are.

Q. You were employed by Mr. Rohl when the Pandora was burned?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Do you recall to whom the insurance was paid?

A. Well, I do not know.

Q. That was a long time ago.

A. Well, the insurance papers quite often are made out incorrectly, or sometimes one way and sometimes another. I don't recall the Pandora. I can't remember how that was.

Q. Are you empowered to sign checks for Floy Rohl?

A. No, only for the H. W. Rohl Company account.

Q. And that, of course, is H. W. Rohl, an individual, doing business under the firm name and style of "H. W. Rohl Company", isn't that right?

A. That's right.

Q. Do you know whether or not there is a certificate of doing business under a fictitious name on file for that concern?

A. Yes.

Q. In Los Angeles County?

A. Yes; I am pretty sure there is.

Q. In any other counties?

A. Well, that I cannot be certain of. I don't know. I have forgotten.

[3874] Chairman TENNEY. How do you spell your name?

The WITNESS. I-r-m-a.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Miss Dickey, did Mr. Rohl pay an income tax to the State of California in 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. He did?

A. Yes, I am sure he must have.

Q. Do you prepare those returns?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Who does?

A. James W. Bontems. He is our auditor.

Q. Is he auditor for all of the books for all of these corporations?

A. Rohl-Connolly Company and R. W. Rohl Company.

Q. There are no other concerns in which Mr. Connolly or Mr. Rohl are interested, are there, besides those two?

A. There is a joint venture in which the corporation is interested.

Q. You are speaking of the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes; and there is another one, the Caddoa Constructors.

Q. What is the name?

A. Caddoa.

Q. Who are the other component members of that joint venture, if you know?

A. Yes; W. El. Callahan Construction Company and [3875] Gunther & Shirley.

Q. Callahan & Company is a Los Angeles concern, is it not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is Gunther & Shirley also a Los Angeles concern?

A. Yes.

Q. Both of them in the construction business?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what enterprise, if any, are they currently engaged—I mean as a joint venture?

A. Aside from the one in which we are interested I really would not know.

Q. I mean the ones in which you are interested.

A. Well, just Hawaiian Constructors and Caddoa Constructors.

Q. What enterprise, if any, is the Caddoa Constructors presently engaged in?

A. What type of work are they doing?

Q. Yes.

A. They are building the Caddoa Dam, at Caddoa, Colorado.

Q. The work that the Hawaiian Constructors is engaged in, is that all work for the Government?

A. So far as I know—I don't know.

Q. So far as you know it is?

A. We don't have very much of that. It is an entirely [3876] confidential document and I have no information on that.

Q. You don't have access to the basic contract?

A. No.

Q. You have never seen it?

A. I have never seen it.

Q. Do you have any correspondence as secretary for Rohl-Connolly Company with Hawaiian Constructors in San Francisco?

A. I have had occasion to write, very little, however.

Q. How much of an interest has Rohl-Connolly Company now in Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Let me see, I believe it is 24 per cent.

Q. How long have they had that interest?

A. I think it has been that since January 1, 1942.

Q. And prior to January 1, 1942, Rohl-Connolly Company had a 40 per cent interest, did they not?

A. 32 per cent I believe it was.

Q. Did they ever own 40 per cent?

A. Now, perhaps—wait until I think. It has been changed—one-fourth of that—they took in another member and I was thinking it was 32 per cent less a fourth. Perhaps they had—I don't think they had—they may have had 40 per cent at first and then 32 per cent. Now it is 24.

Q. Now, the reductions in the percentage that Rohl-Connolly Company owns in Hawaiian Constructors is attributable to the taking of new members into the joint venture from [3877] time to time?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. What is the name of the latest acquisition to the joint venture?

A. It is called, I believe, the "Hawaiian Contracting Company."

Q. An Hawaiian firm?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Rohl-Connolly Company receive anything for the sale of a portion of its interest to the new members of the joint venture?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. Do you recall what the consideration was?

A. Well, it was based on the figures according to the audit at the end of December, 1941. I have forgotten what the exact figures were.

Q. Can you approximate it?

A. I don't like to do that. I don't know. I am not sure enough to guess at it. I am sorry.

Q. It shows on the books of the Rohl-Connolly Company, of course?

A. Yes, it does. The whole record is there.

Q. Now, they did receive adequate compensation?

A. Well, I would not know about that. It was just based on the audit and is subject, probably, to checking again.

[3878] Q. How often do you post your books of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

A. Well, what do you mean?

Q. What I mean by that is, do you keep them posted currently?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Daily?

A. Yes.

Mr. COMBS. I think that is all, Miss Dickey.

Chairman TENNEY. That is all, Miss Dickey, thank you. Miss Dickey and Mrs. Rohl may be excused at this time and we thank you very much.

Mr. COMBS. Mr. Pine.

W. BRUCE PINE, called as a witness on behalf of the Committee, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Chairman TENNEY. Mr. Pine, will you please stand and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to give before this Committee, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The WITNESS. I do.

Chairman TENNEY. Will you state your full name?

The WITNESS. Willard Bruce Pine.

Chairman TENNEY. And your residence.

The WITNESS. 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles.

[3879] Chairman TENNEY. Members of the press, we prefer that Mr. Pine's name not be used for publicity because he is currently investigator for the Committee and if you would treat it simply as "an investigator for the Committee" we would appreciate it. We have some rather important reasons for that.

Mr. AUSTIN. Do you mean we are not to mention his testimony?

Chairman TENNEY. You can use his testimony but we don't want you to use Mr. Pine's name.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Mr. Pine, you are now and have been for some time last past a duly accredited and authorized investigator for the Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities, have you not?

A. That is correct.

Q. And did you do some investigating work on the case of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. And when did you commence your investigations?

A. Well, in the early part of last spring—that is, the spring of 1942.

Q. So that your investigations in the case have covered a period of a little short of a year?

A. Yes, almost a year.

Q. Almost a year?

A. Yes.

[3880] Q. In connection with your investigations did you have occasion to examine the files and records in the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Commissioner in the Federal Building in Los Angeles?

A. I did.

Q. As a matter of fact on one occasion you and I went there together, did we not?

A. That is right.

Q. And examined the file for several hours?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Did you read the application signed by the applicant for admission to citizenship?

A. I did.

Q. Did you read the correspondence in the files?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you read the reports from the investigative agents in the file?

A. Yes; I read them all.

Q. Did you read the interrogations of the applicants by an Immigration Inspector?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. A document comprising questions and answers of 20 pages or more?

A. Yes, sir, I read it in its entirety.

Q. As a result of reading the file are you able to testify from your own independent knowledge, gained from [3881] reading the report and recommendations of the investigators for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as to whether they did or did not recommend that citizenship be granted to the applicant?

A. The investigator's recommendation as shown in that file, is that the applicant not only be denied citizenship but be prosecuted and deported for having entered this country without any re-entry visa on his passport.

Q. Do you recall a letter from F. H. Crocket, of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for Laredo, Texas, dated March 7, 1941, to the effect they had no record whatsoever of Mr. Rohl having been in or out of the United States at that point?

A. Yes, I remember that letter.

Q. Do you recall a statement by Mr. Wilcox Cole or any other official of the Naturalization and Immigration Service, to the effect that in 1932 it was absolutely impossible for an alien to go in and over the border of the United States into Mexico at that point without being questioned as to his citizenship status?

A. Yes, sir, that is exactly as I remember it.

Q. Do you recall a statement in the record to the effect that when the Ramona stopped at Acapulco, Mexico, where it took on gasoline and supplies, there was no record of Rohl being present on the boat either as a passenger or a member of the crew?

[3882] A. That is correct. That is exactly, from my memory, the essence of that particular paper in that file.

Q. Do you recall the letter from Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., urging that Rohl be made a citizen and that the case be expedited because he was interested at that time in secret and highly confidential contracts in the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Yes, I read that particular letter several times.

Q. And do you recollect a letter from T. B. Shumaker of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated February 4, 1941, asking that the case be made a special case and expediting the case?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Pine, when you examined the file you took notes, did you not?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Do you recall a letter written on the 13th day of March, 1941, by an official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, stating, in effect, that when the Vega sailed from the west coast to Honolulu, that Rohl was not revealed on the passenger manifest as being a member of the crew or a passenger?

A. In substance that is exactly as I remember it.

Q. And do you recall that the manifest was reported—that is the manifest that was taken at the time the boat anchored off Honolulu, that Mr. Rohl gave his birthplace as [3883] Iola, Kansas?

A. Yes, because I remarked at the time, from previous knowledge, that that was his wife's birthplace, which she had used, and it was a lack of imagination that arose in my mind at the time.

Q. In giving his wife's birthplace in place of his own?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall the statement in the Naturalization and Immigration file to the effect that the Federal income tax return had been made by him under oath as a citizen of the United States?

A. I do.

Q. Do you recall that at least on one of those returns the statement appeared that he had been naturalized in 1921?

A. Yes, I recall that date, 1921, very clearly.

Q. Do you recall a statement in the file made by the applicant, Mr. Rohl, to the effect that the returns were not prepared by him but by someone for him and that he merely signed them?

A. Yes.

Q. And that you then remarked how it was that the person who prepared the returns knew that the applicant had been naturalized in 1921 unless somebody told him?

A. Yes; I remember that conversation very clearly.

Q. Do you recall an inconsistency in the file—one [3884] statement being to the effect—and I am reading from my notes a letter from William A. Carmichael, District Director of Los Angeles, to T. B. Schofield, dated March 4, 1941, regarding the Federal Communications form 501 for radio telephone on the Vega, the letter stating and quoting:

"During the course of investigation it has been learned that the subject executed a sworn affidavit in connection with this Form 501, that he was a citizen of the United States in order to secure the radio-telegraph license for the ship radio

installed on his yacht Vega, the false statement made therein being contrary to the Federal Communication Act of 1934, Section 310, Paragraph 1, wherein it specifically provides in part that 'No radio station license shall be issued to any alien or any corporation or company; any officer of which is an alien or in which more than one-fourth of the stock is owned by an alien.'"

Q. Do you recall that, in substance?

A. Yes, I recall that letter.

Q. Then, do you recall also that after a form of application blank was filled, and I have a note on it stating that the yacht Vega was licensed April 1, 1939, as KLVC under the name of the owner as H. W. Rohl.

A. Yes, I recall that.

Q. Then, do you recall the inconsistent portion where [3885] a later entry in the file stated that a mistake had been made and that the applicant for the radio-telephone had actually been signed by Floy Rohl?

A. Yes, I recall that very well.

Mr. COMBS. I think that is all, Mr. Pine.

Chairman TENNEY. Thank you, Mr. Pine. I think that is all for today.

Mr. COMBS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TENNEY. Very well. The hearing will recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning in this same room. It will be an open hearing.

(Whereupon, at 8:30 o'clock p. m., the Committee adjourned to 10:00 o'clock a. m., Monday, March 1, 1943.)

[3886] BEFORE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE'S JOINT FACT FINDING COMMITTEE
ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES

In the Matter of: HANS WILHELM ROHL, ROHL-CONNOLLY COMPANY,
HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS and R. W. ROHL COMPANY. Open Session

Met pursuant to the call of the Chairman at 10:00 a. m., Monday, March 1, 1943.

Present: Senator Jack D. Tenney, Chairman, 3207 West 77th Street, Inglewood, California.

Others present: R. E. Combs, Chief Counsel and Investigator.

Reported by: J. D. Ambrose, 322 Wilcox Bldg., Los Angeles, Calif.

[3887]

PROCEEDINGS

Chairman TENNEY. We do not want to divulge the name of our first witness, so I will give you his name at this time so that it will not be necessary to have him announce it at the time he is sworn. Our first witness will be Max Shapiro. Mr. Shapiro resides at 137 South Peck, Beverly Hills, California. The second witness will be Mr. Harry Flannery.

The committee will come to order. The chairman is sitting as a sub-committee pursuant to a resolution passed by the committee at its hearing Saturday.

Will the witness come forward and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

The WITNESS. I do.

Chairman TENNEY. You have already been identified for the record.

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Chairman TENNEY. All right, you may proceed, Mr. Combs.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Are you acquainted with an individual by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

A. I know him by the name of Bill Rohl, but that is the same person.

Q. The same person?

A. Yes.

Q. How long have you been acquainted with him?

[3888] A. Since 1936.

Q. Have you been on board his boat the Vega?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time you went aboard the vessel where was it?

A. It was anchored off of Catalina.

Q. Are you acquainted with the group of people—several persons who commonly went aboard the boat on different occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you acquainted with Major Wyman of the United States Army Engineers, who used to visit aboard the boat?

A. I met him, yes.

Q. About how long ago was it that you met him?

A. It was either in 1936 or 1937—the summer or fall of that period.

Q. Were the people with whom you were at that time acquainted, and who used to visit aboard the boat from time to time, also acquainted with Major Wyman?

A. Yes.

Q. How frequently, according to your best recollection, did Major Wyman visit aboard the Vega at that period?

A. Very frequently.

Q. Did you ever see him intoxicated?

A. Yes.

Q. Once or more than once?

[3889] A. Twice.

Q. Do you know what his general reputation for sobriety was among the people who used to visit aboard the boat frequently, and with whom you are acquainted?

A. Yes.

Q. What was it?

A. Not very good.

Q. Would you elaborate on that, please?

A. Well, I would say that he was considered by that group to be a heavy drinker.

Q. Have you, yourself, discussed his drinking habits with those people?

A. Yes.

Q. During how long a period of time, according to your best recollection, did the Major visit aboard the boat?

A. It was during the period of that particular summer and early fall of either 1936 or '37. I had no particular reason to make any record of it.

Q. Yes.

A. So it was either '36 or '37 during the summer and fall—it was during the summer and fall of either one of those two seasons.

Q. Were you ever acquainted with an individual by the name of Werner Plack?

A. Yes.

[3890] Q. When did you first meet him?

A. '35 or '36.

Q. And how long did your acquaintanceship with him continue?

A. During that year—the first year I met him.

Q. What was his nationality, if you know?

A. He claimed to be a Holland Dutchman, but, of course, we found out later that that was not true.

Q. And what was his nationality?

A. It was German.

Mr. COMBS. That is all.

Chairman TENNEY. You are excused. Thank you very much. We will take a few minutes recess.

(Short recess.)

Chairman TENNEY. The committee will come to order. Mr. Anderson, will you be sworn? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give, will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. ANDERSON. I do.

[3891] RAY ANDERSON, called as a witness by the Committee, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Chairman TENNEY. Will you stake your full name, please?

The WITNESS. Ray Anderson.

Chairman TENNEY. Where do you reside?

The WITNESS. 2249 20th Street, Santa Monica.

Chairman TENNEY. And what is your occupation?

The WITNESS. Electrician.

Chairman TENNEY. Are you presently employed?

The WITNESS. By the Douglas Company.

Chairman TENNEY. All right, Mr. Combs.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Mr. Anderson, how long have you resided in Southern California?

A. 12 years.

Q. Prior to that time where was your residence?

A. I lived in New York City for 15 years.

Q. How long have you been engaged in the electrical business?

A. All my life.

Q. Were you ever acquainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you first make his acquaintance?

A. I think about the end of February, 1942.

Q. Are you acquainted with an organization known as the Hawaiian Constructors?

[3892] A. Yes; I worked for them eight months.

Q. When were you first employed by that concern?

A. January 14, last year.

Q. And where were you employed?

A. In San Francisco.

Q. Did you leave San Francisco and go to the Hawaiian Islands to enter into your duties for that company?

A. I did.

Q. Who employed you?

A. A man by the name of Fitzgerald, I think it was.

Q. In San Francisco?

A. Yes, in San Francisco.

Q. And when did you leave for the Hawaiian Islands?

A. Somewhere about the 6th of February.

Q. Did you go by airplane or by boat?

A. We went by boat, the Lurline.

Q. Were any other employees of the Hawaiian Constructors aboard the vessel when you were?

A. There were 1171 of us.

Q. 1171 of you?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you go from San Francisco to the Island of Oahu?

A. I did.

Q. And you were there employed, were you, as an electrician for the Hawaiian Constructors?

[3893] A. Yes.

Q. Were your pay checks drawn on the Hawaiian Constructors or on the War Department?

A. United States Treasury checks, all of them, except one. We were paid \$1.25 per day on the boat going over there and that check was a Hawaiian Constructors check, signed by Mr. Woolley,—Ralph Woolley.

Q. Will you spell that?

A. W-o-o-l-l-e-y.

Q. What was his position with the Hawaiian Constructors, if you know?

A. He was chairman of the executive board which was composed of Mr. Rohl and Mr. Benson—three of them.

Q. What were Mr. Benson's initials, do you know?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you remember his first name?

A. No, I don't.

Q. And other than the one check drawn on the Hawaiian Constructors all of the other checks were drawn on the United States Treasury Department?

A. All on the Treasury, that is right.

Q. Now, when you first arrived at the Island of Oahu in pursuance to your new employment, where did you go?

A. Ponahou School.

Q. Where was that located?

A. That was located in Honolulu. I think it would be [3894] called the southeast part of Honolulu.

Q. Just what did your duties comprise as an electrician for the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Three days after I was there—after I arrived there, I was taken to General Emmon's headquarters in the mountains, about three or four miles from Fort Shafter, with a construction gang.

Q. Go ahead, Mr. Anderson.

A. And we worked there until the beginning of April, constructing electrical equipment, when they moved in there on December 7. They had thrown wire all

over the place and they brought in a couple of Diesel engines and a transformer bank and just the soldiers had hooked it up on nails and wire any way they could get it, and we went in there to clean that mess up and put it in proper order. And when we finished, I was asked by Major Henderson to remain there as maintenance electrician.

Q. Now, had the Hawaiian Constructors done any work on the Island of Oahu, to your knowledge, before you arrived there?

A. There were some men out at one or two of the fields there. Now, exactly how much they had done I don't know. They were a group that went there in October or November ahead of us.

Chairman TENNEY. That would be 1941?

The WITNESS. 1941.

[3895] By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Did your activities in pursuance of your duties take you generally around the Island of Oahu?

A. On our off days we went all over the place. We had friends at different places and they had camps scattered all over the Island.

Q. The Hawaiian Constructors?

A. They were doing all of the civilian work for the Army on the Island of Oahu.

Q. Who was in charge of those installations and the construction activities for the Army?

A. They had split it up into areas. There were 14 areas and there was a superintendent of each area.

Q. A civilian superintendent?

A. Yes, civilian superintendent, who belonged to the Hawaiian Constructors, and with him there were always officers or an engineer from the U. S. E. D.

Q. Who was that?

A. Colonel Wyman.

Q. Colonel Wyman was in charge?

A. Yes.

Q. That was Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

A. Yes.

Q. You have seen him, have you not?

A. Oh, I have talked to him.

Q. Now, I show you a sketch which is marked Committee Exhibit No. 1, and which purports to be a sketch of the Island [3896] of Oahu, and ask you whether or not that is a fairly representative map of the general configuration of Oahu.

(Handing exhibit to the witness.)

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you familiar with Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

Q. Which I have indicated here?

A. Yes. I was located right in front of this hill here (indicating).

Q. In front of Red Hill?

A. Yes.

Q. You know where Pearl City is?

A. Yes; I have been out there too.

Q. And you see where Hickam Field is delineated on the map?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the City of Honolulu?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And going around the Point up to the southeast coast you see Bellows Field?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the Naval Hospital?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And Kahuko?

A. They had that—

Q. The base yard was there (indicating)?

[3897] A. That is right.

Q. Now, going down from the northerly tip of the Island in a general south-westerly direction, there is Klena Point and Schofield Barracks?

A. And I had worked there.

Q. And Wheeler Field?

A. Yes.

Q. And Kapoku Gulch, Ewa and Barbers Point?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You are familiar with those places, are you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you personally visit all of those points?

A. Yes, sir; we went all over the place but not in the capacity of working, because I didn't work any place except in the headquarters. You see, as far as my actual work was concerned, I did not go to those other places, but I had friends in several of the camps that we used to visit, one and another and get around that way. Of course, it isn't much of a drive around the Island.

Q. Did you do any work at Red Hill?

A. No; the Navy had the Red Hill job but the Constructors sent men up there.

Q. The Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes, sir; I never did quite understand what the setup was at Red Hill. There was several men sent there. Whether they were transferred to the Naval contractors or [3898] whoever had that job I don't know.

Q. You are positive, are you not, that Hawaiian Constructors did send some of their employees to work at Red Hill?

A. They sent men in there because people out of Ponahou School went into that camp.

Q. And the school was where the Hawaiian Constructors maintained their headquarters?

A. Yes, sir, Alexander Hall was their headquarters.

Q. Do you know whether or not most of the installations at Red Hill were underground?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They were, were they not?

A. Yes, sir; they all were underground—underground tanks and tunnels from there to Pearl Harbor.

Q. Now, did the Hawaiian Constructors put in any gun emplacements in the Island of Oahu?

A. They did work at Fort Camp and their electricians hooked up the guns there.

Q. Did they put in any ammunition dumps?

A. They handled oil dumps—all kinds of things of that kind—eight-inch guns, twelve-inch guns, which they did all of the concrete work on.

Q. Do you know whether or not they installed any underground facilities for the storage of ammunition?

A. They had some tunnels at Bellows Field and also near [3899] Wheeler Field. Now, whether they were going to be ammunition dumps I could not say.

Q. The Hawaiian Constructors did work at Hickam Field, did they not?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they do any work in Ewa?

A. That I can't say. There was a Marine Base at Ewa. There was a Marine runway and airfield near Ewa, but I never knew they did do any work on that field.

Q. Now, Mr. Anderson, did the Hawaiian Constructors do any work on the east coast of the Island of Oahu near Skailua Bay in the construction of Naval works?

A. Kahuku Point.

Q. Now, is that on the northeast coast of the Island?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the general nature of the work done there?

A. They had a small field there.

Q. What kind of field?

A. Small airfield.

Q. I see.

A. And I think fortifications up in the hills. I didn't go up into there.

Q. Was any work done on the east coast for a Naval hospital by the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. I don't know that they did the Naval Hospital.

Q. When did you first make the acquaintance of Major [3900] Wyman or Colonel Wyman? Was he a colonel when you knew him?

A. Colonel? When we went there he was a colonel.

Q. Did you have frequent contact with him?

A. I met him three times, and it was always a battle over our food and our bedding.

Q. How were your general living conditions there?

A. Rotten.

Q. Will you elaborate on that, please?

A. Well, I will tell you. They issued us Army rations. They used Rice Hall and another hall down in the school as mess rooms. One hall had been fixed up for the men and the other evidently for the staff, but the men kept going backward and forward from one to the other, the whole gang. They would eat wherever they wanted to—in either hall. But they had eggs and meat and stuff like that that we could not eat. We would get up in the morning for breakfast and the stuff would be so cold that you could stretch the eggs like rubber and you couldn't get a second helping of food without paying 35 cents for it, so I got to Colonel Wyman on that question, and finally he turned me over to Woolley and Middleton, and Woolley and I went to it about the beds.

Now, in the meantime they had three truckloads of beds dumped into the basement of Castle Hall. I had seen the trucks going in there and empty beds and mattresses and we were sleeping on veneer boards.

Q. How many of you were quartered in that particular [3901] locality?

A. In that particular building I think there were 288—something like that—between 275 and 300.

Woolley finally—I was sent in to see Woolley, and I went in to see him and I went in and talked to him about the beds and he told me he would meet me in Castle Hall, and he came over there and Middleton came with him.

Q. That is C. C. Middleton?

A. Yes, C. C. Middleton, who was administrator for the Hawaiian Constructors in the Hawaiian Islands—he was in the headquarters.

Q. Headquarters where?

A. Alexander Hall.

Q. Yes.

A. And Middleton told me that—I was kicking about the eggs, and Mr. Woolley told me that they couldn't buy them. I told him it was not a question of buying eggs, that we had the eggs but they were being ruined the way they were cooked.

We were allowed \$75 a month for food and the civilians that did not belong to us could come in and eat in those halls for 35 cents a meal or \$1.05 a day and we were paying, roughly, \$2.50.

Colonel Wyman informed me that as far as the beds were concerned, the General had issued an order that a man could sleep on the ground like a soldier. I told him that that was O. K. with me provided we have to, but not when beds are idle [3902] in the basement. He finally told George Campbell he could do anything for us in an administrative way he liked, but not one nickel was to be spent on us.

Q. How long did that condition continue?

A. I think we got the beds about a week—I think it was Thursday I saw Wyman the last time and on the following Tuesday night the man in charge of the hall informed me that we would start changing beds the next morning. In the meantime Ralph Woolley told me to get inside somewhere, due to my cold—that it might lead to pneumonia in the Islands.

Q. Do you have a claim against the Hawaiian Constructors for Compensation?

A. Yes, \$682. They have \$125 cash of my money.

Q. In addition to the \$600?

A. They took that from my pay.

Q. What was the reason for that?

A. That was for fare home, or fare over there—expenses somewhere or other.

Q. What effort, if any, have you made to collect that sum?

A. I tried through the Attorney General, I tried through the State Compensation in this building, and they informed me here that we were out of the State, and I made a claim that the contract was drawn within this State and that whatever took place outside of the State the responsibility lay here, and then I tried to find out whether the Constructors [3903] were registered in this State. If not, it was a criminal offense to start out with, and I don't know to this day whether the Constructors ever registered in the State of California.

Q. They did not register with the Franchise Tax Commission I can tell you that.

A. I would like to mention something else. There is a contract drawn between Hawaiian Constructors and I think 449 engineers—602 or 662.

Q. 414, isn't it?

A. It might be 414. It is 400 and something. I wanted to get a hold of that contract because all of us over there thought that part of the contract had us

tied down and we thought that we had been taken there under subversive setup. Now, our contract price was \$225 a month for 44 hours, which I claim was illegal on the 40-hour basis in this State and the United States.

And further, they didn't want to pay us overtime. They tried to make us work 48 hours.

Now, Wyman was behind all of that with Rohl and Woolley and Benson backing him up.

Q. Did you see Rohl and Wyman together in the Islands?

A. No, I didn't. I will tell you—up to the time Wyman left there his office was on the sixth floor of the Young Building at the corner of King and Bishop Streets in Honolulu.

[3904] Woolley and Rohl and Benson were installed in the Alexandria Hall when I arrived in Honolulu and they were there all the time and were there when I left.

Q. When did you leave Honolulu to return to the United States?

A. Somewhere around the 9th of August.

Q. Were you discharged, or did you resign?

A. No. On the 10th of July they came out with an increase in our pay to \$1.45 an hour. You see, on the overtime we were getting \$9.00 a day and then they came out with that. They would give us the rate but would reduce our subsistence allowance to \$45.00 a month and pay us \$1.45. As we were living on soldier rations we didn't see we were losing by it, so we took that.

On the 30th of June the doctor discharged me for varicose veins and my pay stopped that day and I never had another dime out of the Constructors.

Q. Now, while you were over there, Mr. Anderson, did you ever have any occasion to see Major Wyman in an intoxicated condition?

A. Yes.

Q. When was that?

A. During February and March and five days before Colonel Wyman left his job he lay in the hotel drunk all the time.

Q. For how long a time.

[3905] A. Five days.

Q. Do you know that of your own personal knowledge?

A. Yes, I can prove it.

Q. While you were working over there, Mr. Anderson, were there any Japanese employed by the Hawaiian Constructors in executive capacities?

A. There were Japanese in the office, Japanese superintendents—that is, superintendents over—not of an area but superintendents over different constructors, such as carpenters and electricians, and gangs like that; the Merchant Electrical Contractors and Supply Company which Vera—

Q. Who is the head of that?

A. Vera. They employed 36 electricians. They came into our gang. When I left Honolulu, two days before I sailed I was at their stockroom and five of our men were in this Japanese gang. They worked out of area 10.

Q. Was a portion of the work actually supervised by Japanese?

A. Yes. The Japanese were permitted to go into every part of the Island except Pearl Harbor and Diamond Head tunnels and General Emmons tunnels, where the headquarters were.

Now, I went on to Hickam Field after I was there, I think, two weeks, with a Hawaiian Constructors' badge on me. I spent three hours in there. I went all over the hangars and everywhere and I came back up to G2 and talked to the captain there about it, asking why in the world that they permitted people [3906] with those badges to walk into a place like Hickam Field with the setup they had there, and he said he didn't know.

Q. When was that?

A. That was in the early part of March of last year.

Chairman TENNEY. 1942?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Chairman TENNEY. Let me ask a question, Mr. Combs.

Is it your statement, Mr. Anderson, that these Japanese had considerable to do with the supervision of the work on the island?

The WITNESS. They were working in the office and in places where they have the plans of the United States Engineers. They had them in the offices with them. They were in every position there except certain places. They could not go into Diamond Head Tunnel or General Emmons Tunnel or into Pearl Harbor. You had to have special passes that were good only for that particular setup in those places. They could not go there but everywhere else that I know

of on the island, including Hickam Field they could go. Last August the Japanese were working in there.

Chairman TENNEY. Were those in the category of secret installations?

The WITNESS. Well, I should say that they would be because they had the Aircobras and the Boeings and all the big airplanes scattered throughout those fields.

The men had a row at Bellows Field and refused to work [3907] for one day, or a part of a day, until certain Japanese were removed from there. That was some time last April.

Chairman TENNEY. 1942?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Chairman TENNEY. It is your testimony that the Japanese had considerable to do with the supervision of the work?

The WITNESS. They tell you there that the Japanese are 90 per cent more loyal than we are ourselves.

Chairman TENNEY. That is what they tell you in Hawaii?

The WITNESS. They tell you that in Hawaii. They tell you that they don't like us there. There is no fooling about that.

Chairman TENNEY. The Japanese you mean?

The WITNESS. No, the white people that live with the Japanese. There is a peculiar financial setup in the Hawaiian Islands in which the sugar interests dictate the financial setup there. The poor man was never able to get any money there. The only place he can get money or credit is from the Japanese banks and stores and consequently he is friendly to the Japanese.

It was my firm opinion from the time I got there that they didn't particularly care whether we had the Islands or whether the Japanese had them.

Chairman TENNEY. It was immaterial?

The WITNESS. Yes.

Chairman TENNEY. Were these Japanese that you have referred [3908] to employees of the Hawaiian Constructors?

The WITNESS. Yes. You see, a civilian there, except a few engineers when we went there belonged to the Constructors—they were working under the U. S. E. D. I will tell you it is a super W. P. A. set-up.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. You mean the United States Engineer Corps?

A. U. S. E. D. Just like you had with the W. P. A. in the States. That is what they called it.

Q. What did that stand for?

A. I never did know—U. S. Engineer Department, I guess.

Q. Mr. Rohl testified, Mr. Anderson, that he was personally directing the work on the Island of Oahu and under him worked these individuals whom you have mentioned as superintendents, on the various projects. Was that the fact when you were there?

A. Mr. Woolley was considered the head.

Q. Yes.

A. He was the chairman of the executive committee which consisted of Mr. Woolley, Rohl and Benson. Now, whether Rohl—I have always believed that Ralph Woolley was the front man.

Q. A front man?

A. Yes. Ralph Woolley was the man who would do the right thing if he could. He talked very little. You could [3909] get very little out of Ralph Woolley.

Q. Who did you believe he was fronting for?

A. For the outfit that came from here. There is some connection between this gang in the States and that outfit and they wanted men from there so if there is any question raised there is a possibility that we would get out of it.

Q. In what business was Mr. Dillingham engaged?

A. They were part of the Constructors and pulled out I think in May or June.

Q. Of 1942?

A. 1942, yes. For some reason Dillingham came out and the assistant superintendent in area 10. I don't remember his name at the present time. He was taken from there and sent to Johnson Island with certain men that he took with him.

Q. Did the Hawaiian Constructors also do work on Johnson Island?

A. I don't know whether they did or not. They did work at Christmas and Canton. General Tinker ran them out of Christmas Island.

Q. For what reason?

A. Weren't getting any work done.

Q. After the battle of Midway did the Hawaiian Constructors do any work on Midway?

A. There were some men went over there. There was a fellow by the name of Miller here in Glendale who went there on the air conditioning. He was a Hawaiian Constructors man. [3910] He was over there 10 days. He came back in the same convoy. I don't know anything about him personally, but they had five or six men out there—shipped them somewhere where we didn't even know. Miller told me then that he had to go to Midway and what had taken place in Midway.

Now, there is another feature behind this whole thing of which I can only give you indirect evidence. If I can find the man today I will get him.

Last year, in March or April there were 180 men shipped to New Caledonia by the Hawaiian Constructors. They didn't even know where they were going. When they arrived there in New Caledonia they found out it was a French Possession and refused to land. They said, "Anywhere in American territory but not in foreign territory," so they came back. They brought them back to camp. They were shipped to sea in an open barge with an ocean-going tug pulling them for five and a half days to Suva. I saw the letter signed by the Governor of Suva to the effect that if those men crossed certain lines they were to be shot down. That was Governor Wild.

Q. When was that trip to Suva made?

A. Some time, I think, in March. I met the man in April.

Q. March, 1942?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was the nature of the work that that party was to do?

[3911] A. They went out there—they were building an airfield and submarine base.

Q. Building an airfield and submarine base?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes.

Q. On the Island of Suva?

A. No, on the Island of Canton.

Q. Canton Island?

A. Yes. They pulled them out from there to Suva.

Q. Are you acquainted with Paul Grafe?

A. Is this the gentleman here?

Q. No, No, I am just asking you.

A. No, I don't remember, but this gentleman's face is familiar to me.

Q. Did Mr. Rohl make frequent trips away from the Island of Oahu while you were there?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you explain what you observed to that regard?

A. Well, I will tell you. When Rohl left his car—he always parked his car on the lot—Rohl parked right behind Alexandria Hall when he used to go there to eat and, of course, we could always tell when he wasn't in Honolulu.

Q. You could tell what?

A. That he was gone.

Q. Rohl was gone?

[3912] A. Yes, because it was impossible to follow him. There was a rumpus raised in San Francisco when some of the men came back in regard to their pay and the claim was filed with the Compensation Commissioner here for \$8,000 and Rohl was—he flew back here. We never saw Rohl that time for three or four weeks. He disappeared completely and finally he showed up again.

Q. Now, you are speaking about the parking space which was allocated to Mr. Rohl. Where was that parking space?

A. Exactly behind the back door of Alexandria Hall, the headquarters.

Q. Was there any marking or designation on it?

A. Yes.

Q. To show to whom each individual space was allocated to?

A. Rohl, Middleton, Woolley and Benson each had a spot there.

Q. Were their names painted on the asphalt?

A. No; there was a fence rail—a one by three plank painted white there with their names on each one of them.

Q. In black paint?

A. Black paint.

Q. Were you familiar with the automobile commonly used by Mr. Rohl when he was on the Island?

A. Yes, he used a black car then.

Q. Of course you were able to observe at times, the car [3913] was occupying the space which was allocated to him?

A. Yes.

CHAIRMAN. TENNEY. Mr. Anderson, have you any further light you can throw on this matter that you think might be of interest?

The WITNESS. I would like to go into something about the plans. We never did, and to my knowledge to the day I left there, we never had a plan for the headquarters job that we did.

They left a hole in the tunnel six by seven foot that never was closed up.

Mr. COMBS. What tunnel?

The WITNESS. Headquarters of the United States Army, Hawaiian Department, and things of that kind. We couldn't get material, we couldn't get anything. You couldn't get anybody to do anything.

We believed that sabotage, in the sense that they were holding up the work and blaming the men, was going on.

Q. By Mr. COMBS. Who was holding up the work?

A. Whoever had charge of it.

Q. Of the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Evidently, because they were our bosses.

Q. You say this tunnel was located—the United States Army headquarters tunnel was located where?

A. In that tunnel.

Q. Where was the tunnel on the Island?

[3914] A. Right in front of Red Hill.

Q. That is what I want.

A. There is a big magazine there.

Q. And Red Hill overlooks Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, and there is a hill in front of Red Hill towards Hickam Field. This hill lays between Hickam Field and Red Hill. There were eight tunnels there and they had lateral tunnels and they had been preparing that for a year. The soldiers had driven a vehicular tunnel through the west end of it, from one end to the other of it.

We went in there and we fixed it up so it was gas-proof and installed all kinds of equipment, including air-conditioning and stuff like that. We did it without plans and without any help from anyone whatever.

Q. Who was in charge—who, individually, was in charge of that installation?

A. The superintendent was Charles Winstead.

Q. Did he work under the immediate direction of Mr. Rohl?

A. He was working under him—he was working under—I will think of his name in a minute—Frank Olmstead, or something like that. He was the Army superintendent.

Q. Under whom did Mr. Olmstead work?

A. Under headquarters at Alexandria Hall.

Q. And Alexandria Hall was where Mr. Rohl's car was parked?

[3915] A. Yes, that is where the Hawaiian Constructors headquarters were. They had all their equipment there except the personnel department, which was in a school—a grammar school.

Q. Mr. Anderson, how do you know Colonel Wyman was intoxicated for five days?

A. Well, I saw him up there three or four times and everyone that is in there—the place was run for that purpose, practically. Japanese girls hanging out there every night for that crowd and the ones that stay in the main part of the hotel—you see the hotel is split up into several large bungalows or dormitories outside, and then the hotel proper was occupied by some Army officers and Colonel Wyman.

Q. Including Colonel Wyman?

A. Yes.

Q. What was Colonel Wyman's general reputation among the employees of the Hawaiian Constructors for sobriety?

A. Colonel Wyman was a man who liked liquor exceptionally well. He may never get drunk, but he likes it.

Q. What do you mean, "he may never get drunk"?

A. A lot of them can carry a lot of liquor and you don't think they are drunk.

Q. But you testified that he was drunk for five days.

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Have you seen people in an intoxicated condition before?

[3916] A. Oh, yes.

Q. And that would be your opinion of his condition during those five days?

A. Absolutely.

Mr. COMBS. I think that is all unless you have something else to add that you think might be helpful to the committee.

The WITNESS. Well, some of the stuff wouldn't have anything on this matter, but I wish this thing could be brought to the attention of Washington.

Q. We wish so too.

A. Things are rotten out there. There is no kidding about it. I am an American 61 years old, and I went to Honolulu with the idea of helping out and I tell you honestly once I finished that job there it done no good. I tore stuff apart there five and six times and put it together. There was never any reason for it. Charlie Winstead, who I was speaking about, treated me fine but still down in a man's heart he is not an American in any sense or form because he believes the Japanese is the right fellow and I know he is not.

There isn't a question on earth but everything has been blocked up there, either from Washington or some other position, and it is about time that somebody did something about it. Emmons is absolutely helpless now. I hear a lot of things in that tunnel because I work in those offices with them while business was going on, and we hear a lot of things that we can't talk about any place unless it goes into the [3917] place where something will be done about it.

I made three reports to G2 because I would walk right into them and talk to them. They knew of the things that happened, but there was never anything done about it.

Chairman TENNEY. Was there any discussion with reference to the loyalty of these men to the United States?

The WITNESS. I will tell you candidly as far as our men were concerned, Senator, I don't think there was any of them—the majority of the men that went over there were men over 40 years old and the only reason they were there was because they could not take a gun. I have been quite a bit here in Southern California and worked on these defense jobs and I couldn't understand why the young men didn't want to go to war, but that gang of men that went there really wanted to go and do some good, and most of them were so disgusted after six weeks they didn't know what to do, and it was our idea that the thing was done with the purpose of making us disgusted, and they could put it down that we wouldn't work.

Now, I have been in defense work ever since December of last year with the idea of trying to help out. I am an electrician and a good one. I had a contractor's license in this State and I know what I am doing, and when you turn around and find things like that it hurts down deep because you know that certain men, either for money or for some other reason, are destroying the morale of the workers.

Chairman TENNEY. What I mean, Mr. Anderson, was there [3918] reflection or opinion expressed in reference to the loyalty of the men that were in charge of all this work?

The WITNESS. The men out there thought Wyman and the whole gang of them ought to be shot. That is the truth.

Chairman TENNEY. You know that of your own knowledge?

The WITNESS. Yes, I do.

Chairman TENNEY. And upon what did they base that particular opinion?

The WITNESS. The accusations of them. We couldn't get paid. We couldn't get our overtime. We couldn't get nothing at all. We would get, "This is a new setup. This is this and that is that," and other things. One man told me out of his own mouth that we were at sea four days before they knew we were coming and they didn't know how many were coming until we actually landed.

Chairman TENNEY. I am referring more specifically to the progress of the work and the way it was carried on.

The WITNESS. The work has dragged. They will be another year. They have moved hills and moved them back again, and they have filled and holes and dug them out again; and I will swear that that runway, from what I can hear of it, at Bellows Field, has been done a dozen times.

Chairman TENNEY. Do you think that has been done intentionally?

The WITNESS. I do. I honestly believe it is intentional. After the Battle of Midway it was a great thing while [3919] it happened, and those planes came in and out of there for three days. We needed those fields but they weren't ready. They sent a man from here to be a superintendent who belonged to the Musicians Local 47. They put him on the job and in three days shipped him home.

Chairman TENNEY. What was his name?

The WITNESS. I will think of it in a minute. His name is on the tip of my tongue. Going over on the boat he sent for me. He was making up a gang.

Chairman TENNEY. You can't recall his name?

The WITNESS. Not just now. He worked for the Abbott Kinney Company in 1921 as a maintenance electrician. From there he went into a band and carried a card in Musicians Local 47.

Chairman TENNEY. I think that is all, Mr. Anderson. We thank you very much for coming before the Committee.

The WITNESS. I hope you can do something about it.

Mr. COMBS. We appreciate your cooperation very much. I will call Mr. Pine for a few more questions.

[3920] WILLIAM BRUCE PINE, having heretofore been duly sworn, was recalled for further examination.

Chairman TENNEY. You have already been sworn, Mr. Pine?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. You were here on Saturday, were you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you here during the entire time that Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl testified?

A. I was.

Q. Had you ever met that man before?

A. Yes, on several occasions.

Q. When did you first make his acquaintance? About how long ago?

A. I would say roughly, about 1933 or '34.

Q. And since the time that your acquaintance with him originated, have you met him on various occasions since?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear him testify specifically that he had never known a man by the name of Werner Plack?

A. I did.

Q. Did you ever know Werner Plack?

A. Yes, I knew Werner fairly well.

Q. When did you acquaintance with him commence?

A. I should say about the year 1935.

[3921] Q. What was his nationality, if you know?

A. He was German.

Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. Rohl and Mr. Plack were acquainted?

A. I know definitely they were acquainted.

Q. Did you see them together on several occasions?

A. I saw them together on one occasion, which naturally stands out in my mind, and the other occasions—so many years have gone by and I had no reason to mark the occasion, that I hesitate to testify definitely. But on one occasion I specifically saw them together because something occurred which made me remember it.

Q. Was that the occasion concerning which I questioned Mr. Rohl in your presence on Saturday?

A. That was the occasion.

Q. That was when Mr. Rohl and Mr. Plack came into the place commonly known as the Swing Club together?

A. Yes. It had been known as the Swing Club and then the name was changed to "1710 Club" which was the name of the same place.

Q. It was the same, identical place?

A. Yes, same identical place and the same identical building.

Q. About when was that? I mean when you saw them together there?

A. Well, I believe it was in the summer of either [3922] 1938 or 1939. The reason I recall that it must have been during the summer was because I had been to a baseball game earlier in the evening.

Q. Did Mr. Plack and Mr. Rohl come to that place together?

A. They came together with one other gentleman whom I did not recognize. He was a tall, distinguished looking, white haired man.

Q. What particular incident occurred at that time and place which called your attention to the fact that Mr. Rohl and Mr. Plack were together? Of course, you knew them both, did you not?

A. Yes, I knew them both. I might say I knew Plack at that time better than Rohl because I have never known Rohl intimately, although I met him many times and talked with him.

Q. What incident occurred which called your particular attention to the fact that they were together at that time and place?

A. Well, they ran a little floor show at the Swing Club and the floor show was going on when all of a sudden the orchestra leader stopped the music. He stopped the music and he stopped the floor show. The music changed, and all the girls in the floor show, including the band, sang, "Here comes Bill, here comes Bill, here comes Bill Rohl now," so that was why it was so vividly marked in my recollection, [3923] and with him were Werner Plack and the one other man who I never remember having seen before or since.

Mr. COMBS. That is all. Did they sit at the same table?

A. Oh, yes, they sat at the same table and rapidly acquired other guests.

Q. How long were they there?

A. Well, I think they were there for at least two hours, and they were still there when I left.

Q. Together?

A. Yes, together.

Mr. COMBS. That is all.

Chairman TENNEY. Thank you, Mr. Pine.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. COMBS. Mr. Flannery.

Chairman TENNEY. Will you please hold up your right hand and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FLANNERY. Yes.

[3924] HARRY FLANNERY, called as a witness by the Committee, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Chairman TENNEY. Will you state your full name?

The WITNESS. Harry Flannery.

Chairman TENNEY. And your address, Mr. Flannery?

The WITNESS. 6766 Milner Road, Hollywood.

Chairman TENNEY. And your occupation?

The WITNESS. Radio news analyst.

Chairman TENNEY. All right, Mr. Combs.

By Mr. Combs:

Q. Mr. Flannery, how long have you resided in southern California?

A. A little short of a year.

Q. Prior to that time where was your residence?

A. Prior to that time my residence was in New York.

Q. And how long did you reside in New York immediately prior to coming to southern California?

A. From October, 1941, until I came here, which was in March of last year.

Q. And from where did you come when you established your last residence in New York?

A. From Berlin, Germany.

Q. And how long a time did you spend in Berlin, Germany?

A. Approximately a year.

Q. How did you happen to go there?

[3925] A. I was sent to Berlin as correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System.

Q. And was it your business to make broadcasts from Berlin?

A. Right.

Q. Which you did, of course?

A. Right.

Q. During the entire period you were there?

A. Yes.

Q. While there did you know a man by the name of Werner Plack?

A. I did.

Q. When did your acquaintance with him originate?

A. Early in 1941.

Q. That was when you first went to Berlin?

A. I had been there several months at that time. I arrived in 1940.

Q. How did you happen to make his acquaintance?

A. I made his acquaintance through Charlie Lanius of N. B. C.

Lanius had met Plack, who had just come to Berlin and was at the time connected with the radio department for the German foreign office.

Lanius brought Plack up to my room and I met him up there, and we talked afterwards. I met Plack a number of times principally because of his connections with radio for [3926] the foreign office. He was a censor and he also arranged programs. He arranged the Wodehouse release.

Q. Spell that, please.

A. P. G. Wodehouse, an English author who was released from an internment camp and then principally because of publicity he broadcast for the Germans. Plack arranged that.

Q. Plack arranged that?

A. Yes, he got the idea it would be a good stunt to release Wodehouse and make a little publicity out of it, because Wodehouse would be more listened to than some of the Germans who were on the air, and they might, thereby be able to get over their story better.

He also planned, so far as I know, to put on Luckner, the Sea Devil—Count Felix von Luckner, who is well known in this country and who has been well liked; also the Crown Prince.

Q. The Crown Prince of Germany?

A. Yes; one of the Eckeners and a number of others of that same kind, figuring that these people would get audiences in the United States and German propaganda would be more listened to.

Q. Do you know whether or not Werner Plack had any connection with Fritz Weidemann at any time?

A. Not from personal knowledge, although I understand he was connected with Fritz Weidemann before he left California.

[3927] He principally sold wines here. He came out here to go into the movies but found out that he wasn't able to get into the movies and instead made connections by selling wine, German wines, principally.

Q. Do you know whether or not Werner Plack had any connection with Dr. Geisling, the German consul, while in the United States?

A. I know nothing of that.

Q. Now, will you please describe in detail, Mr. Flannery, just what duties Plack had to perform in connection with his position with the German foreign office while you were in Berlin?

A. Well, his principal duties were to arrange broadcasts to go to the United States.

Q. Yes.

A. He was not the head of that department. The head of that department was a fellow by the name of Lilyenfeldt. His first name escapes me—George von Lilyenfeldt. At times when Lilyenfeldt was away Plack had complete charge of the department for the foreign office.

For several months, three or four months after the Russian campaign had begun, Lilyenfeldt, who had been a resident of the Baltic States, was sent up there to do some work, and during that period Plack was completely in charge of the radio department.

Among his duties was to act as a censor for the foreign [3928] office for radio broadcasts to the United States.

I might mention that at least one-third of the times that he came out to do the censoring he was drunk and a few occasions he was so tight he could not read my copy, and one night he asked me to read it to him, which was very foolish. I could have read him anything and he would have O. K.'d it, except he thought something should be changed in it, so he suggested, "Let us change this thing up here," and he started scratching out stuff. I had to stop him because I could not read anything after he would get through with that sort of thing.

In addition to acting as censor he was one of the contact men for us who would arrange for us to go on various trips. For instance, when Matsuoko came there he arranged the trip for me. We met Matsuoko and went down to Potsdam and he would always arrange those things, whereby we would be able to make other trips and make other contacts and so forth.

The foreign office propaganda ministry had men for that particular purpose. Their job also was trying to make us fellows feel better and thereby hoping we might be sold more on Nazi Germany.

They had men selected for that purpose to try to sell the correspondents.

Q. Was Plack one of those men?

A. Plack was one of those men. Of course Plack liked it very well because it gave him a big expense account.

[3929] Q. He was rather convivially inclined?

A. Oh, yes, he would like a job of that kind.

Q. As a matter of fact, you mentioned Plack in your books, "Assignment to Berlin," did you not?

A. That is right.

Q. How is the book doing?

A. Pretty well, thank you.

Q. A very interesting book.

A. Thank you.

Q. When did you come back from Germany?

A. I arrived back here October 14. I left Berlin September 29, 1941.

Q. Do you know at all how long it was after Werner Plack arrived in Germany that he obtained this position in the German foreign office?

A. As far as I know, it was immediately.

Q. Immediately upon his arriving?

A. I know of no lapse in between. Of course, there may have been, but I know of none.

Q. Do you know when he arrived there, about?

A. No. I estimate it was—that is pretty difficult for me to place, because I don't seem to be able to connect it with anything except the fact I mentioned Lanlus—that Lanlus did not arrive until early in 1941 and that I met him with Lanlus, so I know it was early in 1941, but I cannot place it more definitely than that. I can't set it as to what [3930] part of January or whenever it was.

Chairman TENNEY. It was early in 1941?

The WITNESS. Early in 1941, yes.

Q. By Mr. COMBS. Mr. Flannery, in your conversations with Werner Plack from time to time, did he ever boastfully mention any of his propaganda activities in the United States—and of his pro-German activities in the United States?

A. Yes, in a certain respect. He is a peculiar fellow. He had an article from one of the magazines over here. I think it was one of the movies magazines. I am not sure of that. I remember he had it. He had all kinds of American magazines, particular Vogue, which he liked to show to the ladies, in which there was an article about German people who had operated in the United States, and accused them of espionage, and merely among the names down at the end was "Werner Plack," which he seemed to be very proud of. He took it around and showed it to everybody. It did not in any way speak very respectfully of Mr. Plack but he did not seem to be bothered by that fact.

Q. I think that is all, Mr. Flannery, unless you have something to add, which you think might be helpful to the committee.

A. I think that is about all. Oh, there is one thing we might put in. This is a story he told us when he first met us there—how he left the country.

[3931] Q. Yes.

A. He left under considerable cloud. He said that all of his telephone calls had been checked and he said that he had been making them to girls. He was always talking about how he got along with the ladies, and he had been making telephone calls all over the country to the girls he knew, but he said that the F. B. I. was suspicious and that he had been grilled so much that he had not been able to sleep one night before he left on the boat, and that when he did get on the boat the F. B. I. continued to grill him and to go over all his papers that he was taking back with him and that he had a lot of American cigarettes—the Germans like American cigarettes, and that they had broken every second cigarette in two to see whether he had anything in them. And he also told about the incident in which he was in one of the night clubs here and some resident of Hollywood came up to him and said, "There you are, you dirty Nazi," and slugged him, and Plack contends that because he was behind one of these large tables that the waiters usually move so you can't get up and, therefore, he was taken advantage of or he would have done something in return. He did nothing, apparently.

I think that is about everything.

Q. Did he tell you or didn't he tell you how he came from the United States to Berlin? Did he immediately go to Germany or did he go by way of circuitous route?

A. He went by way of Japan and Russia.

[3932] He went from Japan to Russia and then to Germany?

A. Yes, that is right. Russia wasn't in the war at that time and apparently, therefore, came from San Francisco.

Mr. COMBS. I think that is all, Mr. Flannery. We thank you very, very much for your cooperation.

[3933] Chairman TENNEY. Call your next witness, Mr. Combs.

Mr. COMBS. Dr. Lechner.

Chairman TENNEY. Will you come forward and be sworn, Dr. Lechner?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before the Committee, will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. LECHNER. I do.

JOHN R. LECHNER, called as a witness on behalf of the Committee, being first duly sworn, testified as follows:

Chairman TENNEY. Will you state your full name?

The WITNESS. John R. Lechner.

Chairman TENNEY. And your residence address.

The WITNESS. 332 West 64th Street, Inglewood.

Chairman TENNEY. And your business address.

The WITNESS. 838 South Grand Avenue.

Chairman TENNEY. And your occupation.

The WITNESS. Executive director of the Americanism Educational League.

Chairman TENNEY. All right, Mr. Combs.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. How long, Dr. Lechner, have you held your present position with the League?

A. Sixteen years.

Q. Sixteen years continuously?

A. That is right, yes.

[3934] Q. And during that period of time will you describe what the general nature of your duties have been?

A. Primarily the investigation of un-American activities in this area and the interpretation to the general public through public meetings and literature of those activities.

Q. How, generally, have you gained your information concerning subversive activities in this area?

A. For the most part we have very splendid sources of information through our contacts with fact-finding groups—responsible groups. For example on the Japanese situation we have worked very closely with Mr. Kilsoo K. Haan and his counter-espionage group against the Japanese.

Q. Kilsoo Haan is a Korean, is he not?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether at any time he was employed by the Foreign Office of the Japanese Empire?

A. For three years, yes. He was with the consular office of the Honolulu Japanese government.

Q. During that time was he doing any espionage work?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Counter-espionage work?

A. Counter-espionage work, yes.

Q. And he has quite a large group of individual workers working as informants under his direction?

A. Yes, sir.

[3935] Q. And has had for a number of years?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he fluently reads and writes the Japanese language, does he not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When did you last see Kilsoo Haan?

A. Friday night of this past week.

Q. Last Friday night?

A. Yes.

Q. And he left this vicinity Saturday morning, did he not, for Washington?

A. Yes; he left for Washington, D. C.

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Q. And how long a time did you spend with him on the occasion of his visit here?

A. He was here four weeks this time.

Q. Were you with him in Senator Tenney's office when you and I and Kilsoo Haan had a conference?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. And was that on Thursday of last week?

A. That was Thursday of last week, yes.

Q. And were you with Kilsoo Haan and Senator Tenney when you and I and Kilsoo Haan had a conference on Friday of last week?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you present at that time and place when I put Kilsoo Haan under oath?

[3936] A. I was.

Q. And he gave his statement as a sworn statement?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that conference on Friday lasted about how long?

A. Two hours.

Q. And we discussed at that time and place the testimony which you intended to give heretoday?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you bring with you, Doctor, photostatic copies of documents which you obtained from Kilsoo Haan?

A. Yes, sir. I also brought here a report which we just had published on behalf of the American Legion. It is the inside story of the Japanese problem, which I should like to have entered in the record here.

Q. Who is the author of this report?

A. I am.

Q. The report deals with what basic subject?

A. It deals primarily with the Japanese-American situation—the Japanese-American citizen problem on the Coast.

Q. On the Pacific Coast?

A. Yes. Both the psychological aspect and the subversive organizations existing here on the Coast in which the Japanese-Americans took a primary part.

Q. When did this publication come off the press?

A. About three weeks ago.

Mr. COMBS. Mr. Chairman, I ask this report be received [3937] as an exhibit for the Committee in connection with the testimony of Dr. Lechner.

Chairman TENNEY. The report will be attached to the Committee's transcript and marked "Dr. Lechner, Exhibit No. 1."

(The report referred to was marked "Dr. Lechner Exhibit 1, and made a part hereof.)

Q. By Mr. COMBS. The material set forth in this report, Dr. Lechner, is predicated, I take it, on documents and photostats and the reports of informants, that came to you in connection with your capacity with the League?

A. Yes, sir. It came from various sources. You understand, of course, that during a long period like that we would have open to us sources of information not only from men like Haan but from Japanese themselves.

Q. And a great deal of your information did come from Japanese informants?

A. Yes, sir. We have been studying this problem for many years; long before there was a thought of war on the part of our people.

Q. As a matter of fact from some of the information you obtained you accurately predicted the occurrence of war and the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you not?

A. As a matter of fact on March 15, 1941, we released an Associated Press story, which was a front page story, that went all over the country, telling of the inevitability of the war, giving the Japanese plans of attack on Pearl Harbor [3938] and even suggested in a chronological scale the time they had set for it to take place. We stated that they had set aside December for that attack.

Q. With an alternative date?

A. In February 1942 in case that didn't work out.

Q. In your opinion, Dr. Lechner, based on your experience and activities as you have related, is there a tendency now on the part of the American public to soften its attitude toward American born Japanese in internment camps—internment centers?

A. There is a tremendous movement on foot, Mr. Combs, to soften up the American people to placate the local Japanese. If I may be permitted as you ask questions, to give some of the information we have on that matter, I think it would be helpful. I would like to name some of the organization involved in that very definite program—a very definitely programmed approach to the softening up process.

Q. Before you make a statement, Dr. Lechner, let me ask you whether or not your information indicates that Japanese propagandists have taken advantage of that tendency on the part of the American public to soften its attitude toward Japanese internees.

A. The Japanese have certainly taken advantage of it. I have here the notes which were made by a Japanese-American citizen in one of the camps. These are the actual notes.

(Handing sheaf of papers to Mr. Combs.)

[3939] Q. Are these notes in your informant's own handwriting?

A. They are in his own handwriting. This is the situation, if I may explain it. The government decreed that the Japanese-American citizen and other Japanese in evacuation centers were not permitted to listen to broadcasts (but the government gave permission to small groups to appoint committees to listen and to go over the broadcasts of the day and then in turn to re-broadcast over a camp radio broadcasting station the news for the day.

These notes are most significant in that all of the information, or practically all the information, given to the Japanese evacuees in that internment camp was very much colored pro-Jap. Many of the statements which I have checked in the notes, contain conclusions that are definitely in favor of the Japanese. Such things as "Russia is ready to pull out of the war," and that Australia was going to be taken, and building up the Japanese cause so as to give encouragement in building the morale of the internees—both Japanese-Americans and Japanese aliens.

Q. You gave me this sheaf of notes last Friday, did you not?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. And I have had them ever since and have just handed them back to you this morning?

A. Yes, sir.

[3940] Q. And have you read them in their entirety?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Have you seen any single statement any place in these notes detrimental to the Japanese war effort?

A. In all those pages, representing, I should say, twenty-five or thirty pages, there is not a single statement that is detrimental to Japan.

Q. Are all of the statements made in these notes generally pro-Axis?

A. They are generally pro-Axis.

Q. And are generally anti-Ally?

A. Yes. I may point out one other very interesting thing there. You will notice on the bottom of each page there a notation of the number of ships that are lost and the number of planes that were brought down. In every case the ships are listed only on the part of the Allies.

The United States ships and the British ships and the planes reported there, are those that came down here in this country. In one instance the broadcaster has four different crashes listed. Always the losses are American planes or British planes.

Q. Never any Jap losses?

A. No.

Q. And no record of any Jap ships sunk?

A. No record of Jap ship sunk, no.

Q. Now, this individual in this Japanese internment [3941] center made these broadcasts in the American language or in the Japanese language?

A. Made them in the Japanese language.

Q. Did he make them daily?

A. Yes, he made them daily.

Q. Of course I shall not ask you for the name of the camp nor the name of the informant nor the name of the person who made the broadcasts, but you have that information available?

A. Yes, I have that information.

Q. Do you have any objection to my reading some excerpts into the record?

A. Very happy to have you do so.

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Q. This particular broadcast is under date of August 6, 1942. I think you testified these are the original notes in the handwriting of the Japanese broadcaster.

A. Yes. He is a Japanese-American citizen.

Q. A Nisei?

A. Yes, a Nisei.

Q. "France might as well fly the Swastika." "Tokio is waiting for a complete collapse of the Soviet." "When the Japanese attack Siberia it will be sudden and decisive." "Japanese Russian propaganda is very active against communism and the communist United States." "When Russia is beaten she will become like China." "Britain after losing Singapore and Hong Kong cannot expect to get them back in British hands [3942] again." "Why India should remain under British rule to make India a British sphere which will eventually turn India into future British frontier?" "Unless Britain can influence Jinah and Nehru against Gandhi's idea, which is too late, Britain cannot turn India's tide to British satisfaction." "Big, important meeting in Moscow is another development of Allies discord." "Nazi blitz speed is astonishing."

On the same date: "The Australian forces are not strong enough to check Japanese invasion."

Under date of August 5, 1942: "All of the Pacific will be blacked out and the Japanese may attack the Pacific Coast with submarines."

"Japanese air forces is wiping out the United States-Chinese air force."

"Japanese activities in Australia is on increase. The Australians say the air strength is not sufficient to check the Japanese assault."

The same date: "Japanese planes attack Queensland for the first time."

"Four Japanese planes bomb Tourinville. Japanese also bomb Darwin. Japanese threat via Buna also serious."

"One-twentieth of United States population in Australia. Japanese secretly landed in Australia a month ago when Japanese landed in New Guinea. Japanese again landed at Buna. Allies have not checked their threat. New United States plane, Mustang, 1,400 horsepower, may out-do Japanese [3943] Zero. Burma Japanese may invade into China or India."

August 4th, 1942: "Japanese destroy 55,000 tons of Allied shipping in last week. Japanese sent more reinforcements. Allies blasting Buna-Gona area. Japanese submarine sinks British ship. Another large naval engagement coming. British attack Burma force and lose."

Same date: "Big quake in north island of New Zealand. Japanese cruiser was bombed for second time, but Japanese established an air field in Cocoda." Gandhi says, 'unless Allies gives complete independence India may welcome Japs. The Japanese in Burma are preparing to start fresh movement into India. Next Friday is the dead-line for India's independence. 219 Japanese planes attacked United States air base.'

July 29th, 1942: "Goebel says: 'Nazi welcomes the British in Europe; even the Yankees if they want to taste German punch.'"

July 28, 1942: "Japanese landed in Australia in submarine. In New Guinea Japanese set up at Cocoda upland, fifty miles from Moresby. Japanese attack Darwin and Tourinville. In New Guinea the Japanese are advancing by bicycle troops."

July 27, 1942: "Allies attack Buna. More Japanese landed at Buna; more at Gona, 160 miles north of Gona. Japanese attack British force near Moresby. Tojo said: 'Japan holds the initiative in western Aleutians; Japan will [3944] go the limit to crush the United States and Britain. Chunking bombed by fifty Japanese bombers. United States planes countered.'"

The same date: "United States losing this war because they cannot fill orders for spare parts. Nazi using transport planes. United States is trying to convert bombers into cargo planes. C. I. O. auto workers union demands double pay for Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. During the first six months of the war 4,000 seamen's lives were lost. Indian situation is more critical. Gandhi demands negotiation with British to grant India complete and immediate independence or India will become turmoil of trouble. Our (United States) June production is behind schedule. Gandhi says 'Britain is India's friend.' India neither sides with or rejects the United States or the Axis countries. India asks United States, China and Stalin to induce British to accept India's independence plea, but no one acts. Gandhi has political power but not military power—naturally, India relies on Japanese aid. Britain today ordered all essential commodity dealers closed. What next!"

July 25, 1942: "United States citizens arrived in east Africa. Japanese occupies Buna-Gona. 18 Japanese bombers and 8 Zeros attack Moresby."

July 21, 1942: "Japanese attacked Port Moresby with 41 planes. 'Don't neglect Australia for Japanese pilots are darn good and are a good match for United States flyers.'"

[3945] This is under date of July 19, 1942: "Japanese carried out their plan. India will become yoke of Japan after this Friday."

August 7th, 1942: "Only one percent of United States production, or three days production in Australia. How can Australia stop the Japanese?"

Same date: "United States losing this war unless it can produce more war material, and the United States can make this a total war. Only a trickle of supplies coming to Australia. Japanese are undoubtedly occupying many important coastal regions on continent of Australia. We are beaten in India, Turkey, and losing in Siberia and Australia. If Russia gives in the United States must lose China and Australian interests. There may be a negotiated peace!"

And there are many other excerpts I could read, Dr. Lechner, but I think that will suffice to show the general character of the broadcasts which were made by this Japanese-American citizen in an American internment center.

Chairman TENNEY. Dr. Lechner, is there any censorship of the broadcasts made by this announcer in the internment center where these broadcasts were made, by the authorities?

The WITNESS. No censorship whatever on the part of the War Relocation authorities. The little group of five or six in this particular camp were given autonomous power in the matter of broadcasts.

Chairman TENNEY. Is that under the Army or under [3946] civilian control?

The WITNESS. It is under civilian control—under civilian administration.

Chairman TENNEY. Do you feel the Army would permit that sort of thing?

The WITNESS. No, sir; I think we are making a big mistake, if I may give my opinion here, in taking away the administration of these camps by the Army and placing it in civilian hands. For example on July 4th, 1942, in Inyo County, near our aqueduct, a strategic area, as far as we are concerned, Mr. Meyers came out here, who had at no time before his experience with the War Relocation Board or Authority, had anything to do with the Japanese—he came out here as an expert in charge of the Japanese in the relocation centers.

Mr. Meyers delivered an address on the 4th of July, apologizing to the 12,000 Japanese at Manzanar, for the big mistake the Government had made in evacuating them in the first place.

Chairman TENNEY. Which Meyers was that?

The WITNESS. I don't recall his first name. I have his name, however, and can supply you with it at the next session.

Chairman TENNEY. I think we are going to close after your testimony. You may proceed, Mr. Combs.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Dr. Lechner, in your opinion should [3947] American-born Japanese be released through the relocation authority of the Federal Government any time while this war is in progress?

A. Should they be released from the internment centers?

Q. Yes.

A. I believe that every able-bodied Japanese who is not considered by the various government agencies as a real dangerous Japanese, who has not been connected in the past with propaganda activities or sabotage, should be released but placed in certain sections in the interior of the country, under Army control, and put to work in agricultural work. But they should not be released as they are being released now. 1300 of them were released to go to universities. They are absolutely free and are getting more money than they know what to do with together with free scholarships, while our boys are fighting in the Solomons and elsewhere. These Japanese are enjoying a university career with their way paid by our Government while our own boys are fighting all over the world.

I think every able-bodied Japanese male should be put to work, but under strict Army control.

At the present time there is no control. At Manzanar for example, my report shows, and I believe it was verified by Congressman Leland Ford, who issued a statement for the Congressional Record just before he finished his term, stated that groups of ten, twelve or fifteen Japanese were allowed [3948] to go

through Inyo County in trucks without restriction whatever, and the people of that county objected to there being no control of them at all.

Q. Last year, Dr. Lechner, and shortly prior to the time the Japanese in this area were interned, the Committee held a hearing in Los Angeles for the purpose of placing in its sworn records, the ideology and fanatic attitude of the average Japanese on the Pacific coast. Among the witnesses who testified were Togo Tenaga and Fred Tayama—

A. I know them very well.

Q. When did you first become acquainted with Togo Tenaga?

A. About three years ago.

Q. At that time was he one of the editors of Rafu Shimpō?

A. He was editor in Los Angeles.

Q. That was a newspaper, was it not?

A. A daily newspaper, yes.

Q. A Japanese daily newspaper, and it was published in Los Angeles?

A. Yes, in Los Angeles.

Q. And disseminated all up and down the Pacific coast?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Togo Tenaga was a Nisei, was he not?

A. Yes. A graduate of the University of California.

Q. Now, in 1941 did the Rafu Shimpō publish a directory?

[3949] A. Yes.

Q. Was the directory printed in the United States or in Japan?

A. In Japan.

Q. And the one with a cardboard slip cover the committee has a copy of?

A. Yes.

Q. I am just getting these facts in the record.

A. Yes; I understand.

Q. And it had a stamp on it "made in Japan?"

A. Yes; that is right.

Q. Now, when the committee asked Togo Tenaga to produce a copy of the 1941 Rafu Shimpō directory, he did so, but in preparing the copy which he produced with the copy of the committee already had, we found that certain pages had been taken out of the Tenaga copy, those pages being a folding page in colors of the Imperial family of Japan and on the next page there was a large Japanese ideograph which, when translated, meant "Japanese supremacy in the Pacific Sphere."

You are familiar with that?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. And do you know that that translation is substantially accurate?

A. I do; it is.

Q. Now, what did the bulk of that directory contain, if you know, Dr. Lechner?

[3950] A. It comprised, of course, the names of Japanese firms in this country dealing with Japanese firms in Japan proper.

Q. Tenaga, under examination, testified that in his opinion that directory was nine-tenths subversive. Does that tally with the information in your possession concerning that publication?

A. That is right. You asked something about the spirit or morale of the Japanese. I have something here which you may be interested in.

Q. Would you like to read it into the record? How long is it?

A. It is very short.

Q. Will you read it into the record, please?

A. It is regarding the national philosophy which is injected or, rather, instilled into all Japanese, whether they be American citizens or not.

In the case of American citizens it is instilled through Japanese language schools. It is called the "Shinto Faith." It is stated to be a faith but it is not a religion. It is a State philosophy and holds, of course, that the Emperor is the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess and by virtue of that fact every Japanese is of divine origin and owes his allegiance to the Japanese Emperor.

We have read that on many occasions but have failed to look into the deeper aspects of it. It is actually the [3951] controlling force in the life of the Japanese; and that is also the case with the Japanese who are living in this country. For example, there were more than 19,000 boys and girls of Japanese parents, born in California, who attended Japanese language schools before the war. In Hawaii out of 46,670 boys and girls of Japanese extraction attending American schools, 43,000 were going to Japanese schools at the same time.

If I may give this expert's opinion and testimony of the Shinto Faith, which bears out all of the information that we have. It is by Dr. Shunzo Sakamaki, Assistant Professor of History of the University of Hawaii.

Q. When was that published?

A. This was published in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin on April 25, 1942.

At the beginning of 1941 the Japanese Imperial Government issued an edict declaring all Shinto priests in the United States and Hawaii and all Japanese language school teachers were from that date (and that was in January) were to be considered as officials of the Japanese government. In other words they took them openly out of the field of religion and made them agents of the Japanese government, thereby changing their status, so far as we were concerned, of all language schools to centers of Japanese espionage and propaganda.

Dr. Sakamaki said, in part: "Why have Japanese officials for the past two generations been so eager to protect the [3952] special status of State Shinto? Why have they insisted that State Shinto is not a religion but the embodiment of Japanese patriotism?"

"Basically, the reason is that the Japanese government has been in Shinto a political tool of the greatest potency for keeping the fires of nationalism burning at white heat and making the doctrine of political absolutism in Japan virtually inviolable."

"* * * Japan's constitution of 1890 guarantees freedom of religious worship, but the government has taken the position that State Shinto is not a religion and that, therefore, all Japanese must participate in State Shinto ceremonies, as part of their patriotic duty to the state."

"* * * Operation of State Shinto here is inimical to American interests because it both directly and indirectly fosters Japanese nationalism, and arguments by Shinto champions that we cannot infringe their right to free worship contradict responsible pronouncements by Japanese officials denying the religious status of State Shinto."

"We are at war with Japan, and State Shinto is an arm of the government of Japan. Amputation of that arm here in Hawaii is a prerogative of our government that cannot consistently be protested by the government of Japan."

I might add that this particular philosophy of the State is so thoroughly instilled in most Japanese, regardless of whether in California or some other place, that it confronts [3953] us with a paramount problem to determine just to what degree the Japanese are loyal and to what degree they are disloyal.

An external manifestation of that problem is in dual citizenship. When Togo Tenaga and Fred Tayama admitted to me before a committee of Japanese they didn't know how many dual citizens there were, they did admit that the majority held dual citizenship.

In 1924 the Japanese government told the Japanese in this country to register their children with the Japanese consuls so that they might hold dual citizenship. In the first ten years in Hawaii, after the law was established, less than 5 percent of the Japanese were registered with the foreign office of the Territory of Hawaii. We have those figures. That is a matter of record.

Q. What other activities did Togo Tenaga engage in in southern California, in addition to being the English language editor of the Shimpō?

A. Togo Tenaga was the front man for the Japanese. We called on him and Fred Tayama and asked them to demonstrate the sincerity of their particular group by cooperating with our Federal Government.

Q. What was the name of that group?

A. Japanese-American Citizens League.

Q. The Japanese-American Citizens League?

A. That is right. And in order to put the Japanese on a test, and I was asked confidentially by a source from [3954] Washington if I would do that, we called two or three conferences of Japanese Americans under the leadership of Tayama, who was then chairman or president of the League, and Togo Tenaga as spear-head of the organization. We had two or three meetings. One was on April 15, 1941. We had a little dinner in Little Tokio to arrange a meeting. A mass meeting subsequently was held on May 10 at the Hollywood-American Legion Clubhouse. It was attended by over 1,000 Nisei—second generation Japanese.

The purpose of this meeting was to challenge the second generation Japanese, who were professing then through meetings all over, before service clubs and in publications, that they were completely loyal to the United States. We challenged them to set up an inner committee among the Japanese-Americans to give our Government information on Japanese subversive organizations within California and within this area.

In the first place, in the series of two conferences before this meeting at the Hollywood Legion Clubhouse, and my office, both Tenaga and Tayama denied the existence of any Japanese subversive organizations in California, and then I openly challenged the 1,000 Nisei and told them unless we could get that cooperation voluntarily and they cleaned up their own ranks, and because of the inevitability of war, from records we had which all indicated there would be a war, that it would be very bad and very hard on the Japanese-Americans if they did not do so. In other words, they would [3955] have to undergo tremendous changes in their whole sociological structure, and we challenged them to set up the organization for this work and we were turned down flatly.

I have here a program of that particular meeting together with the names who participated in the organizations represented.

Q. I would like to introduce this into the record as Exhibit 2 in connection with Dr. Lechner's testimony.

Chairman TENNEY. This will be marked Dr. Lechner Exhibit 2.

(The document referred to was marked "Dr. Lechner Exhibit No. 2," and made a part hereof.)

The WITNESS. I have here a list, to demonstrate the accuracy of the figures of the Hawaiian situation. These are the names of the Japanese language schools in Hawaii, with the addresses of the schools and the names of the principals. I would like to keep this for my record, but you may glance at it.

Q. Yes.

Chairman TENNEY. Are you introducing that as an exhibit?

The WITNESS. No; it is not necessary.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. What is meant by "the age of moral responsibility" in computing the percentage of loyal as contra-distinguished from disloyal American-born Japanese?

A. That is a relative matter. In the opinion of some [3956] of the experts with whom I have spoken they say, "Well, we will compute the age of moral responsibility as far as Japanese are concerned, at 17. Below 17 a Japanese-American citizen is not considered to be experienced, primarily in a political structure in this country or in Japan, although he has been given the infusion of Japanism, but he is not actively engaged in organizations."

So, if we consider that, we find that out of 96,000 Japanese-American citizens, in computing the percentage of loyalty and disloyalty among the Nisei, we must remember that approximately 45 percent of the 96,000 are below what we term there, "the age of moral responsibility," so that if, as we show in this report, have two organizations alone had over 12,000 members, then the percentage is not as 12 to 96 but as 12 to 45.

I bring that point out because we make a big mistake in all of our newspaper stories because we fail to take into consideration the fact that 45 percent are below the typical group who would be engaged in subversive activities.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Do you have any information or any proof to the effect that plans were made in Japan to finance and direct the education of Nisei in the United States?

A. Yes, very, very definite proof on that. I have here two Japanese documents which were translated, and I have the translation of this particular report. It is on page 5 of the report.

[3957] Q. And you have a photostatic copy of the original Japanese document?

A. Yes.

Q. Which was used as a basis for those translations?

A. Yes; there are three organizations; The Institute for the Education of Over-sea Japanese, the General Board of Overseas Association and Imperial Educational Association. All of these have headquarters, and the main headquarters is in Tokio. They were well financed by the Japanese government. The only purpose is to direct the education of Nisei in the United States and Hawaii from Tokio.

We uncovered a document, by the way, in El Centro, in 1941 which is called, "The Future Road of Nisei." If I may give you that, that will tell the importance of these organizations which are so well financed. This book was discovered in the hands of Japanese agents in El Centro and through one of the men with whom we worked we were able to get a copy of it.

It was endorsed by General Sugiyama, Japanese Imperial Army chief of staff, and Tokashi Zuzuki, Director of Kinmon Gakuin, one of the leading schools of Japanese language in San Francisco.

This was to show the Nisei the appreciation of the Japanese government for the work they were doing.

There was quite a bit of difficulty here in the relations between Japan and the United States after Japan stepped [3958] into China and started their aggressive program, so the Japanese government, according to the information we have, documentary information, demanded that the Nisei soften the public opinion on the part of Americans with reference to that.

"Several hundred lectures have been delivered on the China incident by Nisei in America.

"Many Nisei also returned to Japan with a mass of material collected in California.

"Things of this sort are typical of the work performed in the past by the Nisei for Japan. What they gain and what they do is by no means unimportant. The Nisei have made significant contributions to Japan, but in many cases these facts must remain hidden.

"When the China incident occurred, it became necessary to broadcast to the world the news in the English language. At this most crucial moment the Nisei did the work by assuming responsibility as is befitting great patriots.

"The role of Nisei at the present moment is of utmost importance. Nisei always take the leadership. In the world where English language newspapers and magazines are most influential, the Nisei are in an excellent position to do their share.

"We have seen to it that they shall be well prepared for their task."

And I would like to enter this as a matter of record.

[3959] (Handing paper to Mr. Combs.)

Mr. COMBS. They are in the Japanese language and I will offer them as an exhibit in connection with the testimony of Dr. Lechner.

The WITNESS. And the translation, by the way, you will find on page 5 of this record.

Chairman TENNEY. Let them be marked Dr. Lechner Exhibits 3 and 4.

(The documents referred to were marked as "Dr. Lechner Exhibits No. 3 and No. 4," and were made a part of the record hereof.)

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Do you have any information regarding trips made by Nisei or Kibel to Japan?

A. Yes.

Q. For the purpose of indoctrination and instruction and returning to disseminate propaganda in the United States?

A. Yes. The term "Kibel" is applied to the Japanese-American who has gone back to Japan at the request of some organization connected with Japan, or directly by the Japanese government itself.

In the State of California there are eleven distinct, separate Kibel organizations, and they are listed here.

Q. On what page?

A. Page 7.

Q. Page 7 of your report?

A. Yes. There were so many Japanese in 1938—that [3960] is Japanese-Americans, who were in Japan visiting and studying in Japan, that two organizations, locally, got together because of the American situation with which they were confronted. People asked, "Where is Togo?" And "Where is Harry," and so on, and these young Japanese boys were in Japan. The record shows here that there were at one time as many as 20,000 Japanese-American boys in Japan, and the situation was so embarrassing that two organizations, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Japanese Association of Los Angeles, in 1938, appointed a delegate and sent him to Japan to plead with the Japanese government to send some of these boys back as fast as the Japanese government could, to avoid suspicion and embarrassment here in California. At that time, in 1938, there were 20,000 Japanese-Americans studying in Japan. It was presumably cultural training but we know in reality they were getting the final dose of Japanism preparatory to the war.

Chairman TENNEY. That was in 1938?

The WITNESS. Yes, 1938.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Do you have in your possession any document or report setting forth what transpired when a group of Japanese went to Japan for that sort of indoctrination?

A. I have a very important document here. May I qualify the introduction of this document with this statement: Here we have pressure brought to bear on the American Government to release Japanese-Americans because there is no indication at all of any subversive activities or sabotage having been committed after Japan attacked this country. They say most of them are loyal—in fact, all are loyal.

There was a group of 400 from this country and 500 from Tokio itself and the Japanese area. These 900 Japanese-Americans were called to a conference in Japan. I have the translation here of a Japanese release. It was reprinted in English by the Hawaiian Hochi on October 8, 1940.

The Hawaiian Hochi is an agency of the Domei News Agency of Japan.

Q. It is printed in Honolulu?

A. Yes, and it elaborates on this evidence here which I should like to submit because it is quite important. At this particular conference held in Tokio, and this is a report of it, the Japanese-Americans, 900 of them, were put through a course of study for a few days and committees were appointed to lead the Japanese-Americans in preparation of this move. The course of study was the Japanese plan of attack on the Dutch East Indies, and here is a very interesting Japanese way of presenting their thoughts to the Japanese-Americans.

Page 1 contains the name of a Japanese officer and a group photograph of important officials. 2 contains a map of the Dutch East Indies and you will notice this umbrella over it all. That is the Oriental way of showing how the Japanese are going to smash whatever the British and Dutch holdings there are.

[3962] The first page shows a cartoon of how the Dutch and English will dynamite oil wells, and there is a very interesting thing here. This brings out the fact that although the British and the Dutch believe that dynamiting the oil wells in the event of a Japanese attack will cripple Japan, this report here shows that is just what they want because they would dynamite the wells themselves to get higher octane gasoline by going down to the lower levels, and that is an explanation of that.

I don't need to go into the rest of it, but I do want, with your permission, to turn it over to the Committee.

Chairman TENNEY. You are turning it over to the Committee, Dr. Lechner?

The WITNESS. Yes, sir.

Chairman TENNEY. That will be received as Exhibit No. 5 to the testimony of Dr. Lechner.

(The document referred to was marked "Dr. Lechner Exhibit No. 5 and made a part hereof.)

Mr. COMBS. Exhibit 5 is a group of photostats handed to me by Dr. Lechner with the translation in English.

Chairman TENNEY. What was the date of that conference?

The WITNESS. The conference would run the first two weeks in October. This report is dated October 18, 1940. The report of this conference that we are talking about now, and which is in the record, was published and distributed by the Japanese Overseas Association. That is the association [3963] of which we spoke a moment ago. It was distributed for the Nisei. It was published in February, 1941. (This is important, Mr. Chairman, for this reason, that the 400 Japanese-American citizens coming from this country and the 500 Japanese-American citizens residing temporarily in Tokio, knew of the Japanese plans to attack the Dutch East Indies and were given the complete details. There is nothing in the records of our Government that we can find anywhere of the so-called loyal American citizens ever reported these plans to our Federal Government.)

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Now, Dr. Lechner, there is at the present time a definite, nationally organized movement to soften the American public against the time when the Japanese-Americans will be released from these internment centers, is there not?

A. A tremendously powerful movement.

Q. Will you describe that briefly, please?

A. Yes. There are several organizations who are now engaged in a campaign to discredit the United States Army policy to evacuate the Japanese and the entire policy of the Government holding the Japanese in concentration or restricted areas.

This group is comprised largely of church and educational leaders.

Here is an article which was written by Norman Thomas, head of the Socialist Party, and distributed by the Post War [3964] Council.

I understand that several hundred thousand were sent out. This is a scathing indictment against the United States policy employed so far as the Japanese are concerned, and he advocates the immediate release of all Japanese-Americans, the Churchmen's Committee for Christian Peace, and the president of that is Dr. Albert Palmer, the head of the Chicago Seminary. Two months ago Dr. Palmer announced that he had over 1600 leading ministers in this country who had signed up as active members. Palmer's statement on the unconditional surrender of Japan is this, and it is described. In such things as these we are getting the first announcement of a very carefully worked out plan of all of these groups I am going to mention, for a negotiated peace with Japan. In speaking of unconditional surrender he said, "This goal is not likely to be reached by any method of total military victory; some kind of negotiated peace is a desirable alternative." This statement was made in December, 1942.

They claim to have 12,000 or more active members throughout the United States. The principal theory is that war is not compatible with the teachings of Christ. In addition to that there is the National Committee for Prevention of Wars. This organization held its national convention in Philadelphia on November 11, 12, and 13, 1942. One of the aggressively active leaders is Theodore Walser, an American missionary in Japan for 23 years.

[3965] He spoke before the members of the Pilgrim Church, one of the large churches in Washington, D. C. This was his statement: "Japan was justified in her attack on Pearl Harbor." He gave for the reasons, first, that America had no right to interfere with Japan's "Asia for the Asiatics" policy in the Far East. Secondly, Japan is only doing what America did to Mexico and to Central and South American Republics.

The National Committee for the Prevention of War, their convention adopted the following aims for 1943, and I list there five or six points. First, is a negotiated peace with the Axis powers, following Dr. Albert Palmer's idea. Second, to give financial and moral aid to conscientious objectors; three, to give financial aid and scholarships to Japanese-Americans so they may complete their university educations; four, to release the Japanese from the relocation camps and give the relocation civilian authorities more power to act, because they were, apparently, from their statements, they were already conscious of the fact that they were wielding a great deal of influence over these civilian authorities. Five, give favorable publicity to the Japanese-Americans and the Japanese point of view in the public press, and particularly stress that point of view in church publications throughout America; set up an employment agency to aid the Japanese as fast as they are released from the relocation camps.

Incidentally, one point here about the church publica- [3966] tions. From our information it is very apparent that a definite policy is being employed to create a favorable attitude toward Japanese-Americans in this country, and so favorable that naturally we will build up a sympathetic attitude for Japan. That is what we call the "softening up process" so that these various organizations can put across with full steam by the end of 1943 a terrific campaign for a negotiated peace with Japan, and it is a very clearly worked out scheme.

As an indication of how far they will go, Senator Tenney, from December 4 to December 14 in Quebec, Canada, the Institute of Pacific Relations, which has a very powerful branch here, held what they called "A Pacific Conference" for the purpose of discussing post-war problems in the Pacific area. At that conference the leaders refused admission of a Korean participant, although they claimed that they were interested in establishing the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms in all of the subjugated nations in the world. Finally after a threat was made to expose the Pacific Conference held by the Institute of Pacific Relations, they agreed to allow a Korean as an observer. The opposition came from some of the missionaries who came from Japan, representing the Far East.

Underneath that whole conference was this underlying motive, to build there at that Pacific Conference in Quebec, the structure for the cooperation of the Institute of Pacific [3967] Relations for a negotiated peace and the leaders in that conference were former missionaries and educators in Japan. That was why they had this antipathy for the Korean, because they felt that if he were a part of the conference he would expose the things that were going on inside. That is a matter of fact that Mr. Haan testified to.

The purpose of these groups, is to soften American public opinion against Japanese and pave the way for a negotiated peace with Japan.

These are other organizations who are doing the same thing, and we have many men who feel the same way. For example, it was my experience in Bakersfield to talk to an organization there a month and a half ago, on the Japanese situation. A minister sat in front of me. I didn't know he was a minister, but I noticed that he was not reacting very well to my talk on the Japanese situation. The chairman told me that the Board had just turned him down on his application for four new tires. So after some considerable argument this prominent minister asked for retreads and they said, "No."

He said, "Why can't I have retreads? I am an important man in this community," and they said, "No, we give no man retreads or any tires of any kind who drives 400 miles every week going to Manzanar to attend to somebody else's business rather than attend to church affairs."

I debated with one man on the radio a short time ago who is interested in the Japanese problem, and he drives 600 miles [3968] every week to the internment center.

The purpose of this, Mr. Chairman, is to show that there is a lot going on underneath with which we are not familiar. We are taking a wishful attitude in this whole thing. We have got to understand the tremendous forces that underlie the whole Japanese-American groups. I believe this information should be brought out to show the public the problem is not an easy one.

Chairman TENNEY. You are also an ordained minister, are you not?

The WITNESS. Yes.

By Mr. COMBS:

Q. Dr. Lechner, just one other matter I want to take up before we adjourn. You recall that on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor, that was December 7, 1942, there was a riot at Manzanar?

A. Yes.

Q. During which Fred Kayama was severely beaten?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Are you familiar with the general details of that occurrence?

A. I am somewhat familiar with the details. I have here a report of what transpired shortly before that, leading us to believe that a riot would occur. We had a pretty good idea two or three months before that the thing would explode from within.

Q. There is an internment center in the United States [3969] in the western part of the United States, the name of which we are not permitted to mention, at which a group of Japanese prisoners who were captured during the Solomons Island campaign were placed, is that not correct?

A. Yes; they were placed there to mingle with the Japanese-Americans.

Q. And were allowed to talk with them in the Japanese language?

A. Allowed to talk to them in the Japanese language, yes.

Q. And after those conditions had continued for a time there was a riot in that camp, was there not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Describe that riot, if you will, but first, how did you gain your information as to what transpired on that occasion?

A. Through a camp bulletin, Bulletin No. 56, and it was at Camp Lordsburg, New Mexico. It was published on October 29, 1942. It is a mimeographed news sheet issued daily.

Q. At Lordsburg, New Mexico?

A. Lordsburg, New Mexico, yes, by the evacuees themselves.

Q. English or Japanese?

A. In Japanese, and it is printed with the sanction of the administrative heads there.

[3970] CHAIRMAN TENNEY. Which is civilian?

The WITNESS. Which is civilian, yes. This Bulletin 56 described the number of Japanese prisoners who were brought into that camp as of maybe the day before or the day before that, so the news was up to the minute. They gave details as to where they came from and the boat they came in on, information which our own metropolitan papers are not allowed to use, and these men when they contacted the Japanese-American citizens gave them so encouraging a picture of the Japanese victories and their program, and they carried the story right from the inner circles of the Japanese to the Japanese-Americans and they got this particular camp all fired up. That particular attitude came out one morning shortly after this bulletin came out. There was a big demonstration in the

morning. There were several thousand Japanese participating in the demonstration. They were marching through the camp and singing and having a great time.

Our informant tells us that he happened to be with two or three of the officials—

By Mr. Combs:

Q. Is your informant a Japanese?

A. Yes. He is placed there by the Federal Government and I don't dare tell his name. He said that the two or three civilian officials patted them on the back and said: "Our policy for the Relocation Board is pretty good, we are giving them all the leeway possible; look how happy they are," and this informant turned around and said, "Do you know what [3971] they are singing?" They said, "It doesn't make any difference. They are happy."

He said, "They are singing the Japanese national anthem."

They said: "They can't do that here," but he said, "If you will look at that flagpole you will see what they can do," and they looked at the flagpole and during the night the Japanese had lowered the American flag and had placed the Japanese flag on the pole. My report shows it took the threat of machine guns by the Army to permit a man to go up and take that flag down.

Now, during the period that these prisoners came in, the civilian authorities were permitting visitors to come into that camp from anywhere east of the Rockies. These Japanese visitors would come and get the information from these Japanese-Americans and from the prisoners and in turn visit the other camps and spread the story. Our report shows it was this type of encouragement and propaganda which started the stirring up of the situation at Manzanar.

Q. Which led to the demonstration on December 7, 1942?

A. That is right. And also a camp in Nebraska had the same difficulty.

Q. And that, of course, was before all of the Japanese were interned in that area so they could visit back and forth?

A. They took them all there first. The first group they took, I believe, down to Lordsburgh. To me that all shows, I believe, a very unrealistic attitude on the part of the [3972] civilian authorities in handling the Japanese. I think we are making a tremendous mistake in opening up channels for the inciting of feeling because, as a matter of fact, in this document here, which was brought into Los Angeles in 1941, and written in 1940. It is the war instructions by Matsuo, head of the Intelligence Department for the Japanese Navy.

Q. Entitled "How Japan Plans to Win"?

A. "How Japan Plans to Win." Matsuo mentions in there the Japanese Government does not expect sabotage from any Japanese or Japanese-Americans during the first stage of the war; describing the attack on Pearl Harbor, saying no acts of sabotage would be done then, but when Japan is ready to come in the second time and take the islands and then on to the coast, Japan expects a volunteer army be formed to assist the Japanese forces in taking over the territory.

Now, we are playing with dynamite when we release the Japanese and Japanese-Americans as we are, by the thousands, because Japan has not called for their cooperation yet, and having this information and knowing their connection with Japan it is my firm belief as a matter of our own security and national defense, that we have got to take a far more realistic attitude toward the Japs.

Q. There is one other point I would like to cover, an illustrative incident, Dr. Lechner, when you and I had the conference with Kilsoo Haan last Friday. He was relating an incident in connection with the raising of a volunteer group [3973] of Japanese to fight for the United States.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you briefly explain about wearing the belt of a thousand stitches?

A. Yes. This is an important thing. This is just a news release that came out on February 26, 1943.

Kilsoo Haan warned us against the very fact that you might put these men in an Army uniform but that does not necessarily mean you have established their loyalty to this country. That is very difficult for them to get away from—the old traditions and teaching of Japan. May I read this:

"America's new all Japanese Army unit will go into battle carrying the potent good-luck charm of their ancestors.

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"Officials at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center disclosed today that women evacuees are making traditional Japanese belts of 1,000 stitches for their husbands and sons joining the American armed forces.

"The belts, regarded as certain charm against evil, consist of white cloth with 1,000 red stitches sewed in. Each women adds one stitch to each belt."

This belt is passed from one woman to another, and each one adds a stitch until 1,000 stitches have been put in the belt. The theory is that this belt of 1,000 stitches ties the wearer into the whole system, Japanese ancestry and [3974] ancestor worship. In other words, it brings to the bearer all the Japanese traditions, security, and safety. So, instead of throwing that aside, the Japanese traditions, these men are actually wearing these belts. The belts are regarded as certain charm against evil.

I maintain that this is a clear demonstration of the fact, even though we organize an army of Japanese-American citizens they are still tied to their ancestors and still tied to Japanism.

Before closing I would like to read into the record the article from the Hawaiian Hochi, of October 18, 1940, that we discussed awhile ago.

Chairman TENNEY. Very well.

The Witness. It is entitled "Second Generation Japanese Take Part in Overseas Tokio Convention."

The article is as follows:

"The committee in charge of the Overseas Japanese Tokio Convention to be held in commemoration of the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the empire, has decided to allow about 500 second generation Japanese residing in Tokio to participate in it, and give these second generation Japanese, who have had no organ of unity and liaison in the past, a chance, and as preparation committee, members of the various second generation Japanese organization and educational agencies held a meeting with the convention committee at the Choutei of Marunouchi from 6:00 p. m. on September 26. The organizations [3975] that were represented on that day were as follows:

"* * * Overseas Education Association, Japan-America-Hawaii Society, Nippon Home, Waseda International School, McKinley Alumni Association of the Keizen Girls School, Todo Gakuin of the North American Butoku Kai (7,000 members in Hawaii), Japanese-American Society, Pacific Young Men's Club, Japan Cultural Forum, Tokyo chapter of the Boy Scouts, P. S. P., Second Generation Japanese Society, Little Club, Second Generation Japanese Club of the Union Church, the Nisei Club of Yokohama, Sigma Kappa, Self-Supporting Students' Association of Japan, Mizuho Gakuin, Sayama Home, Gekkei Home, Shoko Girls Schools, Overseas Women's Federation, Musashino Girls School, Young Women's Federation, Musashino Girls School, Young Men Buddhist Association of Japan, Japanese-American Young Men's Federation, Foreign Ministry's Bureau of American Affairs, Foreign Ministry's publicity Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry's Bureau of South American Affairs and the International Division of the Japan Broadcasting Association.

"* * * Handling the key of solution to the second generation Japanese, Lt. Gen. Kichijiro Hamada, executive vice president of the convention committee, stated as follows at this meeting:

"The second generation Japanese problems [3976] should be studied and solved by the second generation Japanese, themselves, and are not matters to be coerced into the manner of thinking of a third party, regardless of whom, I think. I am only old and am saying this because I have tasted a little more worldly experience than you, young people, and I wish that the following three points will be taken into consideration in solving the second generation Japanese problems. The means of solution are all in the hands of you, people. The first is that the color of our skin, which has been derived from the Yamato race, will not change, even if it comes to the periods of the third, the fourth and the fifth generations. That they will be of yellow race ancestry will be the same. The second is that I do not think that there will be a change in the superiority complex of the white race fifty or hundred years from now. Russia was defeated by Japan, but the people of Soviet Russia are boasting that they are superior than the yellow race. The third is the world situation. It is extremely shaky, but the actual condition of the world must be considered. Well, I hope you will take into consideration the above three points.

"Then the 11 second generation Japanese, including Mr. Yu Murayama, reporter of the Domei [3977] News Agency, each stood up and expressed

his opinion. Among them Kazuma Nakayama, a native of Vancouver and presently attending the Misuho Gakuen, stated as follows:

"The key points expressed by the Honorable Mr. Hamada have certainly incited in us a certain determination. That is that we must study, learn and master the Japanese spirit and make the Yamato race into a superior one. We must compensate the great effort made by our parents by improving the level of our culture. I have become spiritually stronger since I came to Japan. I intend to study with all my effort."

"Both eyes of Lt. Gen. Hamada became red, while Mr. Goro Shakahisa of the Bureau of American Affairs wiped his tears with one of his hands when this sincere cry was made. Thus, the 11 second generation Japanese, who attended that night, were elected as members of the committee to pilot the second generation Japanese into the course they should take."

Mr. COMBS. Thank you very much.

Chairman TENNEY. I have just one question. It is your opinion, briefly, then, that the American Legion's contention that these relocation centers should be under military supervision?

[3978] The WITNESS. Under strict Army supervision, yes.

Chairman TENNEY. Thank you very much, Dr. Lechner.

Mr. COMBS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record in connection with the Rohl testimony, a recapitulation of certain inconsistencies that appeared in the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Rohl.

The testimony was somewhat complex and in order to epitomize it and coalesce those inconsistencies for our record, I wish to read the following.

Chairman TENNEY. Proceed.

Mr. COMBS. Mr. Rohl testified when he came to this country from Valparaiso, Chile, in 1913, that he was in the construction business, but on his statement to Immigration officials he said he was a merchant.

From the time he arrived in the United States he consistently and carefully concealed the fact that he was an alien. He told Immigration officials at least once that he was born in Iola, Kansas, the birthplace of his wife.

During the several yachting trips he made to Mexico and to Panama and to the Hawaiian Islands the names of all persons on board except his, appears on the ship's manifest.

Although he made 10 or more trips into Mexico he testified that no one questioned him about his citizenship.

He swore on his Federal income tax return that he was a citizen of the United States.

He testified that he had made an affidavit at an earlier [3979] date under the false name of John William Rohl, but he swore on his application for citizenship in 1941, that he had never made such application.

He testified that he owned the Yacht Pandora and personally received the insurance money when the yacht was burned. Mrs. Rohl testified she owned the boats and that the insurance money was paid to her.

Rohl testified that the Ramona was in his wife's name but that he hired the captain and directed the sailings; paid the crew and all expenses for the upkeep of the boat.

Membership in the Newport Beach Yacht Club was in his name.

Rohl also testified that the Vega was registered to his wife, but that he likewise controlled her movements and paid all expenses in connection with her operation.

Mrs. Rohl testified that she paid all those expenses.

Lloyd's registry of American yachts for 1941 lists the Vega's owner as H. W. Rohl.

Rohl testified that none of the stock of the Rohl-Connolly Company was ever issued to anyone but him and T. E. Connolly, but Mrs. Rohl swore she owned 25 percent of it. She also stated she didn't know that Rohl paid a \$25,000 fine to the Federal Government five days before becoming a citizen because the boats, tugs, launches, and other vessels were owned by Rohl-Connolly, a concern in which Rohl, a German alien, owned more than 25 percent of the stock.

[3980] Both Rohl and his wife swore categorically that they had never seen Major Wyman intoxicated, and that he had been aboard their vessel twice.

Now, I put that in the record, Mr. Chairman, for the simple purpose of having it at the end of the testimony—the inconsistencies in the statements made by H. W. Rohl and Floy Rohl.

That is all we have at this time.

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Chairman TENNEY. At this time the Committee will stand adjourned to reconvene at the call of the Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 o'clock p. m., the hearing was concluded.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 8

Vol. 49

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

HEARING HELD BEFORE EXECUTIVE SESSION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S., WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 24, 1944

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[2188]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1944

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The special committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 o'clock a. m. in room 1310 New House Office Building, Honorable Andrew J. May (chairman), presiding.

Present: Representatives May (chairman), Sparkman, Costello, Durham, Elston, Martin and Fenton.

Also Present: Lt. Col. Knowles; H. Ralph Burton, General Counsel to the Committee; and Mr. Joseph Colgan, special investigator.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Hoffman.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT HOFFMAN

(Mr. Hoffman was duly sworn.)

Mr. BURTON. Please state your full name.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Robert Hoffman.

Mr. BURTON. Please give your home address, your occupation, and something of the background and the experience which you have had.

Mr. HOFFMAN. The permanent address is 651 South Dunsmuir [2189] Avenue, Los Angeles; present address Ramon Guzman 96, Mexico City, D. F.; civil engineer in field construction, railroads, tunnels, highways, utilities, hydrolytic plants for 22 years.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I submit several letters of commendations which have reference to the capability, integrity, and responsibility of Mr. Hoffman and ask that they be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Be it so ordered.

(The letters referred to are as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., March 17, 1942.

Refer to File No. ND 312.1

Mr. ROBERT HOFFMAN,
c/o Hawaiian Constructors,
Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR MR. HOFFMAN: I have your letter of March 15th and thank you for the statements contained therein. I desire to thank you for the service that you have rendered and the support that you've given me while on duty as District Engineer.

I hope that I will again have the pleasure of working with you under conditions where we can build up an organization with the efficiency that all true construction men love.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

[2190]

HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR FORCE,
Hickam Field, T. H., 6 April 1942.*To Whom It May Concern:*

During the period October 27, 1941 to February 9, 1942, during which the undersigned was stationed at and in Command of Bellows Field, T. H., Mr. Robert Hoffman was area Superintendent for Hawaiian Constructors.

I found him to be especially cooperative.

He seemed to anticipate the construction needs of the post and missed no opportunity to offer practical suggestions.

His company, through him, was willing to do everything practical to speed up construction so the field could be gotten ready for operations.

(s) LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWES FIELD,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Bellows Field, T. H., 8 April 1942.

AM/jsv

In reply refer to:

Mr. ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H.

DEAR MR. HOFFMAN: It has been a distinct pleasure to be connected with you [2191] during the past four months. In my capacity as S-4 of this station, I was in almost daily contact with your activity.

Since the outbreak of war, there has been an incredible increase of the work heaped upon your organization, with all its attendant confusion. It was often a thing to marvel at to know that one man could handle all the details that came under your care, and still stand up under it with a smile.

Few people here know or properly appreciate the many things that you have done for the men of the service. Fortunately you were just a bit out of reach of a lot of red tape. This enabled you to do many of the things that you have done for the men here. However, without your intense desire to do things for the comfort and recreation of the soldiers, many of these things would have been left undone.

Your all around spirit of cooperation has been "above and beyond the call of duty". My only hope is that your successor may be half as cooperative and half as interested in our fighting men as you have always been.

With the sincere hope that our paths may cross again, I wish to bid you

Aloha,

(s) A. MEULENBERG,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.

HEADQUARTERS BELLOWES FIELD,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER,
Bellows Field, T. H., 20 April 1942.

[2192] In reply refer to:

Mr. ROBERT HOFFMAN,
c/o Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H.

MY DEAR ROBERT: It is with sincere regret that I find you leaving your work with the Hawaiian Constructors at Bellows Field. Since I have been in command of Bellows Field, I have worked with you daily and have always found you to be very, very cooperative, and in my opinion, an excellent engineer and constructor. I don't believe it would be possible for them to fill your place adequately.

I wish you great success in your undertakings, and please remember always that you carry my sincere respect and affection with you wherever you go.

Truly and sincerely,

(s) W. O. FARNUM,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH AIR FORCE BASE COMMAND.
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,
Hickam Field, T. H., 21 April 1942.

To Whom it May Concern:

I have known Mr. Robert Hoffman since September, 1941, in the capacity of superintendent of construction for the Army project at Bellows Field, T. H.

Mr. Hoffman is an exceedingly trustworthy man who will [2193] give complete cooperation to his superiors. He will, however, insist upon honest dealings which is an asset hard to find. He is eminently qualified to direct airport construction.

The above opinions are based upon my observations of him while I was serving as Commanding Officer of Bellows Field, T. H., and as Commanding Officer of the Seventh Air Force Base Command, a command which supervises all Air Corps construction in the Hawaiian Islands.

It is with much regret that our associations are now terminated.

/s/ W. E. FAETHING,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
McMurray, Alberta, Canada, August 2, 1942.

Address replies to: Officer in Charge.

To Whom it May Concern:

I have known Mr. Robert Hoffman for a period of two months through intimate daily contact on the Canol Project.

In his position as Superintendent for the constructors, Bechtel, Price and Callahan, he has at all times displayed untiring energy and a rare ability to get things done in a minimum of time.

/s/ J. N. KRUEGER,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Base Zone Commander.

[2194] Mr. BURTON. Had you occasion to be in Hawaii and surrounding territory?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, from March 1941 until May 2, 1942.

Mr. BURTON. In what capacity were you there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. As area superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors who held the prime Army contracts with the U. S. Engineers. The various superintendency covered everything on the windward side of the Island of Oahu, from Diamond Head to Kuhukua. It embraced all of the defense work, airports, utilities, artillery camp stations, roads, air raid warning stations, in fact all Army work for a distance of some 70 miles along the coastline, especially Bellows Field, Camp Ulupau, Canica Hospital Base and Airfield Zero as it was not named at that time. Total valuation of that portion of the contract was approximately \$20,000,000. Prior to assuming the area, set up the working force at Wheeler Field, and prior to that the working force at Hickam Field, all of the work done under the District Engineer, a Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., succeeded in February 1942 by Colonel Lyman, who, in April, became General Lyman, now deceased.

Mr. BURTON. Did you have any supervision over any other construction work in that territory?

[2195] Mr. HOFFMAN. All construction work in the territory.

Mr. BURTON. Did you have any supervision over construction work on any of the Pacific Islands?

Mr. HOFFMAN. None at all.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know the firms which composed the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, the Rohl-Connolly Company who started the original negotiations with Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles; the Callahan Construction Company of Dallas and Los Angeles; the Gunther-Shirley Company of Lincoln, Nebraska, and Los Angeles; the Hawaiian associate operating under the name of Ralph A. Wooley.

This group of constructors was augmented shortly after December 7, 1941 when all contracts by other contractors were cancelled by Colonel Wyman and the concern known as the Hawaiian Contractors, sponsored by Walter Dillingham, and actually headed by a Mr. Bennett were taken in the organization.

Mr. BURTON. Do you mean that the Hawaiian Contractors did have contracts and they were cancelled by Colonel Wyman after December 7, and that thereafter the Hawaiian Contractors became associated with the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Correct. Mr. Dillingham put on the active operating committee, which was the top committee, a Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BURTON. You spoke of an operating committee, of what persons was that composed?

[2196] Mr. HOFFMAN. Hans Wilhelm (Bill) Rohl, Paul Grafe, Mr. Bennett, and Ralph Wooley.

Mr. BURTON. What were the dates of the first negotiations?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Talk of it started in December 1940, the actual contract came into effect sometime in February. I didn't get over there until the latter part of April 1941.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know anything about the negotiations for these contracts?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The close association of Rohl and Major Wyman during Major Wyman's tenure of office as District Engineer of Los Angeles; it was common knowledge among the contractors on the West Coast that nobody could get a contract outside of Rohl with Major Wyman.

Rohl had secured one contract down at Long Beach through Major Wyman.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever talk with any contractors about this?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I talked to several contractors offhandedly, as to just where Rohl got his pull and how he became so powerful in being able to pick up these contracts out of the air when the rest of them were fighting for them.

Mr. BURTON. Did they give you any reason why he had that influence?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, just that the reputation of Rohl was such that he was known to have paid and bought his way in contractual [2197] work for years on the West Coast. Rohl was not liked by the West Coast contractors.

Mr. BURTON. Coming back to this operating committee in Hawaii, can you state whether any one person was a dominant figure?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Rohl was the dominant figure. In fact, so much so that after the committee was formed, along the latter part of September or the first part of October, conditions for the operating superintendents became much worse.

Mr. BURTON. Was that in 1941?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It became much worse for procuring of equipment and materials due to Rohl consistently bungling as operating director.

Mr. BURTON. Could you say that any delay in the construction work was occasioned by the handling by Rohl?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Definitely so. Let me add that can be verified by a statement from Mr. Clapp, who was brought over there to Hawaii as project engineer about the first of December 1941, and who after four weeks had a very severe verbal battle with Rohl on account of the operations and he left the island and came back to the mainland.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know of any protests on the part of Wyman to Rohl that the work was being delayed?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, the incompetence of Colonel Wyman could offer no protest to anyone.

[2198] Mr. BURTON. Do you mean that Colonel Wyman was inefficient?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Definitely so.

Mr. BURTON. Can you give any reason for that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. As a field construction engineer, Colonel Wyman couldn't handle a construction job in civilian life. He surrounded himself with men who would say nothing but yes, therefore he denied himself the privilege of ideas that would expedite the work and the materials; in other words doing a good job, it could not be done with his arrogance.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall when Rohl came to Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say the latter part of September 1941.

Mr. BURTON. Did Colonel Wyman act upon the recommendations of Rohl in opposition to those of other persons?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, the recommendations of Rohl who wasn't qualified to handle that job were detrimental to good operations in completing the work assigned.

Mr. BURTON. Did you find that non-completion of the work was detrimental to the interests of the United States?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, time and time again.

Mr. BURTON. Did Colonel Wyman have the absolute control of the work?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Absolute control.

Mr. BURTON. Did he have to report to any superior officer?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I imagine he had to report to Colonel Hannum who was, up until December 7, the District Engineer with head- [2199] quarters in San Francisco. Hawaii at that time was not an individual Division Office—it was part of the Division Office of San Francisco. After December 7 it became an individual office and Wyman was made a District Engineer.

Mr. BURTON. From that time on he was in complete authority?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He was in complete authority prior because his reports, if he made any and he must have, could not have been truthful based on the actual work completed at that time. Any ordinary construction man by checking the reports could have found out that something was vitally wrong.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever have any conferences with Wyman about the delays?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, many of them in which there was very little satisfaction and one in particular which took place at Colonel Wyman's call for all of the area engineers and area superintendents to meet in his office. This was in the latter part of August 1941 and in the presence of Paul Grafe, one of the associate contracting companies in the Hawaiian Constructors. The statement best remembered is one by Colonel Wyman who said, "You men have fallen down. I expected you to spend two million dollars a week and you are only spending one. What are you going to do about it?"

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall any of the answers made to Wyman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. There were many answers. In fact, all of the superintendents said, "Give us more equipment and more material [2200] and we will give you the expenditure."

Mr. BURTON. Is it a usual thing to complain to contractors that they are not spending enough money?

Mr. HOFFMAN. On the contrary, it is the usual complaint of the owner to ask for expeditious completion of the assigned tasks at the lowest possible costs. We never speak of making expenditures without a definite assignment of a definite task or certain work to do.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall whether Rohl was present at that meeting?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He was not at that time.

Mr. BURTON. Did any of the persons present complain about Rohl's attitude and activities?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I might safely say that every superintendent on the job complained of Rohl's bungling of the whole job, in fact, several of the superintendents resigned and broke their contracts because of it.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall what part of this construction was the installation of permanent warning signals, or are they air raid signals?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Permanent Air Raid Warning Signals, referred to as AWR.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall if there was any delay in the installation of these stations?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, in my areas there were delays on four of [2201] them.

Mr. BURTON. Can you give any reason for that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Inefficient operation and direction by the operating committee of the Hawaiian Constructors, of which Mr. Rohl was the head.

Mr. BURTON. Could those warning stations have been completed by December 7, 1941, the date of the attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, sir. There were ample men and ample material. All of the AWR stations on that side of the island particularly were tunneled out of the rock formations along the sea, and we had ample tunnel equipment as far back as August 1941.

Mr. BURTON. Had those stations been completed and in operation by December 7, would it, in your opinion, have aided in detecting the approach of planes?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes. If the stations were working, in effect and force, they would have detected the approach of planes.

Mr. BURTON. Had Rohl conducted the contract work in an efficient manner and utilized the men and equipment as he should have done, could these air raid warning stations have been completed by December 7?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Can you state whether or not it was generally understood that these Air Raid Warning Stations were considered [2202] vital to the defense of Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Very much so.

Mr. BURTON. I show you a document which is entitled, "State by Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area, Bellows Field", and ask you if that document was prepared by you.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that that be submitted as Exhibit No. 1.

(The document referred to was marked as Exhibit No. 1, of 1/24/44.)

Mr. BURTON. Can you give the date that this was prepared?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It was completed April 29, 1942.

Mr. BURTON. This statement is composed partly of narrative and partly of exhibits?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is correct.

Mr. BURTON. Do any of these exhibits reflect upon the progress, or lack of progress of the construction work in Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They do.

Mr. BURTON. I will ask you to point out some of the exhibits which bear upon these questions.

Mr. HOFFMAN. These are the exact copies of the originals. One or two are addressed to Rohl that definitely tie him into the thing you want, I think. Exhibit No. 20, dated March 10, [2203] 1942, is a memorandum to Mr. Rohl asking reasons why the tunnel work was stopped at Bellows Field after General Tinker and General Farthing agreed to go ahead with it immediately, as the tunnel would be the only supply depot for aviation gas for the windward side of the island. General Tinker advised me personally that it was one of the most important items of quick defense required for Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this particular memorandum be spread upon the record.

Mr. COSTELLO. Be it so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to is as follows:)

Exhibit No. 20

Memorandum to H. W. Rohl.

From Robert Hoffman.

Date: March 10, 1942.

We are at a loss to understand why our original list, which you recommended be mailed to the 15th Area, on equipment necessary for tunneling, was stopped. Mr. Lomax advises that you held up this list without notation to hold in abeyance. Your call last night seemingly advised that we proceed at once.

Will you kindly advise this office whether we are to proceed and, if so, give us some help in securing the equipment and we shall give you a pretty good job. I have the men and am anxious to hand much the second tunnel cheaper and faster than was done with the equipment on the previous job.

[2204] We fully understand the difficulty in securing equipment and general conditions pertaining to the entire setup, but we still feel that you can give us some help, and we shall do our best with what we have to work with.

We thank you for your help.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,

Superintendent Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf

Address Reply to District Engineer

U. S. Engineer Office

P. O. Box 2240, Honolulu, T. H.

[2205] Mr. BURTON. Have you any knowledge of contracts which related to defense installations and projects on the islands of the Pacific held by the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, general knowledge. The heads of the Hawaiian Constructors had another organization called Territorial Constructors which was headed by Paul Grafe, who was second in command of the Hawaiian Constructors. Those contracts were let, however, by Colonel Wyman on the Island of Hawaii, the Island of Lanai, and the Island of Kauai, but the two organizations didn't mix although they were headed by the same group. One was called Territorial Constructors on the outlying islands.

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Mr. BURTON. Is it true that the Hawaiian Constructors had a contract on some of the Pacific Islands?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is true, sir. Some of my men were shipped down to some of those islands at various times to work.

Mr. BURTON. Did you have any occasion to come in contact with Paul Grafe?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, Paul Grafe was my immediate superior and up until the time that Rohl came to Hawaii, Paul Grafe was in command of the work.

Mr. BURTON. Did each of the companies associated with the Hawaiian Constructors have their representatives on the jobs?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, not at all. Paul Grafe acted for all of them when he was head, with the exception of Mr. Wooley who was the Hawaiian part of the constructors. Paul Grafe [2206] acted for Gunther-Shirley and Callahan, and if you look back to Los Angeles, you will find that the Gunther-Shirley offices and the Callahan offices are in the same building, Suite No. 714 West Olympic Boulevard.

Mr. BURTON. After Rohl came to Hawaii in September of 1941 did he supersede Grafe so far as having charge was concerned?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes. He seemed to be the top man.

Mr. BURTON. That was for all of the companies?

Mr. HOFFMAN. All of them.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like your permission at this point to submit and be spread upon the record a letter dated December 10, 1943, from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice to me which gives the Immigration and naturalization record of Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

The CHAIRMAN. Be it so ordered.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to say at this point that this letter shows that Hans Wilhelm Rohl came to the United States the first time on October 23, 1913. It further shows that during all of the years he was in the United States until September 1941 he made no attempt to become naturalized, although during the latter part of his being in the United States he enjoyed the benefit of Government contracts.

Mr. ELSTON. Before he was naturalized?

Mr. BURTON. Before he was naturalized.

Mr. ELSTON. Where did he come from?

[2207] Mr. BURTON. He came from Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Had he taken out any papers prior to September 1941?

Mr. BURTON. He apparently had taken out first papers. On September 15, 1941, after he had obtained contracts for installations of defense work in Hawaii he made strong effort to become naturalized and on September 15, 1941, he was naturalized in the Court of Judge J. F. T. O'Connor and left that day for Hawaii.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

[2208]

EARL G. HARRISON, COMMISSIONER

246-C-5256161

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Philadelphia 2, December 10, 1943.

Mr. H. RALPH BURTON,

*General Counsel, Committee on Military Affairs,
Room 519, Old House Office Building,
Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. BURTON: This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 4, 1943, in which you state that you have been directed to obtain, and therefore request for the use of the Committee, a fully detailed statement of the record in the files of this Bureau relating to one Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

The records of this office show that Hans Wilhelm Rohl (John William Rohl), then residing at 8159 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, filed petition for naturalization in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California on March 10, 1941, under the provisions of Section 310 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940. In that petition the alien stated that he was a contractor;

that he was born at Lubeck, Germany on September 29, 1886; and that he was of the German race and German nationality. He alleged that he was married on August 26, 1925, at San Francisco, [2209] California; that the

name of his wife was Floy Edith; that she was born at Iola, Kansas on October 27, 1890; and that she then resided with him. He claimed arrival in the United States at the port of New York, New York on October 23, 1913, on the S. S. Santa Marta, and was legally admitted for permanent residence. He alleged that he had four children, all born in Sacramento, California, in 1916, 1918, 1921 and 1923, respectively. He claimed residence in California continuously since October 1926. His application to file a petition alleged residence in Ely, Nevada, from November 1913 to October 1914; in Sacramento, California, from October 1914 to January 1923; and in San Francisco, California, from January 1923 to October 1926. His petition was duly verified by the affidavits of two witnesses, Thomas E. Connolly, contractor, 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco, California, and Karl Lewis, physician, 9654 Olympic Boulevard, Beverly Hills, California, who averred in their affidavits that they had known the alien at Los Angeles, California, since January 1, 1937.

The record of preliminary examination of Mr. Rohl shows that he testified that his present marriage was his second one. He testified that his first marriage was to Marian Henderson at Sacramento, California, in December 1914, and that his four children were the issue of this marriage. He testified further that he and his first wife separated in 1923, and that she obtained a final decree of desertion. He testified further [2210] that he paid each child \$75 a month and that his first wife had remarried and was living at Sacramento, California. He promised to furnish later the address of his first wife.

Mr. Rohl produced at the preliminary examination his certificate of marriage to his present wife, which certificate was returned to him. Her birth in the United States was proved by the affidavit of her sister and her divorce from her first husband (she had been married one time before her marriage to Mr. Rohl according to the record) was proved by the production of a duly authenticated copy of the court record of the final judgment of divorce.

Mr. Rohl called at the Los Angeles Office on March 11, 1941, and admitted that his testimony at the preliminary examination concerning his first marriage was not correct. He asserted that he was not legally married to Marian Henderson but that he had lived with her from 1914 to 1923; that he was the father of their four children; that they had lived together only in California (wherein commonlaw marriages are not recognized); and that there had not been any kind of ceremony. He asserted further that she was then living at 2371 Portola Way, Sacramento, California, and that their two minor children were living with her. He asserted further that he had entered into property settlement with her on April 22, 1925, and furnished a copy of the written agreement. This agreement shows that he promised to pay to Marian Rohl \$70 per month during [2211] her lifetime or until she should remarry, and that he promised to pay \$45 per month for each of their four minor children, such payments to continue during the minority of each child. Mr. Rohl's first "wife", Mrs. Marian Clark, was interviewed by a representative of this Service at Sacramento on March 29, 1941, and she confirmed the story of their relations, as admitted by Mr. Rohl, and said that he had done everything he promised in the agreement.

The record shows that Mr. Rohl testified at the preliminary examination that he had never been in the United States before his arrival on October 23, 1913, and disclosed several absences since that time, which will be mentioned below.

He asserted that he left New York on November 27, 1924, on the S. S. Deutschland; that he spent three or four days in and the remainder of his visit abroad in London, England; and that he returned at New York on January 10, 1925, on the S. S. France, in possession of a reentry permit. This return was verified by the New York office.

He asserted that in 1931 and 1932 he made about ten trips to Mexico in connection with construction work on a road between Monterrey and Mexico City; that the longest single absence was not over three weeks; and that he departed and reentered at Laredo, Texas. Efforts to verify these reentries were unsuccessful, the Inspector in Charge at Laredo reporting that the records of that port failed to disclose any record [2212] of any kind at any time relating to Mr. Rohl.

The record shows further that Mr. Rohl testified at the preliminary examination that he traveled on the yacht "Ramona" from New York to San Diego, California, in 1933, arriving at San Diego on the day before Labor Day, in September. The journey was through the Panama Canal. He asserted that the vessel stopped at Acapulco, Mexico for ten hours to take on fuel and that there were no other stops en route. The records of this Service at the San Diego office show that the yacht "Ramona" arrived at that port from New York on September 3, 1933, and that

the owner of the yacht was H. W. Rohl, 3278 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. His name did not appear on the crew list.

The record shows further that Mr. Rohl testified at the preliminary examination that he traveled on the yacht "Vega" from Jacksonville, Florida, to Honolulu, and thence to Los Angeles. He asserted that he departed from Jacksonville in November 1937; that he arrived at Los Angeles in February 1938; and that the only stop en route was at Honolulu. The records of this Service at the Honolulu office show that the yacht "Vega" arrived at Honolulu on January 21, 1938, from Balboa, Canal Zone, with four passengers and sixteen crewmen. The crew list was visaed at Nassau, Bahamas, and again at Balboa, Canal Zone, since there were five aliens among the members of the crew. The four passengers were manifested and [2213] one of them was shown as H. William Rohl, (M), born September 29, 1886, at Tola, Kansas.

Information came to this Service, apparently from the records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, that Mr. Rohl asserted in his income tax return for the years 1938 and 1939 that he was a United States Citizen and that in the course of an investigation in 1934 he was asked the question, "Are you a citizen of the United States" and he answered, "Yes, I am. I was naturalized in 1921."

Mr. Rohl was called to the Los Angeles office and was interrogated under oath on April 30, 1941. He was questioned about his marital history and his absences and his income tax returns, among other things. He explained his testimony at the preliminary examination that he had been married to Marian Henderson by the assertion that he believed commonlaw marriages were recognized in California. Concerning his testimony at the preliminary examination that his wife, Marian Henderson, had obtained a divorce from him, he was asked, "Were any divorce proceedings ever had between Marian Henderson and yourself" and he answered, "No, a settlement was made." He was asked further for his reasons for stating that he had been divorced, and answered, "We made settlement and signed an agreement." He asserted that he was never questioned by the officers of this Service at Laredo as to his citizenship when returning from any of his visits to Mexico in 1932, and was [2214] merely asked where he lived. He denied making any claim that he was a citizen of the United States during the course of these reentries. He asserted that he purchased the yacht "Ramona"; that it was registered in his wife's name; and that he was not inspected when he landed from this vessel at San Diego in 1933. He also asserted that he purchased the yacht "Vega"; that his wife also purchased it; and that he does not know how it happened that he was manifested as a native of Tola, Kansas, upon arrival of the vessel at Honolulu on January 21, 1938. He asserted that he was not inspected and admitted by an immigration officer; that he was not asked any questions; and that he never said that he was born in Kansas. He admitted that some of his income tax returns had shown him to be a citizen of the United States, but asserted that his income tax forms were prepared by an auditor; that he only went over the work sheets with the auditor; and that he had no knowledge until recently that the returns contained a cross in a box to indicate that he was a citizen of this country. He denied ever making a statement to the Bureau of Internal Revenue in answer to a question, "Are you a citizen of the United States" that "Yes, I am. I was naturalized in 1921." He asserted that he was not in possession of a reentry permit or an unexpired immigration visa upon any of his reentries from Mexico, or when he landed at San Diego in 1933 from the yacht "Ramona" or when he arrived at Honolulu in 1938 on the yacht "Vega".

[2215] Another sworn statement was taken from Mr. Rohl at the Los Angeles office on May 22, 1941, which explored his absences from the United States as mentioned above. Thereafter, on May 27, 1941, the Inspector in Charge at Los Angeles submitted a formal application for warrant of arrest to the Central Office. The application recited Mr. Rohl's last entry into the United States as being at Honolulu, T. H., on January 21, 1938, ex yacht "Vega" and applied for warrant of arrest on the charge that "He is in the United States in violation of the Immigration Act of 1924, in that at the time of his entry he was not in possession of an unexpired immigration visa." The Central Office concluded on July 10, 1941 that no ground for deportation proceedings appeared to exist, pointing out that it did not appear that it was necessary for Mr. Rohl to have any documents at the time of his arrival at Honolulu on January 21, 1938, he having the status of legally admitted resident of the United States at that time. It was also pointed out that the three-year period of limitation provided by the statute had expired, reference apparently being made to the charge of entry without inspection.

Prior to the hearing on this petition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service received a letter, dated August 28, 1941, from Brigadier General John J. Kingman stating, among other things, that the services of Mr. Rohl were of vital importance because of his peculiar qualifications and the scarcity of [2216] qualified supervisory personnel. He stated further that it was the understanding of his service that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States was beyond question, and then requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be expedited.

Inquiry was made of the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding this alien immediately following the filing of his petition for naturalization with negative results.

Mr. Rohl's petition for naturalization was heard by the court on September 15, 1941, along with the petitions of two other aliens. It was the practice at that time, when a case had facts to be presented to the court, to prepare a written report to the court reciting the relevant facts. Enclosed herewith is a copy of this report to the court. The facts in the case were presented to the court without objection and without recommendation. After considering the facts, the court entered an order admitting Mr. Rohl to citizenship on September 15, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Earl G. Harrison
EARL G. HARRISON
Commissioner

Enclosures

83608—Hans William Rohl

Petition filed 3/10/41

No objection will be made to the granting of this petition. For the information of the court, however, the results of the [2217] investigation made in connection with the case are herewith presented.

The petition was filed on 3/10/41 under the provisions of Section 310 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which grants certain exemptions from the usual requirements of the naturalization law to the spouse of a United States citizen and which requires proof of good character for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

The petitioner was born in Germany in 1886 and has resided in the United States since 1913. From about 1916 to 1925 he lived with one Marion Henderson in the State of California but they were not legally married and no marriage ceremony of any kind was performed. As a result of their relationship four children were born to them. On April 22, 1925, they entered into a written agreement under the terms of which Marion Henderson was to have the use of the home property in Sacramento, California, and to receive \$70 per month during her lifetime or until she should marry. He was also to pay her \$45 per month for the support of each child during minority. The investigation shows that the terms of this agreement have been fulfilled by the petitioner. He married his present wife, who is a citizen of the United States, on August 28, 1925, and has resided with her continuously since then.

There is some evidence to indicate that the petitioner has represented himself as a United States citizen. The peti- [2218] tioner has stated, however, that he has never believed himself to be a citizen and has never wilfully represented himself as a citizen of the United States.

In 1932 the petitioner made 10 or 12 trips to Mexico in connection with a contract which he had to build roads there and on these trips left and reentered the United States at Laredo, Texas. The Immigration Service has reported that he has no record of his inspection upon his returns from these absences. The petitioner states that he was never questioned as to his citizenship but was only asked where he lived and was permitted to reenter the United States.

On September 3, 1933, the petitioner arrived at San Diego, Calif., on the yacht, "Ramona", which was registered in the name of his wife, on a trip from New York. He was not listed on the manifests as a passenger or member of the crew and there is no record that he was inspected as required by the immigration law. The petitioner has stated that the immigration officers came aboard but that he was not asked any questions by them.

On January 21, 1938, the petitioner arrived at Honolulu, T. H., on the yacht, "Vega", which was registered in the name of his wife, on a trip from Jacksonville, Florida. The manifest data on file with the Immigration Service shows that he was manifested as having been born in Kansas and he was, therefore, not inspected. The petitioner has stated that he did not [2219] claim

to have been born in Kansas and he was not asked any questions by the immigration officers.

All of the facts in connection with the petitioner's reentries into the United States were presented to the Department in Washington and it was decided on July 10, 1941, that, in view of all of the evidence, it was not a proper case in which to institute deportation proceedings.

The records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue show that for the past several years it has been shown on the petitioner's income tax returns that he is a citizen of the United States. The petitioner has stated that his returns were made out by an auditor; that he only went over the work sheets with the auditor and did not know that the completed forms showed that he was a citizen and that he believes the auditor assumed he was a citizen and he is certain that he did not state to him that he was. It is understood that the classification as a citizen would not have changed the amount of the tax.

The records of the Customs Service, Los Angeles, show that the Rohl-Connolly Co., of which the petitioner is the president, owned and operated a number of vessels from 1934 to 1940 in violation of the law in that the petitioner, who was the president of and a stockholder in the company, was an alien. The penalty provided is forfeiture of the vessels. The petitioner, however, made a cash settlement of the claim against the company on 9/4/41 of \$25,000. It does not appear [2220] that there was a willful violation of the law and no criminal action is contemplated.

The petitioner is the President of the Rohl-Connolly Contracting Company, located at 4351 Valley Blvd., Los Angeles, and has been awarded a secret contract in connection with a defense construction project in Honolulu. His participation in this project is being held up until he has been naturalized.

Mr. BURTON. I would like also at this time to submit a list of long-distance telephone calls between Hans Wilhelm Rohl and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., in Hawaii, both before and after September 15, 1941, on which date he became naturalized.

The CHAIRMAN. The name Hans Wilhelm Rohl is rather significant, I think.

Mr. ELSTON. Do I understand he got contracts before September 15, 1941?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, he got the first contract in Hawaii on December 20, 1940.

Mr. ELSTON. Had he taken out his first naturalization papers then?

Mr. BURTON. He apparently had taken out first papers at that time because he became naturalized in 1941, September 15.

(The list of telephone calls is as follows:)

[2221] TELEPHONE CALLS—HANS WILHELM ROHL TO COL. THEODORE WYMAN, JR.

Los Angeles, California, from Room 9334, Biltmore Hotel, Rohl to Wyman, Honolulu. Telephone No. 98874, between 2:00 and 3:00 P. M. Person to person call. Charge \$10.20. (July 15, 1940.)

Los Angeles, California, from Room 9227, Biltmore Hotel, Rohl to Col. Wyman, National 8400, Washington, D. C., between 2:00 and 3:00 P. M. Person to person call. Charge \$.60. (December 21, 1940.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Colonel Theodore Wyman, District Engineer, Telephone No. 98874, Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii, at 7:42 P. M. Time 8 minutes. Person to person call. Charge \$24.00. (January 4, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Wyman, District Engineer, (Major Robertson?), Telephone No. 3471, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 5:21 P. M. Time 3 minutes. Charge \$9.00. (January 9, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Theodore Wyman, District Engineer, Telephone No. 3471, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 8:10 P. M. Time 11 minutes. Person to person call. Charge \$33.00. (January 17, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Theodore Wyman, District Engineer, Telephone No. 67731, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 2:55 P. M. (February 5, 1941.)

[2222] Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Wyman, District Engineer, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 5:47 A. M. (March 19, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Theodore Wyman, Telephone No. 67731, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H. Time 16 minutes. Person to person call. Charge \$48.00. (May 22, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Theodore Wyman, Telephone No. 67731, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 10:13 A. M. Time 5 minutes. Person to person call. Charge \$15.00. (October 30, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Theodore Wyman, District Engineer, U. S., Telephone No. 67731, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 4:12 P. M. Time 8 minutes. Person to person call. Charge \$24.00. (October 31, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Theodore Wyman, District Engineer, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H. Time 5 minutes. Person to person call. Charge \$15.00. (October 31, 1941.) At 1:45 P. M.

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Theodore Wyman, District Engineer, U. S. Army, Telephone 67731, Alexander Young Bldg., Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 12:20 P. M. (November 3, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Wyman, District Engineer of U. S. A., Telephone No. 67731, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 12:32 P. M. Time 5 minutes. Charge \$15.00. [2223] Person to person call. (November 8, 1941.)

Los Angeles, California, GRA 4489, Rohl to Col. Theodore Wieman, District Engineers Office, Honolulu, Oahu, T. H., at 3:36 P. M. Time 8 minutes. Person to person call. Charge \$24.00. (November 12, 1941.)

Mr. BURTON. Did Paul Grafe act with efficiency?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, because Paul Grafe is not a construction man nor an engineer. He promoted the jobs and kept the contact good. By that I mean he was very close to Colonel Wyman. They were constantly together.

Mr. BURTON. How close was he to Rohl?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Paul Grafe was Rohl's closest associate.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know anything of Grafe's background?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, only that I understand he married into the Callahan family, and nothing else.

Mr. BURTON. Did you have any opportunity to observe Colonel Wyman both in and out of office hours?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I did.

Mr. BURTON. Can you state whether or not he indulged heavily in drink?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I have seen him intoxicated.

Mr. BURTON. Did you have difficulty in getting in contact with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, on many occasions. We could not find him [2224] for a day or two and the usual excuse was that he was out looking over some other project, which was entirely possible.

Mr. BURTON. Did the Hawaiian Constructors have offices in the Pleasanton Hotel?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They had quarters in the Pleasanton Hotel and their offices were in the Panahou School. That was a school comprised of about twenty-five different buildings and immediately after the attack of December 7, Colonel Wyman took over the entire school, gave one building to the Hawaiian Constructors for their offices and he took two or three for himself. Up until that time, their offices were on the fifth and sixth floor of the Young Hotel in Central Honolulu.

Mr. BURTON. Did they do any reconstructing of the school buildings?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, he, Colonel Wyman, did. He built the most expensive air raid shelter imaginable connecting his office building underground where it was air conditioned and good enough to live in.

Mr. BURTON. You mean the air raid shelter connected with his office?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. How much do you suppose it cost to build?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Offhand, I would say \$125,000 or \$150,000.

Mr. BURTON. In your opinion, was there any need to spend that much money?

[2225] Mr. HOFFMAN. It was not necessary at all because it was given up three or four weeks after that.

Mr. BURTON. Then what became of the expenditure?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It was just charged off.

Mr. BURTON. Did any other officers or Government officials build an air raid shelter?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Not that I know of.

Mr. BURTON. Did he reconstruct any other office buildings?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, they were continually remodeling the offices, tearing out partitions and creating new rooms. They had a maintenance crew around the buildings doing this remodeling with the home crew on the grounds. I would say the crew was composed of probably 150 men.

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Mr. BURTON. They were constantly at work, then, repairing and reconstructing?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. In your opinion, was there any need to do that to the extent that it was done?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, not to the extent that it was done.

Mr. BURTON. Can you state whether Rohl had complete access to the plans and designs and locations of the defense projects and installations in Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He had access to every single plan there. He was the boss.

Mr. BURTON. Do you have any knowledge as to whether he was [2226] advised of those plans before he came to Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I wouldn't know, but after he came there he had every access.

Mr. BURTON. Did the firm of Sverdrup and Parcel have anything to do with the construction on Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, nothing on the island at all. They had work on the outlying islands.

Mr. BURTON. Can you state anything about the personal relations of Rohl and Wyman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Rohl was very close to Wyman and Wyman to Rohl. Their drinking parties at the Moana Hotel were dual drinking parties between the two of them and it became common property around Honolulu that you do business only with a bottle of gin between you, this always referring to Rohl and Wyman.

Mr. BURTON. Just what was the occasion of Rohl calling you when he was drinking?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The actions of drunken men are beyond by understanding. Can I refer you to Exhibit No. 11 dated March 18 in which I called Mr. Rohl's attention to calling me at 2:30 in the morning the evening of March 17, 1942, in which I took exception to his drunken talk and wrote him a letter about it?

Mr. BURTON. I hand you a memorandum dated March 18, 1942, from you to H. W. Rohl; subject—Defense at Ulupau. Is that a copy of the letter?

[2227] Mr. HOFFMAN. That is an exact copy of the letter to which I just referred.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that this letter be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Be it so ordered.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

[2228]

Exhibit No. 11

To: H. W. Rohl.

From: Robert Hoffman.

Date: March 18, 1942.

Subject: Guns at Ulupau.

Your call at 2:30 the morning of the 17th, requesting additional information on the replacement of guns at Ulupau, while merited, was a surprise, in view of the facts as chronologically related below:

It so happens that on the morning of March 16th, at 9:30 the writer for the first time saw the detail plan of the bolt and plate installations on this gun—in the office of Mr. Lloyd, the assistant area engineer. The writer to date, two days later, still has no plans, but merely a takeoff which was made.

There have been constant rains in the Ulupau and Bellows areas since March 2nd and, with the red clay surrounding Ulupau, it was, therefore, impossible to even move into excavation, although two gun excavations had already been made, with the exception of the trim.

Yesterday morning, just six hours after talking to you and Colonel Robinson, we are advised that the grade had been changed on the excavations, made by the survey party, so that we had to work back in again and reset.

The bolts for the gun plates had not been ordered by the Engineers and are still not available, as far as I know.

[2229] It is impossible to understand how anyone could expect a job to be done, without plans, pre-ordered materials, favorable weather conditions and with the existing deficiencies on the part of those who started direction of the work.

This is no alibi of the writer or any part of this organization, but merely a statement of fact.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent,
Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf

Mr. BURTON. You may proceed, Mr. Hoffman, to describe that.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Rohl was drunk when he called. His conversation did not make sense. You knew that he was drunk calling a man at two-thirty with Colonel Wyman sitting right there in the room just because the two men had gotten drunk and gotten into an argument and they called me to settle their argument.

Mr. BURTON. Did they make calls frequently?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say about once a month.

Mr. BURTON. Could you definitely say that they were drunk?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Definitely.

Mr. BURTON. Where did Rohl live?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The first known residence was a house on Blackpoint on Diamond Head Road. His next known residence was a house in Nuannu Field and then after December 7, Rohl told me personally that the Colonel thought it was unsafe for him to be in a house so they moved to the hotel.

[2230] Mr. BURTON. You say "they" moved?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, Rohl and his wife.

Mr. BURTON. Where did Wyman live?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Wyman had a private house prior to December 7. I do not know the address.

Mr. BURTON. Where did he live after December 7?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I understand he moved to the hotel.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever see him there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I saw him there often.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever see him with Rohl there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, many times.

Mr. BURTON. I shall appreciate it, Mr. Hoffman, if you would now give a narrative in the nature of an over-all picture of what you found upon arrival in Hawaii, of your experience with the construction work, until you left, and the same regarding your work in Alaska.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I arrived in Hawaii on April 26, 1940, with instructions to report to the Hawaiian Constructors' Office, then quartered at Pier 2, Honolulu. On reporting there, I was advised to proceed to Hickam Field for assignment.

At Hickam Field the following morning, you could find no one who could give any directions as to what was to be done. I had learned from the cutting platform foreman that while he had one or two plans for Army barracks and buildings, that he had no list of pre-cut materials to follow. In order to keep [2231] busy, I took the plans and worked for five days preparing the pre-cut list of lumber and necessary hardware, including concrete aggregates for all the type buildings for which plans were available and submitted them to the Hawaiian Constructors' office who, in turn, gave them to the United States Army Engineers. These lists were then used as examples for the balance of the entire work in Hawaii.

On the sixth day or approximately May 13, I was ordered to Wheeler Field to straighten out a new construction crew who were just starting a contract at that point. After lining up this crew, which took a week, I was ordered to report to Bellows Field and start operations there.

During the first two weeks at Hawaii I quickly found there were no pre-arranged plans for scheduling of work, that the various foremen and superintendents did not know what they were doing, and that the contractors were blaming the engineers and the engineers blaming the contractors.

The work started at Bellows Field about the last week in May 1941, and the problems of construction began due to the inability in securing the necessary materials from the United States Engineers. The supply yards at Fort Kan, which adjoins Hickam Field, had adequate materials and lumber to complete all of the assigned work at that time, but the confusing red tape of the engineers was such that it was impossible to get a requisition through in less than three or four weeks although [2232] the distance was only about twenty miles.

The Area Engineer at Bellows Field for the Fifth Area was Paul J. Lynch, a recognized construction engineer in the United States who, on his own initiative and through pressure on the United States Engineers at Fort Kan, began bringing materials to Bellows Field with the result that this field, *the last one to start in construction*, was the first one to finish at the *lowest cost* per square foot. The operation committee of the Hawaiian Constructors, inadequately manned by incompetent help, were in part responsible for the deficient progress made in the construction program. To this may be added the gross inefficiency of the United States Engineers who, because of lacking plans and lack of plan-

ning, were detrimental in completing the assigned tasks. While materials were plentiful in all the supply yards, they were difficult to secure for the assigned work due to a lack of systematic requisitioning in the United States Engineers Office.

From the start of excavation for the runways at Bellows Field during the middle of July 1941, until the actual completion of the movement of some two million yards of decomposed coral, there was but one two-yard shovel to do this job. Had there been adequate equipment there the field would have been finished prior to December 1, 1941.

The gasoline storage tunnels at Bellows Field originally scheduled for completion on November 15 were finally completed [2233] in March 1942, due to stoppage orders on the part of the United States Engineers. That is a part of the record completed on April 29.

While there was ample tunnelling equipment, there was no adequate reason why the work did not go on. Gasoline storage of aviation gasoline to supply the gas for the airfield, the nearest one, was thirty miles away.

Mr. BURTON. Did there happen to be need for it on December 7?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The only gasoline truck on Bellows Field was bombed and burned on December 7 and there was no gas for the planes.

Mr. BURTON. How many planes would you say were on the field which could have been used?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Twenty-two P-40's.

Mr. BURTON. Had there been gasoline in those tunnels, they could have been used?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, they could have been used.

Throughout the entire job, in brief summary, there seemed to be no coordination between the Army Engineers and the Army, nor between the United States Engineers and the contractors, nor between the contractors' own employees.

The labor turnover was great with competent efficient field men resigning due to lack of cooperation and lack of assistance. The staff of both the United States Engineers and the contractors [2234] were much overstaffed with no allocated authority so that a definite positive order could be issued and followed. In one particular instance a change of the fill at Bellows Field was reversed four times within seven hours.

Colonel Wyman, the District Engineer, was credited with having the most inefficient organization in the history of construction and it became common knowledge that his removal in February 1942 was definitely due to this inefficiency.

The assumption of director of operations for the Hawaiian Constructors by Rohl seemed to muddle the situation more after he assumed office and the work slowed down.

On May 2, 1942, the day I left Hawaii, I witnessed an incoming convoy of twelve ships which were then bringing in motive equipment that was due in July 1941, to a job that was 95 per cent complete.

It was my understanding from Colonel Wyman himself that most of the equipment belonged to Rohl and had been lying on the docks of San Francisco since the previous May.

During the latter part of August 1941, the Hawaiian Constructors who carried their own payroll with U. S. E. D. money became so inefficient in their payroll accounts with the men that the U. S. Engineers relieved them of paying the payroll and while we all hoped it would be better, the U. S. Engineers' management of the payroll was even worse than when it was handled by the contractors.

[2235] The personal difficulties between the various officers under the command of Colonel Wyman and the difficulties between those officers and his own area engineers made it very difficult to execute any order that came out.

Let us refer to the various exhibits of my report of April 29, which substantiates that there were constant stoppages in assigning work which could have been completed prior to or before December 1, 1941.

Mr. BURTON. Can you state at this point, Mr. Hoffman, whether or not failure to complete the projects about which you are talking played any part in the lack of defense on December 7, 1941?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I can answer that with one particular incident. There were 38 changes made in the plans and grade for the major runways at Bellows Field between June and December 1, 1941. The removal of two million yards of dirt which is a major task in itself and a change of one inch in the grade would mean a possible delay of two weeks in either the cut or fill due to the length and width of the runways.

It is a known fact that had the runway at Bellows Field been completed on December 7, additional planes from the mainland could have been able to have landed in Hawaii either on Monday or Tuesday, December 8 or 9; but because of the constant delay due to contradictory orders the runways were only 50 per cent completed and after the attack of December 7, I received [2236] orders from General Farthing to please work 24 hours a day and to complete the runways not later than Friday, December 12, in order to receive the first contingent of supporting planes from the mainland.

By working three shifts in total darkness during the blackout we completed a coral runway 6,000 feet long and 300 feet wide and had it in condition at 2 p. m. Friday, December 12, in time to receive the first supporting planes that arrived on the same day at 4:15 p. m. It must be remembered that this was the only runway that was undamaged and capable of receiving large aircraft on the Island.

The responsibility, due entirely to inefficiency, is laid on both the contractor and the Army, particularly the Army Engineers.

During the entire period that I was in Hawaii, I never had the pleasure of finding a single estimate of cost of proposed work that came within 25 per cent of the actual expenditure.

The absolute power invested in Colonel Wyman was such that his word was final on all orders and plans without regard to cost. It was common knowledge that the entire work that was done in Hawaii could have been done under good planning at half the amount of expense.

Mr. BURTON. That is your own opinion as an engineer?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, sir.

[2237] Mr. BURTON. Do you know anything about a boat called the Vega?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Rohl told me personally that the Army had asked for his boat and that he had given it to them for \$1 a year and that after the Army had spent approximately \$100,000 in reconditioning the boat that they found it could not be used below the equator due to certain insurance restrictions and, as a result, the boat was turned back to them in first-class shape at no cost for the reconditioning.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know who was responsible for that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Colonel Wyman was the only man who could authorize it.

Mr. BURTON. Did Rohl say for what purpose it was to be used?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No. In fact, no one knew there was a boat coming over there until it landed.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever see the Vega?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I saw it.

Mr. BURTON. What type of boat was it?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Sort of a pleasure yacht, I would say.

Mr. COLGAN. Could it have been used for moving cargo?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, it was not a cargo boat.

The Engineers took the position in June of 1941 that in issuing the plans they would order all the material and equipment necessary to execute the work. In many instances, it was [2238] found that while they issued the plans they forgot to order the material. For example, the sewerage system pumps at Bellows Field, a most important item, which were to be ordered in July 1941 and delivered in November, were never ordered and this error was not discovered until after the pits were complete and the men ready to move into the barracks. In other words, the camp could not be used because of the lack of sewerage.

The Aqua system and pump system for gasoline storage at the new tunnels at Bellows Field was to hold 600,000 gallons of aviation gasoline to supply the entire windward side of the island. After the tunnel was completed and the tanks were in position it was discovered there had been no pumps of any kind ordered to fill the tanks with, and with no railroad spur less than 26 miles away, and with only eight 1,500 gallon gasoline trucks to haul gas on the island, it would take six months to fill the twelve 50,000 gallon tanks if they could get the gas out there.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall the date?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, they discovered they had no pumps in February 1942. The tanks were of no use because there was no way to get the gas into them.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know how long it was before they got the pumps?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No. I left on May 2, 1942, and they still were not there.

[2239] Mr. BURTON. Was it completely the fault of the engineers?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The man who does the planning makes the take-off. I refer to the take-off of materials. The engineers felt that the contractor was incompetent in anything pertaining to figures, as was evidenced by the taking away of the payroll, which was quite a severe blow to the contractor. They just could not get the help that they wanted. That was only one instance. This happened all over the island on all the jobs.

Another instance was when they ordered some eight-inch guns on December 16, 1941, right after the attack. They ordered some guns to protect the artillery camp and they claimed they had everything ready to go in if I would get a crew out there quickly. I borrowed two cranes from Captain Miller, unloaded the gun, first the mounting, and then the rifle, each gun weighing about 80 tons, and then discovered that the engineers forgot to order the bolts to fasten them down into the cement base. They were, therefore, worthless and it took about four weeks to get the bolts after that.

This is contained in a letter of protest known as Exhibit No. 11, dated March 18, 1942.

Mr. BURTON. That has already been spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask whom the letter was addressed to.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That letter, I think, was directed to Mr. Rohl. [2240] It is in the record and is marked Exhibit No. 11. Mr. Rohl was the directing head of the operation committee of the contractor.

Mr. BURTON. Did these conditions which you are describing obtain generally?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They were universal throughout the series of jobs for the entire contract.

Mr. BURTON. You mean by that the defense projects?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The defense projects within the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. BURTON. Upon whom would you place responsibility for these conditions?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say the contractors as well as the engineers' inefficiency, and add to that that the U. S. Engineers were the controlling directing force; they were the last word. We, as contractors, were inefficient because we did not have top men in directive posts and the men we imported from the mainland were not the top mechanics or artisans such as you had on the West Coast. The wage scale was lower in Hawaii than it was in California. For example, why should a good carpenter who could get \$1.25 an hour in Los Angeles or San Francisco go to Hawaii for \$1 an hour?

Mr. BURTON. Is there any reason why this wage scale could not have been changed?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They could have changed it but Colonel Wyman [2241] did not think it was necessary because, prior to the starting of defense projects in Hawaii, the majority of the carpenters were Japanese, and their wage scale was \$3.50 a day. It was the thought of the engineers that they would upset the economic structure of Hawaii if a sudden raise from \$3.50 to \$10 a day were to take place.

Mr. BURTON. Is it not true, however, that they were necessary for the interest of installing defenses without delay?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It is true. It was the most important defense job in the holdings of the United States. It was the midway and the defense base of the Pacific for the entire United States mainland. It was even more important than the Philippines and this assertion is from ranking Army officers whom I talked to in Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know of any protests that were made by any of the engineers, such as yourself, about the inefficiency of the workmen and other employees?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, there were continual complaints from the area superintendent for better men from the mainland. Due to the fact that I started the last job on the island of the big fields, it was necessary that I should not disturb the working personnel of the older jobs like Hickam, Wheeler, Cunningham, with the result that I had to employ the castoffs from these other fields and Japanese. It was also necessary to hold classes during the noon hour to teach these men how to build.

[2242] At Bellows Field I had 1,000 Japanese carpenters, and when it appeared from all newspaper accounts that there might be trouble with the Japanese, I prevailed upon General Farthing to have all of my Japanese examined by the Army Intelligence and either given a clearance slip or removed from the field. This was about August 1941. All I had in mind was, in anything did happen the work in my field would not be disturbed. This was done and of the 1,000 Japa-

nese I had but four were removed from the field; the balance were given Army Intelligence buttons with their picture and number and also the Honolulu police gave them a clearance slip so they were marked O. K.

In the meantime, the other fields that had a preponderance of white help were having strikes along in November 1941. There was a two-day shutdown at Hickam Field by the imported Americans from the mainland, while my Japanese kept right on working. After the attack of December 7, and because of these Japanese having been examined and passed, none were removed from the field for any reason at all.

However, the Hawaiian Constructors were advised to get more workmen into Hawaii and about the middle of January 1942, 1200 assorted employees in the category of caterpillar operators, shuttle operators, truck drivers, bakers, cooks, carpenters, plumbers, et cetera, were brought over to Hawaii and of these 1200, 400 were sent to Bellows Field, to the camp I had established there and that is when my trouble started.

[2243] In the first four days after their arrival, 16 were returned because of illness, some with severe venereal diseases; one man with arthritis so bad that when he bent over he could not straighten up; two men with very bad hearts, all these men who, under the ruling of the War Department, were to be thoroughly examined before embarkation from the mainland. Three hundred of the 1200 had to be sent back because of someone's oversight.

Mr. ELSTON. What do you mean by that, someone's oversight?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It was the rule, sir, that all men leaving the mainland were to be given a physical examination to determine their fitness for the occupational work assigned in Hawaii. It is quite evident the examination was either never made or was so slight that men with those illnesses were allowed to pass quickly.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You do not mean 300 out of the 1200 were sent back?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, were sent back.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Because of physical defects?

Mr. HOFFMAN. All of them. It is a matter of record in the files, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Within what period of time?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Within sixty days.

Mr. DURHAM. Who sent them over from the mainland?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The contractors recruited them and they were sent over by the Army Engineers that controlled the trans- [2244] port. It was during a stress period, of course. I mean the Japs had just attacked and everything was upset and topsy-turvy and there may be some reason for it. I do not know.

Mr. MARTIN. That was at the time there was an urgent need and appeals were made for laborers to go to Hawaii for employment?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That may be true, but still cripples could not work.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I would like to ask a question at this time, even though it is a little out of order,—but I am going to have to leave.

I notice your memorandum 31-G1, I think it was, or maybe E—but it is the one you wrote to Mr. Tilman protesting his letter of April 8, 1942, in which you state that that letter of his should have been addressed to a Mr. Hutchinson because you say that you had previous to that time been relieved.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Who relieved you?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I mean, who ordered you relieved?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I had a contract over there for a year and my many attempts to break it and come back prior to December 7 and after were of no avail.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You had been trying to get relieved, is that correct?

[2245] Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, from June 1941 on.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Then your being relieved there in the early part of April was voluntary on your part?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It was not a case of your being discharged or anything like that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No. In fact, I was offered more money to stay.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Who was it that gave you the relief that you asked for?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Rohl and Mr. Bennett.

Mr. SPARKMAN. In other words, they were your superiors?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right.

Mr. MARTIN. That was April of what year?

Mr. HOFFMAN. 1942.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is all I have at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. And this attack was December 7, 1941.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And Mr. Tillman was the area engineer?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Lynch, who was the area engineer, walked out on the job. It was too bad for him. He walked out and Mr. Tillman replaced him.

Mr. ELSTON. How could he walk out without permission from somebody?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He told Colonel Wyman to take his job, that [2246] all. You do not know Mr. Lynch.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You say that Mr. Lynch told Colonel Wyman he was leaving. Was he not an Army officer?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, the area engineers were mostly civilians but they were the direct representatives of the Colonel.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And Colonel Wyman gave him the relief he wanted?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And Mr. Tillman succeeded him?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Was Mr. Tillman your superior?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Were you working under Tillman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Tillman, as area engineer, was the watchdog for the Army Engineers to see that the plans and specifications were followed. That was the purpose of the area engineer.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And an area engineer, as applied there, meant only on that one job, did it not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. On the entire area that he commanded.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Was that just Bellows Field?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And you still are of the same opinion as expressed in that letter to Mr. Tillman that he was wholly inefficient and had broken down the morale of the workers?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He had. And as a result, he was relieved seven [2247] weeks later.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Seven weeks after you wrote that letter?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He was relieved by somebody else who discovered it long after I had gone.

Mr. ELSTON. May I ask some questions, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Hoffman, these things that you have described, do you attribute them to negligence, mismanagement or deliberate acts?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say inefficient management and lack of planning, right offhand.

Mr. ELSTON. You did not see any evidence of deliberate acts on the part of any of these people against the Government of the United States?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I notice in your statement that you refer to some officer whom you say ought to be court-martialed for the sabotage that he committed. That is pretty strong language.

Mr. HOFFMAN. It is. I had to use strong language to get along. If I had not, that field would never have been ready over there and it was the most important field in Hawaii. It must not be forgotten that the windward side of Hawaii was the possible attacking side.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And up to that time, it had been left undefended?

[2248] Mr. HOFFMAN. It had been left undefended. There are two roads across the island and in some instances, we had to use our own judgment. On December 7, I loaded two trucks of dynamite and told Colonel Farnham, who has a letter in here, that if there was an attack either on December 7th or 8th, we not knowing what was happening, we would block those roads and blow them up, which were the only ways of getting across to the Honolulu or Pearl Harbor side. That was not on the say-so of Colonel Wyman or anybody else. We were using our own judgment for protection.

Mr. BURTON. Is it true that would have been the point of invasion?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That would have been the point of invasion if one on Oahu had been made.

There were perfect beaches there with no protection. The first guns that were put there I put there myself the first of January.

Mr. SPARKMAN. My question was prompted by the one from Mr. Elston and your reply was to the effect that these things you mentioned you thought were

simply mismanagement and not premeditation; and yet I call your attention to the fact you did use language there saying that some officer ought to be court-martialed for acts of sabotage he had committed.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That letter refers to Colonel Robinson?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

[2249] Mr. HOFFMAN. Fine. I believe he should have been court-martialed in that particular instance. The only gasoline supply on the windward side of the island was in that tunnel and they were short of trucks to bring gasoline to that field. It was 30 miles from Bellows Field to the gasoline supply over the mountains.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Was Colonel Robinson responsible for the pumps not having been ordered?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He ordered work stopped on the tunnels to put the tanks in there and he was later removed for inefficiency and sent somewhere else.

Mr. ELSTON. May I ask another question there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. You said there were 22 P-40's at Bellows Field at the time of the attack on December 7, 1941, but there was no available gas supply within 26 miles.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Were those planes without gasoline while they were standing on the field?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They may have had some gasoline in them. They were standing out in the open on the field but the usual custom was for the gas trucks, which there was a deficiency of, to bring gasoline out every morning at ten-thirty. It happened that the attack on Bellows Field occurred at about ten minutes of eight and the trucks had not gotten out there.

[2250] Mr. ELSTON. Were there any alert crews at the field who could have flown the planes?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, there were crews and all of the officers stayed there.

Mr. ELSTON. Did any of the planes take off?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Three of them.

Mr. ELSTON. Why did not any of the others take off?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not know. That is for the Army to explain. I cannot.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Were they destroyed on the ground?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Some of them were.

Mr. ELSTON. The runway was not destroyed there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The runway was not complete. The runway at Bellows Field was a temporary runway which could not take a ship larger than a P-40. The runways we were building were to take the heaviest type of aircraft possible. However, we did have a very narrow strip that could have been landed on and we immediately deployed our equipment with our men on this strip to prevent any Japanese planes from landing on that strip as it was the longest unprotected strip on the island.

Mr. MARTIN. In your opinion, was the work and the improvement on the pleasure yacht done expeditiously?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That I would not know, sir. I would not know.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask a question here, Mr. Burton.

[2251] You said that this officer was removed for inefficiency and sent somewhere else. Was the practice there that when a man was proven inefficient they would move him out and put him somewhere else?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, it was not, sir. It seemed that these people moved in cliques. All through the operation of the U. S. Army Engineers in Hawaii, they were constantly at loggerheads with the Regular Army, particularly the Third Engineers headed by Colonel Lyman. The constant bickering and fighting between the Army itself was such that they were the laughing stock of Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the same thing exist as between the Navy and the Army there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, that did not happen. I say to you frankly that the Army and the Navy got along beautifully over there, as far as I know. There was no time that I could call on the Navy, on Captain Martin, who was commandant of the windward base, that he did not give all cooperation possible. At no time did I see evidence of lack of cooperation. Maybe a soldier did not like a sailor on the streets, but we are talking about the services as a whole. I thought they were very good.

In fact, I even stole some pipe from the Navy and a certain captain accused me of piracy, but he said that he liked that kind of piracy as that was for Army work.

[2252] Mr. ELSTON. Were any of these things brought to the attention of the Hawaiian Command of the Army?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, they were, and as a result, Colonel Wyman was relieved. They were brought to General Emmon's attention by Colonel Lyman who succeeded Colonel Wyman and who later became General Lyman, who is now deceased. In fact, things got so bad with the accounting department of the U. S. Army Engineers that the businessmen of Honolulu were practically on the verge of bankruptcy as there had been no bills paid for months.

Mr. ELSTON. That was after the attack?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Before.

Mr. ELSTON. When was Colonel Wyman relieved?

Mr. HOFFMAN. February 1942.

Mr. ELSTON. That was after the attack.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I know, but the bills had accumulated for six months before that.

Mr. ELSTON. When were these things called to the attention first of General Emmons or whoever was in command of the Hawaiian area?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I could not answer that. I could not say that but it must have been going on some time prior to the attack.

Mr. ELSTON. General Short was in command, was he not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. General Short, prior to December 7, yes.

[2253] Mr. ELSTON. Did General Short ever have called to his attention any of these things that you have described for us this morning?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That I would not know definitely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose duty would it have been to call his attention to it when these things were discovered?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I imagine it would have been the duty of the commanding officer, known as G-2.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was he?

Mr. HOFFMAN. At that time, it was Colonel Weddington, assisted by Colonel Farnham.

Mr. ELSTON. Did the Army not employ inspectors on these projects?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, there were inspectors.

Mr. ELSTON. Under whose jurisdiction were they?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They were under Wyman.

Mr. ELSTON. Where is Wyman now?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not know.

Mr. ELSTON. Is he still in the Army?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, he is still in the Army.

Mr. BURTON. I have been informed by the War Department he is in England.

Mr. ELSTON. Does he have charge of any projects in England, or what is he doing?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would not know. I have not heard of Wyman [2254] in months.

I was finally sent down to the North Island Naval Base and I thought perhaps I would go to work for the Navy and I was to finish up the \$22,500,000 base down there, but I found the Navy was not any better than the Army, so I left them both.

Mr. ELSTON. You were there when Justice Roberts came over to make an investigation?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He was there.

Mr. ELSTON. Were any of these things brought to his attention?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not know.

Mr. ELSTON. Did not the committee go out on the field and go around the island and make some investigation?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They did not make an investigation in that field or that area. They were not there.

Mr. ELSTON. Did they not call any of the witnesses to these things before them and interrogate them?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They called none of the superintendents that I know of. In fact, we did not know they were there for a few days after they got there; but they were not particularly looking for that.

Mr. ELSTON. What were they looking for?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not know. Nobody has ever found out.

Mr. ELSTON. You, of course, knew they were sent over for the purpose of finding out how it was possible for the Japs to [2255] bomb Pearl Harbor and other installations on December 7th. The things that you have detailed to us today were certainly matters which should have been brought to the attention of that committee and would have been very helpful to the committee in making a report. Do you know of any effort that was made by anyone to bring these things to the attention of the committee?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Did you make any effort?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I was nobody over there and I am nobody over here. There was nothing that I could do or say or get before that committee to explain anything.

Mr. ELSTON. You were not in the Army.

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, I was a civilian.

Mr. ELSTON. As a civilian, you had a perfect right to bring these things to the attention of the committee.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I should have done that, but there were more important men who knew more about it, the contractors themselves, Colonel Wyman and his pledge of duty to support any and all action that would solve any detrimental action against his command.

Mr. ELSTON. You would not expect Colonel Wyman to do it because, in doing so, he would necessarily expose his own mismanagement.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Then he has violated his oath of office.

[2256] Mr. ELSTON. When did you call it to anybody's attention?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I did not bring it to anybody's attention. I brought this to nobody's attention. I have kept quiet and I wanted to forget it.

After I finished my work in San Diego, I went to Mexico to do some work for the Mexican Government.

Mr. ELSTON. Of course, I think it is commendable that it is brought out even now but I was simply trying to find out why it was not brought out any sooner, because these are very serious things and I think it is highly important that we know about them; and the more we know about these things the better. I have always felt that there were a lot of things that occurred over there that we did not know about; and even though it may be late, we ought to know about them now.

Mr. BURTON. I would like to ask at this point if a copy of this report of yours was ever delivered to any official?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is that report to?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Let me explain that report for just a moment, if I may. After the completion of my contract, and I wanted to get out of there, realizing some day there would be an accounting of that job and the reasons for its delay; the job was not doing me any good and I could not do any more good because I had lost faith and confidence, I went up to see Colonel Lyman and told him that my contract had expired and that I [2527] wanted to leave the island with my family. My family was there with me.

Colonel Lyman told me they had a commission as a colonel ready for me and all I had to do was to step from one to the other and I was off to the races. I told Colonel Lyman that I would accept no colonel's commission; that I wanted four stars or nothing. In other words, I did not want it in the first place because it was not suitable. After the incompetency of the U. S. Engineers over in Hawaii, I could not stand as a practical engineer and take orders from a man who was a superior in rank, who did not know what he was going to do; and I felt I could do much better staying a civilian and helping to do the work that was necessary.

The argument became very heated with the result that Colonel Lyman threatened me that I would not leave the island until he got damn good and ready.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Colonel Lyman, who later became General Lyman.

I went home that night and thought the matter over and finally decided to appeal to some other ranking officers, and I did. I appealed to General Farthing who was the commanding general of the Seventh Air Force Command and it

appeared that General Farthing did not have much use for Colonel Lyman and he told me that I had no worry, that I would be going home in about two or three weeks—but would I write a report about what [2258] was going on in Hawaii?

Mr. MARTIN. When was that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. This was in April 1942.

General FARTHING called in a Colonel Rice of the Inspector General's Office and said, "I do not want to blackmail you but if you will write a report about conditions with some original exhibits showing the stoppages which have hurt the Air Corps from going ahead and completing their defenses of Hawaii, I will see what you get home."

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion was had outside the record.)

Mr. BURTON. Will you continue with your statement, Mr. Hoffman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The balance of the white men at the camp disturbed the camp so badly by getting drunk, that it came to the attention of Colonel Farnham, the commanding officer, who threatened to have the camp removed unless it was stopped immediately. I eventually disposed of most of those men to other fields. This was known to Colonel Wyman and the U. S. Engineers, and the Area Engineer, Paul J. Lynch, backed me up.

Personally, had it been possible to have resigned my position in Hawaii as early as June 1941, without breaking a contract, I would have left at that time, realizing that the job was badly mismanaged; that it would do me no good in the future as a reference, or as an accomplishment.

[2259] About the Japanese, it was difficult to say whether they were loyal or not. I will truthfully tell you that the best work performed, and the quickest, was done by the Japanese help. The American-born Japanese, most of whom had brothers in the United States Army belonging to the 288th Infantry, or some relative who had been in the Army long before the attack took place. I have heard through the Army Intelligence, who made another examination of all the Japanese working for the contractor, that only one Japanese had been removed from Bellows Field after the attack.

An amusing incident occurred during September of 1941 when it was decided to place an eight-inch rifle on the ledge off the Diamond Head Lighthouse. The only available road is known as the Diamond Head Road around the south end of the island, and due to the height of the ledge, it was necessary to do all the preliminary work and hoist the base of the rifle, as well as the rifle itself, off of the road proper to the top of the ledge, which was about 100 feet. The plans showing how the rifle was to be installed were stamped secret and had to be returned to the office every evening before five o'clock and could not be taken out until nine o'clock in the morning. Still, every Japanese driving along the road was able to stop without molestation and watch every operation in the mounting of this rifle. The secrecy was only for the Americans, the Japanese had access to the complete operation.

[2260] Mr. BURTON. On what date did you leave Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. May 2, 1942.

Mr. BURTON. Did you then become associated in the performance of any other contracts?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I embarked from Honolulu on May 2, 1942, arriving ten days later in San Francisco, where I was immediately contacted by Colonel Theodore Wyman.

Mr. BURTON. Had he left Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He left in February of 1942.

Mr. BURTON. We can stop right there, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The committee will stand adjourned until Thursday morning at ten o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until 10:00 o'clock a. m., Thursday, January 27, 1944.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 8A

Vol. 50

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

HEARING HELD BEFORE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S., WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 27, 1944—
EXECUTIVE SESSION

Washington, D. C., January 27, 1944

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[2261]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1944

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The special committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10:30 o'clock a. m. in room 1310 New House Office Building, Honorable Andrew J. May (chairman), presiding.

Present: Representatives May (chairman), Sparkman, Elston, Martin, and Fenton.

Also Present: Lt. Col. M. H. Knowles, H. Ralph Burton, General Counsel to the Committee, and Mr. Joseph Colgan, Special Investigator.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT HOFFMAN—Resumed

Mr. BURTON. Before this committee adjourned on January 24, you gave testimony in reference to a report dated April 20, 1942, which appeared in the record as Exhibit 1.

I now ask if you will state to whom you delivered that report and what action was taken?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That report was part of a private deal with the Army to get off of the Island of Hawaii with my family. The suggestion was made by General Farthing, who was in command of the Seventh Air Force Command, that if I would tell the story of [2262] what was happening in a complete report and turn it over to Col. Rice, he would see that I had transportation from the Island within two weeks.

The report was made with five copies, of which four were turned over to Col. Rice in General Farthing's Headquarters at Hickam Field.

Col. KNOWLES. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Col. Knowles.

Col. KNOWLES. Would you mind spelling Col. Rice's name?

Mr. HOFFMAN. As far as I know, I think it would be spelled, R-i-c-e.

Col. KNOWLES. Do you think it could have been "R-o-w" instead of Rice?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It may have been. I just met the man once, that is all. His name may have been Row, but I thought it was Rice.

Col. KNOWLES. Thank you.

Mr. HOFFMAN. The fifth copy I had left at home, and three days later I got a call from General Farthing saying that the report was all wrong and to forget it, and did I have any copies? I said, "Yes," I had one, and if they wanted it destroyed, I would destroy it.

Accordingly, I told Mrs. Hoffman to destroy that copy, but being a thrifty soul, she did not destroy it and stuck it in the [2263] bottom of a trunk and I did not know she had it until five months ago. That is the report that has been submitted in evidence.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall having written a letter to any officer of the United States Army relative to the conditions you found in Hawaii?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I was in Washington on about January 10, 1943, just about a year ago, for some other business. I tried to get in touch with General T. L. Robbins, the Assistant Chief of Engineers at that time, hoping I could tell him something, as a matter of courtesy, about the way the job was going on up in Canada, the job I had left contrary to the orders of Col. Wyman, but I could not get to see General Robbins. He was too busy, so I wrote him a letter on Roosevelt Hotel stationery here in town telling him I thought the job was pretty bad, and that perhaps if he looked into it a little bit closer, he might make some changes, particularly since the architect engineer was not on the job for three months, and the contractor had not had any plans to work on at all.

I never heard from General Robbins and I never heard of the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. That was January of what year?

Mr. HOFFMAN. January of 1943, just last year.

I promptly forgot about the entire matter, feeling nobody wanted to know anything about the matter, and, therefore, it was no concern of mine.

[2264] Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I ask permission to submit a certified copy of a transcript of the testimony taken on the 27th day of February, 1943, before the California State Legislative Joint Fact-Finding Committee on UnAmerican Activities, containing testimony relative to Hans Wilhelm Rohl and Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 2 of 1/27/44.)

Mr. SPARKMAN. May I interrupt right there, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It seems to me at that point in the record it might be a very appropriate place to incorporate a copy of the letter which Mr. Hoffman wrote to General Robbins, if and when you obtain such copy.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought a copy was in the record.

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, a copy of the letter I wrote to General Robbins is not here. It must be in his files.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We can ask for a copy of the letter.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I am sure he will recollect the letter, because it was written in my own handwriting and mailed right here.

Mr. ELSTON. You say it was not even acknowledged?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, it was not acknowledged.

I left Washington the following day after I had tried to get in touch with him all day in order to tell him about the [2265] situation merely as a matter of courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Burton, I would like to make an inquiry here. Has this witness told anywhere in the hearings—and I have not been present during all the time—what he knows personally and what he observed with respect to when the bombing occurred over in Honolulu?

Mr. BURTON. He has not, and I think it would be proper at this point to describe what he saw.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask this question: Where were you when that bombing occurred?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I was standing up on top of some framework of a building on Diamond Head.

The CHAIRMAN. How far away were you from the Harbor?

Mr. HOFFMAN. A mile and a half. You could look right down on the Harbor. Maybe it was two miles.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you tell us what you saw?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I had decided to take December 7th off, the first day that I was away from work since I had been over there, and I went out to help a Dr. Campbell, who was building a house on Diamond Head. He had a crew working there on Sunday, and he wanted to know if I would not come over and show those fellows how to get along. So I went over there at about 6 o'clock in the morning and was standing on the studding on the first floor at one of the corners of the room. In my car, I carried a powerful pair of field glasses that I used in my work.

[2266] I would say that shortly after seven o'clock, I saw a lot of black puffs in the sky, and saw a lot of planes flying, and I remarked to the Japanese foreman, Kokuda, that it was funny they would have target practice so early Sunday morning when everybody wanted to sleep. I got down and went over

and got my field glasses from the car and climbed back up where I could get a good look, and at that time, I saw one of the tanks on the side of the road away from Pearl Harbor, hit, and there was a big flame and a lot of black smoke.

Then I put my glasses down and kept looking and it appeared to me that a battleship was rolling and rocking over. I thought my eyes had gone bad, then. When I put my glasses back to my eyes, I could see that was the battleship Arizona that was going over on its side.

Just about that time, Dr. Campbell drove up, and he said that the Japs have attacked us, and I replied that something was going on over there with all of those planes, because none of the planes had split up, and it looked as if there were probably 50 planes in this group.

I got in my car and drove to my home, and as I got into my house I heard the radio calling, "Robert Hoffman, call Col. Wyman," and the radio kept repeating that. I immediately called the operator and she said that I could not call. I told her it was Robert Hoffman and she said, "Yes, they have been trying to get hold of you."

[2267] I got in touch with Col. Wyman, who said, "Get out to Bellows Field and protect that runway," which I did. I was there half an hour later.

I got to Bellows Field just in time to see the first B-17 that was landing on that short strip, come downwind, which was never done, because the wind came in from the sea. It came downwind, rolled over the end of the runway and over the parapet into the antenna, and rolled, I would say, about a hundred feet. Just as he came to a stop, two Jap planes came over the top of him and strafed him. Right behind me was Paul J. Lynch, the area engineer, and of course we were mystified, and we could not understand what was happening, because there had never been a plane larger than a P-40 land on that runway. It was too short and narrow and there was no foundation under it. It could not hold a big ship.

We finally got to the big ship and got the cockpit door open, and there was a group of flyers, all young fellows, and one of them was wounded. I asked the pilot where he came from, and didn't he have more sense than to land on that runway. He asked who I was. I told him, and that I wanted to help them. He told me he was in a flight that left Hamilton Field, and when he was over Hickam Field, the radio went dead, and he did not know where he was going to land, so he wanted to pick a nice, quiet spot on Bellows Field. They did not know what was going on because they could get no radio report of any kind.

[2268] If I remember correctly, the pilot's name was Carlson. I think that is the name that he gave me.

The CHAIRMAN. How long after this first group of ships, this squadron of Japanese bombers, came over, until there was some response from the anti-aircraft equipment?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say within ten minutes. It seemed to happen all at once. In other words, you could see the explosions in the air of shells going up.

May I go further?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Honolulu was known, as far as the service was concerned, as a Saturday night town. They worked hard all week, and when Saturday night came, they all holed up and it was the party night of the week. Contrary to general belief, people did not play very much in Honolulu during the week, and everybody, if they had a party, it was at their home and things were very quiet around 10 to 10:30 every night except Saturday night.

We were totally unprepared, because, on Saturday night at my home, I would say, around 8 o'clock I had Mr. P. S. Pell, President of the Pell Company in Honolulu, at my home. We were playing bridge, and the radio came on and broke into a program. It was a special announcement from Washington, D. C. If I remember the words correctly, the announcer said that a meeting had just been held and terminated between the Secretary of State and the representatives of the Japanese Government and [2269] that it appeared that probably by Monday everything would be settled satisfactorily.

There was no reason in the world why anybody would expect any attack. In fact, we did not know it was one. It was a total surprise and nobody knew it. Nobody knew it at all. I talked to most of the officers over there after that and nobody knew anything.

The CHAIRMAN. I think maybe that is far enough into that.

Mr. ELSTON. I would like to ask a question at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. The B-17 that came down on this runway at Bellows Field picked out the only runway that was available, did it not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, there were two more at that time on the north end of the Island, up by the R. C. A. Station, a small field called Cunningham Field.

Mr. ELSTON. Did these other B-17's come down?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I never found out. I asked the officer how many were in the flight and he said, I think, there were nine that had come over in this flight.

I do not know where the rest of them went.

A very funny thing occurred, however. I saw a moving picture about four months ago, something about an Air Force picture, that depicted the actual flight of these planes in getting over to Honolulu the following morning, and I think the picture was - [2270] based on these ships.

Mr. ELSTON. You said the runway was not strong enough to hold a large ship?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, it was not.

Mr. ELSTON. But was not that runway built to hold bombers?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, Mr. Elston. That runway was built, primarily, I would say, as a fighter station at that time. All they had on there were P-40's, and in fact the field had not really been started. It was a new field. It was the largest field on that side of the Island.

The runway was laid on dune sands, with a little foundation as an emergency field sometime before that. It was only 75 feet wide and about 3800 feet long, which is not large enough to take a ship of that size. It could not take a B-25 but it did take the P-40.

Mr. ELSTON. I would like to ask one more question of Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. In your opinion, if the installations on which you were working and which you have already described to this committee had been handled properly, if they had been completed expeditiously, would it have been possible for the Japs to have gotten into Pearl Harbor and bombed it on December 7?

Mr. HOFFMAN. If your air raid warning stations had been completed, they surely could have detected incoming planes. That [2271] is their purpose. I know nothing about the mechanism of A. R. W. stations. I do not know about that. I do know the actual statements could have been complete because it did not take much construction equipment for these stations.

The mechanical equipment we knew nothing about. That is something the Army was doing themselves. The contractor had nothing to do with the equipment for the actual detection. There was time, as far as construction was concerned, to complete all of the stations they had planned.

Mr. ELSTON. And why were they not completed?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, there were just stoppages in work, and lack of plans, and lack of planning. There did not seem to be any coordinated effort between the Army and Army Engineers and the contractors. Everybody seemed to be fighting everybody else. It was the common talk around there after the attack that the reason that the Japs did not come in and invade Honolulu was because they did not want to have to take in the United States Engineers.

We became the laughing stock of the entire country. We were the laughing stock of the whole darn country.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to make this brief observation off the record.

(There was discussion off the record).

Mr. BURTON. Is it agreeable now, Mr. Chairman, to proceed with Mr. Hoffman's testimony?

[2272] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. We will take up at the point where he discontinued on January 24.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Will you proceed, Mr. Hoffman, with your statement?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I embarked from Honolulu on May 2, 1942, arriving ten days later in San Francisco, where I was immediately contacted by Col. Theodore Wyman, who had left Hawaii in February of 1942. Col. Wyman suggested that I join him in the creation of the largest project the United States Government had to offer in the building of a pipeline from a point in the Northwest Territory, known as Norman, and which ranged westward a little south to Whitehorse in the Yukon Territory.

At the time Col. Wyman contacted me, I had made plans to go on to South America in a projected plan of building air bases across some of the connecting islands from Chile to New Zealand. Due to the fact that diplomatic relations

had not been broken between Chile and the enemy, there was no possibility of the southern job going on, and after some sales talk on the part of Col. Wyman, I decided to join him in this great project in the Arctic.

At the time that Col. Wyman talked to me there was no contractor on the job, nor could the Colonel tell me who the contractor was, but that I was to go up as general superintendent [2273] in the actual construction of the work.

Accordingly, Colonel Wyman, Mrs. Ruth Wyman, his wife, and I left in a plane from San Francisco on or about the 18th day of May, 1942, and proceeded to Edmonton, Canada, arriving there the 19th. We immediately went to the McDonald Hotel and for the following three or four days, I was trying to find plans of any type or sort that would tell me just what the project was.

On or about the 26th of May, the Colonel called me in to his makeshift office in the hotel and gave me a letter of instruction which directed me to proceed to Waterways, Alberta, 300 miles north of Edmonton and at the head of the railroad where I was to find a suitable site for some 3,000 troops; that I was to provide suitable unloading ramps for unloading operations; that I was to immediately design and erect necessary buildings, warehouses, administration buildings, a hospital and hotel; that I was to prepare roads, repair and strengthen bridges, build a railroad spur into Fort McMurray some three miles distant, and, in other words, to act in general as paymaster, quartermaster, chief engineer for the United States Army, architect-engineer for the Architect-Engineer and chief engineer for the contractor.

Mr. BURTON. Did you know who the contractor was to be at that time?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I did not, sir.

In fact, the actual contract was not signed with the contractor until the 29th or 30th of May, and the actual contract was [2274] not signed with the architect-engineer until the middle of June.

The special transportation that Colonel Wyman provided for me consisted of a two-man open-air gasoline put-put in which I rode three hundred miles in the north country to arrive at Waterways, where I immediately established quarters at the hotel.

The following day I found a suitable piece of ground along the Athabaska River, midway between Fort McMurray and Waterways as the number one site and a second location along the river below the town of Waterways as the second site and when the Colonel arrived three days later and saw site number one, he immediately selected it as the troop camp. Without any attempt on his part to lease the property from the four owners who controlled it, he just took possession and said, "That's it." About four days later the first troop train arrived with troops which I learned had been on the road then for two weeks.

Mr. BURTON. Did you have any quarters prepared for them?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I had nothing. I did not even know they were coming.

Mr. BURTON. How did you take care of them?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I put them out in the open field, helped them put up their tents, and gave them all of the assistance I could, as recorded in the letter from the second officer in charge.

Then I learned that Bechtel-Price-Callahan were the constructors, and that the group, with the exception of Steve [2275] Bechtel, formerly of Bechtel-Kaiser Company, were the same group that dominated and owned the Hawaiian Constructors in Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. Did that group include Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. HOFFMAN. To my knowledge, that included Hans Wilhelm Rohl, with this supporting statement: That in February of 1943 when discussing with Paul Grafe in his office in Los Angeles, he told me that due to an investigation by some State Department of California in Mr. Rohl, that Mr. Rohl was no longer president of that little syndicate, and that he, Paul Grafe, had assumed that office, I mean the office as president of the syndicate.

Mr. BURTON. Did Paul Grafe say that Rohl had given up his financial interest in the syndicate?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He did not say that Rohl had given up his financial interest in it. He just said that he had given up the presidency of the syndicate. That was the syndicate that was to handle the Canol project.

When the troops started to arrive at Waterways I immediately called Mr. Grafe, who was then in Edmonton, that I needed some help in the form of carpenters and mechanics, and they hastily recruited 205 Canadian men whom they sent to me by special train to Waterways.

I instructed my foreman to secure a service record of the history of these men and learned to my surprise that not one of these men had ever held a position for more than four weeks during the previous two years. They were all cripples, more or less, [2276] running from 35 to 60 years of age, and the type of help that would hang around the various missions and Volunteers of America Hotels.

At that time it was understood there could be no American help transported due to the very low wage scale of Canada's industry and it was explained that it might upset the economic structure of the North Country. However, I was authorized to pay these men 50¢ an hour with no double time for overtime, and this wage scale resulted in a very serious argument between the Ottawa government and the Hudson Bay Company which had set a standard wage scale for laborers at \$30 a month, out of which they paid 75 cents a day for their keep.

The result of my paying 50 cents an hour and working these men ten hours a day, 7 days a week, plus their bunkhouses and meals gave my men \$35 net per week and their board and room, and while it increased the purchasing power of the community 400 percent, the resounding roar from the Hudson Bay Company was heard all the way to Washington. Eventually we were forced to discharge every Canadian because of this dispute.

From May until August we unloaded and loaded 25,000 tons of freight, which was 18,000 tons in excess of any previous yearly loading by the Hudson Bay Company. I designed and erected 20 buildings, put up a utility plant, provided a water supply, built 200 barges, built a railroad spur and drove a trestle across a creek which the railroad said was impossible; provided transportation [2277] for some 3,000 troops, built the roads, provided nets and stoves for the soldiers in their experimental trips down the river and, in general, acted as a wet nurse for the entire Army without benefit of plans or direction or anything concrete from anyone including Colonel Wyman himself.

In fact, the Architect-Engineer, who should have had plans on the job for the contractor to work with, did not have representatives at Waterways until about July 20, after 80% of the work of the first section was completed, but for which he drew a fee for the work which was accomplished.

Mr. ELSTON. How much did he receive?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That I cannot say. That is in the vouchers which are in the main office.

Mr. BURTON. I have a record of that.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Nor were there any plans for the actual direction of the pipeline; nor were there any plans for the tanks at Skagway which were drawn about the first day of August in Edmonton by Turnbull, Sverdrup and Parcel; nor did anybody know or see any plane; nor could anyone tell what they were going to do, when they were going to do it, or how much it was going to cost.

Colonel Wyman arranged the advance payment of some three million dollars to the contractors, so that there was no investment on the part of the contractors, and the amount of equipment which was shipped to me at Waterways was sufficient to have [2278] completed a half-dozen pipelines of the size they contemplated, with 25% of the total I had on hand.

The pipeline was to run from Norman Wells to Norman, which was 50 miles on the east side of McKenzie, then to White Horse, 510 miles in a country where the temperature is 50 degrees below zero, where no pipeline will hold up without having pump stations at least every 30 miles which must be maintained in the cold weather and which is not warranted in the tremendous expenditure and which cannot possibly pay out in at least 200 years.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know of any other potential oil fields that could have been tapped and saved the building of this line?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do. One-half mile out of the city of Waterways was the first large deposit of what is known as the Athabaska oil sands. When I arrived at Waterways, I discovered that there was a small refinery then in operation turning out approximately 500 barrels of oil a day, which is extracted from these oil sands.

I became interested in the Athabaska oil sands, and much to my surprise I learned from countless authorities that in three issued volumes by the Canadian Government, entitled, "Oil Sands of the Athabaska," that the potential oil reserves exceeded 6,300,000,000 of oil for these sands, and this had been a known fact for some 50 years.

In further talking with the refinery superintendent—and I might mention his name, John B. Cram, formerly superintendent [2279] of the Bartles Oil

Company of Oklahoma—he told me that if he could enlarge the size of his refinery to 2,000 barrels a day it would cost approximately \$2,000,000, and he could turn out more oil than the potential oil field of Norman Wells at a fraction of the contemplated cost.

Mr. BURTON. Had this been called to the attention of Colonel Wyman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I wrote a letter calling the matter to the attention of Colonel Wyman, and he told me to mind my own business.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt here to make this statement: Something like a year ago, former Representative Jim McClintic from Oklahoma, who was then an employee in the Department of the Interior, came to my office with some photographs of an oil field in Alaska somewhere and a refinery. He told me the story of the great possibilities of it and asked me to introduce him to Secretary Patterson.

I invited Secretary Patterson to have dinner with me at the Washington Roof Garden and Mr. McClintic also. He was there with his file and his maps and presented the matter to Judge Patterson, and he agreed to look into it and see what there was to it. That is the last I have heard of it and I do not know any more about it, but that was an oil field in Alaska somewhere, and I looked at the derricks standing up in the photograph and tanks for containing the oil, and the building that looked like the refinery. I do not remember any other details.

[2280] Mr. ELSTON. This project you are talking about is in Canada, is it not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. In Canada, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not in Alaska?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is in Canada, 300 miles north of Edmonton, with a railroad to serve it. This is right at Waterways.

I might add for the record that in the issue of Newsweek which we are trying to locate, either June or July of this year, there was a full-page article in there showing a picture of the refinery there, and quoting some of the prominent geologists which give this as the largest oil reserve, I think, in the history of the world, in these oil sands.

This morning we have a copy of a publication which gives you the area as being 110 miles long and 80 miles wide of nothing but oil sands, oil-impregnated sands, which are known as the Athabaska oil sands.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the name of this project, the Canol Project?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The Canol Project. This had nothing to do with that.

The CHAIRMAN. How far is this refinery from the Canol Project?

Mr. HOFFMAN. One thousand six hundred miles. The Canol Project is 1,600 miles north of Waterways, and from the railroad.

The CHAIRMAN. It is beyond this project you are talking [2281] about?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Beyond this project, farther north of the McKenzie.

Mr. BURTON. I have here two volumes which I obtained from the Library of Congress. One is entitled "The Lower Athabaska and Slave River District—Its Development and Resources." It touches upon these sands.

I have another volume entitled "Oil and Gas Prospects of the Northwest Provinces of Canada," by Wyatt Malcolm, which also refers to these sands.

Mr. MARTIN. I have a question at this point. Is this large deposit of oil sands now reachable by rail transportation?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It is right at the rail head, sir. It has been there. I used the oil for my equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. What grade of oil was it?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, it is the finest Diesel oil I have used in my construction experience. The gasoline has an odor which was temperate, and I bought all they would give me at one cent and a half less per gallon than I could buy it from the Imperial Oil Company. When somebody found it, I was ordered to stop buying from the Athabaska oil sands, and to buy from the Imperial Oil Company.

Mr. ELSTON. And you had to pay more?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, but they had the contract.

The CHAIRMAN. Who gave that order?

[2282] Mr. HOFFMAN. Colonel Wyman. I was told to stop. I did not, because I needed oil. I just kept right on.

As a matter of record of the oil, in a volume called "McKenzie on Exploration," which is some 100 years old, you will find there that he originally discovered the oil seepage of the oil sands in the far North when he came down the McKenzie from Aklavik.

Every Eskimo, every explorer, every fur man in Canada, and every geologist knows there has been oil seepage in Canada for a hundred years. It has been no secret.

The Imperial Oil Company did not control the oil sands of the Athabaska, but they did, in this contract, control the drilling operations for the exploration of the Norman Field. I might say this: The little refinery at Waterways was turning out 500 barrels of oil. The process has been proven successful. I was using the Diesel oil, and I say to you it is the best Diesel oil I ever had. I cannot even tell you the name of the people who own the oil property. I do not know.

I was interested in good equipment and good materials. I tried to make a deal with them whereby they would give me all of the 500 barrels every day because I wanted to send the refined oil up the river to the stations, Fort Fitzgerald, Fort Smith, Fort Resolution, and three or four others, which would save the haul from Edmonton up the railroad, and I would be buying it at less money, but the oil was so good that the gold companies up at [2283] the gold fields along Great Slave Lake beat me to it and they made a contract to take the entire output. What they did not take I could have, with the result that I did not get very much of it. I would say perhaps 150 barrels a day, refined, of course, which was not what I needed. I needed a whole lot more than that.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is this pipeline that was built under General Somervell's orders with respect to the Canol Project?

Mr. HOFFMAN. All told, it would 560 miles from the line at Norman Wells to the McKenzie and to White Horse; approximately 560 miles as the crow flies.

Mr. ELSTON. Is this project you were working on part of it?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That was the project. I was the general superintendent of the Canol Project. I was the first man up there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you call the attention of the War Department to the fact that this other source of supply was available at Waterways?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, Mr. May. I did not call it to the attention of the War Department, because, as I say, I am nobody. I was nobody there and I am nobody here. I did tell Colonel Wyman, the top officer, about it, and I was told to keep still, so I decided I had better get out of the job as quick as I could.

When my agreement was up, I quit, and I was all through. I wanted no part of it.

[2284] To go further, the Dominion Government of Canada, they are pretty smart and conservative people, have gone into the oil sands and taken over that refinery and they have invested \$500,000 and they will produce more oil within the next six months after they get that refinery working, than the whole Norman Wells project will do.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the Canol Project?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is the Canol Project.

Mr. MARTIN. They will produce more in six months than the whole Canol Project can do in how long?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I mean on a daily rate. They will produce more oil with a \$1,000,000 investment than we will with \$250,000,000, daily.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, Mr. Hoffman means that after they have had six months to bring up the development, they will be doing it.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. The Canol Project took longer than six months, did it not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The Canol Project is not done yet.

Mr. ELSTON. How much time has been consumed already?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, I got there on May 18, 1942, and today is January 27, 1944, and they are not done yet.

Mr. ELSTON. How far along are they?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not know. I heard somebody say they would [2285] be done in February. Nobody is able to get any information out of there now, and I am not interested enough to find out.

Mr. FENTON. How long were you there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I was there three months on the first section.

Mr. ELSTON. I was going to ask who owns the Imperial Oil Company?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

Mr. BURTON. Will you proceed, Mr. Hoffman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The Athabaska oil sands deposits were not controlled by the Imperial Oil Company and evidently were of no interest to them. But had the plan been followed, which competent oil men told me was reasonable and

intelligent to do, the actual operation of refining at that point, and by that point we are talking about Waterways, would have produced within 90 days about two thousand barrels of oil a day that could be shipped by rail and water to Edmonton and to Prince Rupert where it could have been unloaded into barges and towed up the inland passage to Skagway and could have provided more oil than is possible out of the potential oil field of Norman Wells.

Mr. BURTON. You spoke of some equipment that was shipped to you. Can you state how much there was and of what it was composed?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I ordered a one-ton truck or a little sedan for myself to get around and they sent me 24 brand new Ford sedans, which I had to park because there were no roads to drive them on. I ordered two 1½ ton trucks to haul supplies and they sent me 196.

[2286] I had over 60 D-8 bulldozers and over 50 D-7's and 6's. In fact, I had \$4,000,000 worth of equipment that was of no earthly use to the job, because in order to lay the pipeline across the muskeg, it was only necessary to provide a road and you could have but one unit working on that road. Instead of having 100 bulldozers, I could have done just as well with 10.

I might explain that. If you are going through the muskeg, you cannot work ahead of yourself. You have got to provide a road to get your equipment over, and therefore, but one unit can work on that road. If it is all muskeg, you cannot get into a station because there is no road.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you build your grade?

Mr. HOFFMAN. You had to, because it was muskeg and swamp and it was impossible to work more than one unit.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you use to pick up the earth?

Mr. HOFFMAN. We had shovels. We had shovels and bulldozers and scrapers. We had all of the equipment in the world. In fact, I got so much equipment in Waterways that I had to go up in the hills and cut trees down and park my equipment and build land to put it on. I had so much equipment I thought I was really going to do a job.

Mr. ELSTON. With whom did you place these orders?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I did not place any orders.

Mr. ELSTON. You said you had placed an order for one car.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That was with our office in Edmonton.

[2287] Mr. ELSTON. Were you not consulted about all this equipment that would be needed?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Nothing. I did not know a thing about it. In fact, I did not even think it was on the way.

Mr. ELSTON. You were the man in charge and the one whom they should have consulted, were you not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right. None of this was pre-planned. On a construction job the general superintendent or chief engineer, as I was, must have something to work from. I must have a plan and I state definitely here there were no plans for that pipeline and there were no plans for that job. There were no plans of any kind until the day I left and then I did not see any.

I did see Mr. Turnbull making up plans for a tank farm up at Skagway which was a supplement to the contract.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "tank farm"?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They were going to store oil up at Skagway and they were going to build storage tanks. I did not know why they were going to store at Skagway if they were going to bring it across to White Horse—this oil was supposed to go into Alaska—I did not know why they would bring it 110 miles south to go north. Those are some of the things I do not know about.

I did not find out enough about them. I had too much to do as it was.

Mr. BURTON. Off the record.

[2288] (There was discussion off the record.)

Mr. BURTON. I show you a report dated July 15, 1942, addressed to S. D. Bechtel, H. C. Price, Paul Grafe; subject: "Progress Report on the Canol Project, Contract No. W-412-eng.-53, Report No. 1 (Edmonton)" and ask you if that is a report which you submitted.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is the report, sir.

You will find the equipment lists right on the bottom showing the tremendous amounts I received there.

Mr. BURTON. I ask that that be marked as an Exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 3 of 7/15/42).

2908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. BURTON. I submit herewith a copy of the "Norman-Whitehorse Pipeline Project General Equipment—to be delivered at McMurray, Canada (except planes and four Fords)" and ask you if that also is a record of equipment.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is a record of equipment there, calling for about 16 or 18 planes and a lot of other miscellaneous things.

Mr. BURTON. I ask that that report be admitted as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, it may be done.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 4)

Mr. BURTON. I submit herewith a memorandum dated June 28, [2289] 1942, addressed to Bechtel, Price and Callahan, Waterways, Alberta, Canada—Attention Mr. Robert Hoffman, and signed Theodore Wyman, Jr., Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Officer in Charge. I ask if you can identify that, Mr. Hoffman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is a true copy of the original letter sent to me by Colonel Wyman to do certain work in waterways; an open letter authorizing me to spend as much money as I wanted to without any restriction of any kind.

Mr. BURTON. I ask that that be spread upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be spread upon the record as an exhibit.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
McMurray, Alberta, Canada, June 28, 1942.

BECHTEL, PRICE AND CALLAHAN,
Waterways, Alberta, Canada,
Attention: Mr. Robert Hoffman.

DEAR SIR: In accordance with the terms of Contract W-412-eng-53 and in connection with the movement of personnel (Civilian and Military) equipment, materials and supplies, to Norman Wells and other places on the Canol Project, you are directed to perform the following work at Waterways, Alberta, and McMurray, Alberta, and at the locality known as the Prairie, located [2290] between Waterways, and McMurray:

(a) Loading and unloading of freight for the Canol Project delivered by the Northern Alberta Railroad to the railhead at Waterways.

(b) to assist the Hudson's Bay Company in the handling of freight destined for Norman Wells and other points in the Canol Project. Any service rendered to the Hudson's Bay Company will be charged to that company and payment received credited to the United States.

(c) The construction of railroad facilities extending from Waterways to the Prairie with the cooperation of the Northern Alberta Railway and military forces located at Camp Prairie.

(d) The rental of lands necessary for the movement and storage of freight and the construction of necessary facilities to expedite the movement of freight and its transfer from rail to boat, and for such other purposes as necessary.

(e) The reconstruction of the highways from Waterways to Camp Prairie and to the loading ramps located on the Clearwater River at Camp Prairie, and the maintenance of these roads and the construction of such additional roads as necessary at Camp Prairie and to the Clearwater River. This construction will be prosecuted in cooperation with Military forces located at Camp Prairie.

(f) The construction of the following buildings at Camp Prairie: Administration Building, approximately 25' x 130'; [2291] Warehouses for the storage of Quartermaster supplies, consisting of two buildings, approximately 25' x 200'; Board House approximately 50' x 200' to accommodate 104 people; two Bunk Houses, approximately 50' x 200'; to accommodate 104 people; two Bunk Houses, approximately 26' x 100', to accommodate 96 people each; a Mess Hall approximately 25' x 160'; a Hospital Building approximately 25' x 110'; a Post Office Building approximately 25' x 60' and such other office buildings and store houses as may be necessary. Camp facilities for the civilian employees of your Company and such other persons who may be authorized to occupy them.

(g) To furnish camp equipment, including mosquito bars and head nets for crews of tows operating on the Athabasca River system.

(h) To furnish lumber for decking over open boats for use in tows hauling freight down the Athabasca River.

(i) To furnish road oil for the maintenance of all roads being used by either Army or Constructors vehicles.

(j) To furnish a staff of native pilots and guides for use on pioneer tows on the Athabasca River and for such other purposes as may be necessary.

(k) To construct utilities, including water supply, sewer system, electric lighting for Camp Prairie, both Civilian and Military Camps, and to construct refrigerator plants, as necessary, for Warehouses.

[2292] (l) To furnish gravel for the construction and maintenance of the road system and about the railhead and Camp Prairie.

(m) To furnish motor fuel and lubricants to military organizations until such time as a regular supply of motor fuel is established.

(n) To arrange with the Hudson's Bay Company to furnish wood for fuel for the S. S. Athabasca River at Waterways, at a price of \$4.00 per cord. All monies received from the Hudson's Bay Company will be deposited to the credit of the United States with the nearest Finance Officer.

Any stevedore service furnished either the Hudson's Bay Company, Northern Transportation Company or any other common carrier, will be charged to the respective companies and the funds deposited with the Finance Officer for the credit of the United States.

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Colonel, C. of E., Officer in Charge.

CC. Bechtel Price and Callahan, Edmonton
Bechtel Price and Callahan, San Francisco
U. S. Engineer Office, Edmonton
U. S. Engineer Office—Canol Project, San Francisco.
Original to Edmonton Office.

Mr. SPARKMAN: Off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOFFMAN: Here, on page 3 of the Progress Report [Exhibit 3]. [2293] Paragraph 4, it states:

"Engineering Studies in Connection with the Skagway and Whitehorse Pipeline and Facilities as per Contracting Officer's authorization, dated July 3, 1942."

Does that tell you that there are any plans prepared for that part of the line at all, when it is authorized in this report, as of July 3, that there were no plans of any kind. It is right there under their own signature. This report was prepared by the main office. This is not my report.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I asked you off the record, Mr. Hoffman, if the contract at Edmonton, Canada, about which you have been testifying, was not subsequent to your leaving the job in the Islands and subsequent to the difficulty, if you want to call it such, or certainly the criticism that you had of Colonel Wyman in the Islands?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I knew nothing about the Canol Project or the Canol pipeline until my arrival in San Francisco on May 12, at which time Colonel Wyman contacted me.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It was subsequent to that time, was it not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It was subsequent to that time.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am just trying to get this on the record. The question that comes to my mind is this: That after you had known something about the inefficiency, if you want to describe it as such, of Colonel Wyman in the Islands, and you had rather severely criticized him, how did it happen that you undertook [2294] this new project with him?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The first reason was that I received a letter from Colonel Wyman, which is a matter of record, in which he, in the wording of his letter, said he hoped the day would come when he and I could do a real construction job together, and from that letter he infers that all was not well in Hawaii.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You make reference to a letter that has already been put into the record, do you not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think it was. It was signed by Colonel Wyman and addressed to me in Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. This letter is on record on page 2189. That letter is dated March 17, 1942, addressed to Mr. Robert Hoffman, and signed Theodore Wyman, Jr., Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District Engineer. That is in the transcript of record of these hearings, dated January 24.

Mr. HOFFMAN. When I arrived in San Francisco, with no intention of contacting Colonel Wyman, and with the hope that I was going to South America to build some air bases for another contractor, Colonel Wyman contacted me and asked me to come down to his office on Montgomery Street and talk to him about the greatest project that was being offered. He did get me enthused over that project.

It was something new, and they said it was impossible, and that is the kind of a job I wanted.

After a day and a half of telling them that I had an [2295] obligation, and that I had to call the man on the South American work, I learned that diplomatic relations had not been broken between the Axis and Chile and it would not be possible to continue with that work, so I agreed to go with Colonel Wyman for a period not to exceed four months on the first section, and I was to be released after that time.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Did that Colonel Wyman at that time virtually admit that the situation in Hawaii had not been a happy one?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And promised the one in Canada would be a better one?

Mr. HOFFMAN. A much better one, and a different job altogether. In fact, I told Colonel Wyman we could not duplicate what we did over in Hawaii or I wanted to quit right then and there.

Mr. ELSTON. I would like to ask a question about what disposition was eventually made with all this equipment?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Elston, that is in this record as we go on.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BURTON. Did you offer any protest about the quantity of equipment that was sent you?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I wanted to know. I asked what the quantity of equipment was for after it arrived, not knowing that it was coming, even. They said it was to build a pipeline. Well, that [2296] is when I decided to get out of there, realizing the construction of a pipeline up in the muskeg country, where I had made several trips for inspection, I decided the thing to do was to get out of that job quickly. My protests would have meant nothing because the equipment was ordered without my consent or advice. It was ordered by the contractor and approved by Colonel Wyman. It had to be approved by him before it could be ordered.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know what became of this equipment?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, if I can go on with the story.

The McKenzie River flows north from McMurray and empties into the Arctic at Aklavik, 1600 miles from McMurray. The river runs over limestone and is never more than 42 inches deep, and therefore, the barges cannot take over three feet of water. When the barges arrive at Fort Fitzgerald, 300 miles north of McMurray, everything must be unloaded and transported over a portage of 20 miles to another town called Fort Smith, and it is then reloaded and sent down the river which enters Great Slave Lake and then westwardly across the end of the lake about a distance of 80 miles and then into the McKenzie and then again up to Norman Wells.

Great Slave Lake is a very treacherous body of water because of its shallowness and a storm can produce 30-foot waves within a half hour. When the first two barges loaded with \$200,000 worth of equipment started north, a storm came up, and the total equipment load of both barges was lost in the only deep spot in [2297] the Great Slave Lake.

The balance of the equipment was left waiting at Fort Smith in 50 degree below zero weather through the winter of 1942-43 with the result that considerably over 25% was lost to future use as there was no cover provided for it. This applies to trucks, maintainers, portable sawmills, shovels, electric welders, air compressors, and all construction equipment of that type.

Mr. BURTON. Let me interrupt there off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOFFMAN. As I said, you could not use all of the equipment for the job. It was impossible. You cannot use a hundred bulldozers when you can only work then on the road, with the result that I learned that a friend of mine whose name is Mickey Ryan, who controls the portage between Fort Smith and Fort Fitzgerald, now has a contract to bring the equipment back. I had word just this morning that some of the equipment went up there, never turned a wheel in work, but is now being returned.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you know how much?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not know. I just got this word this morning and I will find out within a week or ten days when I will know more.

Mr. MARTIN. About what percentage of the total amount of equipment was lost in that storm?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say conservatively 25%. Conservatively, I would say 25%. You cannot leave steel equipment stand out in [2298] 50 degree below zero weather without cover or any care.

Mr. MARTIN. You mean, exposure through the winter?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is true, and mishandling.

Mr. MARTIN. I also wanted to ask what percentage of it was lost in the storm on the lake?

Mr. HOFFMAN. \$200,000 worth on the two barges. The bulldozers run around \$12,000 apiece and there were eight of those on one barge.

Mr. BURTON. Did you come in contact with an explorer by the name of Stephanson.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I did not. However, I know the explorer's first name starts with V. Stephanson, and I knew of a survey that he made of the potential oil fields of Norman Wells. However, Stephanson's recommendations either for or against, were of no importance, as the original discovery of oil seeping from the ground was made first by the Scotch explorer McKinzie, and then by every other hunter and Eskimo that traveled the area.

There are seven or eight volumes published in the open libraries on the oil seepage of the McKenzie Valley.

Mr. MARTIN. According to geologists, the oil field deposits of the Athabasca were a part and parcel of the same seepage.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know of any work that was performed by the soldiers on this project?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I used soldiers in the building of the railroad, in the building of the airport, and in laying the [2299] utility pipelines of the camp.

There was not sufficient work for the soldiers sent to this camp. When I asked one of the officers why they had troops up there, he said they were there in case of invasion. It developed that these troops were engineer labor troops, and there were only 9 rifles and 4 pistols among the 3,000 men there. They were not gun troops.

Mr. BURTON. Did these labor battalions help to do the work?

Mr. HOFFMAN. These labor battalions helped me to build the railroad, helped perform other labor. Of course, the total expenditure of the cost of the project was figured in the amount of the fee to be paid to the contractor.

Mr. BURTON. You mean the fee paid the contractor was based on the estimated cost of the work done?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right. The contractor took the credit for all of the work performed up there. It was *my* railroad, *my* project, *my* buildings, *my* this and *my* that, although a large part of the work was performed by Army battalions.

Mr. BURTON. Then a large part of the work was performed by the Army battalions?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say not a large part, I would say a generous part at the Waterways station, which was the first section of the work. They had to build that before they could go farther north.

Mr. BURTON. Did you find any lack of equipment for the [2300] soldiers?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes. Due to the fact I did not know what troops were going to be there or the purpose they were going to be therefor—I knew they were engineer troops, of course, and an engineer, to me, means the man who does the things—I neglected to take my level and my transit with me from San Francisco.

When I was ordered to build the railroad and to drive the trestles, I had to have a level to set the grade for the bed. Of the 3,000 engineer troops, there wasn't a level or a transit among them. The engineers that were there were not that kind of engineers. They were pontoon and labor battalions, but called engineers of the Army.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know anything about the character of the officers who were sent there to supervise this work for the Army?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The officers were not capable of supervising that type of work up there. These were primarily labor battalions, with probably one or two companies specialized in pontoons.

Mr. BURTON. How about Colonel Wyman and his staff?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Colonel Wyman did not have a staff. He had to accept these officers who came with these troops.

Mr. BURTON. How did they conduct themselves?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Just like a bunch of fellows in the country without responsibility. There was not enough for them to do. They were not the best behaved officers.

Mr. ELSTON. What was the highest ranking officer in command?

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[2301] Mr. HOFFMAN, A lieutenant colonel. The first ranking officer was Jim Krueger, the son of Lt. General Krueger, whom I might say was drunk 50% of the time up there. There were some officers there that were really sincere. I particularly refer to the medical officers who had a job to do, and they did a marvelous job up there. As far as sanitation and keeping the men healthy, for the bugs and mosquitoes and flies were such that they would really make you sick if they bit you often enough, the doctors did a marvelous job.

Mr. BURTON. You had a little something to say about the contractors. What part did they play?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The contractors themselves knew less than the engineers and had no plans to build the project. The contractors were interested primarily in spending the money to secure a fee, as was evidenced by the building up of an office force of some 200 people that had nothing to do for three months, while the only work that was going on was the work I was doing in Waterways with three people.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. Did the cost of the material enter in any way into the fee?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, the cost of the project. The entire cost of the project, the fee is based on that and the only way the contractor can secure his earned fee is by the report of [2302] expenditures.

Mr. ELSTON. And all these bulldozers and these other items of equipment that you say were unnecessary but were sent up there nevertheless, who paid for those, the contractor or the Government?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The government paid for everything.

Mr. ELSTON. Did the cost of that equipment have anything to do with the fixing of the fee of the contractor?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It is included in the total cost of the project. If you will look at that report again, you will find that the original estimated cost of that project is \$30,000,000. The original estimated cost of the project is \$30,000,000 with a fee of \$1,500,000.

Mr. ELSTON. And the \$30,000,000 includes all the equipment?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Everything that is the cost of the project.

Mr. ELSTON. And the fee was \$1,500,000?

Mr. HOFFMAN. \$1,500,000.

Mr. ELSTON. And that was arrived at in what manner, do you know?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. That was fixed by the Blossom board down here?

Mr. MARTIN. But the exact number of bulldozers and the other equipment did enter directly into the computations?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No. The fee is based on an approximated cost [2303] of a job.

The CHAIRMAN. On a percentage basis?

Mr. HOFFMAN. On a percentage basis. In other words, that job was supposed to start at \$30,000,000 and the fee was \$1,500,000. The fact it ran to \$130,000,000 by supplements, nullified the original fee altogether.

The CHAIRMAN. But there would be additional fees fixed?

Mr. HOFFMAN. There were additional fees fixed.

Mr. MARTIN. Then the cost of this additional excess equipment was finally reflected in a larger fee?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, it must be.

Mr. ELSTON. And some of that \$1,500,000 fee was paid rather early was it not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right. It was paid right off. In fact, they had to advance the money before they started.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you know how much they were advanced?

Mr. HOFFMAN. \$3,000,000.

Mr. ELSTON. I mean do you know how much of their fee was advanced?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, Mr. Elston, but the way the auditing was set up in Edmon-ton, the contractor got \$3,000,000 to start doing business. The Army Engineers, of course, through their auditing department would check expenditure of money, but that did not stop the contractor from paying any such bills, that he thought necessary and right, and whether it was a fee or a bill, it would [2304] not make a bit of difference.

The CHAIRMAN. Except if they were bills accumulating on and on until it ran to \$130,000,000 or \$150,000,000, his fee on the side would be increased accordingly, would it not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. For every addition on there, there was a supplement issued. The Architect-Engineer had ten supplements in addition to the original contract, and for each one they got an additional fee.

Mr. ELSTON. I am not clear what it was that increased the cost of the original project to about \$130,000,000.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Elston, if there are no plans for a project and you do not know what you are going to do, how can you estimate the cost?

Mr. ELSTON. The thing that is going through my mind is this: Were there additional projects taken on that ran it above a hundred million, or was it the original project that they estimated at \$30,000,000 and later found it would cost more than \$100,000,000?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They added more work to it, but they had no plans for the original project. I do not know what the original project was. I have never seen a plan of the line.

Mr. ELSTON. What was the \$30,000,000 based on?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It was based on drawing a line and some drilling and getting the line into Whitehorse with a refinery.

Mr. ELSTON. Was that not the ultimate project?

[2305] Mr. HOFFMAN. That was supposed to be the ultimate project.

Mr. ELSTON. So the very plan they had in the beginning, if it was a plan at all, was the plan they ultimately intend to complete and which will cost over \$100,000,000?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is correct.

Mr. ELSTON. So that they missed—

Mr. HOFFMAN (interposing). The boat.

Mr. ELSTON. No, their estimate was perhaps only 25% and maybe less than that of what it actually cost?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is correct.

Mr. ELSTON. Of what it will actually cost.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I think if you take in all the costs, the line will run in excess of \$250,000,000, if you take in the costs of your troops and everything else.

Mr. ELSTON. It is worse than the Pentagon Building.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, as bad, anyway.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Hoffman, if you had not seen any plans at all, how did you proceed with your work?

Mr. HOFFMAN. In that letter, sir, from Colonel Wyman, I could have spent the entire Treasury of the United States, based on this letter. He tells me here that I can build buildings; that I can reconstruct the highways; that I can rent all the lands; that I can construct railroad facilities; that I can assist the Hudson Bay Company in the handling of freight and I can load and unload freight; cut wood for the Hudson Bay Company at a price of [2306] \$4.00 a ton, when it costs me \$6.24 to cut and deliver it; that I can furnish stevedore service to either the Hudson's Bay Company, Northern Transportation Company, or any other common carrier; I can furnish a staff of native pilots and guides; I can construct utilities, including water supply, sewer system, electric lighting and everything else. He goes on further and states that I can construct any such a thing that I think is necessary in my own belief.

Mr. ELSTON. Who were you working for? Who paid you?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The contractor.

Mr. ELSTON. Did you have any contact at all with the heads of this firm or were your dealing all with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They were with Colonel Wyman. I never saw the heads of my concern for a month and a half.

Mr. ELSTON. When you did finally see them, did they give you orders, or anything of the kind?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, they told me to get along with Colonel Wyman, that I was doing fine. We lived right next to each other, but I was fighting with him all the time.

Mr. FENTON. He would tell you what you were to do the next day?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He would tell me to build a 60-bed hospital and I would ask about the plans and he would say—and I will put this in the record—"What the Hell have I got you here for?"

[2307] Well, I am no designer. I am an engineer. He would say, "Can't you draw plans?" I would say, "I haven't got the time." Then he would say, "Put up a hotel of 200 rooms". So I went ahead and built the hotel. I was five minutes ahead of the carpenter. When I got through in my spare time, when

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I was resting about midnight, I would get out the board and draw the plans. I was working on reverse.

Mr. ELSTON. What kind of plans did you draw?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I was pretty good.

Mr. ELSTON. I have no doubt you were, but did you draw plans from which you took blueprints?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Were specifications written up?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I wrote the specifications for just what was put up.

Mr. ELSTON. Were you your own draftsman too?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I was.

Mr. ELSTON. Did you not have draftsmen?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The architect-engineer did not show up. In fact, I built his office without any plans, and when he got there he thought I had done a pretty good job.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

Mr. BURTON. If you will continue your statement, Mr. Hoffman.

[2308] Mr. HOFFMAN. Men that I had in Hawaii as superintendents and foremen and who were earning anywhere from \$300 to \$500 a month were sent up north for the contractor and they were drawing salaries from \$500 to \$800 a month, and were given bonuses along in November of 1942 for meritorious conduct.

Mr. Bendit, who was chief auditor and who since has left the organization, told me personally the bonus payments exceeded \$150,000, which were made by the contractor to the men.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these Japanese employees that you had over beyond or American?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, these were all American. There were no Japanese on this job at all, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. You said a while ago you were compelled to get rid of your Canadian help, did you not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Because you were upsetting the labor market in that area?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. And you were paying those men 50¢ an hour?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. When you got rid of them, who did you get in their places?

Mr. HOFFMAN. They sent up Americans at 90 cents and one dollar an hour and their keep.

Mr. ELSTON. Were they more efficient?

[2309] Mr. HOFFMAN. No, on the contrary they were not. The average Canadian laborer in the North Country is a worker because he has to work to survive in the north woods.

Mr. ELSTON. How many Americans did they send up there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The shipments were coming in there pretty fast. At one time, I had, I would say, about a thousand.

Mr. ELSTON. So, with the manpower shortage, or alleged manpower shortage in the United States, you were compelled to get rid of Canadian labor and use American labor that had to be transported up there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. They were transported clear up into that country and given wages at least double what you were paying the Canadians?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. And a greater number of laborers than you could use?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is right, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. On whose orders did you do that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I did not even order them. They were sent there. I did not even know they were coming.

Mr. ELSTON. Who ordered you to discharge the Canadian help?

Mr. HOFFMAN. The original letter came from Colonel Wyman to Bechtel, Price and Callanhan, at Edmonton. I got a copy of the [2310] letter. They attached to it a memorandum and said, "please comply."

Mr. ELSTON. What would you say the substitution of American labor for the Canadian labor amounted to in dollars and cents, all told?

Mr. HOFFMAN. It would be very difficult, Mr. Elston, for me to estimate, because after I left I had no knowledge of the job. However, you could get those records out of the voucher files. They are very complete.

Mr. ELSTON. I think we should get them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

Mr. BURTON. For what reason and when did you leave the Canol Project?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I left the Canol Project on August 3, 1943, after being warned in a wire by Colonel Wyman that I could not leave. I wired him back that I was leaving just the same.

When I got to Edmonton on the train with my family, I was advised that Colonel Wyman was looking for me, and Sunday morning at 100 o'clock, I got a call from Colonel Wyman saying he would like to talk to me and for me to come to his office which was then in the McLeod Building in Edmonton.

He wanted to know why I was leaving and I told him the job smelled to high heaven and that I was getting out of there, and [2311] quick.

He asked me if I had another job, and I answered, "No," which was the truth. I did not have anything in mind. I just wanted to get away before it opened up. By that I mean before they started investigating the job, which had to come.

Colonel Wyman said, "You are the only man that has accomplished anything here and knows what is going on. The contractor has received no reimbursement for any expenditures for materials and supplies."

He said, "Won't you please sign the Receiving and Inspection reports so that the Bechtel Company can get its money out of this thing? I will regard that as a personal favor."

Accordingly, I told him I would, and for five days I signed Receiving and Inspection reports to the tune of 80,000 stampings and 26,000 signatures, and those Receiving and Inspection reports bear my signature for the material I know had actually gotten up to Waterways. Those R. and I. reports which I could not identify were set aside without signature.

In the three months of operation, the Army had not made out a single receiving and Inspection report for anything received on the job, although the engineers' office crew was exceptionally large.

In other words, there is no record today, nor can anybody identify some of the missing equipment that came up there originally, and the only records of receipt of equipment was the record [2312] I carried in my office at Waterways, and which is part of the files there now.

Mr. ELSTON. May I ask a question, Mr. Hoffman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. When you signed those Receiving and Inspection reports, did you have any records in your possession that you checked against those?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I did. That is what I am talking about, the records that I had made myself and out of, well, there must have been 2000, or maybe more, each one of these reports had 10 or 11 copies and it was a big job, because I got a girl and worked in the hotel, worked up until 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning to get these things out.

Where it would not check with an actual record from my file, of actually having been received, I would refuse to sign. I had no right to sign those R. and I. reports. I was not an Army man. They should have been signed by the Architect-Engineer, who should have been on the job and for which he drew a few from the United States Engineers.

I merely acknowledged that this material had been received at Waterways, was either shipped north or used on a certain project and that corresponded with my daily reports, which are on file up there now.

Mr. ELSTON. You did not certify that the equipment was used?

[2313] Mr. HOFFMAN. No, just received and each number. The material came up unnumbered and I put the allocated number on the equipment which corresponded with my file and which were in use from that time on.

In other words, I gave each one an identity. I signed nothing that I could not identify positively. It was either there or it was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, gentlemen?

Mr. BURTON. Off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

Mr. BURTON. Do you know whether or not it is true that Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., received a Distinguished Service Award?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, he did. It is a matter of open record in the War Department and in the records.

Mr. MARTIN. For what services?

Mr. HOFFMAN. For the service performed in Hawaii.

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Mr. MARTIN. The service that you have described here in these hearings?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is correct, sir.

May I add one thing more to the record to make it complete.

In June, probably a month after I was there, General Reybolt, who was then Chief of Engineers, arrived in Edmonton and it was at that time that they knew that the job could not be completed in the specified time, December, 1942, and it was at [2314] that time that the extension was made, giving him another year to go ahead with the job. There was so little done then that it could have been stopped quickly with very little expenditure.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Knowles, do you want to ask any questions?

Colonel KNOWLES. Yes. Are you associated with any construction companies, Mr. Hoffman?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Now?

Col. KNOWLES. Yes.

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, sir, not any.

Col. KNOWLES. Have you been associated as a part owner or co-owner in the past two years?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Never. I have never owned anything. I have worked.

Col. KNOWLES. You have never been in control of any heavy construction equipment?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Never. I never owned a piece in my life; never owned a piece in my life. I might say for your further information that when I left Canada I was called to complete the North American bomber plant at Kansas City, Kansas, which I did, and when I completed that I went back to my home in California and was called by the Navy to come down and complete the North Island Navy Base, which cost \$22,500,000. I did that in 1943, and then I went to Mexico because I decided I needed a rest.

[2315] Mr. FENTON. Mr. Hoffman, you said you never saw any plans at all?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Never, sir.

Mr. FENTON. Did you ever come in contact with the person who was supposed to be the architect-engineer?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I did.

Mr. FENTON. Did he get on the job while you were there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He got on late in July of 1942.

Mr. FENTON. Did he tell you anything with regard to the plans or anything like that?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, he did not. The man I talked to was J. Gordon Turnbull. I had several talks with him and he said he was as much mystified as to what they were going to do as anybody else.

Mr. FENTON. Did he make any observations about the plans not having been presented to you to work with?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Only that he told me that the contract, as far as he was concerned, was not signed until June. The usual procedure is for the architect-engineer to get on the job and prepare the plans, and that is done in order to make the estimate and to find out what it is going to cost.

Mr. FENTON. When did you first see the architect-engineer?

Mr. HOFFMAN. I first saw him in July, 1942, when he got off of a plane at Waterways with Colonel Wyman.

Mr. ELSTON. I would like to ask Mr. Hoffman this [2316] question: I notice from the Public Record about the awarding of the Distinguished Service Medal to Colonel Wyman, that it was granted to him for exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service in the performance of duty and great responsibility as District Engineer at Honolulu, Engineer's District, from October 14, 1941 to March 15, 1942.

You were working there during all that period of time, were you not?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, I was there before and after that time.

Mr. ELSTON. Did he leave Hawaii at any time and proceed anywhere else and do any work for the Government?

Mr. HOFFMAN. He had work on the outlying Islands, too, that the Army controlled.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you know anything about the work that he did there?

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, only that generally they set up airports as stepping stones all the way from Honolulu to Australia.

Mr. ELSTON. This refers to his being directed to proceed with construction in the South Pacific Area and to be available for use by January 15, 1942, at locations difficult of access and widely separated.

Do you know anything about that work?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes, those are the islands. I had some of my own men go down and took them off my field. They were building temporary coral runways as stepping-stones all the way down to [2317] Australia.

Mr. ELSTON. He was commended for getting the work completed in 11 weeks from the date of the notice to proceed, and on December 28, 1941, which was two weeks ahead of schedule—

Mr. HOFFMAN (interposing). That work was started in July of 1941. Your definition there is work to be completed that had been in process for months. How long do you think it takes to make an airport?

Mr. ELSTON. Do you know whether it was completed in advance of schedule?

Mr. HOFFMAN. That I would not know, sir.

Mr. BURTON: Off the record.

(There was discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will excuse the witness at this time.

We will adjourn subject to call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 o'clock a. m., the hearing was recessed, to be resumed at the call of the Chair.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 8B

STATEMENT BY ROBERT HOFFMAN, AREA SUPERINTENDENT, FIFTH FIELD AREA,
BELLAWS FIELD

The incidents relating to actual stoppages of work due to the indecisive, changeable orders by the U. S. E. D. are substantiated by such exhibits as are available from the files. These pertain only to Bellows Field, as the writer has no authoritative knowledge of the goings on elsewhere. I therefore list below some of the items which merely confirm the statements of this report as I must again say that it would be too lengthy a report were all the items enumerated.

[1] The foregoing statement is made at the request of the Executive Committee of the Hawaiian Constructors for the purpose of record in conjunction with the progress of construction of what is today known as Bellows Field. This statement is made voluntarily and is subject to such oath as may be required now or at a later date and does not serve the purpose of indictment against either the U. S. E. D. or the Hawaiian Constructors. These simple facts as recorded have no bearing as to the personal feelings of the writer nor has the writer an "axe to grind" toward any one individual or any group collectively, and under no circumstances are they to be treated in that light.

The undersigned was employed by the Hawaiian Constructors with the consent of the District Engineer of Honolulu as a construction superintendent at Los Angeles, California, on or about April 20, 1941. After confirmation by Mr. Middleton in the Division Engineers' office at San Francisco, the writer embarked and arrived in Honolulu the morning of April 30 with no apparent assignment and no adequate direction as to where he might end up at. I was finally sent to Hickam Field where I created my own assignment by making take-offs of materials from blue prints (this was definitely a U. S. E. D. work task). After nine days of this I was shifted to Wheeler Field where the writer laid out the first sectionalized two story officers' quarters to prove the theory that mass production in sectionalized work was possible. On the sixteenth day of May I was assigned to Bellows Field, the original task for which I was employed [2] and immediately began the organization of a field force to construct the camp. There were no materials on hand, nor was there any equipment on hand, and there were but eleven men on the job. Because of a lack of knowledge of methods and ways to secure materials, equipment, and men, it was necessary for the writer to blunder for the succeeding two weeks, as no body seemed to know the method. Finally, on May 24, I was advised by the Area Engineer, Mr. P. J. Lynch, that we had a work order No. 20.0 which comprised sixteen sixty-three men barracks, one mess hall and two administration buildings. There were no blue prints on the job and the writer finally made a trip to Hickam Field and made some quick sketches of the barracks at that point, and on returning to Bellows Field the following day we started forming, preparatory to pouring concrete. This statement merely to indicate lacking cooperative effort in furnishing blue prints for proper work plan. From May 26 until June 17 we poured, beamed, framed and sheeted eleven buildings, and still no plans from the U. S. E. D.

covering these items. It was impossible to secure anything more than a one sack mixer, nor was it possible to secure adequate transportation for the movement of lumber because of the lack of directional cooperation on the part of the Hawaiian Constructors' downtown office. Lumber was sent out to the field on city trailer trucks at all hours of the night and was dumped anywhere with the result that for the months of June, July and August we incurred a labor cost of \$2,600.00 for the removal of lumber to the designated buildings into which it was to go.

[3] In the meantime, these barracks buildings, which are ordinarily a six to seven day completion job, were kept waiting for completion because of our inability to secure the necessary building hardware, mill work, electrical fixtures and plumbing fixtures. The Base Yard at Fort Kam, controlled entirely by the U. S. E. D., appeared to be without definite guidance with the result that a requisition to the store keeper was very seldom filled and at no time in the entire year of activity at Bellows Field was a complete requisition having more than three items ever filled.

The writer appealed to Mr. Lynch, the Area Engineer, pointing out that this field up until this time had the lowest labor cost on the Island and that unless we were able to secure millwork, spring bolts, simple door locks, BX cable for wiring, and plumbing fixtures, that our costs would go out of sight. I personally know of Mr. Lynch appealing to Captain Shields, then in charge of procurement, who turned down requisition after requisition with the remark that all the materials had been ordered and we would just have to wait. The result of this inefficient and detrimental policy on the part of the U. S. E. D. resulted in a labor cost of twelve barracks, which was 58¢ per square foot, to rise to \$1.10 per square foot, due entirely to delay, and this, added to the tremendous overhead of the U. S. E. D., caused an ultimate excessive cost, far exceeding comparative mainland costs for a like work. Outside of the extra freight costs, but bearing in mind cheaper labor cost on the Island, and bearing in mind that labor on this type of work comprises approximately 50% of the cost, the statement of excessive ultimate costs [4] is easily confirmed, and in the case of the U. S. E. D. must share the entire blame for this condition.

It appeared that the general feeling on the part of the U. S. E. D. was that they were acting as a super contractor, whereas in reality the Hawaiian Constructors, the contractors, were appointed to fulfil the obligations of a written agreement to construct, erect, and complete certain designated jobs as directed by the District Engineer. The animosity and harsh feelings which definitely placed the U. S. E. D. on one side of the fence, with the Hawaiian Constructors on the other, was so apparent as early as 1941 that it became common talk throughout Honolulu and even reached the mainland as was evidenced in a letter from George Gregory, a friend and engineer widely recognized on the East coast. It became a fight on the part of the Hawaiian Constructors to try and secure necessary materials and equipment to complete the task assigned, and it would take too long an enumeration to list the hundreds of stoppages due entirely to the fault of the U. S. E. D., who failed to realize the three fundamental principles of construction, namely field analysis, field production and finally field completion. It became apparent to all concerned that the U. S. E. D. with its inefficient help was trying to direct by remote control varied activities on a large scale which in the history of engineering construction has never been successful. The stormy sessions between those directing the work of the Hawaiian Constructors with some personages of the U. S. E. D. were a matter of common talk. It does not appear possible that such a state of condition could have existed, but the facts and incidents speak for themselves.

[5] Skipping over that period up to and including December 7, a new era came into being. Mr. Henry Brewer was placed in charge of procurement of the U. S. E. D. and undoubtedly due to the excited conditions brought on by the attack of December 7, the procurement gates opened up and any material that was available in the city of Honolulu was purchased at the request of the area office or the area engineer. It is safe to say that at Bellows Field fifty percent of the work allowed for this project was done between the period of December 7 and February 28, a short three months as compared with seven previous months in which work was slowed down by a continually lacking, inefficient system, heavily overhauled and conspicuous by its inability to give dollar value for the projects listed for erection and completion. It must be said at this time that the energy, stamina and eagerness of Colonel Lyman, the District Engineer, was beyond reproach. It is also the personal belief of the writer that no other man that I have known in twenty-five years of construction accomplished as

much as Colonel Lyman did. While it is true that his work was expensive and loaded with errors, the fact remains that he did accomplish and do a job. This opinion is concurred in by all of the top construction men on the job. The writer understands, without any confirmation of the fact, that it was impossible for Colonel Lyman to secure "top flight" men which were necessary for so vast a task, and as a result he was burdened with inexperienced, inefficient, title seeking men who cared more for the rank they could attain than for the completing of a job. To him goes our sympathy at this time.

[6] The Following Items From the Daily Work Book:

June 3, 1941: No beam stock for buildings G or H. Delay two days.

June 5, 1941: Was ordered to move pier boxes $\frac{1}{8}$ inch in 130 ft. building.

June 9, 1941: No reinforcing steel for piers for buildings O and P. Delay four days.

June 17, 1941: No gasoline. Trucks down two days.

June 20, 1941: No 2 x 10's or 4 x 4's. Delay three days.

June 21, 1941: No studs. Delay two days.

June 27, 1941: Ordered by Area Engineer to cease concrete pouring. See attached Exhibit No. 1. There seemed to be some argument between the Area Engineer and the District Engineer's office regard the type of concrete mix for Bellows Field. This argument was carried on for seven days with no concrete poured due to the interorganization squabble. After the fifth day advised the Area Engineer that unless we were permitted to keep on our work, I would shut the job down. On the seventh day he finally permitted us, in the face of this threat, to again start.

Monday, July 7: Because of District office holding up further work, laid off twenty-seven carpenters and eight laborers. Advised Mr. Lynch that unless the buildings were released, would lay off thirty more carpenters Tuesday morning.

Tuesday, July 8: Was given six more buildings.

July 11, 1941: Have been held up four days due to lack of lumber for the four recreation buildings. There is plenty of lumber in the yard.

[7] Saturday, July 19: Finally received lumber for five hundred man Mess and four recreation buildings. Delay nine days.

July 21, 1941: No electrical supplies. All buildings held up. Captain Shields refuses to honor requisition.

Tuesday, August 5: After eight days, still waiting for lumber for warehouse #32 and Administration building C. Understand U. S. E. D. yard holding up requisition.

Friday, August 8: No plumbing fixtures for barracks as yet. These have been ready for thirty-two days. Also have been ready for sash for five weeks. Shields refuses to honor requisitions. All sash could have been built locally within five days.

Saturday, August 9: Screen hangers on order five weeks. Still no material.

Wednesday, August 13: No cement. This has been on order for seventeen days.

Friday, August 15: No No. 9 tie-wire which has been on order six weeks. No reinforcing steel. This has been on order sixteen days.

The above are but a few of the enumerations which should be convincing enough regarding delays caused by inefficient procurement and distribution by the U. S. E. D.

Exhibits No. 2 and No. 3, dated September 9 and September 25, are confirmed by requisitions now on file which we were unable to get to complete the barracks.

Please note copies of reports running from November 4 to January 30. All of these reports, if carefully read, will indicate a lack of cooperation on the part of the U. S. E. D., and, in some instances, a lack of cooperation on the part of the Hawaiian Constructors. These reports are true copies and indicate clearly the progress of the job which was stopped and held back only by the direction of the U. S. E. D. office. These reports are marked A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H.

[8] Exhibit No. 4: You will note this memorandum dated December 15 signed by the Area Engineer, shows the priorities of work. No. 1 is the bunkers and it is hardly believable that even though they were plans supposedly made out by the U. S. E. D., on April 9, 1942, exactly four months after this first note, the go-ahead signal was given the superintendent at Bellows Field to place these bunkers. It is possible to understand a delay, but hardly one of this type where inefficiency was so apparent on the part of the planning office of the U. S. E. D. that this item became the laughing stock on the island. It is a known fact that Colonel Robinson and the Directing Office of the District Engineer was opposed to any action that the area engineer might make.

Exhibit No. 5: This memorandum called for 5,000 lbs. of caulking lead vitally necessary to the main water lines for the main camp at Bellows. Though ordered on April 22 it finally arrived November 27. In the meantime, the soldiers carried their water while the Honolulu Iron Works had 80,000 lbs. on hand merely for the waiting for a purchase order.

Exhibit No. 6: Because of our inability to secure any better than a one sack mixer in pouring 200 cu. yd. buildings, we appealed to the area engineer for a larger mixer. Finally, early in November, after six months of operation, and after having poured over 3,000 yards of concrete, we were given a two sack mixer.

Exhibit No. 7: The seeming inability of the U. S. E. D. office to properly estimate the yardage of materials is evidenced in this memorandum. After any experienced person looked at the ground to see [9] what these buildings went into, he could easily have realized that their prescribed yardage was deficient for the work. This is another example of U. S. E. D. inefficiency.

Exhibit No. 8: Changes in plans were made by work of mouth with no consistent policy of confirmation. This memorandum indicates a change in the shower rooms of all the barracks, and, as far as the writer knows, it has never been confirmed nor decided. The writer finally prevailed upon the Area Engineer for a "yes" or "no" answer, and this exhibit is the result.

Exhibit No. 9: This memorandum clearly indicates that our requisitions for materials actually having arrived at Base Yard No. 1 and our inability to receive same from the U. S. E. D. Our requisitions were bandied around the U. S. E. D. offices for over five weeks and finally returned to the area office. We never did get the material which was originally purchased for Bellows Field even though the manifest showed them as having arrived and unloaded. To the inefficient bungling of Lieutenant Wilbur, of the U. S. E. D., must go this piece of fine work.

Exhibit No. 10: A, B, C, D, E. These exhibits are self explanatory which shows the new system of the U. S. E. D. which was so inefficient as to be more than ordinarily irritating to the best man. This new system was set up with Lieutenant Rowland in charge and the delay occasioned by the issuance of tally outs and then not finding the materials in the yards designated would sometimes delay the work from three to four weeks. It is inconceivable that so poor a method could have been devised by intelligent men whose first interests were the defense of their country.

[10] **Exhibit No. 11:** This memorandum is self explanatory. The excitement created by Lieutenant Colonel Robinson was unwarranted and without fact. The truth of the matter in this case was that there were no plans for the bolts on the guns, and when Colonel Robinson called at 2:30 the morning of March 15, he was probably intoxicated to talk the way he did. The fact of the matter in this case is that two of the excavations were done and one complete for building, and under no circumstances were any of the statements made by Colonel Robinson true or reasonably intelligent. To this man must go the credit of being one of the most inefficient officers in the U. S. E. D.

Exhibit No. 12: At the time this memorandum was written there was ample dynamite on the island and it could have been released by the U. S. E. D. Their reason for this stoppage is still a mystery.

Exhibit No. 13: This memorandum is merely one of many to show counter-acting orders which were constantly delaying the allotted work. In the files at Bellows Field there must be at least 150 different types of orders stopping this work.

Exhibit No. 14: On receiving this order on January 18, the area engineer directed the immediate starting of this work. Fortunately, we had about 3,000 feet of 15 lb. rail which was left over from the tunnel work. We actually started at 2:00 o'clock the afternoon of the 18th and at 4:00 o'clock the same day two trucks came into the field under orders from Colonel Robinson to take the rail away. With no rail to move the twenty-five ton tanks into the tunnel we had to re-requisition enough rail for the job with the result that due to Robinson's misdirected [11] order these tanks were delayed twenty-three days. It seems silly now to think that the rush on the tanks was important in face of Robinson's order, which was the real cause of all the delay.

Exhibit No. 15: This memorandum is self explanatory from the area engineer which gives a work order with no specifications, no drawings, no nothing, as the area engineer indicates. This was a common practice of the U. S. E. D. office.

Exhibit No. 16: This memorandum from Plummer, who was a requisition chaser and a member of the U. S. E. D. force. This non-important member, who assumed great importance by driving a big Buick car, was constantly giving his untruthful information regarding the procuring of equipment. This memorandum, the same as many others, was not truthful nor was the equipment procurable, but merely caused us extra transport trips to some cost without results.

Exhibit No. 17: This memorandum from the Hawaiian Constructors' planning office is one of a series where requests had been made for drawings and wherein delays from two to six weeks were encountered in securing these drawings. It was a common practice to have to wait from three to six weeks for requested drawings.

Exhibit No. 18: This memorandum is self explanatory and confirms the statements that indecisive orders from the district engineer was more confusing than the common enemy. Trying to get a decision from the U. S. E. D. was as difficult as trying to personally say hello to Hitler.

[12] Exhibit No. 19, A. B: These two memorandums show the confliction between the various directing members of the area engineer's office. The first dated March 14 directs us not to fix the yard for proper coverage of materials, and on March 22 one from the area engineer complaining that the materials are not covered. It was indeed difficult to understand some of these nit-wits who could not understand themselves.

Exhibit No. 20: This memorandum is self explanatory and is one of the reasons for the delay in the tunnel work. It is my understanding, without authoritative confirmation, that Colonel Robinson stopped the equipment from coming to Bellows Field to do this important tunnel job.

Exhibit No. 21: The new Area Engineer, Mr. Tillman, who ordinarily would not make a third class foreman on a fourth class job, wrote this memorandum. He did not understand the reason for the delays, nor was he competent to judge. This stupidity was only in line with the rest of the U. S. E. D. management.

Exhibit No. 22: Another order from the area engineer, who did not understand that the channel to the sea had to be kept open for the water run off from the mountains. Because Tillman had an argument with Mr. Bennett, he issued this order which the writer did not follow as the water would have backed up into the cane fields causing damage beyond understanding.

Exhibit No. 23: This letter confirmed a conversation between the Commanding Officer, Mr. Tillman, and the writer. Mr. Tillman later denied that he ever talked about this matter and Colonel Farnum had to remind [13] him in no uncertain terms. How the U. S. E. D. could employ a man of so little ability for so important a task is still a mystery.

Exhibit No. 24: The redwood tanks in this order were purchased and designated for the water supply in Bellows Field. The area engineer, who did not take time nor the trouble to find out what they were for, ordered them out of Bellows Field because of simple stupidity.

Exhibit No. 25: The camouflaging was delayed almost five weeks because of indecision by the U. S. E. D. district office. The attached memorandum confirms this fact.

Exhibit No. 26: These memorandums are self explanatory. Purchase of asphalt in fiber drums was a serious mistake. Unquestionably the cost of handling these paper drums raised the cost of the asphalt at least twenty-five percent and the procurement department of the U. S. E. D. must assume this blame. Also, the procurement should have consulted the contractor who had a knowledge of asphalt before purchasing 60/70 and should have realized that in this tropical climate that 50/60 is the proper asphalt to use.

Exhibit No. 27: This is self explanatory and indicates again that the U. S. E. D. made no attempt to look at our mix, but found continual fault even though all tests were more than satisfactory.

Exhibit No. 28, A, B, C, D, E, F, G: These memorandums on this exhibit prove that personal feelings on the part of Colonel Robinson against the Area Engineer, P. J. Lynch, were most detrimental [14] to the defense work at Bellows Field. A letter on December 11 from Mr. Woolly, attached, requested an arrangement with the Waimanalo Sugar Company for machine shop work. The writer consulting the area engineer received his consent. This arrangement saved the Government at least \$10,000.00. When the bill was finally pre-

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sented, Colonel Robinson refused to O. K. it, and this correspondence was sent back and forth until the writer threatened to take the matter to General Emmons, as is evidenced in my letter dated March 21, attached, at which time the bill was taken care of. The writer is compelled at this time to state that Colonel Robinson on many occasions placed obstacles in the way of the area engineer and thereby slowed up work. This officer should be roundly censured and court martialed for his acts of sabotage.

Exhibit No. 29, A and B: These exhibits are from the new superintendent and shows the indecision of the area engineer in the important work of bunker construction. It is indicated that the area engineer was looking for an argument from his notation on the letter of April 18. Under these circumstances, how could a field man perform without directives ordering the work.

Exhibit No. 30: This is one of many memorandums from the area engineer in which he did not understand the work accomplished. At no time was work held up except by reason of U. S. E. D. approval. This memorandum clearly shows that the Hawaiian Constructors were ready and willing, but needed approval to do certain work.

Exhibit No. 32, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, to N: On these memorandums it shows the conflicting orders from the area engineer [15] and his interference with men on the field which lowered the morale of the entire organization. On exhibit 31 C it shows a statement which is not true, and a reply to this memorandum is found in exhibit 31 J. The statements in Exhibit 31 E regarding equipment is made up entirely of falsehoods and when I called his hand he just merely laughed and said something had to be done. His lack of knowledge and understanding of construction was so apparent that Mr. Tillman evidently wrote letters to cover his deficiencies. Exhibit 31 F and H shows where he gave away materials without charge or without consulting the field superintendent, thereby interfering with normal work. Exhibit 31 G shows one of the many requests for assistance in procuring materials through his own office which invariably he merely filed and forgot. Exhibit 31 J is in reply to several of these memorandums, and 31 K, L, M, N have assumed a proportion of seriousness, and some action should be taken quickly.

Property, as we know, was ordered to Hawaiian Constructors, and if the area engineer is permitted to take it out without proper signature with the charge remaining against the Hawaiian Constructors, then some real trouble will soon start.

This record in its entirety is merely a statement of fact, far from being complete, but merely to show instances taken at random that were possible for stopping of work at once in action and inefficiency, direction and operation, which is the result of ual control in construction. Far from absolving the Hawaiian Constructors, there is hardly a doubt but [16] what their work could have been more efficient had there been less hampering and indecisiveness on the part of the U. S. E. D.

The full record is in the files at Bellow Field, and when the final chapter of this job is written there is no doubt that somebody will be called for explanations. These files should be guarded and kept intact for just that purpose.

ROBERT HOFFMAN.

April 29, 1942.

Exhibit No. 1

JULY 31, 1941.

Where cement is to be added by the sack, the following volumes per sack of cement should be used:

	<i>Field, Loose Volumes</i>
No. 3 Aggregate-----	4.075 cu. ft.
No. 4-----	2.30 cu. ft.
Sand-----	1.28 cu. ft.
Water-----	7.75 gallons
Absorbed Water-----	1.2 gallons

(Written note:) Use half large rock and half small rock.

Exhibit No. 2

SEPTEMBER 9, 1941.

Mr. HOFFMAN: The following is short of fixtures for the 65 man Barracks Job.

Short 12-24" enameled iron lavatories
 " 8 Pony Laundry Trays and 8 stands
 " 28 Vitreous China Closet Bowls
 " 28 Kohler Closet Seats
 4 Kohler (K8954) Laundry Tray Swing Spiut Faucets
 4 " (K9020) Adjustable P trays (1½")
 4 " (K9060) Continuous Chrom. Drains
 8-1½ x 1½ Chrom. P. O. Plugs (tail pieces) Chain & Rubber Plugs
 24—Crane C31843—R. N. Jr. Lavatory
 Crom. Faucets
 24—Crane C32647
 ¾-6 x 6 Chrom. Lavatory supply pipes
 With C634260 Escentrics nuts and ¾ x ¼ ground joint tail pieces.

F. W. WITT, Plumbing Foreman.

Exhibit No. 3

SEPTEMBER 25, 1941.

Mr. HOFFMAN: Please find out for me at once what kind of fixtures go in 500 man mess hall and order them as I never saw any specifications for same:

I need the Dish Washer Machine
 Two 20 x 30 One Piece Sinks
 Four Grease Traps for Scullery Sinks
 Two Kohler K9060 Continuous Wastes }
 Two Kohler K8954 Swing Spout Faucets } Now at Mess Hall
 One Kohler Closet Bowl and seat }
 One 20 x 24 enameled lavatory } In rear toilet room
 One electric water cooler Drinking Fountain
 Two wall hung urinals for both Administration Bldgs.
 If not correct sizes order per specifications which I can't find out.

F. WITT, Plumber.

Exhibit No. 3-A

NOVEMBER 4, 1941.

To: E. E. Ashlock, General Superintendent.
 From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area.
 Subject: Report, week ending November 1, 1941.

Progress of all jobs in this area is quickly summarized in the following:

Job 20.0: The culvert on 20.2 completed and ready for use. No new building scheduled outside of the telephone building and gas station building, which means four days work for the carpenters. Emphasis is stressed to the effect that more releases of future buildings are necessary in order to keep these crews intact. Our experience in training crews has been a difficult one and we would hate to see a new start made for retraining new crews. Insufficient work means lay off of old crews.

Water lines complete as far as grades allow. Sewer lines will be complete in the building circle by November 6, 1941. Again lack of essential Y's is holding up the speed of laying sewer lines. Power distribution is complete in the building circle and 80% of all buildings in the field are now occupied with 100% of all buildings ready for occupancy.

Job 20.5—Runways: This work has been slowed down due to lack of powder. A lack of parts has kept 25% of the truck inactive. A recommendation is made than an adequate parts order be instituted so that we may realize the full production value of all equipment. This recommendation also applies to parts for "Cats" and shovels. Another factor towards slowing this work has been the lack of 6" pipe which was necessary to properly water the lifts as they were made on the runways. We have solved this problem by using 6" cast pipe on a loan with the result of having adequate water and the runways are now showing good progress.

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Job 20.130—Tunnel: Again the lack of axles and wheels for the dump cars; the lack of 1" air hose and fittings has slowed this work down. We are informed that new cars are on their way and that soon we will have sufficient equipment to make the allotted borings so that a real showing can be made. We might also advise that our supply of powder on the tunnel is almost out and when this happens a shut down is inevitable.

Job. 20.1—Tanks: Due to the urgency of fabricating special work for Station X, it was necessary to move the entire crew to both the Base Yard and Pier 2 so that a delay of five days on the completion schedule of the tanks resulted. The crew is now at work and completion of the tanks is scheduled for Saturday, November 15, 1941.

Job. 20.5—Asphalt Plant: We again repeat our urgent requirements for aggregate so that we may put this plant into operation as it is already to go. It is our thought to start our first work on the roads in the camp and in this manner be able to get all the "Bugs" out of our future operations. May we ask that a determined effort be made to not only secure aggregate but a "Clam" as well for the proper operation of the plant. Should we secure the aggregate for the plant, our first operation is scheduled for November 7, 1941.

In general summary, the entire job has moved along as well as can be expected under existing conditions. We realize the urgency for completion of all work allotted us, but in the absence of required materials and equipment, over which we have a limited control, we can only say that our best efforts have been spent in the direction, in line with our organization policy.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

RH/

Exhibit No. 3-B

NOVEMBER 12, 1941.

To: E. E. Ashlock, General Superintendent.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area.

Subject: Report; week ending November 8th, 1941.

A consistent delay of essential materials again becomes our theme in reporting work progress for this area.

Job 20.0—Completion of the gas station, the telephone building and interior finishing of the infirmary were the major accomplishments for the week. Continuous laying of sewer lines and continued laying of water lines right up to the engineers flags kept the men busy on this job for the period noted.

Job 20.5—One orders of the Area Engineer, we were stopped from further fill on the runways. Kindly refer to letter dated November 5th, addressed to the Fifth Area Engineer and signed by Col. Wyman, which for the first time specifically gives specifications and instructions in working the runways. It should be noted that in complying with these instructions by Col. Wyman, it becomes absolutely necessary to have 6" pipes and pumps, which would give us the necessary pressure of 80# on the nozzle for sluicing. We might advise that we have made requisition for 12,000 feet of 6" galvanized screw pipe, 1,800 feet of 2½" high pressure hose and four high pressure nozzles. As soon as this equipment is on hand we can proceed with some speed. Should this equipment be delayed on arriving here in excess of one week, we would be hard pressed for sufficient work to keep the crews going.

Job 20.2—Particularly in excavating the pump station, which is at -7 elevation, we experienced sufficient pressure to weaken the excavated walls, so that a drag line or "Clam" must be used before we can proceed. Proper requisition has been made for this equipment. Sewer lines and water lines are progressing on schedule.

Job. 20.5—Asphalt Plant. This unit is all ready to go and we are merely awaiting necessary aggregate. At this date, we have 500 feet of fine grade complete and the plant can be in operation within one hour from the time we receive the necessary material. The Area Engineer is doing all he can in trying to procure the rock. May we ask your additional help.

Job. 20.1—Tanks: Merely a clean up operation for the completeness of these twelve units. This work was originally scheduled for completion on Saturday, November 15th, but due to a hurry call of the complete welding crew for some special work, we will have to advance our completion schedule to November 20th, providing the crew return not later than Monday, November 17th.

Job. 20.130—Tunnel: Better progress has been made this week due to receiving several additional dump cars, additional air hose and the more determined morale of the men. It is our hope and belief that we can soon be doing some 10 to 12 feet a day so as to rapidly complete this project.

In summary, while the progress still seems slow, the prospects of faster work looks much better and we feel sure that a brighter report will be available on November 15th.

T.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

RH/ac

Exhibit No. 3-C

NOVEMBER 21, 1941.

To: E. E. Ashlock, General Superintendent.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area.

Subject: Report, Week Ending Saturday, November 15, 1941.

The general work in the Area is slowing down noticeably due to conditions and circumstances as noted below:

Job 20.0—A lack of orders for new buildings which we have been expecting for the past six weeks has not materialized. Hence, our carpenter crews have been reduced to a small working force. All building work orders are complete as far as structure is concerned, with only minor mechanical placements to do.

Our suggestion that we secure more building orders, which our Area Engineer has been trying to get for us, would be our immediate solution.

Job 20.1—The removal of welding equipment and welders holds back the completion of this job. Three or four days of minor work would complete the tanks with the exception of their priming. The tanks are starting to rust and it is suggested that they be wire brushed and primed to preserve them. Your comment would be appreciated on this.

Job. 20.130—Progress on the tunnel has moved faster than in the previous week. A little more equipment and better application is giving us results. The digging is hard but we still believe that eight to ten feet can be made a day as soon as our equipment is working without the constant break downs that have been our luck.

Job 20.2—Sewer and water lines, including all hydrants and man holes, have been completed in the building circle, with water now serving both the new and old camps. This work has not stopped with the exception of a lack of ten inch vitreous pipe for the sewer line which held us up for a day. Our schedule calls for completion of our water line by December 27th. We are working on our pumping station for sewer disposal in a below sea level area, with constant pressure of water seepage. It was necessary to pile and coffer-dam the excavation to lay our mat. We will be ready for steel and concrete on this unit on the 28th of November. Work progress is satisfactory.

Job 20.4—Access Roads: The road circle in the new camp is being graded and we are in a position to place headers for asphalt. With no prospect of rock at the present time we await some word for the starting date. We are ready to work on these roads as soon as asphalt is available.

Job 20.5—Excavation: This work is slowing down to the point where we will have to shut down if the pumping, equipment, hose, and nozzles are not made available very soon. We are cleaning up all odds and ends and grading access roads to the gasoline storage. It is hardly possible to keep the work going on the runways for more than ten days. May we have your comment?

Job 20.5—Asphalt Plant: As shown in our previous reports, the hot plant has been ready for four weeks and still no rock. We have on hand some 9,000 barrels of asphalt, ample fuel oil and everything ready to go, but no rock. Our Area Engineer is using every effort to procure the necessary materials which so far have not been available. Your help is requested.

This report is in itself a summary of all operations, and while realizing that other priority jobs are more important, it will be realized that building new crews is an expensive and slow process. This is truly a time when the front office must come to our aid.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

RH/ac

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Exhibit No. 3-D

NOVEMBER 25, 1941.

To: E. E. Ashlock, General Superintendent, Pier 2 A.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Subject: Report, Week Ending November 22nd, 1941.

We have attempted this week to use every effort in procuring the necessary authority and materials to keep the jobs going.

Job 20.0—A skeleton crew of carpenters is picking up all the loose ends, building forms, and re-roofing buildings where necessary. We need an order for about ten new buildings to get back into the swing of showing progress.

Job 20.1—As indicated in our last week's report, there is no work going on at the tanks. We still await an answer to our request of last week, in regard to wire brushing and priming.

Job 20.130—Progress has been even better last week than previously at the tunnel. We should be in full stride this coming week.

Job 20.2—Sewer and water lines continuing on good schedule. Our completion date as scheduled last week still stands.

Job 20.5—Excavation. This job almost came to a standstill until Mr. Grafe gave the word to go ahead on a modified plan. We are not proceeding with our final lift on the "cuts" and by the end of the week will be making fine grade. With the authority as given by Mr. Grafe, we should make the best showing on this job that we have been able, up to date.

Job 20.5—Asphalt Plant: This unit is ready to go. The roads in the camp are being fine graded and our schedule calls for laying our first asphalt on Wednesday, November 26th. We have made arrangements with the Ready Mix Concrete Company for 300 tons of rock per day, delivery starting Tuesday, November 25th. We are in urgent need of a one yard "clam" so that we can utilize our stock pile for loading the bings.

Summary: We have also learned that Col. Weddington, commanding officer at Bellows Field, has secured the approval of General Martin for some forty additional barracks and buildings to be placed in the new camp. If this is true, it will be necessary to tear up part of our finished paved roads to serve the new units, because of the present line of sewer and water. It seems a pity to make this new line, which is not complete, almost obsolete before everything is completed. This advanced information is given for some future thought.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent Fifth Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

RH/ac

Exhibit No. 3-E

DECEMBER 1, 1941.

To: E. E. Ashlock, General Superintendent, Pier 2 A.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Subject: Report: Week Ending November 29, 1941.

A faster movement in operations for the entire job, which was accelerated by definite orders and specifications, which we have been lacking up to this date, makes the entire job look more promising. The following report explains the reason for the above statement.

Job 20.0—Procurement of materials still is a serious stumbling block and transportation of materials from the Base Yard seems to have passed out of the picture altogether. Small items such as a few screens, a few doors, probably 50-60 sash, and minor fittings for the mechanical work do not seem to arrive after they are ordered, and repeated trips into the Government Base Yard at Fort Kam produces no results at all. A definite solution to this problem must be worked out in order to secure the items that are now in stock. This will require a more cooperative spirit between the U. S. Engineers Base Yard and our transportation department.

Job 20.1—Tanks: Work is stopped altogether because of withdrawal of all welders and welding equipment. We are awaiting the fittings for these tanks and are now on the verge of steel brushing and priming the outer surface to preserve the steel. The question of applying the final enamel, which is a hot process of application, is to be determined by the Area Engineer who is attempting to secure the final authority.

Job 20.130—Tunnel: Progress has been faster and the average bore per day has been up to about seven feet. A sudden cut into clay will make additional gunnitting necessary for safety. This matter has been transmitted to the Operation Superintendent on the tunnel. Based on the depth of bore under present conditions, an estimated 100 working days will complete this project in this area. Poor muck cars with constant break downs has not helped production.

Job 20.2—Water and sewer lines are progressing on schedule. We are sadly lacking in 8" and 10" vitreous sewer pipe which we are unable to secure in Honolulu to carry on our work. The writer personally found 1,400 lengths of 8" pipe in the Base Yard, but it seems that our requisitions are not being honored, without definite reason for such disregard. Can we secure some help from your office to immediately secure this pipe, so that we may proceed with our work.

6" Bell and Spigot, gate valves, are not procurable, and where the specifications demand that these be placed along our line our work comes to a standstill because of our inability to procure same.

Pumping station No. 1 is right on schedule. The mat has been poured and the wet pit is being "stepped" at the present time. The second pour is scheduled for Friday, December 5th, which will bring us above the water line and permit stopping of the 24 hour pump. In connection with this pumping station, may we ask that a follow up be made regarding the Chicago pumps, and fittings for the high pressure line, necessary to complete this item.

Emphasis must be made regarding the importance of this pumping station, as the present temporary cesspools around the Barracks are not adequate to serve the camp. It is estimated that another 90 days will create a seriously unhealthful condition due to lack of sewage disposal. If this equipment has been ordered, can we find out when, by whom, and when we may expect delivery in order to anticipate hooking in our line.

Job 20.4—Excavation: The modified instructions by Col Wyman, directing 6" lifts with water has given us a faster movement in completion of top grade on the runways. Briefly, with everything working in order, we should be ready for asphalt on the runways not later than December 22nd. An additional bulldozer and a road patrol would be a tremendous help in keeping this work going. We are now securing ample water for ordinary work on the runways.

Job 20.7—This is a new order for twenty-five new buildings in which excavation has already started. A further report on this progress will be made next week.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

RH/ac

Exhibit No. 3-F

DECEMBER 14, 1941.

To: Charles Clapp, General Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area, Hawaiian Constructors.

Subject: Report for Week Ending December 13, 1941.

As you can well appreciate our normal operation this week have been considerably disrupted, due to the need for emergency structures, inability of some employees to reach the project, and almost total discontinuance of delivery of material. However, we are proceeding as fast as possible as the following detailed report will show.

20.0—All buildings on this order are erected and in use. Minor sewer connections when sewage plant is operating will make this job 100% complete.

20.1—We are now prepared to sand blast and prime the steel tanks as soon as the enamel is obtained and authority is given the Area Engineer to go ahead. It is suggested that this work be begun as soon as possible as the tanks are now rusting, and each day of delay will make a proper job of protection slower, more expensive, and harder to accomplish.

20.120—Nothing to report as the tunnel is not yet ready to accommodate the tanks. It is suggested that inquiry be made in regard to the procurement of the fittings and dispensing equipment, inasmuch as these are not obtainable on the island.

2928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

20.130—Progress has come to a standstill because the labor has practically all been drawn off to other jobs.

20.2—The sewage pumping station concrete work is 60% completed and we can begin to install equipment in about 5 days. As for sewer lines in the field we are unable to obtain 10" vitrified pipe. Your assistance along this line will be appreciated.

20.3—The infirmary building is 90% complete lacking only in some final fittings. Due to the exigency created by moving troops to Bellows Field from other posts however, some parts of the infirmary are now in use by the Army.

20.4—No work was done on roads this week due to more urgent need of men and equipment elsewhere.

20.5—All efforts were directed to providing a temporary runway and we have had such runway in use by the Army since Tuesday. The magnitude of the job in providing what Army officers have called the best runway in the islands in two days time cannot be over stated. The men worked with but few interruptions, with all the difficulty of working in the open entirely without light, and with few exceptions have done a good job.

20.5—Hot Plant—With the decision Sunday A. M. to immediately provide a runway and dispense with asphalt work the hot plant was shut down. However on the following Saturday we received unofficial word to proceed with paving work and in anticipation of official notice we are preparing the plant for service again, expecting to go into action Tuesday A. M.

20.6—No equipment on hand for this installation.

20.7—We are proceeding full speed ahead on this job as fast as we get labor and material. During the last three days of the week we have completed two warehouse buildings on this order ready for painting and are proceeding with foundation work for two more.

In summary we ask that you use your weight to obtain better material procurement and delivery.

Yours truly,

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area,
Bellows Field.

RH/m

Exhibit No. 3-G

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

To: C. G. Clapp, Project Manager.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

Subject: Weekly Report, ending December 20th, 1941.

This week has seen this area back to about 90 percent of normal operations, and we expect to be 100 percent within a few days. While it is true that we have lost some of our men have not returned as yet, we feel sure that a week or two will straighten us all out and we will resume operations as of prior to December 7th.

Job 20.0—With the cancelation of two small magazines, we are pleased to report that this job order is 100 percent completed.

Job 20.130—Tunnel: This job and explanation thereof is amply covered in our recent confidential report to you. As we understand, progress is reported direct to you through another source.

Job 20.1—Tanks: Part of our welding crew returned Friday and we are now awaiting definite decision as to the type of fittings on these tanks so that we can properly place them to enable us to sandblast, prime and enamel before placing tanks in position. We would appreciate your office's helping us locate the fittings, if they are on the Island, so that we may quickly complete this job. The actual work involved for the welders on this job would not take over a few days.

Job 20.2—Utilities: All sewer lines are completed with the exception of 400 feet of 8-inch pipe which will be placed in position not later than Friday, December 26th. With the laying of this minor run, all sewer lines will be 100 percent complete. We have managed to secure 2 temporary 3-inch pumps which we plan to put in our pump station, and we schedule the operation of the sewer system for the field not later than Saturday, January 3rd. In connection with this sewer system, by order of the Area Engineer we have located a cesspool sunk between Runway A and Runway B that will have a capacity of 3,000,000 gallons of sewerage. We are going to use this until such time as

the proper equipment arrives. This is in accordance with the wishes of the Commanding Officer and the Area Engineer and meets their entire approval.

The Water system is in and in operation. The only portion not laid is that which the Engineers have no data on and which is a secondary return line having no effective force on the present operating system.

The electrical distribution system is complete in the Main Camp. An estimate of 65 percent totally complete would not be too generous. A delay in the procurement of transformers, necessary wire and equipment has slowed us down considerably on this phase of the job. Were we to have the necessary equipment, we could complete this part of the work in three weeks.

Job 20.4—Roads: We have stopped on the grading of 7,000 feet of access roads on order of the Area Engineer. It is our hope that this order will be lifted soon so that we can grade and pave and complete this work. Your help on this would be very beneficial as we would like to see the camp roads in shape.

Job 20.5—Excavation: Runway B, which has been in use since Friday, December 12th, taking ships as large as the B-18's and A-20's, has been pronounced by landing aviators as one of the best they were ever on. While it is true that constant maintenance must be used in keeping this runway in shape, there is hardly a doubt but that asphalt should cover the runway. The runway is now 400 feet wide and we have noticed that 3 ships take off simultaneously and land the same way.

We have built dispersal bunkers which the Commanding Officer says are excellent.

Our fill to the heading of the runway is proceeding very fast and we expect the full fill to mature for actual use by January 6th, which will then give them a runway approximately 6,800 feet in length, capable of taking the largest ships we know of.

It is our understanding that we are to go across the King Kam highway for further dispersal of ships which will be in a finger pattern and will be quite a good sized job.

Runway A is coming along faster than expected and should be ready on the same basis as Runway B is now, not later than January 15th. Another wagon drill, shovel, a few more trucks, would be of great help in speeding up this work, if we should be so fortunate as to be able to get them.

Job 20.5—Hot Plant: This unit is now formant awaiting further orders.

Job 20.7—Mobilization Buildings: This job started off on December 15th and we have averaged one building a day since then. The total order calls for 20 buildings and if we are able to procure the materials, this job should be complete 45 days from today. Again our electrical supplies are slow, as is our plumbing. Your help again is requested on these items.

Job 20.8—One Item—11 Building: We have just received this order and are ready to go through on it subject to the proper placement by the Engineers.

SUMMARY: Under the conditions that exist and the excitement caused by circumstances beyond our control as of December 7th, the work has proceeded much better than expected. In fact, the workmen have produced more in the same time than prior to this period. Our labor has been consistent and there has been no trouble of any kind that might cause a let-up in our determined efforts to produce more. Procurement through the U. S. Engineers still seems to be a stumbling block with more than an ordinary amount of time wastage in trying to get orders filled. We feel sure that this problem will soon be ironed out. If ever there was a time for proper organizations, it is here now.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.

RH: DM

Exhibit No. 3-H

JANUARY 30, 1943.

To: C. G. Clapp, Project Manager.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

Subject: Job Orders 156-W, 273-W and 288-W.

136-W—Construction of Sewer System & 500,000 Gal. Water Tank at Ulupau: The writer has not yet been informed that Mr. Nichols has received the Sewer Contract nor have we received any information as to what part of this Sewer Contract this office will perform.

2930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

We have not received the plan for a 500,000 gallon water tank and there is nothing we can do unless we have information that will tell us what to do. It is hardly plausible in the fact of such deficient information to expect resulting production on this job.

273-W—Construction of Tent Floors and Two Latrines at Ulupau: The tent floors are being fabricated at Bellows Field and the latrine location has not been decided upon by Col. Dutton, the commander of the camp.

288-W—Construction of a Complete Camp at Ulupau: The only instructions the writer has received was a telephone call from Mr. Benson that we were to take over the camp. I was also advised that a Mr. Freitas would continue in charge of the construction forces. However, upon investigation, I found that Mr. Freitas, whom I talked to personally, did not have time to give any effort to this job and upon consulting Mr. Benson, was advised that Mr. Freitas would not be connected with the matter. In addition to Mr. Freitas, a man by the name of Leebrick, whose duties are still a mystery to me, but who seems to be flying from town to Ulupau in a U. S. E. D. car seems to take upon himself work and measures not within the scope of the work order.

They are building chiffoniers for officers, special tables and other items requested by Col. Dutton.

In addition to these two men, a man by the name of Mr. Neves, who is supposed to be the superintendent of the job is in charge of construction. He appears to be doing the actual work, and claims he is taking orders from the Pacific Construction Company. In other words, here is a job which is but a drop in the bucket, with no supervisory ability, employing about 60 men and the Bellows Field job on Camp Construction employing about 300 men where we have but one foreman.

Yesterday, January 29th, Mr. Benson visited Bellows Field, and upon questioning learned that Mr. Freitas was coming back to take charge of the job at Ulupau.

This letter is in reply particularly to your memorandum of January 27th, from Mr. A. A. Taylor who seemed to go overboard in this project without knowing the fact of the case, or the result of inaccurate information given Taylor by both our office down town and at Ulupau.

Will you kindly advise this office in writing, if we are to direct supervision, if we are to order materials, and whether or not it is necessary for me to keep three supervising superintendents on a job the size of a peanut?

I will await your reply and will take no further action until that time.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent,
Fifth Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.

RH/ac.
cc: Middleton.
Lynch.
file.

Exhibit No. 4

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

(1) Bunkers for planes.

The two item No. 15 buildings near the service mats will have priority over all barrack construction and should be rushed through all daylight hours to completion.

(2) Runway B shall be graded to receive asphalt as shown on plane.

Station 0+0 to -10+00 shall be rushed, all coral to be placed 6' layers and thoroughly watered. No coral shall be used on any other area for building construction.

All shooting shall be done at 11 a. m. only, and two hours notification given the Area Engineer before shots are fired.

No material or equipment shall leave the field without approval of the Area Engineer.

(3) The tunnel shall be continued. No tunnel equipment shall leave the Area without the approval of the Area Engineer.

Complete welding on tanks at tunnel.

Place bridge as indicated over slough and open road to tunnel.

Bomb storage.

P. J. LYNCH,
Area Engineer,
Fifth Field Area.

Exhibit No. 5

INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

Honolulu, T. H.

To: P. J. Lynch, Engr. 5th Area.

From: Supt. 5th Area.

Subject: Caulking Head.

Our Req. #1027 H. C. dated 10/22 calls for 5000# Caulking lead for 20.2 sewer water lines. May we ask that this item be rushed so that we may push this phase of the work with all possible speed.

HOFFMAN.

Exhibit No. 6

AUGUST 18, 1941.

Memorandum to Mr. Lynch:

Referring to your memorandum of August 9 asking for suggestions regarding an additional concrete mixer because of the large concrete pours anticipated, please be advised that it is almost necessary that we have additional mixing equipment in order to facilitate our work.

It is hardly possible to pour good concrete in a six foot wall without having a cold joint here and there, and the writer would appreciate your every effort in helping secure another mixer so that these walls could be poured out in a period not to exceed four hours.

Thanking you kindly for your cooperation, I am,

Very truly yours,

ROBERT HOFFMAN.

Exhibit No. 7

AUGUST 1, 1941.

Memorandum to Mr. E. E. Ashlock.

Subject: Item 32. Storehouse, SH-18, 60 x 153.

Item 19. Storehouse, SH-13, 60 x 153.

The estimated amounts of materials for both of these buildings as regards to the concrete yardage to be poured in the footings, should be revised in accordance with this memorandum.

It is the writer's understanding that 117 cubic yards have been allotted for the footings in each of these buildings which, of course, may fit some of these buildings in certain localities. Due to low ground and the fact that an elevation of 12 must be maintained on this field, the following yardage will be used on these two units as shown below:

a. SH-18, Item 32, 184 Cu. Yds.

b. SH-13, Item 19, 216 " "

The amounts shown are almost twice the amounts of the original estimate and the cost of the additional forming must also be taken into consideration.

ROBERT HOFFMAN.

RH: MHH.

Exhibit No. 8

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

FIFTH FIELD AREA, BELLOWS FIELD, T. H., June 9, 1941.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,

Bellows Field, T. H.

(Attention: Mr. Robert Hoffman.)

GENTLEMEN: The doorway into the shower room remains the same distance from the wall as on the original plan, thus giving ample entrance room from the first toilet near that doorway.

Yours very truly,

P. J. LYNCH,
Area Engineer,
Fifth Field Area.

PJL: ECB.

2932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Exhibit No. 9-A

JANUARY 31, 1942.

To: C. G. Clapp, Project Manager.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Subject: Requisitions.

Please refer to your letter dated January 22nd advising us of the new procedure in the securing of materials arriving on ships and delivered to Base Yards for further disposal to final destination.

We immediately made out requisitions No. RS5-254, -255, -256, -257, -258, -259, -260, -261 and -262, all dated January 24th, which was just 2 days after your instructions were received, and disposed of them accordingly.

These requisitions have since been knocked around, Mr. Dodd sending his copy back disclaiming all knowledge of the procedure. Mr. Freitas, whom you mentioned in your letter, has since been purged or liquidated, and today these requisitions were put back into my hands.

Am I permitted to pass the buck to you by attaching these requisitions to this letter in the hopes that this matter can be straightened out and that we can get the material purchased for us and which we need at this field, without actually declaring war? Without becoming too serious, it seems that the biggest fight we have here is fighting to get the stuff we need—not the Japs.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.

RH: DM.
Enc. 9.
cc: C. C. Middleton.
Charles O'Neill.
Earle A. Keifer, Jr.

Exhibit No. 9-B

To: Procurement Department (Mr. Sax).
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: March 10, 1942.

Attached you will find our original requisitions, which we made out on notification of the manifest this material had arrived by boat the middle of January.

We forwarded these requisitions to Base Yard 9 and after the papers kicked around town for about a month they were returned, with no notation whatsoever, although our Mr. Kiefer positively identifies the material as having arrived and purchased for procurement.

We are attaching new requisitions and ask that they be released from the yard in which they are located, and also request that the original papers attached be returned to this office.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
encl.

Exhibit No. 10-A

To: A. A. Sack, Procurement Section, 15th Field Area, Montague Hall.
From: Robert Hoffman, Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Date: March 26, 1942.

We attach hereto Tally Outs 2954 and 3018 advising us that materials requested were in Base Yard 1 ready for delivery.

We received these tally outs on the morning of the 23rd of March and attempted the pickup the same afternoon.

While the material requested does not seem important, we are compelled to advise that the axes and handles were the most important requirements of this field in the last few days, as we use them to open the asphalt barrels, in order to charge the tanks, so that asphalt may be layed on the runways, which are the first priority.

We again ask that our original requisitions be honored for purchase and that this material be given us immediately.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
cc: Mr. Woolley

Exhibit No. 10-B

To: A. A. Sack, Procurement Section, U. S. Engineer Department, 15th Field Area, Montague Hall, Punahou Campus.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Date: March 23, 1942.

Attached you will find your Tally Out 2717, calling for 1000 cinder bricks, and on which we sent our truck to Base Yard 6—the second time—and still they say “No soap.”

May we again emphasize that, due to the lack of transportation, these continual calls for material at designated base yards on false runs is hurting us seriously at this time.

There is plenty of cinder brick available in town and the delay so far has caused some misunderstanding between the Commanding Officer of this post and this office. The building is occupied, but the latrine cesspool cannot be built without the brick.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
encl.
cc: Mr. Woolley

Exhibit No. 10-C

To: A. A. Sack, Procurement Department, 15th Field Area, Montague Hall, Punahou Campus.
From: Robert Hoffman, Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Date: March 21, 1942.

We attach hereto your Tally Outs 65, 300, 307, 326, 1533, 2116, 2231 and 2240, returned to us with the notation “Materials not on hand,” after they were tallied out by your office.

Will you kindly okeh these requisitions and forward them for procurement, to prevent further delay.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
encl.

Exhibit No. 10-D

To: W. D. Lomax.
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: March 21, 1942.

The attached copies of tally outs were returned to us after we were advised that the material was in the base yard.

This slows up our work considerably and, as you will note from the attached letter, we are asking Mr. Sack to expedite this through procurement.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
encl.

Exhibit No. 10-E

To: A. A. Sack.
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: March 15, 1942.

We inclose copies of Tally Outs 883, 1426 and 1427, which were issued by your office and which, evidently, do not coincide with the records of materials at the base yard.

This has been a constant occurrence in the past three weeks, delaying and doubling the work of both procurement and, in some cases, actual production.

We are inclosing duplicate copies of Purchase Orders 1787 and 1746, and ask that they be quickly passed through.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
encl.

2934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Exhibit No. 11

To: H. W. Rohl.
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: March 18, 1942.
Subject: Guns at Ulupau.

Your call at 2:30 the morning of the 17th, requesting additional information on the replacement of guns at Ulupau, while merited, was a surprise, in view of the facts as chronologically related below:

It so happens that on the morning of March 16th, at 9:30, the writer for the first time saw the detail plan of the bolt and plate installations on this gun—in the office of Mr. Lloyd, the assistant area engineer. The writer to date, two days later, still has no plans, but merely a takeoff which was made.

There have been constant rains in the Ulupau and Bellows areas since March 2nd and, with the red clay surrounding Ulupau, it was, therefore, impossible to even move into excavation, although two gun excavations had already been made, with the exception of the trim.

Yesterday morning, just six hours after talking to you and Colonel Robinson, we were advised that the grade had been changed on the excavations, made by the survey party, so that we had to work back in again and reset.

The bolts for the gun plates had not been ordered by the Engineers and are still not available, as far as I know.

It is impossible to understand how anyone could expect a job to be done, without plans, pre-ordered materials, favorable weather conditions and with the existing deficiencies on the part of those who started direction of the work.

This is no alibi of the writer or any part of this organization, but merely a statement of fact.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf

Exhibit No. 12

NOVEMBER 12, 1941.

To: E. E. Ashlock, General Superintendent.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area.
Subject: Dynamite.

We hereby bring to your attention the fact that Job 20.5, Excavating of Runways at Bellows Field, will be out of dynamite by noon November 13th, 1941. Will you kindly take whatever action is necessary to provide dynamite or powder to prevent an otherwise unavoidable shut down of work on this job.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area, Hawaiian Constructors.

HTF/ac

Exhibit No. 13

DECEMBER 20, 1941.

To: G. G. Clapp, Project Manager.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Subject: Reference your letter of December 14th.

Please be advised that Col. Wyman personally called Mr. Lynch and directed him to stop any preparation for laying asphalt on Runway B. This order of course contradicts my letter to you of December 19th and in accordance with Col. Wyman's wishes through the Area Engineer, we are now working on Runway A with no definite prospect of laying hot stuff in the near future.

We will, however, proceed to grade the access roads in the Main Camp in preparation for hot stuff and this office will keep you advised of any change on this latter plan.

Will you kindly verify through such sources as may be at your disposal regarding the order of Col. Wyman to Mr. Lynch.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area, Hawaiian Constructors.

RH:DM

Exhibit No. 14

5-A

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., January 16, 1942.

Refer to File NO;
ND 633

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Punahou Campus, Honolulu, T. H.

Gentlemen: The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force has directed that the gasoline tanks be placed in the tunnel at Bellows Field at the earliest date possible. It is desired that you take necessary action at once to effect completion of this important project.

Very truly yours,

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, District Engineer.

Copy (cd)

Exhibit No. 15

JANUARY 5, 1942.

Memorandum to Mr. Hoffman:

Operations Field Order No. 20 states, "Build 90 tent floors and complete two latrines at Ulupau; also, construct kitchen floors and frames for kitchen tents." No specifications, no nothing, accompanies.

P. J. LYNCH.

Exhibit No. 16

11:00 AM, MON. DEC. 15.

Memo to: Paul J. Lynch.
From: Mr. Plummer.

I have been to Bellows and back this morning trying to catch you. The 12 yd. Carryall will be ready at 3 PM at Davies & Co. You will have to furnish transportation to haul it out. All Arrangements have been made for immediate delivery. Telephone advice at 10:00 this morning assured me that Rig will be assembled and ready for delivery by 3 o'clock PM.

P; ECB

Bob:

Please arrange to get carryall out here. If your man has any trouble contact Plummer.

P. J. L.

Exhibit No. 17

FEBRUARY 25, 1942.

Bob:

For the 3rd time I requested drawings 50/16 and 50/23 which I've been told will be used for latrines on this J. O. instead of drawing 39/96 Mess Hall O. K.

MISURA.

Exhibit No. 18

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

To: G. G. Clapp, Project Manager.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
Subject: Reference your letter of December 14th.

A careful study in compliance with your preliminary request, as outlined in your letter of December 14th, discloses the following information:

Confirming our previous letter to you, there is no black top on either runway A or B for the present. It is also my instructions from Area Engineer that for the time being there will be no asphalt on the access roads throughout the Main Camp. This places our hot plant at a standstill and leaves me with a paving superintendent who will have to be placed in some other work to keep him busy.

The priorities as listed now show bunker construction—1st, runway—2nd, fuel storage—3rd, ammunition storage—4th, and then personnel protection.

2936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

As regards the bunker storage, we have been informed that the Commanding Officer of this field in accord with the General Officer in charge of the Hawaiian Air Force has selected a location across the King Kam Highway towards the mountains. Should this plan go through, it means building an underpass over the main highway and an access road wide enough to accommodate our larger ships passing each other or approximately 400 feet in width.

From the tentative design of bunker construction that we have seen it will take approximately 15,000 yards of coral or fast dirt to construct each bunker, and if there are to be 54 bunkers our yardage will run close to 800,000 yards. To this we must add 240,000 yards for the present fill at the head of the runway from station 0.00 and an additional 150,000 yards for the access runway to the bunker storage.

If the bunker storage locations is changed it will still take 800,000 yards for this item alone which is a considerable amount of material. Sand can also be used as it will blow the minute the motors are started and is also detrimental to the ships so we have but one alternative and that is coral.

Across the slough from Runway B we have an open quarry pit in which there is more than a million yards of fine coral to be had. This pit is already open and is all level ground. In order to operate it, we would have to have at least one more shovel of not less than 2½ yard capacity, 15 dump trucks, 2 additional wagon drills, and a provision for ample powder and caps for shooting.

It is regrettable that we cannot use sand in the fill for the extended runway as this would mean a savings of almost 200,000 yards of coral.

We would appreciate consideration of the facts enclosed and suggest that some effort be made to secure the equipment necessary to expedite this work. While the job is not large neither is it small and it needs some careful planning to secure the maximum production from the least amount of equipment we will be able to have on this field. Your reply will be appreciated.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent,
Fifth Field Area,
Hawaitian Constructors.

RH:DM

Exhibit No. 19-A

MARCH 14, 1942.

Mr. B. E. LOWERY:

Discontinue placing coral in the vicinity of your field office at once and use all available coral and road machinery to repair camp road to a point of reasonable service. Do not put another load around that office.

ALLEN E. PLUMMER,
Project Engineer.

Exhibit No. 19-B

March 22, 1942.

Memorandum

To: MR. HOFFMAN.

It is reported to me that nails, flooring and other material are unprotected at Ulupau.

Now about getting some tarpaulins for protection.

THOMAS E. TILLMAN.

Exhibit No. 20

Memorandum To H. W. Rohl.

From Robert Hoffman.

Date: March 10, 1942.

We are at a loss to understand why our original list, which you recommended be mailed to the 15th Area, on equipment necessary for tunneling, was stopped. Mr. Lomax advises that you held up this list without notation to hold in abeyance. Your call last night seemingly advised that we proceed at once.

Will you kindly advise this office whether we are to proceed and, if so, give us some help in securing the equipment and we shall give you a pretty good job. I have the men and am anxious to hand much the second tunnel cheaper and faster than was done with the equipment on the previous job.

We fully understand the difficulty in securing equipment and general conditions pertaining to the entire setup, but we still feel that you can give us some help, and we shall do our best with what we have to work with.

We thank you for your help.

RH/nf

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent Fifth Field Area.

REQUISITION ON STOREKEEPER

To be used for Bellows Field
Job Order No. 20.150

Req: No. RS-5 302
Date: February 27, 1942

Quantity	Unit	Articles	Price	Amount
2		Battery Meters		
2		Mucking Machines		
3,000 ft.		Rail No. 15 or equal		
2		Cross Arms & Columns		
8		Water Liners		
8		Carriages		
8		Saddles		
8		Universal Clamps		
8		Check Wrenchers		
2		Compressors		
6		Kegs Rail Road Spikes		
1,000		Ties		
8		Side Dump Cars		
		Requisitioned by Signature		
		Robert Hoffman, Engineer, Supt., or Foreman		

Received by Signature

Form 3-A
(Costs)

WAR DEPT.—ENGINEERS

Exhibit No. 21

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 22, 1942.

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Hoffman.

I am not at all satisfied with the progress made on the gasoline tanks in the tunnel.

Please concentrate on getting the one tank into position and get the balance of the cradles poured.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman.
THOS. E. TILLMAN.

Copy

Exhibit No. 22

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 30, 1942.

Memorandum to Mr. Robert Hoffman:

No further action shall be taken in regard to keeping the channel open from the sluice to the ocean. The Area Engineer does not want anymore equipment used for that purpose.

THOS. E. TILLMAN,
/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

COPY-ssk

2938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Exhibit No. 23

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 27, 1942.

Memorandum

To: T. Tillman, Area Engineer.

From: R. Hoffman, Area Superintendent.

Subject: Temporary entree to Bellows Field.

This letter confirms and supplements our agreed conversation with Colonel Farnum in your office the afternoon of March 26, 1942, agreeing to build a temporary entrance gate which will be the main entrance to Bellows Field.

This letter is merely a matter of record so that this work is authorized for the time being.

R. HOFFMAN,
Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors.

RH/ssk
COPYssk

Exhibit No. 24

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 30, 1942.

Memorandum to Mr. Robert Hoffman:

There are considerable supplies on hand, both here and at Kaneohe Hospital, which the Area Engineer wishes to return to stock at Honolulu; namely, five red wood tanks, 10,000 gallon capacity; several pipe vices which you have in your stock room; and a large quantity of sand paper from Kaneohe.

/s/ THOS. E. TILLMAN,
Thomas E. Tillman,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

Copy SSK

Exhibit No. 25

INTER-OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS
Honolulu, T. H.

Dated: 1/30/42
Time: 8:30 A. M.

To: P. J. Lynch
From: Area Supt.
Subject: "Com"

We have completed 2 samples "alleged" camouflaugh. My painters are idle awaiting ("O. K.") to do 50 more buildings. What to do next?

HOFFMAN.

Mr. Hoffman: Will be out tomorrow so says Col. Harrold.

P. J. L.

Exhibit No. 26

OCTOBER 28, 1941.

Subject: Asphalt Containers.

Mr. ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors,
Bellows Field, T. H.*

Please refer to your letter dated October 27. Radio has been sent to stop all shipping of asphalt in paper containers.

P. J. LYNCH,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

OCTOBER 27, 1941.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area.

To: P. J. Lynch, Area Engineer, 5th Field Area.

Subject: Asphalt Containers.

The recent losses in transport and delivery of asphalt fiber containers has proved conclusively that these fiber containers in the final analysis are excessive in cost compared to metal or wood.

It is suggested that a recommendation be made that no more asphalt be purchased or shipped in fiber containers for this tropical climate.

It is estimated that we have lost approximately 20% of our present shipment to this field.

The rains and heat necessitate a change in packaging.

Yours truly,

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, 5th Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

Exhibit No. 27

FEBRUARY 2, 1942.

To: P. J. Lynch, Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

Subject: Batching of concrete at Bellows Field.

Kindly refer to Memorandum of January 27th signed by one B. E. Nutter in which he states that the mixes in use are not those transmitted to the Fifth Field Area and are not in accord with good practice for manufacture of economical concrete of good quality.

Mr. Nutter is wrong and knows not whereof he speaks. Contrary to his statement, there has been an Area inspector on the job at every pouring. Special batch boxes were built and special care was taken to conform 100 per cent to the instructions issued by Mr. Nutter's office, which under the conditions and the materials used cannot give him what he expects without having further knowledge of the effect of mixing on this field. Mr. Nutter should be more careful in his loose statements as he does not speak the truth.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

RH:DM

Exhibit No. 28-A

DECEMBER 13, 1941.

To: Mr. Ralph E. Wooley.

From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

Subject: Your Memo of December 11 in re Waimanola Sugar Co.

In answer to your Memo directing us to make certain arrangements with the Waimanola Sugar Company, please be advised that we have already an understanding with them whereby we have the use of their machine shop facilities and personnel on a twenty four hour basis.

Yours truly,

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
*Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

HF:hf

DECEMBER 11, 1941.

Memorandum

To: Mr. Bob Hoffman, Bellows Field.

From: Mr. Ralph E. Woolly.

Will you please arrange with the Plantation Manager of Waimanalo Sugar Company for the use of their machine shop with their mechanics, so that they will be available at all times for use of Bellows Field.

We will issue an order for the employment of their mechanics and pay for the use of their shop.

Please report your arrangements to me.

Yours very truly,

RALPH E. WOOLLY.

Arrangement:

On hr. basis for complete machine shop and machinists.

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Exhibit No. 28-B

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., March 2, 1942.

Refer to File No: ND 600.114-602 158

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Punahou School, Honolulu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of February 28 concerning the inclosure from Waimanalo Sugar Company.

In order for this office to make payment on any of the obligations incurred by you, it is necessary that accompanying each bill you submit to us for payment, there be a copy of the authorization of the District Engineer for incurring this obligation, a certified copy of the receiving report, preferably countersigned by a government employee and a certified copy of the bill.

Only upon receipt of the above, may payment be made. The attached bill is returned to you for addition of this information.

Very truly yours,

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
*Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.*

cc: Contract Section
copy/kw

Exhibit 28 "C"

MARCH 6, 1942.

Mr. R. HOFFMAN, Supt.,
Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.

DEAR MR. HOFFMAN: we are attaching hereto quadruplicate copies of the Waimanalo Sugar Company invoice in the amount of \$2,614.74. Also attached is letter from Colon Wyman, in which he requests certified copy of the receiving report countersigned by a government employee be attached to the invoice.

We note that invoice makes reference to field order numbers and it is assumed that these field order numbers originate with the U. S. E. D. in your area. With this in mind we assume that proper receiving reports can be obtained by you.

Upon completion of the above request, please return all data to the writer.

Very truly yours,

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS.
(Signed) By ROBERT KARMANN.

RK/kw
Enc.

Exhibit No. 28-D

To: Robert Karmann.
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: March 12, 1942.

We are returning to you herewith bill of the Waimanalo Sugar Company for \$2,614.74, in quadruplicate, the original of which has been countersigned by both the Area Engineer and the Area Superintendent.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

nf
encl.

Exhibit No. 28-D-1

MEMORANDUM

MARCH 10, 1942.

To: T. E. Tillman.
From: Area Supt.
To: T. E. Tillman, Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area, Bellows Field, T. H.
you.

P. J. ———.

Exhibit No. 28-E

To: Mr. T. E. Tillman, Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area, Bellows Field, T. H.
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: March 15, 1942.

Attached you will find correspondence pertaining to items which were signed for by the previous area engineer, Mr. Lynch, whose signature justified the attached invoice, which should, therefore, according to instructions be turned over by your office to your Finance Division.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
encl.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 14, 1942.

ROBERT HOFFMAN, *Supt.*
Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: We are returning herewith quadruplicate copies of Waimanalo Sugar Company invoice in the amount of \$2,614.74, as per advice of Mr. C. C. Middleton. We believe that these bills should be turned through by the Area Engineer for payment by his office.

This office is not familiar with the transaction, and further, we have been advised that the Field Orders no doubt originate in the Area Engineer's office. We further believe that a Cost Sheet may be required.

For your information, we are attaching hereto a copy of the letter signed by Colonel Wyman as of March 2nd, which is the only knowledge this office has of this transaction.

Yours very truly,

By: (s) HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
R. Karmann.
ROBERT KARMANN.

RK: khh
Enclosures
Invoice/letter of Col. Wyman

Exhibit No. 28-F

MEMORANDUM

MARCH 30, 1942.

To: Robert Hoffman.
From: C. C. Middleton.

We are enclosing copy of letter dated March twenty-third from the Department Engineer together with invoices from the Waimanalo Sugar Company.

It is our belief that the field orders noted on this invoice are U. S. E. D. field orders.

Please advise us if we are correct, returning all the attached papers intact.

Please handle the above at once.

j
Enclosures

Refer to File No: 602

5-H

WAR DEPARTMENT

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE

Honolulu, T. H.

DEPARTMENT ENGINEER, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
March 23, 1942.

Subject: Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Punahou Campus, Honolulu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: The inclosed invoice of the Waimanalo Sugar Company dated February 23, 1942, in the amount of \$2,614.00 has been resubmitted to this office

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by your Superintendent, Fifth Field Area, Bellows Field, through the U. S. Area Engineer at that point. This invoice was returned to you upon its original submission by letter of this office dated March 2, 1942, for lack of supporting evidence of advance authority from the District Engineer for incurring this obligation.

In view of the fact that this was a direct purchase made by you without prior authorization of this office, and that no evidence of competition has been submitted with respect thereto, the invoice is returned to you for direct payment. Reimbursement therefor will be authorized under the terms of your Contract No. W-414-eng-602 upon submission by you of receipted invoice, accompanied by evidence that the method of purchase was in conformity with contract requirements.

Very truly yours,

/s/ B. L. Robinson,
B. L. ROBINSON,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Contracting Officer.

1 Inclosure
Inv., Waimanalo
Sugar Co. (in dup.)

Exhibit No. 28-G

To: C. C. Middleton.
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: March 31, 1942.

We return herewith the invoice pertaining to work done by the Waimanalo Sugar Company on equipment and for necessary parts for the job at Bellows Field.

Will you kindly inform Colonel Robinson that the signature of P. J. Lynch, who was the area engineer during the entire period which appears on this invoice, is affixed to it, and that it was under his orders, direct to the Waimanalo Sugar Company, that the work was done and the parts secured.

It is quite evident that Colonel Robinson is pursuing a course detrimental to not only this organization, but to defense as well, in denying the signature and consent of the duly appointed area engineer—who had been in service for one year.

It would please me much to present a copy of this letter to Colonel Robinson—and to General Emmons, if necessary—to ferret out the reason Colonel Robinson refuses to recognize the signature and authority of a person over which there has been no dispute up until this time.

The matter is too damned silly even to write a letter on.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
encl.

Exhibit No. 29-A

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

To: T. E. Tillman.
From: L. S. Hutchinson.
Date: April 18, 1942.

Confirming my requests of the 16th and 17th—we again, this day, are without necessary work to keep three caterpillars and three carryalls busy.

As you know, we are still waiting for plans covering bunker locations. If it is not possible to secure such plans within the next 24 hours, I shall be compelled to release this equipment to other areas.

/s/ L. S. Hutchinson,
L. S. HUTCHINSON,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

1st Ind.

LSH/nf

OFFICE, AREA ENGINEER, FIFTH FIELD AREA,
Bellows Field, T. H., April 18, 1942.

To: Mr. L. S. Hutchinson, Supt., Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H.

It has been, and still is, a standing order that no equipment shall be released from the Fifth Field Area without the written permission of the Area Engineer.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
THOS. E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

Copy—ssk

Exhibit No. 29-B

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, April 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

To: T. E. Tillman.

From: L. S. Hutchinson.

Subject: Necessity of Estimates for Uncompleted Work.

I will again mention that it is of utmost importance to the constructor that he may properly plan and organize his organization, and to do so we must have a minimum of thirty to sixty days planning of work in advance.

Such items as quarry, concrete pouring, building construction and general organization all depend on our ability to populate program for future requirements from the work outlined.

L. S. HUTCHINSON,
*Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

LSH: ssk

Copy—ssk

Exhibit No. 30

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 22, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Hoffman.

Please install the wiring in the building #14 without further delay.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
THOMAS E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer.

Tillman—3/22

#14 calls for explosion proof. We have been ready to install ordinary units for four months. If you will OK to go ahead eliminating explosion proof—we will proceed. A letter directing this will be OK.

/s/ Hoffman.
HOFFMAN.

OK—Tillman.

Copy—ssk.

Exhibit No. 31-A

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 30, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Robert Hoffman.

Subject: Your memorandum of March 26, Overtime for Tank Crew.

1. Overtime work on the tanks will be discontinued effective this date.
2. This does not mean, however, that the three shift work should cease. The work must be carried out on a 24 hour basis.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
THOMAS E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

Copy—ssk.

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Exhibit No. 31-B

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

To: T. E. Tillman, Area Engineer.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent.
Date: March 26, 1942.

I have just been informed by the foreman on tank construction that you have instructed them to work unlimited hours until they are in, regardless of the overtime, etc., etc.

This memorandum is written merely as a confirmation of your order.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
COPY ssk
cc Mr. Woolley

Exhibit No. 31-C

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

FIFTH FIELD AREA,
Bellows Field, T. H., April 8, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Hoffman.

Each time I visit the hot plant in the evening, I find a large surplus of labor standing around with apparently nothing to do. In my opinion this labor, which you are using to pick up asphalt and get it to the hot plant, could be reduced at least 50 percent.

There is no sense in having a crew standing out at the stock pile waiting for trucks or sleds to come back from the hot plant, while you have another crew idle half the time standing around at the hot plant unloading platform. *I want this condition remedied immediately.* If you cannot find anything better for them to do, send them up to the tunnel and start them to cleaning up there or carrying pipe and fittings into the tunnel.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
THOMAS E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

Copy—ssk

Exhibit No. 31-D

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

FIFTH FIELD AREA,
Bellows Field, T. H., April 8, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Robert Hoffman.

I have repeatedly asked you to carry the paving on Runway A to a full width of 200' and in runs of 500' to 700' in length. This request has been ignored repeatedly, and I find the fine grading crew working on ahead of the paver.

Your fine grading crew has complained of no blue tops as their excuse for not carrying the fine grade to the maximum width. Upon checking, I find that the blue tops have been there. *I want this condition remedied immediately,* and I insist that this pavement be carried through the full 200' width as we go.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
THOMAS E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

Copy—ssk

Exhibit No. 31-E

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

FIFTH FIELD AREA,
Bellows Field, T. H., April 8, 1942.

Subject: Greasing of Equipment.

To: The Department Engineer, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, T. H.
(Through: Captain Ralph L. McDaniel.)

1. The Area Engineer is convinced that the present setup for greasing of equipment at Fifth Field Area is all wrong, and that equipment is being unnecessarily wrecked.

2. The men in charge of the greasing of the trucks are not under the supervision or control of the shop foreman. In fact, the Area Engineer cannot find out to whom these men are responsible.

3. At the present time there are seven trucks standing in the shop waiting for repairs. One 1,500 gallon sprinkler truck has been idle while waiting for repairs due to absolute neglect. The men charged with the responsibility of greasing this sprinkler truck have failed to put grease in the drive shaft bearing with the result that the shaft bearing is completely destroyed. The same bearing on the new Mac trucks, which have been at Fifth Field Area for approximately ten days, was never greased until yesterday.

4. With equipment as scarce as it is, the Area Engineer recommends that some action be taken whereby the men responsible for the greasing of equipment in the field will be responsible to their properly designated shop foreman. It is also requested that some system be worked out whereby the equipment can be greased while idle—either during lunch hour or while it is not working at all—so that it will not be tied up while being serviced.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
THOMAS E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

CC—Hawaiian Constructors
Fifth Field Area
Bellows Field, T. H.

Copy—ssk

EXHIBIT No. 31-F

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu Hawaii, March 27, 1942.

Memorandum to: Mr. Hoffman.

Starting tomorrow morning, 7:00 A. M., please give to Lt. Tibbs during the day, 70 tons Asphaltic Concrete. Trucks furnished by the Army.

This is for Kualoa.

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman,
THOMAS E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

Copy—ssk

EXHIBIT No. 31-G

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

To: T. E. Tillman, Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area, Bellows Field, T. H.

From: Robert Hoffman.

Date: April 7, 1942.

The urgency of need for roofing paper is such that it is hampering work.

Any assistance that you can give will help.

Also, in order to get power Utility SP-8 for the use of the Air Base supply, it is necessary to secure three 25-KVA transformers before we can tie this power

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into the building. Our requisition has been in now for sixty days—and still no action.

/s/ Robert Hoffman,
ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
Copy—ssk

Exhibit No. 31-H

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, HAWAII

FIFTH FIELD AREA, BELLOWS FIELD, T. H., March 28, 1942.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Bel lows Field, T. H.
(Attention: Mr. Hoffman.)

GENTLEMEN: Please deliver to Capt. D. B. Cummings the following materials:

8 ea. $\frac{3}{4}$ " shower heads
3 ea. $\frac{3}{4}$ " faucets
1 ea. 1" x $\frac{3}{4}$ " 4 way tee
6 ea. 1" x $\frac{3}{4}$ " elbows & one 1" elbow
4 ea. 1 x $\frac{3}{4}$ " tees
2 ea. 1" crosses
12 ea. 1" pipe straps
75 ft. 1" pipe

(All for portable bathhouse.)

/s/ Thos. E. Tillman
THOMAS E. TILLMAN,
Area Engineer, Fifth Field Area.

COPY ssk

Exhibit No. 31-I

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Honolulu, Hawaii, March 26, 1942.

To: T. E. Tillman, Area Engineer.
From: Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent.
Date: March 27, 1942—Time: 8:55 A. M.
Subject: Stoppage of work on tanks.

This letter confirms your telephone order to immediately stop work on the placement of tanks in the trees, as previously ordered.

This letter is merely a matter of record.

ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

RH/nf
COPY SSK
cc Mr. Woolley

Exhibit No. 31-J

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

HONOLULU, T. H.

To: T. E. Tillman.
From: Robert Hoffman.
Date: April 8, 1942.

Your memorandum of April 8th should have been addressed to Mr. Hutchinson, superintendent of the field. As you are aware, the writer was replaced Monday morning, April 6th, and it has been as a courtesy to you that he stayed on for a few days.

Your statement that you see surplus labor around the asphalt plant is absolutely untrue, as we have been shy of labor for the past two months. When a man moves

500-lb. barrels for 15 or 20 minutes, he is entitled to stand and rest for a few minutes; and if you lack the knowledge of a good construction man, as is apparent from the fact that you can't use good reasoning, it is time that you were told. It is certainly a pity that in defense work you have taken up the little items and have missed the big ones that would have put you somewhere in the upper brackets.

This letter, while caustic, is something you are asking for and it is to be regretted that the job is slowed down because of your attitude.

Also your memorandum of April 8th, which should have been directed to Mr. Hutchinson, in which you make the untrue statement that the blue tops were on runway A—may I correct you by saying that there were no blue tops on the runway after 1 o'clock on the afternoon of April 7th.

May I also advise you that your constant interference with the foremen on the job is creating so much dissatisfaction that three of the foremen are ready to leave.

As a last statement—you have done more damage in six weeks than the previous area engineer, at the rate he was going, could have done in ten years, as far as morale is concerned.

I think, perhaps, that if you were more truthful in your statements and less conspicuous in your desire to undermine the workers on this field, you would be more appreciated downtown. Frankly, Tillman, you are not fitted for this kind of a job and you have proved it conclusively to all concerned.

Robert Hoffman,
ROBERT HOFFMAN,
Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.

Exhibit No. 31-K

MEMORANDUM

APRIL 15, 1942.

To: Executive Committee.
From: L. S. Hutchinson.

I wish to hereby be placed on record that as of April 6, 1942, I disclaim responsibility of all tools and equipment that is charged to Hawaiian Constructors into my responsibility. The reason for this declaration is as follows:

On the above mentioned date, U. S. E. D., by order of the Fifth Area Engineer took over all stock rooms and storage places wherein the above material was stored, and also took over all the responsibility of checking out materials and supplies for the construction. As part of this move, they have issued tools and property regardless of to whom it was charged, and without proper signatures of receipt.

In view of the above circumstances it is unreasonable to expect that we should be held responsible for these items.

For the signature of
L. S. HUTCHINSON,
*Area Superintendent, Fifth Field,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

HTF:SSK

Exhibit No. 31-L

APRIL 28, 1942.

To: Mr. L. S. Hutchinson.
From: Harold T. Fuller.

Effective April 6, 1942, this being the day on which the Area Engineer assumed authority over all material and supplies, I consider myself relieved of all responsibility for knowledge of where material was used, and for having sufficient supplies on hand to carry on construction, for reasons detailed below.

As you know, the Area Engineer has acted very concerned about the amounts of building material on hand, and since his appointment has consistently followed a policy leading to the reduction of these same amounts. He has also issued materials to almost anyone who would ask for them whether covered by a job order or not. This whole situation is illustrated by an incident which happened today when Mr. Tillman diverted a truck loan of 2 x 4, consigned to job order 354-W, which is Bellows Field Construction, to some other work of which we had no knowledge whatever.

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On none of these occasions does Mr. Tillman refer to the Constructors Office in anyway. The impossibility of our keeping any track of materials, and the absurdity of expecting me to keep a stock on hand should be evident from the above.

HAROLD T. FULLER,
*Office Manager, Fifth Field,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

HTF:SSK

Exhibit No. 31-M

To: Mr. Lloyd Hutchinson, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area.
From: Harold T. Fuller, Office Manager, Fifth Field Area.
Subject: Property.
Date: April 26, 1942.

Again referring to the assumption of authority by the Assistant Area Engineer, by which he arbitrarily disposes of tools and equipment which are charged to Hawaiian Constructors, I wish to inform you of the latest incident of this type.

Today, April 26, the Assistant Area Engineer went into our tool house accompanied by one A. E. Plummer and took therefrom six wooden handle steel brushes, leaving no record or charge for their removal. The whole transaction would have unrecorded had not the author noticed the above parties leaving the vicinity with the articles in question and made inquiries of the tool room man. The tool room man was inexperienced and had not doubted the Engineer for authority but after questioning, had on his own initiative, asked the Engineer for a Tally-Out for the items of property. The Engineer signed a Tally form saying the articles were for the use of A. E. Plummer, but no job number was given.

It is again requested that the whole question of property be brought up and jurisdiction and responsibility be definitely fixed. As the matter stands now the Engineers dispossit property charged to us without referring to us in any way, yet there has been no suggestion of their releasing us from responsibility for that same property.

HAROLD T. FULLER,
Office Manager, Fifth Field.

COPY—SSK

Exhibit No. 31-N

APRIL 24, 1942.

To: L. S. Hutchinson.
From: H. T. Fuller.
Subject: Property.

For your possible information, and in line with recent events concerning property, may I review the whole manner in which it is handled.

The item "property," as used in dealings between the Constructors and the U. S. E. D., includes all tools, machinery, small equipment, office furniture, etc.—in other words, everything that is non-expendable, but not classed as equipment. These items of property are supplied to the Constructors by the Engineers, and then charged to Hawaiian Constructors for as long as they are in use by the Constructors. The U. S. E. D. charge is made to the Constructors as a whole, but the Constructors maintain a property section whose function it is to charge these items to the individual person—usually the Area Superintendent. The person to whom they are charged signs a receipt of the property and thereafter is financially responsible for its return. While in possession of the Constructors "property" is not under the authority of the U. S. E. D. unless transferred formally in such a way as to lift the financial obligation.

The above system is fixed in practice, and many precedents are on record, wherein we have deducted from employees pay checks to cover missing property.

This all is repeated because of an incident which happened this morning, and which I will now detail. The Assistant Area Engineer, Mr. T. E. Tillman, came into our tool house and arbitrarily told our property man to provide a certain individual, who accompanied Mr. Tillman, with six picks. This man then signed the tally-out for the tools. The point of this note is that the tool man was ordered to supply tools to an individual unknown to him, with no knowledge of when they would be returned, and for use on a job which we are not working.

This is the second time that Mr. Tillman has assumed this authority. I think it very important that the matter be brought to Mr. Tillman's attention in a way that will make it clear to him that such practice is not to be repeated.

H. T. FULLER,
*Office Manager, Fifth Field,
Hawaiian Constructors.*

HTF:ssk

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 9

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

In Re: Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

County of Los Angeles, ss:

Nils M. Olsen, aged 42 years, married 14 years, owns his own home at 1114 Dolphin Street, San Pedro, California, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

That I was living at 718 60th Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., when I met H. W. Rohl, in July, 1933, when he employed me as Steward aboard the yacht "Ramona", which he had just purchased in New York. I was introduced to Rohl by Capt. Gudmundsen, the former captain of the Ramona. I worked for Rohl as steward until February, 1936, and the checks were signed by Irma Dickey and bore the printed name of H. W. Rohl. This same custom was followed while I was steward on the Vega. About a year after I was employed I asked Rohl personally for a \$15.00 raise, and he gave it to me—so thenceforth I received \$150.00 per month.

The Ramona sailed from New York, equipped with a new Mackay radio which Rohl installed in New York, and the Mackay operator boarded the vessel there. Mr. and Mrs. Rohl, and his son, Fred, were aboard. We sailed to Guantarramo Bay, where we stopped three or four days while Rohl received treatment for broken ribs at the Naval Hospital—he was injured during a storm in the Caribbean Sea and fell down a companionway. I'm certain we were inspected by Immigration when we left New York. We then stopped at Colon overnight after sailing through the Canal. We then went to Acapulco, Mexico, for fuel and water, and left after several hours. Then we anchored near Coronado Islands, and someone came aboard. I believe it was Mr. Tom Connolly, Rohl's partner. Next we anchored off Catalina Island for a short time, then tied up overnight at Wilmington—at the California Yacht Club. The Captain told us no one could leave the boat that night because we hadn't been cleared by immigration officials. Mr. and Mrs. Rohl nevertheless left the boat that night and returned to their home in Los Angeles. I was present and actually saw them leave, so Mr. Rohl never did clear Immigration, this was on September 3, 1933.

On September 4, 1933, at Fellows and Stewart's Yacht landing, where we tied up that morning at San Pedro, Immigration officers came aboard; there were several inspectors. There were ten men in the crew, and we cleared in about two hours. One Norwegian, Hans Anderson, was an alien, had no papers, and he was eventually deported.

The crew had only signed on for this one cruise, and they were all paid off the next day, September 5th, 1933, except Earle Schetne, who was hired as captain, and myself.

Mrs. Rohl had nothing to do with directing the crew and the operations of both the Ramona and the Vega. All the crew was firmly of the opinion that both boats were Rohl's.

Thereafter the only trips we took were back and forth to Catalina Island from the Fellows and Stewart Pier at San Pedro.

Sometime in 1935 Rohl told me he was bringing a guest aboard, and he instructed me to be particularly courteous and attentive to him. I think it was in the summertime. He boarded the boat, and we went to Catalina and the two men went to Rohl's rock quarry and inspected the rock, which was to be used in constructing the Long Beach Breakwater. Rohl got drunk, but the guest signalled me that he didn't want much to drink, and he remained sober. We

returned to San Pedro the following day. The guest was short, chunky, full face, smooth-shaven, dark brown hair.

On October 1, 1939, I was employed by Rohl as steward on the Vega—having worked in other positions after I left the Ramona in January or February, 1936. On August 13, 1941, I went to Colorado as cook for Rohl and remained until November 20, 1941. Mr. Rohl didn't stay with us all this time. Sometime after September 15, 1941, Rohl left us where we were staying at Caddoa, Colorado, and went to the Hawaiian Islands.

The Vega carried a crew of eight men during most of the time she was running between Newport or San Pedro and the Catalina Islands, before we went to Colorado.

After we returned the Vega remained tied up at the Rohl-Connolly slip near Wilmington, until she went to Honolulu.

Rohl asked me to come to his home late in November, 1941; he had been drinking quite heavily, and was plainly drunk. He said he was about to be made a general, and was going to rent the Vega to the Army Engineers for a dollar a year, and asked me to get his old master, Captain Otto Mathies, offering to pay him \$450.00 per month, and he offered me \$250.00. Accordingly we loaded the boat, Rohl told me to put on plenty of stores, so I did. Eighteen cases of whisky arrived, (4 cases Bourbon, 4 Johnnie Walker, 2 cases Brandy, 8 cases Ballentine), and the man who delivered it stated that it was for Mr. Rohl, so I stored it aboard. Captain George Goldrainer actually signed on as master, and we all signed on for one year, about December 1, 1941, under Hawaiian constructors. We were supposed to leave for Honolulu on December 8, 1941, and at that time Rohl was in the Hawaiian Islands. There was also ten cases of Pabst beer aboard. I am positive the Vega was not armed when we sailed from San Pedro in a convoy, bound for Honolulu to turn the boat over to the Hawaiian Constructors, which, I understood, was in turn to lease it to the Army Engineers. I also bought \$2700.00 worth of new uniforms for the crew at Rohl's direction, from Brown Bros., in San Pedro. The store of supplies amounted to \$3800.91, exclusive of the liquor. The uniforms were later returned to Rohl.

We sailed on February 20, 1942 in the late afternoon, and spent 18 days en route to Honolulu. We first went to the Pearl Harbor Naval Dock, and next day we tied up at Pier 6 or 7, for about three month. The liquor was removed a few days after we arrived, at Mr. Rohl's order—he was there when we landed. Our master received his orders from C. C. Middleton, general superintendent for Hawaiian Constructors. During this three months we did absolutely nothing. What it amounted to was simply a trip to carry 18 cases of whiskey from San Pedro to Pearl Harbor. I wanted to do something, and so did the crew. We all felt that our country was at war, and we wanted to do something to help; but after we docked, not a thing was removed from the vessel except the whiskey, and the whole crew just remained idle for the entire three-month period—and I even complained to Rohl about it. I knew perfectly well that martial law had been proclaimed in the Hawaiian Islands, and that it was strictly against the law for Rohl to bring any liquor ashore.

During the three months we were paid by the Hawaiian Constructors, because although we were actually working for the U. S. Engineers, Rohl told us we should give him a power of attorney so that he could pay us through the Hawaiian Constructors to save time for us, so we all gave him the power of attorney and thereafter received our checks from Hawaiian Constructors.

Rohl, meanwhile, went to Los Angeles, and when he returned I complained to him about the inactivity. He said he could fix it so we could leave without a convoy, and he did, because we left on May 1, 1942, arriving in San Francisco. The next day we sailed for San Pedro, and tied up at our old dock, Rohl-Connolly, Wilmington, May 15, 1942.

The Coast Guard took over the boat, and I left it about June, 1942. After we left Hawaii, our checks came from U. S. Engineers instead of Hawaiian Constructors, and were for the same basic amount.

While in the Hawaiian Islands, anything I got for the vessel was requisitioned from Hawaiian Constructors.

I am now Ship's Cook, first class, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve, attached to Training Station, Catalina Island, Eleventh U. S. Naval District.

(signed) Nils M. Olsen.
NILS M. OLSEN.

This statement taken, and signature witnessed by JOHN H. WEINER, INVESTIGATOR for The Committee On Military Affairs United States House of Representatives.

(signed) John H. Weiner.

JOHN H. WEINER.

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 19th day of December, 1943, by Nils M. Olsen and John H. Weiner.

FRIEDA SEGEL.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 10

[1]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., April 4, 1944.

INTERVIEW

Present: George H. Moody, H. Ralph Burton.

BURTON. May I ask your name?

MOODY. George H. Moody.

Q. During what period were you in Hawaii?

A. I just left there a few weeks ago and I am going back. That is my home.

Q. You, at one time, were with the Corps of Engineers?

A. Yes, and then under the Engineer Corps when they changed the designation. I worked there in camouflage and then Colonel Nurse asked me to come over on this investigation. He is an excellent man and straight as a die. He built Hamilton Field. They finally retired him. He is back in San Francisco now. Of course, when the Engineers started in Honolulu, they took people who wanted jobs so they got a great many crackpots and screwballs.

Q. That was back in '41?

A. After December 7.

Q. Do you know anything that happened prior to December 7?

A. No, I wasn't involved at all.

Q. Do you know anything about the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes, I was on their payroll and then taken over to the Corps of Engineers payroll later.

[2] Q. Did you have occasion to observe anything about the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. Yes, more or less.

Q. Did you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl or Paul Grafe?

A. No, I never met them.

Q. Did you come into sufficient contact to determine whether the Hawaiian Constructors were proceeding rapidly and efficiently as they could?

A. I think they were doing the best they could. I did later come into contact with some purchases—for instance, there was a jackhammer which ordinarily would cost \$90, they paid \$150—they bought pieces of equipment at the most outrageous prices.

Q. Do you refer to the Hawaiian Constructors?

A. I am referring to the Engineers.

Q. Do you remember Col. Theodore Wyman?

A. I know of him. I know where you could find some contracts that I would look into—one I investigated and turned over to Colonel Nurse. It was made with Weaver. Mr. Weaver, himself, was an automobile mechanic. He was set up immediately after the blitz with engineer equipment. He didn't have any of his own. He was paid \$4,000 a month for the pleasure of taking care of repairs plus \$4 an hour for his labor. When we checked the contract, Colonel Nurse told Colonel Wymer that the contract was impossible and would have to be renegotiated. He told him three or four times. Finally he had that renegotiated, making Weaver and Company purchase the equipment and cutting him from \$4 to \$2.50 an hour and cancelled the \$4,000 a month payment. Several months ago Weaver tried to negotiate for \$3.50 an hour. His travelling expenses were \$1,000 a month. Where he could travel, I don't know. His bookkeeper and auditing came to \$650 a month. His bookkeeper was his wife. At the time I left, however, his contract had not been renegotiated in his favor.

Q. During what period was this contract made?

A. After December, while Colonel Wymer was still there. Wymer signed the contract, but he was acting under Colonel Wyman.

Q. Was Colonel Wymer over Colonel Wyman?

A. The man you are talking about was Wyman. Under him was Wymer.

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[3] Q. That contract was between the Government and this man Weaver?
A. Weaver and Company, which was organized overnight.

Colonel Nurse headed this division which Colonel Cramer set up to investigate everything that was going on and this division has kept records of everything they investigated. You could learn a great deal if you could get those records of the Bottleneck Busting Division under the Engineers headed by Colonel Nurse. The records are in Honolulu. Talk to Colonel Nurse who is in San Francisco. He knows more about it than anyone else. He is an old Quartermaster man who has been in the Army 30 or 35 years. Colonel Hunt came out from here under the Inspector General's Office last spring, but I don't know what his report was.

Q. Did he go over this Bottleneck Busting Division's records?

A. Not much. He was out to prove that nobody was willing to testify that Colonel Wyman was crooked.

Q. The facts we are looking for probably will be in these particular records?

A. They will be if they haven't been destroyed. If they have been destroyed, I have my own copy of the records.

Q. What is your address?

A. King Street, Honolulu. I have a firm there, Grossman Moody.

I am here now to get the Government to get houses for us. I am on the Housing Committee, Labor Commissioner, and work with the Red Cross Disaster Relief Committee.

There is considerable rowing there with military authorities. They are putting men in jail for absenteeism. They are not military plants. They say they are necessary workers, and the Army puts them in jail for absenteeism. They are not managing any better than we are.

The YWCA is one of the few buildings in town the civilians can use. They announced to the YWCA that they were going to take over two floors. There were a number of women living there and they called me. A Colonel came in and announced they were taking over two floors and wanted them immediately. The Colonel said, "People in Honolulu will have to change their minds about a lot of things because we are going to put civilian employees of the Army in these houses." He said they would give us a week to find a place for these women. I told them that was impossible. Later I gave them a list of just what the [4] Engineers had that was not being used. Around the island there were 2800 beds not in use. Now you will find one man in a room where formerly were housed 4 girls. Across the street is the Pleasanton Hotel which hadn't had a soul in it for five weeks. I told them they had better give us back the hotel instead of trying to take over the YWCA. So, the next week, we got back the Pleasanton Hotel. We used to build 2500 houses a year, but we have only had permission to build 500 houses.

Q. What is the official name of the division headed by Colonel Nurse?

A. It is known as the B. B. D. (Bottleneck Busting Division), District Engineers Office for the Hawaiian Territory under the direction of Colonel Nurse.

Army Pearl Harbor Board Exhibit No. 11

Vol. 53

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

HEARING HELD BEFORE EXECUTIVE SESSION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S., WASHINGTON, D. C.,
FEBRUARY 9, 1944

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[2393]

EXECUTIVE SESSION

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1944

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The special committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock p. m., in room 1310 New House Office Building, Hon. John M. Costello (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Costello (chairman), Durham, Martin, Elston, and Fenton.

Also present: Mr. H. Ralph Burton, General Counsel to the Committee, and Joseph Colgan, Investigator; Major General Julian L. Schley, and Lieutenant Colonel Miles H. Knowles.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Proceed, gentlemen.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL JULIAN L. SCHLEY, UNITED STATES ARMY

(Major General Schley was sworn as a witness.)

The **CHAIRMAN**. Will you state your full name for the record?

General **SCHLEY**. Major General Julian L. Schley, United States Army.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Now, will you state your present position?

General **SCHLEY**. I am presently recalled from the retired [2394] list to the active list and assigned to the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Proceed, Mr. Burton.

Mr. **BURTON**. General, you were Chief of Engineers of the United States Army, were you not?

General **SCHLEY**. That is correct, sir.

Mr. **BURTON**. Please state for what period.

General **SCHLEY**. From about October, 1937, to September, 1941.

Mr. **BURTON**. Do you recall having recommended the approval of a contract between the United States and Hawaiian Constructors, which was signed on December 20, 1940, for certain installations in the Hawaiian Islands and some of the South Pacific islands?

General **SCHLEY**. I do not remember that, no, as such. I do remember that activity near that time was considerable and increasing in construction work in the Hawaiian Islands, and it was my function to make such recommendations in such instances.

The particular case you refer to, I do not remember, no.

Mr. **BURTON**. Do you know Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

General **SCHLEY**. Very well.

Mr. **BURTON**. Do you remember that he was here in December, 1940?

General **SCHLEY**. I could not associate his presence here [2395] with that date. He did come to Washington from the Hawaiian Islands—I don't remember how many times—for consultation, and he did come here from his previous position while I was in that office, which was in Los Angeles, California. He came East several times. It was not uncommon for him to do that which you mention, and he did come here from time to time.

Mr. **BURTON**. Do you recall that certain defense installations were constructed in the Hawaiian Islands at that time?

General **SCHLEY**. In a general way.

Mr. **BURTON**. This morning you called me on the telephone and at that time you said that you wanted to refresh your recollection by referring to the files. Did you do that, sir?

General **SCHLEY**. No, I did not. I called the office of the Chief of Engineers and asked if they could make those papers available to me and they said that they were unable to locate them at that time, they were in the hands of another office, but they probably could be made available in a day or two, as soon as they found them.

I don't remember now whether it was the Army Service Forces or the Under Secretary's Office or whose office, or someone in that office, because we discussed them all, as to where they might be.

I talked to a major who did look for them in the files.

I don't mean by that that they are lost, [2396] but they are not in the Chief's office at this time.

Mr. **BURTON**. Do you remember that one of the contracting firms was the Rohl Connolly Company?

General **SCHLEY**. No, I do not.

Mr. **BURTON**. And you can't recall any discussion of this contract?

General **SCHLEY**. Not that one in particular, no.

Mr. **BURTON**. Do you recall anything whatever about the conduct of the work in the Hawaiian Islands?

General **SCHLEY**. No, I do not. I don't remember any of the details of it. If anything had gone very wrong with it, it probably would have come to my desk.

If anything was worthy of note in any direction, it probably would have come to me. We had two main branches in my office, one having to do with the expansion of the military side and the training of the troops, and the other side having to do with what we call Rivers and Harbor work, and also fortification construction work.

About this time we received, in addition to that, the construction for the Army Air Forces. That was the first step in adding to our functions.

Mr. BURTON. Can you say what procedure would be followed in considering a contract of that nature?

General SCHLEY. Yes, sir, I remember that quite clearly, although it changed as we proceeded, and I am not quite certain [2397] in which phase this came.

Before the great increase in activities in that kind of work, there was not anything outside of our office necessary to have such a contract entered into and have its work progress. It was a normal function within our own office.

At the time of the large expansion there was added review given and all those contracts had to be approved, I think, from the beginning of this change in practice, by the Under Secretary, who at that time was Mr. Patterson. I think he still is.

Before submitting it to him, however, before making a recommendation to him, we first contacted O. P. M., Office of Production Management.

Later there was an additional consultation which we followed, and that was a committee which we always looked on as Mr. Patterson's committee. It was formed in the Quartermaster General's Office and was called the Construction—something—Committee.

Mr. ELSTON. Advisory?

General SCHLEY. Construction Advisory Committee, perhaps that was the name of it. Later, after we started this program, General George R. Spalding, whom I knew well, was placed at the head of it. I doubt if it was this early.

In this particular case I am not sure whether we went to O. P. M. or this committee for approval, or to both. We [2398] looked on this committee as Mr. Patterson's committee and I would not be surprised if he instructed us so to do.

We consulted them because we knew he would send it there anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. In passing on the contracts, you had nothing to do with the contract? It would be simply routine for you to approve a contract that came to your desk?

General SCHLEY. I would not put it quite that automatically, but that is true to some extent.

The form of contract we used before the expansion took place was our own. Of course, it had been reviewed by the Comptroller General and other departments interested in those things, and it was a standard form.

The difference between contracts was, of course, what you were undertaking to do, but the clauses were about the same. Those clauses in that form were at some time under this procedure changed and reviewed and we got a new form, and if I am not mistaken the Quartermaster General's committee was instrumental in getting that form. Perhaps the O. P. M. was.

The CHAIRMAN. But you didn't go into details of the contract when it was submitted to you for approval?

General SCHLEY. Unless I saw something on the face of it. I looked through all contracts I signed to see if there was anything I should look into further.

[2399] The CHAIRMAN. Whose duty would it be in the first place to approve and recommend a contract at this time for your signature?

General SCHLEY. We kept the thing decentralized into the field. I was in no small part instrumental in continuing that practice.

There was talk at one time of determination being made in Washington. There was a definite policy of the Administration of having what they called local contractors on the job, and we finally got to look on a local contractor as within the State in which the work was being done.

I think the Rivers and Harbors districts, 40-odd, our officers in those offices were the best-informed men as to who were the best contractors in the States. They had been conducting work of that kind right along.

Of course, I wanted all the review possible in Washington, and in case of disagreement we got from an approved list of contractors which these review officers had, contractors' names who were satisfactory to them and whom we also ap-

proved, and sent them back as suggestions only, and left the initiative in the hands of the field.

The CHAIRMAN. And a contract of this kind would be initiated in the field?

General SCHLEY. When you go outside the territory of the United States we may have suggested contractors we knew [2400] were satisfactory.

Of course, a lot of things were to be considered besides being a satisfactory contractor. The fact that he was a large contractor who could undertake a big job and had experience in that work and was responsible financially had to be considered.

The CHAIRMAN. The officer in the field would be largely responsible for the direct negotiations with the contractors in the beginning?

General SCHLEY. In the beginning, and then it was subject to our review and later by O. P. M.

I think they continued later to review, as well as the Review Board in the Quartermaster General's Office.

Mr. BURTON. This contract involved a sum of \$84,436,961. Is it possible that a contract of that size would be approved simply as a routine matter?

General SCHLEY. I would say that a \$84,000,000 contract at that stage of our procedure would be a very big and very unusual-sized contract, and probably would receive very careful consideration.

One thing that was bothering us at that stage was the amount of the fixed fee. The contractors, of course, were holding out for figures which they thought proper. We were trying to hold to what we thought was proper. That naturally would be smaller.

[2401] The Assistant Secretary, Mr. Patterson, was very attentive to that figure and before the thing was over he gave us a table which we could not exceed. The table was composed of fixed percents, although the fee was not. In very large contracts it was a smaller percent of the table. In smaller contracts the fixed fees were a larger percent of the contract table.

Mr. BURTON. Aren't there records of the various conferences and discussions affecting a contract of this size?

General SCHLEY. I doubt if there would be records of conferences at that stage. I will say there should have been kept records of any approvals or consultation with these several agencies to determine their agreement or disagreement with us.

The CHAIRMAN. Those records would be simply letter memoranda from one agency to another?

General SCHLEY. I think so. I think that those will all be of record in the form of memos or letters, initialed or approved by someone.

Many times when we were in a hurry, it may have been done by phone, but if they didn't make a record it was bad business. It should have been done.

Mr. BURTON. Those records could be made available to you and from those records you could probably refresh your recollection on what took place?

[2402] General SCHLEY. If the committee wishes I will make every effort to produce whatever the Chief of Engineers office has.

I left that office, as I say, in 1941, and their records, of course, are undoubtedly all the same now. They are all there, I presume. I have no records with me which pertain to this work.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it ight be well, General, for you to review the records that are available in the office there and whatever additional records you can get.

General SCHLEY. You are speaking of the approval of this contract with this contractor?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, any record that may be there involving any conferences.

General SCHLEY. May I have the name again?

The CHAIRMAN. Rohl Connolly.

General SCHLEY. And Company?

Mr. BURTON. This contract was with the Hawaiian Constructors, and that was a syndicate or association of contractors, consisting of Rohl Connolly Company, the Gunther Shirley Company, and Price Callahan.

The CHAIRMAN. Possibly, General the contract number would be a help. The contract number is W-414-Eng-602. The date of signing was December 20—.

General SCHLEY. Is a "W" before the number "414"?

[2403] The CHAIRMAN. Yes; W-414-Eng-602. That was executed December 20, 1940.

General SCHLEY. That is the date of the signature with the contracting office?

The CHAIRMAN. By Colonel Wyman and on behalf of Hawaiian Constructors by Paul Grafe.

Colonel KNOWLES. Does this obviate the necessity of our office now securing this information? This has been asked for.

Mr. BURTON. No, that does not obviate any request that we have made.

Colonel KNOWLES. It is only going to duplicate work. You are asking the General to produce information that has been requested from our office.

The CHAIRMAN. We wanted to get from the General any information that he might have in connection with the signing of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract.

Colonel KNOWLES. This was not a \$84,000,000 contract initially; it was about \$1,800,000, and it was increased from time to time by supplements. Isn't that correct, Mr. Burton?

Mr. BURTON. It doesn't say that in the letter. This letter says, "The total estimated cost involved in this contract was \$84,436,961, and the contract called for a fixed fee of \$1,014,690."

[2404] Colonel KNOWLES. But that includes numerous supplements to the original contract.

Mr. BURTON. Those supplements could not very well have borne date of December 20, 1940.

Colonel KNOWLES. No, they were dated later. But they were all under that contract number, and the fixed fee was increased as the supplements were added to the original contract.

Mr. ELSTON. May I suggest there, Mr. Chairman, that we get in the record the exact dates when each supplement was entered into and the amount and the work included in the contract? I think we should have it in the record.

Mr. BURTON. A full and complete report on the entire contract and supplements has been requested from the War Department and that is being prepared at this time. It was the purpose, however, in calling General Schley, as the Chairman has said, to ascertain from him what he could recall about the negotiations at the time that led up to the signing of the contract with Hawaiian Constructors.

Mr. ELSTON. I want to ask a couple of questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. ELSTON. General, is this committee that you spoke about, which might be the Construction Advisory Committee, what is known as the Blossom Committee?

General SCHLEY. That name does sound familiar in [2405] connection with it. Someone was at the head of it originally and he was replaced by George R. Spalding. It may have been Blossom.

Mr. ELSTON. There was a man named Blossom at the head of one of those committees and he was replaced.

General SCHLEY. That may be. I bring the committee into the picture because that was along the line of our change in the expansion and the change in the practices.

Mr. ELSTON. How much of an investigation would be made into the character and background of contractors bidding on work in strategic areas like in the Hawaiian Islands?

General SCHLEY. I would say that it is a subject which should be covered in the investigation as well as the financial responsibility and reputation of a construction firm. Certainly it is a proper item to look into, particularly with the war apparently in the not distant future.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, who would have the responsibility of making that investigation?

General SCHLEY. I think all along the line that investigation would cover.

Mr. ELSTON. Where would it start and where would it finish?

General SCHLEY. I should say it would start with the man in the field, who would be the district engineer.

Mr. ELSTON. In this case it would be Colonel Wyman?

[2406] General SCHLEY. I should say Colonel Wyman. If there had been anything about the matter which looked as if unsafe agencies were involved, he would be the first one to know, I should think. He is the man right in the field.

The next responsibility would have been on the Chief of Engineers' Office, and that, of course, I take responsibility for, because I was the head of it.

Next, I would say that it would be in this board that you speak of, and the Under Secretary himself, I assume—I don't know what means of investigation, or other organization, he would have besides that board.

Mr. ELSTON. Would the Chief of Army Engineers' Office accept the word of the District Engineer without making some independent investigation?

General SCHLEY. That is a little difficult to answer categorically. I know of no district engineer who had any important work under him—any district engineer in whom we did not have implicit confidence. I will put it that way.

On the other hand, I would say anybody who reviews anything must not do it automatically, and without his eyes and ears open, so a review would cover naturally whatever was proper to be looked into, and no man can shirk that responsibility. The responsibility is his.

Mr. ELSTON. I think about that time the War Department began to require even stenographers who worked in the War [2407] Department to be fingerprinted and furnish birth certificates and show what their background was.

Was any greater strictness required of employees in the War Department than was required of contractors who were going out and doing millions of dollars worth of business in strategic areas?

General SCHLEY. Well, now, I can't tell you whether that same thing was required of all workmen on all contracts or not.

Mr. ELSTON. I am not talking about the workmen as much as I am talking about the heads of the firms.

General SCHLEY. Well, I don't know whether they were similarly investigated in the matter that you speak of, the same as men in the offices of the War Department, or not.

Mr. ELSTON. I don't know whether you know it or not, General, but the head of this firm was a German alien and did not become a citizen of the United States until December 15, 1941, three months—no, nine months after the original contract was entered into.

Was any effort made to determine the citizenship of people engaged in contracts for the Government?

General SCHLEY. That is difficult to answer at that stage, whether that was gone into or not, because I just don't remember.

There undoubtedly was a time, somewhere along the [2408] line of the passage of time, as things became more and more threatening, when that was done. Whether it was done at this stage or how far back, I couldn't advise you.

Mr. ELSTON. Would you have any records indicating when that was done?

General SCHLEY. No, I have no doubt in my mind that at that time—in fact, I don't know whether I am safe in saying it was not done to a certain time and was done from then on. I should say it should have been done at all times, with the war threatening us.

Mr. ELSTON. General, you yourself would not have approved any contract entered into between any alien enemy and the United States Government. Of course, we were not then at war with Germany.

General SCHLEY. One year before.

Mr. ELSTON. But Germany was at war at that time with nations to whom we were furnishing lend-lease materials and money, and it was evident which side we were on.

Now, you yourself would not have approved a contract in a strategic area like the Hawaiian Islands, if the head of the company was a German, would you?

General SCHLEY. Well, that question you naturally tend to answer in the negative because, looking back on the picture now, we can see clearly that such a thing should not have been done.

[2409] I should say, on December 20, 1940, knowing what we know now, it should not have been done.

Looking forward from the back end, I don't know how the situation looked from the other end. It is pretty hard to say we should or should not have looked into such a matter at that time.

Mr. ELSTON. I don't suppose a German citizen could have gotten a job in the Government at that time.

General SCHLEY. That I can't answer.

Mr. ELSTON. They couldn't have gotten a job in an aircraft factory or any shipyard. They would have been excluded from work of that kind.

General SCHLEY. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Certainly there must have been some place along the line where you inquired into the citizenship of people who were engaged in contracts in critical and strategic areas like the Hawaiian Islands.

General SCHLEY. It does seem, looking from where we now sit, that that should have been done, yes.

Mr. ELSTON. We are seeking to find out whether it was done. Is there any way you can tell us whether it was done or not?

General SCHLEY. No, I can't tell you. In the first place, I don't remember the contract. I don't remember its being signed.

[2410] You ask me a hypothetical question as to what I would do under those conditions at that time. I don't know but what my only answer would be that I should look into such a thing.

Mr. ELSTON. In any event, if you knew that you would certainly call it to the attention of the Under Secretary or whomever you had to report to, wouldn't you?

General SCHLEY. From where I now sit it looks that way. To turn the clock back, I should say it should be done.

Mr. ELSTON. That was after we passed the Lend-Lease Act and after we began the conscription of American boys.

Mr. MARTIN. After we had shipped quite a number of vessels, after Dunkirk, too.

Mr. ELSTON. And after we had given them 50 destroyers. Don't you think at that time that you would immediately have caused an investigation to be made if you had any information that a big contractor in a strategic area was an alien of this country and a citizen of Germany?

General SCHLEY. Yes, I would say if there was any suspicion to that effect it should have been done.

If that is the stage in our national relations, if it is as you now put it, which is undoubtedly true—I have not reviewed it myself but I dare say it is—it does definitely look as if a German, a person suspected of being a German citizen, should have been gone into in considerable detail.

Mr. ELSTON. Would you expect a district engineer under [2411] your supervision to furnish you with information of that kind if it was within his knowledge?

General SCHLEY. At the time when we should have been on notice, definitely so. Not only should he not have recommended, but we should not have approved, beginning at whatever time it was that we should have been on notice that things could be done by a contractor which would harm our situation, our defense.

There is no question, the district engineers should be responsible in the first instance, and we would be in the second instance, assuming there was some reason for suspicion.

I don't know what Rohl—

Mr. ELSTON. His first name was Hans and his middle name was Wilhelm and his last name was Rohl. "Hans Wilhelm" should have been a suggestion to anybody, and I think it was generally known he was not a citizen of the United States.

Now, where in the record would the recommendation of the engineer, the District Engineer, appear?

General SCHLEY. I would say that it could be either in a letter of transmittal, or under his signature itself if it was on the document.

Mr. ELSTON. What document?

General SCHLEY. The contract itself. If his signature is on the document I would say there was no doubt in his mind unless you find some correspondence at the time which raised [2412] the question.

I would so accept it.

If the contract came in without correspondence, signed by the District Engineer, I would say there was nothing in his mind that raised a doubt as to the contractor.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, as supplements were let and the amount increased, until it reached the amount of \$84,000,000, wouldn't there have been some investigation even though the District Engineer had approved the contract in the first instance?

General SCHLEY. As to the nationality of the man?

Mr. ELSTON. His character and his background, his nationality, and anything that should be brought to the attention of the Government.

General SCHLEY. I would say that as that contract went along, it did start at a smaller figure and got very large, that we would have been under obligation to do whatever the proper thing was to do.

Mr. ELSTON. Were any instructions sent out to the district engineers instructing them to exercise great care in the selection of contractors because of the critical situation in which we were getting?

General SCHLEY. That I don't recall.

Mr. ELSTON. Would your file contain any recommendations that had been made with respect to this firm?

General SCHLEY. I don't know by whom you mean. By our [2413] own people?

Mr. ELSTON. By anybody at all.

General SCHLEY. I don't know that I could answer that question. If there was any written recommendation concerning him, it certainly would be there, and for any oral recommendation made you might or might not find a memorandum on the subject.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, asking you the question directly: have you any recollection of anybody ever recommending to you that this contractor, this firm of contractors, be approved?

General SCHLEY. No, I don't remember the contract at all.

Mr. ELSTON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. General, do you recall any disapprovals of contracts at all in 1940 on the ground of citizenship of the proposed contractors?

General SCHLEY. I don't know that I do.

Mr. MARTIN. Another question along a little different line. What time in 1941 did you leave the position of Chief of Engineers?

General SCHLEY. My 4 years were up in the autumn of 1941—my 4 years assignment as chief. I left the service at that time.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you recall any checking up on the progress of the Rohl contract, as to whether or not it was lagging in [2414] performance?

General SCHLEY. There is no doubt that knowledge of conditions on every contract we made was reported in to our office in Washington.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you recall anything at all about the work being done in Hawaii giving rise to concern about the maintenance of the schedule as originally planned?

General SCHLEY. No, I do not. And I might say there were many such cases where the contractors were behind schedule on the contracts. There were cases where they were up and cases where they were ahead.

Mr. MARTIN. Could you find out from your examination of the records down here, whether or not the Hawaiian defense construction was one of those that had given occasion for alarm or concern? And I would like to know also whether any of these supplemental contracts were awarded to this Hawaiian Constructors after it had been discovered that there was some delay in construction causing such concern.

The CHAIRMAN. General, when you were Chief of Engineers, did you receive periodically from the field progress reports on the various construction contracts let by your office?

General SCHLEY. They were received by the office.

The CHAIRMAN. But they were not brought to your attention, your personal attention?

General SCHLEY. At one stage of the game, when the work [2415] became very great, we had special reports prepared which kept us all informed of the progress of the work.

The amount of current contracts was quite large and there was quite a volume. That came to the desks of all of us.

Naturally there were brought to my attention cases where a cancellation was involved because of being behind schedule or any other reason.

The CHAIRMAN. But you didn't make it a part of your position to actually keep an eye on the actual progress being made?

General SCHLEY. At one stage it came to my desk.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have some particular officer whose duty it was to watch progress?

General SCHLEY. Part of the office had to do with civil engineering construction, Rivers and Harbors, and watched those things. Into one of the branches of it came these periodic reports.

The CHAIRMAN. But no specific officer was charged with that study?

General SCHLEY. I have no doubt there was. We had quite a number of officers in our office at that stage.

The CHAIRMAN. How is the work divided up in the Rivers and Harbors division? Do the contracts come in generally to all the officers or are there separate units for all areas?

General SCHLEY. There was a separate section. I don't [2416] know what it was called at that time, but it had to do with the contract features.

And there was another breakdown on the class of work, which was the engineering. The Rivers and Harbors, Flood Control Section, and Military Construction, I think were the three main branches.

The CHAIRMAN. And the contracts at this time came under the Military Construction Section, building airfields and so forth?

General SCHLEY. That may be, because there was military work here involved. And we did have a Fortification Division. It is quite possible this was under the fortifications part of the Military Division.

This was because we took over airfield construction and, of course, later we took over all camp construction, and this was all done on the civil engineering side.

But it is quite possible that this, since it had to do with fortifications in Hawaii such as gun emplacements—

The CHAIRMAN. The letter indicates the contract called for construction including airfields, fortifications, and other defense projects. It is all-inclusive.

General SCHLEY. You can't tell from that which branch it was handled in.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of it was in the Fortification or Military Construction units of your office?

[2417] General SCHLEY. All in my office.

The CHAIRMAN. And any supervision of the progress being made on construction would go to those divisions in your office and not necessarily come to your attention?

General SCHLEY. Until this time when we had the whole thing presented in very easily consolidated form, clearly expressed form, and rather voluminous, and in that case it came to all of us.

The CHAIRMAN. A general progress report of everything?

General SCHLEY. The progress of each contract set forth in it. I have to add there that I didn't pay much attention to the progress being made because there were men whose function it was to do that.

Mr. DURHAM. Did this Construction Committee make its recommendation direct to you on these contractors?

General SCHLEY. Under the Quartermaster General's Office. Our only consultation with them might have been called a preliminary consultation because, if I am not mistaken, Judge Patterson referred his contracts to that committee as a final step.

Mr. DURHAM. Then he would make the recommendations to the Secretary of War?

General SCHLEY. But we found we saved a lot of time if we didn't go too far into the thing until we found they were going to approve the contractor. And they would say, "No [2418] question about him, he is on our list," or, "not on our list."

Mr. DURHAM. Then the contractors were finally approved by Judge Patterson's office. If that correct?

General SCHLEY. I think at this stage everything was going to his office, no matter whether this committee was a part of it or not. But before that, as I say, the Office of Production Management was consulted by us and perhaps along parallel with it later. I can't recall that.

They also had a list of contractors who were considered to be proper for us to contract with.

Mr. BURTON. According to information which has been given to this committee, negotiations for this contract took place between about December 16 and December 20, and the committee has also been informed that the negotiations were conducted by T. E. Connolly of the Rohl Connolly Company, and Paul Grafe of the Price Callahan Company, with you and General Robbins and Major Newman.

I would like to know if you recall any such negotiations taking place.

General SCHLEY. No, I do not. However, the names Major Newman and General Robbins are two who were in that branch of the office, and if I was consulted on this case those are the proper men to consult me. I would say that is the proper trio to be considering such a thing if it was before me.

[2419] Mr. DURHAM. Do you know T. E. Connolly or Paul Grafe?

General SCHLEY. I can't recall T. E. Connolly. Paul Grafe I have known for many years. My first acquaintance with him was that his three companies entered into a contract with the Canal Zone for the construction of the Gatun Dam, which was built while I was in the Canal Zone.

He represented the contractors. It so happens that Gunther and Shirley and the Callahan Construction Company were the three groups which were in this contract, and Paul Grafe was resident manager for them. I was at that time Engineer of Maintenance at the Panama Canal and it was my job to deal with him.

Mr. BURTON. Now, if this contract was negotiated in about four days with Colonel Wyman present here from the Hawaiian Islands, wouldn't that have taken place in your office?

General SCHLEY. If Wyman was in the city and the negotiations proceeded in the city, for a contract of that kind, I would say it would have taken place in the office of the Chief of Engineers, and Wyman would have been present and I might also add that it would be entirely proper for General Robbins and Major Newman to be present.

The CHAIRMAN. What specifically, General, were their duties in connection with your office?

General SCHLEY. In the early part of our expansion of work, Newman was in charge of this very contract work in our [2420] office. He reported to General T. M. Robbins, who was in charge of that half of our office, the Rivers and Harbors half, which had the construction more of a civil nature. This was handled by them and not by the Fortification Division. It would have come under General Robbins and Newman.

Mr. BURTON. Had it been brought to your attention by Colonel Wyman or anyone else that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien, would you have then and there suspended negotiations until you could have found out about him?

General SCHLEY. Well, I answered a question very much of that same kind a moment ago.

Mr. BURTON. You did and I recall it.

General SCHLEY. And I said that looking at it from what we now know on the passage of time, I would say unquestionably that would be true.

Mr. BURTON. But you couldn't say that as of that time?

General SCHLEY. As of that time it is a little difficult for me to say what I would have done. From sitting where I am now I would say if someone had raised the suspicion I think I would have looked into it.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall the nature of the installations being constructed in the Hawaiian Islands at that time, that is, December, 1940?

General SCHLEY. Only to this extent, that they were unquestionably installations of a national defense nature.

[2421] Mr. BURTON. That being the case, couldn't you say definitely that had you known a German alien was being employed as a contractor, you should have looked into his citizenship?

General SCHLEY. Sitting where we are now at this time, unquestionably.

Mr. BURTON. I mean at that time generally, as long as they were defense installations, and there existed, as there did exist at that time, very delicate relationships with Germany and with Japan. Don't you think it should have been done?

General SCHLEY. I would have been inclined, as well as I can now turn back the time and sit in that period—I would have been very much inclined to either do that or consult someone above me on the subject to be sure it was the proper thing to do at that time.

Mr. BURTON. All the facts could have been ascertained by a telephone call to the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau, could it not?

General SCHLEY. I have no doubt it could on practically anybody.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know whether or not Colonel Wyman ever did call your attention to the fact that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien?

General SCHLEY. Of course, not remembering the incident at all, not remembering the name of the contractor, it would [2422] follow that I didn't remember that.

Mr. FENTON. General, on work of that kind, even the plans were secret and confidential, were they not?

General SCHLEY. Yes.

Mr. FENTON. And the very purpose of keeping them secret and confidential was to prevent their falling into the hands of persons who might be enemies of this country?

General SCHLEY. Well, we usually went further than that because, you try to keep things out of the hands of people who might be disloyal, no matter who they are. A man's name might be John Smith and still he could be disloyal.

Mr. FENTON. But you wouldn't assume that any person who might be an enemy alien could be loyal?

General SCHLEY. Certainly not, and I might say this: that in all contracts where you are dealing with very secret installations, you have that very serious problem.

It is not like a manufacturing concern where people are all closely held and all employed for usually long lengths of time, and the firm itself has a certain feeling of responsibility, but where you have a contractor who hires and fires men in the field day after day, and they are all working on extremely secret matters, it is a very serious problem.

Mr. FENTON. You even have the F. B. I. investigate people working on installations of that character?

General SCHLEY. Beginning at this stage of international [2423] developments we did, of course, report every suspicious case.

Mr. FENTON. When did you arrive at that stage?

General SCHLEY. I can't tell you that because I don't fit it into the times, but it was before I left the Chief's office that we not only had that, but also had an F. B. I. man in our own office. The name of the man in the office was not known to anyone. I, of course, knew who it was.

Mr. FENTON. When was that office set up?

General SCHLEY. I can't recall that.

Mr. FENTON. Was it as far back as December, 1940?

Mr. MARTIN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FENTON. When was the period of time you said you were Chief of Engineers?

General SCHLEY. 1937 to 1941.

Mr. FENTON. And I believe you said you knew Colonel Wyman very well?

General SCHLEY. From the last war. He entered the service in the last war before this one.

Mr. FENTON. Did you have any reports at any time derogative to the ability of Colonel Wyman?

General SCHLEY. No, I am sure I can say that the only criticisms I have ever heard of him came from people who suffered from the fact that he was a hard driver in his contract work.

[2424] He was very exacting of his contractors. He was a hard worker himself and he demanded a great deal of the people he was working with, whether his own people or contractors.

Mr. FENTON. You never heard anything derogative to his behavior?

General SCHLEY. No.

Mr. DURHAM. Had he ever had experience in building fortifications of this type before, General?

General SCHLEY. He is an engineer and therefore he knows construction work. He has been in the Corps of Engineers since the earlier war, he has been on the West Coast, Los Angeles, and I am sure he had because his district was quite extensive and that was his job just before he went to the Hawaiian Islands.

I would say Colonel Wyman was thoroughly familiar with the secrecy of the fortification plans and so forth.

Mr. ELSTON. Were you in the Chief of Engineers' Office when Colonel Wyman was transferred from Hawaii and placed in charge of the Canol project in Canada?

General SCHLEY. I am quite sure I was not because I didn't even know that he was placed in charge of that. My last recollection of him is that he was in the Hawaiian Islands. He was transferred from Los Angeles to that assignment when I was in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a transfer from Los Angeles to [2425] Hawaii?

General SCHLEY. To Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall any of the circumstances surrounding or connected with his transfer from Los Angeles to Hawaii?

General SCHLEY. I remember one or two features connected with it. One was that he had been kept in Los Angeles quite a long time and it was our policy to relieve men at the end of a 4-year tour at the end of one of those assignments, if possible. We didn't want them to get too closely connected with local affairs. We wanted them to retain their national point of view.

We left him long enough to be thoroughly familiar with the work, and we usually considered 4 years to be that time.

My recollection is that he was at Los Angeles longer than that and we left him there because he was doing well at it. It was a large job with large expenditures being made.

And also, if I remember correctly, the Los Angeles flood control interests were very much pleased with him. His transfer out there was, I would say, a normal thing.

Mr. ELSTON. General, who passed on his transfer from Los Angeles to Hawaii? Who made that assignment?

General SCHLEY. I would say that it would be made in that instance by the man who occupied the position of assistant on that half of the office, unless it

was something [2426] of such importance that it was taken to the top where the responsibility would be carried.

Mr. ELSTON. Who was that?

General SCHLEY. At that time it was probably General Robbins, the same man you spoke of. His predecessor was General Max C. Tyler, but I don't think he was there at that time.

Mr. ELSTON. You seem to have some knowledge of the work Colonel Wyman was doing in the Los Angeles area. Have you any knowledge of his being transferred to the Hawaiian area and the circumstances surrounding that transfer?

General SCHLEY. Only those that I have just mentioned.

Mr. ELSTON. If anyone suggested his transfer or urged it, would it appear in the files?

General SCHLEY. If they urged it in writing it certainly would.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you recall anybody suggesting his transfer?

General SCHLEY. Not outside of our own office.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you remember anybody in your office suggesting it?

General SCHLEY. I have a recollection that I knew of the transfer at the time and that is what I recall in connection with it, that he had been in Los Angeles quite a long time. That is the feature that I recall.

[2427] Mr. ELSTON. You won't recall anybody suggesting the transfer to Hawaii?

General SCHLEY. You mean anybody in my organization or outside of it?

Mr. ELSTON. Either way.

General SCHLEY. No. As a place selected for him to go?

Mr. ELSTON. Yes.

General SCHLEY. No. I remember something connected with his personal affairs at the time, because he had been recently divorced and his alimony was quite considerable, and he felt that going to the Hawaiian Islands would be—in some way he felt it would be an additional expense which it would be difficult for him to carry and, if I remember correctly, he spoke of that in connection with his transfer, as if he would just as lief be left in the United States. I don't remember what that feature was.

Mr. ELSTON. Did he talk to you about that?

General SCHLEY. No. I don't recall his having mentioned it to me.

Mr. ELSTON. From whom did you get that information?

General SCHLEY. I probably got it from my own office.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you at any time pay any attention to the requests of the engineer himself as to where he would like to go?

General SCHLEY. Yes, we invite him to comment on his [2428] preferences.

Mr. ELSTON. Did you or anyone in your office consult with Colonel Wyman on this matter?

General SCHLEY. That I don't recall. I say we do it automatically because, as you may know, the Adjutant General used to invite in the reports which were made periodically, your own request as to where you would be stationed next, and the class of work you preferred to be on. And often an officer might ask for a particular station. We would consider that.

It might be something about family affairs or some other affairs.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you have them made out a request in writing when they want a transfer to some particular place?

General SCHLEY. Not necessarily.

I might say this: That it is unusual for a man to request a certain assignment and get it, because most of them don't request and, in the second place, usually something stands in the way.

So, as a rule, I would say a man gets a new station rather as a surprise, and he takes it and likes it.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, in the Army wasn't the transfer to the Hawaiian area considered one of the best?

General SCHLEY. I have never so considered it. Of course, when you say "one of the best," many things bear on [2429] that. You have more good times at certain places than you do at others. You have more responsibility at some places than at others. Your chances of advancement are greater if you get certain assignments rather than others.

All those things count, depending upon the individual and his personal affairs.

Mr. ELSTON. General, is there an increase in salary when an officer is sent from the United States to Hawaii or overseas?

General SCHLEY. At that time my recollection is that there was not. There were several stages of that, looking away back in the earlier service. There was a 10 percent increase for foreign service. At that time the foreign service was the more unhealthful places, such as the Philippines. At that time certain stations were excluded from that special treatment and, as I recall it, it was all wiped out. They found the health records in the Panama Canal Zone were better than in the United States. Hawaii was one of the earlier ones withdrawn because it was a healthful place.

The CHAIRMAN. General, as soon as these records are available to you in the War Department, I wonder if you would make it a point to review them and see if you can secure any further information?

General SCHLEY. Whom would they be sent to?

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has already requested certain documents to be forwarded to the committee, which the Department [2430] is assembling for that purpose.

I suggest that you yourself might obtain access to the records and refresh your own memory in regard to them in connection with the Hawaiian Constructors contracts.

General SCHLEY. Then you want me to call the committee?

The CHAIRMAN. I thought we might call you further as a witness after you have had an opportunity to refresh your memory.

General SCHLEY. I will examine the files rather than produce them here, and be prepared to answer these questions about these phases of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe Mr. Burton has already requested the documents to be made available to the committee, so that request will stand.

Mr. BURTON. I have requested certain records but there are probably some records in addition to those that it will be necessary for you to consult.

I doubt if everything necessary to refresh your recollection will be included. Do you think they will be, Colonel?

Colonel KNOWLES. I am of the impression that there were no minutes kept of conferences preliminary to the institution of the contract, and that was one point that was discussed in the earlier part of the general testimony.

My understanding is there are no such transcripts. The contract speaks for itself.

[2431] So, as I see the picture, the General would have to refresh his recollection from the contracts and the supplements and from such directives as were in existence at that time governing the negotiations.

Mr. BURTON. Is there no correspondence, no transcripts of telephone calls? Wasn't this recommendation which was made to the Under Secretary in writing?

Colonel KNOWLES. The contracts were transmitted from the Corps of Engineers up to a certain period in 1941 where they amounted to over \$500,000. I thing around April or May, 1941, that was changed to \$5,000,000.

After that period, without being sent to Washington, they were executed in the field.

Mr. BURTON. This was in 1940.

Colonel KNOWLES. That is right. The original contract was for \$1,800,000. That would be submitted to the Under Secretary's office for approval.

Mr. BURTON. There would be some record of that?

Colonel KNOWLES. It would be sent with a transmittal slip.

Mr. BURTON. Then, a copy of that would be available?

Colonel KNOWLES. Well, what is available is the last page of the contract where it shows the approval of the Under Secretary. It would come into the Under Secretary's office with probably a buff slip for approval and signature. He [2432] would sign under the approval.

General SCHLEY. I would say if it was signed by Colonel Wyman and somebody in the office of the Chief of Engineers, and then went to Mr. Patterson, it would be assumed that it was approved. I would say the fact that it was signed before it reached Mr. Patterson, is prima facie evidence that we recommended that it be signed.

Mr. ELSTON. Wasn't that contract signed in Washington by all parties?

Mr. BURTON. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Certainly someone must have sat around a table and there would be some record of that. Perhaps Colonel Wyman could advise you whom he saw when he came to Washington if he did at this time.

You call up some of these departments downtown and they turn on a phonograph and get a record of the conversation. They are getting very particular about some people and very careless about others if they don't keep a record.

General SCHLEY. Of course, responsibility is pretty well fixed. I don't have to have a memorandum. I always assume that with something coming from the field, if a paper comes to my desk with the signature on it, certainly that is recommended to me.

Mr. ELSTON. The fact that they came to Washington to execute that original contract would show that it was necessary [2433] to talk it over with somebody in Washington before the contract could be approved, wouldn't it?

General SCHLEY. Let me put my answer a little different from that. I would say it was not usual for the District Engineer to accompany a contract to Washington. I think anything done outside the country might have had a different light thrown on it.

In the Hawaiian office you have a number of contractors. I have not been in the Hawaiian Islands for 40 years, but I have been in Panama a great deal. In Panama you can't find a local contractor except those who have come down to do some work and stay on for another piece of work.

Mr. DURHAM. Wouldn't that District Engineer have to be ordered here by somebody higher up?

General SCHLEY. He would have to ask permission to come to Washington or we would send for him to come.

Mr. ELSTON. The name of the company, Hawaiian Constructors, would imply that they were ready to do business in Hawaii.

Mr. BURTON. On December 16, according to information that the committee has, this contract had not been signed, and it was negotiated in Washington between December 16, 1940, and December 20, 1940. That is, Colonel Wyman did not accompany the contract here, but he came here and it was negotiated in Washington and, as I said before, according to the information we have, that negotiation took place between Paul Grafe, T. E. [2434] Connolly, yourself, General Robbins, and Major Newman.

According to Mr. Connolly's own signed statement, he came here on December 16, 1940, and that it the first time he ever heard of the contract.

I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your coming here today, General, and Major Knowles, and I wonder if you will make an effort to review whatever records you might be able to obtain, and you might let Mr. Burton know whatever you are able to obtain, and if we deem it necessary to do so we might have you come back and question you further with regard to certain matters.

(Thereupon, at 4:30 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken without date.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 11A

Vol. 70

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

HEARING HELD BEFORE EXECUTIVE SESSION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S., WASHINGTON, D. C., MAY 4, 1944

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CONTRACT—ROHL-CONNOLLY

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1944

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The special committee met at 3:20 p. m., pursuant to adjournment, in Room 1310 New House Office Building, Honorable John W. Costello (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representative Costello (chairman), and Representative Elston (Ohio).

Also Present: Mr. H. Ralph Burton, General Counsel to the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, General, that you are prepared to give some testimony to the Committee in connection with the testimony which you gave to us previously, after you had had an opportunity to refresh your memory from documents in the War Department, and so on, in connection with your duties there.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JULIAN L. SCHLEY

Gen. SCHLEY. That is correct, sir, and I have been at it from time to time as I found papers in the Chief of Engineers' Office, and kept Mr. Burton informed, as soon as I learned some papers were on the way from the Hawaiian Islands which I knew would throw some light on some parts of it.

[3283] After they did arrive, I have had a chance to look over some of them. I have learned in the last few days that many more are on hand, or rather on their way too, but I thought since it has been some time since I appeared last, I thought I better notify Mr. Burton so that I could at least bring you up to date on the situation.

I would like to correct, first, one point on which I was somewhat hazy when the question was first asked me when I was here before, not having had time to consult the records, and that is, that this particular contract was reviewed and approved after it left the Corps of Engineers, by William S. Knudson, of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense. It was subsequently approved by Robert P. Patterson, as Under Secretary of War. That position of Mr. Knudson and that Commission was one of the steps in the development of those review boards; it was later changed to another board.

Mr. BURTON. You are speaking of contract W-414-E. N. G. 602?

Maj. Gen. SCHLEY. That is correct, sir. Answering one of the questions which the Committee asked me specifically, and that is to see if I could locate any notes, memos, or letters which bore on the conferences or negotiations or anything to alter the contract, and I have done that and I find none. There is some additional information, however, on this particular contract after it was prepared, and that was that the [3284] application for approval of a cost plus a fixed fee form of construction, which we had to do in those early days, was submitted the 14th of December by Colonel Wyman.

The CHAIRMAN. What year is that?

Maj. Gen. SCHLEY. 1940. And forwarded from the Division Engineer, Col. J. D. Matherson, to the Chief of Engineers' Office. On December 18, a letter was written to the Assistant Secretary of War by Lt. Col. Earl E. Gessler, of the Financial Section, similarly requesting authority, or in other words forwarding this application for authority for the use of the cost plus a fixed fee contract. This was approved by the Assistant Secretary of War on December 20, 1940, and this endorsement stated that the Secretary of War had determined it was necessary to enter into a cost plus a fixed fee contract for the construction proposed, and that authority to enter into negotiations of that contractor selected and the constructors—contractors' fee being subject to subsequent approval by the Assistant Secretary.

Mr. BURTON. You spoke of the Assistant Secretary. Do you mean the Under Secretary?

Maj. Gen. SCHLEY. I mean Mr. Patterson. I am not sure whether at that time he was Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary. The records, I think, show at that time Assistant.

On December 26, 1940, Col. Gessler sent a memorandum to me, as Chief of Engineers, with the contract, dated [3285] December 20, between the United States and the constructors. The constructors consisted of W. E. Callahan, of Nebraska, Gunther Shirley, of Nebraska, and Rohl-Connley (spelled C-o-n-n-l-e-y-), a Nevada corporation.

Mr. BURTON. I think it is C-o-n-n-o-l-l-y. I think it is.

Maj. Gen. SCHLEY. I have it another place here. But the contract will show.

On December 28, Col. Gessler sent a memorandum to Commissioner Wm. S. Knudson requesting clearance for the award of contract W-414-E. N. G. 602 with constructors. On December 28, same day, Col. Gessler sent a letter to the Under Secretary of War, now recorded here as "Under Secretary, transmitting the contract and giving certain information concerning it. This was approved by Robert P. Patterson under date of January 3, 1941.

That corrects some approximate information which I tried to give from memory when I came here before.

The Committee wanted to know the supplemental agreements. Do you still want me to give information on them? You now have them, I believe.

Mr. BURTON. Copies of those are now in our office. As I remember, there was an original contract dated December 20, 1940, and there were forty-six supplements.

Maj. Gen. SCHLEY. I might say that the first four [3286] supplements were effected before I left the Service: Number 1 on March 22, 1941; No. 2 on May 5, 1941; No. 3 on May 22, 1941; No. 4 on June 19, 1941.

Now, the other question I was asked was the progress made under the contract. In other words, was the contractor, did he show any great amount of delinquency? I have made a very extensive effort to try to get some information on that, and what I have got is very unsatisfactory, not as to the contractors' progress, but as to my ability with the papers at hand and time at my disposal to check. However, I can throw some light on the subject.

The manner in which the contract deals with the question of time is interesting, and I think it is understandable when we realize the changes which were made as the contract progressed. Indicating that work was crowding on the contracting officer to be done, and that when this contract was entered into, something of that was undoubtedly foreseen. Because it reads as follows as to the time and as to what was to be done specifically: The contract is quite general in what it proposes to be done, and falls under five categories, one of which, for instance, is railroad trackage at location specified in article 1, paragraph 1. When we returned to article 1, paragraph 1, we will see that it still is a very general statement of what is to be done. In paragraph (f) under article 1, section 1 of paragraph 1, is the [3287] following:

Additional work may be required to be done under the terms, if and when additional monies appropriated for National Defense purposes become available, provided such additional work is ordered to be done by the contracting officer.

That, plus the very indefiniteness of these requirements under the contract, show to me that there was not in the mind of the contracting officer, and therefore not in the mind of the contractor, any specific quantity of work to be done, except that the estimated work was a definite number of dollars and cents, and that must have been based on an estimate for doing some particular work.

Mr. BURTON. Do you find there an item, General, for air raid warning stations, and, I think, also, for storage of ammunition?

Gen. SCHLEY. Here is the warning service one. The second of the group of kinds of work to be done: Warning service stations at locations to be determined specified in article 1, section 1. Article 1, section 1, says this, under (b) of article 1, section 1: Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai, involving certain installations including the building of roads, trails, cableways, haulage ways, and other structures appertinent to aircraft warning service, as directed by the contracting officer. That is what the contract includes in that category.

[3288] Then, I read this item on additional work, another paragraph just a little further down, reading as follows:

It is estimated that the total cost of the construction work covered by this contract will be approximately \$1,097,673, exclusive of contractors' fees and that the work herein contracted for will be ready for utilization by the Government within six months from the date of this contract.

Then follows this: It is expressly understood, however, that the contractor does not guarantee the correctness of either of these estimates.

Mr. ELSTON. What was the date of that, General?

Gen. SCHLEY. That is in the contract proper.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the date of it?

Gen. SCHLEY. December 20, 1940. Now, that, I give not to try to prove to the Committee that it is useless to try to pursue that question, because I don't intend to do any such thing; and with the proper group of men to do the research and with all the papers present, it is quite possible to tie together a little more, certainly better than I have been able to do here, those two things, and that is what was expected and what was done.

Now, let's turn to job orders on that same subject. There are a great many job orders, and while I have not been [3289] able to establish the fact, I think no work was done under this contract unless it was covered by a job order. In other words, I don't think the job orders are in addition to what is mentioned in broad terms in the contract, and what is mentioned more specifically

in the several supplements following, but I think that they are all included in the job orders, but I have not been able to establish that.

Now, the job order as to time reads this way:

Estimated time for completion: The job order has the work to be done, the place where it is to be done, commencement date, that is usually the same date as the job order, and estimated time for completion, showing there, again, that, apparently, the relationship between the contractor and the contracting officer was that the contracting officer was to drive the contractor to do the work, the contractor to do it efficiently and rapidly or not, depending on how good a contractor he was.

Now, if you care, I will attempt to go into the several efforts to follow up requirements, as compared to progress, but it is scarcely worth your time, to be frank.

I have one other piece of information to add to what I gave you before, and that is a little more specific about the times when certain officials in the Office of the Chief of Engineers were on duty connected with this kind of work. In general, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief Engineer did work [3290] under two categories: First, entering into the contract, which was a matter of determining the contractor, determining the terms of the contractor, including the work to be done, and having the necessary formalities gone through with, the bonds furnished, signature supplied, and approval of what is called the Contracting Claims Branch. Claims arising out of contracts by the Construction Section, the branch follows it up on contracts. It is the one which handled the reports on progress, and seeing that the contractor—reviewing the work in the field to the extent the Office of Chief Engineer found it necessary and desirable to review them. The Claims, the Contracting Claims Branch, during the entire period that interests me in this particular contract, was under Lt. Col. Earl E. Gessler. I gave you that information over the phone one day, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Yes, sir.

Gen. SCHLEY. He was assisted in this work, insofar as these particular jobs were concerned, under Major James B. Newman, from October 7, 1940, to June 4, 1941, when he was relieved. Major Joseph W. Cox was in immediate charge of that work from June 16, 1941, to December 12, 1941.

The construction Section, during the entire time, was under Major J. R. Harden, who is the one which followed up on the progress of the contract. He was there until December 16, 1941, which covers my period.

[3291] One of his three branches, he had one on Navigation and River Improvement, one on Flood Control, and one of—one on Defense Projects, and that branch on Defense Projects, which relates to this work, was under Major E. G. Plank, who happened to come into the office the same date this contract was dated, December 20, 1940, and stayed there all through 1941 calendar year.

Now, the Fortifications Section was under a different part of the office again, Lt. Col. George Mayo. I might explain to you this much to give you a little more background which I had to refresh my memory on as to time. As you know, the Corps of Engineers in time of peace had the construction of all our sea coast fortifications. As a matter of fact, that is the only kind we build in time of peace, so we might say, all of the fortifications. They had also certain public works which are classed under Rivers and Harbors; that is what it is called here, and Flood Control too. The construction work, therefore, was of a civil nature, and the military work—construction of fortifications—was the only part of a military nature, and they came under the military side of the office.

As the Army expanded and work began to increase of defense preparedness, there was transferred to the Corps of Engineers from the Quartermaster's Corps, first, the work on air corps construction. That was done under letter of Adjutant General dated November 20, 1940, one month before this contract. [3292] In those instructions, we were definitely advised that it would not be effective, the transfer, on a certain date, but that the Corps of Engineers would take over from the Quartermaster's Corps each project at each air field as it reached a stage where the transfer could be made in an orderly manner so as not to cause confusion or loss of progress. The result was that it was some period of months before November 20 before that transfer was complete.

All work of the Constructing Quartermaster was turned over to the Corps of Engineers on December 6, 1941. That is a year and two months later—three months.

The organization of the Chief of Engineers' Office changed to meet these changes, the Fortifications Section continuing to do fortifications up to a certain date, which I don't remember, it is past my time, when it was absorbed into the larger construction work. The Construction Section has just indicated setting up a third branch called the Defense Projects Branch, and its first work was to handle this air crops construction which was mostly air fields. And in addition, Newman was set up followed by Cox on what I might call emergency work of further contract in violation of the normal laws after due advertisement and competition by selecting the contractor and making it a cost plus a fee basis. Those men came in to undertake that work.

Mr. BURTON. Have you anything which would throw light [§293] upon the progress of the work concerning the air raid warning stations? According to the contract, those stations were supposed to be completed within six months after the date of the contract, or, at least, after the approval on January 3, 1941, and they were not finished on December 7, 1941, and if you can throw any light on what caused the delay—

Gen. SCHLEY. I am afraid I haven't enough—

Mr. BURTON. We would like to have it.

Gen. SCHLEY. I checked between the requirements and the progress to be able to answer you that question, but feel quite certain—I will verify it in a minute—that there was a good deal of warning stations included also in the supplements. I may be mistaken, I will look it up and see (consulting file). I am quite certain you will find that better in the job orders, which I haven't with me because they are so numerous, but I feel quite certain you will find air raid warning things running through the entire file, not only for this period that I have which relates to me, but also to subsequent periods. I will see whether those I was able to match up whether there was any aircraft warning.

Mr. BURTON. Doesn't the original contract provide that air raid warning stations should be installed on the Island of Oahu?

Gen. SCHLEY. I read to you, I think, everything that is in the contract itself on the subject, and that is in the [§294] second item under the work to be done which says: Warning service stations at locations to be determined as specified in article 1, paragraph 1. And then, turning to that article, under (b) is this expression: Aircraft warning service stations, on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai, including certain installations, including building roads, trails, cableways, haulage ways, and other structures appurtenant to aircraft warning service, as directed by the contracting officer.

Now, the job orders—there are many of them—which relate to this aircraft work, aircraft warning work; and it will be necessary to get all progress reports and compare them in order to see if there was a time sufficiently set which was exceeded in the instructions. I have not those and have not been able to find them in Washington. It may be among the things which are coming from Hawaii which are on the way now by regular mail.

The CHAIRMAN. But, General, where the original contract provided for certain air raid warning installations, did these job orders amplify the nature of those installations that were to be put into various places on the Islands?

Gen. SCHLEY. As I said a few minutes ago, sir, I assume that no work was done that isn't covered by a job order, which may be a further detail of what the contracted intended in more general terms to require. But I find this statement [§295] in the contract, and I have been unable to find the part which it refers to. "In accordance with the drawing and specifications, our instructions contained in Appendix A hereto attached and made a part hereof are to be provided hereafter by the Contracting Officer and subject in every detail to his direction and instructions."

Now, you have not in your set that Appendix A, nor have I a set with Appendix A. Appendix B is there, which is a less important paper; it is quite possible all Appendix A's were in the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. BURTON. You have a set of photostats of the contracts which are similar to those which we have, have you not?

Gen. SCHLEY. I received a set day before yesterday. But I have examined the originals, and I have verified the fact that in those originals there is not this Appendix A. Now, whether that will give the details or whether the job orders are intended to do so is something I am not familiar with. I have seen all the job orders; you now have those, I believe, or they are coming.

Mr. BURTON. I have not received the job orders yet.

Gen. SCHLEY. I have examined all of the job orders pertaining to 1941, and there again I fail to find the design which was referred to, the drawings, but

I find enough, I think, to serve this purpose. When you get them, I think [3296] you will be able to tell pretty well where the job was to be done, what the estimated cost was, and the estimated materials to go into it, date commenced, and estimated time for completion. But you are going to run into this difficulty, which is extremely complicated. Sometimes, you have as many as 24 addendums. There will be Job Order 25 with 24 addendums. Those addendums will add to the job until you get toward the end, and then it begins to cancel some of them. So it is going to be quite an undertaking to tabulate those so that you can see what was under way at any particular time in the progress of every job order. And that job order may run to 1943, some of them do, for something which was started in the early part of 1941.

Mr. BURTON. Insofar as you know, there isn't anything else that would give definite information on the progress of work or reason for delay other than the job order item, except as it may be in the papers which are now enroute. The papers left the Islands, I would say, a week ago by straight mail, probably too heavy for Airmail.

Mr. BURTON. This is off the record.

(Discussion outside the record.)

Mr. BURTON. According to the records of our office, the original contract of December 20, 1940, schedule B, reads: "Aircraft warning stations on the Islands of Oahu and Kauai involving certain installations including buildings, [3297] roads, cableways, haulage ways, and other structures pertinent to aircraft warning service."

Gen. SCHLEY. My copy which I have made here from the contracts have two more Islands: Hawaii and Maui, besides the two you read.

Mr. BURTON. Pearl Harbor is at Oahu?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Gen. SCHLEY. Pearl Harbor is on the Island of Oahu.

Mr. BURTON. That is the particular reason why we were interested in the air raid warning stations?

Gen. SCHLEY. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Which were, according to the contract, to be installed within six months after the date of the contract?

Gen. SCHLEY. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. And they were not furnished, not finished when Pearl Harbor was bombed?

Mr. BURTON. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. And were not finished, as I understand it, for about two months after that, isn't that correct?

Mr. BURTON. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, General, right in that connection, what action did the War Department take when the contractor didn't complete his contract on time?

Gen. SCHLEY. I would say that a large number of [3298] contracts are not completed on time for various reasons, some the fault of the contractor, and some not the fault of the contractor. I would say that it is not unusual for a contractor to be late in his contract. I would say that what the Government does depends a great deal on the circumstances, and I don't doubt that policies change from time to time with conditions and with individuals who are responsible.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you know what was done in this particular case, if anything, when these air raid warning stations, which were supposed to be completed in six months, were not completed even within a year?

Gen. SCHLEY. Well, of course, I can't agree with you—I don't want to argue, the time was different from six months, but it is worthy of note that the contract was not specific as to the time. It was evidently an estimate. Second,—

Mr. ELSTON (interposing). Well, isn't that a rather inaccurate estimate as it is estimated? They estimated it can be completed in six months and it wasn't completed in a year and two months?

Gen. SCHLEY. I think you have to give weight to the wording in the contract which says that it is expressly understood, however, that the contractor does not guarantee the correctness of either of these estimates. Those two estimates being the cost and the time. And the cost estimate reading in this manner:

[3299] "It is estimated that the total cost, etc., and that the work herein contracted for will be ready, it is estimated that it will be ready."

Now, that is not the form of contract which is entered into. That phraseology is unusual, except in this form of contract, of the cost plus a fee. Where you

advertise for bids, as undoubtedly you know, and then enter into a firm contract to do a specific job, the design and the structure is finished; the estimate of cost is all made by the contractor and by the Government representative; advertisement is made in which bids are submitted, firm bids, and the man, each bidder submits a bond that he would enter into the contract if the contract is awarded to him. Then when it is awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, that bond is released and then he gives bond as he entered into the contract that he will perform this work as required and that requirement, in all cases, we might say, involves a question of time.

When the contractor finishes his job and does it certainly within the time and he has paid the standard amount of money, that, in this kind of contract, is by no means not the case. If you took the time—one man could not do it—but if a group of men investigated this thing and got the picture at any one time of the number of things which the contractor was called on to do, and when the completion dates of those things were, then you could judge at any one time whether he was [3300] seriously in fault. But you must remember the requirements of this original contract were added to and subtracted from as the contract progressed. I am not saying the contractor was not grossly delinquent at the end of six months. He may have been; I don't know that he was, but I do think that in charging or judging, it is proper that the Committee take into consideration that phraseology, which is peculiar to a cost plus a fee form of contract. The contractor has agreed to nothing except that he is willing to accept this amount of fixed fee and he is going to undertake to do the work at a time specified, but no guaranty. He may have been grossly delinquent at the end of six months, but I don't think we have the facts to show it; I haven't, at least.

Mr. ELSTON. There were no bonds given on the contracts of that kind?

Gen. SCHLEY. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a penalty provision?

Gen. SCHLEY. I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. The contract, then, did not ask for any penalties to be paid by the contractor for not making a completion of the work?

Gen. SCHLEY. If I am not mistaken, the remedy is to throw the contractor off the job and enter into contract with another one. If you are faced with that sort of step, you know you are going to cause delay by that very action, and [3301] it is often a very close decision, even if the contractor is delinquent, to keep him on the job and try to drive him, or get rid of him and take the loss which is always part of such a change.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had in most of these contracts a penalty for failure to keep within the time, that is your best incentive to get the contract completed in time?

Gen. SCHLEY. That will stand up in the courts under certain conditions. Sometimes the court will throw out the whole action; in other cases, where you can show real damage, you can.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, that is in a case where something occurs which the contractor could not reasonably anticipate. Do you know whether anything occurred in this case that the contractor could not reasonably have anticipated?

Gen. SCHLEY. That, I could not say, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. He didn't have any strikes, did he?

Gen. SCHLEY. I couldn't say; I have not the facts. I have found in one case that I was able to check through, I did find that the steel for a tower had not been received for coast defense work.

Mr. ELSTON. General, wouldn't there be some record showing why he hadn't completed it? Certainly, a few days wouldn't make a lot of difference, but where six additional months go by and the job isn't completed, there must have been [3302] something in the record to show why it wasn't completed.

Gen. SCHLEY. That may be, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, do you think you could find anything in your records along that line so that we would know what did occur that prevented this contract from being completed short of fourteen months?

Gen. SCHLEY. I think I have consulted, I have reason to believe that I have consulted everything that bears on the subject that is now in the Office of the Chief of Engineers or in the Secretary of War's office. He has some of the original papers. I have no reason to believe that anything has not been shown to me. The files have been searched many times, I have asked specific questions, and have searched them no later than this morning and made my last effort to find some other things, I thought I might be able to locate. However, we must

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remember that these things are on the way, and I would say that if this Committee puts a large enough force on it to analyze it for yourselves fully, you will be able to get a satisfactory answer to that very question.

The CHAIRMAN. The supplements, General, are in the nature of a separate contract itself for different items and different amounts?

Gen. SCHLEY. Some of them apparently extend the quarters in the original contract and in each other, and others enter into new kinds of work.

[3303] Mr. BURTON. I thought the original contract of December 20, 1940, was only for \$1,790,000-odd dollars, where supplement six is for \$2,249,600 for construction of underground facilities for various gasoline storage. I could state for the record that the total amount of the contract, the total estimated amount of the original contract and all of the supplements was about \$135,000,000, about 65% of which was completed on January 31, 1943, when the contract was terminated for the convenience of the Government.

Gen. SCHLEY. I could throw some light on that which I ran into in the files, but it doesn't seem to be my part of the responsibilities, so I should, perhaps, leave that for others.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall whether or not the Rohl-Connolly Company was particularly recommended for efficiency and ability to complete work rapidly?

Gen. SCHLEY. No, I find nothing in the files about that, nor have I personal knowledge of that company. It so happens that the other two companies I do know, and have worked with in Panama. I know them and had very long dealings with them for almost three years. The Rohl-Connolly, the name is new to me, new to me since you have commenced this inquiry; I don't remember having seen it. The Callahan Company is quite well known. There were even more than those three before the thing ended. During my time, supplement 3 [3304] brings in one additional contractor, Ralph E. Wooley.

Mr. BURTON. That is true. At the beginning, Rohl-Connolly Company and then Callahan each had a participation of 40 percent, and Gunther Shirley 20 percent in the Iron Constructors, Inc. Later on, they took in others, and the relative participation was reduced.

Gen. SCHLEY. Off the record.

(Discussion outside the record.)

Mr. BURTON. Well, I think that is about all that we have. That is all the General can give us on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything more you wish to add?

Gen. SCHLEY. No. I regret I wasn't able to check progress; I would like to have. I examined the general project reports for the Office of the Chief of Engineers, which had circulated in the office from field reports, but it did not pertain to contracts. It was to familiarize the higher officials of the office, what was on the books and how far completed it was, but they were in classes of work. For instance, there would be 700 barrels at a certain location; there would be 53 something else there. But not broken down by contracts. The progress of the contracts were not in those.

The CHAIRMAN. You were located, General, in Hawaii at this time?

Gen. SCHLEY. No, sir, I was here.

[3305] The CHAIRMAN. Here in Washington. You were never over in Hawaii at the time of the progress of these contracts?

Gen. SCHLEY. No, it so happens I did not visit the Hawaiian Islands during my entire four years in the job.

Mr. BURTON. I had asked the General to give us what he could because this contract was negotiated in Washington, and I thought, for that reason, that he might recall some of the incidents related to it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have nothing further to add to any testimony you may have given the Committee regarding negotiations that took place here in Washington concerning the contract?

Gen. SCHLEY. No, sir, nor have I anything at all which bears on the question which you have asked me.

The CHAIRMAN. Those negotiations were not conducted directly by you or with you personally?

Gen. SCHLEY. I did not take part in them at all. I signed the contract as it shows as recommending its approval to the Under Secretary of War.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be done, as you recall, as a matter of routine business like so many other contracts coming to your attention for approval by inferior officers?

Gen. SCHLEY. Yes, except as I said when I was here before, in spite of a number of things of the kind which I signed, I tried to grasp what the thing was that I was signing [3306] to see if there was anything on the fact of it that I wanted to ask about of the responsible officers who were my assistants who were handling it. This was not one of those. There seemed to me to be nothing on the face of this which prompted me to go into it further before signing.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Thank you very much, General, we appreciate your cooperation with the Committee.

(Whereupon, the meeting adjourned at 4:10 p. m.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 12

(Exhibit No. 12 consists in the main of the following photostated items:

Folder of Hotel Biltmore, Los Angeles, records relating to H. W. Rohl, which will be found reproduced as Items No. 10, 11, 12, and 13.

Bank statements from Seventh and Figueroa Branch, Bank of America, Los Angeles, relating to Theodore Wyman, Jr., which will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23.

Signature cards of Bank of America in name of Theodore Wyman, Jr., reproduced as Items Nos. 24 and 25.

Folder of Daily Records of Long Distance Calls, the Biltmore Hotel, during period July 15 to December 21, 1940, which will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31.

The Items to which reference is made, *supra*, will be found reproduced in the volume EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

January 1, 1925—Adjusted Service Certificate A-2,430,361, \$1557 issued to Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.

January 15, 1936—Final settlement by Veterans Administration. Amount—\$782.92 (\$774.04 deducted for loans, interest, etc.)

April 1, 1936—U. S. life insurance policy K213051 surrendered for cash, \$3834.99.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 13

JOHN WEINER, INVESTIGATOR FOR HOUSE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

It was expected that at the February 15 hearings of the Committee there would be testimony indicating that during the Spring of 1942 in Hawaii Colonel Wyman and three other Army officers participated in an evening of drinking in a hotel barroom. Wyman became quite intoxicated and stated:

"There are probably a good many things which I have done during my life that are not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is to sell out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl did to his German friends. I should never have trusted him and what I should do now is take this service revolver, go out and shoot him and then blow my own brains out."

It is said that Weiner has an affidavit from a Capt. Gutter who was attached to the General Staff at Washington in July 1943 embodying Wyman's remarks.

The day after the carousal Capt. Gutter and the other officers reported the incident to the G-2 office at Honolulu. Nothing was heard for about six weeks when the officers were called in and statements taken. Nothing further was heard of it.

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ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 14

(Exhibit No. 14 consists of telephone toll tickets, Los Angeles, California, which will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 15

(Exhibit No. 15 is a radar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941, Opana, and will be found reproduced as Item No. 48, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 16

Volume of broadcasts, Fulton Lewis, Jr. (Withdrawn after examination by Board and returned to witness.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 17

Documents selected from folder relating to Canol Project. (Withdrawn after examination by Board and returned to witness.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 18

Documents selected from personal file. (Withdrawn after examination by Board and returned to witness.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 19

ITEMS APPEARING IN THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER

Headline, Page 1, Sunday, 30 November 1941

"Japanese May Strike Over Weekend."

"Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle."

Headline, Page 1, Monday, 1 December 1941

"Hull, Kurusu In Crucial Meeting Today."

Excerpt: "Secretary of State Hull meets at 10 AM today with Saburo Kurusu and Kichisaburo Normura, Japanese envoys, amid rising tension but apparently with the United States prepared to wait for Japan's next move, even if it is against a military objective."

Excerpt: "Some unofficial quarters asserted that Japanese Premier Gen. Hideki Tojo's speech on Saturday indicated that Japan may possibly have decided upon war."

Headline, Page 1, Tuesday, 2 December 1941

"Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S."

Excerpt printed from Japanese newspaper *Nichi Nichi*: "We appreciate the government's last effort to make peace with the United States however futile it is to listen any more to U. S. hypocritical peace talks."

Excerpt printed from Japanese newspaper *Asahi*: "We are deeply impressed that the negotiations are heading toward a finale without any hope of success."

Headline, Page 5, Tuesday, 2 December 1941

"Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations."

Excerpt: "Prospects for successful conclusion of Japanese American negotiations in Washington are most difficult the newspaper Nichi Nichi said tonight and therefore the Japanese government is making preparations to meet whatever eventualities occur."

Headline, Page 1, Wednesday, 3 December 1941

"Huge Pincer Attack on U. S. by Japan, France Predicted."

Excerpt: "Sen. Claude Pepper, D., Fla., tonight predicted that Japan and Vichy would soon bring a huge pincer movement into operation in an effort to slow the flow of materials to Britain and Russia. 'An aggressive action with Vichy and Japan acting in concert with and as a pawn of Hitler will be apparent in a few days' Senator Pepper said. 'Hitler, in effect, is attempting to give us a war on two fronts.'"

Two Column Headline, Page 1, Friday, 5 December 1941

"Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today."

Excerpt: "Secretary of State Cordell Hull meets at 11 AM today with Japanese negotiators to receive Japan's reply to President Roosevelt's inquiries concerning troop movements in French Indo-China. One Congressional leader emerging from a White House conference last night admitted that the situation looks pretty serious and there was some hint that negotiations might collapse entirely."

Headline, Page 1, Saturday, 6 December 1941

"America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China."

Excerpt: "Japanese News Agency Domei said: 'Feverish war preparations in Australia, the Netherlands East Indies, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines with Japan as the hypothetical enemy make the future of negotiations darker and peace in the Far East is hanging by a very thin thread.'"

Headline, 1st Column, Page 6, Saturday, 6 December 1941

"Japanese Navy Moving South."

Excerpt: "The Australian press said today that a Southward movement of Japanese Navy has been confirmed. Other Australian sources also confirmed that the Japanese Navy is moving Southward as the Cabinet met twice in Melbourne instead of at Canberra in order to maintain closest contact with the armed forces. The Cabinet abandoned its weekend adjournment plans due to late advices seeming to indicate an immediate break in Japanese-American relations."

Two Column Leadline, 1st Page, Saturday, 6 December 1941

"Detailed Plans Completed For M-Day Setup."

Excerpt: "Detailed recommendations for administration of the Hawaii Defense Act, otherwise known as the M-Day law were received by Governor Poindexter yesterday from his advisory council on civilian defense preparations."

Headline, 1st Page, Sunday, 7 December 1941

"F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis."

Excerpt: "President Roosevelt will send a message to Emperor Hirohito of Japan on the Far Eastern situation, the State Department announced tonight as further Japanese southward movements were reported."

ARMY PEARL HARBOR EXHIBIT NO. 19A

ITEMS APPEARING IN THE HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN

Headline, Page 1, Saturday, 29 November 1941

"U. S. Waits Japan Reply."

Excerpt: "Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador, conferred today for an hour over the critical oriental situation and waited to see whether Japan will choose war or peace in the Pacific."

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Excerpt: "NBC reported today that it heard a broadcast from Tokyo today sharply attacking the United States and holding Washington responsible if anything breaks out in the Pacific. The broadcast said that 'the United States has broken the peace.'"

Headline, Page 1, Monday, 1 December 1941

"U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows."

Excerpt: "Information reaching non-British quarters from the Far East today indicated possible movement of Japanese Naval forces southward, presumably for the purpose of obtaining naval and other bases in Thailand. Indication in London continued to point to Thailand as the next objective if Japan moves southward."

Leadline, Column 1, Page 1, Monday, 1 December 1941

"Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension."

Excerpt: "Japanese-American conversations were resumed again today as reports across the Pacific reflected an increasing tension and the possibility of general war."

Leadline, Column 2, Page 5, Monday, 1 December 1941

"War Fears Grow in Philippines."

Excerpt: "War fears have increased perceptibly over the weekend as the Philippine Island's populace anxiously awaited Japan's reply to Secretary of State Cordell Hull's note. Reliable sources said today that the Army and Navy is now on alert with officers on leave ordered back to their posts."

Headline, Page 1, Thursday, 4 December 1941

"Japan Spurns U. S. Program."

Excerpt: "Domei Japanese News Agency reported tonight that it is 'utterly impossible for Japan to accept American proposals' for settlement of the Far Eastern situation as Premier Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo explained current diplomatic issues to the privy council."

Excerpt: "The Nationalistic newspaper Hochi charged that the United States ignores 'the new situation in East Asia' and said that 'in event Japan is forced to rise in order to break through Anti-Japan encirclement to secure existence and power, the responsibility would be the United States'."

Headline, Page 1, Saturday, 6 December 1941

"Singapore on War Footing."

Excerpt: "Great Britain suddenly recalled all fighting men to their posts today at Singapore as the Far East crisis hung in delicate balance. The summoning of all men of the fleet, air, and army completes the present state of readiness at the 'Gibraltar of the Orient.' The order was so sudden that trucks and other vehicles were dispatched to downtown points to transport men to ships, fields, and posts."

Leadline, Column 3, Page 1, Saturday, 6 December 1941

"New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo."

Excerpt: "A proposal to appoint a Japanese-American commission to iron out the present Pacific deadlock gained ground here today in important civilian circles."

Excerpt: "Meanwhile the Japanese press hardened its hostility toward the United States and voiced opinions which were war minded. Kokumin asserted that in event of 'American aggression, a billion people in East Asia would become bombs' against Batavia and the United States."

Excerpt: "Asahi editorially said that the United States has abandoned its post war defense policy and is now openly pursuing an offensive attitude. It is dangerous to think, Asahi said, that the United States is sticking to appeasement."

Leadline, Column 2, Page 4, 6 December 1941

"Civilians Urged to Leave Manila."

Excerpt: "The Cabinet in a special meeting at Baguio presided over by President Manuel Quezon decided today to urge the immediate evacuation of non-essential citizens from Manila and other 'danger zones.' It was indicated that the move would be followed by compulsory evacuations."

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 20

CONFIDENTIAL

[1]

ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
HEADQUARTERS FIRST SERVICE COMMAND,
Boston 15, Massachusetts, 18 August 1944.

Lieutenant General GEORGE GRUNERT, USA,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Munitions Building, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL GRUNERT: I am grateful to you for authorizing a transcript of my testimony to be sent to me for correction. I am returning it herewith with my personally penned corrections. There were certain minor errors, due to misunderstanding on the part of the stenographer as to what I said or inexact expressions on my part. There was one rather serious error, which I have also corrected, regarding the inevitability of war with Japan (pages 113 and 114), in which I either made or was understood to have made conflicting statements.

What strikes me forcibly in rereading my testimony is that it is quite inadequate to accomplish your stated purpose—to get “the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack” (page 91). The questions propounded to me are no doubt relevant to the issue you have before you, in that they were designed to bring out various points and angles of that issue. But they were almost entirely confined to specific points in a very broad picture. The sum of my answers to these specific questions does not, as I see it, present more than a relatively small part of the background which I understand you desire. You may not consider it necessary to obtain this background from me; but I feel bound to say that my testimony, per se, misses the wood for the trees.

You are examining into what occurred at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th and why it occurred. I submit that the causes of the disaster at Pearl Harbor cannot be judged solely from what happened in the Hawaiian Department, or what the War Department did or did not do with regard to the Hawaiian Department. Hawaii was only one of five United States areas vulnerable to Japanese attack should war ensue. It was, as a matter of fact, the strongest fortress in the world, measured in terms of garrison and armament strength. A great fleet was present in its waters. It offered less permanent military advantage to successful enemy attack than did the Panama Canal. Its defense against its sole potential enemy, Japan, had been the subject of continuous study by our Army and Navy for some 40 years. Many of these studies assumed the absence of our fleet from the Pacific, a crippling damage to the Panama Canal, and little or no warning in the way of strained diplomatic relations—conditions much less favorable to us than those of 1941. The Hawaiian defense plans, prepared [2] by responsible Commanding Generals and approved by the War Department, were both detailed and comprehensive. The Army garrison was commanded by a Lieutenant General, with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet present in Hawaiian waters. I think it fair to say that these senior and responsible officers required no specific directives as to what they should or should not do under a threat of war, or, indeed, any warnings other than the knowledge of the serious situation then existing.

But this still does not give the whole picture. In 1941, up to at least November, the most poignant military concern of the United States lay in the outcome of the war in Europe. We were still feverishly preparing for “hemisphere defense.” The most obvious threat to the Western Hemisphere lay in the success of German arms, against which our lend-lease and other measures were progressively aligning us, and in subsequent Axis penetration through the “bulge” of Brazil. Even after Pearl Harbor, we rushed marines and air ground forces into northeastern Brazil, and I was sent on a hurried trip to South America for intelligence purposes in this regard. Japan, on the other hand, was engaged in a war with China, none too successfully. Her military threat to us lay in her possible reaction to our own measures in belatedly cutting off her oil and scrap purchases in this country, and, still more belatedly, denying some of her ships the use of the Panama Canal.

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It is true that we had Japan on the carpet in our diplomatic negotiations in Washington, and that it was becoming increasingly apparent that she would probably make some radical move. The military oligarchy that ruled her was not obtaining notable results in China, had failed to dislodge the Russians in the private war of the Kuantung Army in 1938 and '39, and was apparently losing face. This was particularly so in comparison with the great successes of the German Army up to December, 1941.

Nevertheless, it was none too apparent that the United States would be the next victim of Japanese aggression. As stated in the dispatch of November 27th, Japan's actions were unpredictable. She might well have attacked Russian Siberia and the Maritime Provinces, particularly in view of the then successful German invasion of European Russia. Or she might have elected to drive south against the Dutch East Indies. Or she might have taken the greater risk of including the British possessions in her southern drive. Or she might well have declined to take on any other enemy, and thrown her whole weight against China. I remember the Chinese military attaché coming to me in the fall of 1941, and stating his concern that the stiffening attitude of the Western Powers towards Japan might force the Japanese to throw everything in against China and clean her out. Or she might adopt the boldest and most dangerous of all of her alternatives and take on the two greatest naval powers in the world, plus the Dutch.

All of these factors and all of these contingencies were given due weight by the General Staff. The causes of the disaster at Pearl Harbor must be viewed in the light of the situation as a whole. An open [3] attack by Japan on the United States was by no means inevitable. One could only say that the tension was steadily growing because of our increasing cooperation with the Allies, particularly Britain; because of our diminishing willingness to supply Japan with essential materials of war; and because of our stiffening attitude in the negotiations in Washington. All of these major factors, producing increasing tension in Japan, were well known to our responsible commanders in Hawaii and elsewhere. The hasty dispatch of Admiral Nomura to Washington, and his passage through Honolulu, was but one of the clear signs of this increasing tension. The tension curve mounted dangerously on November 27th, signalized by the Chief of Staff in his dispatch to his higher commanders in the field. Finally there was the personal appeal of the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan which, if my memory serves me, was published in the American press on Friday, December 5th, or the morning of Saturday, the 6th.

The Overseas Departments and the West Coast were fully informed of the essential elements of the mounting crisis, and the War Department knew that they were so informed. When one considers the Hawaiian garrison and the Fleet in that area, with but a single potential enemy in view and carefully prepared plans to meet him, the broad knowledge which they unquestionably had of the increasing tension should have been decisive. In Washington there was absolute confidence that that knowledge of the situation had been translated into full alert. This became very apparent on the morning of December 7th, when the only question on the sending of the final warning was whether it was necessary, or indeed advisable to prod further those commands which were actually facing the issue. The Chief of Naval Operations went so far as to refuse, on that ground, to send a warning similar to ours.

As Commanding General of the Philippine Department earlier in 1941, no doubt you are aware of the broad outlines of the picture I am trying to draw. The other members of your Board may or may not have similar knowledge. In any event, if you think it advisable to have on the record my testimony along these lines, as you seemed to indicate when I appeared before your Board last week, I will, of course, be happy to give it, and to answer any further questions which your Board may desire to ask.

With best personal regards,
Sincerely yours,

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Major General, United States Army.
Commanding.

1 Inc.
Transcript

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 21

[1] TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF DEC. 3, 1941 BETWEEN A CITIZEN IN HONOLULU (JAPANESE) & A MILITARY OR NAVAL OFFICER IN TOKIO. TRANSLATED & AVAILABLE TO MILITARY INTEL. HAWAII DEC. 5, 1944.

IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

[2] (H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japa—here appears calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in . . . ? . . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

[3] (H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom is many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(J) Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seems to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about

[4] (J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

[5] (H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate the fleet here seems small. I don't all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.

*(J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

[6] (H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

*(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamuno", that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; and that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

[7] (H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) off phone.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 22

(Exhibit No. 22 is a copy of a map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort Kamehameha, December 7, 1941, and will be found reproduced in four parts as Items 49, 50, 51, and 52, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 23

(Exhibit No. 23 is a photostat of a captured Japanese map taken from the chart board of a Japanese dive bomber and will be found reproduced as Item No. 53, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 24

(Exhibit No. 24 is a captured Japanese map and will be found reproduced at Item No. 54, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 25

(Exhibit No. 25 is a captured Japanese map and will be found reproduced as Item No. 55, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 26

(Exhibit No. 26 is a captured Japanese map with translation of Japanese endorsements and will be found reproduced as Item No. 56, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

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ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 27

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 September 1941.

IG 333.1—Dist. Engr., Honolulu, T. H., F. Y. 1941

Subject: Special Report on the Organization of the Office of the District Engineer,
Honolulu, T. H.

Thru: District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

I. DATE OF INSPECTION

1. This inspection was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Whisner, Infantry, Assistant Department Inspector General, during the period 13-20 August 1941.

2. This is the initial inspection report on the District Engineer's Office. The inspection was made as the result of a directive from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in accordance with the provisions of letter AG 600.12 (2-13-41) M-IG, W. D., A. G. O., 17 February 1941, subject: "Inspection of Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee construction Projects."

II. ORGANIZATION

3. *General.*—a. This report, on the organization of the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu, deals with the administrative framework which has been set up by that government agency for the supervision of the construction projects that are under its control. This report is informative in nature and is intended to serve as a background for a better understanding of the subsequent reports that will be submitted on the more detailed phases of the inspections of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction projects in the Hawaiian Department.

b. The District Engineer (Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. (O-7925), C. E.) operates directly under the South Pacific Division Engineer in San Francisco, who in turn operates directly under the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D. C. Lieutenant Colonel Wyman has been in charge of the Honolulu district since 15 July 1939.

c. The main offices of the District Engineer are on the fifth and sixth floors of the Young Hotel Building in Honolulu. In addition to this, other portions of the organization are scattered in the following locations in Honolulu:

First Floor, Young Hotel Building—Fiscal section (Adm. Div.)
Pier 2-A—Transportation and Supply section (Oper. Div.)
Hickam Field—Storage yard for materials
Wheeler Field—Storage yard for materials

[2] d. The executive function of the District Engineer's office is divided into three parts—engineering division, operations division, and administrative division. See copy of organization chart attached and marked Exhibit "A". Since this chart was published, the fourth part (shown as the transportation-and-supply division) has been absorbed by the operations division.

e. This organization is based upon instructions issued by the Chief of Engineers. These directives state that the District Engineer shall provide an adequate inspection, cost accounting, and auditing force prior to the start of actual construction on projects under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. The amount of personnel required to satisfy these control objectives is left to the judgment of the District Engineer.

f. In order to facilitate administration, the District Engineer has divided the Hawaiian Islands into seven field areas, each of which is in charge of an engineer who is directly responsible to the District Engineer. Each of the construction projects is placed under the direct supervision of these area engineers.

g. The civilian organization, which furnished the skilled technicians and actually performs the construction work for the District Engineer, is a corporation known as the Hawaiian Constructors, and it consists of a combination of the following construction firms:

W. E. Callahan Construction Company of Nebraska
Gunther and Shirley Company of Nebraska
Rohl-Connally Company of Nevada
Ralph E. Woolley Company of Honolulu

These four organizations have pooled their resources of plant and personnel to complete the projects assigned to the District Engineer in the Hawaiian Islands. A separate report is being prepared, which will describe the organization of the Hawaiian Constructors and explain more fully its relationship to the District Engineer.

h. In order to establish policies and to effect control of the efforts of this large force, the District Engineer issues his instructions from time to time in the form of district orders and district circulars, which are distributed to the various office divisions, the field area engineers, and the Hawaiian Constructors. These directives settle local problems and disseminate the decisions of the higher engineer echelons.

4. Engineering Division.—a. The duties of this branch of the District Engineer's office are to prepare all engineering designs, specifications, and original estimates for construction projects. In addition, it plans all future work in connection with the Honolulu district.

b. After the request for a certain local defense project has been approved by the War Department, the job is assigned to the District Engineer in Honolulu through the South Pacific Engineer Division in San Francisco.

c. The job is in turn assigned by the District Engineer to the chief of his engineering division for study. If it is of a military nature, the job is given to the military-engineering section. There the designs are prepared to determine the most economical and feasible type of construction. If surveys are necessary, parties are sent out to prepare a report upon which designs and estimates will be based. These [3] are then submitted to the District Engineer for approval and later, forwarded to the station commander who sponsored the project, for his comment as to general design features. Following this, the work is then transmitted through channels to the Chief of Engineers for approval.

d. When these plans are approved in Washington, they are returned to the local engineering division for final design, estimates, and specifications, so that construction work can start.

e. The military-engineering subdivision prepares all designs relating to such projects as underground storage magazines, tunnel construction, highways, railway-gun positions, fire-control stations, searchlight towers, demountable towers, air-warning stations, and all major reinforced concrete structures in the Honolulu district.

f. The function of the civil-engineering subdivision is to prepare the designs, specifications, and estimates on all work of a civil nature. In addition, it prepares the plans and specifications for dredging, as well as for work on all runways for airports for the Army Air Corps, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and other agencies.

g. The principal duties of the building-and-utilities subdivision is to prepare plans, specifications, and bills of material for all military camp buildings, and the utilities in connection with them. It also designs all gasoline installations at all air fields.

h. The drafting-and-survey subdivision operates principally as a supply agency. After the designs and details have been prepared by another group, they are sent here for the final drafting. In addition, it handles all reproduction work such as blue printing, photostating, lithographing, and various other types.

i. The materials-testing subdivision is entrusted with the testing of all materials entering into the final construction of any project. Samples of concrete are taken from the batches as they are being placed into a structure, and the strength is determined. Tests are conducted on all mineral aggregate in order to determine their strength, characteristics, and suitability for construction purposes. Chemical tests are prepared in order to determine the existence of harmful ingredients which would tend to cause deterioration to the finished concrete structure. Soils are tested for their physical properties in order to determine their bearing capacities, fineness, modulus, moisture content, and other necessary features required for the proper design of a structure. Asphalt used in the construction of roads and pavements is also tested in this subdivision.

j. In brief, the duties of the engineering division are to design sound engineering structures which meet the requirements of standard practice, and to produce a structure at a minimum cost for the service it is intended to perform.

5. Operations Division.—a. The function of the operations division is to carry into effect the work as designed by the engineering division, in accordance with the plans and specifications. The work to be done is accomplished by one of

several methods—by construction contract (lump sum), or by hired labor (purchase & hire), or by cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.

b. To accomplish the work to be done by a construction [4] contract, it is necessary to advertise the work, receive bids, and enter into a contract with the lowest responsible bidder who guarantees to the government that he will perform the work as specified within the time allotted and at the price fixed in his proposal. This is the common form of contract, which has been accepted as standard by most government agencies.

c. The work to be done by hired labor usually comprises minor jobs, which for obvious reasons can be performed more effectively by government plant (owned or leased) with hired labor, under the direction of a representative of the District Engineer. Hired-labor jobs are initiated by work orders which are prepared by the operations division, and the work is performed under the direction of an area engineer.

d. The method of performing work by a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract was authorized by Congress to meet the conditions which exist during a period of national emergency. This type of contract is entered into only after approval by the Under Secretary of War, who has been designated as the authority to fix the terms and conditions of such contracts. These agreements are referred to as "negotiated contracts", because the formality of advertising, publicly opening bids, and awarding the work to low bidders has all been eliminated. The contract is concluded after informal negotiation between the authorized government agency and a reputable contractor.

e. In order to qualify for work under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract, it is necessary for a firm to establish the fact of proven ability and of financial capacity to perform the work to be done. This type of contract was designed (1) to speed up the work, (2) to remove some of the causes for delays in the construction, (3) to remove some of the hazards of construction which are inherent in the more formal contract procedure, and (4) to secure savings to the government in the cost of the work to be done.

f. Before a contract can be entered into by any method, it is necessary to determine the money value of the work to be done; this takes the form of an estimate. These are prepared by the estimating section, which is composed of engineers who have had experience in construction and who are proficient in determining in advance the cost of the work to be done. These estimators must have a knowledge of the cost of materials which are to be included in the construction, of the value of machinery rental which must be charged to the work, and of the labor requirements which will be necessary to accomplish the work.

g. All of these costs are assembled and tabulated to determine the "field cost" of the construction. To this must be added the "engineering cost" for both field and office, together with the "overhead cost" of administration. This latter includes a flat 8% of the construction cost to cover the expenses of the area office, the district office, the division office, and the Chief of Engineer's office. After all of these costs have been assembled, the resulting document is the estimated cost for doing the work and it is presented to the District Engineer for approval. It is then used as a basis for making the award of the contract.

h. The operations section handles the administrative details of the operations division, such as the correspondence to the field [5] agencies concerning the purchase of plant and the rental rates on these items of equipment, employment, and the increases in rates of pay. This section gathers the necessary data from other sections for the preparation of correspondence.

i. The transportation-and-supply section is responsible for all engineer motor transportation which is not under the supervision of the field area engineers. The transportation subsection moves materials from the piers to the base yards, where it is turned over to the supply subsection for storage. The Hawaiian Constructors are responsible for the delivery of material to the various projects, and they dispatch their trucks to the base yards where they are loaded by employees of the District Engineer. The supply subsection handles the records on the receipt, warehousing, and issue of materials and plant.

j. The construction-contract section is responsible for the administration of the processes of construction by contract. It advertises the work to be done by contract, receives bids, assists at the opening of bids, tabulates them, and prepares an abstract of the bids to form a permanent record of the procedure. This section advises the bidders of the award of the contract, prepares the contract form, issues notices to proceed with the work, and exercises the custodianship of all contract documents. It also negotiates change orders and supple-

mental agreements that may become necessary after the original contract has been signed.

k. The inspection-and-safety section sends out personnel to visit the site of the various jobs during the construction period, to inspect the quality of the work being done, and to report any deviations from the plans and specifications. It is responsible for the acceptance or rejection of material and equipment which is to be incorporated into the work. After the completion of the project, personnel from this subdivision make the final inspections and recommendations, which (if favorable) result in the acceptance of and payment for the work under the contract. After the final acceptance of the finished project, this group prepares and forwards a completion report covering the construction.

l. The inspection-and-safety section is also charged with the daily inspection of all construction work in the furtherance of a safety program. It trains personnel in first aid to the injured, and it investigates and reports on all claims for compensation or liability which arise out of the construction activities of the projects.

m. The cost section assembles the cost data, breaking down expenditures into cost items covering the various elements of the construction of each job. This type of work begins when notice is received that construction on a certain project can start and it continues throughout the period of construction. It is not until after the structure has been finished and the final payment has been made that a complete analysis of the cost of the finished structure can be made. In order that cost records may be maintained in an orderly fashion, forms are prepared at the beginning of each job with symbols for identifying each of the various elements of the work for which costs are to be kept. These symbols are used throughout the duration of the job. The data furnished by this cost subdivision are used by the estimating subdivision in arriving at their figures as to the money value of new proposed work of a comparable nature.

[6] n. The right-of-way section is charged with investigating records of title of the real estate affected by the construction projects. Whenever necessary, it procures the permits that are essential before work can proceed.

o. The procurement-and-property section is organized under two subexecutives, one of whom is responsible for procurement and the other for control of property. The procurement subsection functions as the purchasing agent for both the District Engineer and the contracting organization known as the Hawaiian Constructors. Purchase requisitions, in most instances, are instigated by these constructors and after proper approval, are routed through the procurement subsection, where they are acted upon in accordance with a purchasing procedure which has been set up by the District Engineer. This subdivision has jurisdiction over all purchases of plant, property, and materials, with the exception of those involving proper purchase contracts and certain mainland purchases on which delivery can be expedited by side-tracking the regular purchase procedure. The property subsection records all items of property which are purchased for use on projects supervised by the District Engineer. Property items are recorded in relation to field areas in such a way that a personal responsibility is established for each item.

p. The works-progress-administration section handles the details pertaining to the construction projects to be paid for from WPA appropriations, none of which are on a cos-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.

q. In brief, it is the responsibility of the operations division (1) to provide a well-regulated flow of material, supplies, and equipment to the field, and (2) to aid the forces in the field in all matters essential to the orderly prosecution of the construction activities in the district.

6. *Administrative Division.*—a. This division is charged with the administration of all matters pertaining to personnel, finances, and miscellaneous office services. It also coordinates all administrative activities in the district office and in the area offices.

b. The payroll-and-personnel subdivision is responsible (1) for the enforcement and the administration of civil service rules and regulations, (2) for the maintenance of proper personnel and payroll records, (3) for the preparation of recommendations for changes in the status of employees, (4) for the employment of personnel, and (5) for the miscellaneous work pertaining thereto.

c. The finance subdivision is charged (1) with the proper disbursement of and accounting for all funds allotted to the District Engineer, (2) for the maintenance of the records of financial budget and encumbrances, and (3) for the preparation of all financial reports required by law and regulation.

d. The office-service subdivision prepares all correspondence not specifically assigned to stenographers employed in other divisions of the District Engineer's office. It maintains a file of correspondence, reports, and other papers pertaining to the district except those papers which are filed in the personal records of civilian employees. It furnishes data from the office files upon receipt of proper requests and authority. It is responsible for the delivery and dispatch of all [7] incoming and outgoing mail, and for the maintenance of messenger service for the delivery of inter-office communications. It also furnishes the telephone switchboard, the information desk, the district supply room, and other miscellaneous office services.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

7. *General.*—The District Engineer has based the organization of his office on instructions issued to him by the Chief of Engineers at Washington. These instructions direct that provisions be made for adequate inspection, cost accounting, and auditing before actual construction is started on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The District Engineer has accomplished these objectives by creating the departmental controls within his organization which are described below.

8. *Fiscal Audit.*—For the protection of the disbursing officer (who is also the District Engineer's executive assistant), an audit section has been established in the finance subdivision of the administrative division. This audit section accumulates for the disbursing officer sufficient evidence which is intended to substantiate the payments that will encumber the funds allotted to the District Engineer. In order to accomplish this objective, the audit section is required to keep in close touch with timekeeping and with the preparation of payrolls; and it must correlate purchase orders with receiving reports before approving payment of purchase invoices. The audit section records and approves payments for the rental of contractor's plant, and it is instrumental in checking and approving all invoices of a miscellaneous nature before they are presented to the disbursing officer.

9. *Procurement.*—The procurement subdivision is organized under the operations division. Requisitions for purchases must be approved by the executive in charge of operations before the procurement subdivision is authorized to make purchases. In this manner all purchases, regardless of origin of the request, will clear through one individual who is responsible directly to the District Engineer. By following this procedure, besides creating an automatic purchasing control, the District Engineer is conscious of fund expenditures prior to the time the money is actually spent.

10. *Storage and Issue.*—The warehousing controls are also exercised by the operations division in the property and procurement section. Through this agency, the District Engineer is assured that his organization has constant supervision of purchased items until such time as they are issued for delivery to specific projects. From the standpoint of control, the protection this system offers is adequate—the contractor may designate the articles he needs; but the purchasing and storage operation is the responsibility of the District Engineer, while the contractor functions only as a receiving agent.

11. *Cost Section.*—The cost section is organized under the operations division and serves as an instrument for accumulating cost [8] data based upon units of work, for the purpose of justifying operating methods and for the accumulation of historical data to be used for future reference.

12. *Control of Property.*—Property records are established in the office of the District Engineer as each unexpendable item is purchased. When these items of property are turned over to the contractor for use in construction, he is held accountable until such time as they are returned. The property records are verified by a physical inventory which is made at regular intervals.

13. *Control of Plant.*—Plant is purchased by the contractor and rented to the District Engineer on an agreed contract basis. The District Engineer's audit section keeps a plant-control record which lists each piece of equipment, as well as the rental payments which have been made to the contractor. The rental rate is prorated monthly through the cost section to the projects on which each piece of equipment was utilized. The plant records are verified by a physical inventory which is made at regular intervals.

IV. ENGINEER FIELD AREAS

14. *General.*—In order to facilitate the inspection and control of the projects under construction, the Territory of Hawaii has been divided into seven field areas, each of which is in charge of an area engineer who is directly responsible to the District Engineer. As each new project is assigned to the contractors, the responsibility for the close supervision of that new job is delegated to the area engineer in whose zone the project is to be located. The first area is the only one in which there are no projects being constructed under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.

15. *Organization.*—The organization of each area is similar to that of the District Engineer's office except that it is on a smaller scale. The area engineer has two executive subordinates, one in charge of administration, the other in charge of engineering. The administrative head is the chief clerk who controls the personnel and stenographic clerks. Operating through a cost accountant, he is also in charge of cost clerks and timekeepers. The engineering section controls the project inspectors and draftsmen who are the area engineer's direct contact with project construction.

16. *Cost Accounting.*—Area cost sections are organized to accumulate direct labor and material charges by projects, as a control for the area engineer to use in checking project estimates against actual construction schedules. In order to verify the correctness of his figures, the accountant in charge controls the timekeepers and account-distribution clerks by verifying a daily balance between payrolls and account charges to the respective job orders. In order to verify his material charges, he exercises control over receiving clerks. Periodically, he submits cost reports to the District Engineer's office where they are accumulated on a monthly basis and combined with project [9] overhead for presentation as final cost figures.

17. *First Area.*—The office for this area is on the second floor of the Engineer Building at Pier 2-A in Honolulu. The work at present being done in this area consists of the following:

Dredging in Pearl Harbor for the Navy Department.

Dredging in Kaneohe Bay for the Navy Department.

Maintenance and repair of fortification work.

Surveys in connection with Keelii Lagoon project.

Harbor patrol to enforce pollution laws.

None of the work that is being performed in this area is under a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.

18. *Second Area.*—The office for this area is at Hickman Field, Oahu, and the majority of the projects assigned to it are under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. This is the second largest area, from the view point of number of projects and the amount of funds involved. The jobs are all located on the air field and include a miscellaneous assortment of various types, many of which were transferred from the Constructing Quartermaster. They include such projects as:

Bomb-storage magazines.

Buildings of various types.

Utilities for buildings.

Access roads to buildings.

Hospital.

Air Corps hangars.

Reservation fence.

19. *Third Area.*—The office of this area is at Wheeler Field, Oahu, and the majority of the projects assigned to it are under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. It is the largest area, both as to the number of individual projects and the amount of appropriations involved. The work includes:

Bombproof ammunition storage magazine.

Fire control stations.

Office buildings.

Mobilization buildings.

Warm-up aprons.

Railway gun positions.

Grading of airport.

Searchlight shelters.

Underground gasoline storage.

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20. *Fourth Area.*—The office of this area is located at Waimea on the island of Kauai, and the projects are being constructed under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. They include such work as:

- Gasoline storage tanks.
- Air-warning-station roads.
- Utilities and fences.

21. *Fifth Area.*—The office for this area is located at Bellows Field, Oahu, and the projects are being constructed on cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts [10] They include such work as:

- Mobilization buildings
- Gasoline storage tanks
- Utilities and storehouses.

22. *Sixth Area.*—The Engineer in charge of this area has his office at Wailuku, Maui, and he will supervise the projects on the islands of Molokai, Maui, and Niihau. At the present time, work is proceeding on Maui on an air-warning station and access road thereto. Other projects are in the survey stages.

23. *Seventh Area.*—The office for this area is in Hilo on the island of Hawaii. The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction projects include:

- Gasoline storage tanks
- Air-warning station
- Utilities.

V. DISCUSSION

24. *Contract and Supplements.*—On 20 December 1940, the District Engineer entered into the original contract with the Hawaiian Constructors for the construction of assigned defense projects on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis. This contract was issued under standard government stipulations common to this type of agreement. The contractor was instructed to function as a separate contracting unit and was held responsible for various constructing and administrative operations. The District Engineer established inspection and audit controls to check the contractor's operations, and had his executive officer designated as a government finance disbursing agent for the purpose of satisfying obligations entered into by the contractor in connection with fulfilling the terms of the contract. Supplemental agreements have been added to the original contract since the date of its issue and subsequent additions will be made as appropriations for new projects are received. These agreements assign additional defense projects to the Hawaiian Constructors and adjust the fixed-fee stipulation to compensate for this increased responsibility.

25. *Contract Modifications.*—a. On 19 May 1941, the District Engineer modified the original contract stipulations by transferring, from the office of the contractor to the office of the District Engineer, the responsibility for procurement, timekeeping, preparation of payrolls, and the actual payment of all salaries and purchase invoices. These changes were made for several reasons:

- (1) To afford greater protection of government funds.
- (2) To eliminate duplication of data being accumulated by the District Engineer.
- (3) To eliminate inaccurate data being presented by the contractor.
- (4) To increase employee efficiency, because it would no longer be necessary to provide an auditing team to control the contractor's method of handling these operations.

[11] b. The installation of these changes had, in effect, changed a true cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract to represent in large measure the purchase-and-hire contract used in many instances by government construction agencies. The fixed-fee stipulation is the only contractual requirement which basically makes one type of contract differ from the other. From the standpoint of the District Engineer, these changes in the application of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract are sound and can be substantiated as the best solution for most efficiently completing assigned projects under conditions as they exist in the Territory of Hawaii.

26. *Deficiencies.*—A study of the District Engineer's organization, and of the checks installed for controlling and protecting the expenditures of government funds, shows the executive direction to be generally efficient and logical. However, the execution of the directives and checks fails to achieve the objectives sought in some instances, because subordinates have not given sufficient stress to these control factors. These deficiencies are apparently the result (1) of insufficient experience on the part of some subordinates and (2) of the necessity to complete assigned projects in the shortest possible time, in a locality which

does not possess an available supply of skilled clerical technicians. These conditions have allowed project construction to draw away from intended internal audit checks.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

27. After a study of the organization of the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu, and preliminary visits to various construction projects under the supervision of that government agency, the following conclusions have been drawn:

a. That the system of safeguards, for the protection of government funds, property, and plant (inspection, cost accounting, and auditing), as directed by the Chief of Engineers, have been established by the District Engineer.

b. That deficiencies do exist within the organization, apparently caused by inadequate inter-office coordination and a lack of sufficiently-skilled clerical employees. These deficiencies have generally allowed clerical controls to lag behind the progression of actual construction, resulting in partial failures in the system of cost accounting, procurement, and storage-and-issue.

c. That conscientious efforts, on the part of the District Engineer and his key assistants, are apparently being made to correct these deficiencies, as soon as they manifest themselves.

d. That skilled clerical technicians for administrative duties are difficult to obtain because of the large number needed by other competing government agencies and because of higher wages offered by civilian firms for similar services.

e. That the field areas, established for the prosecution of the construction projects under contract, appear to be well organized and to be working generally in an efficient manner.

f. That progress on the construction of many projects has been delayed by the shortage of material, which in turn has been caused [12] by (1) the shortage of transportation facilities from the mainland, (2) the inability of local firms to deliver materials on schedule, and (3) the status of defense priorities established for the District Engineer's office.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

28. Based upon this initial survey and inspection of the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu, the following recommendation is submitted:

a. That the District Engineer institute adequate measures to correct the deficiencies noted in paragraph 28 and in subparagraph 27b above.

E. B. WHISNER,
Lieut Colonel, Infantry,
Asst Dept Inspector General.

1 Incl—

Exhibit "A" (Organization Chart)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 28

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT INSPECTOR GENERAL,
4 November 1941.

IG 333.1—Dist Engr
Honolulu, TH, FY 1942

Subject: Special Report on the Organization of the Office of the Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H.

Thru: Hawaiian Constructors and District Engineers, Honolulu, T. H.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

I. DATE OF INSPECTION AND BY WHOM MADE

1. This is the initial inspection report on the organization of the Hawaiian Constructors, the civilian organization which furnishes the skilled technicians and actually performs the construction work for the District Engineer in the Hawaiian Department under Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee contract W 414-Eng-602. The inspection was made by Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Whisner, Infantry, Assistant Department Inspector General, during the period 4 to 11 September 1941, pursuant to a

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directive from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in accordance with the provisions of letter AG 600.12 (2-13-41) M-IG, WD., AGO, 17 February 1941 subject: "Inspection of Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Construction Projects."

II. ORGANIZATION

2. General.—*a.* This report deals with the administrative framework which has been created by the Hawaiian Constructors to accomplish the construction work required by their contract. Reference is made to my report IG 333.1-Dist Engr, Honolulu TH, FY 1941, 2 September 1941, subject: "Special Report on the Organization of the Office of the District Engineer, Honolulu, TH."

b. The Hawaiian Constructors consist of a corporation of the construction firms listed below, who have pooled their resources of plant and personnel to carry out this contract:

W. E. Callahan Construction Company of Nebraska
Gunther and Shirley Company of Nebraska
Rohi-Connally Company of Nevada
Ralph E. Woolley Company of Honolulu

c. The main office of the Hawaiian Constructors is located at Pier 2-A, Honolulu, T. H., where the administrative work of the overhead is conducted. See the attached chart marked Exhibit "A".

d. The Hawaiian Constructors receive and acknowledge all project plans and specifications from the District Engineer. They are held responsible by the District Engineer for planning projects well in advance of construction in a manner which meets with the approval of the engineer in charge of the field area in which the projects will be constructed. The contractor is responsible for transporting materials, equipment, and property from points of issue to the respective projects, and is responsible for the organization and direction of all construction crews.

e. The Hawaiian Constructors are controlled by an executive committee composed of Mr. Paul Grafe, vice-president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Mr. Ralph E. Woolley, a local general and building contractor, and Mr. E. E. Ashlock, a supervising operations engineer with the W. E. Callahan Construction Company. This committee operates as the corporation's administrative control board, and is responsible for designating the policies which govern construction operations. Mr. Grafe is the senior executive and has been delegated the authority to contractually bind the corporation. He divides his time between Los Angeles and Honolulu, and serves as the corporation's mainland representative. Mr. Woolley acts in the capacity of an operating consultant, giving to the corporation the value of his experience and also the value of his many local contacts. Mr. Ashlock is the general superintendent in charge of engineering, operations, and administration.

f. On 19 May 1941 the stipulations of the original contract were modified and the responsibility for procurement, timekeeping, and the preparation of payrolls was transferred from the Hawaiian Constructors to the District Engineer. (See paragraph 25 of the report mentioned in subparagraph 2 *a* above.) This change resulted in all procurement clerks, payroll clerks, and timekeeping being transferred to the District Engineer, which considerably reduced the number of office employees on the Hawaiian Constructors monthly payroll. However, a sufficient staff was retained to act as a coordinating unit between the departments referred to above and the field superintendents in charge of operations. In effect the District Engineer has taken from the Hawaiian Constructors the responsibility for all overhead functions leaving them a pure responsibility for project construction.

3. *Engineering Division.*—The engineering division is responsible for studying and analyzing all project plans and specifications, in order that periodic operating estimates can be outlined and a satisfactory procedure established for the operations division. At the present time the engineering division has a staff of only four employees. However, this is not adequate and additions are contemplated in the near future.

4. *Operations Divisions.*—The Hawaiian Constructors have placed an operating superintendent in charge of the projects in each of the field areas which have been established by the District Engineer. The superintendent in each field area situated on the island of Oahu (Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields) is responsible to a field superintendent who functions as an assistant to the general superintendent. The project superintendents [3] in the areas located on islands other than Oahu, are directly responsible to the general superintendent.

Besides controlling area superintendents, the field superintendent on Oahu also has charge of a group of specialized construction foremen, who, with their crews, are shifted between projects as they are needed. There are five foremen of this type who are respectively responsible for concrete buildings, heavy excavating, underground work, equipment, and transportation.

5. *Administrative Division*.—*a. Office Manager*.—An office manager is in charge of the several administrative duties. He is a bonded employee and is responsible for supervising the clerical staff assigned to the subdivisions described below.

b. General Office.—The general office concerns itself with all correspondence and filing, and is responsible for the control and issue of office equipment and supplies. The section has five employees, who are sufficient to perform adequately the assigned duties.

c. Personnel and Payroll Auditing.—(1) This subdivision is the hiring agency for the Hawaiian Constructors. In each instance where it is necessary for the contractor to hire personnel, the District Engineer requires that a request must first be submitted for his written approval. The personnel section of the subdivision is responsible for securing this written approval as requisitions for employees are received from operating supervisors.

(2) The personnel and payroll-auditing subdivision was formerly a time-keeping and personnel subdivision. When the District Engineer took over time-keeping and the preparation of payrolls, the contractor retained sufficient personnel to check the payrolls against the hiring authorizations from the District Engineer, prepare social security records, and prepare a bimonthly payroll for about one hundred employees. The payroll comprises employees of the supervisory staff and clerical group hired by the contractor on a monthly-pay basis. The District Engineer has ruled that this payroll will continue to be prepared and submitted by the contractor. It is also necessary for this subdivision to keep in contact with the contractor's foremen in charge of construction crews, as these foremen must keep a daily time record of employees in order to have a check against time rolls prepared by government timecheckers before they are submitted for record.

(3) This subdivision lacks proper coordination for most efficiently performing assigned duties. It is in a state of reorganization following the recent transfer of the timekeeping and payroll responsibility to the District Engineer, systems in use are not fully developed, duties are not clearly outlined, and the subdivision head does not exercise a sufficient control over the personnel section. These deficiencies are aggravated by inadequate office accommodations.

d. Procurement.—(1) This subdivision, consisting of [4] eight employees, is necessary for operation of the purchasing procedure directed by the District Engineer. The contractor is required to submit to the District Engineer's Procurement Division requisitions for supplies as they are needed in construction. These requisitions must show a description of the required item and the accounting symbol designating the procurement authority under which the purchase is to be made.

(2) This subdivision also acts as the contact agency between the Contractor's project engineers and the storage-and-issue subdivision of the District Engineer's organization. Purchases are catalogued by delivery dates so that this information can be relayed to project engineers to assist them in the preparation of efficient work schedules.

e. Plant Records.—(1) A major portion of the constructing equipment used on defense projects is obtained by the Hawaiian Constructors under third-party lessor agreements and is rented to the District Engineer at a monthly rate equal to one-twelfth plus one percent of its purchase value. These procurements are made only with the prior approval of the District Engineer. All payments covering purchase and rental of equipment are made by the District Engineer.

(2) This accounting subdivision composed of five employees, was established primarily for the purpose of maintaining an up-to-date record of all plant purchases, to insure that all obligations are settled in accordance with purchase stipulations.

(3) This subdivision also records transactions of a miscellaneous nature, such as employee transportation expenses and the cost of certain office supplies, and prepares invoices which are audited and paid by the District Engineer.

f. Property Records.—(1) In order to conform to contract stipulations a property subdivision was established, with a total of nine employees, consisting of one section head, one office clerk, and seven property clerks.

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(2) Its functions are to maintain records of all property issued to the contractor on memorandum receipt by the District Engineer. The receipts are recorded by project areas, the section head and office clerk posting property control ledgers to show accountability vested in the property clerks of the different engineer field areas. This requires a system of tally-in and tally-out for all property issued for temporary use by individuals.

(3) The property records kept by the section head were found to be up-to-date and accurate. Those kept by area clerks are, in most instances, incomplete and carelessly posted. These irregularities were most prominent on Job 5.0 at Wheeler Field, and Job 9.0 at Hickam Field.

g. Commissary (Wheeler Field Tent Camp).—Because of the shortage of housing facilities for men employed on defense contracts, the [5] Hawaiian Constructors have established a tent camp at Wheeler Field for the purpose of housing and feeding approximately one hundred and twenty employees. The system installed for handling cash collections for boarders at the camp is not sufficiently safeguarded. Bookkeeping records are untidy and entries are made in a haphazard manner.

III. IRREGULARITIES AND DEFICIENCIES

6. *Irregularities.*—*a.* Property records kept by area clerks re incomplete and carelessly posted. (II 7f (3))

b. The handling of cash collections and bookkeeping records at the commissary are unsatisfactory. (II 7g)

7. *Deficiencies.*—*a.* Need for additional personnel in the engineering division. (II 3)

b. The personnel and payroll auditing subdivision lacks proper departmental coordination and adequate office accommodations for most efficient performance of duty. (II 5o (3))

IV. CONCLUSIONS

8. That the contractor is not exercising adequate supervision over property accounting and operations of the commissary.

9. That the corporation executives are attempting to effect an organization that will insure completion of project construction with the greatest degree of efficiency.

10. That shortages of building supplies, skilled clerical assistants and trained construction laborers are adversely affecting efficient operations; that these conditions will continue for sometime due to the lack of adequate transportation and manufacturing facilities, and to the time required to train personnel properly.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

11. That action be initiated to correct the irregularities and deficiencies noted in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Section III above.

/s/ E. B. Whisner,
E. B. WHISNER,
Lieut Colonel, Infantry,
Assistant Dept Inspector Gen.

1 Incl:
Exhibit "A" Organization Chart.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 29

Exhibit F

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, 29 August 1944.

Refer to File No, SPEAF

Subject: Priorities on Hawaiian Construction—Army Pearl Harbor Board Investigation.

To: Colonel D. I. McKay, Room 5114—War Dept. Bldg.

1. Pursuant to Major Loxier's request, the facts revealed by the records in the Office of the Chief of Engineers and the personal recollections of the undersigned on priorities matters relating to Hawaiian construction projects are set forth

hereunder for whatever purpose they may serve in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board Investigation.

2. Numerous requests for assistance in securing priorities ratings for construction projects in Hawaii were received from the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H., the Department Engineer, Hawaiian Department, and from the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, before Pearl Harbor. Many of these are a matter of record in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. Other assistance rendered, and attempted to be rendered, through this office by telephone and by personal contact with higher authorities cannot be documented but were material in scope nevertheless.

3. Until approximately June 1941, construction projects in Hawaii were rated on the same basis as similar projects in Continental United States; e. g., on the basis of the type of facility and not like projects in Panama, which were uniformly rated A-1-b. The isolated location of Hawaii presented difficulties in procurement and in transportation from the mainland, which the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, reported to the Adjutant General in letters dated 4 June 1941,¹ 3 July 1941,² and again in a letter dated 28 July 1941.³ In the letter dated 28 July 1941, the Commanding General endorses the recommendation of the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, for the establishment of a stockpile of materials, since "the delay in securing necessary materials for our construction program has become a matter of serious concern" and "this materials situation may become critical." This recommendation of the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, was approved in a modified form by the Adjutant General by 1st indorsement, dated 27 September 1941, to the letter dated 28 July 1941.⁴

[2] 4. In his letter, dated 3 July 1941¹, to the Adjutant General, the Commanding General reported that despite efforts to anticipate their needs, the construction agencies cannot anticipate every item; local suppliers' stocks are being depleted without their being able to replenish their stocks, or to secure shipping space; that "To our knowledge there is now no coordinated shipping priorities"; "the Aircraft Warning Service Project is the most important single project in the department" and under the priority directive its rating would be A-1-f; "the conditions facing this department are similar to those in Panama and * * * a similar blanket [A-1-b] priority * * * for our defense projects should be authorized, and * * * this rating should be high". He recommended the establishment of a blanket priority for Hawaiian defense projects as has been done for Panama, the granting of authority to his office to select suppliers to whom ratings could be issued, and the establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies on the West Coast.

5. As early as 3 March 1941² transportation difficulties were reported to the Chief of Engineers by the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division. Pursuant to this report, the Office of the Chief of Engineers took up the matter with the General Staff and subsequently informed the Division Engineer that the Office of the Quartermaster General will handle all arrangements and that "hereafter full dependence [will] be placed upon that Service [Water Transport] to supply all transportation needs".

6. The Office of the Chief of Engineers, based upon a telegraphic request from the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, dated 13 May 1941³ for a priorities rating on the AWS (Contract W-414-eng-784, dated 13 April 1941), obtained an a-1-f. This rating was not regarded⁴ as sufficiently high by the Division Engineer, since the Commanding General "considers it urgently necessary that the Aircraft Warning System * * * be completed and placed in operation without delay". A rating of A-1-c was obtained by the Office of the Chief of Engineers from the Army and Navy Munitions Board by telephone on 17 June 1941. A specific instance of assistance rendered by the Office of the Chief of Engineers to a contractor on the AWS despite the A-1-c rating already assigned to it was through personal contact with the Office of Production Management whereby it was arranged to transfer a pattern and the order for castings from one foundry to another which could make better deliveries⁵. In a letter

¹ Ltr. 4 June 1941 from CG, HD (his file Engr. 523.07. It is not of record in this office, but is referred to in his ltr., dtd. 3 July 1941, to the TAG. Copy of the latter on file as inclosure to ltr. from CG, HD, to OCE, file OCE 523.07 (Hawaiian Dept.) 1.

² Inclosure to ltr. dtd. 11 July 41 to OCE. OCE file 523.07 (Hawaiian Dept.) 1.

³ OCE file 400.291 (Stock Pile QM) 1.

⁴ Inclosure to ltr. OCE file 523.07 (Hawaiian Dept.) 1.

⁵ 600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 39.

⁶ 676.3 (AWS-Haw.) 33.

⁷ Ltr. fm. Div. Engr. SPD to OCE, dtd. 12 June 41, OCE file 676.3 (AWS-Haw.) 39.

⁸ Ltr. OCE to SPD, dtd. 13 Aug. 41, OCE file 676.3 (AWS-Haw.) 46.

dated 24 July 1941 to the OPM on this project requesting assistance in obtaining steel, this office pointed out that "the project on which this material is needed is one which is vital to the defence of Hawaii" and "would take on added importance should the situation in the Pacific become more critical".

[3] 7. In a letter dated 11 July 1941¹ to this office, the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H., requested a priorities rating on Contract W-414-eng-602 "as high as possible consistent with current priorities directives" because of the isolated location, and procurement and transportation problems obtaining. A rating of A-1-g had been assigned 28 February 1941 to this Hawaiian Constructors contract², as well as to numerous others (W-414-eng-658, 660, 669, 670, 672, 683, 696, 722)³. Based upon this request of 11 July 1941 from the Honolulu District Engineer, a rating of A-1-c was secured from the ANMB⁴ on contract Eng-602, and, about this time, on numerous others⁵.

8. The Office of the Chief of Engineers in requesting priorities ratings for gasoline reserve projects from the ANMB in a letter dated 4 June 1941 recommended the highest possible priority because "the need for building up adequate * * * reserves is of utmost importance"⁶. The Board authorized an A-1-b for projects in Panama and an A-1-c in Hawaii.⁷

9. Individual requests for ratings and for assistance in obtaining equipment, materials, and supplies for Hawaii have been received from Hawaii directly, or through the Division Engineer. The assistance the Office of the Chief of Engineers had been able to render was not spectacular because the Army and Navy Munitions Board had to be guided by the Priorities Directives. Since the Hawaiian construction projects were considered in the same defense category as domestic projects, the priorities ratings in the early part of 1941 were A-1-g⁸. It was not until June-July 1941 that certain projects were authorized ratings of A-1-c⁹. The general authorization to assign a rating of A-1-c to all contracts in Hawaii, even though Panama was authorized an A-1-b, was not favorably considered. Each contract had to be submitted separately to the ANMB for a priorities rating and for a priorities certificate, even though it was known beforehand what rating the Priorities Directive authorized. It was not until 8 August 1941 that the Office of the Chief of Engineers could advise the Division Engineer by teletype that a rating of A-1-e could be applied to all contracts in Hawaii and to any critical list item¹⁰. It was not until 20 August 1941 that an ANMB directive was published containing this authorization.¹¹

[4] 10. Even this authority was not adequate since ratings could be extended only to critical items or materials authorized by the Priorities Directive, whereas for construction, requiring literally thousands of items, few were listed as "critical", although the materials going into their fabrication were frequently classified as "critical". Gen. Reybold in a letter dated 25 August 1941¹² to Gen. Hines, Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, recommended the addition of construction projects to the critical list along with aircraft, ordnance and shipbuilding because "Of these categories, only construction is unable to readily obtain the numerous parts required, although it requires fully as varied a group of materials, component parts and accessories as any of the other categories above". This letter encompassed all construction, domestic as well as overseas, but it had particular significance for Hawaiian projects because of transportation and communication difficulties.

11. Pursuant to the teletype 8 August 1941 from this office to the Division Engineer, information was submitted on all Hawaiian construction for the purpose of supporting a Project Rating Order which would permit the assignment of the authorized rating (A-1-c) to all items required, critical as well as those not deemed critical. The Project Rating Order was issued 2 October 1941.¹³

12. The documents in the files of the Office of the Chief of Engineers cannot be purported to present fully the activities of this office in attempting to obtain the highest rating for Hawaii. This office was in frequent daily personal con-

¹ Ltr. OCE to OPM, dtd. 24 July 41, OCE file 676.3 (ANS-Haw.) 46.

² 600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 130.

³ 600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 40.

⁴ 600.1 (Hickam Fld.) 139, 140, 141, 142, 157, 162.

⁵ 600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 136.

⁶ 600.1 (Hickam Fld.) 317, 344, 345, 346, 348, 349, 361.

⁷ 635 (War Reserve) 141.

⁸ 1st Ind. dtd. 9 June 41 OCE 635 (War Reserve) 141.

⁹ 600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 40.

¹⁰ AWS, gasoline reserve, Hawaiian Constructors.

¹¹ 3820 (Priorities Preference Rating) 3.

¹² 3820 (Priorities Preference Rating) 40.

¹³ 3820 (Priorities Preference Rating) 39.

¹⁴ OPM to OCE file 400.1301) 95.

tact with the personnel of the ANMB and was constantly urging a rating of A-1-a. This office was more successful in the case of Alaskan construction, since an A-1-a rating was assigned thereto 4 September 1941.² No documents have been found in this office showing a request for an A-1-a rating for Hawaii, nor can it be recalled whether such a request was actually reduced to writing. However, the undersigned recalls distinctly that on the day following Pearl Harbor, Jacob R. Hershey, Captain, CE, in the ANMB office, called him and said, in substance, "Well, I guess from what happened yesterday you were justified in asking to have Hawaii advanced to an A-1-a".

13. Of particular significance on the number of requests received by the Office of the Chief of Engineers from or on behalf of Hawaiian construction projects was the policy of the ANMB for granting priorities higher than assigned by Priorities Directives. Actually, the amount of general and detailed information required by the ANMB and the OPM in support of each such request was so comprehensive that the mere compilation consumed considerable manpower and time. In fact, the ANMB states that: "It is the announced policy to utilize priorities only as a last resort for relieving production difficulties. The results of efforts by the Chiefs of Supply Arms and Services to solve procurement problems by other means must be known by the Army and Navy Munitions Board before relief by priorities measures can be justified"³. Under these circumstances proportionately few requests reached the Office of the Chief of Engineers, since the major effort had to be exerted at contractor levels, and the district and the division levels before this office could approach the ANMB for assistance.

[5] 14. Also to be noted is the fact that about the time the ANMB began assigning A-1-c ratings to certain Hawaiian projects⁴ that Board published a letter, dated 17 June 1941⁵, stating the broad objectives of the Priorities System and the basis on which requests for higher ratings would be considered. The letter stated that: "From the point of view of priorities agencies [ANMB and OPM], delays in completing some contracts are but a measure of the improvement made possible in other contracts of greater importance * * * the delays occasioned to lower rated orders are indication that the system, as a whole, is functioning". It further states that: "While this Board is entirely sympathetic with the aims [to assure completion and delivery, as scheduled] of these agencies * * *, it is desired to point out that requests based *only upon a desire to complete a contract on time is not a valid reason to raise the priorities*" (italics supplied). Requests for higher-than-normal preference ratings were considered justifiable when "(a) the military importance of a particular project or order exceeds that importance of the general item * * *, and (b) where a minor amount of material is needed to complete a relatively large contract * * *".

15. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and the lower echelons of each, had to be governed by the broad view of the rearmament program when priorities assistance was requested for individual projects⁶ and for all projects collectively⁷ similar to that for Panama. At least twice in the recollection of the undersigned a verbal sounding-out of the Board for an A-1-a rating for Hawaii was made; e. g., when priorities on Alaskan projects were raised to that level⁸ on 4 September 1941 and when the Transpacific Ferry Route project was similarly rated⁹ on 24 October 1941, both at the request of this office. Apparently, the military importance of Hawaiian projects was considered to merit an A-1-c rating, as viewed at that time.

16. In conclusion, from the evidence available in the files of this office and from personal recollections of the undersigned, the agencies responsible for directing and supervising construction projects in Hawaii [6] were not remiss in stressing procurement and transportation difficulties and in urging high priority for individual projects and for all work in Hawaii. Requests to

² 5th Ind. by ANMB to OCE, file 600.1 (Alaska) 184, dtd. 4 Sept. 1941.

³ Ltr. fm. ANMB to Chiefs of all Army and Navy Services and Bureaus, dtd. 16 Aug. 41, quoted as pars. 1-3 incl., C/L (Fin. No. 144) (Contr. No. 52) (Supply No. 1) dtd. 28 Aug. 41.

⁴ AWS on 17 June 41; gasoline reserve 9 June 41.

⁵ OCE file 3820 (Nat. Def.) 435; also quoted as par. 4, C/L (Fin. No. 144) (Supp. No. 1), 28 Aug. 41.

⁶ ANMB ltr. dtd. 17 June 41—see footnote 2 above.

⁷ Ltr. fm. ANMB, 27 Aug. 41, file 3820 (Priority Preference Rating) 3.

⁸ TT 13 May 41 Div. Engr. to OCE, 676.3 (AWS-HW) 33; ltr. Div. Engr. to OCE 12 June 41, 676.3 (AWS-HW) 39; ltr. DE, Honolulu, to OCE 11 July 1941, 600.1 (Hwn. Dept. Airfields) 130; see also footnotes 4 and 5, page 3, herein.

⁹ 600.1 (Alaska) 184.

¹⁰ 8820 (Priority Preference Rating) 126.

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higher authorities for assistance in securing specific items had to be preceded first by exhaustive efforts on the part of the field to secure the items and, if unsuccessful, had to be fully supported with detailed information and supporting statements. Although this policy of the ANMB was not so intended, in practice it resulted in many fewer requests for assistance being submitted to higher authorities than the number of instances which actually existed.

17. Some of the cases which a search of the files in the Office of Chief of Engineers has disclosed are appended hereto.

JOSEPH L. D. MISIORA,
*Lt. Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Executive Officer; Fiscal Branch.*

Incl.

List of Citations to Following Files:

600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields)
400.291 (Stock Piles QM)
635 (War Reserve)
3820 (Priority Preference Rating)
400.1301
676.3 (AWS-Hawaii)
600.1 (Hickam Field)
523.07 (Hawaiian Dept.)
3820 (National Defense)
686 (Bellows Field, TH)

[7] INCLOSURE TO MEMORANDUM PRIORITIES ON HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTION
29 AUGUST 1944

Listed hereunder are citations to specific cases on file in the Office of the Chief of Engineers showing, in part, the assistance requested and rendered on priorities matters for construction projects in Hawaii up until the Pearl Harbor attack.

NOTE: A serial number reference in parenthesis, thus (40), denotes the appropriate location in the file, since the document does not bear its own serial number.

FILE: 600.1 (HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AIRFIELDS)

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
28 Feb. 41	40	S. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT—Requests priority rating on Contract W-414-eng-602—Hawaiian Constructors.
1 Mar. 41	(40)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.	TT—Authorizing A-1-g rating.
3 Mar. 41	39	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Reports difficulty in transportation: "Constant changes in arrangements with Army Transport Service of national defense materials to Hawaii have hampered materially to expedite delivery." (See also letter 3 July 1941 CG, HD, to TAG referred to under file 523.07 (Hwn. Dept.) 1, herein.)
11 Mar. 41	1st-39	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Reports arrangement with General Staff that OQMG will handle all transportation and that "hereafter full dependence be placed upon that Service [Water Transport] to supply all transportation needs." (Ltr. to OQMG to make arrangements in this file.)
1 Apr. 41	59	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	Transmits Certificate with A-1-g rating on Contract W-414-eng-602. See Serial No. 40.
17 June 41	103	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	Transmits certificates on various items. Under the Priorities System each had to be preceded by a request as in the case of Serial No. 40 Requests not located in OCE file.
17 June 41	104	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
17 June 41	105	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
17 June 41	106	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
[8]			
11 July 41	130	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	Lists required information and contract W-414-eng-602 and subcontracts with completion dates. Requests priority rating "with authority to extend and reextend such ratings to suppliers. Because of the isolated location of the projects it is recommended that the priority ratings assigned be as high as possible consistent with current priorities directives. Transportation of the major portion of the equipment and supplies required in the execution of the work must be made from the mainland with subsequent transshipments via steamer and thence by local railroads on the islands involved."

FILE: 600.1 (HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AIRFIELDS)—Continued

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
22 July 41	1st, 130	OCE to ANMB.....	"Capt. Hershey (ANMB) informs this office that a rating of A-1-c would be applicable to this contract. The district engineer has been informed of this rating by wire."
22 July 41	(130)	OCE to DE, Hon	TT advising A-1-c rating authorized on contract eng-602.
1 Aug. 41	164	HWN Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for items for Hilo Elec. Co.
16 Aug. 41	1st, 164	OCE to ANMB	Transmits request for rating for Hilo Electric.
4 Sept. 41	184	HWN Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for steel and instruments ordered by Hilo Elec. through Honolulu Iron Works
11 Sept. 41	1st, 184	OCE to ANMB	Recommends request be forwarded to OPM.
15 Sept. 41	191	ANMB to OPM	C. C. Re. Ser. 184 ANMB recommends A-1-d to OPM.
17 Sept. 41	1st, 191	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises OPM will assign A-1-d. Authorizes use of A-1-d.
[9]			
9 Sept. 41	187	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Requests increase from A-1-c to A-1-a on cable required for distribution system at Wheeler and Hickam. A-1-c delivery promised February 1942 at earliest.
13 Sept. 41	1st, 187	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises that ANMB insists on clear showing what orders at manufacturer's plant will be displaced.
13 Sept. 41	204/1	CGHD to TAG.....	TT Referring to Clipper letter 28 July 41, OCE file 400.291 (Stock Pile QM)1, herein, stating that DE, Hon. received \$1,000,000 revolving fund for stock pile. Requests similar allotment to ZCQM.
16 Sept. 41	(204/1)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises OC of S disapproves OCE stock pile fund.
22 Sept. 41	208	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT Re stock pile in Hawaii with OCE funds. Advises that DE, Hon. is applying funds to airfield improvement.
22 Sept. 41	204	TAG to CG, HD.....	Re TT Ser. 204/1. Funds for stock pile not approved. Engineers funds are for projects, not stock pile.
22 Sept. 41	1st, 204	TAG to OCE.....	Transmits copy of TT Ser. 204 and directs that funds be recalled if allotted for stock pile. See Ser. (204/1). 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ind. to Ser. 204 Shows compliance with Ser. 1st, 204.
20 Sept. 41	206	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Requests information whether Hawaii is an "advance" base per ANMB ltr. 5 Sept. 41 which would entitle it to an A-1-a rating.
22 Sept. 41	(206)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	TT advises that Hawaii not considered an advance base. (It is recalled that at this time an informal attempt was made to have it considered as "advance").
26 Sept. 41	209	ANMB to OCE.....	Advises that OPM assigned A-1-c rating to Hilo Elec.
29 Sept. 41	1st, 209	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Transmits basic and quotes OCE TT to DE, Hon. that A-1-c rating may be assigned to all items regardless of critical list.
[10]			
29 Sept. 41	(209)	OCE to DE.....	TT advising A-1-c authorized to Hilo Elec.
1 Nov. 41	(256)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises that QMG instructed ZCQM to make available to Engineers the stock pile (see Ser. Nos. 204, 204/1 and 208 in this file and Ser. Nos. 1 2 and 10 under 400.291 (Stock Piles QM)).

[11]

FILE: 400.291 (STOCK PILES QM)

28 July 41	1	CG, HD to TAG.....	Reports delay in securing materials for construction. Three or four months are necessary to procure construction materials after funds are allotted. With the District Engineer's "construction crews now well organized, the rate of using these materials has greatly accelerated and stock is being depleted . . .". Refers to South Pacific Division Engineer's recommendation to give D. E. Honolulu \$1,000,000. for procurement of materials in advance (Recommendation of Div. not in OCE file.) Thinks the materials situation may become critical. He "strongly recommends that the suggestion of the Division Engineer, San Francisco, be adopted . . .". See also substance of letter of CG, HD to OCE 11 July 1941 under 523.07 (Hawaiian Dept.) 1; and TT of CG HD to TAG, 13 Sept. 1941 under 600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 204/1.
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FILE: 400.291 (STOCK PILES QM)—Continued

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
1 Aug. 41	1st, 1	TAG to OCE-QMGM	Remarks and recommendations.
7 Aug. 41	2nd, 1	OCE to QMGM to TAG	Recommends \$1,000,000 for stock pile from Air Corps funds. Reimbursement to be secured from 1943 funds.
21 Aug. 41	3rd, 1	QMGM to TAG	Advises QMGM established stock pile of lumber of \$400,000. Recommends additional \$500,000. for other materials.
27 Aug. 41	4th, 1	TAG to CG, IID	Revolving fund for Engineers not favorably considered. States QM will augment present stock pile, including materials other than lumber, Engineers to use but will replace materials.
27 Sept. 41	-----	TAG to QMGM	1st Ind. to CG of 4th Ind. to Ser. 1 above, directing QMGM to establish stock pile available to Engineers.
[12]			
29 Sept. (?)	10	QMGM to ZCQM	Instructs ZCQM in Hawaii to enable Engineers to withdraw materials from stock pile as required.
20 Oct. 41	2	QMGM to ZCQM	Requests outline of steps taken to implement Ser. 10.
28 Oct. 41	1st, 2	ZCQM to QMGM	Reports that conference held 16 Oct. with D. E. Honolulu, and G-4 outlining plan.

[12A]

FILE: 635 (WAR RESERVE)

4 June 41	141	OCE to ANMB	Recommends highest possible rating for aviation gasoline reserve. "The need for building up adequate * * * reserves is of utmost importance."
9 June 41	1st, 141	ANMB to OCE	Authorizes A-1-b for Panama; A-1-c for Hawaii; and A-1-e for domestic projects.
12 Nov. 41	412	OCE to S. Pac. Div.	Advises delivery dates for tanks. Offers assistance if dates are unsatisfactory.
3 Dec. 41	543/1	Supplier to OCE	Steel for gasoline storage for Hawaii being held-up. Requests assistance.
9 Dec. 41	543	OCE to OUSW	Information from supplier not sufficient but attempt made to secure assistance from OUSW Steel Unit. Pittsburgh D. E. advised that A-1-c is applicable since tanks are diverted to Hawaii.

[13]

FILE: 3820 (PRIORITY—PREFERENCE RATING)

8 Aug. 41	(3)	ACE to S. Pac. Div.	Authorizes A-1-c to projects in Hawaii. Requests detailed information to support request for blanket rating.
27 Aug. 41	3	ACE to ANMB	Transmits information on Hawaiian projects submitted pursuant to TT Ser. (3).
18 Aug. 41	5	Hw. Dep. Engr. to OCE	Requests rating for steel for Honolulu Iron Works which is a supplier to defense contractors and should have stocks on hand. See also letter 15 Oct. 41, 400.1301/134.
9 Sept. 41	21	ANMB to OPM	Recommending A-2 for Honolulu Iron Works, re Ser. 5.
6 Sept. 41	16	ANMB to OPM	Forwarding request recommending A-1-d on equipment for Honolulu water system.
11 Sept. 41	-----	Gen. Reybold to ANMB	Outlines difficulties on construction because of priorities system since only end items and contracts are assigned ratings but not projects nor items not on critical list, yet these items contain materials which are critical. Requests addition of projects to critical list, including AWS (a general letter in which Hawaii was not mentioned specifically but the comments were pertinent thereto.)
23 Oct. 41	126	OCE to OPM	Requests Proj. Rating Order for Hawaii-Phil. Ferry Route.
24 Oct. 41	1st, 126	OCE to S. Pac. Div.	Advising A-1-a assigned, re Ser. 126 (Blders. Ser. No. 62).
24 Oct. 41	(126)	OCE to S. Pac. Div.	TT—Advising of A-1-a.
10 Oct. 41	127	Hw. Dept. Eng. to OCE	Requests assistance on equipment for Hilo Electric

[13] FILE: 3820 (PRIORITY—PREFERENCE RATING)—Continued

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
14 Oct. 41	131	Hw. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Refers to letter dated 11 July 1941 from D. E., Honolulu (his file Engrl 400.174, not in OCE file), requesting assistance in getting hose for fire equipment for city of Honolulu. Requests further effort.
[14]			
30 Oct. 41	1st, 131	OCE to ANMB.....	Strong recommendation made to accrue hose.
18 Nov. 41	4th, 131	ANMB to OCE.....	Advises A-4 rating assigned.
13 Feb. 42	7th, 131	Hw. Dept. Eng. to OCE.....	Reports hose delivered.
13 Nov. 41	189	Hw. Dept. Eng. to OCE.....	Requests assistance on equipment for vocational school on national defense.

[15]

FILE: 400.1301

NOTE: Requests listed herein for priorities assistance to local supplier, public utilities, city of Honolulu, and other non-defense agencies were supported by the Commanding General, HD, because the local suppliers maintained stocks upon which defense contractors drew, and because the other agencies directly or indirectly contributed to construction progress. These requests were submitted to the Office of the Chief of Engineers because the CG, HD, appointed the Department Engineer as priorities officer and coordinator. See letter from DG, HD, to OCE, dated 11 July 1941—file 523.07 (Hawaiian Department) 1.

26 July 41	1	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for City of Honolulu water system materials.
13 Aug. 41	(1)	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests rating re Ser. 1.
28 July 41	5	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests assistance on lift trucks for a drayage company.
1 Aug. 41	8	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests assistance on steel and other materials for Honolulu Water system.
15 Aug. 41	1st, 8	OCE to ANMB.....	Transmits request re Ser. 8.
9 Sept. 41	61	OPM to Bd. Wtr. Sup.....	Assigns A-1-d to materials re Ser. 8.
2 Aug. 41	9	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests assistance for material for Hilo Electric Co.
18 Aug. 41	1st, 9	OCE to ANMB.....	Transmits request, re Ser. 9.
2 Aug. 41	11	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests assistance for rating on multi-fork trucks for Castle and Cooke Terminals, Ltd.
8 Sept. 41	59	OPM to Supplier.....	Assigns A-1-c, re request Ser. 11.
16 Aug. 41	12/1	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-1-d on pipe and fittings, City of Honolulu. Basic request not on file.
8 Aug. 41	16	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests assistance on meters and other equipment for Hilo Electric.
22 Aug. 41	1st, 16	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests rating be secured from OPM re Ser. 16.
25 Aug. 41	112	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-1-d to OPM.
9 Aug. 41	17	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating on fittings for school used in defense training.
26 Aug. 41	37/1	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-4 to OPM re Ser. 17.
8 Aug. 41	18	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for Honolulu Water System supply for housing.
25 Aug. 41	111	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-1-d to OPM re Ser. 18.
[16]			
8 Aug. 41	19	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for cement lined water pipe and fittings for City of Wahiawa. City "will be used for dispersion of evacuees from Honolulu and other crowded areas" in time of an emergency.
25 Aug. 41	110	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-1-s to OPM re Ser. 19.
27 Sept. 41	89	ANMB to OCE.....	Advises OPM issued A-1-o to Wahiawa Water, re ser. 19.
21 Aug. 41	43	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating on materials and equipment for Hilo Electric.
26 Aug. 41	54	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests A-1-a for 50% of blasting caps, including for Hawaii.
3 Sept. 41	68	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating on material for electric system of private company.
16 Sept. 41	1st, 68	OCE to ANMB.....	Recommends assistance be obtained from OPM.
8 Sept. 41	72	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for Hilo Elec. to extend its lines.
18 Sept. 41	1st, 72	OCE to ANMB.....	Transmits request re Ser. 72.
19 Sept. 41	76	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-1-d for Hilo Elec., re Ser. 72.
16 Sept. 41	73	OPM to OCE.....	Advises A-1-d rating issued on water system.
18 Sept. 41	65	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests assistance on certain materials for Hilo Electric.
19 Sept. 41	75	ANMB to OPM.....	Transmits request to OPM without recommendation.
19 Sept. 41	74	OPM to OCE.....	Advises of A-1-d for Hilo Elec., re Ser. 65.

3000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FILE: 400.1301—Continued

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
2 Oct. 41	95	OPM to OCE.....	Assigns A-1-c in blanket to Hawaiian project (only reference is in index to file 400.1301).
29 Aug. 41	118	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Transmits 42 requests for ratings for Hilo Electric.
22 Sept. 41	105	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Recommends favorable action for police force equipment for County Provisional Police Guard.
15 Oct. 41	134	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests assistance for Honolulu Iron Works stock pile.
29 Oct. 41	1st, 134	OCE to ANMB.....	Recommends referring to OPM for favorable action.
[17]			
15 Oct. 41	135	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating on equipment for St. Francis Hospital.
28 Oct. 41	1st, 135	OCE to ANMB.....	Recommends reference to OPM for favorable action.
20 Oct. 41	139A	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT requesting A-1-a for Transpacific Ferry Route.
29 Oct. 41	163	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests A-1-d for Hilo Elec. equipment.
14 Nov. 41	1st, 163	OCE to ANMB.....	Recommends A-1-d, re Ser. 163.
31 Oct. 41	172	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for St. Francis Hospital equipment.
1 Nov. 41	173	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating for sewerage system of Honolulu.
18 Nov. 41	1st, 173	OCE to ANMB.....	Recommends reference to OPM for rating.
5 Nov. 41	175	Hwn. Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating on equipment for St. Francis Hospital.
4 Nov. 41	148	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	TT—Advising that A-1-c was assigned for all materials, critical and non-critical, for numerous projects by Preference Rating Order No. 19, Builders' Serial No. 60 (information therefor submitted to ANMB 27 Aug. 41, see 3820 (Priority Preference Rating) 3 in OCE).
19 Nov. 41	188	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-1-d on manhole covers for City of Honolulu.
25 Nov. 41	189	OCE to Hwn. Dept. Eng....	Informs that St. Francis assigned A-1-d re Ser. 135

Following cases originating after Pearl Harbor are cited to show that A-1-c for Hawaii was not changed generally.

10 Dec. 41	258	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT—Quoting DE, Hon. requesting A-1-a for rock crushed.
13 Dec. 41	-----	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests A-1-a for rock crushed re Ser. 258 (note on TT Ser. 258).
15 Dec. 41	254	ANMB to OCE.....	Authorizes A-1-a, re Ser. 258.
15 Dec. 41	-----	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises A-1-a authorized, re Ser. 258.
[18]			
20 Dec. 41	274	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Informs that A-1-a on approximately \$5,000,000 of equipment is not high enough. Requests OPM issue blanket AA rating for 60 days for all equipment.
22 Dec. 41	(274)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises AA not favorably considered. Offers assistance on specific items.
16 Dec. 41	288	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT—Quoting DE, Hon. requesting AA on 15 generators.
17 Dec. 41	(288)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises ANMB requests all information to consider case.
22 Dec. 41	305	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	TT—Replying to SPD TT 19 Dec. 41 advises that request for blanket A-1-a or better for all materials not approved as it would disrupt priorities system. System must be controlled centrally. OCE will act on telephone or telegraph request direct from project but all information to be furnished in first instance.
22 Dec. 41	342	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Assigns A-1-a to all emergency repair required as a result of enemy action. AA upon request.

[19] FILE: #676.3 (AWS—HAWAII)

13 May 41	33	S. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT—Requesting blankets rating for aerial cable for AWS Station on W-414-eng-784. Advises that track, cable, traction rope, structural steel, electric motors are required but are not on critical list. Completion required 20 Sept. 1941. CG, HD, desires station completed at earliest possible date. Recommends authorization of rating commensurate with desire of Department.
22 May 41	(33)	OCE to S. Pac. Div.....	TT—Advising ANMB assigned A-1-f to prime contractor for items on critical list (by 1st Ind., 20 May 1941 to Ser. 33).

FILE: #676.3 (AWS-HAWAII)—Continued

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
12 June 41	39	S. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Refers to 13 May TT and advises A-1-f priority is not sufficiently high; that it will cause delay but cannot say how much. Informs that CG, HD states AWS is urgent. Requests highest possible rating.
17 June 41	1st, 39	OCE to ANMB.....	Stresses urgency of AWS.
20 June 41	2nd, 39	ANMB to OCE.....	Assigns A-1-e to AWS.
24 June 41	3rd, 39	OCE to S. Pac. Div.....	Advises of A-1-e and that contractor notified; offers further assistance. (See Ser. Nos. 45, 46 and 50.)
11 June 41	37	CG, HD to TAG.....	TT—Informs TAG that A-1-g on Contract 784 will result in delay of 15 weeks. Requests A-1-b.
17 June 41	2nd, 37	OCE to TAG.....	Advises TAG that A-1-e was assigned by ANMB upon telephonic request (pursuant to request from Division Engineer, see Ser. 39 above).
9 July 41	45	Contractor to OCE.....	Contractor gives evidence of inability to get steel deliveries.
11 July 41	(45)	OCE to Contractor.....	Informs contractor of procedure to get assistance.
[20]			
21 July 41	46	Contractor to OCE.....	Contractor requests assistance to obtain castings for AWS.
24 July 41	(46)	OCE to OPM.....	Submits forms and order for castings. Points out—"The project [AWS] on which this material is needed is one which is vital to the defense of Hawaii [and] which would take on added importance should the situation in the Pacific become more critical." Urges every possible assistance be given to contractor.
11 Aug. 41	54	OPM to OCE.....	Advises that, by shifting patterns and order, castings will be delivered 15 Sept. 41.
12 Aug. 41	(46)	OCE to Contractor.....	Advises that OPM, by shifting patterns and order to another supplier, has moved up delivery to 15 Sept. 41.
13 Aug. 41	(57)	OCE to S. Pac. Div.....	Advises Division Engineer of 12 Aug. 41 letter to Contractor.
4 Aug. 41	50	Contractor to OCE.....	Requests higher rating on Contract 784, difficulty in getting steel.

[21]

FILE: 600.1 (HICKAM FIELD)

8 Mar. 41	139	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	Transmits cc of priority certificate of A-1-g on W-414-eng-672, 696, 683, 722, 658, 669, 670 and 660. Requests for these priorities have not been located in OCE files, but under the priorities system each had to be preceded by a request which went to the ANMB for approval and for assignment of a rating.
8 Mar. 41	140	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
8 Mar. 41	141	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
8 Mar. 41	142	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
1 Apr. 41	157	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
1 Apr. 41	162	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
28 Mar. 41	147	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Requests extension of A-1-g to certain items not on the critical list.
6 Apr. 41	148	ANMB to OPM.....	Transmits request re Ser. 147 requesting A-1-e.
22 Apr. 41	186	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Follow-up on Ser. 147 and 148.
29 Apr. 41	192	ANMB to OCE.....	Re Ser. 147. Advises that supplier can ship without rating.
12 June 41	270	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Requests rating for tandem rollers (not critical item) for W-414-eng-602.
18 June 41	1st, 270	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests assignment of rating.
17 July 41	2nd, 270	ANMB to OCE.....	Advises OPM issued rating.
19 June 41	282	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT follow-up re Ser. 270 (A note on TT states OCE was advised that OPM wired supplier to release and Division Engineer was informed).
30 July 41	4th, 270	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Advises shipment made.
6 June 41	274	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	TT requesting assistance on shipping of cable.
12 June 41	(274)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	TT DE Ser. 274 advises shipping arranged.
21 June 41	277	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Requests A-1-b for steel in lieu of A-1-g on contract 722.
24 June 41	1st, 277	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises A-1-c is authorized.
24 June 41	(277)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	TT advises A-1-c is authorized.
7 July 41	303	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Request priority for rock crusher on contract Eng 602.
10 July 41	1st, 303	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests rating. Informs ANMB that request for contract rating was requested under 600.1 (Hwn. Dept. Airfields) 130.
12 July 41	(303)	ANMB to OPM.....	Recommends A-1-c for rock crusher.
12 July 41	2nd, 303	ANMB to OCE.....	Transmits cc Ser. (303).
14 July 41	3rd, 303	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises A-1-c rating on contract 602 and transmits cc Ser. (303).

3002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FILE: 600.1 (HICKAM FIELD)—Continued

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
13 July 41 [22]	317	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	TT advising that A-1-c has been assigned to W-414-eng-696.
28 Nov. 41	(504)	OCE to OUSW.....	Steel Unit, OUSW, requested to secure allocation of steel for Fire Control and Repair Bldg. at Hickam which steel the Division Engineer cannot obtain.
2 Dec. 41	504	OUSW to OCE.....	Re Ser. (504). Advises that OPM requested to insert rolling of steel in January 1942 schedules.

[23]

FILE: 523.07 (HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT)

Letter dated 11 July 1941 from CG, HD, to OCE (through TAG), filed as Serial No. 1 under this file. Although this letter primarily advises that the Commanding General appointed the Department Engineer as the coordinating officer on all priorities matters under his command, it contains as an inclosure a letter dated 3 July 1941 from the CG, HD, to the TAG. The substance of this letter, dated 3 July 1941, is important in that it reports upon materials and transportation difficulties on Hawaiian projects, and refers to prior reports made by him on the same subject.

The letter of 3 July 1941, in substance, as follows:

Increasing difficulties in procurement of materials. Hawaii presents special problems in procurement due to shipping. Construction agencies are anticipating their needs, but it is impossible to anticipate every item. There is no apparent coordination of shipping priorities on the West Coast. Contractors and local suppliers are encountering increasing difficulties. Reports that ANMB in its directive of 27 November 1940 placed Panama in an A-1-b priority, but assigned no similar blanket coverage for Hawaii. He stated that:

"The Aircraft Warning Service is the most important single project in this Department, and under the general classification in this directive the highest priority which could be assigned to it would be A-1-f. It is believed that the conditions facing this Department are similar to those in Panama and that * * * blanket priority classification for our defense projects should be authorized, and this rating should be high."

He recommended: high blanket ratings; authority be given him to select essential firms (local suppliers) to which ratings may be given; and the establishment of a liaison on shipping on the West Coast for shipping priorities.

[24]

FILE: 3820 (NATIONAL DEFENSE)

Date	File Serial No.	Office Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
11 July 41	482	Hwn Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests rating on "non-critical" items required by City of Honolulu and by Major Disaster Council.
15 July 41	1st, 482	OCE to Hwn Dept. Eng.	Advises only non-defense items which are vital to defense can be sent to OCE requesting assistance.
17 July 41	563	Hwn Dept. Eng. to OCE....	Requests assistance for 150 cast steel wheels for Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., Honolulu. Required for doors on piers taken over by Army.
19 Sept. 41	6th, 563	ANMB to OCE.....	Assigns A-1-c to castings, re Ser. 563.
22 Sept. 41	(563)	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advising A-1-c to castings, re Ser. 563.
31 July 41	564	ANMB to OCE.....	Advises OPM considering assigning project rating order on construction projects outside continental U. S. Specified data required to be submitted.
15 Aug. 41	619	OCE to ANMB.....	Data on Hawaiian projects submitted, re Ser. 564.

[25]

FILE: 686 (BELLOWS FIELD)

14 Oct. 41	19	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	Requests higher than routine rating (now A-1-c) to trucks for Bellows Field. A-1-a is needed. Delivery required 15 Oct. Promised—Indefinite. Bellows Field "urgently needed". Field designated by CG, HD as "ranking first in priority in program for development of outlying airports in the Hawaiian Islands * * *"
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FILE: 686 (BELLOWS FIELD)—Continued

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
21 Oct. 41	2nd, 19 26 (26)	OCE to ANMB.	Recommends A-1-a be assigned.
28 Oct. 41		So. Pac. Div. to OCE.	Requests TT advice on A-1-a request for trucks, re Ser. 19.
29 Oct. 41		OCE to So. Pac. Div.	Advises that supplier has difficulty obtaining materials. ANMB states it is rendering all possible aid. Will continue to advise on progress.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 30

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(Stamped:) MAR 3 1727 PM 1941.

Fort Shafter
Honolulu T HReceived at
51 WAR AB 262 WD
WASHINGTON DC 732P Mar 3 1941

COMMANDING GENERAL

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

In reply cite AGMO REUR fifth indorsement third January nineteen hundred forty one file engr six seven six point three period

Informal discussion with officials National Park Service indicates Department of Interior is opposed to permanent transfer of any additional land in Hawaii National Park comma but will grant special use permit for Red Hill installation as recommended by you period

Proposed road location appears satisfactory period

No difficulty anticipated regarding telephone line period

Park Service opposed to use of forty acre tract for camp site and suggest use of CCC Spur Camp in same general locality period

Some facilities at CCC Camp now and special use permit would be granted including permit to construct additional buildings and facilities comma with understanding that such installations will remain for park use when war department need no longer exists period

(Stamped:) 1940 MAR 4 AM 8:48

(Stamped:) RECEIVED 4 MAR 1941, H. Q. HAW'N. Dept. A. G. O.

(Stamped:) FOR ACTION

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

Received at
NR 51 WAR AB PAGE TWO

Need for kitchen comma dining room comma private rooms for section chief and shower in combined communication and caretaking building at Red Hill not apparent and desired that consideration be given to holding this building to minimum to provide small storeroom comma latrine comma and room to shelter personnel not actually engaged in operating station period

All preliminary building plans must be submitted to Department of Interior prior to granting permits period

After agreement with superintendent national park desired you transit preliminary building plans to him for forwarding to Park Service in Washington period

Additional copies to War Department by air mail period similar radio being sent by Park Service to superintendent in Hawaii period

Your comments and recommendations desired by radio period

ADAMS
455P(Stamped:) FOR ACTION
Form H. D. No. 1054

3004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 31

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 March 1941.

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification

This message is Routine

/s/ Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.,
Major, Corps of Engrs.,
Asst. Dep. Engr.

Sent as Radiogram No. 2339-5
Approved for transmission:

/s/ Carl Grosse,
CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant Gen.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Fifth endorsement this headquarters three January Nineteen forty one file engr six seven six point three on Haleakala AWS installation represented best thought of officers making study Stop Your radio AGMO three March Nineteen forty one transmitted in clear does not appear to appreciate the seriousness of the situation Stop I have personally reviewed the Haleakala situation and find that the officers responsible for this project had already thoroughly considered all the questions raised in your radiogram Stop My comments on the points in your radio are as follows colon agree to construction at Red Hill under spacial use permit semicolon disagree with decrease proposed in combined communication and caretaking building as it will be necessary to maintain caretaking detachment at this point and adequate shelter and facilities must be provided at the high altitude period reference camp site comma possibility of use of CCC camp was thoroughly investigated and before any recommendations were submitted semicolon camp is now occupied by CCC and by park rangers semicolon in immediate vicinity of CCC camp there is not room for expanded facilities and for this reason the other site about a half mile distant is necessary for proper housing of men and equipment of the mobile unit semicolon in addition I am opposed to any joint housing with agencies not under War Department control as the great importance and secret nature of this equipment makes this highly undesirable Period reference necessity submitting building plans to Department of Interior comma I have received copy of letter from Secretary War to Secretary Navy which states that the AWS equipment would be available in this department in June and would be in operation shortly thereafter semicolon Haleakala is second most important station in the system and construction should not be delayed any further comma if building plans must be submitted to Interior Department for its detailed examination the completion of the Haleakala station which is vital both to the army and the navy in the present situation will be unduly delayed Paragraph

The seriousness of the situation requires that all administrative obstacles be removed semicolon this applies not only to the Haleakala installation but also to the entire project Period Now that basic decisions of location comma type of station comma and general plans have been reviewed and approved by the War Department I strongly recommend this project be decentralized and that I be authorized to make final decision on Design and layouts and such other details as may be required to expedite completion

SHORT

Enc sec by Capt R W Davis SC 245 PM Mar 5 '41

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 32

[1]

SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE

SECRET

107 WAR BC 340 WD

WASHINGTON DC 837P Mar 12 1941

COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Dept Ft Shafter TH

665 Twelfth yourrad two three three nine you are authorized to make final decision on design and layout and other details of construction within limitations of funds now available for AWS projects in your department and subject to approval by Department of Interior of construction projects in national park Period Department of Interior desires preliminary building plans only showing size architecture and general appearance Period Plans will be submitted by you to Mister Wingate park superintendent for transmittal by him direct to Washington by air mail Period Expedite reply by radio Period Submission of duplicate plans by you direct to this office by air mail will facilitate and expedite action Period Park service advises CCC camp will be vacated to make room for army personnel and equipment Period Park ranger only will remain at station Period

[2] There will be no joint housing with other agencies Period Park service indicates that with concurrence of Superintendent Wingate it will recommend approval of Red Hill and CCC sites for War Department use with understanding that installations and buildings be approved by Department of Interior prior to construction Period. Department of Interior positively refuses occupancy of forty acre tract and demands that preliminary building plans be submitted as heretofore requested Period Appreciate fully your position but consider it highly undesirable to attempt further discussion with Department of Interior on these two questions Period Desired you contact Superintendent Wingate and submit further recommendations by radio regarding use of CCC camp site when vacated

ADAMS

657P

Received as a Secret communication. Decoded by: /S/ E Lt. JOSEPH ENGELBERTZ, SC. 8:00A 13 Mar 41

Answer should be marked "Answer to Code Message No."

NOTE: See A. R. 330-5 and 335-5 for handling messages of this classification.
Form H. D. No. 1175

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 33

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, March 15, 1941.

Lieut. General WALTER C. SHORT,

*Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.*

DEAR GENERAL SHORT: The matters referred to in your secret letter dated March 6, 1941, and the inclosures thereto, have been given careful study.

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose,

3006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. The War Department finds it necessary to ask the Department of the Interior for the use of many tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their cooperation in the transfer of large areas of public lands. It is not believed that it would be advisable to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the Department of the Interior by carrying this matter to higher authority, or to prolong the discussion through official channels.

We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest cooperation.

Faithfully yours.

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL,
per WB.

In the absence of the Chief of Staff.

(Note in longhand:)

SHORT: Gen Marshall had this letter prepared but he went off on a trip before signing. I am sending it on.

/s/ BRYDEN.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 34

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER.

Fort Shafter, T. H.
Initials: /s/ OMM A.G.
Date: 29 May 1941

In reply refer to: Engr. 676.3

Subject: Base Camp Haleakala AWS Station

To: District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, this headquarters, 9 May 1941, on your letter, file 2014-42, April 23, 1941, subject: "Haleakala Aircraft Warning Service Station."

2. The War Department has informed this headquarters by radio, paraphrase of which is attached as Inclosure No. 1, that the National Park Service has approved the building designs and layout and is issuing a special use permit for the 6.67 acre camp site. All negotiations with the War Department and the National Park Service concerning the Haleakala AWS Station have now been completed and your office is free to proceed with the construction of both summit installation and the base camp.

3. Also attached is copy of letter from Mr. Edward G. Wingate, Superintendent, Hawaii National Park, which states that the CCC Camp at Haleakala, recently vacated, is available for such use as the Army may care to make of it. There are accommodations at this camp for approximately 25 persons, including a mess hall which can be used for feeding twice that number. It may be convenient to utilize these facilities for quartering at least a portion of the construction crew which will be engaged on the work at the Haleakala sites.

4. Outside of the Mt. Kaala Station, the Haleakala installation is the most important link in the aircraft warning system and it is consequently essential that the work thereon be carried to early completion.

For the Commanding General:

O. M. McDole,
Major, A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

2 Incls: #1—Paraphrase WD Rad #2—Ltr. fr/Mr. Wingate, 16 May 1941

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 34A

Paraphrase

20 MAY 1941

C. G., HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT:

Re your letters dated 31 March and 5 May as to the location of the base camp, Haleakala Aircraft Warning Service Station. The National Park Service has approved plans for proposed installations and for use of 6 and 2/3rds acre camp site as recommended by you. National Park Service, by radiogram dated 17 May 1941, notified Superintendent Wingate that you may proceed with installations as planned pending issue of special use permit now being prepared by Department of Interior. Your correspondence is being filed in the War Department.

ADAMS.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 34B

Subject: Base Camp, Haleakala AWS Station. (Eng. 676.3)

2014-54

1st Ind.

Honolulu, T. H., June 11, 1941.

OFFICE, DISTRICT ENGINEER,

To: The Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Noted.

2. It is planned to commence construction on the work outlined in basic letter at an early date.

/s/ W

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

/s/ RN

Incls.: w/d.
BLR/gg

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 35

Exhibit "L"

NECESSARY PRINCIPAL DECISIONS OR ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH AWS STATIONS
BY VARIOUS AUTHORITIES

1. Reconnaissance and report of Board of Officers—Selection of Sites. (C. G. Hawaiian Dept., Chief Signal Officer, Chief Air Corps, Coast Artillery Corps.)
2. Review and approval by General Staff and W. D. Technical Service. (General Staff Chief Sig. Ofcr., C. G. Hawaiian Dept.)
3. Acquisition of Land.
 - a. Surveys by District Engineer.
 - b. Interior Dept. for Park Lands (Haleakala only).
 - c. Territory of Hawaii Lands at Kokee.
4. Estimate of Funds—By District Engineer & Dept Signal Officer
Approval by Chief Signal Officer.
5. Availability of Funds and Allocation—Chief Signal Officer.
6. Plans and Specifications. *Furnished by*
 - a. (1) Towers and Detector Stations----- Sig. Corps.
 - (2) Communication Bldg. & Transmitter----- Sig. Corps.
 - (3) Generators----- Sig. Corps.
 - (4) Equipment for (1), (2) and (3)----- Sig. Corps.
 - (5) Equipment for information center----- Sig. Corps.
 - b. (1) Roads—Cableway----- Dist. Engr.
 - (2) Barracks, Camp, Power Bldg.----- Dist. Engr. & Sig. Corps

3008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

6. Plans and Specifications—Continued	
b. (3) Utilities—Water Supply, Electric facilities, sewage, fences-----	<i>Furnished by</i> Dist. Engr.
(4) Erection & Installation of items in a, exclusive of interior radar equpt.-----	Dist. Engr.
(5) Tunnel for Information Center-----	Dist. Engr.
7. Approval of Layout-----	C. G. Hawn Dept., Sig. Corps & Div. Engr.
8. Ordering and delivery of special bldgs & equipment in 6a-----	WPB & Sig. Corps.
9. Negotiating and approval of construction contract-----	Dist. Engr. Div. Engr., CofE.
10. Material Procurement-----	WPB, Wash. Echelons
a. Lumber, cement, reinf. steel, elec. fixtures, struct. steel-----	Div. Engr & Dist. Engr.
b. Priorities on critical materials-----	WPB—Dist. Engr.
c. Stock piling—funds (Not allowed to build up stock except for specific authorized project)-----	Dist. Engr.
11. Labor Procurement-----	Dist. Engr—Con- tractor
12. Actual Construction-----	Dist. Engr—Con- tractor

Of the foregoing 12 items, the Dist. Engr. in the Field has exclusive authority in only three, viz. 9, 11, and 12.

Delays or slowness in any of the others seriously affect time of completion. Such slowness or delays did occur in connection with most items.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 36

By the Authority of the District Engineer,
Honolulu, T. H.

14 Feb 41 T. W.
Date Officer Assigning
Copy No. 1 of 3

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., February 14, 1941.

In reply refer to: 2014-38.

Subject: Approval of preliminary sketches and plans for proposed buildings at
A. W. S. Stations.

To: The Department Engineer, Headquarters Hawn. Dept., Fort Shafter,
T. H.

1. In accordance with your request there is attached two prints each of the following drawings:

<i>Title</i>	<i>File No.</i>
Proposed Communication Bldgs., Oahu, Maui and Kauai-----	F-4/8
Proposed Buildings, Maui and Kauai Base Stations-----	F-4/9
Proposed Buildings, Mount Kaala and Manawahua Stations----	F-4/10
Proposed Garage Bldgs., Hawaii, Maui, Kauai, Base Stations-----	F-4/11

2. In order to expedite the preparation of necessary plans and specifications, it is desired that one set of the drawings be returned to this office with your approval.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Incl.: 4 prints in dup.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 36A

Engr. 676.3.

Subject: Approval of preliminary sketches and plans for proposed buildings at AWS Stations.

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 6 March 1941.

To: District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

1. The general plans of the proposed communication buildings on Oahu, Maui, and Kauai are approved.

2. The proposed buildings for the Maui and Kauai base stations as shown on drawing F-4/9 are approved.

3. The proposed buildings for Mount Kaala and the layout at that station shown on your drawing, file No. F-4/10, are approved.

4. The proposed buildings shown for construction at Manawahua on this same drawing is not approved; a *portable building* will be substituted for this design. In connection with the approval of the layout at Mount Kaala attention is invited to section 1 (f page 4) of letter this headquarters, Engr. 676.3, 7 November 1940, to you, subject: "Construction of Aircraft Warning Stations," which requested that particular care be exercised in the construction of the station to take every advantage of possibilities for concealing the installations from aerial observation.

5. The proposed garage buildings shown in your drawing F-4/11 are approved for general designs. No further work should be done on the design of these garages, however, pending further instructions from this headquarters. The question of whether or not these garages will be constructed with funds of the Aircraft Warning Service project has been submitted to the War Department and no answer has as yet been received. You will be notified when a definite decision on this point has been received from the War Department.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ Carl Grosse,
CARL GROSSE,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Incl: 4 prints in dupl. (1 set w/drawn)

(Stamp:) RECEIVED MAR 12 1941 U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 37

A. W. S. INFORMATION CENTER—FT. SHAFTER, OAHU

J. O. #39.0

Characteristics: This project consists of a series of interconnected tunnels 890 feet long and varying in diameter from 10 feet to 30 feet. Access to the tunnel is gained by two entrances. Originally the structure was to be located at Hickam Field, but later in June, 1940, it was decided to locate the center at Alimamu Crater. On 9 April 1941 the structure was finally located at Ft. Shafter, Oahu.

Ft. Shafter site approved by Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and War Department.....	9 April 1941
Layout plan (File No. F4/57) and estimates of cost of station submitted to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and Chief of Engineers.....	18 April 1941
Layout plan held by Headquarters Hawaiian Department and District Engineer notified that change in plan contemplated by War Department.....	17 May 1941
Plans of revised layout approved by Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.....	5 August 1941
Work started on station.....	19 June 1941
Percent complete on 7 December 1941.....	72%

This job at first contemplated a small tunnel about 600 feet long involving 3600 yards of rock with completion date fixed for August 11, 1941.

3010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The project was expanded in the layout approved August 5, 1941 to 3 tunnels with a total length of 890 feet and about 10,200 yards of rock excavation. Due to the rooms and number of tunnels this was not straight driving. The completion date was fixed at December 15, 1941. This was not excessive. Hand methods were used initially. When the larger project was adopted, additional tunnel equipment was ordered.

Excavation was completed October 31, 1941. The % of completion on 7 December was only 72% because Using Services had not yet decided interior arrangement so that side walls could be completed. These decisions not made until after Pearl Harbor. During period immediately after Pearl Harbor it was used as a bomb proof shelter.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 38

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., April 18, 1941.

Refer to file No. 2014

Subject: Cost Estimates A. W. S. Communication Center
at Fort Shafter, T. H.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attached are two prints of drawing file No. F-4/57 showing general plan and sections of the A. W. S. Central Communication Station, together with estimates of cost for construction of this underground structure at Fort Shafter, T. H.

2. As requested under the 4th indorsement of the Department Engineer dated February 26, 1941, the length of the waiting room has been increased to 40 feet. The power room has been modified to include double doors and vestibule type entrance as shown on the above drawing.

3. The estimate attached herewith includes cost of materials, labor and equipment, mobilization and the necessary overhead, engineering and supervision. The total estimated cost is \$177,956.00.

4. A copy of this estimate and drawing is being forwarded to the Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C.

/s/ Theodore Wyman, Jr.
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
*Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.*

Incls.:

2 prints each of drawing file No. F-4/57
2 copies of estimates

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 38A

Engr. 676.3

Subject: Cost Estimates, A. W. S. Communication Center at Fort Shafter, T. H.

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 17 May 1941.

To: District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Action on approval of the design submitted by basic communication has been held in abeyance as a result of instructions received from the War Department that this structure for the Aircraft Warning Service would be combined with the Command Post for the Hawaiian Air Force and the Antiaircraft Groupment. Similarly the data necessary for your office to design the Command Post of the Air Force and of the Command Post of the Antiaircraft Groupment for which you were directed to prepare detail designs has not yet been submitted.

2. This entire matter is now undergoing final study at this headquarters and you will be advised of the final requirements of the Information Center, the Air Force Command Post and the Anti-aircraft Groupment Command Post in the near future. It is believed that the combination of these three units and the elimination of some duplication will result in a lowered cost.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ O. M. McDole
O. M. McDole,
*Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.*

Incls: w/drawn

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 39

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION ENGINEER,
SOUTH PACIFIC DIVISION,

351 California St., San Francisco, California, January 6, 1941.

File No. Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Room 1216 Balfour Bldg.,
351 California Street,
San Francisco, California.

Attention Mr. C. C. Middleton

Subject: Authority to purchase plant and establish rental rates.

GENTLEMAN: You are hereby notified that the Assistant Secretary of War approved your Contract No. W-414-eng-602, January 4, 1941.

In accordance with Article II, paragraph 2, purchase of the following list of plant is authorized subject to the maximum amounts set opposite each item. If it is considered advisable to modify the list of plant, or change the makes or models of equipment proposed, application should be made to this office, or to the District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H. This authority covers the items discussed by Colonel Wyman and Mr. Middleton on December 24, 1940.

Item No.	Quantity	Description	Maximum approved unit cost f. o. b. origin
1	2	Northwest Shovels, 1½ cu. yd.	25,305.00
2	3	Tractors, with angledozers, RD-8 or RD-7 as alternates.	7,886.40
3	1	Patrol grader No. 12 Caterpillar.	6,258.00
		or No. 99 Austin-Western.	7,272.00
4	1	Tractor, D-7, with sheepsfoot rollers Ben Hulse D-7 and W 2 Sheepsfoot.	7,488.20
5	2	Compressors, 500 cu. ft. 2-stage, Diesel, C. P. or equal.	8,875.00
6	15	4 cu. yd. dump trucks GMC Model AC-703, Model 361 engine, S 4452 transmission, W-12 body with model, F 4 C hoist, 10.00 x 20 mud and snow tread tires, model E-527 front axle, and E-2680 rear axle.	3,780.00
7	2	1 cu. yd. Paver Ransome, Rex or Koehring as selected by contractor.	3,578.00
[2]			
8	1	Batching Plant, 150 ton capacity Blaw-Know.	3,200.00
9	2	¾ cu. yd. Shovel-crane, N. W. Model 25.	12,580.00
10	3	5-ton trucks, Ford, with 5-ton Freuhauf trailers.	(Price to be separately authorized).
11	1	40-ton low-bed trailer, Freuhauf or equal.	5,088.00
12	1	Electric Welder, 300 amp. G. E., gas driven.	995.00
13	1	10-ton Tandem roller, Buffalo-Springfield Model VT-21.	4,350.00
14	1	3-ton Utility roller, Buffalo-Springfield model VT-9.	2,350.00
15	1	Pug Mill, ½-ton capacity, Madsen Iron Works.	2,677.50
16	4	¾-ton Pick-up trucks, Ford V-8.	779.60
17	4	Light weight automobile sedans.	865.50
18	4	Light weight automobile Coupes, Ford V-8.	779.60
19	1	Rubber-tired sack mixer, gas driven.	1,140.00
20	2	Drifters, 3½" G. D. Model AF-9H.	515.00
21	1	12" Ventilating Fan, Sutterbilt Corp.	520.00
22	1	Concrete placing outfit, 7 cu. ft. electric Ransome.	1,800.00
23	1	Crane, Z-1114, stiff-leg, mounted on a D-7 tractor.	7,520.00
24	1	Logging winch, 2-drum, Heavy duty, D-7 Hyster.	2,093.50

Attention is invited to items numbered 1 and 11. It is preferred by the contracting officer that 2½ cubic yard shovels be purchased instead of 1½ cubic yard size. If the 2½ cubic yard shovels are obtainable without undue delay authority is hereby given for their purchase. If shovels of 2½ cubic yard capacity are used it will be necessary to obtain a low-bed trailer of sufficient capacity to handle them. Authority is hereby granted to modify item 11 accordingly. The district engineer, Honolulu, T. H. and this office should be advised promptly as to the sizes of these two items and the purchase prices involved.

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[3] Monthly rental rates for the equipment authorized by this letter shall be computed on the basis of one-twelfth of the purchase price, f. o. b. point of origin, not to exceed the maximum approved unit prices listed herein, plus one (1) percent per month, or fraction thereof, that such plant has been in use. The cost of any transportation shall not be included in this figure. See Article II, paragraph 2 of the contract.

It is desired by the contracting officer that this equipment be shipped by Army or other Government transport, if practicable, and if such transportation is available. Therefore, it is requested that you notify this office of probable shipping dates, weights and cubic measurements of the equipment. Application should be made on this office for necessary Government bills of lading for commercial shipments.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Warren T. Hannum,
WARREN T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 40

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT ENGINEER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 September 1941.

In reply refer to : Engr. 676.3

Memorandum to District Engineer :

1. In accordance with conversation, Colonel Powell-Major Robinson, and Major Fleming, on the Aircraft Warning Service, it is requested that you arrange to obtain from the Signal Officer the necessary metal building and towers for installation at Kokee and Haleakala. As you know, the installation at Kokee will consist of the metal detector building and a 100-foot tower and at Haleakala, will consist of the combined metal building and 35-foot tower.

2. It is my understanding that these metal buildings are now on hand at the Signal Corps yard at Fort Shafter. This can be verified by having someone check the buildings on hand in the yard. If the buildings are now complete, shipment of them to Haleakala and Kokee and their erection at the site should be expedited.

3. It is also requested that erection of the power house at these two stations be expedited. It is understood that your office has designed and is furnishing all materials for these power houses. Their completion should be expedited in order to enable early installation of the equipment.

4. Also, in the discussion referred to, it was decided that the Signal Corps would furnish an employee at Kokee and at Haleakala to assist in the erection of the buildings and to see that they are properly screened and shielded as required. It is also tentatively agreed that the District Engineer would suballot funds to the Department Signal Officer to cover the cost of this employee's transportation and time while engaged on this work. In view of the need of this Signal Corps employee's assistance during the erection of the building, it is requested that you notify this office before the actual erection starts in order that arrangements can be made to send him to the site.

5. The Department Commander is extremely desirous that these stations be placed in operation without delay.

/s/ RF
ROBERT J. FLEMING, Jr.,
Major, G. S. C.

(Stamped :) RECEIVED SEP 9 1941 3:30 U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu
T. H.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 40A

5-A

SEPTEMBER 23, 1941.

ND 676.3 AWS Kokee
X ND 676.3 AWS Haleakala
Aircraft Warning Service Stations

DEPARTMENT ENGINEER,
*Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.*

1. In answer to your memorandum of September 8 regarding the installation of the Aircraft Warning Service buildings at Kokee, Kauai and Haleakala, Maui, and the necessary funds for furnishing Signal Corps employees to assist in erection of these buildings, the following information is submitted for your convenience:

a. The necessary metal buildings and towers have been shipped to Kokee and Haleakala.

b. The necessary steel for the power houses at these stations is now being fabricated and upon completion the erection will be expedited.

c. Bill for the Signal Corps employees' time and transportation while engaged in this work will be submitted to the District Engineer and payment will be made directly from this office instead of suballotting the necessary funds to the Department Signal Officer as mentioned in memorandum referred to above.

d. The actual erection of the metal buildings and station towers at these stations will be started as follows: Haleakala, as soon as Signal Corps employees arrive; Kokee, approximately October 1, 1941.

2. You will be notified, as soon as can be determined, the exact date that erection of buildings and tower will be started. Arrangements have been made at these stations for the accommodation of the Signal Corps employees.

3. It is requested that this office be informed the day before the employees are to leave for Maui and Kauai.

(S) W

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
*Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.*

(Stamped:) Dispatched Sep 24 1941 11:30 U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu,
T. H.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 41

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE

STS Contract 602

U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,
Alexander Young Building, Honolulu, T. H., March 7, 1941.

GOVT WD
DIVISION ENGINEER,
San Francisco.

Reference is made to Kaala Cable Way Job Order Number Two Contract Eng Six Naught Two period Riblet Tramway Company of W Twenty Nine Main Avenue Spokane Washington USA designers manufacturers and erectors of aerial tramways has submitted a proposal to the Hawaiian Constructors to furnish a cable fob factory in accordance with our specifications and drawings for the total price of One Hundred Thousand Five Hundred Dollars including the services of an erection superintendent at Twenty Five Hundred Dollars period This proposal appears excessive period The estimate prepared by the board of officers who passed judgment on the proposed erection of the cable way is approximately Thirty Six Thousand Dollars period The local representative of Hawaiian Constructors advises me that this proposal was sent to five prospective

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bidders but only the one bid cited above has been received period I have requested the Hawaiian Constructors to furnish me with additional proposals from other manufacturers period It is requested that the division engineer go into this matter and by inquiry determine whether or not other bidders are interested and what price should be paid for the cable way and towers desired period Early radio advice is requested

WYMAN

Certified to be US Govt. official business:

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
*Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.*

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 42

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 5, 1940.

6-E

C. of E. 676.3 (Aircraft Warning Service)

Subject: Requirements for A. W. S. Building Construction.

To: The Chief Signal Officer.

1. The Chief of Engineers is apprehensive as to his ability to accomplish the design and construction of the necessary buildings for Aircraft Warning Service with fiscal year funds unless definite information can be obtained of Signal Corps requirements. Preliminary designs of structures have been prepared but it is felt that preparation of type plans for transmission to the field can not be completed until a definite statement of the equipment to go in each structure, and the space requirements for operation can be obtained. This information was requested by letter this office, dated May 21, 1940, subject: Requirements for A. W. S. Building Construction, C. of E. file 676.3 (A. W. S.), and has been requested informally at intervals since that time.

2. The Chief of Engineers is ready and anxious to cooperate in working out any details in connection with this important program. It is considered essential that basic information with type plans be transmitted to the constructing agencies, in the near future, with authority for local determination of details. Unless such information and necessary funds for accomplishment of the work are made available and authority decentralized the program will be seriously delayed.

For the Chief of Engineers:

C. L. ADCOCK,
*Major, Corps of Engineers,
Executive Officer.*

Copy of C. of E. 676.3 (Aircraft Warning Service) 21.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 42A

OCSigO 676.3—AWS Gen.
(8-5-40)

1st Ind. 6

WAR DEPARTMENT, OCSigO,
Washington, August 16, 1940.

To the Chief of Engineers.

1. Reference is made to your drawing "21 Man Barracks for AWS Station" dated April 3, 1940. This general plan and layout is suitable for fixed stations if due consideration be given to the local climate conditions and to the provision of space for heating plant as may be required. Space for personnel should be as follows:

a. Panama.

1 Officer, 22 enlisted men.

b. Hawaii.

Stations at Kokee and Haleakala.

2 detachments at each, consisting of

(1) 1 Officer, 19 enlisted men.

(2) 1 Officer, 26 enlisted men.

c. All other fixed stations requiring this type of construction—1 Officer, 19 enlisted men (Puerto Rico: Alaska; Kaala, T. H.).

d. Requirements at Burrwood, La., are not known at this time. If existing barracks space is now available there will be required only space necessary to house the communications and shop equipment, office, etc. This may also be available.

In connection with the stations in Hawaii, requirement for heating cannot be definitely stated other than that, from personal experience, provision for heating the communications building at Haleakala is essential. The requirements at the other two stations (Kokee and Kaala) should be investigated before completing the final plans.

Detailed projects have not yet been received enumerating the specific items of equipment to be installed at each station; however, there will be installed in the radio room a minimum of

a. 1 radio transmitter, 24' x 24' x 72' high, weight—1000 lbs.

2 radio receivers mounted in a rack 19' x 16' x approximately 76' high.

2 operating tables or desks, chairs, etc.

A power building located adjacent to the communications building is required for each fixed station. Except at Burrwood, La., where commercial power is available, the power building will house three power units and necessary switchboards. The minimum clear floor space required is 16' x 21' and ceiling height should be at least 9'. The building at Burrwood will house one power unit and should be 12' x 16' with 9' ceiling.

The communications building and power building at each station should be sufficiently removed from the detector station (minimum 300 yd.) to avoid interference with the operation of the detector. If practicable, these buildings should be located at somewhat less elevation than the detector.

2. Reference is made to your drawing "Preliminary AWS Information Centers" dated April 25, 1940. Requirements for the plotting room are stated by the Signal Corps Board as a room at least 30' x 30' x 20' high with a balcony 9' from the floor on at least two sides of the room, the major item of equipment being a plotting board 18' x 18'. The power room is required to provide space for an emergency power unit and switchboard. This room should be approximately 12' x 15' minimum.

The telephone room and radio room should each be approximately 12' x 25' minimum, the dimensions indicated providing for the most economical use of space. It is desirable, although not essential, that the radio room be readily accessible to the outside for installation of antenna lead-ins. The office should provide approximately the amount of floor space indicated in your drawing. The repair shop and storeroom may be reduced in area by about one-third.

3. In connection with the mobile detector stations no protection will be required for the equipment. No provision should be made at this time for quarters for personnel at these stations.

4. The information centers in the continental United States and Alaska are contemplated as separate buildings; in the overseas departments, the information centers will be combined with the command post. The information centers in the United States will be designed as splinter-proof with provision for later bomb-proofing as required. Provision will not be made at this time for housing for information center personnel.

5. All equipment should be suitably housed to give it the normal protection from excess moisture as is required for radio and telephone equipment in fire control installations.

6. It is requested that prior to their completion, plans be referred to this office, or that a representative of this office be given an opportunity to inspect such

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plans, in order that provision may be made for necessary ducts for carrying communication and power circuits.

7. For all building one duct from the exterior will be required for communication cable and one for power cable. The detailed requirements within the buildings are not available at this time. It is hoped that this information will be available in the near future. There will be required for information centers and communications buildings provision for antenna lead-ins.

For the Chief Signal Officer:

PAUL C. GRIPPER,
Major, Signal Corps.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 43

[1]

[SECRET]

By order of the Chief of Engineers 10/23/41

/s/ JLP
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, 3-N
Washington, October 23, 1941.

Refer to File No. 676.3 (AWS-Continental US)

Air Mail

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service—Foundation Drawings.

To: The Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, 1200 Balfour Building, 351 California Street, San Francisco, California.

1. Reproducible prints of drawings listed below are forwarded for use in the design and construction of foundations for antenna towers and transmitter buildings, where authorized, at approved fixed and semifixed Aircraft Warning Service Stations.

a. ES-D-6681-C, Floor Plan for Combined 36-foot Tower and Building used with Radio Set SCR-271.

b. ES-D-7418-A., ES-D-7419-A, ES-D-7420-A., Foundation Plan for 36-foot Tower and Building used with Radio Set SCR-271, for Three General Soil Conditions.

c. ES-D-7421-A., ES-D-7422-A., ES-D-7423-A., Foundation Plan for Tower TR-8 (100') used with Radio Sets SCR-271-A and SCR-270-C, for Three General Soil Conditions.

d. ES-D-7424-A., ES-D-7425-D., Foundation Plan and Floor Plan for Separate Transmitter Building used with SCR-271-A.

e. ES-D-7366-B., (Secret) Relative Position of 100-foot Tower TR-8 and Separate Transmitter Building used with SCR-271-A.

f. ES-D-6859-B., (Secret) ES-D-6860-A., (Secret) Sketches of 100-foot Tower and Separate Buildings used with SCR-271-A.

2. Drawing No. ES-D-6862, copies of which have been previously furnished to certain field offices has been superseded by the drawings listed in paragraph 1 a above, and is no longer applicable.

3. Action is being taken by the Office, Chief Signal Officer to change the classification of certain of the drawings listed above. [2] This office will furnish Division Engineers with a new set of the drawings as soon as notification of the change in classification is received.

By direction of the Chief of Engineers:

/s/ J. L. Person,
J. L. PERSON,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Chief, Construction Section.

Inclosures: 12 Vandyke prints of drawings listed in par. 1.

Received Nov 24, 1941 at 8:00 a. m. in U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H. as shown by receipt stamp.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 43A

[SECRET]

By Order of the Division Engineer South Pacific Division

October 30, 1941

Date

URDM

Officer Assigning

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION ENGINEER,
SOUTH PACIFIC DIVISION,

351 California St., San Francisco, California, October 30, 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service—Foundation Drawings.

To: The Dist. Engr., U. S. Engr. Office, Sacramento, Calif.
The Dist. Engr., U. S. Engr. Office, San Francisco, Calif.
The Dist. Engr., U. S. Engr. Office, Honolulu, T. H.
The Dist. Engr., U. S. Engr. Office, Los Angeles, Calif.

1. There is furnished herewith for your information and guidance copy of self-explanatory letter from the Chief of Engineers dated October 23, 1941, on the above subject, together with one reproducible print each of the drawings referred to therein.

2. The new set of drawings referred to in paragraph 3 of the inclosed letter will be forwarded to your office as soon as received.

/s/ J. R. D. Matheson,
J. R. D. MATHESON,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Acting Division Engineer.

Incl.—Cpy. O.C.E. ltr. dated 10/23/41, with incls. thereto.

Received by U. S. Engineer Office Nov. 24, 1941, at 8:00 a. m. as shown by receipt stamp Honolulu, T. H.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 44

[6531]

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, December 12, 1941.

3-N

Refer to File No. 676.3 (AWS-Cont. US)

Air Mail

Subject: Drawings and Instructions for Aircraft Warning Service Construction.

To: The Division Engineer,
South Pacific Division,
1200 Balfour Building,
351 California Street,
San Francisco, California.

1. Reproducible prints of drawings listed below applicable to foundations for and erection of the several types of Aircraft Warning Service towers and buildings, are forwarded for your information.

- a. ES-D-351-A Relative position of 100' tower and building.
- b. ES-D-8511 Standard building sheet-metal details.
- c. ES-D-8518 Electroforged grating.
- d. P-12619 (Blaw-Knox) Sections and bill of materials.
- e. P-12620 (Blaw-Knox) Sections.
- (Blaw-Knox) Sheet-metal diagram—B-K building
- f. P-12085 19'8" x 20' x 12 $\frac{3}{8}$ ".
- g. P-12086 (Blaw-Knox) Steel diagram—B-K building 19'8" x 20' x 12 $\frac{3}{8}$ ".

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- h. P-12087 (Blaw-Knox) Ceiling for B-K building 19'8" x 30' x 12'2 3/8".
- i. P-15836 (Blaw-Knox) Foundation plan, transmitter building.
- j. P-12788 (Blaw-Knox) Erection diagram, transmitter building
- k. P-12789 (Blaw-Knox) Erection diagram, special radio tower.
- l. P-12790 (Blaw-Knox) Special radio tower.
- m. P-11659 (Blaw-Knox) Foundations for 100' special radio tower.
- n. P-12792 (Blaw-Knox)
- P-12793 (Blaw-Knox) Erection diagrams, 100' special radio tower
- P-12794 (Blaw-Knox)

2. Attention is invited to the fact that drawing P-11659 (Blaw-Knox) is the equivalent of drawings ES-D-7421, ES-D-7422, and ES-D-7423, previously furnished Division Engineers, and drawing P-15836 (Blaw-Knox) is the equivalent of drawings ES-D-7424, and ES-D-7425, which were also furnished Division Engineers in letter from this office dated October 23, 1941, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service—Foundation Drawings."

3. Also inclosed are five copies of each of the following erection instructions.

- a. "Erection Instructions for Blaw-Knox operation building—20' x 20' x 12'."
- b. "Instructions for erecting 100-foot special radio tower."
- c. "Instructions for erecting combination 36-foot tower and transmitter building."

By direction of the Chief of Engineers:

J. L. PERSON,
Major, Corps of Engineers.
Assistant, Chief Operations Branch.

Inclosures:
16 Drawings
15 Specifications

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 45

[1] STATEMENT OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
COVERING ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN
HOUSE REPORT No. 1638, 78th CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION RELATING TO HIS
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEARL HARBOR DISASTER

WAR RESERVE AVIATION GASOLINE

J. B. 314, 5 September 1940, contemplated storage for 250,000 barrels for the Army and 100,000 barrels for the Navy, on the basis of an estimated cost of \$2.00 per barrel in commercial tanks of 25,000 barrel capacity. The directive of 28 December 1940 raised the estimate of cost to \$4.00 per barrel, reduced the quota (Army) for Hawaii to 100,000 barrels, and authorized preliminary surveys to be made. In March 1941, \$5,000 was made available to the District Engineer for these surveys.

The surveys were made in March 1941, and during March a representative of the Air Corps came to Hawaii, inspected sites and made recommendations. On 3 April 1941 the Commanding General forwarded to the Adjutant General his recommendations (in which the District Engineer and the Naval Commandant concurred) for locations at two sites. By letter 5 April 1941 the Chief of Engineers notified the District Engineer that priority for steel for tanks could not be obtained until the contract for the tanks had been let.

By letter 9 April 1941 the Chief of Engineers directed the District Engineer to prepare a definite project report for a total capacity of between 125,000 and 133,000 barrels, and by letter 21 April 1941 to submit recommendations regarding protection at both sites. On 21 June 1941 the District Engineer received notice that the proposed Army storage had been increased from 100,000 to 250,000 barrels.

[2] On 17 June 1941 the District Engineer was notified that funds had been authorized (\$600,000 cash and \$1,400,000 contract authorization) and directed to commit the contract authorization before 1 July. On 24 June 1941 the District Engineer forwarded his definite project report, stating that the construction for 200,000 barrels at Site "B" had been put under the Hawaiian

Constructors contract, and that the estimated completion time would be eight months. The Chief of Engineers, in forwarding this report to the Adjutant General, recommended 25,000 barrel capacity tanks instead of 50,000.

On 23 July 1941 the Division Engineer relayed to the Chief of Engineers the District Engineer's request to be permitted to proceed with excavation work, but on 26 July 1941 the District Engineer was instructed not to start work as the plans were being materially changed.

On 3 September 1941 the Adjutant General requested the Chief of Engineers to revise the plans. On 23 September 1941 the District Engineer was directed to proceed with construction at Site "B" but not to start work at Site "A" pending arrival in Honolulu of the Engineer's Advisory Committee. On 27 September 1941 the District Engineer was notified that installation of eight 40,000 barrel capacity tanks had been approved and that negotiations for procuring these eight tanks had been begun.

On 9 October 1941 the District Engineer forwarded the report of the Advisory Committee (which had been in Honolulu in September) and concurred in its recommendations, and on 31 October 1941 the District Engineer was directed to proceed with the work in accordance with the recommendations of the Advisory Committee. On 15 November 1941 the District Engineer informed [3] the Division Engineer that he estimated the tanks and the pipe line could be installed sixty days after their arrival. Construction began 19 November 1941 with a completion date of 1 June 1942. On 25 November 1941 the District Engineer wired the Division Engineer requesting immediate shipment of the channel anchors and bars. By letter 25 November 1941 the Division Engineer forwarded to the District Engineer a copy of an indorsement for the Chief of Engineers to the Navy stating that four tanks would be shipped by 30 November and the steel for the other five by 15 January 1942. On 28 November 1941 the District Engineer was notified that the channel anchors and bars were shipped 26 November.

Plans and specifications for the 40,000 barrel tanks were received by the District Engineer 22 December 1941.

[Hand written:] The foregoing history is conclusive that it would have been impossible to have completed the war reserve gas storage by the date of Pearl Harbor.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 46

[RESTRICTED]

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS

Contracts and Claims Branch

Bond, \$-----

Surety-----

Notice to proceed received by contractor -----, 19--

To be commenced-----

To be completed within six months.

Completed-----, 19--

Final payment made-----, 19--

Voucher No.-----

Contract No. W 414 Eng. 602 .

File No. 600.1 (Hawaiian Oept.)-3

Payment card by ----- Indexed by -----

3020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT

Entered into December 20, 1940.

Contractor: Hawaiian Constructors consisting of W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Gunther and Shirley Co., and Rohl-Connally Co. and Ralph Wooley.

Address: Honolulu, T. H.

For Construction of works of National Defense at locations within the Hawaiian Islands.

Total amount, Cost \$1,097,673.00
Fee 52,220.00

District Honolulu.

Appropriation Seacoast Defense.
Insular Department.

Progress Report

Month	Percent Complete	
	Scheduled	Actual
-----	S/A See form 50-----	-----

C. O. #10 11-14-41 Additional work.
C. O. #11 4-21-41 Reimburse contractor—about \$18,000.
S. A. #43 3-14-42 \$150,000.00
Fee 1,050.00
S. A. 13 1-20-42 \$4,020,530.00
Fee 57,725.00
S. A. 24 2-12-42 Add'l provision re communications
S. A. 25 2-27-42 \$4,459,000.00
Fee 43,205.00
S. A. 11 1-3-42 Adding Hwn. Cont. Co. to joint venture
C. O. #13 (pt.1) 5-13-42 Modify Contract No money
Terminate Contract 5-15-42

Contract W-414-eng-602 Hawaiian Constructors

Job Orders transmitted to GAO

No.	Date of transmittal	No.	Date of transmittal	No.	Date of transmittal
20.6	4-4	58.2	6-22	49.0	" "
21.0	4-21	47.0	6-22	20.3	" "
20.0	4-21 (Secret)	60.0	6-22	28.0	" "
29.0	4-22 (Secret)	65.0	6-22	31.0	7-17 Reg.
2.2	5-21-42	65.1	6-22	48.0	7-17 Reg.
73.0	"	65.2	6-22	38.0	7-22 Reg.
55.0	"	65.3	6-22	44.0	" "
83.0	"	65.4	6-22	88.0	" "
74.0	"	92.0	6-22	8.1	" "
54.2	"	47.0	6-22	51.0	" "
21.3	6-12	58.5	6-25 (Secret)	59.0	" "
47.1	"	75.0	7-9 (Secret)	36.0	" "
59.0	"	3.6	7-17 Reg.	47.3	" "
20.2	6-13 (Secret)	3.8	" "	98.0	" "
47.2	6-22	6.0	" "	96.0	7-29 Secret

Contract W-414-eng-602

Hawallian Constructors

Job Orders transmitted to GAO

No.	Date of transmittal	No.	Date of Transmittal
27.0	1-22 (Regular)	67.0	3-3 (Regular)
Specs. to accompany		48.0	3-3 (Regular)
above	1-27 Restricted	31.0	3-3 (Regular)
24.0	1-27 Secret	50.0	3-3
81.0	1-27 Secret	42.0	3-9 Secret
63.0 (with Addendum		28.0	3-11 (Regular)
No. 1)	2-3 Secret	33.0	3-11 (Regular)
19.0 (with Addenda		17.0	3-12 Secret
Nos. 1, 2, 3)	2-3 Secret	86.0	3-14 (Regular)
39.0	2-3 Secret	9.0	3-19 Secret
44.0	2-6 (Regular)	30.0	3-20 (Regular)
52.0	2-6 (Regular)	5.0	3-23 Secret
66.0	2-7 (Regular)	9.2	3-30 (Regular)
64.0	2-14 Secret	69.0	3-30 (Regular)
36.0 and 37.0	2-16 (Regular)	12.1	3-30 (Regular)
26.0	2-17 Secret	68.0 & 68.1	3-30 (Regular)
40.0	2-21 (Regular)	9.1	3-30 (Regular)
70.0	2-21 (Regular)	8.2	3-30 (Regular)
8.0 (3 volumes)	2-25 Secret	20.4	4-3 (Regular)
32.0	3-3 (Regular)		

Contract W-414-eng-602

Hawallian Constructors

Job Orders transmitted to GAO

RESTRICTED

SECRET

No.	Date of transmittal	No.	Date of transmittal	No.	Date of transmittal
6.2	11-27-41	3.2	11-27-41	1.0	11-27-41
6.1	11-27-41	3.3	11-27-41	15.0	11-27-41
5.2	11-27-41	3.4	11-27-41	18.0	11-27-41
6.0	11-27-41	3.5	11-27-41	11.0	11-27-41
5.1	11-27-41	3.6	11-27-41		
3.9	11-27-41	3.7	11-27-41	4.0	11-27-41
8.1	11-27-41	3.0	11-27-41	2.1	11-27-41
20.3	11-27-41	3.1	11-27-41	14.0	11-27-41
10.1	11-27-41				
3.8	11-27-41			13.0	11-27-41

21.1-----	11-29-41	Restricted
22.0-----	12- 6-41	Secret
7.1 and 7.2-----	12-20-41	Secret
20.1, 20.120, 20.130, and 20.140-----	1-14-42	(Regular)
2.30-----	1-16-42	(Regular)
20.5-----	1-16-42	(Regular)
7.3 and 7.4-----	1-19-42	Secret
7.0-----	1-19-42	Secret

3022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[1] [Stamped:] OFFICE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS 600.1 (Haw. Dept.)3
JAN 1 1941 Sub. 1 and copy 3814 (Natl. Defense) 393/1 acctg.

[RESTRICTED]

Seacoast Defense

Appropriation Titles: Insular Department
Symbol Numbers: 21011210: 21010605: 21x1204

Contract No. W414-Eng-602

C. P. F. F. Form No. 1
Approved by the Assistant Secretary of War
July 12, 1940

COST-PLUS-A-FIXED-FEE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

WAR DEPARTMENT

Contractor: Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H., consisting of W. E. Callahan Construction Co., a Nebraska Corporation, Gunther and Shirley Company, a Nebraska Corporation, ~~W. E. Callahan Construction Company~~ and Rohl-Connolly Company, a Nevada Corporation.

Fixed-fee, \$52,220.

Contract for the construction of works of National Defense at locations within the Hawaiian Islands.

Place Islands of Hawaii, Maui, Oahu and Kauai.

Estimated cost of project, \$1,097,673.00.

Payments to be made by Finance Officer at Honolulu, T. H.

The supplies and services to be obtained by this instrument are authorized by, are for the purpose set forth in, and are chargeable to the following procurement authorities, the available balances of which are sufficient to cover the cost of the same:

CAC 126 P34-99 A1200-01
SC 1450 P23-99 A0605-01
Eng 305 P13-99 A1204-N
Eng 306 P16-99 A1204-N

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Theodore Wyman, Jr.
Lt. Col. C. E.
Contracting Officer.

This contract is authorized by the following laws: National—Defense—Strengthening—Chapter 508, 3d Session (Public—No. 703—76th Congress).

I hereby authorize change of this classification from "SECRET" to "RESTRICTED."

[2]

COST-PLUS-A-FIXED-FEE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

THIS CONTRACT, entered into this 20th day of December, 1942 by THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter called the Government, represented by the Contracting Officer executing this contract, ~~W. E. Callahan Construction Company~~ Hawaiian Constructors, Honolulu, T. H., consisting of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska Corporation, Gunther and Shirley Company a Nebraska Corporation and Rohl-Connolly Company, a Nevada Corporation. ~~corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Nebraska partnership consisting of~~ (not applicable).

"and" individual trading as (not applicable) of the City of Honolulu in the Territory of Hawaii hereinafter called the Contractor, witnesseth that:

In order to expedite the building up of the national defense, it is necessary, out of moneys appropriated for national defense purposes for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, to enter into a contract, without advertising, for the construction, rehabilitation, conversion, and/or installation at various military posts, depots, stations, and other locations within the Hawaiian Islands, such plants, buildings, facilities, utilities and/or appurtenances as are or may become necessary to the functioning of the national defense plan.

¹ Delete all lines which do not apply.

[3] WHEREAS, the Government desires to have certain work performed, specifically enumerated but not restricted to the following:

1. Ammunition storage magazines on the Island of Oahu, specified in Article I, 1.
2. Warning service stations at locations to be determined, specified in Article I, 1.
3. Railway trackage at locations specified in Article I, 1.
4. Fixed Fortification Structures at locations specified in Article I, 1.
5. An addition to radio station WTJ, Island of Oahu, as specified in Article I, 1.

-----; and
WHEREAS, the accomplishment of the above-described work under a cost-plus-a-fixed-feed contract, entered into after negotiations approved by the Secretary of War, and without advertising for proposals, is authorized by law; and

WHEREAS, as a result of such negotiations, the Secretary of War has directed that the Government enter into a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract with the Contractor for the accomplishment of the above-described work;

Now, THEREFORE, the parties do mutually agree as follows:

ARTICE I—STATEMENT OF WORK

1. The Contractor shall, in the shortest possible time, furnish the labor, materials, tools, machinery, equipment, facilities, supplies not furnished by the Government, and services, and do all things necessary for the completion of the following work:

A. Ammunition storage magazines on the Island of Oahu complete with service roads, railroad spur tracks and appurtenances. The major items of work involved in the construction of the ammunition storage magazines include the approximate quantities as follows:

- Excavation 200,000 cu. yds.
- Compacted backfill 135,000 cu. yds.
- Concrete in floors, walls and protected covering 36,000 cu. yds.
- Reinforcing steel 6,000,000 lbs.

All service roads will be constructed at locations to be determined by the Contracting Officer, and will involve grading, installation of drainage structures, preparation of the sub-grade and constructing bituminous type pavements. The major features of construction include the following approximate quantities:

- Excavation 180,000 cu. yds.
- Compacted earth embankment 15,000 cu. yds.
- Foundation for pavement 6" thick, 23,000 sq. yds.
- Bituminous type pavement 3" thick, 28,000 sq. yds.
- Culverts, Total length 1,410 lin. ft.

The major items of work involved in the construction of the railroad spur tracks will include transporting government furnished materials and supplies to the site of the work, preparing the site for the tracks, furnishing ballast and constructing the tracks complete in all details as directed by the Contracting Officer. All ties, rails, switches, fastenings and track accessories will be furnished by the Government.

B. Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii, Maui and Kauai, involving certain installations, including buildings, roads, trails, cableways, haulage ways and other structures appurtenant to aircraft warning service, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

C. Railway trackage on the island of Oahu at certain locations to be designated, in accordance with detailed instructions to be issued from time to time by the Contracting Officer. All track materials, including ties, rails, frogs, switches, fastenings and track appliances, will be furnished by the Government.

D. Fortification structures for use in connection with fixed fortifications at locations to be determined by the Contracting Officer.

E. An addition to radio station WTJ in accordance with detailed instructions to be issued by the Contracting Officer.

F. The items of work to be done, enumerated in Article I, paragraphs A, B, C, D and E, include construction for which funds have been provided, in whole or in part. Additional work may be required to be done under the terms, if

and when additional moneys, appropriated for national defense purposes, become available, provided such additional work is ordered to be done by the Contracting Officer. [4] in accordance with the drawings and specifications or instructions contained in appendix "A" hereto attached and made a part hereof, or to be furnished hereafter by the Contracting Officer and subject in every detail to his supervision, direction, and instructions.

It is estimated that the total cost of the construction work covered by this contract will be approximately One Million Ninety Seven Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Three dollars (\$1,097,673.00), exclusive of the Contractor's fee, and that the work herein contracted for will be ready for utilization by the Government within six (6) months from the date of this contract. It is expressly understood, however, that the Contractor does not guarantee the correctness of either of these estimates. The estimated total cost set forth above is based upon a detailed estimate agreed to by both the Government and the Contractor, a copy of which is on file in the office of ² The Chief of Engineers.

In consideration for his undertaking under this contract the Contractor shall receive the following:

- (a) Reimbursement for expenditures as provided in article II.
- (b) Rental for Contractor's equipment as provided in article II.
- (c) A fixed fee in the amount of Fifty-two thousand, two hundred twenty dollars (\$52,220) which shall constitute complete compensation for the Contractor's services, including profit and all general overhead expenses.

2. The Contracting Officer may, at any time, by a written order and without notice to the sureties, make changes in or additions to the drawings and specifications, issue additional instructions, require additional work, or direct the omission of work covered by the contract. If such changes cause a material increase or decrease in the amount or character of the work to be done under this contract, or in the time required for its performance, an equitable adjustment of the amount of the fixed fee to be paid to the Contractor shall be made and the contract shall be modified in writing accordingly. Any claim for adjustment under this article must be asserted within 10 days from the date the change is ordered: Provided, however, That the Contracting Officer, if he determines that the facts justify such action, may receive and consider, and, with the approval of the Chief of Branch, adjust any such claim asserted at any time prior to the date of final settlement of the contract. If the parties fail to agree upon the adjustment to be made the dispute shall be determined as provided in article XV hereof. But nothing provided in this article shall excuse the Contractor from proceeding with the prosecution of the work so changed.

3. The title to all work, completed or in the course of construction, shall be in the Government. Likewise, upon delivery at the site of the work or at an approved storage site and upon inspection and acceptance in writing by the Contracting Officer, title to all materials, tools, machinery, equipment and supplies, for which the Contractor shall be entitled to be reimbursed under article II, shall vest in the Government. These provisions as to title being vested in the Government shall not operate to relieve the Contractor from any duties imposed under the terms of this contract.

4. The work shall be executed in the best and most workmanlike manner by qualified, careful, and efficient workers, in strict conformity with the best standard practices.

[5] 5. Except it be otherwise authorized by the Contracting Officer, all materials shall be of the best quality of their respective kinds. If the Contracting Officer requires that the Contractor submit for prior approval samples of materials proposed for use in the work covered by this contract, the Contractor shall make no commitments for such materials until the submitted sample has been approved by the Contracting Officer.

ARTICLE II—COST OF THE WORK

Reimbursement for Contractor's Expenditures.

1. The Contractor shall be reimbursed in the manner hereinafter described for such of his actual expenditures in the performance of the work as may be approved or ratified by the Contracting Officer and as are included in the following:

- (a) All labor, material, tools, machinery, equipment, supplies, services, power,

² Insert name of chief of branch concerned.

and fuel necessary for either temporary or permanent use for the benefit of the work. All articles of machinery or equipment valued at \$300 or less shall be classed as tools and shall be charged directly to the work. Title thereto shall thereupon pass to the Government.

(b) All subcontracts made in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

(c) Rental actually paid by the Contractor, at rates not to exceed those approved by the Contracting Officer, ~~mentioned in the schedule of rental rates in appendix "B," hereto attached and made a part hereof, except as hereinafter set forth;~~ for construction plant in sound and workable condition, such as pumps, derricks, concrete mixers, boilers, clamshell or other buckets, electric motors, electric drills, electric hammers, electric hoists, mechanical shovels, locomotive cranes, power saws, engineers' levels and transits, and such other equipment exceeding \$300 in value as may be necessary for the proper and economical prosecution of the work. Each contract for the rental of construction plant or parts thereof by the Contractor from third parties shall be in a form prescribed by the Secretary of War, shall be subject to approval by the Contracting Officer, and shall contain the same provisions entitling the Government to acquire title to such plant or any part thereof upon the same conditions as those contained in paragraph 2 of article II of this contract.

(d) Loading and unloading at the site of the work of construction plant, owned or rented by the Contractor; the transportation thereof to the place or places where it is to be used in connection with said work and return transportation f. o. b. cars to the point of original shipment or equivalent mileage, except as hereinafter set forth; the installation and dismantling thereof, and such repairs and spare parts as are not included in the rental; provided such repairs or spare parts are not made necessary by defects in such plant, or parts thereof, or by the fault or negligence of the Contractor or his employees; but charges for transportation of such construction plant over distances in excess of 500 miles must have the written authorization of the Contracting Officer in advance.

(e) Transportation charges on materials and supplies.

(f) Transportation and traveling expenses to and from the work of the necessary field forces for the economical and successful prosecution of the [6] work; expenses of procuring labor and expediting the production and transportation of material and equipment. Expenditures under these items must have the written authorization of the Contracting Officer in advance.

(g) Salaries of resident engineers, superintendents, timekeepers, foremen, and other field employees of the Contractor in connection with the work. In case the full time of any field employee of the Contractor is not applied to the work his salary shall be included in this item only in proportion to the actual time applied thereto. No person shall be assigned to service by the Contractor as superintendent of construction, chief engineer, chief purchasing agent, chief accountant, or similar position in the Contractor's field organization, or as principal assistant to any such person, until there has been submitted to and approved by the Contracting Officer a statement of the qualifications and experience of the person proposed for such assignment. The regular salary or compensation rate of any such person shall not be in excess of the highest salary or compensation rate received by him during the year preceding the date of this contract plus such increase as the Contracting Officer may approve.

(h) Temporary rights in land required in connection with the work.

(i) Buildings and equipment required for necessary field offices, commissary, hospital and other facilities and the cost of maintaining and operating said offices, hospital and other facilities, including minor expenses such as telegrams, telephone service, expressage, and postage. The cost of maintaining commissary buildings and utility service therein will be reimbursed, but the cost of all commissary operating personnel and supplies will be borne by the Contractor. All commissaries shall be operated as nearly as possible without profit or loss and shall be subject to such sanitary regulations as the Contracting Officer may prescribe.

(j) Premiums on such bonds and insurance policies as the Contracting Officer may require for the protection of the Government; the cost of all public liability, employer's liability, workmen's compensation, fidelity, fire, theft, burglary, and other insurance that the Contracting Officer may approve as reasonably necessary for the protection of the Contractor.

(k) Losses and expenses, not compensated by insurance or otherwise (including settlements made with the written consent of the Contracting Officer), actually

sustained by the Contractor in connection with the work and found and certified by the Contracting Officer to be just and reasonable.

(l) The cost of reconstructing and replacing any of the work destroyed or damaged, and not covered by insurance, but expenditures under this item must have the written authorization of the Contracting Officer in advance.

(m) Payments from his own funds made by the Contractor under the Social Security Act, and any applicable State or local taxes, fees, or charges which the Contractor may be required on account of this contract to pay on or for any plant, equipment, process, organization, materials, supplies, or personnel; and, if approved in writing by the Contracting Officer in advance, permit and license fees, and royalties on patents used including those owned by the Contractor.

[7] (n) Such portion of the transportation traveling, and hotel expenses of officers, engineers, and other employees of the Contractor as is actually incurred in connection with this work. Expenditures under this item must have the written authorization of the Contracting Officer in advance.

(o) When specifically approved in advance by the Chief of Branch, a reasonable allowance for work done in the Contractor's general offices exclusively for and directly chargeable to the work.

(p) Such other items as should, in the opinion of the Contracting Officer, be included in the cost of the work. When such an item is allowed by the Contracting Officer, it shall be specifically certified as being allowed under this paragraph.

(q) It is agreed that, unless otherwise authorized by the Contracting Officer, all allowances as items of cost on account of the work under this contract for travel expenses and subsistence provided for herein shall conform to the allowances authorized by the "Standardized Government Travel Regulations."

Rental for Contractor's Equipment.

2. Rental shall be paid to the Contractor for such construction plant or parts thereof, as he may own and furnish, at not to exceed the rates mentioned in the ~~schedule of rental rates hereto attached, except as hereinafter set forth,~~ approved by the Contracting Officer. Except as specified below, such rental shall begin on the date of the delivery of such plant, or part thereof to a common carrier for shipment to the site of the work, as evidenced by the bill of lading covering such shipment, and shall terminate, unless title thereto passes to the Government at an earlier date, on the date of the delivery of such plant, or parts thereof, to a common carrier for shipment from the ~~site of the work~~ Government dock at Fort Mason, Calif., as evidenced by the bill of lading covering such shipment, provided such plant, or parts thereof, are so delivered without delay after notice by the Contracting Officer to the Contractor that such plant, or parts thereof, are no longer required; otherwise, the rental shall terminate on the date of such notice. If such plant, or any part thereof, is not in sound and workable condition when it arrives at the site of the work, the rental period therefor shall not begin until such plant, or parts thereof, shall have been placed in sound and workable condition at the expense of the Contractor, and no rental therefor shall be paid for any prior period. If such plant, or parts thereof, cannot be placed in sound and workable condition, no transportation charges for the shipment thereof shall be included in the cost of the work or paid, either directly or indirectly, by the Government. Determination as to whether such plant, or parts thereof, are in sound and workable condition shall, in every instance, be made by the Contracting Officer. Slight delays in the use of such plant, or parts thereof, caused by necessary minor or field repairs and replacements shall not interrupt the rental period, but no rental shall be paid for the period of any delay in the use of such plant, or parts thereof, caused by other than necessary minor or field repairs. ~~When such construction plant or any part thereof shall arrive at the site of the work, the Contractor shall file with the Contracting Officer a schedule setting forth the fair valuation at that time of each part of such construction plant. Such valuation shall be deemed final unless the Contracting Officer shall, within 10 days after the machinery has been set up and working, modify or change such valuation. When and if the total rental paid to the Contractor for any such part shall equal the valuation thereof, plus one percent (1%) per month for each~~ [7.1] Before the delivery of any item of plant to the site of the work, the contractor shall file with the contracting officer a schedule setting forth the fair valuation at that time of each part of such construction plant. Such valuation shall be deemed final unless the contracting officer shall, within 10 days after the

machinery has been set up and working, modify or change such valuation. Any new equipment purchased by the contractor for rental on the job must be acceptable to the contracting officer, and no purchase of any item of equipment at a cost exceeding \$500 shall be made without prior approval of the contracting officer. When and if the total rental paid to the Contractor for any such part shall equal the valuation thereof, plus one percent (1%) per month for each month or fraction thereof such part has been in use, no further rental therefor shall be paid to the Contractor, and title thereto shall vest in the Government. At the completion of the work or upon termination of the contract as provided in article VI, the Government may at its option purchase any part of such construction plant by paying to the Contractor the difference between the valuation of such part or parts, plus one percent (1%) per month for each month or fraction thereof such part or parts have been in use and the total rentals theretofore paid for such part or parts. The contracting officer will furnish necessary fuel and lubricants required for the operation of the construction plant at the site of the work. The contractor will maintain at all times a suitable supply of repair parts acceptable to the contracting officer, payments for such parts delivered to the site of the work and deemed necessary by the contracting officer for the maintenance and operation of the plant will be made upon presentation of a receipted proper invoice.

[8] ~~month or fraction thereof such part has been in use, no further rental therefor shall be paid to the Contractor, and title thereto shall vest in the Government. At the completion of the work or upon termination of the contract as provided in article VI, the Government may at its option purchase any part of such construction plant by paying to the Contractor the difference between the valuation of such part or parts, plus one percent (1%) per month for each month or fraction thereof such part or parts have been in use and the total rentals theretofore paid for such part or parts.~~

SEE PAGE 7-A

General

3. The Government reserves the right to furnish any materials, construction equipment, machinery, or tools necessary for the completion of the work.

4. The Government reserves the right to pay directly to common carriers any or all freight charges on construction plant, materials, and supplies.

5. The Government reserves the right to pay directly to the persons concerned all sums due from the Contractor for labor, materials, or other charges.

6. Rates of rental as substitutes for scheduled rental rates may be agreed upon in writing between the Contractor and the Contracting Officer, such rates to be in conformity with similar rates of rental charged in the particular territory in which the work covered by this contract is to be performed. Such substitute rates shall be subject to the approval of the Chief of Branch, but shall be followed until so approved, at which time any necessary adjustments in prior payments will be made.

7. No salaries of the Contractor's executive officers, no part of the expense incurred in conducting the Contractor's main office or regularly established branch offices, and no overhead expenses of any kind, except as specifically authorized in section 1 of this article, shall be included in the cost of the work; nor shall any interest on capital employed or on borrowed money be included in the cost of the work.

8. The Contractor shall, to the extent of his ability, take all cash and trade discounts, rebates, allowances, credits, salvage, commissions, and bonifications, and when unable to take advantage of such benefits he shall promptly notify the Contracting Officer to that effect and the reason therefor. In determining the actual net cost of articles and materials of every kind required for the purpose of this contract, there shall be deducted from the gross cost thereof all cash and trade discounts, rebates, allowances, credits, salvage, commissions, and bonifications which have accrued to the benefit of the Contractor or would have so accrued except for the fault or neglect of the Contractor. Such benefits lost through no fault or neglect on the part of the Contractor, or lost through fault of the Government, shall not be deducted from gross costs.

9. All revenue from the operations of the hospital or other facilities, except commissaries, or from rebates, discounts, refunds, etc., shall be accounted for by the Contractor and applied in reduction of the cost of the work.

[9]

ARTICLE III—PAYMENTS

Reimbursement for Cost.

1. The Government will currently reimburse the Contractor for expenditures made in accordance with article II upon certification to and verification by the Contracting Officer of the original signed pay rolls for labor, the original said invoices for materials, or other original papers. Generally, reimbursement will be made weekly but may be made at more frequent intervals if the conditions so warrant.

Rental for Contractor's Equipment.

2. Rental as provided in article II for such construction plant or parts thereof as the Contractor may own and furnish shall be paid monthly upon presentation of proper vouchers.

Payment of the Fixed-Fee.

3. The fixed-fee prescribed in article I shall be compensation in full for the services of the Contractor, including profit and all general overhead expenses. Ninety percent (90%) of said fixed-fee shall be paid as it accrues, in monthly installments based upon the percentage of the completion of the work as determined from estimates made and approved by the Contracting Officer. Upon completion of the work and its final acceptance, any unpaid balance of the fee shall be paid to the Contractor. If the contract is terminated for the convenience of the Government, before completion, the Contractor will be paid that proportion of the prescribed fee which the work actually completed bears to the entire project, less fee payments previously made. If the contract is terminated due to the fault of the Contractor, no additional payments on account of the fee will be made.

Payments by Contractor.

4. If bills for purchase of material, machinery or equipment, or pay rolls covering employment of laborers or mechanics incurred by the Contractor or by any subcontractor hereunder are not promptly paid by the Contractor or subcontractor as the case may be, the Contracting Officer may, in his discretion, withhold from payments otherwise due the Contractor an amount equivalent to the amount of any such bill or pay roll. Should the Contractor neglect or refuse to pay such bills or pay rolls or to direct any subcontractor to pay such bills or pay rolls within five (5) days after notice from the Contracting Officer so to do, the Government shall have the right to pay such bills or pay rolls directly, in such event a deduction equal to five percent (5%) of the amount so paid directly shall be made from the Contractor's fee.

Final payment.

5. Upon completion of the work and its final acceptance in writing by the Contracting Officer, the Government shall pay to the Contractor the unpaid balance of the cost of the work determined under Article II hereof, and of the fee, less any sum that may be necessary to settle any unsettled claims for labor or material, or any claim the Government may have against the Contractor. The Contracting Officer shall accept the completed work with reasonable promptness. [10] The Contractor shall, if required, furnish the Government with a release of all claims against the Government arising under and by virtue of this contract other than such claims, if any, as be specifically excepted by the Contractor from the operation of the release in stated amounts to be set forth therein.

ARTICLE IV—RECORDS AND ACCOUNTS—INSPECTION AND AUDIT

1. The Contractor agrees to keep records and books of account, on a recognized cost-accounting basis, showing the actual cost to him of all items of labor, material, equipment, supplies, services, and other expenditures of whatever nature for which reimbursement is authorized under the provisions of this contract. The system of accounting to be employed by the Contractor shall be such as is satisfactory to the Contracting Officer.

2. The Contracting Officer shall at all times be afforded proper facilities for inspection of the work and shall at all times have access to the premises, work and materials, to all books, records, correspondence, instructions, plans, drawings, receipts, vouchers, and memoranda of every description of the Contractor pertaining to said work; and the Contractor shall preserve for a period of 3 years after completion or termination of this contract, all books, records, and other papers herein mentioned.

3. Any duly authorized representative of the Contractor shall be accorded the privilege of examining the books, records, and papers of the contracting officer relating to the cost of the work for the purpose of checking up and verifying such cost.

ARTICLE V—SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

1. The Contractor hereby agrees that he will:

(a) Procure and thereafter maintain such bonds and insurance in such forms and in such amounts and for such periods of time as the Contracting Officer may approve or require.

(b) Procure all necessary permits and licenses; obey and abide by all applicable laws, regulations, ordinances, and other rules of the United States of America, of the State, Territory, or subdivision thereof wherein the work is done, or of any other duly constituted public authority.

(c) Unless this provision is waived in writing by the contracting officer, reduce to writing every contract in excess of two thousand dollars (\$2,000) made by him for the purpose of the work hereunder for services, materials, supplies, machinery, or equipment, or for the use thereof; insert therein a provision that such contract is assignable to the Government; make all such contracts in his own name, and not bind or purport to bind the Government or the Contracting Officer thereunder. No purchases in excess of \$500 shall be made or placed without the prior approval of the Contracting Officer.

(d) Enter into no subcontract for any portion of the work, except in the form prescribed by the Secretary of War, nor without the written approval of the Contracting Officer. Subcontracts are defined as contracts entered into by the Contractor with others which involve the performance, wholly or in part at the site of the work, of some part of the work described in Article I hereof.

[11] (e) At all times during the progress of the work keep at the site thereof a duly appointed and qualified representative who shall receive and execute on the part of the Contractor such notices, directions, and instructions as the Contracting Officer may give.

(f) The Contracting Officer may require the Contractor to dismiss from the work such employee as the Contracting Officer deems incompetent, careless, insubordinate, or otherwise objectionable.

(g) At all times use his best efforts in all acts hereunder to protect and subserve the interest of the Government.

ARTICLE VI—TERMINATION OF CONTRACT BY GOVERNMENT

1. Should the Contractor at anytime refuse, neglect, or fail to prosecute the work with promptness and diligence, or default in the performance of any of the agreements herein contained, or should conditions arise which make it advisable or necessary in the interest of the Government to cease work under this contract, the Government may terminate this contract by a notice in writing from the Contracting Officer to the Contractor. Such termination shall be effective in the manner and upon the date specified in said notice and shall be without prejudice to any claims which the Government may have against the Contractor. Upon receipt of such notice the Contractor shall, unless the notice directs otherwise, immediately discontinue all work and the placing of all orders for materials, facilities, and supplies in connection with performance of this contract and shall proceed to cancel promptly all existing orders and terminate work under all subcontractors insofar as such orders and/or work are chargeable to this contract.

2. If this contract is terminated for the fault of the Contractor, the Contracting Officer may enter upon the premises and take possession, for the purpose of completing the work contemplated by this contract, of all materials, tools, equipment, and appliances and all options, privileges, and rights, and may complete or employ any other person or persons to complete said work.

3. Upon the termination of this contract as hereinbefore provided, full and complete settlement of all claims of the Contractor arising out of this contract shall be made as follows:

(a) The Government shall assume and become liable for all obligations, commitments, and claims that the Contractor may have theretofore in good faith undertaken or incurred in connection with said work and in accordance with the provisions of this contract; and the Contractor shall, as a condition of receiving the payments mentioned in this article, execute and deliver all such papers and

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take all such steps as the Contracting Officer may require for the purpose of fully vesting in the Government the rights and benefits of the Contractor under such obligations or commitments.

(b) The Government shall reimburse the Contractor for all expenditures made in accordance with Article II and not previously reimbursed.

(c) If this contract is terminated for the convenience of the Government, the Government shall reimburse the Contractor for such further expenditures after the date of termination for the protection of Government property and for accounting services in connection with the settlement of this contract as the Contracting Officer may approve.

[12] (d) The Government should pay to the Contractor any unpaid balance for the rental of the Contractor's equipment in accordance with Article II to the date of termination, and if any of the Contractor's equipment is retained by the Government under the provisions of this article, additional compensation therefore shall be paid in accordance with Article II, either by purchase or rental at the election of the Contracting Officer.

(e) The obligation of the Government to make any of the payments required by this article, or by paragraph 3, Article III of this contract, shall be subject to any unsettled claims for labor or material or any claim the Government may have against the Contractor.

ARTICLE VII—PREFERENCE FOR DOMESTIC ARTICLES

1. In the performance of the work covered by this contract the Contractor, subcontractors, materialmen or suppliers, shall use only such unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or produced in the United States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States. The foregoing provision shall not apply to such articles, materials, or supplies of the class or kind to be used or such articles, materials, or supplies from which they are manufactured, as are not mined, produced or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality, or to such articles, materials, or supplies as may be excepted by the head of the department under the proviso of title III, section 3, of the act of March 3, 1933, 47 Stat. 1520 (U. S. Code, title 41, section 10b).

2. Inasmuch as the materials listed below or the materials from which they are made are not mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities and of satisfactory qualities, their use in the work herein specified is hereby authorized without regard to the country of origin:

Asbestos.	Nickel.
Balsa wood.	Nickel alloy
China wood oil	(Monel metal).
(Tung oil).	Platinum.
Chromium.	Rubber.
Cork.	Silk.
Jute.	Sisal.
Kaurigum.	Teak wood.
Lac.	Tin.

Articles, materials, or supplies made in the United States and containing mercury, antimony, tungsten, or mica of foreign origin may be used (subject to the requirements of applicable specifications) in the work herein specified, if such manufactured articles, materials, or supplies have been made in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States.

ARTICLE VIII—CONVICT LABOR

The Contractor shall not employ any person undergoing sentence of imprisonment at hard labor.

[13]

ARTICLE IX—RATES OF WAGES—NONREBATE

1. In accordance with the act of August 30, 1935 (49 Stat. 1011; 40 U. S. C. 276a and 276a-1), the following provisions shall apply:

(a) The Contractor or his subcontractor shall pay all mechanics and laborers employed directly upon the site of the work, unconditionally and not less often than once a week, and without subsequent deduction or rebate on any account the full amounts accrued at the time of payment, computed at wage rates not less than those established by the Secretary of Labor for the work herein specified, regardless of any contractual relationship which may be alleged to exist between the Contractor or subcontractor and such laborers and mechanics; and the scale of wages to be paid shall be posted by the Contractor in a prominent and easily accessible place at the site of the work. The Contracting Officers shall have the right to withhold from the Contractor so much of accrued payments as may be considered necessary by the Contracting Officer to pay to laborers and mechanics employed by the Contractor or any subcontractor on the work the difference between the rates of wages required by the contract to be paid laborers and mechanics on the work and the rates of wages received by such laborers and mechanics and not refunded to the Contractor, subcontractors, or their agents.

(b) In the event it is found by the Contracting Officer that any laborer or mechanic employed by the Contractor or any subcontractor directly on the site of the work covered by the contract has been or is being paid a rate of wages less than the rate of wages required by the contract to be paid as aforesaid, the Government may, by written notice to the Contractor, terminate his right to proceed with the work or such part of the work as to which there has been a failure to pay said required wages and prosecute the work to completion by contract or otherwise and the Contractor shall be liable to the Government for any excess costs occasioned the Government thereby.

2. Should the Contractor or any subcontractor pay to any laborer or mechanic a wage based upon a rate in excess of the wage rate for the classification in which said laborer or mechanic is included as established for the work by the Secretary of Labor, such increased wage shall be at the expense of the Contractor and shall not be reimbursed by the United States. When, in connection with the audit and check by the Contracting Officer or his authorized representative, of the Contractor's pay rolls, prior to reimbursement as contemplated in paragraph 1 of article II hereof, it is found that one or more laborers and/or mechanics have been paid wages at rates in excess of the wage rates, established for such laborers and/or mechanics, the reimbursement made to the Contractor on account of such pay rolls will not include such excess payments. The provisions of this section shall not apply when wage rates for a particular classification greater than those prescribed by the Secretary of Labor have been approved in writing by the Contracting Officer who executed this contract or his successor.

3. The Contractor shall furnish to the Government representative in charge at the site of the work covered by this contract or if no Government representative is in charge at the site, shall mail to the Federal agency having control of the project, within 7 days after the payment of each and every weekly pay roll, an affidavit in the form prescribed by regulations issued jointly by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Interior under date of January 8, 1935, or any modification thereof pursuant to the act of June 13, 1934 (48 Stat. 948; 40 U. S. C. 276b and 276c), sworn to by the officer or employee of the Contractor supervising such payment to the effect that each and every person employed on the work has been paid in full the weekly wages shown on the pay roll covered by the affidavit; that no rebates, or deductions from any wages due such employee or employees not required by law have been made either directly or indirectly, and that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the affiant no agreement or understanding exists with any person employed on the project pursuant to which any person, directly or indirectly, by force, intimidation, threat, or otherwise, induces or receives any deductions or rebates in any manner whatever from any sum paid or to be paid any person for labor performed in carrying out this contract. At the time upon which the first affidavit with respect to wages paid employees is filed the Contractor shall also furnish an affidavit executed by its president or a vice president, setting forth the name of the officer or em-

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ployee who supervises the payment of employees and stating that such officer or employee is in a position to have full knowledge of the facts set forth in the affidavit respecting the payment of wages of employees. A similar affidavit shall be filed immediately in the event that a change is made in the officer or employee who supervises the payment of employees. The Contractor shall cause appropriate provisions to be inserted in all subcontracts relating to this work to insure fulfillment of the requirements of this article.

ARTICLE X—WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS

The act of June 25, 1936 (49 Stat. 1938, 1939; 40 U. S. C. 290), provides that the several States have authority to make their workmen's compensation laws applicable to contracts for the construction, alteration, or repair of a public building or public work of the United States, and the several States are vested with the power and authority to enforce such State laws on lands of the United States.

ARTICLE XI—ACCIDENT PREVENTION

The Contractor shall at all times exercise reasonable precautions for the safety of employees on the work and shall comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, local, State, and municipal safety laws and building and construction codes.

ARTICLE XII—OFFICIALS NOT TO BENEFIT

No Member of or Delegate to Congress, or Resident Commissioner, shall be admitted to any share or part of this contract or to any benefit that may arise therefrom, but this provision shall not be construed to extend to his contract if made with a corporation for its general benefit.

ARTICLE XIII—APPROVAL REQUIRED

This contract shall be subject to the written approval of ~~Assistant~~ Under Secretary of War and shall not be binding until so approved.

ARTICLE XIV—COVENANT AGAINST CONTINGENT FEES

The Contractor warrants that he has not employed any person to solicit or secure this contract upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee. Breach of this warranty shall give the Government the right to terminate the contract, or in its discretion, to deduct from payments due the Contractor the amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent [15] fee. This warranty shall not apply to commissions payable by Contractors upon contracts or sales secured or made through bona fide established commercial or selling agencies maintained by the Contractor for the purpose of securing business.

ARTICLE XV—DISPUTES

Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, all disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, subject to written appeal by the Contractor within 30 days to the Chief of Branch concerned or his duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties hereto, when the amount involved is \$15,000 or less. When the amount involved is more than \$15,000, the decision of the Chief of Branch shall be subject to written appeal within 30 days by the Contractor to the Secretary of War or his duly authorized representative, whose decision shall be final and conclusive upon the parties hereto. In the meantime the Contractor shall diligently proceed with the work as directed.

ARTICLE XVI—CONTRACTOR'S ORGANIZATION AND METHODS

Upon the execution of this contract the Contractor shall submit to the Contracting Officer a chart showing the executive and administrative personnel to be regularly assigned for full or part-time service in connection with the work under contract, together with a written statement of the duties of each person and the administrative procedure to be followed by the Contractor for the control and direction of the work; and the data so furnished shall be supplemented

as additional pertinent data become available. There shall also be submitted to the Contracting Officer by the Contractor charts of the various field organizations showing all personnel, other than artisans, mechanics, helpers, and laborers to be assigned for full or part-time service outside of the central-office organization, together with a written statement of the duties and rates of pay of each person and the procedure proposed to be followed by the Contractor for the accomplishment of all field work, including temporary requirements; and the data so furnished shall be supplemented as additional pertinent data become available. Statements of procedure shall include purchasing, disbursing, accounting, transportation, storage, employment, housing, sanitation, subsistence, recreation, and similar essential activities and methods.

ARTICLE XVII—DEFINITIONS

1. The term "Chief of Branch" refers to the head of a branch or bureau of the War Department, viz., the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Engineers, etc.

2. The term "his duly authorized representative" shall mean any person authorized by the Secretary of War or a chief of branch, as the case may be, to act for him, other than the Contracting Officer.

3. Except for the original signing of this contract, the term "Contracting Officer" as used herein shall include his duly appointed successor or his authorized representative.

[16]

ARTICLE XVIII—ALTERATIONS

The following changes were made in this contract before it was signed by the parties hereto:

APPENDIX "B" was added.

In Article 11, Section 2, line 9, the words "the site of the work" were deleted and in lieu thereof the following words were inserted: "Government dock at Fort Mason, Calif." Beginning in line 28 of said Article and Section with the word "When" the balance of the section was deleted and page 7A added.

ARTICLE XIX—EIGHT-HOUR LAW—OVERTIME COMPENSATION

No laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by this contract, in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor contracting for any part of said work contemplated, shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon such work at the site thereof, except upon the condition that compensation is paid to such laborer or mechanic in accordance with the provisions of this article. The wages of every laborer and mechanic employed by the contractor or any subcontractor engaged in the performance of this contract shall be computed on a basic day rate of eight hours per day and work in excess of eight hours per day is permitted only upon the condition that every such laborer and mechanic shall be compensated for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of pay. For each violation of the requirements of this article a penalty of five dollars shall be imposed upon the contractor for each laborer or mechanic for every calendar day in which such employee is required or permitted to labor more than eight hours upon said work without receiving compensation computed in accordance with this article, and all penalties thus imposed shall be withheld for the use and benefit of the Government: *Provided*, That this stipulation shall be subject in all respects to the exceptions and provisions of U. S. Code, title 40, sections 321, 324, 325 and 326, relating to hours of labor, as in part modified by the provisions of Section 303 of Public Act No. 781, 76th Congress, approved September 9, 1940, relating to compensation for overtime.

ARTICLE XX—LOADING AND UNLOADING RAILWAY CARS

The contractor shall load promptly all railroad cars furnished for loading upon his order and shall unload from railroad cars promptly upon arrival all shipments consigned to him and shall provide storage facilities and other facilities necessary for these purposes; and the contractor shall not order railway cars for loading unless they can be loaded promptly and shall not cause or permit shipments to be consigned to him unless they can be unloaded from railroad cars promptly upon arrival.

[17] IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this contract as of the day and year first above written.

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Approval recommended: Dec. 28, 1940

J. L. Schley, J. L. SCHLEY, Major General, Chief of Engineers.	By	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Theodore Wyman, Jr. THEODORE WYMAN, JR., Lt. Col. C. E.
Two witnesses: H. F. BARSA, 1501 Hamlin St. NE., Washington, D. C. ANASTASIA B. GOWEN, 101 N. Carolina Ave. SE., Washington, D. C.	By	HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS (Contractor) PAUL GRAFE, (Business address.)

Approved 3 January, 1941

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Undersecretary of War.

I. _____, certify that I am the _____, secretary of the corporation named as Contractor herein; that _____ who signed this contract on behalf of the Contractor was then _____ of said corporation; that said contract was duly signed for and in behalf of said corporation by authority of its governing body, and is within the scope of its corporate powers.

(CORPORATE SEAL)

I hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, based upon observation and inquiry, Paul Grafe, who signed this [18] contract for the Hawaiian Constructors had authority to execute the same, and is the individual who signs similar contracts on behalf of this corporation with the public generally.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Theodore Wyman, Jr.
(Contracting Officer) Lt. Col. C. E.

DIRECTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF CONTRACT

1. This form shall be used when authorized by the Secretary of War for formal contracts for the construction, alteration, or repair of buildings or works accomplished under the provisions of the law specifically authorizing the use of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract.

2. There shall be no deviation from this approved contract form, except as provided for in these directions, without approval of the Secretary of War or his duly authorized representative. Where interlineations, deletions, additions, or alterations are authorized, specific notations of the same shall be entered in the blank space following the article entitled "Alterations" before signing. This article is not to be construed as general authority to deviate from the form. Deletion of the descriptive matter not applicable in the preamble need not be noted in the article entitled "Alterations."

3. All blank spaces on the little page must be filled in including a citation of the act or acts authorizing the contract. The Contracting Officer or his duly authorized representative will sign the certificate of availability of funds appearing on the title page.

4. The blank space in the preamble is intended for the insertion of a statement of the work to be done, together with place of performance, or for the enumeration of papers which contain the necessary data.

5. The blank spaces in articles I and XIII must be filled in with the data indicated therein. The contract must be dated, and the performance and payment bonds, if required, must bear the same date.

6. Each appendix will contain a sufficiently descriptive statement to identify it with the contract viz.:

APPENDIX "A" to Contract No. W414-Eng-602, dated December 20, 1940 between THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and Hawaiian Constructors for the construction of works of National Defense at locations within the Hawaiian Islands.

7. Contracts subject to approval are not valid until approved by the authority designated to approve them, and the Contractor's number will not be delivered [19] ed, nor any distribution made, until such approval. All changes and deletions must have been made before the contract is forwarded for approval.

8. The number of executed copies and of certified copies, designation of

disbursing officer, statement of appropriation, amount of bond if required, as well as other administrative details, shall be as directed by the Chief of Branch to which the contract pertains.

9. An officer of a corporation, a member of a partnership, or an agent signing for the principal, shall place his signature and title after the word "by" under the name of the principal. A contract executed by an attorney or agent on behalf of the Contractor shall be accompanied by two authenticated copies of his power of attorney, or other evidence of his authority to act on behalf of the Contractor.

10. If the Contractor is a corporation, one of the certificates following the signature of the parties must be executed. If the contract is signed by the secretary of the corporation, then the first certificate must be executed by some other officer of the corporation under the corporate seal, or the second certificate executed by the Contracting Officer. In lieu of either of the aforementioned certificate there may be attached to the contract copies of so much of the records of the corporation as will show the official character and authority of the officer signing, duly certified by the secretary or assistant secretary, under the corporate seal, to be true copies.

11. The full name and business address of the Contractor must be inserted, and the contract signed with his usual signature. Typewrite or print name under all signatures to contract or bonds.

12. Any provisions respecting labor or materials required by law to be included in this contract and any additional contract provisions deemed necessary for the particular work shall be made the subject of one or more additional articles or included in the specifications, appendix "A".

[20]

APPENDIX "B"

To Contract No. W414-Eng-602, dated December 20, 1940, between THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Hawaiian Constructors.

1. The following changes were made in the aforementioned contract before it was signed:

a. In Article II, Section 1 (c), lines 1, 2 and 3, the words "mentioned in the schedule of rental rates in Appendix "B", hereto attached and made a part hereof, except as hereinafter set forth," were deleted therefrom and in lieu thereof the following words were inserted: "approved by the Contracting Officer,".

b. In Article II, Section 1 (d), the following phrase was inserted in line 1 between the words "Unloading" and "of": "at the site of the work". There was also inserted in line 3 in said Article and Section between the word "work" and the comma immediately following it, the phrase: "and return transportation f. o. b. cars to the point of original shipment or equivalent mileage".

c. In Article II, Section 2, lines 2 and 3, the words "mentioned in the schedule of rental rates hereto attached, except as hereinafter set forth," were deleted therefrom and in lieu thereof the following words were inserted: "approved by the Contracting Officer."

d. In Article IX, Section 2, the following sentence was added at the end thereof: "The provisions of this section shall not apply when wage rates for a particular classification greater than those prescribed by the Secretary of Labor have been approved in writing by the Contracting Officer who executed this contract or his successor."

e. A new Article, Number XIX, is added and shall read as follows:

"ARTICLE XIX—*Eight-Hour Law*—Overtime Compensation. No laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by this contract, in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor contracting for any part of said work contemplated, shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon such work at the site thereof, except upon the condition that compensation is paid to such laborer or mechanic in accordance with the provisions of this article. The wages of every laborer and mechanic employed by the contractor or any subcontractor engaged in the performance of this contract shall be computed on a basic day rate of eight hours per day and work in excess of eight hours per day is permitted only upon the condition that every such laborer and mechanic shall be compensated for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of pay. For each violation of the requirements of this article a penalty of five dollars shall be imposed upon the contractor for each laborer or mechanic for every calendar day in which such employee is required

or permitted to labor more than eight hours upon said work without receiving compensation computed in accordance with this article, and all penalties thus imposed shall be with- [21] held for the use and benefit of the Government; *Provided*, That this stipulation shall be subject in all respects to the exceptions and provisions of U. S. Code, title 40, sections 321, 324, 325 and 326, relating to hours of labor, as in part modified by the provisions of Section 303 of Public Act No. 781, 76th Congress, approved September 9, 1940, relating to compensation for overtime."

f. A new Article, number XX, is added and shall read as follows:

"**ARTICLE XX—Loading and Unloading Railway Cars.** The contractor shall load promptly all railroad cars furnished for loading upon his order and shall unload from railroad cars promptly upon arrival all shipments consigned to him and shall provide storage facilities and other facilities necessary for these purposes; and the contractor shall not order railway cars for loading unless they can be loaded promptly and shall not cause or permit shipments to be consigned to him unless they can be unloaded from railroad cars promptly upon arrival."

End of Appendix "B"

Revised 9/26/40

40/1553

[1] ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 46-A

600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields) 62/3

RESTRICTED

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT

This supplemental agreement entered into this 22d day of March, 1941, by and between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter called the Government, represented by the contracting officer executing this agreement, and The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture, composed of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska corporation; Gunther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska corporation, and Rohl-Connolly Company, a Nevada corporation, joint contractors and co-adventurers, hereinafter called the contractor, WITNESSETH That:

WHEREAS, On the 20th day of December, 1940, the parties hereto entered into contract No. W-414-eng-602 for the performance of work therein described at locations within the Territory of Hawaii, hereinafter referred to as the said contract; and

WHEREAS, It is found advantageous and in the best interests of the United States to modify the said contract so that construction work and services, more particularly hereinafter described, in addition to that covered by the said contract, may be performed for the benefit of the National Defense; and

WHEREAS, The work and services to be performed by this Supplemental Agreement are authorized by, are for the purpose set forth in, and are chargeable to, Procurement Authority No. Eng-602 P99A-0540.063-N, the available balance of which is \$1,687,000, and to Procurement Authority No. Eng-716 P99A-0540.062-N, the available balance of which is \$283,880.

[2] Now, THEREFORE, The said contract is hereby modified in the following particulars, but in no others:

1. The contractor agrees, for and in consideration of the fixed fee being increased as hereinafter provided, to perform the work and services (in addition to that covered by the said contract) described in Schedules A and B herein and made a part hereof.

2. The estimated total cost of the work and services covered by this Supplemental Agreement is approximately \$1,671,000, exclusive of the contractor's fee for said work and services. The estimated total cost set forth above is based upon field data now available and agreed to by both the Government and the contractor.

3. The fixed fee stated in the said contract shall be increased in the amount of sixty-nine thousand dollars (\$69,000), which shall cover all the work and services irrespective of the cost thereof.

4. The work shall be done in conformity with the provisions of the War Department Construction policy dated June 15, 1940, File AG 600-12 (6-15-40) M-D-M, and its supplements.

5. Work to be done shall be undertaken immediately after receipt by the contractor of notice to proceed. The work shall be prosecuted with faithfulness and energy and shall be completed as follows:

(a) Temporary housing construction and facilities as described in Schedule A within sixty (60) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(b) Bomb storage magazines and facilities as described in Schedule B within one hundred (100) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

[3] 6. Minor changes in structures and facilities as may be found necessary in the interest of economy or required due to climatic conditions may be directed by the contracting officer without additional compensation to the contractor.

7. The work as described in Schedules A and B shall be in accordance with applicable paragraphs of the Standard Specifications of the Quartermaster General (Construction Division) for similar items.

THIS SUPPLEMENT AGREEMENT shall be subject to the approval of the Under Secretary of War.

[4] *Schedule "A"*

Construction for Increase in Air Corps, Hawaiian Department, Consisting of Temporary Housing Construction and Facilities To Be Located in Territory of Hawaii as Directed by the Contracting Officer

Item	Size, Feet	Plan No. 700-	Capacity	Total Req'd
1. Barracks, Air Corps.....	29 x 80.....	1165	63	23
2. Barracks, Service Tr.....	29 x 80.....	1165	63	29
3. Mess, E. M.....	25 x 108.....	1116	250	3
4. Mess, E. M.....	82 x 160.....	1331	500	1
5. Mess, E. M.....	130 x 138.....	1325	1,000	2
6. Mess, Officers.....	25 x 72.....	1127	118	2
7. Mess, Officers.....	25 x 93.....	1127	170	1
8. Mess, Officers.....	25 x 114.....	1127	250	1
9. Day Rooms, AC, E. M.....	25 x 72.....	1110	250	7
10. Day Rooms, Ser. Tr. E. M.....	25 x 72.....	1110	250	5
11. Officers Quarters.....	30 x 146.....	1257	40	14
12. AC Operations Bldgs. A-12.....	25 x 108.....	397	38 Clerks	13
13. AC Utilities Shp SP-8.....	25 x 99.....	316		1
14. AC Utilities Shp SP-11.....	25 x 141.....	318		1
15. AC Mtncs Shed SD-8.....	28 x 90.....	312		1
16. Adm. Bldgs. Sqs. A-8.....	25 x 72.....	251	22 Clerks	6
17. Adm. Bldgs. Gp. A-22.....	25 x 63.....	253		3
18. AC Unit Adm. & Sup.....	25 x 78.....	377		7
19. AC Hangar Annex.....	25 x 99.....	316		8
20. AC Warehouse SH-9.....	25 x 108.....	322		1
21. Infirmary I-4.....	25 x 111.....	282		2
22. Service Warehouses SH-13.....	60 x 153.....	324		6
23. Ordnance Rep. Shop SP-6.....	25 x 39.....	315		3
24. QM & Ord. Paint & Oil Storage SP-13.....	25 x 36.....	319		4
25. Motor Repair Shop SP-2 (1-AC, 1-QM).....	37 x 84.....	314		4
26. Utilities Rep. Shop.....	25 x 45.....	3154		1
27. QM Utilities Shop SP-9.....	25 x 129.....	316		1
28. Med. Warehouse SH-8.....	25 x 54.....	322		1
29. Ord. Storehouse SH-8 (bomb sand loading).....	25 x 54.....	322		3
30. S. A. & Bomb Stor. Mag.....	24 x 60.....	289		6
31. S. A. & Bomb Stor. Mag.....	20 x 20.....	M-2 289		8
32. QM Oil Storage SH-11.....	25 x 54.....	M-1 323		1
33. Vehicle Gasoline Station GOS-2 (With pump) (1-A.C., 1-Q.M.).....	22 x 35.....	365		4
34. Radio Rep. Shop SH-9.....	25 x 108.....	322		3
[5]				
35. Adm. Bldgs. Ser. A-12.....	25 x 108.....	397		4
36. Photo Lab. Extension.....	25 x 100.....	282		1
37. Fire Station F-2.....	44 x 97.....	Modified 277		1
38. Guard House GH-2.....	25 x 66.....	260.1		1
39. AC Tech. Schools A-12.....	25 x 108.....	397		4
40. Commissary SH-18.....	60 x 153.....	326		1
41. Post Office PO-1.....	25 x 87.....	298		2
42. Post Exchange E-3.....	37 x 99.....	297	3000	1
43. Post Exchange E-2.....	37 x 63.....	297	1000	2
44. Post Exchange Whse SH-9.....	25 x 108.....	322		1
45. Recreation Bldg. RB-1.....	37 x 99.....	310		3
46. Bakery, Bak-2.....	34 x 108.....	255		1
47. Utilities to serve above bldgs.....				

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[6]

Schedule "B"

Construction of Bomb Storage Magazines and Facilities in the Territory of Hawaii to be Located as Directed by the Contracting Officer

Item No.	Item	Unit	Quantity
1.....	New Fence.....	Lin. Ft.....	3,410
2.....	Fence (Relocated).....	" ".....	2,075
3.....	Railroad.....	" ".....	7,510
4.....	Road Surfacing.....	Sq. Yds.....	16,785
5.....	Excavation (Roads & Railroads).....	Cu. Yds.....	142,074
6.....	Ten (Igloo Type) Magazines.....	Each.....	10

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have executed this agreement as of the day and year first above written.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
By Warren T. Hannum,
WARREN T. HANNUM,
Contracting Officer,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Contractor,
By Paul Grafe,
PAUL GRAFE,
714 W. Olympic Blvd.,
(Business Address) Los Angeles, Calif.

Witnesses to signature of contractor:

WALTER PINKUS,
Off. of the Ch. of Engr., Wash., D. C.
1229 Noyes Drive,
Silver Spring, Md.
(Address)

Approved: Mar 25, 1941.

Robert P. Patterson,
ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Under Secretary of War.

Approval recommended: Mar 24, 1941.

J. L. Schley,
J. L. SCHLEY,
Major General,
Chief of Engineers.

AFFIDAVIT

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
City of Washington, ss:

Paul Grafe, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is authorized and empowered to execute any and all contracts for construction work, and modifications and amendments thereto, in connection with such work in the Territory of Hawaii, by signing the name Hawaiian Constructors, by Paul Grafe (the said Hawaiian Constructors being a joint venture composed of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska Corporation; Gunther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska Corporation, and Rohl-Connolly Co., a Nevada Corporation, joint contractors and co-adventurers) with the same effect and efficacy as if the same were executed by each and all of the said co-adventurers; that the Hawaiian Constructors is about to enter negotiations with the United States for the following work: Construction for increase in air corps consisting of temporary housing and facilities and construction of bomb storage magazines and facilities, in the Territory of Hawaii; that he did not nor has any of the joint adventurers, or any officer or member of the said joint adventurers employed any person, either directly or indirectly, to solicit or secure a contract or supplemental agreement for the above described work or services upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee; that all information and data submitted by them to the United States incident to

the above mentioned negotiations are accurate and true to the best of his knowledge and belief. Furthermore, that in event the aforementioned contract or supplemental agreement is awarded to any of the above firms, no part of the fixed-fee given as compensation therefor shall be paid to any persons, firm or corporation for soliciting or assisting in any manner whatsoever in securing this contract.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,

Contractor.

By Paul Grafe,

PAUL GRAFE.

Subscribed and sworn to this 22d day of March 1941.

My commission expires the 14th day of March 1946.

CHARLES B. EBBECKE,

Notary Public.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 46B

[RESTRICTED]

Contract No. W-414-eng-602

[1] 600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields)-75/3

SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT No. 2

This supplemental agreement entered into this fifth day of May, 1941, by and between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter called the Government, represented by the contracting officer executing this agreement, and The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture, composed of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska corporation, Guenther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska corporation, and Rohl-Connally, a Nevada corporation, joint contractors and co-adventurers, hereinafter called the contractor, WITNESSETH That:

WHEREAS, On the 20th day of December, 1940, the parties hereto entered into Contract No. W-414-eng-602 for the performance of work therein described at locations within the Territory of Hawaii, hereinafter referred to as the said contract, and

WHEREAS, On the 22nd day of March, 1941, the parties hereto executed a supplemental agreement modifying said contract, in order to provide for additional construction work and services, which supplemental agreement is hereinafter referred to as the first Supplemental Agreement; and

WHEREAS, It is found advantageous and in the best interests of the United States to modify the said contract as modified by said first Supplemental Agreement so that construction work and services, more particularly hereinafter described, in addition to that covered by the said contract as modified by said first Supplemental Agreement, may be performed for the benefit of the National Defense; and

WHEREAS, The work and services to be performed by this Supplemental Agreement hereinafter referred to as the Second Supplemental Agreement are authorized by, are for the purposes set forth in, and are chargeable to, Procurement Authorities which, with the available balances are listed below:—

(a) Procurement Authority No. SC 1450 P99A-0605-01, the available balance of which is \$130,000.00.

(b) Procurement Authority No. CAC 131 P99A-1210-N, the available balance of which is \$20,400.00.

(c) Procurement Authority No. CAC 126 P99A-1210-01, the available balance of which is \$7,758.00.

(d) Procurement Authority No. CAC 128 P99A-1204-01, the available balance of which is \$5,242.00.

(e) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 812 P99A-0540.068-N, the available balance of which is \$150,000.00.

(f) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 790 P99A-0540.067-N, the available balance of which is \$221,000.00.

(g) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 784 P99A-0540.067-N, the available balance of which is \$138,000.00.

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(h) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 765 P99A-0540.068-N, the available balance of which is \$100,000.00.

(i) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 749 P99A-0540.068-N, the available balance of which is \$16,000.00.

(j) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 677 P99-0540.068-N, the available balance of which is \$2,943.00.

[2] (k) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 715 P99-0540.035-N, the available balance of which is \$300,000.00.

(l) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 602-P99A-0540.068-N, the available balance of which is \$176,000.00.

(m) Procurement Authority No. Eng. 711 P99A-0540.035-N, the available balance of which is \$80,500.00.

Now, THEREFORE, The said contract is hereby modified in the following particulars, but in no others:

1. The contractor agrees, for and in consideration of the fixed fee being increased as hereinafter provided, to perform the work and services (in addition to that covered by the said contract as modified by said first Supplemental Agreement) described in Schedules A to P (inclusive) herein and made a part hereof.

2. The estimated total cost of the work and services covered by this Supplemental Agreement is approximately \$1,123,875, exclusive of the Contractor's fee for said work and services. The estimated total cost set forth above is based upon field data now available and agreed to by both the Government and the Contractor.

3. The fixed fees stated in said contract and in said first Supplemental Agreement shall be increased in the amount of \$27,200 which shall cover all the work and services irrespective of the cost thereof. If the funds now available are not sufficient to perform all of the work and services herein described and if any additional sum or sums become available, the Contractor may be required to perform any work and services which may be necessary to complete any of the work and services herein described, for which there shall be no additional fee. Provided, however, that there shall be no adjustment in the amount of the fixed fee as provided in the said contract, or in the said contract as modified and amended, nor shall there be any claim for increased compensation, because of any errors and/or omissions made in computing the estimated cost of the construction of the work under the said contract, or under the said contract as modified and amended, or where the actual cost varies from the estimated cost of the work provided in the said contract, or in the said contract as modified and amended.

4. The work shall be done in conformity with the provisions of the War Department Construction policy dated June 15, 1940, File AG 600-12 (6-15-40) M-D-M, and its supplements.

5. Work to be done shall be undertaken immediately after receipt by the Contractor of notice to proceed. The work shall be prosecuted with faithfulness and energy and shall be completed as follows:

[3] (a) Construction of additional roads for aircraft warning service installations in the Territory of Hawaii as described in Schedule A within 60 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(b) Construction of additional fire control stations on the Island of Oahu as described in Schedule B within 60 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(c) Construction of portable seacoast searchlights shelter as described in Schedule C within 90 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(d) Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building (bombsight) as described in Schedule D within 120 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(e) Armament, Instrument Inspection and Adjustment Building as described in Schedule E within 120 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(f) Temporary warehouse as described in Schedule F within 120 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(g) Construction necessary for installation of utilities as described in Schedule G within 90 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(h) Installation of utilities consisting of additions to gasoline distribution system as described in Schedule H within 60 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(i) Grading, clearing and grubbing as described in Schedule I within 40 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(j) Construction of gasoline storage and distribution system in the Territory of Hawaii as described in Schedule J within 90 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(k) Warming up apron, Wheeler Field, as described in Schedule K within 40 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(l) Construction of third floor addition to Wing Operations Building as described in Schedule L, within 60 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(m) Construction of air base paint, oil and dope building as described in Schedule M within 60 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(n) Installation of cleaning fluid storage as described in Schedule N within 40 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(o) Construction necessary for installation of electric and steam services to hangars as described in Schedule O within 40 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(p) Construction of pipe line facilities, etc., as described in Schedule P within 60 calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

[4] 6. Minor changes in structures and facilities as may be found necessary in the interest of economy or required due to climatic conditions may be directed by the contracting officer without additional compensation to the contractor.

7. The work as described in Schedules A to P (Inclusive) shall be in accordance with the applicable paragraphs of Standard Specifications attached hereto and made a part hereof. The work and services to be performed under the contract, in addition to the procurement authorities enumerated therein, will be chargeable also to Procurement Authority No. CAC 131 P99-A 1210-N.

THIS SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT shall be subject to the approval of the Under Secretary of War.

[5]

SCHEDULE "A"

Construction of additional roads for Aircraft Warning Service Installations to be located in the Territory of Hawaii as directed by the Contracting Officer

The work to be done shall include all excavating, backfilling and compacting necessary to the construction of the roadway and/or roadways and appurtenances thereto; the construction and/or installation of all drainage structures, complete, with approach and discharge ditches; the construction of paved surfaces on the prepared roadway subgrade, when and as directed. In general, the pavements to be constructed will consist of hot-mixed asphaltic concrete wearing surface on compacted rock base course.

SCHEDULE "B"

Construction of additional fire control stations including instrument structures and bunk houses, together with access roads and trails, as part of the fixed fortification to be located in the territory of Hawaii as directed by the Contracting Officer in accordance with applicable plans.

Instrument structures will be of reinforced concrete design approximately 16' x 16', and Bunk Houses of temporary wooden construction to be built in accordance with plans to be furnished. Access roads and trails will, in general, be unpaved.

SCHEDULE "C"

Construction of a Shelter for portable Seacoast Searchlight units, to be located in the Territory of Hawaii as directed by the Contracting Officer

The building will consist of light steel construction with corrugated iron walls and roof. The floor will be of concrete.

[6]

SCHEDULE "D"

Construction of an Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building (bomb-sight), in the Territory of Hawaii

This building shall be in general conformity with Quartermaster Corps drawings for the Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building at San Antonio Air Depot (Duncan Field), Texas, as modified.

Building will be of reinforced concrete design approximately 67' x 90' in dimensions.

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SCHEDULE "E"

Construction of an Armament, Instrument Inspection and Adjustment Building in the Territory of Hawaii

This building shall be in general conformity with Quartermaster Corps drawings for the Armament, Fire Control, Supply and Repair Building designed for the San Antonio Air Depot (Duncan Field), Texas, as modified.

Building will be of reinforced concrete design approximately 67' x 130' in dimensions.

SCHEDULE "F"

Construction of a Temporary Warehouse in the Territory of Hawaii

This building consists of one (1) Air Corps Depot Supply Building. It shall be constructed in general conformity with Quartermaster plans for the present Mobile Depot Supply Building, as modified.

It shall be of reinforced concrete and steel design and approximately 100' x 200' in dimensions.

SCHEDULE "G"

Construction necessary for installation of utilities

This work shall consist of furnishing a Sanitary Sewer System, Water System and Electrical System, necessary to service a population of approximately 2,000 men at Bellows Field. Work shall be in conformity with plans to be furnished.

[7]

SCHEDULE "H"

Installation of Utilities, Hickam Field, T. H.

This installation shall consist of supplying compressed air, water and electrical service to existing outlet pits in the warm-up aprons at Hickam Field and for interconnecting the existing five (5) gasoline delivery lines at that place. Work shall conform to plans to be furnished.

SCHEDULE "I"

Grading, clearing, and grubbing

This work shall consist of clearing, grubbing and minor grading of approximately 25 acres of land at Wheeler Field, T. H., as shown on plot plans to be furnished.

SCHEDULE "J"

Construction of Gasoline Storage and Distribution System

This work shall consist of fabricating and installing underground, in accordance with plans to be furnished, twenty-four steel tanks of 50,000-gallon capacity each, together with necessary fittings, pumps and appurtenances. Installations shall be at those points in the Territory of Hawaii designated by the contracting officer.

SCHEDULE "K"

Warming-up Apron, Wheeler Field, T. H.

Item No.	Item	Unit	Quantity
1.....	Concrete apron.....	Cu. yds.....	8,500

Construction shall be in accordance with plans furnished and shall include necessary service pits, utility lines to the pits and tie down rings.

[8]

SCHEDULE "L"

Construction of Third Floor Addition to Wing Operations Building, Hickam Field, T. H.

Work shall conform to plans to be furnished in general conformity to the reinforced concrete design of the existing Wing Operations Building.

SCHEDULE "M"

Construction of Air Base Paint, Oil and Dope Building

This building shall be of fireproof construction in accordance with plans to be furnished. Location of building is Hickam Field, T. H.

SCHEDULE "N"

Installation of Cleaning Fluid Storage, Hickam Field, T. H.

Item No.	Item	Unit	Quantity
1.....	5,000-gallon gasoline tank.....	Each.....	1
2.....	1,000-gallon kerosene tank.....	Each.....	1
3.....	1,000-gallon tank (used fluids).....	Each.....	1

SCHEDULE "O"

Construction necessary for installation of electric and steam services to hangars

Work shall consist of providing ducts in the floor of existing hangar and installing therein the necessary piping, electric cable, outlets, connections and fittings, all in accordance with plans to be furnished.

SCHEDULE "P"

Construction of Pipe Line Facilities, Hickam Field, T. H.

This work shall consist of the following items;

1. Make rigid the existing aviation gasoline lines on deck at Hickam Field.
- [9] 2. Install pressure relief valve.
3. Replace existing control valves.
4. Install tank car unloading facilities.
5. Install two (2) pumps and measuring meter.
6. Install approximately 5,000 lineal feet of pipe line.

All work to be performed in accordance with plans to be furnished.

[10] IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have executed this agreement as of the day and year first above written.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
By Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Contractor Officer,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.
HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Contractor.

By Paul Grafe
PAUL GRAFE,
714 W. Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.

Witnesses to Signature of Contractor:

B. L. Robinson
B. L. ROBINSON,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

P. C. Chew
P. C. CHEW,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

Approved Jun 25, 1941.

ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Under Secretary of War.

Approval recommended Jun 23, 1941.

John J. Kingman,
JOHN J. KINGMAN,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.

[1]

SECTION IV—CONCRETE

4-01. *Proportioning.* Concrete shall be composed of cement, natural or crushed aggregates, and water of the qualities herein specified and in the required proportions; these ingredients to be well mixed and brought to a proper consistency. The exact proportions in which such materials are to be used for different parts of the work shall be as determined by the contracting officer from time to time during the progress of the work, and as analyses and tests are made of samples of the aggregates and the resulting concrete. In general, the proportions shall be designed to produce a concrete of maximum practical economy to the Government and having ultimate compressive strength at the age of 28 days of not less than the following amounts for the various classes.

Class	Pounds per sq. inch	Nominal limits in size of aggregate in inches
A.....	3,300	$\frac{1}{4}$ " to $1\frac{1}{4}$ "
B.....	3,000	$\frac{1}{4}$ " to $1\frac{1}{4}$ "
C.....	2,500	$\frac{1}{4}$ " to $1\frac{1}{4}$ "

[3]

No. 4 Rock and Rock Dust

Size of Screen (Square opening)	Per cent of weight passing
No. 4 sieve.....	90-100
No. 8 sieve.....	50-85
No. 16 sieve.....	27-85
No. 100 sieve.....	2-10

(f) *Composite grading limits.* The grading of coarse aggregate in the mixed concrete shall fall within the following limits:

	Per cent of weight passing
Maximum size mesh screen (square mesh).....	95-100
• $\frac{1}{2}$ maximum size mesh screen (square mesh).....	40-70
No. 4 sieve.....	0-10

(g) *Storing.* In the event coarse aggregate is stored in stock piles in advance of concreting operations, such stock piles shall be built up by approved methods so that coning or segregation of the material cannot occur.

4-05. *Water for Concrete.* The water used in the mixing of concrete must be clean and free from objectionable quantities of organic matter, alkali, salts, and other impurities which, in the opinion of the contracting officer, might reduce the strength, durability, or other qualities of the concrete.

4-06. *Measurement of cement and aggregate.* (a) *Measurement.* The amount of cement and the amount of each separate size of aggregate entering each batch of concrete shall be determined by direct weighing equipment; provided, that where batches are proportioned so as to contain an integral number of sacks of cement, and the cement is delivered at the mixer in the original unbroken sacks, the weight of the cement contained in each such sack may be taken without weighing as 94 pounds. Said direct weighing equipment shall comply with the following requirements:

(1) The accuracy of the weighing equipment shall conform to the requirements of the United States Bureau of Standards. Spring scales will not be permitted.

(2) The equipment shall weigh each aggregate separately and each unit shall include an under and overweight indicator. The underweight indicator shall indicate the filling of the last 200 pounds of the batch. The overweight indicator shall indicate overweight to a maximum of 50 pounds. Both shall be graduated in a manner at least as legible as 5 pound units indicated by alternate black and white divisions $\frac{1}{8}$ inch wide with other markings to emphasize 25, 50 and 100 pounds. At the contractor's option approved cumulative weighing equipment may be used instead of the individual weighing equipment herein specified. [4] Said cumulative weighing equipment shall be equipped with a visible dial or equally

suitable device which will accurately indicate scale load at any state of the weighing operation from zero to full load.

(3) The equipment shall be so arranged that the operator may conveniently observe and inspect the operation of the bin gates and also the materials in the weighing hopper. The under and overweight indicators or weighing dials shall be in full view of the operator when he is at the controls.

(4) The equipment shall be capable of ready adjustment for compensating for the varying weight of moisture contained in the aggregates, or for changing the proportionate batch weights.

(5) The equipment shall be so operated as to control the weight of the cement to within one per cent of that specified and the weight of the fine and coarse aggregates to within two per cent of the specified weight for each separate size of aggregate. Automatic weighing and batching equipment shall be used unless the use of manually-operated equipment is authorized by the contracting officer.

(6) The equipment shall be so arranged as to permit the convenient removal of overweight material in excess of the prescribed tolerances.

4-07. *Measurement of water.* The quantity of water entering the mixed shall be measured by a suitable water meter or other measuring device of a type approved by the contracting officer and capable of measuring the water in variable amounts within a tolerance of one per cent. The meter mechanism shall be capable of being locked in position so as to deliver constantly any specified amount of water to each batch of concrete. A positive quick-acting valve shall be used for a cut-off in the water line to the mixer. The operating mechanism must be such that leakage will not occur when the valves are closed. The use of horizontal tanks for the measurement of water will not be permitted.

4-08. *Construction of forms.* (a) Forms shall be of wood, steel or other approved material except that, unless specifically authorized, the sheathing for all exposed surfaces shall be tongue and groove lumber, plywood or fibreboard of uniform width and thickness. All forms shall be true in every respect to the required shape and size, shall conform to the established alignment and grades, and maintain their position and shape under the loads and operations incident to placing and vibrating the concrete. Metal forms shall be accurately made so that similar removable parts will be interchangeable.

The contracting officer may select and/or approve a maximum size of aggregate within the above limits which he considers the most adaptable for the type of constructions being performed or the conditions under which it is to be placed.

4-02. *Water content.* (a) In calculating the total water content in any mix, the amount of moisture carried on the surface of the aggregate particles shall be included. Unless otherwise directed by the contracting officer, the total water content per bag of cement for each batch of concrete shall not exceed the following:

Class "A"	5.5 gallons	or	45.8 pounds
Class "B"	6.5 gallons	or	54.1 pounds
Class "C"	7.0 gallons	or	58.3 pounds

(b) *Variation.* In all cases, however, the amount of water to be used shall be the minimum amount necessary to produce a plastic mixture of the strength specified and of the desired density, uniformity and workability. In general, the consistency of any mix shall be that required for the specific placing conditions and methods of placement, and ordinarily the slump shall be between 1½" and 4" when tested in accordance with the current specifications for "Method of Test for Consistency of Portland Cement Concrete," of the American Society for Testing Materials.

(c) *Increase.* An increase in the maximum water content will not be permitted unless comparative tests under job conditions show conclusively that such increase in water content will not result in a decrease in concrete strength and provided further that such increase does not exceed one gallon per cubic yard.

[2] 4-03. *Cement.* All cement used shall be Portland, of American manufacture, conforming to Federal Specification SS-C-191A. All cement delivered to the site of construction shall be in sacks bearing the brand and name of the manufacturer. All cement delivered for any one project shall be all of the same brand. All cement will be furnished to the contractor by the Government.

4-04. *Aggregates.* (a) All aggregates will be furnished the contractor by the Government which shall conform to the following requirements. Fine aggregate

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for concrete shall consist of a mixture of equal parts of natural sand and rock dust. Sand shall be composed of clean, hard, strong, durable, uncoated grains, free from shale, salt, lumps, soft or flaky particles and from injurious amounts of dust, alkali, organic matter, loam or other deleterious substances. The sand shall be taken from a part of the beach which has not been recently in contact with salt water.

(b) Beach sand shall be graded in accordance with the following requirements:

<i>Size of Screen</i>	<i>Per cent by weight passing</i>
No. 4 sieve-----	100%
No. 100 sieve-----	0.5%

(c) Coarse aggregate shall consist of gravel or broken stone composed of strong, hard, clean, durable, uncoated pebbles or rock fragments, free from alkali, organic or other deleterious matter. All broken stone or gravel shall be washed and uniformly moistened before batching. The relative amounts of each size of broken stone or gravel to be used in each mix of concrete in all parts of the work will be determined by the contracting officer, and will be based on securing a well-graded aggregate producing concrete having the required workability, density, strength and economy without the use of excess sand, water, or cement.

(d) *Maximum sizes.* For class "A", "B" and "C" concrete, the maximum size mesh screen for the aggregate shall be not less than one-half inch and not more than one and one-half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) inches.

(e) *Grading.* The aggregate shall be separated and graded in accordance with the following requirements and the specified sizes delivered separately to individual proportioning hoppers.

No. 2 Rock ($1\frac{1}{2}$ inch to $\frac{3}{4}$ inch size)

<i>Size of Screen (Square opening)</i>	<i>Per cent by weight passing</i>
$1\frac{1}{2}$ "-----	95-100
$\frac{3}{4}$ "-----	0-10

No. 3 Rock (3.4 inch to No. 4 mesh size)

<i>Size of Screen (Square opening)</i>	<i>Per cent by weight passing</i>
$\frac{3}{4}$ "-----	95-100
$\frac{3}{8}$ "-----	20-45
No. 4 sieve-----	0-10

(b) *Securing.* Suitable and effective means shall be provided for holding adjacent edges and ends of panels and sections tightly together and in accurate alignment so as to prevent the formation of ridges, fins, [5] offsets, or similar surface defects in the finished concrete. The forms shall be tight, so as to prevent the loss of water, cement, and fines during placing and vibrating of the concrete.

(c) *Number of forms.* Adequate and suitable means for removing forms, without injury to the surface of the finished concrete, shall be provided. Forms shall be of such construction as to permit them to be moved forward rapidly, and a sufficient number of forms of each kind shall be provided to permit the required rate of progress to be maintained.

(d) *Form ties.* When ties extending through the concrete are used to support or to strengthen forms, they shall be so constructed and so removed that no tie other than metal will be left in the concrete, and that no metal tie which extends to within one and one-half inches of any concrete surface shall be left in the concrete.

4-09. *Maintenance of forms.* Forms shall be maintained at all times in good condition, particularly as to size, shape, strength, rigidity, tightness, and smoothness of surface. Before concrete is placed the forms shall be thoroughly cleaned and coated with a non-staining mineral oil or other lubricant approved by the contracting officer. Any excess lubricant shall be satisfactorily removed before placing concrete. Fibre-board and plywood, when used as form facing material, shall be given a coat of shellac before being oiled.

4-10. *Removal of forms.* Directions of the contracting officer as to the removal of forms shall be strictly followed and all such work shall be done with care so as to avoid injury to the concrete. No heavy loading on green concrete shall be

permitted. Immediately upon removal of the forms the concrete surfaces shall be thoroughly wet down and kept wet until the sealing compound is applied or other curing procedure made effective as hereinafter specified. As soon as the forms are removed, the inspector shall carefully examine the surface of the concrete after which any irregularities in the surface shall be repaired as required.

4-11. Preparing of surfaces for concreting. (a) Rock surfaces, upon or against which concrete is to be placed, must be free from mud and debris, and shall be thoroughly wetted prior to the placing of any concrete. Earth surfaces after being trimmed and compacted as hereinbefore provided shall be thoroughly wetted by sprinkling prior to the placing of any concrete and these surfaces shall be kept moist by frequent sprinkling up to the time of placing concrete thereon. A moisture penetration of at least 12 inches in sandy soil shall be obtained by the above sprinkling, and not less than 6 inches elsewhere, except where application of water to such a degree causes the soil to become muddy or soggy. The surface shall be free from pools of water at the time of placing concrete.

(b) Unformed concrete surfaces upon or against which concrete is subsequently to be placed and to which new concrete is to adhere shall be cleaned with an air-water jet under pressure sufficient to remove laitance, at such time, as determined by the contracting officer, when the cement film can be washed clean from the mortar and aggregate without dislodging the aggregate. Immediately prior to placing new concrete on old, to which it is to adhere, the surface of the old concrete shall be thoroughly cleaned [6] of all sealing compound and other substances that might prevent a bond with new concrete. It shall then be wetted, and surplus water removed. When, upon inspection, it is the judgment of the contracting officer that any such surface is not in proper condition for bond with the concrete about to be placed, the contractor shall roughen the surface or remove objectionable matter therefrom by wet sandblasting and again clean it before depositing concrete. Wherever concrete is to be placed on hardened concrete, or when starting to fill a deep form, the contact surfaces, after cleaning and wetting as herein provided, shall be coated with a one-inch layer of a mortar of the same ratio of fine aggregate to cement as the concrete used on the job. This mortar shall be scrubbed with wire brooms into the surfaces, upon which new concrete is to be placed, where accessible, before new concrete is placed against them. When the placing of concrete is to be interrupted long enough for the concrete to take its final set, the working face shall be given a shape by the use of forms or other means, that will secure proper union with subsequent work.

4-12. Exclusion of water. No concrete shall be deposited under water, nor shall the contractor, without explicit permission, allow still water to rise on any concrete until the concrete shall have attained its initial set. Water in motion shall not be permitted to flow over the surface of any concrete in such manner or at such velocity as will injure the surface finish of the concrete.

4-13. Mixing. (a) The cement, sand, and broken stone or gravel shall be so mixed and the quantity of water added shall be such as to produce a homogeneous mass of uniform consistency. Dirt and other undesirable substances shall be carefully excluded. All concrete shall be thoroughly mixed in a batch mixer of an approved type and size, so designed as positively to insure a uniform distribution of all the component materials throughout the mass during the mixing operation. Only sufficient water shall be used in mixing to give a workable mix, conforming to the consistency requirements of Section 4-02. The mixing of each batch shall continue not less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ minutes after all materials, including water, are in the mixer, during which time the mixer shall rotate at the speed for which it has been designed or at such speed as will produce a mass of uniform consistency at the end of the mixing period. Wherever necessary to secure proper results, the concrete shall be mixed for a longer period than herein specified. Overmixing of concrete or overloading of mixers will not be permitted.

(b) *Timing.* A batch timer and counter, including lock, release, and audible indicator, shall be installed and used on each concrete mixer.

(c) *Cleaning.* Hardened concrete or mortar shall not be permitted to accumulate on the inner surfaces of the mixer.

(d) *Addition of water.* Retempering, i. e., remixing, with the addition of water, concrete that has partially hardened, will not be permitted.

4-14. Placing concrete. (a) Concrete shall be placed in the work with the least possible delay after mixing, and in no event after it has contained [7] its water content for more than 45 minutes. Only methods of transporting and placing that will deliver into the work concrete of the proper consistency and specified maximum size without separation will be permitted. All ends of

chutes, hopper gates and all other points of concrete discharge throughout any conveying, hoisting, and placing system adopted, shall be so designed and arranged that concrete passing from them shall not be separated in falling into the form receiving it. Adequate headroom provision must be made at such points for a vertical drop and for proper baffling. No chutes or conveyor belts shall be used except as approved by the contracting officer. Chutes longer than 50 feet and conveyor belts longer than 100 feet will not be permitted. Minimum slopes of chutes shall be such that concrete of the specified consistency will readily flow in them. If a conveyor belt is used, it shall be wiped clean by a device operated in such a manner that none of the mortar adhering to the belt will be wasted. All conveyor belts and chutes shall be covered.

(b) *Manner.* Concrete shall not be dropped through reinforcement steel or into any deep form whether reinforcement is present or not, so as to cause separation of the coarse aggregate from the mortar on account of repeatedly hitting rods or the sides of the form as it falls, nor shall concrete be placed in any form in such a manner as to leave accumulations of mortar on the form surfaces above the placed concrete. In such cases hoppers and, if necessary, vertical ducts shall be used in the forms, or other means employed so that the concrete may reach the place of final deposit without separation. Concrete shall be uniformly distributed during the process of depositing, and in no case after depositing shall any portion be displaced in the forms more than 3 feet in a horizontal direction. Concrete in forms shall be deposited in uniform horizontal layers, not deeper than 2 feet, care being taken to avoid inclined layers or inclined construction joints. Each layer shall be placed while the previous layer is still soft. No concrete shall be placed except in the presence of a duly authorized representative of the contracting officer.

4-15. *Power vibrators.* As concrete is placed in the forms it shall be thoroughly settled and compacted throughout the entire depth of the layer which is being consolidated into a dense, homogeneous mass, filling all corners and angles of the forms, thoroughly embedding the reinforcement, eliminating rock pockets and bringing only a slight excess of mortar to the exposed surfaces of concrete during placement. Such settling and compacting shall be accomplished by the use of internally-vibrated, high-speed power vibrators of an approved type in sufficient numbers, with standby units as required, and of sufficient power to compact concrete in the quantities and of the medium consistency herein specified within 15 minutes after being placed. Compaction and consolidation of the concrete shall be obtained by inserting the vibrator for short periods of time at close intervals. Excessive vibration at one point shall be avoided.

4-16. *Finish of formed surfaces.* All finished, formed surfaces shall conform accurately to the shape, alignment, grades and sections as shown on the drawings or as prescribed by the contracting officer. Surfaces shall be free from fins, bulges, ridges, offsets, honeycombing, or roughness of any kind, and shall present a finished, smooth, continuous, hard surface. All sharp angles, where required, shall be rounded or leveled by the use of moulding strips, or suitable moulding or finishing tools.

[8] 4-17. *Treatment of defects on formed surfaces.* (a) As soon as forms are removed, all exposed surfaces shall be carefully examined and any irregularities found in the surface shall be immediately rubbed or ground down in a satisfactory manner so as to secure a smooth uniform and continuous surface. Plastering or coating of surfaces to be smoothed will not be permitted. Shallow defects shall be repaired with gunite or an approved compressed air mortar gun.

(b) *Patching.* Holes left by tie rod cones, and other imperfections shall not be united but shall be repaired in an approved manner with dry packed mortar, prepared from sand and cement identical with that used for the mortar in the concrete at that section, and mixed in the same proportions. Surfaces shall be made smooth and hard by steel troweling and shall receive the same kind and amount of curing treatment as required for concrete in the repaired section.

4-18. *Construction, expansion and contraction joints.* All joints shall be constructed at such points and of such dimensions as may be directed or as shown on the drawings. Vertical joints shall be formed with tongue and groove bonds or keys at such locations and of such shapes and dimensions as approved or directed. Horizontal joints shall be formed with keys, or where horizontal pressure is always in one direction, with steps. Where required, dowel rods shall be used. All concrete in vertical members shall have been in place not less than twelve (12) hours, and longer if so directed, before concrete in horizontal members resting thereon is placed. Before placing is resumed, all laitance and excessive

water shall be removed and the concrete shall be cut away, where necessary to insure a strong, dense concrete at the joint. Except as otherwise specified herein, the surface of existing concrete shall be cleaned and roughened and shall then be spread with a one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) inch layer of mortar of the same cement-sand ratio as is used in the concrete, immediately before the new concrete is deposited. Steel water stops shall be placed at all construction joints, and in such manner, as to form a water-tight diaphragm. Copper water stops shall be placed at all expansion joints.

4-19. *Embedded items.* Before concrete is placed, all embedded items shall be firmly and securely fastened in place as indicated on drawings. They shall be thoroughly clean and free from coating, rust, scale, oil or other foreign matter.

4-20. *Test specimens.* (a) Test specimens to determine whether the compressive of the concrete is in accordance with that specified in paragraph 4-01 will be taken by the inspector. At least one set of three (3) specimens will be made for every major pour, and in general for every Two Hundred Fifty (250) cubic yards of concrete placed, but in any event a sufficient number of specimens will be taken to give a comprehensive knowledge of the concrete in each section of the work.

(b) *Taking of specimens.* All specimens will be taken from the concrete as it is placed in the forms and in accordance with the current specifications of the American Society for Testing Materials.

4-21. *Trowelled concrete surfaces.* All floor or other surfaces requiring a smooth finish, as specified in the drawings, shall be trowelled [9] to a smooth hard finished surface. Before the concrete has received its initial set, a topping mixture consisting of one part cement to two parts medium coarse sand shall be applied to all surfaces to a depth of one-half inch and smoothly finished. Such topping mix shall be struck off to the true established grade specified, after which it shall be thoroughly compacted and floated by means of wood floats. After such preliminary floating, and the concrete has set sufficiently to prevent separation of materials, the surface shall be steel trowelled until a smooth surface is obtained, free from defects and blemishes.

4-22. *Mastic for joints.* Mastic joint filler shall be constructed as shown on the plans. All mastic shall be of asphalt composition of approved quality and shall be such as to not deform by ordinary handling. Thin strips of stiffener will be allowed.

4-23. *Curing.* (a) The contractor shall protect all concrete from injury until its final acceptance by the Government. All construction joints shall be kept continuously moist, regardless of time, until they are covered with concrete. All other concrete surfaces shall be kept moist in contact with wet burlap for at least two weeks after the forms are removed. Wooden forms shall be wetted immediately before concreting and kept moist until removed. Whenever sealing compound has been applied on surfaces against which concrete is subsequently to be placed, and to which it is to adhere, the said compound shall be entirely removed by wet sandblasting or other approved means just prior to placing of the new concrete.

(b) Interior concrete surfaces to be cured by the water spray method shall be tightly closed off by bulkheads or other means or entirely surrounded by tight inclosures. The surface of the concrete within such bulkheads or inclosures shall be kept moist by an adequate sprinkling or spray system or other suitable means. The sprinkling system or wetting system used shall be provided with jets or nozzles at regular intervals and controlled by readily adjustable, automatic regulating device or devices to regulate the duration of each sprinkling and the period between successive sprinklings as required to keep the surface of the concrete continuously wet but with the smallest possible excess of water. The curing of any interior surfaces by the water spray method as herein specified shall be continued for 14 days following removal of forms.

(c) *Sealing compound method.* Wherever directed, surfaces shall be cured by the sealing-compound method. All surfaces to be cured shall be sprayed thoroughly, completely and uniformly with two coats of a commercial sealing compound, at the rate of not less than one gallon to each 200 square feet of concrete surface for each coat. Application shall be made under pressure of at least 80 pounds per square inch so as to completely seal all surfaces and not to flow off when applied to vertical surfaces. All concrete surfaces to be cured by the sealing-compound method shall be kept wet under wet burlap from the time of stripping of forms or finishing of unformed surfaces, as the case may be, until the application of the first coat of sealing compound as specified above.

[10]

SECTION V—REINFORCEMENT STEEL

5-01. *Reinforcement.* (a) *Bar placing.* Steel reinforcement bars for concrete will be furnished by the Government. Reinforcement steel will be furnished in the form of deformed bars conforming to Type B, Grade 2 of Federal Specifications for "Bars, Reinforcement, Concrete," File QQ-B-71a. All reinforcement shall, when surrounding concrete is placed, be free from rust, scale, grease or other coating which might destroy its bond with concrete. Bending and placing of steel shall be in accordance with drawings furnished or approved by the contracting officer. All reinforcement shall be secured in place, true to lines and grades indicated, by use of approved metal or concrete supports, spacers or ties, or spot welds. Supports shall be of sufficient strength to maintain the reinforcement in place throughout the concreting operation and shall be used in such manner as not to be left exposed to the face of or, in any way, mark or discolor the finished concrete surface.

(b) *Splicing.* Where splices in reinforcement, in addition to those indicated, are necessary, there shall be sufficient lap to transfer the stress by bond, as may be directed. Bars shall be lapped not less than 40 diameters and splices shall be staggered. The lapped ends of bars shall be wired together and connected properly to develop the full strength of the bar.

(c) *Coverage.* All main reinforcement shall be placed three (3) inches from any concrete surface, except as otherwise specifically indicated on the drawings.

SECTION VI—MISCELLANEOUS METAL WORK

6-01. *Miscellaneous metal work.* (a) *Installation.* All metal parts shall be installed in position and securely fastened prior to the placing of concrete. All metal parts shall be clean, free from all dirt, rust, oil, or other material deleterious to the bonding of the imbedding concrete.

(b) *Doors.* All metal doors shall be installed on the imbedded frame complete with all necessary fastenings, connections and appurtenance for efficient operation and maintenance.

(c) *Painting.* After installation, all exposed metal parts shall be thoroughly cleaned by means of wire brushes, sandpaper or other approved methods, after which they shall be painted in a good and workmanlike manner, with two coats of approved paint furnished by the Government.

SECTION VII—FENCING

7-01. *Materials.* (a) The fabric for the man-proof fence shall be 2" diamond mesh, chain link, and of width as shown on the drawing, and shall be [11] made of copper bearing steel wire of No. 9 gauge, with edges twisted and barbed finish. The fencing shall be galvanized after weaving.

The steel wire shall develop unit tensile strength of not less than 85,000 pounds per square inch.

The fencing shall conform in every respect to A. S. T. M. Specification Serial A 117-33 for "Zinc-coated Iron or Steel Chain Link Fence Fabric Galvanized After Weaving", and shall be in continuous lengths of one hundred (100) feet. It shall be similar and equal to Cyclone Invincible Fence, U. S. Steel Cyclone Fence Co. Catalog 107.

(b) *Barbed wire top strands.* Barbed wire used in the construction shall be in accordance with Federal Specification No. RR-F-221, as amended for "Fencing; Wire (barbed, netting and woven) Black and Galvanized." Type A Barbs shall be 4 points and spaced 6 inches apart.

(c) *Fence posts.* All line posts shall be two inches (2") outside diameter copper bearing steel tubing weighing not less than 2.72 pounds per linear foot galvanized inside and out by the hot dipped method in conformity with A. S. T. M. Specification No. A-123-33.

In lieu of the tubing specified, two and one-fourth inch (2¼") H-shaped sections of copper-bearing steel, weighing not less than 4.10 pounds per linear foot, galvanized as specified, may be used. All other posts except swing gate posts, shall be as specified for line posts except that three inch (3") diameter tubing weighing not less than 5.79 pounds per linear foot shall be used.

Single swing gate posts used for single swing gates wider than six feet (6') up to and including a thirteen-foot (13') opening shall be four-inch (4") tubing weighing not less than 9.1 pounds per linear foot.

Single swing gate openings used for single swing gates wider than thirteen feet (13') shall be 6 $\frac{5}{8}$ " diameter tubing weighing not less than 18.97 pounds per linear foot.

(d) *Angle brackets.* All intermediate fence posts shall be fitted with pressed steel angle brackets to support three (3) strands of barbed wire. All end and corner posts shall be fitted with heavy malleable iron angle brackets. All brackets shall incline outward at an angle of 45 degrees from the vertical and shall be of sufficient length that the top wire of the angle brackets, when mounted to the fence post, shall position the top barbed wire twelve inches (12") above the fabric and twelve inches (12") out from the fence line.

(e) *Bracing.* Gates and corner posts shall be braced with galvanized tubing 1 $\frac{5}{8}$ " in diameter, weighing not less than 2.27 pounds per foot. Gate posts shall be reinforced with auxiliary braces as shown on the drawings.

(f) *Tops.* All fence posts except those capped for and/or with angle brackets shall be capped with galvanized malleable iron fittings to exclude moisture.

[12] (g) *Top rail.* Top rail shall be 1 $\frac{5}{8}$ " outside diameter seamless copper-bearing tubing weighing not less than 2.27 pounds per foot, galvanized as specified in subparagraph (c) hereof.

(h) *Tension bars.* Tension bars shall be copper-bearing steel, three-quarters inch ($\frac{3}{4}$ ") wide, one-fourth inch ($\frac{1}{4}$ ") thick, galvanized as specified in subparagraph (c) hereof.

(i) *Brace and tension bars.* Brace and tension bars shall be of an approved type, galvanized as specified in subparagraph (c) hereof.

(j) *Gates.* Gates shall be fabricated as shown on the drawings for framed tubings and shall be of two-inch (2") diameter copper-bearing seamless tubing weighing not less than 2.72 pounds per foot and galvanized as specified in subparagraph (c) hereof. All intermediate bracing shall be 1 $\frac{5}{8}$ " outside diameter seamless steel tubing, weighing not less than 2.27 pounds per foot, galvanized as specified in subparagraph (c) hereof. Gate fillers shall be of the same fabric as the fence.

(k) *Hinges and latches.* Hinges and latches shall be of an approved design, made of malleable iron forged steel, galvanized as specified in subparagraph (c).

SECTION VIII—RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION

8-01. *Materials.* (a) All materials shall be new and unused unless otherwise specified and shall be of the best grade suitable for its intended use. Certified copies of mill inspection certificates shall be furnished for all material mill produced but such certificates will not preclude subsequent rejections of unsatisfactory materials.

(b) *Rails.* All rails shall conform to all the requirements of A. S. T. M. specification, Serial Designation A1-39 for "Open Hearth Carbon, Steel Rails." All rails shall be furnished free from kinks, crooks, or excessive rust and shall be sawed at the ends and furnished in standard mill lengths. Rails which are badly rounded or which have crystallized or which have line or surface bends will be rejected.

(c) *Track bolts.* All track bolts and nuts shall conform to the requirements of A. S. T. M. specifications, Serial Designation A-766-33.

(d) *Spring washers.* All spring washers shall conform to the requirements of appropriate A. R. E. A. specifications.

(e) *Tie plates.* All tie plates shall be standard A. R. E. A. construction conforming to the requirements of A. S. T. M. specifications, Serial Designation A-67-33.

(f) *Spikes.* All track spikes shall conform to the requirements of A. S. T. M. specification, Serial Designation A-65-33.

(g) *Joint bars.* All joint bars shall conform to the requirements of A. R. E. A. specification for "Quenched carbon, Steel Joint Bars" or [13] A. S. T. M. specification, Serial Designation A-4-14.

8-02. *Track laying.* (a) Lining and spacing of cross ties. (1) *Number required.* Ties shall be laid at the spacing as specified on the drawings.

(2) *Lining ties.* The ends of all ties shall be lined parallel and equal distance from the center line of track except in the case of switch ties which shall be lined as directed by the contracting officer.

(3) *Joint and intermediate ties.* The ties of better quality shall be used at all rail joints and on curves and shall be evenly spaced from center to center

with the exception of the switch ties which shall be spaced as directed contracting officer.

(b) *Placing ties.* Ties shall be placed with the widest heartwood side down, square to the line of rail.

(c) *Adjoining ties.* Only sufficient adjoining shall be done to obtain bearing for the entire section of the laid rail.

(d) *Tie plugs.* Spikes shall, insofar as possible, not be withdrawn once driven. If necessary to withdraw spikes, the holes made by such drawn spikes shall be immediately plugged so as to completely and tight the hole made by the withdrawn spike. In re-driving spikes for any tie spikes have been withdrawn and holes plugged, the tie shall first be turned for any new spikes are driven.

(e) *Rail braces.* On all curves, rail braces shall be installed on the outside of rail along the outside rail of the curve, for each tie, and shall be so placed to provide full bearing against the outside surface of the rail. Rail braces shall be double spiked.

(f) *Laying rail.* (1) *Unloading.* Rails shall be unloaded, stored and distributed along the track roadbed in such a manner to prevent any injury to rail. Dropping of rails in unloading will not be permitted. Rails with crooks or with kinks, or with any other defects which might impair their strength shall not be laid but shall be removed from the site of the construction as directed by the contracting officer. All rails shall be laid one at a time and all rails shall be brought square together and shall be leveled before being spiked. Rails shall be so laid that the joints in one rail shall be opposite the middle of ties in the opposite line.

(2) *Bolting.* All bolting shall be uniformly alternated from inside to outside of each joint. All connections shall be made with four bolts, each equipped with one spring washer and nut. Track bolts shall be installed when the track is laid and the nuts shall be turned snug after which bolting shall be tightened three times; the first after the track has been laid to true alignment; the second, after it has been raised on ballast, and, finally, just prior to final completion. The fishing spaces for rails shall be swabbed with heavy oil before bolting.

(3) *Gauging.* One line of track shall be laid and spiked before the other line is gauged to true spaced intervals, as herein specified. Standard gauge track tangents shall be 3'-0" and all track must be gauged before spiking curves, track shall be gauged as provided in the hereinafter schedule:

- [14] Curves of 5-6°—widen gauge $\frac{1}{8}$ "
 Curves of 7-8°—widen gauge $\frac{1}{4}$ "
 Curves of 9-10°—widen gauge $\frac{3}{8}$ "
 Curves of 11-12°—widen gauge $\frac{1}{2}$ "
 Curves of 13-14°—widen gauge $\frac{5}{8}$ "
 Curves of 15-16°—widen gauge $\frac{3}{4}$ "

When gauging track on curves, proper alignment should be maintained outside rail and the extra width of gauge applied to the inside rail. When gauge is widened on curved track, metal frogs should be attached to the gauge or iron shims used to insure uniformity. Where frogs are located inside of main track curves, the gauge of the track at the frog shall be maintained at standard gauge. Where frogs are located on the outside of curves which require extra gauging width, the width of the flange way between guard rail and the adjoining main track rail must be increased as much as the extra gauge.

(g) *Tie plates.* The contractor shall install standard 60 pound tie plates on all ties for all rail. Each tie plate shall be punched with four $1\frac{1}{16}$ " holes. All tie plates shall be so installed as to have a true even bearing on their entire surface on all ties. All rails shall be gauged prior to the installation of any tie plates and no tie plate shall be used as a rail brace or spacer. When spiking is completed, the outer shoulder of each tie plate shall have full bearing against the base of the rail.

(h) *Spiking.* All tracks shall be spiked to the tie with one spike inside and one spike outside. Spikes shall be started vertically in driving, spaced half their width from the base of the rail and shall then be driven straight to the face of the spike in contact with the rail to permit full bearing of the head on the base of the rail. All rails must be fully spiked, four spikes to the tie, which shall be driven carefully to provide the bearing above specified.

shall not be bent over the rail. Spikes should be staggered, the outside spikes of both rails being placed on one side of the tie and the inside of the spikes on the other side.

8-03. Ballasting and surfacing. All ballasting shall be evenly spread to cross section specified and shall have sufficient running surface to prevent bending or distortion of rails. All track being ballasted shall be maintained in true alignment. Both rails shall be raised uniformly at the same time by means of picks or other approved methods. In using jacks, care shall be taken that jacking shall be done close enough together to prevent bending of rail or springing of joint. Ballast shall be tamped uniformly for the entire length of tie. Tamping shall be performed from outside end of ties to one foot inside of rail. Joint ties shall be tamped last. When track has been laid and sufficiently tamped and properly compacted, the final tamping shall be made by jacking the track to final grade as specified and ballast thoroughly driven under and around each tie for their entire length by means of tamping machines, tamping picks or tamping bars. The ballasting shall be to true surface grade as shown on the drawings. After final ballasting, the entire track section shall be dressed to true section [15] as shown on the drawings, by means of templates. The edge of ballast shall be shaped to true line against form boards by means of shovels or forks and all ballast shoulders shall be uniformly shaped and compacted. The ballast shall be applied flush with top of ties in the center of track and slope each way towards the sides leaving the ends of ties exposed as shown on the drawings.

8-04. Turnouts. Turnouts shall be installed at the locations as shown on the drawings and/or as staked in the field. All frogs, switches, switch plates, switch rods, switch stands and all other necessary appurtenances shall be constructed and/or installed to provide efficient operation at all times of all turnout assemblies. Turnout curves shall be properly lined in true position by means of offset measurements from the main track rail. Stock rails shall be given a bend or set at the vertex of the switch $6\frac{3}{4}$ " ahead of the actual switch point and the switch shall be so installed to allow for $4\frac{1}{4}$ " throw. Frogs shall be installed of rigid, self guarded type of bolt design, of the length and size necessary for proper installation. Switches shall be of the size, dimension and section to adequately serve their purpose and shall be installed in accordance with general A. R. E. practice. All switches shall have installed in conjunction, suitable for efficient use, a low switch stand of heavy construction, equipped with an adjustable throw, positive in action and automatic.

8-05. Connections with main line trackage. All necessary connections of any construction specified herein with main line trackage shall be cut in and constructed under the direction and to the satisfaction of the contracting officer.

8-06. Construction of track at firing position. Firing position locations shall have a subgrade prepared and ballast laid as herein provided. After the subgrade has been ballasted and the ties laid as shown on the drawings, the entire roadbed shall have provided over and around the ballast and extending in slopes a selected fill embankment. Such embankment shall be of the section and grade as shown on the drawings and shall be made with clean, select material suitable for compacting properly as directed by the contracting officer.

8-07. Installation of track bumpers. At the end of each track run there shall be placed a track bumper as shown on the drawing or as directed by the contracting officer.

8-08. Highway crossings. Where the main lead track crosses the highway, such crossing shall be constructed as indicated on the drawings and as staked in the field. The approaches shall be graded to the elevations shown on the drawing and the subgrade shall be rolled with a suitable power roller prior to placement of crushed stone. Excessive material excavated from the approaches shall be disposed of as directed by the contracting officer. After preparation of subgrade, a base course of broken stone shall be placed to the satisfaction of the contracting officer.

After the broken stone base course has been thoroughly consolidated and the installation of the track has been completed, all pavement removed from the track crossing shall be restored in such a manner as to provide a true [16] section joining the undisturbed highway pavement. The reconstructed pavement shall be of a gradient to permit proper alignment with the track rail and the

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entire highway surface shall be replaced to provide a surface across the track equal to that existing prior to any work being performed under this contract. After the base course has been reconstructed it shall be surfaced with asphalt concrete wearing surface satisfactory to the contracting officer.

8-09. *Crossing tracks of other ownership.* The contractor shall reconstruct trackage of other ownership at the location where the main load track specifically crosses such track. The track shall be removed and reconstructed to the alignment, dimension, section and grade as shown on the drawing. All material removed from the existing trackage shall be incorporated in the reconstruction of the crossed track. Materials unsuitable for use in reconstruction shall be moved and disposed of as directed by the contracting officer, and new material necessary for proper installation as herein specified shall be provided and installed.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 46C

Contract No. W-414-eng-602
Supplemental Agreement No.

[Stamped:] Office Chief of Engineers. Jun 30 1941.
600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields)-99/2

SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT

This supplemental agreement entered into this 22nd day of May, 1941, by between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter called the Government represented by the contracting officer executing this agreement, and Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska corporation, Gunther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska corporation and Rohl-Connolly Company, a Nevada corporation, joint contractors and adventurers, and Ralph E. Woolley, an individual operating as Ralph E. Woolley of the City of Honolulu, in the Territory of Hawaii, hereinafter called the contractor, WITNESSETH That:

WHEREAS, On the 20th day of December, 1940, the Government and Hawaiian Constructors entered into Contract No. W-414-eng-602, for the construction of works of National Defense at locations within the Hawaiian Islands, which contract was subsequently modified by Supplemental Agreements entered into May 22, 1941, and May 5, 1941, hereinafter referred to as the first Supplemental Agreement and Supplemental Agreement No. 2, respectively, and

WHEREAS, It is found advantageous and in the best interests of the United States to modify the said contract, as modified by the said first Supplemental Agreement and Supplemental Agreement No. 2, for the following reasons: skill, experience and resources of an additional general and building contractor can be advantageously used in expediting the construction of works of National Defense in the Hawaiian Islands;

NOW, THEREFORE, The said contract, as modified by the said first Supplemental Agreement and Supplemental Agreement No. 2, is hereby further modified to the following particulars, but in no others:

[2] Ralph E. Woolley, General and Building Contractor, operating as an individual of the City of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, is joined as coadventurer with W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska Corporation, Gunther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska Corporation, and Rohl-Connolly Company, a Nevada Corporation, to constitute a joint venture and to act both jointly and severally, under the name of Hawaiian Constructors, as contractor in the performance of the said Contract.

THIS SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT shall be subject to the favorable recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and approval of the Under Secretary of War.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have executed this agreement as of the day and year first above written.

Witnesses:

B. L. Robinson,
B. L. ROBINSON,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

Neoma Foster
NEOMA FOSTER

Neoma Foster
NEOMA FOSTER

Approval recommended Jul 3, 1941.

Approved Jul 8, 1941.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer,
Contracting Officer.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS (Contractor)

By Paul Grafe,
PAUL GRAFE,
Honolulu, T. H.
Ralph E. Woolley,
RALPH E. WOOLLEY,
Contractor.
Honolulu, T. H.

J. L. Schley,
J. L. SCHLEY,
Major General,
Chief of Engineers.

Robert P. Patterson,
ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Under Secretary of War.

AFFIDAVIT

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
City of Honolulu, ss:

RALPH E. WOOLLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is a General Contractor operating as an Individual, of the City of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii; that his firm is about to enter negotiations with the United States for joining as a coadventurer with the coadventurers now doing business as the Hawaiian Constructors in the performance of Contract No. W-414-eng-602, for construction of works of National Defense in the Hawaiian Islands on a cost-plus-a-fixed fee basis; that he did not nor has any member of his firm employed any person, either directly or indirectly, to solicit or secure a commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee; that all information and data submitted by him to the United States incident to the above mentioned negotiations are accurate and true to the best of his knowledge and belief. Furthermore, that in event his firm is joined as coadventurer under the said contract, no part of the fixed-fee given as compensation therefor shall be paid to any person, firm or corporation for soliciting or assisting in any manner whatsoever in securing a part in this contract.

By Ralph E. Woolley,
RALPH E. WOOLLEY.

Subscribed and sworn to this 21st day of June 1941.

My commission expires the 30th day of June 1941.

[SEAL]

Wm. Austin Cottrell,
WM. AUSTIN COTTRELL,
Notary Public, 1st Judicial Circuit,
Territory of Hawaii.

Certificate

The undersigned do hereby certify that subject to the approval and consent of the United States, that RALPH E. WOOLLEY, of Honolulu, T. H., has by mutual agreement of the undersigned, been made a member of the joint venture, Hawaiian Constructors, the contractor under Contract No. W-414-eng-602, and that Hawaiian Constructors is now composed of all the undersigned, each having a participating share in the benefits and obligations thereof, all as of the date of its inception.

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The undersigned do hereby further certify that Paul Grafe has been and hereby duly authorized by each and all of the undersigned to act alone, either in person or by or through any other person or persons by him duly authorized in writing, in all matters for the joint venture, in the name of Hawaiian Constructors, including the execution of contracts with the United States, either modifying said Contract No. W-414-eng.-602 or new contracts for additions or new construction work, the making of subcontracts, contracts for the purchase of materials and supplies, contracts for the purchase or rental of equipment, the employment of assistants and workmen, the opening of bank accounts, the endorsement of checks for deposit in and the writing of checks for the withdrawal of funds from such bank accounts for any purpose, the signing of estimates and certificates, and the execution of any and all other documents and the performance of any and all other acts and deeds in the name of Hawaiian Constructors, as he, Paul Grafe, may determine in his sole discretion to be for the best interests of the undersigned, with the same legal effect as if the same were executed by each and all of the undersigned joint venturers.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have executed this agreement as of the day and year first above written.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
By B. L. Robinson,
B. L. ROBINSON,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Contracting Officer.
HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
Contractor.
By H. P. Benson,
H. P. BENSON,
Attorney-in-fact,
Honolulu, T. H.

Witnesses to signature of contractor:

Matilda S. Demmert,
MATILDA S. DEMMERT,
Seaside, Honolulu, T. H.
Bruce Gentry,
BRUCE GENTRY,
Pleasanton Hotel, Honolulu, T. H.

Dated this 27th day of May 1941.

[CORPORATE SEAL]

Attest:

IRMA DICKEY, *Secretary.*

[CORPORATE SEAL]

Attest:

H. L. CAMPBELL, *Asst. Secy.* PAUL GRAFE

[CORPORATE SEAL]

Attest

J. P. SHIRLEY, JR., *Sec.*

W. E. CALLAHAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
By Paul Grafe

GUNTHER & SHIRLEY COMPANY,

By J. P. Shirley

J. P. SHIRLEY

President.

Ralph E. Woolley

RALPH E. WOOLLEY.

Witness:

NEOMA FOSTER,

3610 Bethshan Rd., Honolulu, T. H.

A True Copy.

P. C. Chew,
P. C. CHEW.
Chief Administrative Assistant.

RESOLUTION

RESOLVED, that T. E. Connolly, President, J. L. Connolly, Vice-President, Irma Dickey, Secretary, each be and any one of them acting alone is hereby authorized and empowered in so far as this corporation is concerned, to execute a certificate on behalf of this Company for delivery to the United States and any other firms or persons who may be dealing with Hawaiian Constructors certifying that Hawaiian Constructors is a joint venture composed of Rohl Connolly Co., W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Gunther & Shirley Company, and Ralph E. Woolley; that Paul Grafe has been authorized to act alone

either in person or by or through any other person or persons by him duly authorized in writing, in all matters for the joint venture, in the name of Hawaiian Constructors, including the execution of contracts with the United States, either modifying Contract No. W-414-eng.-602, or new contracts for additional or new construction work, contracts for the purchase of materials and supplies, contracts for the purchase or rental of equipment, the employment of assistants and workmen, the opening of bank accounts, the endorsement of checks for deposit in and the writing of checks for the withdrawal of funds from such bank accounts for any purpose, the signing of estimates and certificates, and the execution of any and all other documents and the performance of any and all other acts and deeds in the name of Hawaiian Constructors, as said Paul Grafe may determine in his discretion to be for the best interests of the joint venture, all with the same legal effect as if the same were executed by all of the members of the joint venture.

Certificate

I hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of a Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of Rohl-Connolly Co., at a Special Meeting duly held on May 27, 1941, at which a majority were present.

[SEAL] IRMA DICKEY,
Secretary.

A True Copy.

P. C. Chew,
P. C. CHEW,
Chief Administrative Assistant.

RESOLUTION

RESOLVED, that Paul Grafe, Vice-President of this corporation, be and he is hereby authorized and empowered in so far as this corporation is concerned, to execute a certificate on behalf of this Company for delivery to the United States and to any other firms or persons who may be dealing with Hawaiian Constructors, certifying that Hawaiian Constructors is a joint venture composed of Rohl-Connolly Co., W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Gunther & Shirley Company, and Ralph E. Woolley; that Paul Grafe has been authorized to act alone, either in person or by or through any other person or persons by him duly authorized in writing, in all matters for the joint venture, in the name of Hawaiian Constructors, including the execution of contracts with the United States, either modifying Contract No. W-414-eng.-602, or new contracts for additional or new construction work, contracts for the purchase of materials and supplies, contracts for the purchase or rental of equipment, the employment of assistants and workmen, the opening of bank accounts, the endorsement of checks for deposit in and the writing of checks for the withdrawal of funds from such bank accounts for any purpose, the signing of estimates and certificates, and the execution of any and all other documents and the performance of any and all other acts and deeds in the name of Hawaiian Constructors, as said Paul Grafe, may determine in his discretion to be for the best interests of the joint venture, all with the same legal effect as if the same were executed by all of the members of the joint venture.

Certificate

I hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of a Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, at a Special Meeting duly held on May 27, 1941, at which a majority were present.

[CORPORATE SEAL]
A true copy.

H. L. CAMPBELL,
Ass't Secretary.
P. C. Chew,
P. C. CHEW,
Chief Administrative Assistant.

RESOLUTION

RESOLVED, that J. P. Shirley, President of this corporation, be and he is hereby authorized and empowered in so far as this corporation is concerned, to execute a certificate on behalf of this Company for delivery to the United States and to any other firms or persons who may be dealing with Hawaiian Constructors,

certifying that Hawaiian Constructors is a joint venture composed of 1 Connolly Co., W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Gunther & Shirley Company, and Ralph E. Woolley; that Paul Grafe has been authorized to act as either in person or by or through any other person or persons by him authorized in writing, in all matters for the joint venture, in the name of wailan Constructors, including the execution of contracts with the United States either modifying Contract No. W-414-eng-602, or new contracts for addit or new construction work, contracts for the purchase of materials and sup contracts for the purchase or rental of equipment, the employment of assis and workmen, the opening of bank accounts, the endorsement of check deposit in and the writing of checks for the withdrawal of funds from bank accounts for any purpose, the signing of estimates and certificates, the execution of any and all other documents and the performance of any all other acts and deeds in the name of Hawaiian Constructors, as said Grafe, may determine in his discretion to be for the best interests of the venture, all with the same legal effect as if the same were executed by the members of the joint venture.

Certificate

I hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of Gunther & Shirley Company at a Special Meeting duly held on May 27, 1941, at which a majority were present.
(SEAL)

J. P. SHIRLEY, Jr.,
Secretary

A true copy.

P. G. Chew.
P. G. CHEW,
Chief Administrative Assistant

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 46D

[1]

(RESTRICTED)

(Stamped :) Office Chief of Engineers. June 30, 1941.

600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields)

Contract No. W-414-eng-602.

SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT No. 4

This supplemental agreement entered into this nineteenth day of June, 1941, by and between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter called the Government, represented by the contracting officer executing this agreement, and Hawaiian Constructors, consisting of W. E. Callahan Construction Company, a Nebraska corporation, Gunther & Shirley Company, a Nebraska corporation; Rohl-Con Company, a Nevada corporation; and Ralph E. Woolley, an individual trading as Ralph E. Woolley of Honolulu, T. H.; constituting a joint venture and acting jointly and severally; hereinafter called the contractor, WITNESSETH That:

WHEREAS, On the 20th day of December, 1940, the Government and Hawaiian Constructors entered into Contract No. W-414-eng-602, for the construction of works of National Defense at locations within the Hawaiian Islands, herein referred to as the said contract, and

WHEREAS, On the dates shown below the parties hereto executed supplemental agreements modifying said contract, in order to provide for additional construction work and services, and to increase the number of coadventurers acting as contractor, as follows:

First supplemental agreement, dated March 22, 1941,

Supplemental agreement No. 2, dated May 5, 1941, and

Supplemental agreement No. 3, dated May 22, 1941, and

WHEREAS, It is found advantageous and in the best interests of the United States to further modify the said contract (a) in conformity with the direction of the Under Secretary of War as published in Circular Letter (Finance No. (Contracts No. 45), dated May 16, 1941, subject, "Requirement for Cost-Plus Fixed Fee Contracts," and (b) so that construction work and services, particularly hereinafter described, in addition to that covered by the said con

and supplemental agreements thereto, may be performed for the benefit of the National Defense; and

WHEREAS, The work and services to be performed by this supplemental agreement, hereinafter referred to as supplemental agreement No. 4, are authorized by, are for the purposes set forth in, and are chargeable to, Procurement Authorities, which, with the available balances, are listed below:

(a) Appropriation 211/20540 (C of BU & A), 1941-1942, Procurement Authority No. Eng-812 P 99 A-0540-12, the available balance of which is \$23,900.00;

[2] (b) Appropriation 211/20540 (C of BU & A 1941-1942, Procurement Authority No. Eng-917 P 99 A-0540-12, the available balance of which is \$27,000.00;

(c) Appropriation 21X0540.035 (C of BU & A), No Year, Procurement Authority No. Eng-714 P 99 A-0540.035-N, the available balance of which is \$8,968.13;

(d) Appropriation 210/10535 (B & QA), 1940-1941, Procurement Authority No. QM 2611 P 99 A 0535-01, the available balance of which is \$2,046.00;

(e) Appropriation 211/20540 (C of BU & A), 1941-1942, Procurement Authority No. Eng-991 P 99 A-0540-12, the available balance of which is \$215,300.00; and

(f) Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, September 9, 1940, Procurement Authority No. Eng-820 P 99 A-(0540).152-N, the available balance of which is \$600,000.00 cash and in addition \$1,400,000.00 in contract authorization.

NOW, THEREFORE, The said contract is hereby modified in the following particulars, but in no others;

1. The contractor agrees, for and in consideration of the fixed fee being increased as hereinafter provided, to perform the work and services (in addition to that covered by the said contract as modified by prior supplemental agreements) described in Schedules "A" to "G", inclusive, attached to and made a part hereof.

2. It is estimated that the cost of all the work and services covered by this supplemental agreement is \$2,080,770.00, exclusive of the contractor's fee for said work and services. The estimated cost set forth above is based upon field data now available and is agreed to by both the Government and the contractor.

3. The fixed fee stated in said contract and in said contract as modified and amended shall be increased in the amount of \$50,915.00, which shall cover all the work and services described in said contract and in said contract as modified and amended, irrespective of the cost thereof. If the funds now available are not sufficient to perform all the work and services described in said contract and in said contract as modified and amended and if any additional sum or sums become available, the contractor may be required to perform any work and services described in said contract and in said contract as modified and amended which may be necessary to complete any of the said work and services, for which the contractor shall be paid no additional fee: Provided, however, that there shall be no adjustment in the amount of the fixed fee as provided in the said contract, or in the said contract as modified and amended because of any errors and or omissions made in computing the estimated cost of the construction of the work under the said contract, or under the said contract as modified and amended, or where the actual cost varies from the estimated cost of the work provided in the said contract, or in the said contract as modified and amended.

4. The work shall be done in conformity with the provisions of the War Department Construction policy dated June 15, 1940, File AG 600-12 (6-15-40) M-D-M, and its supplements.

5. Work to be done shall be undertaken immediately after receipt by the contractor of notice to proceed. The work shall be prosecuted with [3] faithfulness and energy and shall be completed as follows:

(a) Construct two (2) chapels on the Island of Oahu, T. H., as described in Schedule "A", within sixty (60) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(b) Construct one (1) paint shop and storage building on the Island of Oahu, T. H., as described in Schedule "B", within sixty (60) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(c) Construct two hundred ten (210) wooden tent floors on the Island of Oahu, T. H., as described in Schedule "C", within forty-five (45) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(d) Furnish and install shelving in Air Corps Barracks Building on Island of Oahu, T. H., as described in Schedule "D", within forty-five (45) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(e) Construct one (1) Armament, Instrument Inspection and Adjustment Building on the Island of Oahu, T. H., as described in Schedule "E", within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

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(f) Construct protective fencing and provide floodlighting for the Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, as described in Schedule "F", within sixty (60) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

(g) Construct bombproof underground storage for 200,000 barrels of reserve aviation gasoline on the Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, as described in Schedule "G", within two hundred (200) calendar days from date of notice to proceed.

6. Minor changes in structures and facilities as may be found necessary in the interest of economy or required due to climatic conditions may be directed by the contracting officer without additional compensation to the contractor.

7. The work as described in Schedules "A" to "G", inclusive, shall be in accordance with the applicable paragraphs of Standard Specifications attached to and made a part of the aforementioned Supplemental Agreement No. 2.

THIS SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT shall be subject to the favorable recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and approval of the Under Secretary of War.

[4]

SCHEDULE "A"

Construction of two (2) chapels at Air Corps stations to be located on the Island of Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

The chapels are to be mobilization-type buildings and construction thereof will be in general conformity with Quartermaster Corps drawings Nos. 700-1 to 1809, inclusive, and No. 643-100, Regiment Chapel.

SCHEDULE "B"

Construction of one (1) paint shop and storage building on the Island of Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

The building shall be constructed in accordance with plans to be furnished.

SCHEDULE "C"

Construction of two hundred ten (210) wooden tent floors, each size 16' x 16', at Air Corps station(s) on the Island of Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

The work shall conform to plan to be furnished.

SCHEDULE "D"

Furnishing and installation of shelving in 600-Man Barracks Building at Air Corps station on the Island of Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

The work shall conform to plan(s) to be furnished.

SCHEDULE "E"

Construction of one (1) Armament, Instrument Inspection and Adjustment Building at Air Corps Station on the Island of Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

The work shall conform to plans and specifications to be furnished.

[5]

SCHEDULE "F"

Construction of protective fencing and floodlighting for Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field, Territory of Hawaii.

The fencing and floodlighting shall conform to drawings and specifications to be furnished. The work shall consist of an eight-foot chain link fence, together with necessary poles, gates, floodlights and wiring.

SCHEDULE "G"

Construction of bombproof underground storage for 200,000 barrels of reserve aviation gasoline on the Island of Oahu, in the Territory of Hawaii.

The work shall conform to drawings as follows and shall be of cut and cover type.

U. S. E. D. Honolulu District Drawings F-26/1 F-26/6 F-26/9 F-26/10

The work consists of the following items:

- (1) Excavation: Approximately 152,000 cu. yds.
- (2) Backfill: Approximately 92,000 cu. yds.
- (3) Concrete: Approximately 23,000 cu. yds.

- (4) Reinforcing steel: Approximately 5,500 lbs.
- (5) Structural steel: Approximately 1,660 tons.
- (6) Steel tanks installed: 4 50,000-barrel tanks.
- (7) Construction of two ethyl blending plants.
- (8) Construction of access road, railway siding, necessary fuel piping, valves, etc., service pipe line and pumping equipment to road and railroad, electric power and lighting system, fire protection equipment, water supply system, and such other minor appurtenances as are necessary to the proper functioning of the installation but not including piping and pumping equipment from deck to site of installation.

(9) Disposal of excess spoil material and concealment of the site as directed by the contracting officer.

[6] IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have executed this agreement as of the day and year first above written.

Witnesses to signature of contractors:

B. L. Robinson,
B. L. ROBINSON,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

P. C. Chew,
P. C. CHEW,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

Approval recommended Jul 12 1941

J. L. Schley,
J. L. SCHLEY,
Major General of Engineers,
Chief of Engineers.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
By Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Contracting Officer,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS
By Paul Grafe,
PAUL GRAFE,
Honolulu, T. H.

Approved Jul 15. 1941

Robert P. Patterson,
ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Under Secretary of War.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 47

[Copy]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
Washington, D. C., May 5, 1943.

SPAAW 201-Wyman, Jr., Theodore
Subject: Reprimand Under 104th Article of War.
To: Commanding General.
Eighth Service Command.

1. It is directed that you administer a reprimand under the 104th Article of War to Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., now a member of your command, substantially as follows:

a. Pursuant to instructions of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, War Department, you are hereby reprimanded under the 104th Article of War for your failure to enforce safety precautions in connection with the field operations of the Miller Construction Company and the Oman-Smith Company, which failure was in part responsible for the explosion and fire which occurred at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, on February 13, 1943.

b. Should you prefer to stand trial, under the provisions of the 104th Article of War rather than accept this reprimand, you will so indicate, by indorsement hereon, within three (3) days following receipt hereof. Should you elect to accept this reprimand in lieu of trial, no action other than to acknowledge receipt hereof need be taken by you.

2. Advise this officer of your action.

By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVELL:

/s/ Madison Pearson,
MADISON PEARSON,
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,
Deputy Chief of Administrative Services.

[Copy]

JA 201—Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
X AG

1st Ind.

Hq. 8TH SERV C, ASF, *Santa Fe Bldg., Dallas, Texas, May 10, 1949*

To: Commanding General, Engineer Unit Training Center, Camp Claibor
Louisiana.

1. It is desired that you administer the reprimand directed in basic letter.
2. Report to this Headquarters the action taken and furnish copies of notice a actual reprimand together with acknowledgment and acceptance by the offi concerned.

By command of Major General DONOVAN:

JULIEN C. HYER,
Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Chief, Judge Advocate Branch

201—Wyman, Jr., Theodore (Col.)

2nd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, ENGINEER UNIT TRAINING CENTER,
Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, May 19, 1949

To: Comanding General, Eighth Service Command, Army Service Forces,
Santa Fe Building, Dallas, Texas.

1. Paragraph 1, 1st Indorsement, has been complied with by the Commandi General, Engineer Unit Training Center.
2. A copy of the notice, and reprimand, together with acknowledgement a acceptance by the officer concerned, are inclosed.

For the Commanding General:

/s/ William S. Crocker, Jr.,
WILLIAM S. CROCKER, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Adjutan

1 Incl: Copy Letter, Hq., EUTC, dated May 17th, and 1st to 3rd Ind., inclusi

HEADQUARTERS,
ENGINEER UNIT TRAINING CENTER,
Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, May 17, 1949

Subject: Disciplinary Action.

To: Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Engineer Unit Training Center, Ca
Claiborne, Louisiana.

1. The Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, War Departme through the Commanding General, Eighth Service Command, has directed tl unless you prefer to stand trial, you be reprimanded under the 104th Art of War for your failure to enforce safety precautions in connection with field operations of the Miller Construction Company and the Oman-Smith C pany, which failure was in part responsible for the explosion and fire wh occurred at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, February 14, 1943.

2. You are accordingly informed that the Commanding General, Engineer U Training Center, proposes to reprimand you as directed unless you prefer t by court-martial.

3. You will acknowledge receipt of this communication by indorsement her and include in such indorsement any demand for trial you wish to make.

By order of Colonel MADDIX:

/s/ William S. Crocker, Jr.,
WILLIAM S. CROCKER, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Adjutan

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 398TH ENGINEER REGIMENT, E. U. T. C.,
Camp Claiborne, La., May 18, 1943.

To: Commanding General, Engineer Unit Training Center, Camp Claiborne, La.

1. Receipt acknowledged.
2. No request or demand for trial is submitted.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Colonel, C. E.

2nd Ind.

201-Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col.

HEADQUARTERS, ENGINEER UNIT TRAINING CENTER,
Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, May 18, 1943.

To: Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Engineer Unit Training Center, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

1. Pursuant to instructions of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, War Department, you are hereby reprimanded under the 104th Article of War for your failure to enforce safety precautions in connection with the field operations of the Miller Construction Company and the Oman-Smith Company, which failure was in part responsible for the explosion which occurred at Dawson Creek, British Columbia, on February 13, 1943.

2. You are directed to acknowledge receipt of this communication by indorsement hereon, including in the indorsement the date of such receipt and stating whether you desire to appeal under the provisions of the 104th Article of War and paragraph 108, Manual for Court-Martial.

/s/ John W. N. Schulz,
JOHN W. N. SCHULZ,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3rd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, 398TH ENGINEER REGIMENT, E. U. T. C.,
Camp Claiborne, La., May 19, 1943.

To: Commanding General, Engineer Unit Training Center, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

1. Receipt on May 19, 1943, is hereby acknowledged.
2. No appeal is desired.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.
Colonel, C. E.

incl. 1

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 48

(Exhibit No. 48 is Map 1 taken from a Japanese submarine and will be found reproduced as Item No. 57, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 49

(Exhibit No. 49 is Map 2 taken from a Japanese submarine and will be found reproduced as Item No. 58, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

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ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 50

[1]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Headquarters Army Pearl Harbor Board
7 September

Memorandum to: Commanding General, USAFPOA.
Subject: Documentary Evidence.

1. It is requested that you make available to the Board, named 1 Department, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, following documents, to wit:

a. All data in whatever form, relating to the Japanese-American received by the Hawaiian Department from the War Department during period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941; including movements of the Japanese armed forces and probable Japanese actions.

b. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same from and through the Navy.

c. Similar data received by the Hawaiian Department during the same from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

d. All reports relating to Japanese activities, both military and civil, in G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or others for said period, including G-2 summaries.

e. All messages taken from the Japanese Consulate on December 7, 1941 subsequent to said date.

f. Documents captured from Japanese invading forces on or about December 7, 1941.

g. All correspondence or other writings relating to the alert of June 1

h. All orders for close-in reconnaissance by aircraft or other agencies during period January 1, 1941 to December 7, 1941.

i. Secret report of Colonel Capron describing damage to structures in Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

j. Letter of transmittal to War Department of SOP of November 5, 1941

k. Report of Colonel Berquist upon his return from school in 1941 in which discussed air warning service, stations and information centers, and general employment of Radar.

[2] l. Memorandum of General Staff asking study of air situation in Hawaii

m. Pattern of bombings by Japanese.

n. Copy of record of trial against Kuhn in Hawaii.

o. Herron's Field Order #1.

p. Complete file of O.N.I. of message taken by F.B.I. from Hawaii R.C.A. file

q. Army's A-B lists in 1941.

r. Navy's estimates based on presence of carriers in the Marshalls.

2. It has come to the attention of the Board that an exchange of information by the O. N. I. and G-2, Hawaiian Department was made during said period by means of teletype. Are there any records of these exchanges?

3. Procedure for obtaining the described documents desired to be used as evidence by the Board can be agreed upon.

George Grunert
GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieutenant General
President

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 50A

[3] (Basic: Memorandum from War Department, Headquarters Army Pearl Harbor Board, dated 7 September 1944, subject: Documentary Evidence)

1st Ind.

R

HEADQUARTERS USAFPOA, APO 958,
13 September 1944.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, APO 958.

1. In compliance with request in basic letter, a search was made of the files of this headquarters for documentary evidence as listed. Items in sub-paragraphs 1 c, d, e, f, p, q, r, and paragraph 2 were sought by Colonel Fielder, AG-2. The remaining items were sought by Lt Col Hain, Asst AG of S, AG-2.

2. Although a thorough search of files was made, the following were not located:

a. Letter of transmittal to War Department of SOP of November 5, 1941. The only written evidence that it *might* have been sent to the War Department was the interstaff routing slip which showed the date of publication as 8 November 1941. Apparently no record was kept because the SOP was classified only "Restricted." (Paragraph 1 j, basic.)

b. Colonel Berquist's report was not found. (Paragraph 1 k, basic.)

c. Memorandum of General Staff asking study of air situation in Hawaii was not found. However, what is believed to be a reply to this memorandum was found. (Paragraph 1 l, basic.)

d. Pattern of bombings by Japanese was not found. (Paragraph 1 m, basic.)

e. Navy's estimates based on presence of carriers in Marshalls was not found; at least none were found with any specific reference to these carriers. (Paragraph 1 r, basic.)

For the Commanding General:

Robert W. Hain,
ROBERT W. HAIN,
Lt. Col., G. S. O.,
Asst. AC of S; G-3.

[1]

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 51

[Copy]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF.
12 September 1944.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Japanese Task Force that attacked Pearl Harbor, Summary of information concerning, derived from Prisoners of War and Captured Documents.

References:

- (a) JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report #7 of 10 January 1944—FURUKAWA, Masayuki, served with SHOKAKU Air Group during attack on Pearl Harbor.
- (b) ATIS, Sowspace Area Serial Number 230, dated 16 August 1943 report of Interrogation #148; YOKOTA, Shigeki, served aboard KAGA during attack on Pearl Harbor.
- (c) Cincpac Conf. serial 02259 of 23 July 1942 composite interrogation of HIRYU prisoners: K. Aiso (Comdr), H. Nagayama (1st Eng. Off.), Y. Kajishima (2nd Eng. Off.), H. Mandai (Eng. PO), S. Turukawa, T. Koga, M. Hidaka, H. Iwasaki, T. Yoda, H. Ueda, N. Hidaka, M. Suzuka, H. Huchikami, M. Yonemura, S. Urakawa, I. Okada, S. Turuda, T. Yanagi, Y. Ochiai, T. Baba, S. Yamada, S. Kameshima, T. Nagatomi, T. Takano, U. Hidaka, J. Todorokihara, S. Nagai, A. Hara, M. Honda, S. Kuriyama, N. Takechi, M. Manaka, K. Hashiguchi, K. Ikeda.
- (d) Preliminary Interrogation of POW Noda, Mitsuharau—Interrogation not yet complete, report to be made in near future.
- (e) Document captured from Japanese plane raised from waters of Pearl Harbor on 9 December—Enclosure A(1) to Cincpac Conf. Serial 079, dated 10 January 1942.
- (f) Track Chart of Japanese Carriers—November 1941 to April 1942; reproduced from Japanese map of Pacific Area, captured at New Georgia early June 1943. Comsopac S-1865, #643. (Copy attached herewith).

ALL TIMES AND DATES UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED ARE JAPANESE TIMES AND DATES: OUR DECEMBER 7 IS JAPANESE DECEMBER 8; TIME DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOKYO AND HAWAIIAN TIME WAS FOUR AND ONE HALF HOURS.

1. Prisoner reference (a) states SHOKAKU departed OITA (on BUNGO CHANNEL) 20 November arriving TANKAN BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND about 25

November, departing there 27/28 November taking a northerly route south of ALEUTIANS and on the night of 5 December turning south, planes flying of 0200 Japanese time (0630 Hawaiian time) for attack on Pearl Harbor.

[2] 2. Prisoner of war, reference (b), states departed SASEBO about November and arriving TANKAN BAY 20 November, that SORYU arrived November, SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU 17 November and AKAGI, HIRYU, cruiser of the TONE Class, HIYEI and KIRISHIMA arriving TANKAN I prior 20 November. Also present at TANKAN BAY were three oil tankers, supply ship, and three submarines. The departure from TANKAN BAY 1400, 22 November, when they were joined by three submarines. After departing TANKAN their course was east until 4 December, when course was changed south. After 4 December, the tankers and supply ship were no longer seen. The night of 7 December speed was increased to 26 knots and submarines proceeded on independent patrols in the vicinity of the Task Force. Planes took off at 0100 Japanese time (0530 Hawaiian time). Note: It is believed that prisoner has confused his departure from the Japanese Empire and TANKAN BAY.

3. A composite of the interrogation of thirty-four prisoners from the HIJ captured after MIDWAY (reference (c)) states the HIRYU departed 10 November 1941 from SASEBO for rendezvous with the Hawaiian Striking Force, consisting of CARDIV ONE, TWO and FIVE (AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU, ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU); CRUDIV EIGHT (TONE, CHIKUMA); and BATDIV THREE (HIYEI, KIRISHIMA); and DESRON ONE with ABUKUMA as flagship, at an anchorage either called TANGAN or TANKAN BAY in the KURILES; possibly on ETOROFU ISLAND. It was stated that island was barren, without even the vestige of a village. A stop was made at SAEKI for upkeep enroute. Departed TANKAN BAY where they had been anchored for two or three days on 25 or 26 November with the above Striking Force and carried out the attack on Hawaii on December 8 (MINUS NINE TIME).

4. This prisoner of war (reference (d)), who was confidential clerk on Staff of Admiral Yamamoto, and who helped write the stencils to mimeograph the order for the war against America and the Hawaiian Striking Force's activities, has stated in effect:

(a) The Striking Force to assemble in home water bases and depart 3 days (X Day was later set as 8 December, TOKYO TIME), which would be about 22 November as date for departure from home bases.

(b) That this force was to proceed and attack the Pearl Harbor base of the Pacific Fleet by way of TANKAN BAY. The Hawaiian Striking Force was to maintain strict radio silence and receive all traffic via TOKYO Number 1 broadcast.

(c) That deception measures were to be taken in Japan, to give the impression that the Main Force of the Japanese Navy remained in home waters.

5. The composition of the Striking Force (reference (e)), was obtained from a call sign card removed from a Japanese plane salvaged from the water near Pearl Harbor on 9 December; it showed CARDIV ONE, TWO and FIVE; CRUDIV EIGHT; BATDIV THREE and DESRON ONE as subordinate commands under command of First Air Fleet. These units were also listed by name as: Air craft carriers: AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYU, SORYU, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; Battleships: HIYEI and KIRISHIMA; Heavy Cruisers: TONE and CHIKUMA; Light Cruiser ABUKUMA.

6. The track of Japanese aircraft carriers from November 1941 to April 1942 (reference (f)), shows carriers departing ETOROFU ISLAND east coast of the geographical location of TANKAN BAY on 27 November 1941 and proceeding due east to about longitude 178 west; thence a southeast course to a position roughly north of OAHU arriving December 8, 1941.

SUMMARY

7. With the exception of a difference in dates given by one prisoner of war (paragraph 2), there is an overwhelming weight of evidence that the Japanese Striking Force assembled in home waters during November and departed from the BUNGO CHANNEL area about 22 November, proceeding to TANKAN BAY (sometimes called HITOKAPPU BAY). Departing TANKAN BAY on 27 November, this Task Force, consisting of six (6) aircraft carriers, two (2) fast battleships, two (2) heavy cruisers, and one (1) light cruiser and some destroyers,

proceeded on an easterly course (to avoid being sighted by shipping) and then headed for a position to the north of OAHU, arriving there on the early morning of 8 December, Japanese time, or 7 December, Hawaiian Time.

8. TANKAN BAY does not appear on ordinary maps or charts, but does appear in a series of maps of the Japanese Empire in the Japanese National Encyclopedia, in the same position normally shown for HITOKAPPU BAY. It is highly improbable that several prisoners of war in widely separated areas would choose the name of a place unfamiliar to foreigners if they were attempting to give misleading information. It is believed that the track of the Japanese carriers (reference (f)), which shows departure from the BUNGO CHANNEl area (no departure date shown) to ETOROFU ISLAND, and departure therefrom on 27 November, confirms beyond doubt the statements of prisoners.

(Penciled note:)

The foregoing supplements my testimony given on 11 Sept.

/s/ C. H. McMorris,
Rear Admiral U. S. N.,
Chief of Joint Staff,
Cincpac and Cincpac.

(The remaining portion of Exhibit No. 51 is a map reflecting the track of Japanese aircraft carriers—November 1941–April 1942—and will be found reproduced as Item No. 59, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 52

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 52 IN EVIDENCE

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR,
Iolani Palace, Honolulu, T. H., 7 November 1942.

IN THE MATTER OF—THE CONFINEMENT OF BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN, A PERSON
CONVICTED OF VIOLATING SECTIONS 31, AS AMENDED, 32, AND 34, TITLE 50, UNITED
STATES CODE ANNOTATED.

ORDER

THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII:

To: The Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.; and, The
Warden of The United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas.

1. Whereas, the above named Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, duly was convicted on February 21, 1942, by the Military Commission duly appointed for the Territory of Hawaii by the Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, of the following charges, to wit:

Charge I: Violation of Section 34, Title 50, United States Code Annotated; unlawfully conspiring to transmit information affecting national defense.

Specification: BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN, OTOJIRO OKUDA and NAGAO KITA, at Honolulu, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, during the period commencing on or about the 20th day of November, 1941, up to and including the date of the filing of this charge, did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together and with each other and with other persons whose names are unknown, to commit an offense against the United [2] States of America, to wit, the offense of unlawfully and feloniously, with intent and reason to believe that it was to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely Japan, communicating, delivering and transmitting, and attempting to communicate, deliver and transmit, to a foreign government, to wit, the Imperial Japanese Government, documents, codes, sketches, plans, lists and writings relating to the national defense and the movements and positions of the several units of the United States Fleet (Section 32, Title 50, U. S. C.), that is to say that during the period and at the place above set forth BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN, OTOJIRO OKUDA and NAGAO KITA did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together and with each other and with other persons whose names are unknown, with the intent and reason to believe

that the information to be transmitted relative to national defense was to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely Japan, to communicate, deliver and transmit to a foreign government, namely the Imperial Government of Japan, certain information relative to national defense and to the movements and positions of the several units of the United States Fleet by means of a plan and system of signals which were prepared by BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN and submitted to OTOJIRO OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, which would give a concise method of transmitting to the Imperial Government of Japan and its naval and military representatives information relative to national defense and the movements and locations of the battle fleet, scouting fleet, aircraft [5] carriers and other units of the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii.

That thereafter and during the existence of said conspiracy one or more said conspirators hereinafter mentioned by name did the following overt act in furtherance of and to effect the object of said conspiracy aforesaid:

OVERT ACTS

(1) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 28th day of November, 1941, BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did make a trip to the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.

(2) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 29th day of November, 1941, BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did prepare a plan for transmittal of information relative to the United States Fleet.

(3) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 30th day of November, 1941, BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did deliver to OTOJIRO OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate, 1714 Nuuanu Avenue, Honolulu, T. H., a plan for the transmittal of information relative to the movements and positions of the several units of the United States Fleet.

(4) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 30th day of November, 1941, OTOJIRO OKUDA advised BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN at the Japanese Consulate that his plan for transmittal of information relative to the United States Fleet was too complicated, and instructed him to prepare a simpler plan.

(5) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 1st day of December, 1941, BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did prepare a plan for the transmittal of information relative to the movements and positions of the several units of the United States Fleet.

(6) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 2nd day of December, 1941, BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did deliver to OTOJIRO OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate, 1714 Nuuanu Avenue, Honolulu, T. H., a plan for transmittal of information relative to the United States Fleet units and movements.

(7) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 2nd day of December, 1941, BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did deliver to OTOJIRO OKUDA at the Japanese Consulate, 1714 Nuuanu Avenue, Honolulu, T. H., a list showing the number and names of naval vessels in Pearl Harbor, T. H.

(8) At Honolulu, T. H., on or about the 3rd day of December, 1941, NAOKI KITA did transmit a plan and system of signals previously prepared by BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN to the Foreign Minister of the Imperial Japanese Government at Tokio, Japan (Section 34, Title 50, U. S. C.)

CHARGE II: Violation of Section 31, as amended, Title 50, United States Code, Annotated; unlawfully obtaining information affecting national defense.

Specifications: In that BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did, at Pearl Harbor, Island of Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, on or about November 28, 1941, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense, with intent and reason to believe that the information to be obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully and feloniously obtain information concerning matters connected with the national defense, to wit, battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, owned and constructed by the United States and under the control of the United States [5] and of its officers and agents, in violation of Section 31, as amended, Title 50, United States Code, Annotated.

Charge III: Violation of Section 32, Title 50, United States Code Annotated; unlawfully disclosing information affecting national defense.

Specification: In that BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN did, at Honolulu, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, on or about December 2, 1941, with intent and reason to believe that it was to be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation, namely, Japan, unlawfully and feloniously communicate, deliver, transmit, and attempt to communicate, deliver and transmit, to a foreign government, namely, The Imperial Government of Japan, and to the military and naval forces within a foreign country, namely, Japan, and to representatives, officers, agents, employees, subjects and citizens thereof, information relating to the national defense of the United States, to wit, information relating to and concerning vessels, to wit, United States battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines connected with the national defense, at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii, their positions, locations, and movements in violation of Section 32, Title 50, United States Code Annotated.

2. And, whereas, the said Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn duly was sentenced upon said conviction of said charges on said February 21, 1942, by said Military Commission, to be shot to death with musketry;

3. And, whereas, on October 26, 1942, the said sentence duly was approved by the undersigned Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii but was commuted to [6] confinement at hard labor for fifty (50) years; and whereas it appears necessary to the undersigned, as the said Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, that the said Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn be confined in The United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, to serve said sentence as commuted as aforesaid;

4. Now, therefore, you, the said Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, hereby are ordered to deliver, or cause to be delivered, the said Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, to the Warden, The United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, for the purpose of confining him, the said Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, in the said United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, to satisfy the said sentence of confinement at hard labor for fifty (50) years so imposed by the said Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii. **HEREOF FAIL NOT.**

THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII:

To:

The Warden of The United States Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas.

Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, duly having been convicted and sentenced in the manner and form aforesaid,

You hereby are ordered to receive the said Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn in The United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas from the said Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, and safely keep and confine him, the said Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, in the said United States Penitentiary and cause the said sentence of confinement at hard labor for fifty (50) years [7] to be fully executed. **HEREOF FAIL NOT.**

/s/ Delos C. EMMONS,
DELOS C. EMMONS,
*Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Military Governor of the Territory of Hawaii.*

A true copy:

/s/ William R. C. Morrison,
WILLIAM R. C. MORRISON,
*Lieutenant Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Assistant Executive.*

3070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[8]

[Copy]

3 DECEMBER, 1941

#0245(1) "PA"

From: KITA

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

(Secret military message No) (By Chief of Consulate's Code).

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff

From: FUJII

Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows.

1. Code (following 3 section 8 line table)

Battle force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.
2. All Battle force has sailed 1st-3rd dates Inc.
3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd).
4. All aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd).
5. All battle force have sailed, 4th-6th dates Inc.
6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th).
7. All aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th).

2. Signal

Light in Lanikai beach house at night -----

One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1". From 9 pm to 10 pm indicate "2". The below signals until midnight, in order indicate 3 and 4. Two lights according to the time, indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

[9] When not in accordance with (lights) above 1 full automobile light and one half light indicate 1, 2, 3, 4. Two full lights indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

2. On the Lanakai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every ho piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates 1, 2, 3, 4. Two pieces indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

3. In Lanakai bay during daytime in front of harbor (Offing) a star with one star on sail indicates 1, 2, 3, 4; a star and "III" indicates 5, 6, 7, 8.

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama house from 7 pm to 1 am every indicates 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

5. "KGMB Want Ads" advertisement 9.45 am

(A) A chinese rug etc., for sale—apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 3.

(B) A complete chicken farm etc., apply as above indicates 4 or 7.

(C) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates 5 or 8.

In the event that in accordance with one of 3 items written above from (a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located bet the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanatorium and Haleakala road we can be watch from the sea to the south west and south east of Maui, until receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak.

7 pm-8 pm indicates 3 or 6; 8 pm-9 pm indicates 4 or 7; 9 pm-10 pm indicates 5 or 8.

[10]

[Copy]

DECEMBER 5, 1941

From: KITA

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

1. The three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the entered port. They expect to depart port on the 8th.

2. On the same day the LEXINGTON and 5 heavy cruisers departed.

3. The following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the 5th:

- 8 battleships
- 3 light cruisers
- 16 destroyers

Coming in were 4 cruisers of the Honolulu type and 2 destroyers.

[11]

[Copy]

6 DEC 1941.

No. 369

From: KITA

To: Washington-Tokyo

On the evening of the 5th the bb WYOMING (sic!) and one sweeper entered port.

Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

BB-9

CL-3

DD-17

am-3

Ships in dock

CL-4

DD-2

(CA and CV all -----)

PS—CV cannot be found in the fleet(?)

[12]

[Copy]

3 DECEMBER, 1941.

#0245(1) "PA"

From: KITA

To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo

(Secret military message No.) (By Chief of Consulate's Code).

To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff

From: FUJII

Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows:

1. Code (following 3 section 8 line table)

Battle force, including scouting force, are about to put to sea—

1. Several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea.

2. All Battle force has sailed 1st-3rd dates Inc.

3. Several aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)

4. All aircraft carriers have sailed (1st to 3rd)

5. All battle force have sailed, 4th-6th dates Inc.

6. Several aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)

7. All aircraft carriers have sailed. (4th to 6th)

2. Signal

Light in Lanikai beach house at night -----

One light from 8 pm to 9 pm indicates "1". From 9 pm to 10 pm indicates "2". The below signals until midnight, in order indicate 3 and 4. Two lights, according to the time, indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

When not in accordance with (lights) above 1 full automobile headlight and one half light indicate 1, 2, 3, 4. Two full [13] lights indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

2. On the Lanakai coast during daytime from 8 am until noon every hour 1 piece linen cloth (sheet) indicates 1, 2, 3, 4. Two pieces indicate 5, 6, 7, 8.

3. In Lanaki bay during daytime in front of harbor (Offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates 1, 2, 3, 4; a star and "III" indicates 5, 6, 7, 8.

4. Light in dormer window of Kalama house from 7 pm to 1 am every hour indicates 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

5. "KGMB Want Ads" advertisement 9.45 am

(A) A chinese rug etc., for sale—apply P. O. box 1476 indicates 3 or 6.

(B) A complete chicken farm etc., apply as above indicates 4 or 7.

(C) Beauty operator wanted—same—indicates 5 or 8.

In the event that in accordance with one of 3 items written above from Oahu a signal or radio message is impossible or Maui Island at a point located between the lower road six miles north of Kula Sanatorium and Haleakala road which can be watched from the sea to the south west and south east of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX" this (the following) will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak.

7 pm-8 pm indicates 3 or 6; 8 pm-9 pm indicates 4 or 7; 9 pm-10 pm indicates 5 or 8.

3072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[14]

TERRITORY OF HAWAII

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR

Iolani Palace, Honolulu, T. H.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs BERNARD JULIUS OTTO KUEHN

The statement of Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn made to the investigating Captain James W. Chapman, Air Corps, at the Immigration Station, local the City of Honolulu, T. H., was, in effect, as follows:

Mr. Kuehn stated that his previous detailed statements to the investigation for the Federal Bureau of Investigation were substantially true and correct that he thoroughly understood his constitutional rights relating to making statements to be used in any trial which might result from the investigation. Kuehn was at that time again advised of his rights by Captain Chapman.

States that the only reason for his original visit to Japan in about 1934 to undertake a study of the Japanese language, art, and history, with a to later serving as an instructor in Japanese art and history. He states on that trip he met Baron Kycoga who was an official of the Japanese government and that Baron Kycoga on one occasion during his visit to the Japanese Islands, which lasted approximately three months, suggested to him that it would be beneficial both to the Japanese government and to Mr. Kuehn if he could arrange to secure and transmit certain [15] information of a great value to the Japanese government, but he states that he refused to enter into such an agreement with Baron Kycoga. He states that this matter has never been mentioned again by either of them. He thinks that it may be possible that Baron Kycoga may have later contacted the Japanese Consul at Honolulu and suggested that the Consul renew the offer, but that he does not know to be a fact, nor did any member of the Japanese Consulate ever refer directly to Baron Kycoga.

He says that his wife's son, Leopold Kuehn, is now residing in Berlin, Germany, and occupies some kind of official capacity with the German government. He states that he and his wife had, since 1938 until about June of 1941, been sending a small monthly allowance of money to Leopold, together with a customary Christmas present, also in money, and occasional presents of food. He states that because of the so-called "freeze" order of the United States government effective about last May or June, he was unable to send further money to Leopold. He says that no money has gone forward to him and that in October or the early part of November he and his wife decided to again attempt to send Leopold a Christmas present of \$500 in cash if they could find a convenient way for transmitting the money. He says they first attempted to send this through the Bishop National Bank and that he talked to Mr. Lowe in the bank concerning it, but that Mr. Lowe told him that it was impossible to do so. He says he later had some correspondence with some person in South America and attempted to send the money that way, but these negotiations fell through. At that time he thought [16] that the way he could get the money to Germany would be to go to the Japanese Consulate and see if the money could be sent, possibly through the Yokahama Specie Bank and that with this in view he visited Mr. Otojiro Okuda at the Japanese Consulate.

On one of his visits to the Consulate at which the transmission of the money was discussed, he says that Mr. Okuda told him that they would attempt to transmit the money if Mr. Kuehn would agree to secure for them certain information relating to the strength and movements of the United States fleet in the Hawaiian waters. He says that he told Mr. Okuda he would secure this information for him but at the time he said this he had no intention of carrying out his promise, but was merely attempting to get Mr. Okuda to take care of the money for him and he felt this was the only way it could be done. He states that Mr. Okuda suggested that he prepare a certain code for the sending of signals by lights from his house in Kalama and also from his beach, together with an alternate set of signals by means of hanging a sheet on a clothesline during the daylight hours and with certain other alternate signals. He states that the original code which he submitted was rejected by Mr. Okuda and that the Japanese Consulate as being too complicated, and that he then prepared a simplified code. He states that he never at any time used any signals to transmit any information. He states that the meetings with

Okuda occurred during the last two or three days of November and the first two or three days of December, 1941.

He states that about the 1st or 2nd of December, 1941, [17] he prepared a list purporting to represent the strength of the United States fleet in Hawaiian waters in various types of ships and that he delivered this list to Mr. Okuda, but he states that the figures used therein were purely fictional except for such general information as he had concerning the size of the fleet from the reading of newspapers and that if any of the figures should be correct, that this is merely a coincidence. He says that he made a trip to Pearl City and, of course, drove along the main highway of Pearl Harbor two or three days before he submitted this list, but that he made no effort at that time to observe or count the number of ships in harbor.

He states that all of the money which he has received from various foreign sources including Holland and Japan represented income from the sale of certain property which he formerly owned in Germany.

/s/ James W. Chapman,
JAMES W. CHAPMAN,
Captain, Air Corps.

FEBRUARY 5, 1942.

[18]

HONOLULU, T. H., January 3, 1941.

I, Otto Kuehn, make the following voluntary statement to J. Sterling Adams and George E. Allen, whom I know to be Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and who have informed me that I cannot be required to make a statement, further that anything I might say can be used against me in court.

In July of 1936, when I made a trip to Japan to study the Japanese language, on a Japanese boat I met a Baron KYOGOKU who was returning from England. KYOGOKU told me that he was one of the old noble Japanese families and was connected with the MITSUI family in Japan. Prior to his return from England, KYOGOKU had spent some time in Germany as well as England and he speaks both English and German fluently. When we left the boat in Yokohama, KYOGOKU asked me my address where I would be stopping and I told him the Imperial Hotel, Tokyo. He then stated that he would see me later on. Two or three days later KYOGOKU called on me at the Imperial Hotel. We spent the entire afternoon together, KYOGOKU showing me around Tokyo and I afterwards invited him for dinner at the Imperial Hotel.

I had previously told KYOGOKU that I had served in the German Navy as an officer during the World War and had recounted some of my experiences to him during that time. While we were eating dinner KYOGOKU began very tactfully to question me as to whether I would from time to time furnish him with information about Honolulu. This information, or [19] whatever I was asked to do, was to be for the Japanese Government. I refused to have anything to do with the idea and KYOGOKU never mentioned the question any more. Although KYOGOKU never again attempted to get me to give information to the Japanese Government, he visited me quite often at the hotel and took me to his castle near Gifu and he also took me cormorant fishing near Gifu. We also went to the theater and some other places and had dinner together on occasions. On all of these occasions KYOGOKU and I were alone with the exception of one time when Mr. SATO, a doctor in one of the Japanese hospitals whom I had previously met in Honolulu through Mr. KUNITOMO, was with me at a time when KYOGOKU called on me and KYOGOKU took us to dinner.

During this time KYOGOKU often told me that if there was any favor or anything that he could do for me, that all I need do was to ask him and he would do it. I left Japan about October, 1936, following about a three months visit. Before leaving Japan I obtained my quota visa for permanent residence in the United States. KYOGOKU went to the boat with me to bid me goodbye and at that time he reminded me that if he could ever do a favor for me he would be willing to do so. From the time we parted and when I returned to Honolulu, I heard nothing from KYOGOKU nor did I communicate with him in any way until 1940, with the possible exception of one Christmas card I received from him in 1936.

In the spring of 1940 my wife made a trip to Japan and returned with about \$6,000.00, which she had obtained from Dr. WILHELM HOMBERG. Following her return to Honolulu and about four weeks later, I received a letter from Dr. HOMBERG [20] advising me that it would be necessary for me to make

some arrangements to get any additional funds out of Japan; that it was becoming too difficult and dangerous for him to do this. About three weeks after receipt of Dr. HOMBERG'S letter, I wrote him suggesting that he contact Baron KYOGOKU, an old friend of mine, and that KYOGOKU could assist us in sending the money from Japan to Honolulu. With this letter I sent a Duden (German) grammar dictionary, similar to a Webster dictionary. At the same time I retained a duplicate dictionary in my possession. In the letter to HOMBERG I explained that in future communications I would use a number code which would indicate the number of the page and the word from the top of the page denoting the word intended, such as if the word "money" appeared on page 210 of the dictionary and was the sixth word down from the top, to indicate the word "money" I would send the numbers "210—6." This letter and its contents, the dictionary, were sent by me from Honolulu through Mr. KAI, purser on the KAMAKURA MARU, whom I had known in the past and who had previously brought presents from HOMBERG to my daughter. This message was sent through Mr. KAI during July, 1940.

I received no further communication from HOMBERG until September, 1940, at which time Mr. KAI telephoned me at my Kalama residence and asked me to meet him in front of the N. Y. K. office in Honolulu. I did so and he gave me a package of money containing \$10,000.00. At the same time Mr. KAI gave me a slip of paper which instructed me not to write to Dr. HOMBERG but rather to address my letters or communications to Baron KYOGOKU at a post office box number in Tokyo.

[21] During July, 1941, shortly after the freeze order went into effect and I was given to understand that each alien must submit a list of all their property, I contacted a Vice Consul at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, as Mr. KITA, the Consul, was not there. My purpose in doing so was to send a message to HOMBERG through KYOGOKU in the pre-arranged manner. I had prepared a brief message in the coded form mentioned above which in substance read: "Please send balance as soon as possible." At first the Vice Consul was suspicious and reluctant about sending my message but I explained as follows: I told the Vice Consul I was acting for the Japanese Government and that I had an important message to go through to Baron KYOGOKU, an important official in the Japanese Government at Tokyo. I told the Vice Consul that I needed the money before October 29 so that I could make my statement of property under the Foreign Funds Law and so that I could include this amount in my statement of property holdings as required by the foreign funds division in order that no questions would be asked at a later date relative to my source of income and how I came into possession of these monies. I intentionally gave him the impression that the money I was to get from Baron KYOGOKU was as compensation for services I had rendered for the Japanese Government. The Vice Consul agreed to send my message to KYOGOKU at this time.

After two or three weeks I came back and spoke to the Vice Consul and asked him if he had gotten an answer or any money as yet. He said no, so I again returned about three weeks later and he still said no. At that time I made arrangements with the Vice Consul that when he heard from [22] Japan regarding the money or got an answer that he should send me a post card to my box signed "JIMMIE" and he said for me not to come too often to the Consulate.

I did not contact the Consulate again nor did I receive any post card until one afternoon in the very end of October, just after the first Japanese boat came to Honolulu, a young Japanese man came to my home in Kalama and he told my son that he wanted to see me. I was in the back working in my garden. My son came and advised me he was there and I went around. He very brusquely asked me if I was OTTO KUEHN and I said "Yes," and he said, "I have something for you from Dr. HOMBERG," so I took him back to my little garden house where he gave me a package and a letter and I asked him if he had any other information for me and he said no. I opened the letter first and in the letter was a sheet of paper written in English asking if I had a short-wave transmitter and if I would be willing to make a test at a certain stated time which was on a night several nights later, on a certain wave length. This letter was typewritten and had no name on it. He gave me a sheet of paper and an envelope and I wrote on the sheet of paper that I was unable to make the test. I was quite nervous and put it in the envelope and gave it to him. I asked him if he knew what was in the package and he said no. I asked him if he wanted a receipt for the package and he said no, and he then left and I opened the package and counted the money. There were \$14,000.00 in the package, mostly in new \$100.00 bills, some \$20.00 bills. I think that this was a contact KYOGOKU was trying to make with me through this letter. As soon as he left I tore up the sheet of paper asking me to make this radio [2] test and burned it up.

It was about a week after this, and after the TAIYO MARU had sailed from Honolulu, that I again contacted the Japanese Consulate and talked to the Vice Consul and asked him to send some money to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany. He said that he did not think it could be done and I suggested that he take it up with the Yokohama Specie Bank and I would come back two or three days later.

I went back and spoke to the Vice Consul about three days later, at which time he asked me what information I could give him about the United States Fleet and how many ships were in the harbor. He also asked me if I knew which part of the Pacific the United States Fleet usually went in on their maneuvers and how long they would be out. I told him that I could tell him how many ships there were in the harbor but that I could not tell him where the fleet was or when it would be back. He suggested that I work out a set of signals so that we could let the Japanese Fleet know how many ships were in the harbor, how many were prepared to leave and how many had already left for Japan. I told him that I could do all this.

I think that sometime between my previous contact and this time when he asked me for information about the fleet and suggested I prepare the set of signals that he had contacted KYOGOKU or someone in Japan about me. He appeared to me to be very glad to have me in his office and to have me do something for him.

About three or four days later I went back to the Japanese Consulate and showed him a set of signals containing [24] fifteen numbers, each one of which was to indicate a certain situation, as to how many ships were in the harbor, how many prepared to leave, how many had left, whether they were battle fleet, scouting fleet or aircraft carriers, exactly as previously told by me to Special Agents Adams and Allen in my statement of January 1, 1942. He told me at this time that the system was too complicated. During this visit KITA was present in the room. I did all of my talking with the Vice Consul who would speak in Japanese with KITA, the Consul, who would in turn speak in Japanese to the Vice Consul and then the Vice Consul would speak with me in English. They said that this system was too complicated and requested me to make a simpler method of signals, which I said I would do.

On Tuesday, December 2, 1941, I went back and took them two envelopes, one containing the money to be sent to my son and the other containing the simplified system of signals as described by me in my previous statement to Special Agents Adams and Allen dated January 1, 1942, and also I had written at this time some information as to the number and various types of ships in Hawaiian waters, as also set forth in that statement. I handed these two envelopes to the Vice Consul and he asked me to come in and said he would like to talk with me but I told him that it was all written out and there was no need to and turned around and went back to my car and went on into town.

[25] I have read the above statement consisting of five pages and certify that the same is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Otto Kuehn.
OTTO KUEHN.

WITNESSES:

/s/ J. Sterling Adams.
J. STERLING ADAMS,
Special Agent.
/s/ George E. Allen,
GEORGE E. ALLEN,
Special Agent.

*Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice,
Honolulu, T. H.*

[26]

HONOLULU, T. H., January 1, 1942.

I, OTTO KUEHN, make the following statement to J. STERLING ADAMS and GEORGE E. ALLEN, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, knowing same to be such. No threats, inducements or promises of any kind have been made to me. I make this statement freely and voluntarily, of my own free will.

I, OTTO KUEHN, was born on July 25, 1895, at Berlin, Germany. In April, 1913, I enlisted in the German Navy, as a Cadet, on the training cruiser, HERTHA, at Flensburg, Germany. After serving my training period, I was a midshipman on the German cruiser, BLUCHER, on which I served in the war until January 24, 1915, at which time I was captured by the British following a naval engagement in which the BLUCHER was sunk. I remained in a British camp, as a

prisoner of war, until January of 1918, at which time, during an exchange of prisoners, I was sent to Holland, where I remained for the duration of the war. Following the armistice, I returned to Berlin and studied architecture for three months. Following this, I again entered naval service, as a lieutenant aboard the WITTELSBACH, the mother ship of a minesweeper flotilla. I continued this navy service for an additional six months, following which I was released and placed in the Naval Reserve Corps. I then took up the study of medicine at the University of Berlin and at the University of Munich, continuing this for a period of one and one half years. During this time, 1920, I married my present wife, FRIEDEL, in Munich. Shortly before my marriage, [27] I purchased a 500-ton sail freighter, which operated between Finland and Rotterdam. My father had previously left me an inheritance of about \$50,000 cash, as well as a number of houses and government bonds. The sail freighter, known as the "ANTARES," ran on a reef, after which I sold the boat for about \$2,000.00.

In about 1921, I began working in Berlin with "SEIMENS," a machinery concern engaged in the manufacture of heavy motors, etc. I continued in this employment, serving as plant protection man, for about one year, following which I entered training with the same company to learn the business, and continued in this up until 1923. I then operated a manufacturing and distributing business of sparkling water and lemonade in Stettin, Germany, operating less than a year. Afterward, I returned to Berlin and was employed as an inspector with "POMMERSCHER MEIEREIEIEN", which business consisted in dairy products, etc. I continued in this work up until 1928, but before discontinuing this employment, about 1927, I entered into the coffee importing business in Berlin in partnership with one OVERBACK. My position was Sales Manager, and I continued the operation of the same business up until my departure from Germany in 1935. My first contact with the Nazi Party was attendance at a meeting called by HITLER in Kiel, Germany, in 1930. HITLER spoke at the meeting, which I attended with my son, LEOPOLD. Following the meeting, and on that same day, I enlisted as a member of the Nazi Party, and influenced my son to join the party also at the same time. I did not become active in the party until 1932, when Mr. SUNKEL, district leader of the [28] party at Kiel, advised me to go with REINHOLD HEYDRICH to Munich and to see a person, name unrecalled, who later became chief of police at Munich, about securing a job with the party. SUNKEL brought HEYDRICH by my home, and HEYDRICH and I took the night train, together, to Munich, after my having advanced HEYDRICH about a one-hundred-mark loan. Upon reaching Munich, HEYDRICH and I went to the City Hall Restaurant, to have a cup of coffee. HEYDRICH excused himself, stating he was going to see the person to whom SUNKEL had referred us, the party who later became chief of police at Munich, and it later developed he was given a position by this person, which turned out later to be chief of the German Gestapo system, working under HEINRICH HIMMLER, the head of the entire German police. At the time SUNKEL had sent us both to meet with this individual in Munich, he had indicated one or more positions were open and it is quite possible the position given to HEYDRICH was the one I, too, was being considered for. If such a position had been offered me at that time, I would unhesitatingly have accepted it.

HEYDRICH returned after about four hours to the City Hall Restaurant, where I was waiting in the company of the individual, whose name I have forgotten, who later became chief of police in Munich, and I accompanied them to HEINRICH HIMMLER's home, where I spoke with HIMMLER for maybe half an hour regarding Communism and the means which should be adopted in order to eradicate it from Germany, following which HEYDRICH came to me and said that HIMMLER did not like me and it would be best for me to return to Berlin, which I did. Shortly after that, I received word from SUNKEL that I was to be [29] assigned to work in Altona, Germany, for the party, as an investigator for the party to determine the identity of those individuals who were Communists and ascertain who was pro-Nazi in the Altona Police Department and residents of that vicinity. I engaged in this occupation for about six months, toward the end of which time I made a report on the chief of police in Altona, who was a party member, to the effect that he was immoral in his private life, and shortly thereafter, following some other minor troubles, I was advised that my services were no longer required, so I returned to Berlin and my coffee business.

While in Berlin, a Jewish friend of mine, PAULSSEN, came to my home and some individuals notified the party of this occurrence. They then told me to leave the Nazi Party, and I was later arrested by the police when I went to the office of a Nazi Party official to request a hearing. I was held by the police for two weeks, then placed in a concentration camp for four weeks. During this time I was not questioned. OTTO STRASSER was in this same concentration camp. During the time I was confined to the camp, my wife, FRIEDEL, and son, LEOPOLD, and Mr. BRUCKER were working for me among members of the party and I was released. At that time my son, LEOPOLD, was a stormtrooper in the party and my wife was working for the Nazi Welfare Department. About three months later, I was again arrested by the police on a charge of having attended a meeting between HITLER and VON PAPEN at Coeln, and having taken pictures of this meeting and made a report of it. I was taken into the German courts and proved my alibi that I had never been in Coeln during this time, and was released. [30] All of this occurred during the year 1933.

I returned to my coffee business but business was constantly going down and down and it was impossible for me to obtain reorders and additional business, as I was no longer a member of the Nazi Party, and during the year 1934 I wrote several articles for the newspapers and magazines on the Far East, their culture and politics, and in April, 1935, I decided to go to the Orient in order to study the Japanese language. I sailed from Bremen, Germany, in April of 1935, on the SS STUTTGART. I arrived in New York, where I stayed for six days, took a train across the country to San Francisco, where I went to the German Consulate and asked for the names of some German individuals in Honolulu whom I could contact. They gave me the name of Dr. ARTHUR HOERMANN. I sailed from San Francisco on the TATUTA MARU, in company of my wife, who had been with me since I left Germany. The balance of my family had remained in Germany. On reaching Honolulu, I got in touch with Dr. HOERMANN, and he advised that I stay at the Brookland Hotel in Honolulu. I stayed there for three weeks, and then sailed to Japan, on the ASAMA MARU, with my wife. Upon reaching Japan, we went from Yokohama to Tokyo, to the Imperial Hotel, where I contacted Professor HISAMATSU, of the Imperial University, relative to the study of the Japanese language. My wife and I traveled on to Shanghai then, and she continued on to Germany. I did not start to study the Japanese language at this time, but returned to Honolulu on the CHICHIBU MARU.

My original idea in wanting to learn the Japanese language was so that I could return to Germany and teach in the universities there. I had originally planned that my wife [31] and children would stay in Germany. However, when I decided to come to Honolulu to study the language, we thought it best that she and the children join me here.

When I returned to Honolulu, I again stayed at the Brookland Hotel in 1935, until March of 1936. During this time I was joined by my daughter, RUTH KUEHN, and son, EBERHARD KUEHN, in December of 1935. During the time I resided at the Brookland Hotel, I met a Lieutenant KENNEDY, a submarine officer in the United States Navy. I also met FRANCESCO LOMBARDO during this time. Lieutenant KENNEDY introduced me to Lieutenant NEW, also a United States Navy submarine officer, who he stated wanted to learn to speak the German language. Lieutenant NEW also introduced me to a Lieutenant Commander DURGIN. Both Lieutenant NEW and DURGIN were interested in obtaining a job as Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Lieutenant Commander DURGIN received the appointment. I also met SPENCER WARNER, a Commander at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, during 1936. In March of 1936, I rented a home at 2369 East Manoa Road, Honolulu, T. H., and moved there with my daughter, RUTH, and son, EBERHARD, and was joined by my wife, FRIEDEL, and son, HANS, in April of 1936. During this time I was studying the Japanese language at the University of Hawaii.

During May 1936, I rented a home at Lanikai Beach from a Mr. GRUNE. About June, 1936, I made a trip to Tokyo, to continue my Japanese language studies, and during the time I was gone my family moved to the Lanikai Beach home permanently. I returned to Honolulu from Tokyo, where I had studied at the Japanese language school for three months, about September, [32] 1936. I continued my Japanese language studies at the Japanese language School in Kailua, under Mr. IKENO, the principal of that school. He gave me private tutoring at his home.

During 1936 and 1937, I met a Major RODNEY ROBERTS, of the 64th Coast Artillery, and through him I met Major HART, of the Quartermaster's Corps. I had also met a Lieutenant HARALD LINDSAY, a submarine officer of the United States Navy, at the Brookland Hotel. These individuals visited me at my home on various occasions. I was also friendly with ARTHUR LUHR, a dentist in Honolulu, and Mr. VAN ORT, and Mr. EINDHOVEN. I also met CARL BASLER, about 1938, through my children's taking music lessons from his wife. During 1938, I purchased the Modern Steel Furniture Company, which I operated for eight or nine months, which I finally turned over to a trustee after losing about \$15,000.00. The only other employment I have had in Honolulu Iron Works, June 1941, when I went to work as a freight checker for the Honolulu Iron Works, which job I held for six weeks and quit as the work was too hard. I have since attempted to obtain a position with HAROLD CASTLE, through FRANZ MAHN of the Hawaiian Trust Company, with no success.

With regard to the income which I have been able to derive locally, I might state that in 1937 I leased eight acres of land from the Kaneohe Ranch Company, and since have sub-leased seven acres to a Japanese gardner. The other acre I use to raise fruits and vegetables for my own use. I also raise chickens at my Kalama residence, having about 200 at the present time. None of these operations are income-producing. [33] My wife, FRIEDEL operates the Kailua Beauty Shop, from which she derives an average income of approximately \$80.00 a month. This business was originally opened in June, 1940. Other friends I have in Honolulu, not previously mentioned, are as follows: MARIO VALDASTRI, a regular acquaintance, with whom my wife and I frequently play bridge, Dr. E. A. STEPHENS, Kaneohe Territorial Hospital, Kaneohe, Oahu, who prior to his divorce was a frequent visitor in my home, a slight acquaintance with Dr. MARQUIS STEVENS, Dr. and Mrs. ARTHUR HOERMANN, who were close associates up until the past two years, HENRY B. WOLTER, better known to me as HEINE, a neighbor at Lanikai, through whom I first met HEINZ PLOENJES, representative of the Roechling Steel Works, a German firm, stationed in Tokyo, Japan, from whom I have since received some correspondence. Dr. HOMBERG, also a representative of Roechling Steel Works at Tokyo, Japan, first became known to my family through RUTH, who met him in 1937, while en route to Japan on a Japanese vessel. Since that time, Dr. HOMBERG has visited Honolulu on two occasions, once in early 1938, at which time he occupied my Lanikai Beach residence, for two to three weeks, and again in September, 1938, when he stopped over only for a night on his way back to Japan.

Regarding the monies which I have received from time to time from outside sources, I wish to make the following statements: At the time I left Germany in 1935, I was only permitted to carry about ten marks with me. I have been unable since to get any of my monies out of Germany and the other members of my family were also unable to bring out additional funds. About 1918, during the first World War, I had opened a small [34] account in a Rotterdam bank. Afterwards, during the period I owned and operated the sailing freighter ANTARES I deposited funds received from the operation of the vessel in this same bank in Rotterdam. In 1934 my Aunt ELSE SVENDSON, resident in Sweden, transferred to me about \$35,000.00 as my share of the inheritance which I would have received later, which money was deposited in an Amsterdam bank. During the years 1936, 1937 and 1938, I received money transfers totaling about \$30,000.00 from these accounts through the Bishop National Bank, Honolulu. I have been unable to get any additional funds from Holland since 1938. From 1938 to the spring of 1940, I received no additional funds from the outside and as a result was forced to sell one of my wife's homes at Kalama as well as mortgage my wife's other Kalama residence and Lanikai residence. I had previously acquired these three pieces of property during 1937.

In the spring of 1940 my wife, FRIEDL, planned a trip to Japan in order to make arrangements with Dr. HOMBERG of the German steel firm, ROECHLING STEEL WORKS, Tokyo, Japan, for further funds. At that time she borrowed money from the bank on Dr. MAURICE GORDON's signature. My wife made arrangements with Dr. HOMBERG to transfer her property in Germany to him for a consideration of \$40,000.000. However, he was to first have an inquiry made in Germany to determine the value of the property and arrive at the exact figure, but in the meantime he advanced my wife \$6,000.00 on account. She brought the \$6,000.00 in cash with her on her person. Upon reaching Honolulu my wife told me that Dr. HOMBERG had promised to send more money after the lapse of five months.

[35] About five months later, around September, 1940, an additional \$10,000.00 in cash was brought by a Mr. KAI, purser aboard the CHICHIBU MARU from Dr. HOMBERG. My wife had previously made the acquaintance of Mr. KAI while on board the HAKUSA MARU on a trip from Shanghai to Germany in 1936. Mr. KAI, upon reaching Honolulu, telephoned me and then brought the money to my Kalama residence. The money was made up entirely of American currency.

In October, 1941, following the arrival of the TATUTA MARU at Honolulu from Japan, a Japanese employee of this vessel called in person at my Kalama residence and delivered to me a package enclosed in cardboard which contained \$14,000.00 in \$100.00 bills. At the time the package was delivered by this Japanese he remarked that same was from Dr. HOMBERG in Japan. The name of this Japanese is unknown to me and I had not seen him before or since. The money was afterwards given by me to my wife and I do not know where she has it hidden. However, we at no time have deposited these amounts in the banks in Honolulu, except to carry a small account.

During our residence in Hawaii, my step-son, LEOPOLD, has continued to reside and work in the Nazi Party in Berlin, Germany. He presently is employed under GOEBBELS, Minister of Propaganda. There has always been a very close relationship between LEOPOLD and my wife. Therefore she has been insistent on supplying him with foods and a monthly allowance of 50 marks. In the past, shipments of food have been made through FORTRA, INC. in New York City, and the monthly allowance was sent through the Bishop National Bank until June, 1941, when the freezing order went into effect.

[36] I talked to Mr. LOW of the Bishop National Bank several times and asked him if he would help me, if there was any legal way he could send money to my son, so Mr. LOW wrote to New York and got an answer that there was no chance of sending money. Mr. LOW told me the only chance would be to send pesos to a friend in South America and this friend could send the pesos to Germany and we found somebody in South America, whose name I have forgotten, that my wife wrote to but never received an answer in an attempt to transmit money to LEOPOLD via South America.

About the first part of November, 1941, after talking the matter over with my wife, FRIEDEL, I went to the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu and asked them to send money to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany through the Yokohama Specie Bank. They advised me at this time that they would inquire at the Yokohama Specie Bank to see if this was possible. I spoke to one of the Vice Consuls at this time, his name I do not recall. This was my first visit to the Japanese Consulate since the summer of 1940 when I had been to see a member of the Consulate staff to find if it would be possible to send a large package of food on a Japanese liner to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany via Japan and Russia. I was advised at this time to make inquiry at the Japanese Chamber of Commerce above the Yokohama Specie Bank, which I did and they informed me that I could send only a one-pound package.

About two or three days after my first visit to the Consul late in November of 1941, I returned and this time I spoke to the man sitting behind the large desk in the back of the room, to the left of the entrance of the Consulate.

[37] He and I went across the hall into the second room on the right from the front of the Consulate. At that time he refused to send any money to my son and I offered to assist him and the Consulate in obtaining information that they might be interested in. He asked me if I knew how many ships were in Hawaiian waters and I told him I could find out. Then I left the Consulate and went home and after three or four days returned to the Japanese Consulate, at which time I spoke to the same man and KITA, the Consul himself, in that same room, the second one on the right from the front of the Consulate. At that time I made suggestions to them stating that I had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outlined a system of signalling that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This system of signalling contained fifteen sets of signals. These signals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanakai or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as follows: One light between 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant scouting force in harbor; one light between 8 and 9 meant aircraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle fleet prepared to leave; one light between 10 and 11 meant scouting force prepared

to leave; one light between 11 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 meant battle fleet left between one and two days ago; one light between 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meant [38] battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meant scouting force left three to four days ago; two lights between 9 and 10 p. m. meant aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p. m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights between 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting forces left five to six days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a. m. meant aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

This same set of signals could have been sent by means of linen on the clothes line at my Lanakai home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a. m. in daylight meaning battle fleet in harbor; one sheet between 7 and 8 a. m. meaning scouting force in harbor; one sheet between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers in harbor; one sheet between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a. m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning battle fleet left one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p. m. and 2 p. m. meaning scouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a. m. and 7 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a. m. and 8 a. m. meaning battle fleet left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 9 a. m. and 10 a. m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a. m. and 11 a. m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning [39] meaning scouting force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 12 noon and 1 p. m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

They told me at that time that this system of communication was too complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of signals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About three days later I went back to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago.

These signals were to be given as follows from my Lanakai home: One light between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 1; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No. 2; one light between 9 and 10 p. m. meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p. m. meaning No. 4; two lights between 7 and 8 p. m. meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p. m. meaning No. 6, etc. These lights were to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have been used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanakai between 8 and 9 a. m., meaning No. 1, one between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 2; one between 10 and 11 a. m. [40] meaning No. 3; one between 11 a. m. and 12 noon meaning No. 4; two pieces between 8 and 9 a. m. meaning No. 5; two pieces between 9 and 10 a. m. meaning No. 6, and so forth. It was also arranged that a light in the skylight at my Kalama home between 7 and 8 p. m. would mean No. 1; one between 8 and 9 p. m. would mean No. 2; one between 9 and 10 p. m. would mean No. 3 and 6; one between 10 and 11 p. m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p. m. (midnight) would mean Nos. 5 and 8.

It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanakai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sail or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those previously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

It was also arranged that on the KGMB Want-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for:

and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this system of signals, a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certain hours would indicate the above number signals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p. m. would mean signals 3 and 6, and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a [41] map of Maui which showed the names of the two roads which border that locality and which names were mentioned in my recommended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire signals were to be effected.

It was also arranged that this same set of signals could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Consulate desired to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JIMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu. This simplified set of signals was taken to the Consulate in an envelope by me about 8:30 in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife, FRIEDEL, and while she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the envelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \$500.00, which was to be sent to my son LEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consul whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

On the same occasion that I transmitted this simplified system of signalling I had also advised the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, two aircraft carriers, forty destroyers and twenty-seven submarines, or some similar figure, in Hawaiian waters. These figures were purely fictitious as far as I knew. This information was submitted in the same [42] envelope as the one containing the latter plans.

Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact with any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me.

I have never been to the Island of Maui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanakal Bench house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September, 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanakal residence on November 1, 1941 to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30, and the other an employee with the Engineers, about the same age, both of whom had been transferred from Schofield Barracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time.

The above statement consisting of eleven pages has been read by me and I have signed each page individually and I certify the same to be true to the best of my knowledge and belief, [43] and sign the same of my own free will.

/s/ OTTO KUEHN.

Witnesses:

/s/ George E. Allen,
GEORGE E. ALLEN,
Special Agent.

/s/ J. Sterling Adams,
J. STERLING ADAMS,

Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, Honolulu, T. H.

3082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 58

LABORATORY REPORT

File #65-33780-697
Lab #60015

Re: HMAR; C. W. Smith; Espionage (G).
Examination requested by: San Francisco
Reference: Letter of October 23, 1941 Appel
Examination requested: Document
Specimens:

The following specimens are all photostatic copies:

- K1 One Informal Entry form No. 557109, in name of Mrs. J. H. Marsman.
- K2 One Baggage Declaration No. 871743, in name of Arthurita Randall.
- K3 One Border Declaration No. 329227, in name of J. H. Marsman.
- K4 One Baggage Declaration No. 871574, in name of Jullo Lopez.
- K5 One Baggage Declaration No. 871561, in name of Joseph A. Coppola.
- K6 One Baggage Declaration No. 871652, in name of Paul Bakhar.
- K7 One Baggage Declaration No. 871573, in name of Frusan U. Kurtz.
- K8 One Baggage Declaration No. 871761, in name of Bliss Wiant.
- K9 One Baggage Declaration No. 871724, in name of P. D. Klehn.
- K10 One Baggage Declaration No. 871751, in name of Rolf Singer.

The conclusion has been reached that specimens Q1 and Q2 in this case were not written by any of the individuals whose known handwritings have been listed as specimens K1 through K3 and K5 through K10 respectively.

For your information the known specimens listed above as K1 through K10 which were submitted by your office now reflect the following Identifying Laboratory numbers: K135 through K145 in the case entitled, "Fred Ludwig, et al., Espionage—G." (Bureau File 65-33780). Particular attention is invited to the known handwriting specimen of Jullo Lopez, K4, which is now listed as specimen K139 in the "Fred Ludwig" case.

It has been concluded that specimens Q1 and Q2 in the instant case were written by Ulrich Bonder Osten, alias Jullo Lopez, K139. It has also been concluded that specimens Q47, Q48, Q56, Q78 and Q79 in the "Fred Ludwig" case were written by Lopez, K139.

However, no conclusion was reached whether the secret ink writing appearing on specimen Q37 was written by Lopez, K139. In this connection, the attention of the New York Field Division is invited to the secret ink writing appearing on specimen Q37. If it is possible to obtain the original of this specimen or at least the original photostatic or photostatic copy of this specimen additional evidence may be developed which will permit advancing a definite conclusion with respect to this specimen. This seems particularly desirable inasmuch as this specimen appears to be signed "Konrad" which may indicate that "Vonder Osten" alias "Ildo" was the "Konrad" first referred to in the original information on which the investigation was instituted.

It is also noted that specimen Q101, the passport of Vonder Osten contained an insufficient quantity of writing to be used as the sole known specimen. This is mentioned as it may be desirable to ascertain whether other writings may be proven as known specimens of this subject for purposes of testimony.

For future reference photographic copies of specimens Q1 and Q2 are being forwarded to the New York Field Division.

Henceforth, these specimens, Q1 and Q2, also Q3 in this case, will be identified as specimens Q1173 through Q1175 in the Fred Ludwig case. A photographic copy of specimen K139 will be forwarded to your office in the next several days.

- 1—Bureau
- 2—San Francisco
- 2—New York
- 1—Laboratory

AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES

New York - California - Orient - Round the World

ON BOARD

A. Honolulu (Island of Oahu)

Strong concentration of troops of all kind. Said to be 40000 Army and as many Navy. Lately arrived: 1500 technicians, more expected. Mainly for Army barracks and fortification MoKapu (see map). Harbor SW MoKapu is being

readied as sea plane base. Barracks for army are being built near Schofield B. (Wheeler Field and west of it, and esp. between Pearl Harbor-Honolulu. Milit. roads are being constructed or are completed (very well) all over island. On side of roads milit. cables are being put in ground. All milit. establishments prohibited for civilians, 57 officers of the F. B. I. are said to be in Oahu alone. Questioning can't be done too openly.—*Army*: seen: 17 Field Art. Regt.—64 searchlight unit (what kind?), land mission troops no number showing. *Navy*: Said to be stationed in Pearl Harbor & rest of islands 150 units of all kinds. Seen in harbor about 50 vessels at least; 5 armoured ships, big (battleships?), Saratoga and other, very small aircraft carrier, the last one outside of harbor, other big one besides Saratoga said to be there.—Seen several units of destroyers (each 4 of them tied to other, slightly higher, outmoded looking ship. Seen destr. No. 372, 383, 374, 375. Couldn't read other numbers.—1 drydock 1000 ft. stationary, other swimming dock of same length said arrived recently. Along east side of harbor (near submarine station) about 80 fuel tanks (20 in diameter—10 in height.).—*Airforce*: Nothing to be seen, save a few planes in air. Main bases southwest Pearlharbor, south of Schofield Barracks and for sea planes Mokapu bay. Plenty of auxiliary or emergency fields completed or in construction all over island.—*Fortifications*: said to be very strong ones everywhere. Seen 2 forts between Waikiki-beach and Honolulu (eastside of Waikiki). Crater of Diamondhead said containing lots of guns, esp. howitzers. Point farthest to right on photo has lookout, said to be main fire-control for guns in craters.—

Evacuation of white women said to be considered on account of many soldiers, that maybe cannot be held under control.—High labor wages: 400-600\$ a month.—

This will be of interest mostly to our yellow allies, are you interested? Might be good idea to despatch observer, if you are. Want me to find somebody? Link in Shanghai has got Honolulu papers (1 morning, 1 evening paper) through me, rather revealing stuff to read!

Seems to be still better so send somebody to Puerto Rico: Follow passenger, Lt. Cdr., been there in december says about Puerto Rico: Garrison up to now 12,000, of whom 5000 army. Improvements cost up to now \$50 million, expected to cost the double altogether.—Dry dock Isla Grande 670 x 270 feet, access to it not yet made. Air patrols day and night between Miami & British Guyana. *Airforce*: In Isla Grande accomodation in progress for 50 bombers and 100 pursuitships. (Here garrison of 65th Infantry.)—Main Army-airbase: Punta Boringuen (at Mona-Passage), stationed 4000 men and 2000 civil technicians. 1 pursuit and 2 bomber groups.—Auxiliary bases: Juana Diaz (near Ponce), here stationed 36. Pursuit group. 48. Air base Group expected with 2000 men. (In Punta Boringuen stationed now: 24. Airbase Group (formerly Kelly field) and 25. Bombardment group (from Langley Field).—Further auxiliary airbases: Arecibo (between San Juan & Boringuen; Mayaguez on west coast; St. Croix (Virgin Islands).—

Critic: lots of waste, food difficulties feared in case of war (even now 1000 tons of food alone has to be imported *daily*. No air shelters.

New York: Police headquarters for port-control: Barge-office on southernmost point of "Battery."

Munitions and Fuel ships are loaded in three different places from barges (out of quais.) Especially at Gravesend-Bay. Maybe too at New York Foreign Trade Zone (Staten Island), where airplanes, tractors and so forth are being shipped to England. This zone is equipped with "electrical eyes" for safety against spies and sabotage.

Nitrate plant in Hopewell, Virg. (said to be biggest in States) said to be ready for guncotton production in case of necessity.

Smith, please send on to Carl—82, with map & photo. H (illegible)

(The remaining portion of Exhibit No. 53 consists of photostatic copies of an envelope addressed "C. W. Smith, Esq.", a scene at Waikiki, and the reverse side of the indicated envelope. This material will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 60 and 61, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 54

Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd.

Appraiser A. J. Roblee

No. Units	ACCO No.		Location	ACCO Price	Area	Gentry	Roblee
1	5	Automobile—Eng. K 2056743—Chevrolet Suburban.	Moiliili yard.	800.00	16	550.00	600
1	12	Automobile—18.305045—Ford Coupe.	U. S. E. D. Service.	500.00	3	350.00	300
1	13	Automobile—L 333875—Oldsmobile Coupe.	U. S. E. D. Service.	576.00	16	500.00	500
1	6	Automobile—A B 4043952—Ford Station Wagon.	Island of Maui.	500.00	6	300.00	300
1	1	Bender—on flange track wheels—Electric Bar Bender—10 HP.	Haw'n Elec. Co.	500.00	10	500.00	300
1	1	Broom—Road VNC-119—Huff.	Hickam Field.	800.00	2	800.00	800
1	1	Bucket—5/8 Yd. Model 607—AA1761—Clamshell R. N. with digger teeth.	Haleiwa.	700.00	13	650.00	700
1	1	Bucket—3/4 Yd. Model 615—Clamshell R. N. with digger teeth.	Wheeler Field.	1,200.00		1,000.00	1,200
1	1	Bucket—1 1/2 Yd. Model 721—Clamshell R. N. with digger teeth.	Haleiwa Gulch.	500.00	3	500.00	500
1	1	Bucket—2 Yd.—Haywood—Clamshell.	Moiliili Yard.	550.00	10	500.00	500
1	1	Bucket—3 1/2 Yd.—Model AX—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	Moiliili Yard.	750.00		750.00	750
1	1	Bucket—1 Yd. Model AX—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	Wheeler Field Shop.	650.00		550.00	550
1	1	Bucket—1 1/4 Yd. Model I—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	Kawailapui Quarry.	900.00	13	900.00	900
1	1	Bucket—1 1/4 Yd. Model AY—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	Moiliili Yard.	300.00	13	500.00	500
1	1	Bucket—1 1/4 Yd. Model Y—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	Waleo Gulch Quarry.	750.00		750.00	750
1	1	Bucket—1 3/4 Yd. Model AX—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	Wheeler Field Ammunition Sige.	900.00		900.00	900
1	1	Bucket—2 Yd. Model AX2—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	Moiliili Yard.	500.00		450.00	500
1	1	Bucket—1 1/2 Yd. Model U—Bucyrus—Erie—Dragline.	do.	300.00		250.00	250
1	16	Bucket—1 Yd. #572—Insley—Norton Dump Concrete.	Kawailapui Quarry.	200.00		200.00	200
1	23	Buildozer—Attached to tractor #18—Ateco.	Island of Maui.	1,000.00		1,000.00	1,000
1	1	Buildozer—Le Tournieu—Angledozer #75.	Moiliili Yard.	500.00		600.00	500
1	8	Compressor—315 GFM—Serial #1122—Zin Ho-on skids—gas. eng.	do.	1,000.00		1,200.00	1,500
1	12	Compressor—300 GFM—Serial #15131—Sullivan—Portable—Diesel Eng.	Island of Maui.	2,500.00		2,500.00	2,500
1	14	Compressor—210 GFM—Serial #16926—Sullivan—Portable—Diesel Eng.	Wheeler Field Beaching Plant.	15,000.00		11,000.00	11,000
1	11	Crane—2 Yd.—Bucyrus—50 H—Steam.	Moiliili Yard.	5,000.00		5,000.00	5,000
1	1	Crane—McMylor—Interstate—Steam.	Moiliili Yard.	1,000.00		1,000.00	1,000
1	1	Crane—Tractor Type—Le Tournieu.	Moiliili Yard.	2,000.00		2,200.00	2,500
1	2	Drilling Machine—Model 33—Bucyrus—Armstrong—Gasoline Eng.	Moiliili Yard.	2,000.00		1,800.00	2,000
1	1	Finisher—Concrete—Model 201—Ord—Gasoline Eng.	Pearl Harbor Dry Dock.	1,000.00		1,200.00	1,500
1	1	Finisher—Concrete—18 Ft.—Ord—Gasoline Eng.	Moiliili Yard.	350.00		350.00	350
1	3	Finisher—Floor 3 1/2 Hp.—Whiteman Electric.	Moiliili Yard.	235.00		250.00	300
1	1	Generator—1 1/4 Kw—Electric Portable.	Kawailapui Quarry.	600.00		6,000.00	6,000
1	1	Grader—Road—Drawn Type—Adams—7 Ft.	Island of Maui.	100.00		100.00	150
1	24	Grader—Road—Drawn Type—Adams—12 Ft.	Moiliili Yard.	300.00		250.00	200
1	1	Grader—9K1688—Auto Patrol—12 Diesel.	Moiliili Yard.	1,700.00		1,500.00	1,600
1	1	Hammer—Pile #1464—Union Midget 100 Lb.	Moiliili Yard.	1,500.00		1,500.00	1,500
1	1	Hammer—Pile #30—Jugersoll—Rand 146 Lb.	Moiliili Yard.	1,500.00		1,500.00	1,500
1	1	Hammer—Pile—Vulcan 11,000 Lbs.	Pier No. 32.	1,500.00		1,500.00	1,500
1	2	Hammer—Pile—9-5-3—McKernan—Perry 7,000 Lbs.					

1	3	Hammer-Pile #7-McKernan-Perry-5,000 Lbs.	Base Yard #5	1,000.00	1,000.00
1	10	Holst-3 Drum-Flory-Steam 20 HP	Mollili Yard	1,000.00	1,250.00
1	10	Holst-1 Drum-On wheels-Washington Electric-20 HP	Mollili Yard	1,000.00	800.00
1	10	Mixer-Concrete-Kwik-Mix-Gasoline Eng	Castle & Cook Storage Yard	300.00	250.00
1	12	Mixer-Concrete #9106-Koehring 7-K-Gasoline Eng	Kawahaoki Quarry	800.00	500.00
1	13	Mixer-Concrete-with Boom #3637-Multifoote 27-F-Cover	Mollili Yard	4,000.00	5,000.00
1	14	Mixer-Concrete-No. Boom #3613-Multifoote 27-E	Mollili Yard	4,000.00	4,650.00
1	15	Mixer-Concrete-15 HP-#11281-Kohring 21-3-Electric	Mollili Yard	1,000.00	850.00
1	16	Mixer-Concrete-Gasoline Eng #69380-Jaeger-14-B with extra skip	Mollili Yard	2,200.00	2,200.00
1		Pile Driver Steel Cast-70 Ft. Height	Mollili Yard	500.00	700.00
1		Pile Driver Steel Gin & Lead-50 Ft. Length	Mollili Yard	450.00	500.00
1		Placer-Concrete-Pneumatic	Mollili Yard	1,000.00	1,000.00
1		Plow-Killifer	Mollili Yard	500.00	500.00
1		Plow Disc Harrow-Killifer-22'	Mollili Yard	400.00	430.00
1	21	Pump-3' 60 GPM on steel wheels-Barnes quadruplex	Mollili Yard	300.00	300.00
1	24	Pump-2 1/2' 40 GPM Gasoline Eng-Barnes Triplex-on wheels	Mollili Yard	1,000.00	1,000.00
1	29	Pump-6' #25751-Gasoline Eng-Neve Centrifugal	Mollili Yard	900.00	800.00
1	31	Pump-8' #4190783P Diesel Eng-Jaeger Centrifugal	Mollili Yard	500.00	400.00
1	32	Pump-6' P-11090-243216-Gasoline-Jaeger Centrifugal	Mollili Yard	2,200.00	2,000.00
1	34	Pump-6' P-11070-Gasoline Eng-Jaeger Centrifugal	Mollili Yard	600.00	700.00
1	36	Pump-2' P-1751467795-Gasoline-Jaeger Centrifugal	Mollili Yard	200.00	200.00
1	35	Pump-2' P-14725-Gasoline Eng-Jaeger Centrifugal	Ft. De Russy	225.00	115.00
1	3	Roller-12 Ton Road-Buffalo-Steam	Mollili Yard	500.00	750.00
1	3	Roller-5 ton, Tandem-Erie-Gasoline-Re-built	Navy Yard	800.00	800.00
1	4	Roller-17 Ton Road #4279-Buffalo Springfield-Steam	Mollili Yard	4,500.00	2,251
1	10	Roller-12 Ton-3 Wheel-Huber-Gasoline	Schofield	4,000.00	4,500.00
1	7	Roller-10 1/2 Ton-Austin-Autocrat	Kanoche Hot Plant	2,000.00	1,000.00
1	9	Roller-12 Ton-#3355-Huber-3 Wheel-Gasoline	Island of Maui	4,500.00	4,500.00
1		Roller-Sheepsfoot-Le Tournau	Wheeler Field Ammunition Stge.	500.00	500.00
1		Roller-Sheepsfoot-Le Tournau	Mollili Yard	500.00	500.00
1		Scarifier-Spears-Wells	Mollili Yard	400.00	500.00
1		Scarifier-Killifer	Mollili Yard	850.00	800.00
1		Scarifier-Ateco R-5	Mollili Yard	1,600.00	1,600.00
1		Scarifier-Heavy Duty-Le Tournau Beater	Hanawahua Road	1,100.00	1,100.00
1		Scrapers 1 1/2 yd. Baker-Maney	Mollili Yard	500.00	600.00
1		Scrapers Jumbo Model 60	Mollili Yard	500.00	700.00
1	4	Scrapers 14 yd. #2821-8-3-Le Tournau Carryall	Island of Maui	3,000.00	5,000.00
1	1	Shovel-10 D-Gasoline Bucyrus Erie Attachments & Trailer	Wheeler Field Shop	3,000.00	3,000.00
1	13	Spreaders-Rock-Spears-Wells-1931 Model	Wheeler Field Bunkers	8,500.00	9,000.00
5		Spreader-Rock-Jaeger-Model AJS	Mollili Yard	250.00	250.00
1		Spreader-Rock-Jaeger-Model AJS	Mollili Yard	600.00	650.00
1		Spreader-Rock-Buckeye 10 ft.-Pneumatic Tires	Island of Maui	600.00	750.00
1	54	Sprinkler-1,100 Gal. Tank-Semi-Trailer	Island of Maui	550.00	550.00
1		Tool House on Wheels	Station Y	500.00	500.00
1		Tool House on Wheels	Mollili Yard	600.00	600.00
1	7	Tool Box-Trailer Type-on Wheels	Mollili Yard	250.00	200.00
1	1	Tool Box-Trailer Type-on Wheels	Base Yard #6 Honolulu	290.00	200.00
1	2	Tower-120 ft. Steel Mast-Insley	Mollili Yard	2,000.00	2,000.00
1		Tractor-Saw Attachment-McCormick-Deering-Used for Power	Mollili Yard	500.00	500.00

Hawaiian Contracting Co., Ltd.—Continued

No. Units	ACCO No.		Location	ACCO Price	Area	Gentry	Roblee
1	16	Tractor—60 HP—Caterpillar	Zawalhapai Quarry	1,000.00		1,000.00	1,000
1	23	Tractor—90 HP Diesel—Caterpillar D-8	Island of Maui	7,500.00		7,500.00	7,500
1		Tractor—Est. 20—Bueyrus Erie—Loadmaster	Moliliili Yard	2,000.00		2,000.00	2,000
1	2	Trailer—Flat Bed—25 Ton on Solid Rubber Tires	Moliliili Yard	2,000.00		2,000.00	2,000
1	3	Trailer—Lumber Wagon	Moliliili Yard	200.00		200.00	200
1	8	Tank—775 gal.—on wheels	Moliliili Yard	250.00		250.00	250
1		Truck 1½ Ton—184283397—Ford Flat Body	Island of Maui	800.00		800.00	800
1	141	Truck—18-2752290—Ford V-8 Pickup	do	350.00		350.00	350
1	142	Truck—52-156544—Ford V-8 Pickup	Kawalhapai Quarry	350.00		350.00	350
1	451	Truck—6½ Yd Dump—G. M. C. Diesel	Moliliili Yard	7,500.00		7,500.00	7,500
1	19	Truck—Fageol	Wheeler Field Underground Shop	350.00		350.00	300
1		Semi-Trailer—Service—Attached to Fageol Truck, No. 19	do	1,000.00		850.00	800
1	52	Wagons—7 to 10 Yd.—Euclid Crawler	Wheeler Field Moliliili Yard	10,000.00		10,000.00	10,000
5		Wagons—2 to 2½ Yd.—Watson—Wooden Type	Moliliili Yard	1,200.00		600.00	600
12		Vibrators—Concrete—Gasoline	do	750.00		750.00	750
2				150,085.00		154,500.00	156,150

Approved \$156,411.

3/13/42.

KENNEDY, JR.
Col., C. E.,
Contracting Officer.

X

44.931: P31 Pt. 31 ✓

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 31

PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE , Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY , Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS , Senator from Illinois	BERTRAND W. GEARHART , Representative from California
OWEN BREWSTER , Senator from Maine	FRANK B. KEEFE , Representative from Wisconsin
HOMER FERGUSON , Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK , Representative from North Carolina	

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(Through January 14, 1946)

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LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

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[1]

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 55

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, December 9, 1940.

3820 (National Defense)

Re. O. & R. Chapter VII.

Circular Letter (Finance No. 226) (Contracts No. 21)

Rescinded by C/L Fin 41, 1941, file 103 (1941) 41

Subject: Procurements and Contracts for National Defense Purposes.**To: All Contracting Officers and Others Concerned:**

The following procedure will govern the making of purchases and the letting of contracts for National Defense purposes by the Corps of Engineers. It includes instructions supplemental to Army Regulations, and, for the convenience of contracting officers, includes the pertinent requirements of Army Regulations, Procurement Circulars and special instructions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War pertaining to such purchases and contracts. It is issued as a new section to Chapter VII, Orders and Regulations, and will be kept up to date by supplemental Finance Circulars:

Section 13—Procurements and Contracts Without Advertising for National Defense Purposes.

772. Statutory provision.—Section 1 (a) of the Act approved July 2, 1940 (Public No. 703, 76th Congress) provides as follows:

“* * * That (a) in order to expedite the building up of the national defense, the Secretary of War is authorized, out of the moneys appropriated for the War Department for national-defense purposes for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, with or without advertising, (1) to provide for the necessary construction, rehabilitation, conversion, and installation at military posts, depots, stations, or other localities, of plants, buildings, facilities, utilities, and appurtenances thereto (including Government-owned facilities at privately owned plants and the expansion of such plants, and the acquisition of such land, and the purchase or lease of such structures, as may be necessary), for the development, manufacture, maintenance, and storage of military equipment, munitions, and supplies, and for shelter; (2) to provide for the development, purchase, manufacture, shipment, maintenance, and storage of military equipment, munitions, and supplies, and for shelter, at such places and under such conditions as he may deem necessary; and (3) to enter into such contracts (including contracts for educational orders, and for the exchange of deteriorated, unserviceable, obsolescent, or surplus military equipment, munitions, and supplies for other military equipment, munitions, and supplies of which there is a shortage), and to amend or supplement such existing contracts, as he may deem necessary to carry [2] out the purposes specified in this section: Provided, That the limitations contained in sections 1136 and 3734 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, and any statutory limitation with respect to the cost of any individual project of construction, shall be suspended until and including June 30, 1942, with respect to any construction authorized by this Act: Provided further, That no contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this section which would otherwise be subject to the provisions of the Act entitled ‘An Act to provide conditions for the purchase of supplies and the making of contracts by the United States, and for other purposes,’ approved June 30, 1936 (49 Stat. 2036; U. S. C., Supp. V, title 41; secs. 35–45), shall be exempt from the provisions of such Act solely because of being entered into without advertising pursuant to the provisions of this section: Provided further, That the cost-plus-a-percentage-of cost system of contracting shall not be used under this section; but this proviso shall not be construed to prohibit the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract when such use is deemed necessary by the Secretary of War.”

772.1. Applicability of the Act.—Procurements and contracts made without advertising will be referred to as negotiated purchases and contracts. Negotiated contracts may be distinguished as to form as (1) lump-sum contracts, and

(2) cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. They include all construction, supply, service, and rental contracts for the purposes stated in the Act regardless of the actual or estimated amounts involved. The authority does not include procurements and contracts for River and Harbor and Flood Control works.

772.2 Administrative directions.—The Acting Secretary of War on July 2, 1940, determined it to be necessary in the public interest and authorized contracts within the scope of Section 1 (a) of the Act to be entered into without advertising whenever that method of procurement will serve to expedite the accomplishment of the national defense program. By direction of the Assistant Secretary of War the general principles governing the letting of national-defense contracts and the labor policy adopted by the National Defense Advisory Commission (Document No. 950, 76th Congress) will be followed. Such principles and policy are set forth under the following subparagraphs (a) and (b).

(a) General principles governing the letting of defense contracts:

1. The essence of the preparedness program is the getting of an adequate supply of materials of the proper quality in the shortest space of time possible. Considerations of price alone are highly important, but in the emergency are not governing.

2. Speed of delivery of all items on the defense program is essential. This means:

(a) That orders should be placed in such a manner as to insure the most efficient use of each particular [3] facility from the point of view of the program as a whole;

(b) That proper consideration should be given to contributory industries, such as the machine tool industry, to avoid creating underlying bottlenecks;

(c) That once delivery dates are fixed, assurance be given that they will be met by the supplier.

3. Proper quality is also of prime importance. It is therefore necessary to determine first of all whether or not the supplier can meet the quality requirements, as specified. There should be a willingness on the part of both the Army and Navy, on the one hand, and of the supplier on the other to adjust specifications on a cooperative basis in order that such specifications may come as near as possible to meeting commercial standards while at the same time fulfilling the military requirements.

4. Price, while not the sole consideration, is of outstanding significance, and every effort must be made to secure a fair price. This must take recognition, among other things, of determination of proper cost factors.

5. The impact of the defense program upon the consumers must be recognized. This relates to such factors as:

(a) Due regard to the necessity of protecting civilian needs and morale;

(b) Proper health and housing conditions among employees;

(c) Consideration to possible off-season production in order to dovetail the military program into production for civilian requirements. Off-season production should also lead to lower overhead and consequently to lower prices for both the consumers and the Government.

6. Adequate consideration must be given to labor. This means compliance with the principles on this subject stated by the Commission in its release of August 31, 1940 (quoted under (b) below).

7. Undue geographic concentration of orders should be avoided, both as to procurement districts and as to industrial sections within any such procurement district. Reasons for such decentralization relate to factors of military strategy, as well as avoiding congestion that will slow down production.

8. Financial responsibility of the supplier should be examined. Ability to post a bond does not necessarily dispose of this problem. [4] The probability should exist that the supplier will be able to continue in business, at least long enough to complete his contract satisfactorily. Further, an ability to finance himself through private sources should take preference over necessity for securing Government aid.

9. The avoidance of congestion of transportation facilities should be sought. The same applies to warehousing facilities.

10. Due consideration should be given to the adequacy of power facilities, particularly where furnished by public utilities.

11. A general preference should be given to firms having experience with so-called educational orders.

12. The moral responsibility of the supplier is important, and in some respects, fundamental. There should be evidence of honest and sincere desire to cooperate

with the Army and Navy in producing what is called for, and on time, without profiteering; to assume some risks himself rather than attempting to shift all such risks to the Government; and to furnish a correct statement as to his capacity and his experience. The supplier's general standing and reputation among reputable businessmen (as distinct from his financial rating) is one index of such qualifications.

13. The Commission recognizes that competitive bidding is the better procedure in certain types of industry and circumstances. However, it is often impossible to make sure that the principles outlined above are followed when contracts are placed on the basis of price alone and are let to the lowest bidder. Therefore, in cases where competitive bidding will not fulfill the above stated needs of national defense, the Commission recommends that the use of the negotiated contract be authorized where necessary in order that these objectives be obtained in making defense purchases.

(b) Labor policy:

1. Primary among the objectives of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense is the increase in production of materials required by our armed forces and the assurance of adequate future supply of such materials with the least possible disturbance to production of supplies for the civilian population. The scope of our present program entails bringing into production many of our unused resources of agriculture, manufacturing, and manpower. This program can be used in the public interest as a vehicle to reduce unemployment and otherwise strengthen the human fiber of our Nation. In the selection of plant locations for new production, in the interest of national defense, great weight must be given to this factor.

[5] 2. In order that surplus and unemployed labor may be absorbed in the defense program, all reasonable efforts should be made to avoid hours in excess of 40 per week. However, in emergencies or where the needs of the national defense cannot otherwise be met, exceptions to this standard should be permitted. When the requirements of the defense program make it necessary to work in excess of these hours, or where work is required on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, overtime should be paid in accordance with the local recognized practices.

3. All work carried on as part of the defense program should comply with Federal statutory provisions affecting labor wherever such provisions are applicable. This applies to the Walsh-Healey Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, etc. There should also be compliance with State and local statutes affecting labor relations, hours of work, wages, workmen's compensation, safety, sanitation, etc.

4. Adequate provision should be made for the health and safety of employees.

5. As far as possible, the local employment or other agencies designated by the United States Employment Service should be utilized.

6. Workers should not be discriminated against because of age, sex, race or color.

7. The Commission reaffirms the principles enunciated by the Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army, during the World War, in his order of November 15, 1917, relative to the relation of labor standards to efficient production:

"In view of the urgent necessity for a prompt increase in the volume of production * * *, vigilance is demanded of all those in any way associated with industry lest the safeguards with which the people of this country have sought to protect labor should be unwisely and unnecessarily broken down. It is a fair assumption that for the most part these safeguards are the mechanisms of efficiency. Industrial history proves that reasonable hours, fair working conditions, and a proper wage scale are essential to high production. * * * Every attempt should be made to conserve in every way possible all of our achievements in the way of social betterment. But the pressing argument for maintaining industrial safeguards in the present emergency is that they actually contribute to efficiency."

(c) As to whether or not a prospective contractor is barred from receiving a contract by reason of findings made against him by the National Labor Relations Board, the following guide will be applied:

[6] While the labor policy of an industrial concern has an important bearing on its ability to carry out a proposed contract and the record of a concern in regard to the National Labor Relations Act may be an indication of such labor policy, the award of a War Department contract under the defense program is not to be considered as barred by the single fact that proceedings under the

National Labor Relations Act have been instituted or that findings of violations of the Act have been made by the National Labor Relations Board. In relation to this matter, consideration should be given to the seriousness of the offense charged, the stage which the proceeding has reached, the importance of the plant facilities of the particular concern to the national defense program, and similar factors. Emphasis must necessarily be placed on the prime importance of expeditious accomplishment of the defense program with due regard to efficiency and economy and to the various principles stated by the Advisory Board and approved by the President.

772.3 Authority of contracting officers.—District and division engineers, and other contracting officers specially designated by the Chief of Engineers with authority equivalent to that of a district or division engineer, may issue specifications and negotiate purchases and contracts without the approval of higher authority as provided in paragraphs 706.1 to 706.6, inclusive. Contracting officers who have been specially designated by the Chief of Engineers or by district or division engineers under paragraphs 706.1 (c) and (d), will act within the limits of authority contained in their respective letters of appointment. Specifications, awards, and contracts issued and negotiated by contracting officers not under the jurisdiction of a division office, which require the approval of higher authority, unless otherwise specifically directed, will be submitted for the approval of the Chief of Engineers.

[Handwritten in margin:] See C/L Fin 10, 1941.

772.4 Open-market purchases.—Purchases amounting to \$2,000 or less may be made in the open market under the same procedure as those set forth in paragraph 725.7, Orders and Regulations, and paragraph 4.o., AR 5-240.

772.5 Forms to be used.—(a) **Lump-sum contracts.**—Purchases amounting to \$2,000 or less may be made by purchase order as set forth in paragraph 725.3, Orders and Regulations, substituting the figure \$2,000 for the figure \$500 appearing in said paragraph. All negotiated lump-sum contracts and purchases in excess of \$2,000 will be entered into on the forms of contract prescribed in paragraphs 750.5 and 750.6, with the exception of (1), "E. D. Form No. 22," for expert services, which is exclusively for River and Harbor and Flood Control works. No standard form has been prescribed for lump-sum architectural and engineering services, and pending the issuance of such a form, they will be executed as provided in paragraph 750.6.

(b) **Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.**—All cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts will be executed only on standard or special forms approved by the Secretary of War. To date standard forms have been approved as follows:

- [7] 1. C. P. F. F. Form No. 1—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction contract.
2. C. P. F. F. Form No. 2—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction subcontract.
3. C. P. F. F. Form No. 3—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee supply contract. (This form is applicable primarily to Air Corps contracts but may be of use as a basis for similar contracts pertaining to purchases in cases where cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract is necessary and authorized.)
4. C. P. F. F. Form No. ____—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract for "Architect-Engineer Services." (This form has not yet been formally approved but will be generally followed in the preparation of such contracts pending approval.)

(c) **Miscellaneous.**—For use in connection with (a) or (b) or otherwise as required, forms have been approved as follows:

1. Equipment Rental Agreement.
2. Lump-sum Construction Subcontract.
3. Emergency Plant Facilities Contract.

The standard forms will be followed without change in all possible cases. For construction works outside the continental limits of the United States, or in other cases where it is considered necessary, the form may be altered or redrafted to fit the particular needs of each case, and transmitted to the Chief of Engineers for his consideration and submission for the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War.

772.6 Preparation and distribution.—All negotiated contracts will be prepared and distributed as set forth in paragraphs 750 to 750.9, inclusive, except that:

1. One authenticated copy of all negotiated contracts (contract instrument only, less invitation, specifications, drawings, copy of bid, etc.) of \$1,000,000 or more, except those contracts which are classified as secret, confidential or restricted in accordance with AR 380-5, will be transmitted by the contracting officer executing the contract, immediately upon the final approval thereof, direct to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C. (AR Par. 15b (4) (a).)

[8] 2. When the contract contains terms and conditions relating to reimbursement of the cost of emergency facilities and the protection of the United States with reference to the future use and disposition of such emergency facilities, one additional copy (contract instrument *only*, but including the terms and conditions indicated), regardless of the amount of the contract, will be forwarded immediately upon final execution, direct to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C. (AR 5-200, Par. 15b (4) (b).)

3. The copy of all contracts required to be filed in the Returns Office, as set forth in paragraph 750.9, which are of a secret or confidential nature, shall be prepared for such filing as other contracts but will be transmitted direct to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Unit, by memorandum, stating the secret or confidential nature of the papers which would warrant their not being immediately made available for public examination.

4. The signed ribbon copy of every contract required under paragraph 750.9 (b) to be forwarded to the Office, Chief of Engineers for examination and transmittal to the Audit Division, General Accounting Office, which is of a secret or confidential nature, will be transmitted by registered mail, or other special method of delivery, to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Section, with memoranda stating that the contract is of a secret or confidential nature. Such contracts will be specially handled and personally delivered to the General Accounting Office where special arrangements have been provided for their safekeeping.

5. Copies of specifications and drawings made a part of negotiated defense contracts, and such contracts themselves, will not be distributed to publishers and others as set forth in paragraphs 735.8 (d), (e), (f), and (g).

772.7 Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.—(a) Approval of use.—The use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract requires the approval of the Secretary of War in each specific case. If a district engineer or contracting officer considers that the work can be best performed by the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract, he will submit a letter to the Chief of Engineers stating:

1. The nature of the particular work to be done.
2. The location and the estimated cost thereof.
3. The particular reasons for the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract.
4. The amount of fixed fee proposed.
5. The name of the contractor proposed for the work with the reasons therefor.

[9] 6. The name of one or more alternate contractor or contractors believed to be suitable to perform the work.

7. Whether or not the proposed contractor or any alternate has been awarded any other national defense contract, and if so, the contract number, description of the work, location of the work, estimated cost, and fee for each such contract, if known to the contracting officer.

8. Waiver of bonds. (See paragraph 773).

This application with recommendations of the Chief of Engineers, will clear through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and the National Defense Council.

(b) Amount of fee.—The Act of September 9, 1940 (Public No. 781, 76th Congress) provides that the fixed-fee to be paid the contractor as a result of any such public works contract (cost-plus-a-fixed-fee), hereafter entered into, shall not exceed six percentum of the estimated cost of the contract exclusive of the fee as determined by the Secretary of War. The amount of the fees approved in existing construction contracts ranges from the maximum of six percent in smaller contracts of less than \$100,000 in almost a straight line to approximately two and one-half percent for contracts approximating \$30,000,000. Fixed-fees approximating three-fourths of one percent of the estimated project cost have been accepted as reasonable for architectural, engineering and design contracts.

(c) Inspection.—In addition to the inspections required by AR 5-360, such necessary inspections, audits, and supervision, to make certain that the interests of the Government are fully safeguarded with respect to quantity, quality, cost of labor, materials and services, which are to be charged against such contracts and paid for by the Government, will be made. In view of the many difficulties inherent in contracts of this nature and the necessity for the assurance of rigid honesty in their performance, the careful supervision by contracting officers is enjoined. Care will be exercised in the preparation of all cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts that no condition is included which would preclude or abridge the right and duty of the Government to make such inspections and audits. (See Circular Letter Finance No. 225, dated December 9, 1940.)

772.8 Designs and Specifications.—It is extremely important that designs and specifications, particularly those in connection with supply contracts, be care-

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fully prepared and that all conditions or practices which might operate to delay both procurement and production be eliminated therefrom. It is further important that changes in such specifications or designs, when issued, be limited to cases of absolute necessity. It is, therefore, directed, insofar as practicable, that:

(a) Specifications will be so clear and complete that any competent manufacturer should experience no undue difficulty in preparing bids or estimates.

[10] (b) Unusual or unproven requirements will be avoided wherever possible.

(c) Tolerances and inspection standards will, to the greatest extent possible, conform to commercial practice and be capable of realization by mass production methods.

(d) Except in cases of absolute necessity changes in specifications or designs affecting work in process and affecting contracts to be placed will be avoided during the current emergency situation.

772.9 Approval of contracts.—(a) Lump-sum contracts.—All negotiated lump-sum contracts, both supply and construction, will be subject to the approval of higher authority as provided in paragraph 706.4, except that (1) all such contracts in excess of \$100,000 or less than \$500,000, will be submitted for the approval of the Chief of Engineers; (2) all such contracts of \$500,000 or more will be subject to the favorable recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War and will not be binding until so approved.

(b) Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.—All cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts where the estimated amount is in excess of \$50,000 and less than \$500,000 will be subject to the approval of the Chief of Engineers, and all such contracts of \$500,000 or more will be subject to the favorable recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and the approval of the Secretary of War, and will not be binding until so approved.

(c) Letters or indorsements transmitting contracts for approval will state briefly, (1) the necessity for making the procurement without advertising; (2) bidders solicited; (3) comparative cost; (4) whether or not the contractor has been awarded any other negotiated contracts; and (5) any other pertinent data.

772.10 Priorities.—A committee, known as the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, has been established and a priorities system has been prescribed by it to insure the procurement of items of Army and Navy equipment and supplies, in the quantity needed, in the order of their military importance, and with the least practicable burden to industry. It is effected by the use, at the discretion of contracting officers, of a specific preference rating to be placed on individual contracts or orders for critical items, as directed by the Committee. They do not apply to contracts for River and Harbor and Flood Control works or procurements. The instructions and procedure prescribed by the Priorities Committee for the use of preference ratings on contracts will be published in a restricted Finance Circular Letter.

772.11 Delays due to priorities.—Under the standard form of construction contract, and under the liquidated damage article of the standard form supply contract, where delivery is delayed through the observance by the contractor of a voluntary preference obligation assumed at the instance of the Government under the system of priorities established by the Army and Navy Munitions Board on August 12, 1940, contracting officers will, in accordance with paragraph 754.1, grant such extensions of time of performance or delivery as may be warranted by the facts in each case.

[11] 772.12 Reports.—Reports of procurements and awards of contracts are required as follows:

(a) Reports of awards of contracts.—(1) Reports of awards of contracts in excess of \$2,000 under authority of the Act of July 2, 1940 (Public No. 708, 76th Congress) will be submitted by the district engineer or other contracting officer making the purchase at the time the award is made. In the case of items which have been classified under AR 380-5, the word "classified" will be substituted for the quantity and description of the item. Such reports will be made direct to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C., and a copy thereof will be transmitted to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Section, Washington, D. C. These reports will be made on ordinary letter paper and will conform to the following outline:

Office..... Date.....

REPORT OF CONTRACT SERIAL No. -----

Under authority of sec 1 (a), act July 2, 1940 (Public No. 703, 76th Cong.)
 Project No. ----- Contract or production schedule No. -----
 Name and address of contractor -----
 Location of establishment or plant -----
 where the contract will be performed -----

Quantity	Item	Unit Cost	Total Cost
		Grand Total	-----

DATES

a. Quotations requested -----
 b. Award made -----
 c. Contract executed or notice to proceed issued -----
 d. Deliveries to commence -----
 e. Contract to be completely performed -----
 Number of quotations considered -----
 Competition was not obtained in the negotiation of this contract for the following reasons (when applicable) -----
 The prices obtained in the negotiations of this contract are fair and reasonable.

 Signature of Purchasing and Contracting Officer.

[12] (2) Every report submitted in accordance with (a) above will be serially numbered by the station submitting it and the first report submitted by a station will bear the notation "Serial No. 1" immediately below the date in the upper right hand corner. Subsequent reports will be similarly numbered. Such reports as have already been submitted and not so numbered will be assigned serial numbers by the stations submitting them and information as to the numbers assigned furnished by letter to the office indicated in (a) above.

(3) For any item, to which a preference rating has been assigned in accordance with the priorities instructions of the Army and Navy Munitions Board dated August 12, 1940, appearing in the report, a notation substantially as follows will be given:

"ANMB preference -----"
 (insert rating)

(b) Purchases in excess of \$2,000, made through contracts entered into under authority of the Act referred to in paragraph (a) (1), will not be reported under entry 14 on War Department Form No. 8 as open-market purchases (par. 5, AR-240). The number of such purchases made and the total amount of funds so obligated during each month will be shown by an appropriate notation in the space below entry 9 on page one of that form. The amount reported in the notation will be included in the total shown under entry 10. The number of purchases reported in the notation will be included in the total number of "other" purchases shown under entry 12.

(c) The instructions contained in the preceding paragraphs, (a) and (b), are applicable to all purchases made from War Department funds appropriated for the fiscal year 1941. Reports referred to therein, which have not been furnished covering the obligation of such funds prior to the receipt of these instructions will be prepared accordingly. They do not apply to procurements from River and Harbor and Flood Control funds.

(d) Reports of cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts and land acquisitions.

(1) The Act of October 8, 1940 (Public No. 800, 76th Congress) requires the Secretary of War to submit monthly within ten days following the last day of each month, commencing on or about November 10, 1940, to the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs and Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, certain information on all cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts and all land acquisitions within certain periods. The Act provides that the first report should cover the period from July 1 to October 31, 1940.

(2) Such reports will be submitted by the contracting officer who executed the contract directly to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C., and a copy thereof will be transmitted to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Section, Washington, D. C. The report covering contracts executed during the [13] period July 1 to October 31, 1940 should

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be submitted not later than November 5, 1940, and subsequent reports will be forwarded at the time the contract is executed in each case.

(3) Reports of cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts will contain substantially the following information:

Office ----- Date of Report -----
Serial No. of Report -----

REPORT OF CONTRACT

Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee

Act Oct. 8, 1940

(Public No. 800, 76th Congress)

- (a) Object or objects of the contract -----
- (b) Name and place of business of the contractor -----
- (c) Estimated cost of the contract (exclusive of the fee) -----
- (d) Amount of the fee -----
- (e) Date of contract -----
- (f) Location of the project where the contract will be performed -----

Signature of
Purchasing and Contracting Officer.

(4) Reports of land acquisitions will contain substantially the following information:

Office ----- Date of Report -----
Serial No. of Report -----

REPORT OF CONTRACT

Land Acquisition

Act Oct. 8, 1940

(Public No. 800, 76th Congress)

- (a) Location -----
- (b) Area -----
- [14] (c) Intended use -----
- (d) Purchase price -----
- (e) Amount appropriated for the purpose -----
- (f) Assessed value -----
- (g) Date acquisition was accomplished -----

Signature of
Purchasing and Contracting Officer.

(e) Press releases.—(1) Semi-monthly reports on the fifteenth and last day of each month of awards of contracts for supplies and Army construction will be submitted by the contracting officer executing the contracts, directly to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Room 2513, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C., and a copy thereof will be transmitted to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Section, Washington, D. C. Such reports should be transmitted in time to reach the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War within three days of the period reported. Only contracts of sufficient importance to have news interest should be included. Awards of unusual interest and importance will be reported promptly at the time of award, rather than being held for the regularly semi-monthly release and items so reported need not be included in the semi-monthly report, but some mention should be made of them. Six copies of each semi-monthly and special report is required to be furnished the Office of The Assistant Secretary of War.

(2) Information on awards should include the contracting office, name and address of the contractor, the item or items contracted for, and the amount of each award as to quantity and money value and any other pertinent information. In addition thereto, the report will contain the completion date of deliveries for all contracts in excess of thirty days.

(3) The last release for each quarter of the fiscal year, will, in addition to the usual report of recent awards, include a summary showing the up-to-date status of the procurement program for the year by suitable items or categories, showing the amounts provided for in the annual program, the amounts contracted for to date, the amounts included in outstanding invitations, and other pertinent information.

(4) If the contracting officer considers that certain awards are of a confidential or other nature to make their publication inadvisable, recommendation to that effect should accompany the release.

(f) The term "contracting officer" as used herein means division and district engineers and other contracting officers specially designated by [15] the Chief of Engineers with similar unlimited authority. The reports of such contracting officers will include all procurements and awards by contracting officers with limited authority under their supervision or direction.

773. Bonds.—(a) Lump sum contracts.—Bid bonds will not be required. Performance bonds for all supply contracts, and construction contracts under \$2,000, are discretionary with the contracting officer and should be required only in exceptional cases. Performance and payment bonds must be required for negotiated construction contracts in excess of \$2,000.

(b) Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.—The Secretary of War is authorized under the Act of September 9, 1940 (Public No. 781, 76th Congress) to waive the requirements for performance and payment bonds for public works under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. Pursuant thereto the Secretary of War has determined that the requirements of performance and payment bonds for public works for the military establishment, entered into upon a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis, out of funds appropriated for the fiscal year 1941, or authorized to be entered into prior to July 1, 1941, shall be waived except in cases of special circumstances. If the district engineer or other contracting officer considers that the circumstances in any particular case are such that performance and payment bonds should be required, he will include a recommendation to such effect in his letter of application to the Chief of Engineers, (paragraph 772.7) setting forth in detail the facts upon which such recommendation is based.

773.1 Liquidated-damage provisions.—For use in Engineer Corps supply and construction contracts generally, see paragraphs 734.2 (d) and 734.3 (f). The inclusion of liquidated damage clauses in supply contracts under existing emergency conditions may frequently lead to complications in delivery or performance schedules with deliveries on other contracts under the system of priorities established by the Army and Navy Munitions Board on August 12, 1940. They will accordingly be included in negotiated supply contracts only in exceptional cases.

773.2 Walsh-Healey Act.—All negotiated supply contracts in excess of \$10,000 (both lump-sum and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee) will contain the Walsh-Healey Act provisions.

773.3 Bacon-Davis Act.—All negotiated contracts for the construction or repair of public works in excess of \$2,000 are subject to the provisions of the Bacon-Davis Act and must contain a schedule of minimum wage rates as determined by the Secretary of Labor.

773.4 Eight-hour Law requirements.—The provisions of the law prohibiting more than eight hours labor in any one day of persons engaged upon work covered by Army, Navy, and Coast Guard contracts were suspended by the Act of June 28, 1940 (Public No. 671, 76th Congress, Section 5 (b)). All contracts for the construction or repair of a public work or for non-personal services in which the stipulation prohibiting work in excess of eight hours a day was theretofore required to be included, are now subject to the provisions of Section 303 [16] of the Act approved September 9, 1940 (Public 781, 76th Congress) permitting employment of laborers and mechanics in excess of eight hours per day upon payment at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of pay. The following paragraph will be included in all such contracts:

"ARTICLE 11. Eight-hour law—Overtime compensation—Convict labor.—

(a) No laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by this contract, in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor contracting for any part of said work contemplated, shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon such work at the site thereof, except upon the condition that compensation is paid to such laborer or mechanic in accordance with the provisions of this article. The wages of every laborer and mechanic employed by the contractor or any subcontractor engaged in the performance of this contract shall be com-

puted on a basic day rate of eight hours per day and work in excess of eight hours per day is permitted only upon the condition that every such laborer and mechanic shall be compensated for all hours worked in excess of eight hours per day at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of pay. For each violation of the requirements of this article a penalty of five dollars shall be imposed upon the contractor for each laborer or mechanic for every calendar day in which such employee is required or permitted to labor more than eight hours upon said work without receiving compensation computed in accordance with this article, and all penalties thus imposed shall be withheld for the use and benefit of the Government: *Provided*, That this stipulation shall be subject in all respects to the exceptions and provisions of U. S. Code, title 40, sections 321, 324, 325, and 326, relating to hours of labor, as in part modified by the provisions of Section 303 of Public Act No. 781, 76th Congress, approved September 9, 1940, relating to compensation for overtime."

773.5 Advance payments to contractors.—Section 1 (c) of the Act of July 2, 1940 (Public No. 703, 76th Congress) provides that advanced payments to contractors in amounts not exceeding 30 percent of the contract price, may be made prior to July 1, 1942, when necessary in the interests of the National Defense upon such terms and conditions and such adequate security as the Secretary of War may prescribe. Requests for advance payments by contractors may be made at any time after negotiations have begun. District engineers and other contracting officers upon receipt of requests from firms or contractors for advance payments will forward such requests to the Chief of Engineers who will transmit the request with his recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of War for appropriate action. The following information will be presented with each case:

(a) Amount proposed to be advanced.

(b) Amount and character of contract involved.

(c) Whether award with or without advertising or on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis.

[17] (d) Terms of the proposed advance (including method and time of repayment or liquidation).

(e) Necessity for the advance.

(f) Security proposed to protect the Government against loss with the definite recommendation as to the adequacy thereof.

(g) Financial position and the general character and responsibility of the contractor.

(h) Any other information pertinent to a proper decision in the case.

(i) Appropriation available.

773.6 Assignment of claims.—The Act of October 9, 1940 (Public No. 811, 76th Congress) provides that Sections 3477 and 3737, Revised Statutes, shall not apply in any case in which the moneys due or to become due from the United States, under a contract providing for payments aggregating \$1,000 or more, are assigned to a bank, trust company, or other financing institution, including any Federal lending agency; provided that:

(a) No claim shall be assigned, in the case of any contract entered into prior to October 9, 1940, without the consent of the Secretary of War. District engineers and other contracting officers will forward any requests for approval under authority of this subparagraph to the Chief of Engineers, who will transmit the request with his recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of War for appropriate action. All pertinent information necessary for action of higher authority will be submitted with the request.

(b) An assignment may be made in the case of any contract entered into subsequent to October 9, 1940, providing its terms do not prohibit such assignment. Assignments under authority of this subparagraph will be submitted for the approval of the Chief of Engineers, but they do not require the approval of the Secretary of War.

(c) Unless the terms of a contract provide otherwise, an assignment of the contract shall—

(1) Cover all amounts payable and not already paid.

(2) Not be made to more than one party.

(3) Not be subject to further assignment, except that an assignment may be made to one party as agent or trustee for two or more financing parties.

(d) In case of an assignment, the party to whom the contract was assigned shall file written notice, and a true copy of the assignment with the—

(1) General Accounting Office.

(2) Contracting Officer.

[18] (3) Surety or sureties upon the bond or bonds, if any, in connection with such contract.

(4) Disbursing officer, if any, designated in such contract to make payment.

Any contract entered into by the War Department after October 9, 1940, may provide that payments to an assignee of any claim arising under such contract shall not be subject to reduction or set-off for any indebtedness of the assignor to the United States arising independently of such contract.

773.7 Compulsory orders.—(a) Section 9 of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 (Public No. 783, 76th Congress) authorizes the President, through the head of the War Department or the Navy Department, in addition to the present authorized methods of purchase or procurement, to place an order with any individual, firm, association, company, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry for such product or material as may be required, and which is of the nature and kind usually produced or capable of being produced by such establishment. Compliance with all such orders for products or material shall be obligatory.

(b) It is the policy of the War Department to continue procurement under the defense program on the basis of voluntary cooperation between industry and the Government wherever possible.

(c) In the event that in any particular case a satisfactory solution cannot be reached on such voluntary basis, a full report of circumstances will be submitted to the Chief of Engineers for submission with his recommendation to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Such report of the contracting officer will include his conclusion that action under Section 9 of the Act referred to is necessary, together with the reasons therefor, and a statement that the product or material desired is normally produced or is capable of being produced by the person or corporation involved, that the price of the product or material desired as determined by him is fair and reasonable, and as to the preference over other contracts or orders to which the proposed order should be entitled. All pertinent correspondence or other documents relating to the case should accompany such report.

By order of the Chief of Engineers:

E. E. GESLER,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Finance Section.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 56

[1] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR. SUPPLEMENTING TESTIMONY BEFORE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., a person subject to Military Law, appearing before me in person and being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

The following corrections should be made to the transcript of my testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 14 September 1944:

Page 3375, line 8, the word "bridges" should be changed to "barges".

Page 3470, line 11, the phrase "not of serious occasions" should be changed to "not a series of occasions".

Page 3478, line 8, the word "light" should be deleted.

Page 3581, line 13, the name "Mr. Epsom" should be changed to "Mr. Epps".

The answer recorded as given by me on page 3539, line 16, to the effect that I did not see Mr. Rohl at the Palace Hotel is erroneous, either because of a stenographical error or because of my misunderstanding of the question when asked. I did see Mr. Rohl at the Palace Hotel with Mr. Grafe, but did not discuss the questions of whether the contract would be enlarged in scope and amount.

In view of the Board's questions on my previous appearance covering the point of when I first knew that Mr. H. W. Rohl was not an American citizen, how I discovered this fact and what I did about it, I have reviewed the files on this point to refresh my recollection. My review of these files on this point reveals an inaccuracy in my statement made [2] on page 3504, of the transcript and repeated on pages 3560, 3579, and 3580, to the effect that I "immediately" wrote the Chief of Engineers upon discovering that Mr. Rohl was not an American citizen. At the time I testified it was my recollection that I wrote the

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Chief of Engineers immediately, but a review of the file indicates that I did not write this letter until August 15, 1941. Consequently I would like my answers in this regard stricken from the record and for the following statement to constitute my testimony with regard to my discovery of the fact that Mr. Rohl was not an American citizen and the action taken by me after such discovery.

The first knowledge I had that Mr. H. W. Rohl was not an American citizen was gained through the following letter dated June 2, 1941 from Hawaiian Constructors to me as District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H. :

Contract No. W-414-eng.-602

JUNE 2, 1941.

THE DISTRICT ENGINEER,

U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: Referring to your letter of May 7th—my answer thereto is supplemented by the following information :

1. Mr. H. W. Rohl, who owns 25% of the stock of the Rohl-Connolly Company, a member of the joint venture known as Hawaiian Constructors, was born in Germany and is not a citizen of the United States.

2. Mr. Rohl has an application for United States citizenship pending before the Naturalization Department of the U. S. Government in Los Angeles.

3. Mr. Rohl desires and intends, if permitted, to aid the United States Government in every way possible in the defense program of the present National Emergency.

[3] 4. Mr. Rohl is not employed by the Hawaiian Constructors; he is not now, nor has he been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of the Rohl-Connolly Company.

5. Mr. Rohl does not have, nor has he ever had, access to the plans or specifications for the work under this contract, nor has he participated in the contract trials; in fact, he has purposely refused to do any of these things and intends to continue to refuse in the future until he either receives U. S. citizenship, or express permission is granted to him as provided for in the Act.

Very truly yours.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
/s/ Paul Grafe,
PAUL GRAFE.

This letter was written by Mr. Paul Grafe for Hawaiian Constructors in reply to a letter that I had written to Hawaiian Constructors on May 7, 1941, which reads as follows :

MAY 7, 1941.

TWJr/mlm

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS

Pier 2-A, Foot of Channel Street, Honolulu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: Reference is made to Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Eng. 602 of your company.

Your attention is invited to the following information relative to the employment of aliens on National Defense Contracts.

[4] "1. The employment of aliens by contractors on national defense contracts is not prohibited but is restricted as stated by War Department Circular No. 121, 1940, as follows :

"Protection of classified plans and specifications.—a. No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who wilfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"b. Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"c. For the purpose of this section, the term *person* shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise. Sec. II, act June 28, 1940 (Bull. 15, W. D., 1940)

"2. Should it become desirable, for any reason, that aliens be employed by contractors on contracts affected by the foregoing restriction, application should

be made through this office, requesting the written permission of the Secretary of War for such employment and stating fully the reasons therefor.

"By order of the Chief of Engineers:"

Information is requested as to whether or not any aliens are employed by your company who would come under the meaning of Section II, act June 28, 1940.

Very truly yours.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer

[5] Prior to receiving Mr. Grafe's answer of June 2, 1941, I had already received an answer from Hawaiian Constructors, dated May 14, 1941, which reads as follows:

MAY 14, 1941.

Subject: Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Eng.-602

THE DISTRICT ENGINEER,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: Reference is made to your letter of May 7, 1941 relating to employment of aliens by contractor on National Defense Contracts. We wish to report that to our knowledge we have no aliens employed by our company who would come under the meaning of Section II, act of June 28, 1940.

We require each man to sign an application for employment on which he states whether or not he is a citizen of the United States. If he is not a citizen we do not hire him, except that some Filipinos are hired in accordance with District Circular #4 of March 22, 1941.

Yours very truly.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
/s/ R. A. Schwieger,
R. A. SCHWIEGER.

The occasion for my writing my letter of May 7, 1941 to Hawaiian Constructors was the receipt by me on May 6, 1941 of the following Circular Letter, dated April 21, 1941, from the office of the Chief of Engineers:

[6]

4-H
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, D. C., April 21, 1941.

3820 (National Defense)

Re. O. & R. Chapter VII.

Circular Letter (Finance No. 104)
(Contracts No. 35)

Subject: Employment of Aliens on National Defense Contracts.

To: All Divisions and District Engineers.

1. The employment of aliens by contractors on national defense contracts is not prohibited but is restricted as stated by War Department Circular No. 121, 1940, as follows:

"Protection of classified plans and specifications.—a. No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless he written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who wilfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"b. Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"c. For the purpose of this section the term *person* shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise. Sec. II, act June 28, 1940 (Bull. 15, W. D., 1940)."

2. Should it become desirable, for any reason, that aliens be employed by contractors on contracts affected by the foregoing restriction, application should

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be made through this office, requesting the written [7] permission of the Secretary of War for such employment and stating fully the reasons therefor.

By order of the Chief of Engineers:

E. E. GESLER,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Finance Section.

41/774

It should be noted that Mr. Grafe advised in his letter of June 2, 1941 that Mr. Rohl was not employed by the Hawaiian Constructors; that he was not at that time, nor had been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of Rohl-Connolly Company. I knew, of course, that Mr. Rohl had not taken any active part in the supervision or management of the work under Contract No. 602. Therefore, the fact that he was not an American citizen was not important in connection with the administration of Contract No. 602.

Later, as the work on Contract No. 602 expanded, it was felt desirable by Hawaiian Constructors and by me that his services be utilized in connection with this work. On August 15, 1941, I received the following letter from Mr. Grafe of Hawaiian Constructors:

AUGUST 15, 1941.

THE DISTRICT ENGINEER
U. S. Engineer Office
Honolulu, T. H.

Re: PROGRESS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
Contract No. W-414-Eng-602

[8] DEAR SIR: Mr. H. W. Rohl of 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, applied in the U. S. District Court in Los Angeles on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers, which have not yet been issued to him.

Mr. Rohl is one of the principal stockholders of the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company, members of the joint venture known as the Hawaiian Constructors, the contractors on Contract No. W-414-Eng-602.

Mr. Rohl is a man of outstanding ability, with good judgment, resourcefulness, and experience on construction work.

Mr. Rohl's services as an executive on work to be performed under subject contract are urgently needed to expedite the National Defense Program at this time, due to the large amount of work to be done, and the scarcity of supervisory personnel and efficient labor. Mr. Rohl has not taken any part in the performance of the work under subject contract, although anxious to do so, because, since he is not a naturalized citizen, he did not think it good policy to become associated with restricted and secret work.

It is requested that you ask the Department of Justice to give early attention to Mr. Rohl's application for citizenship, so that his valuable services will be available for this work, thus accelerating the progress of this part of the National Defense Program.

Very truly yours.

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
/s/ Paul Grafe,
PAUL GRAFE.

On the same date, I wrote the following memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, through the division Engineer, advising that Mr. Rohl's services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under Contract No. 602, and requesting that the Attorney General's attention be invited to the facts with the request that action on Mr. Rohl's application for final citizenship papers be expedited.

[9]

VIA CLIPPER

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 15, 1941.

ND 600.114-602

" 230

Request for Final Citizenship Papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.

THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.

(Thru: The Division Engineer, South Pacific Division)

1. Mr. Paul Grafe, Attorney-in-fact for the Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Los Angeles, California; Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California; Gunther and Shirley Company, Los Angeles, California; and Mr. Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, prosecuting Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, has requested the District Engineer to bring to the attention of the Engineer Department the status of Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, one of the principal stockholders of the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company. Mr. H. W. Rohl has applied to the U. S. District Court at Los Angeles, California, on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which, it appears, have not been issued to date.

2. Mr. H. W. Rohl is a very skillful construction supervisor. He has personally supervised several large construction jobs for the Engineer Department under various contracts, also, other agencies of the United States. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam and other heavy construction in the State of California. Mr. Rohl is a man of outstanding ability, and of excellent judgment and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work.

3. Due to the fact that part of the work being performed under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602 is of a restricted nature, and because of his alien status, Mr. Rohl has been reluctant to take any active part in the supervision or management of the work under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602; therefore, his valuable services have been lost.

4. While District Engineer at Los Angeles, California, the writer had frequent contacts with Mr. Rohl in connection with the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater construction and the dredging of the Los Angeles Harbor. It is the writer's opinion that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

[10] 5. In view of the scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel for construction work in the Hawaiian Islands, it is the District Engineer's opinion that Mr. Rohl's services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under the above cited contract; therefore, it is recommended that the Attorney General's attention be invited to the case with a request that action on his application for final citizenship papers be expedited.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Inclosure: Ltr 8/15/41 fr
Hawn Constrs.

My recommendation in this memorandum was concurred in by the office of the Division Engineer at San Francisco through the following 1st indorsement:
Subject: Request for Final Citizenship papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.

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Forts 665 (Hon) 15

1st Ind.

OFFICE, DIVISION ENGINEER,
SO. PAC. DIV.,
San Francisco, August 19, 1941.

To: The Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Concurring in the views and recommendation of the District Engineer.
For and in the absence of the Division Engineer:

F. C. SCHEFFAUER,
Head Engineer.

Incl: n/c

[11] In response to this recommendation, I am advised that the office of the Chief of Engineers wrote the following letter to the office of the Attorney General on this matter:

"WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 28, 1941.

LEMUEL B. SCHOFIELD,
Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SCHOFIELD: The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; Rohl-Connolly Co., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif.; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer Corps Contract No. W-144-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one of the principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States district court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and miscellaneous dams, tunnels, and other heavy construction in the State of California. To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government defense projects because of his alien status.

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the afore-mentioned defense construction project because of his peculiar qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be expedited.

[12] Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.
Very respectfully

JOHN J. KINGMAN,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers."

I was requested by the Board to determine the date on which Hawaiian Constructors actually initiated construction work under Contract No. 602. The file reveals that this date was February 5, 1941. This is shown in the attached exhibit marked Wyman Affidavit, Exhibit "J."

The Board requested that I determine who had final authority to approve drawings, plans and specifications. My research on this point reveals the following:

1. Plans prepared by the District Engineer were first submitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for approval. Upon receipt of approval the plans, including design calculations and specifications, were transmitted to the Division Engineer in San Francisco for his approval.

2. For AWS projects certain items of equipment, such as towers, transmitter building, and power plant, were furnished by the using agency. Designs had to be held in abeyance until receipt of drawings from the using agency.

I have searched the files in the Office of the District Engineer in order to determine whether any written answer was received to my letter of January 22,

1941, written to Mr. Rohl requesting him to come to Hawaii in connection with the handling of Contract No. 602. I can find no answer. At the time I wrote this letter I did not realize that Mr. Rohl was not [13] employed by Hawaiian Constructors, nor that he was not at that time nor had been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I was first advised of this situation in the above quoted letter of June 2, 1941 from Mr. Grafe. I did not follow up the request in my letter of January 22, 1941 because the Hawaiian Constructors, shortly thereafter took steps to eliminate the difficulties that were being experienced in initiating work under Contract No. 602, the existence of which difficulties were the cause of my writing this letter.

The Board inquired as to who was immediately responsible for the quality and progress of work under Contract No. 602. My answer in this regard was not as complete as it should have been. This responsibility runs through the entire chain of engineering command. It begins with the selection of the contractor. Contractors are first chosen according to experience records as well as the knowledge of them possessed by contracting officer. The latter assures himself that the contractor can perform the work, both as to quality and time requirements, because he possesses finances, management, experience, plant, and personnel. A good contractor realizes his responsibility for progress and pushes the job.

The officer in immediate contact with the work is the Area Engineer. It is the Area Engineer who has the initial responsibility of checking progress and quality of work. An Area Engineer who has more than one job Engineer who is a resident on the job. The Area Engineer and the Job Engineer are assisted by Inspectors who are chosen because of training and ability.

[14] Field Areas submit *semi-monthly* reports of progress of all items of work to the District Engineer. These reports showed the estimated percentage of work completed as originally scheduled or planned, and the *actual* percent of completion attained, with explanations of reasons for delay or of difficulties.

I offer in evidence as Exhibit "K" a sample of the monthly report for a semi-monthly period for the construction program at a station. As part of it is shown the bar diagram of progress of individual features. These reports were prescribed by instructions contained in Orders and Regulations, Corps of Engineers, Paragraphs 236 and 243, supplemented by instructions contained in Finance Circular Letter No. 225, Paragraph 21, December 9, 1940, and Circular Letter, July 24, 1941, Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Area Engineers are in constant contact with the District Office to report difficulties and seek assistance.

District Engineers carefully choose Area Engineers from men whom they know are able and vigorous operators. All District Offices have operations and/or inspection divisions whose tasks are to keep constantly in touch with the work and to inspect it both for progress and quality. Under pressure of war work most districts also had additional transportation divisions, control divisions for coordination, and expediting sections. The Honolulu District had a transportation division and a special coordinator in charge of inspection.

The next higher echelon is the Division Engineer. The Division Engineer normally receive monthly reports of operations which tell what was [15] accomplished during the month on all projects in all districts. During the war period semi-monthly reports were prescribed. (Insert here date when semi-monthly progress reports were initiated.) These reports show breakdowns for every major job into its important features. Reports show the scheduled percent of completion and the actual, with explanations and reasons for delays and difficulties. It also shows the progress expected in the next semi-monthly period. Division Engineers habitually visit all projects under them or have some of their assistants do so to the extent that the magnitude of their work permits. During the war period Division Engineers generally have so great a number of projects that they must select those projects with the highest priority or those which were suffering the most difficulties to personally inspect, leaving the others to their assistants.

The next echelon of command is the Chief of Engineers. The semi-monthly progress reports described above are transmitted to the Chief of Engineers. There the Control Section examines them minutely to determine which projects are falling behind. Those projects of chief importance which are falling behind would generally be visited at once by a special inspector. For practically every

project having fallen more than 2% behind, a special letter of explanation was required. Many times these were required by radio or telephone.

At a previous hearing I was asked, who was responsible for the "tedious process" in effect with respect to putting construction projects underway during the period from the receipt of approval of the Hawaiian Constructors contract, January 6, 1941, to December 7, 1941.

[16] These time-consuming processes were those required by law, regulations, or long established procedures. The general purposes of these laws, regulations, and long established procedures is to secure control by higher echelon and to protect the Government in expenditures as well as to insure quality of work.

The change from peacetime methods of procedure to wartime was generally accomplished by decentralization of contractual authorities to lower echelons and a relaxation of the extent of review by higher echelons. However, some changes had to be made in laws of long standing.

The procedures might be divided into general types, namely: securing technical approval through Engineer channels; and securing approvals by tactical agencies or the using services, responsible for operating, and also securing the coordination required between all responsible agencies.

In order to understand the limitations on the authority of the District Engineer and all the steps that had to be taken by him in cooperation and coordination with other agencies, it is of the utmost importance that the Board keep in mind that at the time of the negotiation of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, it was about a year before Pearl Harbor. The great sense of urgency was not yet present, although changes from peacetime procedure were being gradually introduced. In order to make this clear I shall discuss the law, regulations, and procedures as they existed under the following general heads:

- a. Method of contracting
- b. Procedures for technical approvals
- c. Limitations on money magnitude for a and b

[17] Under each of these headings I shall compare the situation during:

(1) Peacetime procedures which were in effect through most of 1940, and up to just before the date of approval of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, January 3, 1941.

(2) Transitional period beginning in 1940 and during the period of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract up to 7 December 1941.

(3) Immediately after Pearl Harbor and during the war period.

I submit in evidence as Wyman Affidavit, Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D", tabulations of the contracting authorities for advertised, negotiated lump sum, and negotiated CPFF contracts prescribed for the District Engineer, Division Engineer, and the Office, Chief of Engineers, as these authorities varied in peacetime of 1940, in later 1940, and at the time of negotiating the Hawaiian Constructors contract in December 1940, just after that date and during 1941, and just after Pearl Harbor. These tabulations were extracted from existing orders and regulations. Some orders and regulations were missing from the files of the District Engineer but any inaccuracies will not affect the conclusions from statements made. If any great inaccuracies are found corrections will be submitted after records in Washington have been examined.

The following points are stressed:

a. The low magnitude of the peacetime contractual authorities of the District Engineer and of the Division Engineer, namely \$10,000.00 for the District and \$50,000.00 for the Division.

b. The low limitation for the District Engineer continued up to February 19, 1941. As far as the approval of specifications was concerned this meant that most plans and specifications had to be submitted to the Division Engineer on the mainland.

[18] c. Under the pressure of preparation for war there was a progressive decentralization of authority as shown by the increased limits of authorities of the District and Divisions on the dates May 1, 1940, December 9, 1940, and February 19, 1941. This decentralization thus began 19 months before Pearl Harbor.

d. That negotiated contracts were not permitted before the latter part of 1940; that up to the war period the authority to negotiate had to first be secured from the Under Secretary of War.

e. That decentralization was progressive from 19 months before up to the date of Pearl Harbor. In no respect was it comparable to the great decentralization that came after Pearl Harbor. For example District Engineers during 1941

could approve lump sum advertised contracts up to \$100,000.00. Later in the war period their authority was increased to \$3,000,000.00.

f. Attention is invited to Note 2 in the District Engineers' Contractual Authority which states that decentralization up to \$3,000,000.00 went even below District Engineers to Area Engineers.

g. Exhibit "D" shows the relative authorities for the execution of change orders after contracts were once negotiated. It shows similar trends to those described above. Decentralization of authorities was begun before Pearl Harbor and immediately after almost completely decentralized for the war period. In the special case of the District Engineer in Honolulu, four days after the attack at Pearl Harbor, the Division Engineer delegated to the District Engineer all of his contractual authority. This enabled the District Engineer to take action on contract instruments up to \$5,000,000.00.

It will be seen from the above that the District Engineer in Honolulu during the period of 1941, which is the period under investigation, had [19] many limitations under the law and under regulations of the War Department which required submission of specifications, awards, and contracts to higher authority. At the same time the War Department and the Engineer Department had started decentralizing to meet the increasing tempo pressure of war work. As noted in my earlier statement priorities ascribed to Hawaiian contracts were the same as those on the continent in spite of its isolated position.

It should be added that all job orders had to be submitted by the District Engineer, Honolulu, to the Division Engineer for approval. With reference to the use of negotiated contracts, either lump sum or cost-plus-a-fixed-fee, revised statutes which had been most rigid on requiring advertising for competitive bids of contracts for public works had to be modified to permit execution of construction *without advertising* and to permit of the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract. The Act which afforded this relaxation was Public No. 703, 76th Congress, approved July 2, 1940. This information was published to the field in a Circular Letter from the Chief of Engineers, December 9, 1940, and at first the negotiated contract was merely recommended in cases where competitive bidding would not fulfill the needs of National Defense. It will be noted that in the tabulation the field offices had their choice of advertised contracts and negotiated contracts; that later in the war period advertised contracts were prohibited and only the negotiated ones allowed.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the responsibility for many of the procedures which might have been said to have delayed work because of limitations of authority was not that of any individual but lay collectively in existing laws, regulations of the War Department, and of the Engineer Department which laws and regulations had many fundamental sound reasons for existence, [20] and that those responsible for such laws and regulations recognized the need for their alteration in and took proper steps to that end to meet the increased speed of pre-war conditions even though there was no certainty of war.

As stated above some of the time-consuming procedures were those necessary for coordination with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Using Services. In my original statement I submitted one example of the procedure involved in this coordination as Exhibit "N". I desire to submit a few additional examples marked Wyman Affidavit Exhibits "E", "F", "G", and "H". It will be noted that the time interval to cover the interchange of indorsements in these coordinating staff memoranda ran up in one instance of the four examples to nine weeks. These are merely additional examples selected at random. As noted in my original statement there are hundreds of examples of such coordinating memoranda in the District Engineer files.

Through oversight one page of the schedule attached to Exhibit E, which was the study on priorities introduced by me in evidence during my testimony was not included in the exhibit. I submit this missing page in evidence as Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "I".

In connection with my statements on page 28 of my original statement read before the Board on September 14, I submitted several exhibits illustrating efforts on my part toward expediting the work under the Hawaiian Constructors' contract. I would like to submit in evidence, another exhibit bearing on this point since it is quite pertinent thereto. I am therefore submitting exhibit designed Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "L", which is a letter to [21] all contractors engaged on defense projects within the Honolulu District emphasizing how

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imperative the expedition of this work was and urging anticipation of their material and equipment requirements.

I desire to submit a reply to the "Testimony of Mr. Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H., taken at Hickam Field on 21 April 1942, by Colonel Lathe B. Row, Inspector General's Department." This report was answered completely and adequately in letter of May 9, 1942 addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and signed by Colonel A. K. B. Lyman, Department Engineer. The latter became my successor, inasmuch as the Hawaiian Department absorbed the District Engineer's activities in February of 1942. I submit in evidence this letter in refutation of the charges made by Mr. Hoffman in said Inspector General's Report as an exhibit marked Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "M".

[22]

Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Colonel, C.F.

Signed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authorized to administer this oath by the 114th Article of War, on this 16th day of September 1944.

Lue C. Lozier,
LUE C. LOZIER,
*Major, Commissioned in the Judge Advocate's Department,
Army of the United States.*

EXHIBIT "A".—District Engineer Contractual Authorities

	ADVERTISED CONTRACTS			AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE		AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS	
	Approval of Specifications	Making Awards	Approval of Contracts	Lump Sum	CPFF	Lump Sum	CPFF
1. Peace Time.....	Up to \$10,000.....	Up to \$10,000.....	Up to \$10,000.....	None.....	None.....	None.....	None.
2. May 1, 1940 Changes...	Up to \$10,000.....	Up to \$50,000. (If no protest.)	Up to \$50,000. (Stan. forms.)	None.....	None.....	None.....	None.
3. Dec. 9, 1940 Changes...	Up to \$10,000.....	Up to \$50,000. (If no protest.)	Up to \$50,000. (Stan. forms.)	Up to \$50,000.....	None USW only (Note 1).	Up to \$50,000. (Stan. forms.)	Up to \$50,000. (Stan. forms.)
4. Feb. 19, 1941 Changes...	Up to \$50,000.....	Under \$500,000. (If regular.)	Lump sum up to \$100,000. (Stan. forms.)	Up to \$50,000.....	None USW only (Note 1).	Up to \$100,000. (Stan. forms.)	Up to \$100,000. (Stan. forms.)
5. War Period (After Pearl Harbor; published 2/19/42.)	All, except unusual cases over \$100,000 and certain other specified cases.	Up to \$1,000,000. (If no protest.)	Up to \$2,000,000. (Stan. forms.)	Up to \$1,000,000.....	Up to \$1,000,000.....	Up to \$2,000,000. (Stan. forms.)	Up to \$2,000,000. (Stan. forms.)
LATER IN WAR PERIOD	ADVERTISED CONTRACTS PROHIBITED			Up to \$3,000,000.....	Up to \$3,000,000.....	Up to \$3,000,000.....	Up to \$3,000,000.

NOTE 1. Authority must be secured from Under Secretary of War in each specific case.

NOTE 2. The authority to negotiate contracts up to \$3,000,000 was still further decentralized to Area Engineers.

EXHIBIT "B".—Division Engineer Contractual Authorities

	ADVERTISED CONTRACTS			AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE		AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS	
	Approval of Specifications	Making Awards	Approval of Contracts	Lump Sum	CPFF	Lump Sum	CPFF
1. Peace Time.....	\$10,000 to \$50,000.....	\$10,000 to \$50,000.....	\$10,000 to \$50,000.....	None.....	None.....	None.....	None.
2. May 1, 1940 Changes..	\$10,000 to \$50,000.....	Over \$50,000 if no protest.	Over \$50,000 (Stan. forms).	None.....	None.....	None.....	None.
3. Dec 9, 1940 Changes..	\$10,000 to \$50,000.....	Over \$50,000 if no protest.	Over \$50,000.....	Up to \$100,000.....	None (Note 1).....	Up to \$100,000.....	Up to \$50,000.
4. Feb 19, 1941 Changes..	All, unless unusual.....	Under \$500,000 (certain exceptions).	Lump sum over \$100,000 (Stan. forms).	\$50,000 to \$100,000	None USW only (Note 1).	\$100,000 to \$500,000 (Stan. forms).	\$100,000-\$500,000 (Stan. forms).
5. War Period (After Pearl Harbor; published 2/19/42.)	Unusual cases \$100,000 to \$250,000.	Up to \$1,000,000 (certain exceptions).	Over \$2,000,000 (Stan. forms).	Up to \$1,000,000.....	Up to \$1,000,000.....	Over \$2,000,000 (Stan. forms).	Over \$2,000,000 (Stan. forms).
LATER IN WAR PERIOD.	ADVERTISED CONTRACTS PROHIBITED			Up to \$5,000,000.....	Up to \$5,000,000.....	Up to \$5,000,000.....	Up to \$5,000,000.

NOTE 1. Authority must be obtained from Under Secretary of War in each specific case.

EXHIBIT "C".—Office Chief of Engineer Contractual Authorities

	ADVERTISED CONTRACTS			AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE		AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS	
	Approval of Specifications	Making Awards	Approval of Contracts	Lump Sum	CPFF	Lump Sum	CPFF
1. Peace Time.....	Over \$50,000.....	Over \$50,000.....	Over \$50,000.....	None.....	None.....	None.....	None.....
2. May 1, 1940 Changes...	Over \$50,000.....	Over \$50,000 if protest or special conditions.	All contracts not on stan. forms.	None.....	None.....	None.....	None.....
3. Dec 9, 1940 Changes...	Over \$50,000.....	Over \$50,000 if protest or special conditions.	All contracts not on stan. forms.	\$100,000-\$500,000 (Note 1)	None (Note 2)	\$100,000-\$500,000.....	\$50,000 to \$500,000 (Note 3)
4. Feb 19, 1941 Changes..	Unusual cases.....	Over \$500,000.....	All contracts not on stan. forms.	Over \$100,000.....	None USW only (Note 2)	Over \$500,000; contracts on other than stan. forms. (Note 4)	Over \$500,000; contracts on other than stan. forms. (Note 4)
5. War Period (After Pearl Harbor; published 2/19/42)	Unusual cases over \$250,000.....	Over \$1,000,000.....	Over \$2,000,000 or on non-stan. forms to USW	Over \$1,000,000.....	Over \$1,000,000.....	Over \$2,000,000 or non-stan. forms to USW	Over \$2,000,000 or on non-stan. forms to USW (or if fee in excess of schedule).
LATER IN WAR PERIOD	OVER \$5,000,000 to Under Secretary of War						

NOTE 1. Over—Subject to approval by Asst. Secretary of War.

NOTE 2. Authority must be obtained from Under Secretary of War in each specific case.

NOTE 3. Over—Subject to approval by Secretary of War.

NOTE 4. Over \$500,000—Subject to approval by Under Secretary of War.

EXHIBIT "D."—*Authorities for Approval of Change Orders*

	District Engineer	Division Engineer	Chief of Engineers
1 May 1940 Changes.....	Change orders not in excess of \$500 providing for changes in plans and specifications within general scope thereof; extension of time of performance.	Change orders in excess of \$500 under contracts not exceeding \$50,000 (construction & supply).	Change orders in excess of \$500 under contracts in excess of \$50,000 (construction & supply); all change orders under contracts executed on other than prescribed stan. forms regardless of amount.
19 Feb. 1941 Changes.....	Same as above.....	Change orders in excess of \$500 and not more than \$25,000 under lump sum contracts only.	Change orders in excess of \$25,000 under lump sum and all change orders CPFF contracts (latter subject to approval of higher authority as required).
War Period. (After Pearl Harbor; published 2/19/42.)	Change orders up to \$2,000,000 under stan. form contracts and where the award (authority to bind Government in cases of \$1,000,000 or more) has been approved.	Change orders in excess of \$2,000,000 and less than \$5,000,000 under stan. form contracts and where award of change order (in cases of \$1,000,000 or more) has been approved.	Due to changed conditions—where amount less than \$5,000,000. (USW—change orders above \$5,000,000)

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit E

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements herein will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Gasoline Storage Tanks	
1st Ind. Sig. O. 17 July 41	Dept Engr	1. Your drawing of the Kaala Station site shows a provision for a gasoline storage tank at the summit. This office has received six of these tanks and after inspection, questions the feasibility of initially installing one of them on Kaala, as well as keeping it filled. These tanks are 4000 gallon capacity and require a tank truck to properly service them. 2. An alternate suggestion is made—Install the tank at the base of the cableway, equip it with a pump so as to fill standard drums. These drums can then be accommodated by the cable car and hauled to the top. Tank trucks can readily be driven to the base of the cableway to refill the tank. This will also provide a storage for gasoline to be used by the cable hoist.	/s/ C. A. P. C. A. P.
2nd Ind. Engr. 8 Aug 41	Sig. O.	1. Since receiving your first R/S Indorsement, I have found out that the gasoline for the power plants for these stations must be a special white gasoline. If stored at the base of the cableway, the gasoline there could not be used for the power for the cableway operations. 2. I have discussed this matter with the District Engineer. Both of us believe that these tanks probably can be cut and hauled to the top of Mount Kaala in sections and then rewelded. If this is done and the tank is installed at the top of Mount Kaala, then it could be filled by gasoline carried up in drums without any great hurry, and having the tank at the top of Mount Kaala would insure that there was a supply of gasoline for the power units. On the other hand, if the tanks were placed at the bottom and gasoline hauled to the top in drums as needed, in actual operations it might be possible for the cableway to be knocked out of action, and this would make the supply of gasoline very difficult. I therefore suggest that we plan on installing the tanks at the top of the mountain. 3. Captain Tetley told me the other day that these tanks were all designed to be located above the ground in concrete cradles. I believe if it is at all possible they should be installed under the ground and I have asked the District Engineer to have a man look at the tanks to see if this can be done. For the Department Engineer:	/s/ R. F. R. J. F., Jr.
3d Ind. Sig. O. 21 Aug 41	Engr. O	1. Concur in cutting the tanks as suggested in par 2, 2nd R/S Ind. 2. The latest information received by this office regarding the installation of these tanks indicates that they may be placed underground after being treated with hot asphalt applications. Attention is invited to Drawing OCSigO ES-D-327. 3. The question of white gasoline to be used with the PE 74 has been taken up with the Signal Corps Laboratories. The PE 74 can be modified to use regular issue gasoline. Steps are being taken to effect this modification at the earliest practical date.	/s/ C. A. P. C. A. P.

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Gasoline Storage Tanks	
4th Ind. Engr. 22 Aug 41	Dist. Engr.	1. To note 2nd and 3rd Indorsements. 2. Return of correspondence is requested. For the Department Engineer:	/s/ F. W. H. F. W. H. DB.
5th Ind. Dist. Engr. 2 Sept. 41	Dept. Engr.	1. Noted and concurred.	T. W., Jr.

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit F

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

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This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Installation of Gasoline Storage Tanks at Bellows Field. (S-13)	
1st Ind. Air O. 10 May 41	Engr.	With reference to your request of 9 May 1941—attached hereto is a section of the Bellows Field Reservation on which is outlined the area selected for gasoline tank installations. Plans call for an installation of twelve (12) fifty thousand (50,000) gallon tanks. It is desired that these tanks be bombproofed. The area as shown will be covered by the end of the proposed runway and is placed in a section that will need a minimum of excavation. 1 Incl: Sketch showing Gas Storage for Bellows Field. For the Air Officer:	/s/ W. J. F.
2nd Ind. Engr. 26 May 41	Air O.	1. This office does not believe that the location selected for the installation of these gasoline tanks at Bellows Field should be accepted. 2. If these tanks are to be bombproofed they must be placed a considerable distance below the level of the ground where the burster course is located. At the point chosen there will not be sufficient fill above the tanks to provide this distance, and if the tanks are dug into the ground at this point to secure greater overhead cover, there will undoubtedly be difficulties encountered with seepage water as the tanks will be below the ground water level. 3. When preliminary discussions occurred several months ago regarding the bombproofing of these 30 50,000-gallon tanks, the recommendation that this be done was based upon being able to locate the tanks where they could be dug in or tunneled into the side of a hill in long galleries where several tanks could be placed end to end. I believe that these tanks are fabricated from $\frac{1}{2}$ " or less steel plate with no supporting ribbing. If the tanks are placed in a long pit end to end, the pit could probably be dug narrow enough so that an undisturbed berm could be left at the edge of the trench and the eventual weight of the burster course could be supported in large part upon this undisturbed berm. The tanks in this case would only carry the weight of the backfill above them. If, however, the tanks are placed in a trench parallel to each other, the tank would not only have to carry the weight of the backfill but would also have to carry the weight of the burster slab and there would be some question as to whether the tanks would have sufficient structural strength to do this.	

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Installation of Gasoline Storage Tanks at Bellows Field. (S-15)	
2nd Ind. (Con't.) Engr. 26 May 41	Air O.	4. Based on a very hasty estimate made by this office, the cost of bombproofing these tanks will be about \$200,000 more than installing them without this protection. It is believed that locating them rather widely separated in locations away from the runways where the installation can be camouflaged by vegetation should be considered in lieu of bombproofing in view of this increased cost. There is a hill about 100 yards to the south of the existing runway where some of them could be installed and camouflaged and some more high ground to the west of the proposed new runway where possibly some more of the tanks could be installed and camouflaged. 5. It is requested that these comments be given your consideration in order that an acceptable method of installation and location may be reached. For the Department Engineer: 2 Incls: Added Map	/s/ RF R. J. F., Jr.
3rd Ind. Air O. 29 May 41	Engr.	The site as shown in the attached drawing for installation of gasoline tanks at Bellows Field is approved by this office. The matter of bombproofing is considered vital and should be provided for these tanks. Gasoline is obviously one of the most important items of supply for the Air Force. Any failure of this vital item would immobilize our service. For the Air Officer: Incls—n/c	/s/ WJF W. J. F.
4th Ind. Engr. 2 June 41	Dist. Engr.	1. The attached file is on the subject of location of the gasoline tanks for Bellows Field. 2. The Air Office originally proposed that these tanks be installed on the western end of the existing runway under the fill necessary for this extension and that the tanks should be bombproofed. This office believes that the tanks installed in this location would have to be below the ground water line in order to get sufficient overhead cover and raised the question in 2nd R/S Indorsement as to whether the tanks should be bombproofed or given protection by dispersion and camouflage. We made a very hasty estimate based upon the cost of the burster course that bombproofing would cost about \$200,000 additional. 3. The 3rd R/S Indorsement from the Air Office states definitely that they desire the tanks bombproofed and proposes locating them in the small hill to the south of the existing runway. Before the question of installing these tanks and bombproof storage is presented to the Department Commander for decision, I would like your comments on the proposal and on the additional cost required to bombproof the tanks. As stated, my estimate of this additional cost at \$200,000 was based upon a very hasty comparison of bombproof costs. For the Department Engineer: Incls: n/c	/s/ RF R. J. F., Jr.
5th Ind. Dist. Engr.	Dept. Engr.	1. This office concurs in the recommendation of the Department Engineer, that gasoline tanks be not located under the ends of the runway as shown on attached tracing. 2. The location indicated on the blue-line print has the disadvantage of being near the center of the camp and of having too little area to permit dispersion and therefore would require an expensive bombproof protection. 3. A suggested site which is shown on the attached print has the advantage of: (1) Ample room for dispersion. (2) Ease of excavation, as material is sand with no rock in evidence. (3) Ease of access, to large area in which planes may be dispersed for protection, without crossing the runways. (4) Natural camouflage by existing brush and Keawe trees. Incl.: 3 Incl. Added Map.	/s/ T. W. T. W.
6th Ind. Engr. 24 June 41	Dist. Engr.	1. What is your rough estimate of increased cost if these tanks are bombproofed? For the Department Engineer. Incl: No change.	/s/ R. F R. J. F., Jr.

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Installation of Gasoline Storage Tanks at Bellows Field. (S-15)	
		District Engr verbally confirmed our estimate for \$200,000 additional.	
7th Ind. Engr. 14 July 41	Dist. Engr.	1. I have discussed this question of location of the gasoline tanks at Bellows Field with General Martin. I explained to him that bombproofing these tanks would take additional funds, and that these funds have not been included in the estimates submitted for Bellows Field. I also explained to him the status in regard to the \$2,000,000 allotment for installation of gasoline tanks at Hickam Field and at Wheeler Field which you recently received. 2. General Martin agrees with our belief that the first proposed location at the end of the runway is not satisfactory, and also with your statement in the 5th R/S Indorsement above, that the location in the small hill south of the existing runway is not satisfactory. He does not like the location that you suggested, however, because these tanks would then be practically in the bombing range at Bellows Field. I suggested to him then that we consider an area in the hill north of the proposed runway as indicated in red on your print. He agreed that this location would be satisfactory but before approving it finally would like to leave the question open to your engineering determination. I also passed on to General Martin your suggestion that these tanks now be installed without bombproofing, but in such a manner that a burster course could be later added when additional funds are made available. General Martin also concurred in this suggestion. 3. It is therefore requested that you give consideration to installing these tanks in the hill indicated on your print. If this site is feasible from Engineering considerations it will be approved by General Martin. For the Department Engineer: 3 Incls: n/c	/s/ R.F. R. J. F.

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit G

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., July 1, 1941.

Refer to File No: 461

X-633 Ammunition Mag.

Subject: Transmittal of Definite Project Report and Drawings for the Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands.

To: The Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Attached herewith is a copy of the Definite Project Report for the Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands, including necessary drawings.

2. A copy of this report was forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Engineers with recommendations for the adoption of the cut and cover type of gasoline storage at Site "B" and tunnel type of construction to be used for site "A".

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Incls.:

Report Copy No. 7

Drawings File Nos. F-26/1 to F-26/10

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands	
1st Ind Engr. 11 July 41	G-4	1. There is attached a letter dated 1 July from the District Engineer which forwards a copy of his report to the Chief of Engineers on the installation of War Reserve Storage for Aviation Gasoline. In brief this report discusses four items: a. Installation of gasoline and tunnel-type galleries at Site A near Salt Lake. b. Installation of gasoline in tunnel-type galleries at Site B in the Waikakalaua Gulch. c. The installation of gasoline in cut-and-cover bombproofed tanks at Site B. d. The installation of necessary pipelines and appurtenant pumps. 2. The District Engineer finds that 83,000 barrels can be installed in tunnel-type galleries at Site A for \$1,020,374.00 or \$12.29 per barrel. At Site B storage of 200,000 barrels in tunnel construction would cost \$2,991,048.00 or \$14.96 cents per barrel. At Site B installation of storage of 200,000 barrels in cut and cover bombproof constructions would cost \$2,111,808.00 or \$10.56 per barrel; and the pipeline from Pearl Harbor to Sites A & B and distribution lines to Hickam and Wheeler Fields would cost \$407,339.00. 3. The District Engineer recommends that projects be adapted for the storage of 83,000 barrels at Site A; for 200,000 barrels at Site B in cut-and-cover bombproof construction, and for the installation of a pipeline. 4. This recommendation follows in general the original recommendations of this headquarters and the Navy when this matter was discussed last spring. At that time it was recommended that of the Army storage 50,000 barrels be installed at Site B; 50,000 installed at Site A; that the Navy storage be installed at Site A; and that all tanks be bombproofed. In the event that bombproof protection was not permitted, it was strongly recommended that the storage be installed in the sites selected, but in sufficiently small tanks to permit proper protection by dispersion. Since the project now provides for fully bombproofed protection, dispersion in small tanks is not believed essential. 5. Time for finishing the project is estimated at 8 months. Colonel Wyman has informed me that he is ready to commence operations at Site B; that the construction is included in his cost plus fixed fee contract with the Hawaiian Constructors; and that he expects to receive allotment of funds from the Chief of Engineers in the very near future to permit him to initiate construction at Site B. He also informed me that he was receiving funds from the Navy to pay for their share of the project at Site A. 6. The present War Department status of this project is as follows: We have been informed by The Adjutant General that the original	

3116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands	
1st Ind Engr. 11 July 41	G-4	project for 100,000 barrels of storage has been increased to 250,000 barrels, and that funds in the amount of \$2,000,000 will be available, and that additional funds will probably be forthcoming if needed. The Navy has not specified any set amount of storage, but has specified that as much storage be secured as possible with the funds to be made available. Colonel Wyman estimates that this Navy money will be sufficient to provide storage for about 33,000 barrels of gasoline, and therefore the entire project consists of storage for between 275,000 and 283,000 barrels of gasoline, 250,000 of which is the Army share. 7. In a further discussion with Colonel Wyman today we discussed the question of the storage at Site B. As indicated on the drawings, this storage is now planned for four separate tanks of 50,000 barrels each, each with its own burster course. The tanks are separated by 200 feet as this was the original directive from the War Department before the study was made. Colonel Wyman believes that since bombproof protection is to be provided with a reinforced concrete burster course, that the tanks can be placed closer together. This will enable more than one tank to be placed under a burster course and will save concrete which can be utilized to extend the amount of lateral protection. 8. The Department Commander has been informed in general of this study, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, has been informed. The District Engineer has consulted the Navy. This memorandum is submitted for information only as no action is necessary at this time. For the Department Engineer: 1 Incl: Ltr. No. 461 x-633 Ammunition Mag. 1 July 41 w/Incls	/s/ R. F. R. J. F., Jr.
2nd Ind. G-4 15 July 41	C/S-----	1. The Engineer Officer forwards herewith for the information of this headquarters one copy of the engineering study which was prepared by the District Engineer covering the storage of a war reserve of aviation gasoline. This study was prepared as a result of a directive from the Chief of Engineers direct to the District Engineer. 2. This Headquarters is vitally interested in the manner in which its war reserve of aviation gasoline is stored. While the W. D. has taken no action to indicate whether the instant study will be approved it is probable that its principal features will be used as a guide in designing the installations. It is believed that the Department Commander should be fully informed on the recommendations which have been submitted by the District Engineer. With that object in view, it is recommended that the District Engineer be requested to discuss the details of this study with the Department Commander. 3. In general, this study discusses the following: a. Installation of gasoline storage in tunnels at Site "A", southwest of Allamapu Crater. b. Installation of gasoline storage in tunnels at Site "B", in gulch near RR Station of Robinson, south of Wheeler Field. c. Same as b, except storage in cut and cover tanks. d. Pipe lines, pumps and other appurtenances. 4. It is recommended that: a. The District Engineer discuss this study with the Department Commander. 1 Incl. n/c.	/s/ C. C. B. C. C. BANK, Col. G. S. C. Asst. C. of S.

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands	
3rd Ind. C/S 7/15/41	Lt. Col. Wyman District Engineer	Please present this to the Department commander, in person. Incls: n/c	/s/ H. PHILIP HAYES, Colonel, G. S. C. Chief of Staff.
4th Ind Dist. Engr. 16 July 41	C/S.....	1. The District Engineer discussed this study with the Department Commander Wednesday, July 16th. 2. The District Engineer discussed the study with Admiral Bloch on Monday, July 14th. Admiral Bloch stated that he concurred in the plans and recommendations of the District Engineer with one exception. In view of the Naval Regulation that gasoline will not be passed over the fuel oil dock located at Pearl Harbor, the loading point should be moved to another location. The Admiral suggested that the loading point be located in the vicinity of the Quartermaster Dock at Hickam Field. The District Engineer has no objection to changing the loading point to Hickam Field. A loading point can be designed in the vicinity of the Quartermaster Dock at Hickam Field which will not interfere with normal traffic at the dock. Admiral Bloch also stated that he would desire a connection from the pipe line to the proposed Navy air facility at Barbers Point, the cost to be financed by the Navy Department. Incl. n/c	/s/ T. W., Jr.
5th C/S 7/17/41	Engr O.....	Please present to D. C. Incls: n/c	/s/ PHILIP HAYES Colonel, G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit H

[SECRET]

[Paraphrase of Radiogram—Action Copy]

AG 676.3 (6-10-41) MC-D

EHB/cdm—1712

To: CG., Haw. Dept.

From: TAG.

JUNE 26, 1941.

Kaala aws station priority contract has been advanced to A-1-C from W-414 Engr 784. Should results under this priority be unsatisfactory Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure. Above reference your radio No. thirty naught nine. AGMC.

[Stamped:] Office Chief of Engineers Jun 30 1941. 676.3 (AWS—Hwn Dept) 37/1.

676.3 (A. W. S.—Haw. Dept.) 37

Subject: Cableway, Kaala Aircraft Warning Station, Hawaii.
Forts 660 (Honolulu) 54.3

5th Ind.

OFFICE, DIVISION ENGINEER,

SO. PAC. DIV.,

San Francisco, July 9, 1941.

To: The District Engineer, U. S. Engineer Office, HONOLULU, T. H.

To note.

For and in the absence of the Division Engineer.

J. R. D. MATHESON,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

Incl.—n/c exc. copy

Sub 1 added.

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2014.1-8

6th Ind.

OFFICE, DISTRICT ENGINEER,
U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., July 18, 1941.

To: The Division Engineer, So. Pac. Division, SAN FRANCISCO.
Noted.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Incl.—n/c exc. dup.
Sub 1 w/d

4th Ind.

4

676.3 (A. W. S.-Haw. Dept.) 37

OFFICE, C. OF E., July 1, 1941.

To the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, Calif.

For your information.

By order of the Chief of Engineers:

JOSEPH L. D. MISIORA,
Lieut., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Chief, Finance Section.

1 Incl.

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

Washington

Subject: Cableway, Kaala Aircraft Warning Station, Hawaii.

AG 676.3 (6-10-41) MC-D

3rd Ind.

EHB/cdm-1712 (7-1-41)

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 27, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

1. Inclosed for your information and guidance is paraphrase copy of radiogram, this office, June 26, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

2. It is desired that this correspondence be forwarded to the Division Engineer, San Francisco for further necessary action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. (Added)

Prph Cy of Radio,
AGO, 6-28-41, to
CG., Haw. Dept.

Office Chief of Engineers Jun 30, 1941. Sub 1 accmpg

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

Washington

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

On Paraphrase of: Radiogram, No. 3009, June 10, 1941, from Hawaii.
 Subject: Cableway, Kaala Aircraft Warning Station.
 AG 676.3 (6-10-41) MC 1st Ind. BLW/cdm—1712 (6-14-41)
 WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 11, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

C. of E. 676.3
 (A. W. S.—Haw. Dept.) 37

2nd Ind.

6-E

OFFICE, C. OF E., June 17, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. By telephonic conversation with the Priorities Committee, A. N. M. B., a rating of A-1-C was authorized.

2. The contractor should contact his suppliers to determine if satisfactory delivery can be made with this rating. If not, he should contact other sources for earlier delivery.

3. In the event further assistance is requested, instructions in Circular Letter Finance No. 144 should be followed.

For the Chief of Engineers:

/s/ Joseph L. D. Misiore,
 JOSEPH L. D. MISIORA,
*1st Lieut., Corps of Engineers,
 Assistant Chief, Finance Section.*

[Stamped:] Jun 19 1941, Received Misc. Div., AGO. W. P. Sub Section.

Rec'd Back Jun 19 1941 46 A G O. Rec'd W. P. D. Jun 23 1941

[Stamped:] In G-4 Jun 23 1941.

[Paraphrase of Radiogram—Action Copy]

[SECRET]

AG 676.3 (6-10-41) MC

BLW/cdm—1712.

To: TAG

June 11, 1941.

From: Hawaii

8:10 A. M.

No. 3009 June 10

I have been informed by the Division Engineer San Francisco that A-1-G is the priority covering contract W-414 Engr 784 with Interstate Equipment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey. Materials for cableway to Kaala aircraft warning station covered by this contract. General Electric has subcontract for motor and all electrical equipment. According to division engineer a delay of about fifteen weeks in the delivery of this electrical material to contractor is strongly probable under this priority. As this Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system, it is essential that this cableway be completed early. In this department this aircraft service is considered to be the most important single project. War Department assistance to the Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to A-1-B is strongly recommended.

[Stamped:] Rec'd W. P. D. Jun 23 1941.

[Stamped:] Office, Chief of Engineers Jun 13 1941. 676.3 (A. W. S.—Haw. Dept.)—37

3120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit I

File: 600.1 (Hickam Field)

Date	File Serial No.	Offices Originating & Receiving Corres.	Substance of Correspondence
14 July 41	(317)....	OCE to DE, Hon.....	TT advising that A-1-c is proper for W-414-eng-696.
22 July 41	344.....	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	Requests that "rating assigned [be] as high as possible, consistent with current priorities directives". Cover W-414-eng-670, 668, 672, 702, 697, and 698.
21 July 41	345.....	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
21 July 41	346.....	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
21 July 41	347.....	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
21 July 41	348.....	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
21 July 41	349.....	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	
7 Aug. 41	1st-344 to 349	OCE to ANMB.....	Requests A-1-c and states that DE, Hon. "has been informed by wire that the [A-1-c] Rating will be applicable."
7 Aug. 41	(344-9)...	OCE to DE, Hon.....	TT advising of A-1-c ratings on Sers. Nos. 344-349.
8 Aug. 41	2nd, 344-9.	ANMB to OCE.....	Advises A-1-c approved.
30 July 41	361.....	DE, Hon. to OCE.....	Contr. 669: Same as Ser. Nos. 344-349 above.
13 Aug. —	(361).....	OCE to DE, Hon.....	Notifies DE, Hon. of A-1-c on W-414-eng-669.
29 Aug. 41	383.....	So. Pac. Div. to OCE.....	Quotes TT from DE, Hon. that steel for W-414-eng-602 for armament bldg. at Hickam with A-1-c is promised for Nov. 41. DE, Hon. advises work will shut down if steel not delivered by 15 Sept. and that it is impossible to secure steel without A-1-a. Desires delivery by 5 Sept. to meet transport at San Francisco.
30 Aug. 41	(383)....	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Advises that OPM is unable to render assistance & that ANMB will not consider higher rating. OPM believes steel can be picked up on West Coast.
28 Aug. 41	385.....	Contractor 696 to OCE.....	Reports difficulty in obtaining wire and cable.
30 Aug. 41	(385)....	OCE to DE, Hon.....	Requests verification of Ser. 385 and necessary information.
10 Sept. 41	396.....	ANMB to OCE.....	Incloses letter from contractor 722 requesting information on applicable rating.
26 Sept. 41	2nd, 396	OCE to So. Pac. Div.....	Transmits information on steel deliveries arranged by OUSW on W-414-eng-722 as result of Ser. 396
11 Sept. 41	397.....	OPM to OCE.....	Transmits Pref. Rating Order No. 18 of A-1-c for Hickam for all materials—critical and non-critical. (Pursuant to request submitted to ANMB 27 Aug. 41. See 3820 (Priority Preference Rating) 3, herein.)

Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "J"

Semi-monthly Report of Operations—Military Construction—3rd Field Area—Period Nov. 16-30

Report Section
Form No. M-1 (Rev. as of Nov. 15, 1941)

Job Order No.	Item of Construction	Date Construction Begun	Probable Date of Completion	% of Completion		Work Done During Month	Probable Operations next month	Date last Insp. by Engr. Off.
				End of This Per.	Probable next Per.			
1.0	Fire Control Station "M"	Feb. 5, '41	July 26, '41	100	100	Excavation, stringing cable putting up temporary tower to carry equipment to job site.	Excavation, stringing cable putting up temporary tower to carry equipment to job site.	
2.0	Cableway at Mt. Kaala	Sept. 8, 41	Apr. 31, 42	20	30	Riprapping and masonry work.	Riprapping and masonry work.	
2.1	Access Road at Mt. Kaala	Mar. 11, 41	Dec. 15, 41	99	100	Laying rock, hot top and rolling.	Laying rock, hot top and rolling.	
Add. 1	Paving of Road	Aug. 27, 41	Dec. 15, 41	96	100	Not started.	Not started.	
2.2	A. W. S. Camp and Install Utilities, Mt. Kaala.					Not started.	Not started.	
	Mess Hall					Not started.	Not started.	
	30-Man Barracks Building					Not started.	Not started.	
	Power House					Not started.	Not started.	
	Cartaker's Quarters					Not started.	Not started.	
	Radio Communication Bldg.					Not started.	Not started.	

REMARKS:

NOTE: This form shall be fully completed and returned to the Report Section, Civil Engineering Subdivision, U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H. on the 1st and 16th day of each month.
Nov. 16-30.

3122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[1]
Hickam Field

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit K

AUG. 16-31, 1941.

CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AT AIR CORPS STATIONS

NO. 1—HICKAM FIELD, T. H.

1. LOCATION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

Hickam Field is an existing military airfield located on the south shore of Oahu, approximately three miles west of the City of Honolulu. The current project consists of construction of the additional buildings, facilities, and miscellaneous works required to house and serve an Air Force Headquarters, a Wing Headquarters, two Bombardment Groups, one Air Base Group, one Transport Squadron, and attached service troops of the Quartermaster Corps, Signal Corps, Ordnance Department, etc.

2. PERTINENT DATA:

a. Directive:

(1) 4th Ind., from the Adjutant General, dated January 2, 1941, File No. AG 600.12 (12-6-40) M-D, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

(2) Letter from A. G. O. April 2, 1941, to Q. M. C. Subject: Construction of Chapels.

(3) Letter from Chief of Engineers dated May 29, 1941, to Division Engineer, S. P. D. Subject: Armament, Instrument Inspection, and Adjustment Building, Hickam Field.

b. Date layout plan approved by Air Corps:

(1) December 2, 1939.

(2) Revised layout plan approved February 8, 1941.

c. Lease of land approved: Construction is on military reservation.

d. Troop capacity of housing:

(1) Completed, 357.

(2) Under construction, 1,386.

(3) Authorized but not under construction, none.

e. Number of troops occupying stations: 5,475.

[2] f. Construction begun: Existing works begun in 1936 prior to transfer of project to Corps of Engineers.

Present construction:

(1) Administration and Housing, November 13, 1939.

(2) Hospital or Medical Corps Installation, May 28, 1940.

(3) Technical Facilities, November 20, 1939.

3. STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION:

See Table I, progress chart, and map herewith.

Percentage of Completion:	Original program	Additional program	Total program
Administration & Housing (including utilities).....	99	67	76
Hospital or Medical Corps Installation.....	98.5	92.5	94
Technical Facilities.....	88	42	60
Project as a Whole.....	93	57	69
Readiness for Occupancy and Use.....	93	57	69

4. AUTHORIZED AND ESTIMATED COST OF PROJECT:

	Original program	Additional program	Total program
a. Authorized Cost.....	\$12,821,882.00	\$3,188,906.19	\$16,010,788.19
b. Estimated Cost:			
(1) Work constructed or in place (from "Cost to 7/31/41", Fm 38A).....	6,554,888.01	422,509.17	6,977,397.18
(2) Work under way.....	1,569,127.54	1,548,947.18	3,118,074.72
(3) Work authorized, but not yet under way.....	5,100.00	818,420.76	823,520.76
(4) Total estimated cost (from "Present working Estimate as of 7/31/41", Form 38A).....	7,382,323.87	1,690,866.04	9,043,189.91

[5] 5. STATUS OF PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS:

	Per Cent Complete	
	Plans	Specifications
Gasoline Storage Tanks.....	0	0
Aqua Gasoline Storage from domestic water to salt water.....	70	0
Chapel.....	100	0
Headquarters Building.....	98	55
Commissary Warehouse.....	95	0
Theatre (800-Man).....	70	0
Utilities.....	100	65
Pump House.....	90	0
Concrete Reservoir (60,000 gals.).....	90	0
Alterations to Hangar #15.....	3	0

6. OPERATIONS DURING THIS HALF-MONTH PERIOD:

See Table 1, progress chart, and map herewith.

7. PROBABLE OPERATIONS NEXT HALF-MONTH:

See Table 1 and progress chart.

8. ESTIMATED DATE OF COMPLETION:

	Original Program	Additional Program
a. Administration & Housing (including utilities).....	Nov. 30, 1941	Jan. 31, 1942
b. Hospital or Medical Corps Installation.....	Dec. 26, 1941	Nov. 30, 1941
c. Technical Facilities.....	Jan. 12, 1942	Jan. 31, 1942
d. Project as a Whole.....	Jan. 12, 1942	Jan. 31, 1942
e. Readiness for Occupancy and Use.....	Jan. 12, 1942	Jan. 31, 1942

9. Remarks: None.

[4] TABLE I.—Hickam Field Semi-Monthly Progress Table

Contract Symbol	Map Item	No. of Units	Item	Date Construction Begun	Per Cent of Completion	
					August 31, 1941	Probable September 15, 1941
ADDITIONAL PROGRAM						
Admin. and Housing					67	70
W-414-Eng-602	1	1	Barracks, A. C.—63-Man	Mar. 20, 1941	98	99
602	2	23	Barracks, Service Troop	Mar. 20, 1941	96	98
602	3	3	Mess, Enlisted Men	Mar. 20, 1941	96.1	98
602	6	1	Mess, Officers'—118-Man	May 28, 1941	94	95
602	7	1	Mess, Officers'—170-Man	May 28, 1941	94	95
602	9	1	Day Rooms, A. C.—250-Man	May 28, 1941	98	100
602	10	1M	Day Rooms, Service	May 28, 1941	98	100
602	11	7	Quarters, Officers'	Mar. 20, 1941	94	95
602	16	6	Administration Bldgs.	May 19, 1941	95	100
602	35	2	Administration Bldgs., Service	May 28, 1941	75	95
602	39	2	Technical Schools, A. C.	May 10, 1941	100	100
602	40	1	Theatre, 800-Man	Not begun	0	0
602	42	1	Commissary	June 19, 1941	15	25
602	43	1	Post Office	May 19, 1941	100	100
602	44	2	Post Exchanges	Mar. 20, 1941	91	95
602	46	1	Post Exchanges, Whse	May 27, 1941	100	100
602	47	1M	Recreation Bldg	Not begun	0	0
602	48	1	Bakery	Not begun	0	0
602	50	1	Utilities	June 2, 1941	40	45
602	55	1	Headquarters Bldg	Not begun	0	0
602	56	1	Regimental Chapel	Not begun	0	0
602		1	Y. M. C. A. Bldg	Aug. 16, 1941	2	20
Medical Corps Installations.					92.5	97.5
W-414-Eng-602	21	1	Infirmery	Mar. 20, 1941	85	95
602	28	1	Medical Whse	May 19, 1941	100	100

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TABLE I.—Hickam Field Semi-Monthly Progress Table—Continued

Contract Symbol	Map Item	No. of Units	Item	Date Construction Begun	Per Cent of Completion	
					August 31, 1941	Probable September 15, 1941
Technical.					42	51
W-414-Eng-602	12	6	Operations Bldg., A. C.	May 7, 1941	81	90
602	15	1	Maintenance Shed, A. C.	June 28, 1941	99	100
602	20	1	Warehouse, A. C.	May 10, 1941	65	100
602	22	12	Warehouses, Service	July 10, 1941	30	50
602	23	2	Repair Shops, Ordnance	Not begun	0	0
602	24	2	Paint & Oil Storage, Q. M. & Ord.	Jul 11, 1941	45	50
602	25	2	Repair Shops, Motor	Jun 26, 1941	85	100
602	27	1	Utility Shop, Q. M.	Jun 27, 1941	75	90
602	29	1	Storehouse Ordnance	Not begun	0	0
602	32	1	Oil Storage, Q. M.	Jun 26, 1941	100	100
602	33	1	Vehicle Gas Station	Jun 26, 1941	40	80
602	34	3	Repair Shops, Radio	May 5, 1941	100	100
602	49	1	Warming-up Apron	Not begun	0	0
602	51	1	Arm. Fire Con. Sup. & Rep. Bldg.	Jul 17, 1941	5	10
602	52	1	Airbase Oil and Dope Bldg.	Aug 27, 1941	0.1	2
602	53	1	Repair & Signal Corps Whse.	Not begun	0	0
722		1	Engine Test Bldg	Feb 25, 1941	24	30
602		19	Powder and Ammun. Stor. Mag.	Mar 20, 1941	11.7	14
683			Cold Stor. & Equip A. C. Depot.	May 23, 1941	85	100
602	54	1	Arm., Inst. Insp. & Adj. Bldg.	Not begun	0	0
Entire Additional Project.					57	61
ORIGINAL PROGRAM						
Admin. and housing.					99	100
W-414-Eng-663	70	1	Service Club Bldg.	April 1, 1940	100	100
661	71	10	Apartments, N. C. O.	Jan. 15, 1940	100	100
W-414-Eng-666	72	1	Mess Bldg., Officers'	May 20, 1941	100	100
689	77	13	Apartments, Officers'	Nov. 8, 1939	100	100
688	L	129	Quarters, N. C. O.	Nov. 13, 1939	100	100
659	0	168	Quarters, Officers.	Jan. 12, 1940	100	100
660			Street Lighting, etc.	Jan. 19, 1940	100	100
704			Pavements, Curbs, etc.	Dec. 31, 1940	100	100
702			Reservation Fence	June 9, 1941	95	100
Medical Corps installation.					98.5	99
W-414-Eng-699	79	1	Hospital	May 28, 1941	98.5	99
Technical.					88	90
W-414-Eng-699	73	1	Equip. Maintenance Bldg.	Oct. 28, 1940	100	100
656	74	7	Supply Bldgs, Whscs.	Nov. 30, 1939	100	100
658	75	1	Engineering Shop A. C.	Dec. 14, 1939	100	100
696	75	1	Engineering Shop, A. C.	Oct. 9, 1940	80	81
698	76	1	Steam Plant, etc.	Oct. 28, 1940	92	93
672	78	1	Repair Shop Engine	Oct. 24, 1940	31	34
662	80	1	Equip. Repair Bldg.	April 5, 1940	99	100
697	81	1	Double Hangar	Nov. 3, 1940	66	71
670			Hangar Facilities	Aug. 17, 1940	91	100
664		1	Fueling System Gasoline	June 10, 1940	100	100
667		1	Fueling System, Gasoline	June 7, 1940	100	100
669		1	Fueling System, Gasoline	June 7, 1940	100	100
695			Monorail in Repair Hangar	Oct. 11, 1940	100	100
665			Fencing, Flood Lighting	Oct. 28, 1940	100	100
670			Bombsight Storage Vaults	Not begun	0	0
Entire original project					93	95
Entire project (original and additional projects).					69	72

¹ Previously reported as 3 units, 2 units, and 1 unit each of Service Warehouses, Day Rooms and Recreation Bldg. respectively. Funds covering construction of 1 unit of each type has been transferred to cover cost of moving a Y. M. C. A. Bldg. and a Y. M. C. A. Secretary's House from Pearl Harbor to Hickam Field.

(The map referred to under "Status of Construction," *supra* is a chart which will be found reproduced as Item No. 62, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board)

EXHIBIT L

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., July 12, 1941

Subject: Material and Equipment Requirements on Defense Contracts.

To: Contractors engaged on construction of defense projects within the Honolulu District.

Recent experience on construction work has demonstrated that it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure delivery of necessary materials and equipment without undue delay in some phase of the work. It is imperative that construction of defense projects be expedited and completed as soon as practicable with due regard to considerations of economy, sound construction practice, and close adherence to the contract plans and specifications.

In order that construction on defense projects may proceed steadily and without interruption, it is considered highly desirable that all contractors anticipate material and equipment requirements and place all orders at the earliest possible date. Granting of priority ratings has materially aided delivery of certain items, however, the effectiveness of this system has been diminished by the large volume of existing business. Placing of orders at an early date materially advances date of delivery.

Cooperation of all concerned is urgently requested.

[s] THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

EXHIBIT M

[7]
ND 600.114-602

5-H
MAY 9, 1942.

Subject: Statement of the Department Engineer in reply to allegations of Robert Hoffman relative to the progress of work at Bellows Field under Contract No. W-414-eng-202.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Reference is made to the testimony of Mr. Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H., which testimony was taken at Hickam Field, T. H., on the 21st of April, 1942, by Colonel Lathe B. Row, I. G. D., Department Inspector General, and forwarded to this office by Interstaff Routing Slip from the Inspector General to the Department Commander, and thence to this office.

2. From an analysis of the testimony of Mr. Hoffman, it appears to be a highly falsified general criticism of the conduct of the work by this office on the island of Oahu, a criticism of virtually all of the key personnel, and a criticism of his employers, the Hawaiian Constructors. In order to properly present the matter, it is necessary to refute his general allegations; however, these will be touched on but briefly as the actual facts presented demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Hoffman was grossly inefficient, either willfully or through lack of ability and apparently without integrity.

3. It has been deemed desirable, however, to answer in somewhat greater detail, the allegations made relative to the water supply and gasoline storage projects at Bellows Field, due to the importance of these works.

4. Mr. Hoffman's complete lack of integrity is evident from the answer to the fourth question appearing on page one of the testimony, wherein he falsely claims to receive \$4,200 per year from the Hawaiian Constructors payable from their funds, in addition to the \$7,800 yearly from the funds payable by the United States. His total salary was \$7,800 yearly and not \$12,000 as claimed. This deliberate and premeditated prevarication, under oath, demonstrates the worthlessness of his testimony.

5. By way of introduction, it may be stated that Mr. Robert Hoffman was employed on the mainland by the Hawaiian Constructors (cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractors—Contract No. W-414-eng-602), for the position of Assistant Building Superintendent at a salary of \$400.00 per month (\$4,800 per annum). [2] His initial assignment at this field was confined to relatively simple wood mobilization structures. At a later date, work commenced on the runways and the first one was completed (to a usable degree) late in December 1941, with the exception of the fine grading and paving with asphalt. Subsequent promotion to \$500.00, to \$800.00 and thence to \$650.00 per month, with the title of Area Superintendent, were authorized on October 21, 1941, January 24, 1942, and March 24, 1942, respectively. Shortly, after the outbreak of war, it was noticed that the progress of work at Bellows Field was conspicuously slow. Efforts were made to speed up construction, but all such efforts failed. Mr. Hoffman either would not or could not, through incompetence, maintain anything like a normal rate. The history of the gasoline storage tanks set forth below conclusively demonstrates this fact. The source of the trouble, having been analyzed, Mr. Hoffman was removed for incompetence shortly after his last promotion (included with fifty-eight other employees) had been approved. The interests of the United States rendered this action mandatory. In no case, where the facts have been known, has this office tolerated hindrance of the defense effort by permitting incompetent personnel to remain in charge of vital projects.

6. Mr. Hoffman's motives in submitting his testimony wherein he vindictively attacks his superiors and representatives of this office are not understandable. It is noted that he submitted his evidence only after his removal. Obviously his patriotism, if genuine, would have prompted him to speak at an earlier date, as his supposedly pertinent observations were, in some cases, not disclosed for a period of six months.

7. In his testimony, it is noted that he has commented upon many matters on which he is completely uninformed. Investigation reveals that he has distorted facts to suit his peculiar purpose, and finds, it to his interest to resort to the truth only upon infrequent occasions. Inquiry from his former associates discloses that his reputation for truth and veracity, based upon their observations over a period of a year, is bad.

8. That his testimony is presented on a biased viewpoint is demonstrated by the fact that no mention is made of the outbreak of war as contributing to the difficulties encountered.

9. Since his removal, conditions have improved. The gasoline storage tanks were completed to a usable condition on May 4, 1942.

10. The discussion herein follows in general the sequence of his testimony. Mr. Hoffman first criticizes the organization of the U. S. E. D., contending that they are attempting to do a field job by remote control with men earning \$3000 to \$4800 annually and who are without the proper experience. [3] It is a well known fact that work on the mainland prosecuted under the direction of the various Engineer Offices is handled in this manner with great success, thereby demonstrating that a great multiplicity of relatively simple projects (as encountered in the Hawaiian Islands) does not require the presence in the field of government employees in the higher salary brackets. An examination of the projects under construction will result in the conclusion that they are relatively simple construction problems, far less intricate than the lock and dam structures frequently encountered in the mainland, which have been successfully constructed under the direction of the Corps of Engineers for almost the past century with the same type of organization.

11. In one of his initial statements he contends the work was being prosecuted by remote control. Actually the work at Bellows Field was largely under his control as Area Superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors, with the Area Engineer at Bellows Field in local charge of the functions of this office. The design of work is handled in the Young Building, a forty minute drive from the field, and with direct telephone connection. The island of Oahu is divided into seven areas. The islands of Kauai, Maui (with Molokai and Lanai) and Hawaii are each separate areas. Southerly Pacific Islands comprise four additional areas. Obviously this is decentralization to a high degree. Mr. Hoffman apparently was either incapable of appreciating this fundamental fact or he chose to intentionally distort even this basic truth. This is typical of the remainder of the observations and is consistent with his general character.

12. Procurement in the Hawaiian Islands for large scale construction is necessarily something of a problem, where, as in this case, funds were not available to permit stocking of needed materials. It is evident that special materials must

be brought from the mainland and that securing such items, even when ordered by radio must take several weeks at the very minimum. Major Shields, who handled procurement and was relieved of this assignment only when it was desired to utilize his services as Area Engineer at Station "Y", is a graduate engineer, well qualified to handle any mass production procurement pertaining to the work in the Hawaiian Islands. Shortly before Major Shields' transfer to his new assignment, the total estimated cost of Contract W-414-eng-602 was less than \$15,000,000 and as of July 15, 1941, was less than \$6,000,000 at which time procurement on the mainland had already become an acute problem due to shortage and delay in securing materials. Mr. Hoffman chose to ignore entirely the recognized shortage of materials which required the complicated system of priorities which has been in effect for more than one year.

13. The criticism of the prosecution of the work on the gasoline installations may be understood more clearly after a review of the pertinent facts connected therewith. On page 3 of the testimony, it is stated that "the tunnel was driven but not completed for a period of 90 days." [4] Mr. Hoffman's personal animosity to Mr. Cherry, Superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors, contributed largely to the change in organization by which Mr. Cherry, his crew, and his equipment were withdrawn from the work at Bellows Field to permit the Area Superintendent to handle all tunnel work in the area. When this change was effected, on December 8, 1941 (approximately) the tunnel for gasoline tanks had been driven to its full length for six tanks. However, it was decided to excavate a relatively shallow trench in the floor of the tunnel to contain a concrete pipe duct to house the pipes leading to the tanks. With the inexpert supervision and methods utilized by the Area Superintendent, work on this project was delayed for approximately three months.

14. On page 3, he states "the U. S. E. D. insisted on having the tanks within 24 hours which was a physical impossibility." This statement is without foundation nor is there any record in this office of such demand.

15. Mr. Hoffman stated (on April 21, 1942) that there was no way to fill the tanks with gasoline and he specifically mentions, "as an accredited engineer" that no plan had been made to pump gasoline in these tanks. Actually, as of May 1, 1942, a pipe line was in existence for this filling the tanks. This line extends from the tanks, up the hillside, along the road to the additional tunnels under construction, (which road is usable and accessible for heavy trucks) terminating in intake pipes providing means whereby the tanks may be filled at this point by utilizing a gravity system, which method is obviously less expensive and has many advantages over any system which Mr. Hoffman deemed necessary. It is apparent from his own statement that the relatively simple expedient of the gravity system did not occur to him. Mr. Tillman, the Area Engineer who succeeded Mr. Lynch, found stored at Bellows Field practically all of the complete pipe fittings for the tanks including the pressure release valves which Mr. Hoffman at one time said had not been shipped from the mainland and which he apparently decided to forget were stored at the site.

16. There is no genuine excuse for the delay in installing the tanks in the tunnel. The 15 pound rail referred to is part of a limited local supply used for tunnel construction. The construction at an inaccessible A. W. S. Station required the use of this light weight rail. The inaccessible location of the station required use of a pack train to deliver the rail. It is evident that the 60 pound rail could not be used for this purpose, whereas it was perfectly satisfactory and available for use at Bellows Field. Colonel Robinson directed the Hawaiian Constructors to secure immediately the needed 60 pound rail of which there is a great surplus available in Honolulu. This was for use in skidding the tanks into position. Mr. Hoffman took this incident as an excuse to delay prosecuting the work. It was entirely within his prerogative, and a part of his responsibility as Area Superintendent to expedite the action of his organization in securing the necessary rail. Instead, as in many other instances, he did nothing about the matter. [5] Mr. Cherry finally delivered 1,200 track feet of rail together with the ties to the field on February 1, 1942. The Area Engineer, Mr. Lynch, had assured Colonel Wyman that the tanks could be placed and properly connected in a period of ten days, provided that he was given an RD 8 Caterpillar and other necessary materials. These materials and the tractor were delivered in accordance with his requisition. Mr. Hoffman then installed the rail extending up the hillside from the then location of the tanks and into the tunnel. Then, at this late date, in attempting the excavation of the trench in the floor of the tunnel, he ascertained that the tracks and ties interfered with the work and he decided to remove the tracks and ties from the tunnel and stock them

outside. The necessary excavation for the pipe duct in the floor of the tunnel continued at a slow pace for a period of approximately 60 days, during which time, three of the tank saddles required for one tank were constructed at the remote end of the tunnel.

17. Mr. Hoffman insisted on pouring one set of concrete saddles, moving in one tank for same, building the next set of saddles and moving in another tank, all of which was scheduled to take 48 days. The Area Engineer, Mr. Tillman, however, insisted upon pouring the saddles first and then moving in the tanks, thereby saving a great deal of time.

18. A brief resume shows that work started on the tunnel about September 18 and stopped on December 8, 1941. Nothing further was done until about February 10th, 1942, when the trench was started. The trench was completed on March 20, 1942. The initial attempt to move the first tank on March 25, was a failure as a saddle pulled out of position due to use of improper methods. This schedule demonstrates that from December 8, 1941 to March 25, 1942, a period of 3½ months, little was done on the project except construct the saddles and excavate the trench and place therein the concrete duct for the pipes. The dilatory conduct of the Area Superintendent in this matter is difficult to understand, but may be attributed to his lack of experience in handling projects of this nature.

19. Some further delay in prosecuting the work on this project was occasioned by suspending operations on this project due to the desire of the local Air Corps to use the tunnel for some other purposes. This matter was finally settled and no change was made in the tunnel for that reason.

20. The design of both the water supply and fire protection system for Bellows Field assures adequate facilities for the completed camp. The present system is temporary only for use during construction. The facts relative to the 4" water line are that virtually all materials for this line were delivered by February 19, 1942. At that time, some trenching had been completed. Mr. Hoffman then delayed starting work until he could secure a reducer connection for the transition from 6" to 4" pipe. Upon receiving that item, he then said he needed a 6" x 6" cross fitting. Upon receiving that, he then stated he needed a 22½ degree fitting. Then, having exhausted even his ingenuity for concocting excuses, he put off from day to day initiating work on the project. [6] Finally, this office, in an effort to get the work done, assigned the project to Mr. John F. Nichols, a Honolulu contractor who completed the job in less than 6 days under a negotiated contract. Water was in the line on May 4, 1942.

21. On page 3 of the testimony, it is stated "the requisition for the materials for the 6" line was dated February 16 and until the 20th of April, neither the fittings nor the cast iron had been delivered." Actually, the Area Coordinator, Mr. Plummer, located all necessary materials for this line in the base yards, earmarked them for the Bellows Field project, and delivered receipts then in use known as "stug-outs" to the Hawaiian Constructors' Superintendent of Transportation to effect delivery of this material to the site of work. Any subsequent delay in delivery of this material is evidently a responsibility of the Hawaiian Constructors which the Area Superintendent could have remedied. However, inasmuch as Mr. Hoffman had permitted all the materials for the 4" line to remain at the site of the work without making any effort towards their installation, it is evident that expediting delivery of the material for the 6" line at that time would merely have resulted in materials for two lines, instead of one, lying idle at the site. However, it appears that some materials for the 6" line were delivered and stored on the property of the sugar company nearby, taken from there by the forces of the Hawaiian Constructors and installed in a 6" distribution line inside Bellows Field, but not in connection with the proposed 6" water supply line. It will be noted that Mr. Hoffman already knew the distribution system of Bellows Field was over-taxed and that installing this additional interior distribution line before the needed supply line merely aggravated that condition.

22. Based on his supposedly wide experience, Mr. Hoffman has apparently convinced some that he is qualified to handle the extensive construction work in the area, including runways for the airport. Mr. Tillman, who succeeded Mr. Lynch as Area Engineer, became dissatisfied with the operation of the asphalt plant at Bellows Field as the asphalt being placed in the runways was obviously unsatisfactory. Joint investigations made by Mr. Tillman and his associates in the District Office, including one engineer, especially well qualified through many years of broad experience in highway work on the mainland, indicated that Mr. Hoffman knew nothing whatsoever about the operation of this plant and that

it had been set up and assembled in a rather haphazard way. After six weeks' operations, certain vital features of the plant were on the site but not installed in the plant. Mr. Hoffman had refused to make these installations when requested to do so by the Area Engineer. After Mr. Hoffman's removal, this matter was remedied immediately.

23. On page 4 of the testimony, he states the work "is being done as only a group of saboteurs could do it." Before his removal the dilatory conduct of work under his direction, subsequent to the outbreak of war, was so pronounced that serious thought should be afforded this charge as regards his own failure (as previously mentioned) to prosecute the work with even ordinary diligence.

[7] The reference to the appointment of a political group, (mentioning four officers) opposed to Colonel Wyman is obviously nonsense. Colonel Wyman had their wholehearted support; their every effort was directed to furthering the program of this office; his appreciation of this fact is evidenced by his recommendations for their promotions. In this connection, it may be pointed out that Lt. Col. Robinson preceded Colonel Wyman to the Honolulu District, so his appointment was evidently not for the fanciful reason mentioned.

24. The handling of equipment by this office was an intelligent, honest effort to improve the then existing somewhat unsatisfactory conditions. His reference to the materials on hand, at the Honolulu Iron Works, is irrelevant inasmuch as this office placed many orders on the mainland prior to the War to effect a substantial savings to the government.

26. His reference to overstaffing is far from authoritative. Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts are an innovation on which he is absolutely uninformed. Existing Government regulations require compliance with certain directives such as keeping costs, etc. The timekeeping and payroll records were also handled by this office. For these reasons, the Government Area Office must of necessity utilize a larger office force than the contractor who need not concern himself with this detailed paper work.

26. The baseyard situation has always been something of a problem due to a definite lack of a source of suitable trained employees available for this work.

27. Withdrawing work from the Hawaiian Constructors to have it accomplished by hired labor forces is the result of an effort to further the interests of the United States by prosecuting work by whatever means seem most effective. This point is illustrated by the case of the 4' water-line at Bellows Field where the failure of Mr. Hoffman to do anything at all resulted in transferring it to Mr. Nichols, who expeditiously completed the work by lump sum contract.

28. The comments upon the contract and the organization of the Hawaiian Constructors are also totally irrelevant. It will be noted (as aforementioned) that he fails to mention the current war contributing anything to the difficult conditions. This is typical of his testimony as it is evident that he is indulging in an attempt to "white-wash" himself for his sorry effort, and to subject to criticism all who failed to tolerate his own brand of inefficiency. He completely fails to mention the organizational problem arising from expanding a contract of this nature from \$15,000,000 to \$75,000,000 within two months, following a surprise attack on an isolated island having limited labor supply and a shipping shortage so severe that much badly needed construction equipment remained on the wharves at San Francisco for three months or more during the critical construction stage.

[8] The situation may be further illustrated by the fact that over a period of months, Mr. Hoffman visited projects under his jurisdiction at Ulupau and Kaneohe only two or three times, resulting in the projects coming to a standstill through absolute neglect.

29. While he states Mr. McCullough of the Hawaiian Constructors was removed because his forceful and energetic nature was undesirable, he actually left because of an almost fatal heart ailment and with the sincere regret of this office. Mr. Ellison, whom he cites as the possible source of more information, was removed, as was Mr. Hoffman, for inefficiency, but in the case of Mr. Ellison, it was noted at an earlier date. His comments on the conduct of the contract are matters on which it is believed he is entirely uninformed and as such his statements do not merit comment by this office.

30. Mr. Hoffman was thoroughly discredited insofar as this office is concerned and was removed from his post after repeated verbal requests addressed to Mr. Rohl by Colonel Robinson who assembled the facts and acted accordingly. It is sincerely regretted that his removal was not accomplished at an earlier date with the resultant benefit to the progress of the work. Mr. Hoffman was the only employee of the Hawaiian Constructors who refused to submit a written statement of his previous experience when requested repeatedly, giving as his reasons,

therefor, some fanciful excuse. In light of his sorry showing, when confronted with anything more complex than construction of wood mobilization structures, with is doubted that he possesses balanced general construction experience and that his connection with the various projects mentioned in his testimony relative to his qualification would, on cross examination, verify that fact and disclose his shortcomings. It is reported that he attempted to create dissatisfaction among his former employees.

31. By his own admission (page 4 of testimony) he required 23 days to secure rail on an island the size of Oahu where the plentiful supply and high priority carried by the gasoline storage project made the problem relatively simple. As elsewhere, his failure to assume the responsibility attached to his position is the cause of delay and he now attempts to evade the consequences by making derogatory remarks affecting several individuals including one Colonel, one Lt. Col., four Majors, one Lieutenant, and several civilians, including the executive committee of the Hawaiian Constructors, one of whom is Mr. Woolley, whose many successfully completed projects include virtually all the outstanding structures on Oahu, such as the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, both Mormon Temples, the Alexander & Baldwin Building and the Hawaiian Electric office building and power plant. The record of Mr. Woolley as an experienced constructor is absolutely unimpeachable on the visible evidence. Mr. Hoffman's statement that he "pleaded for the installation of the tanks in temporary position" would imply that the problem was, for him so difficult that even with the tunnel already completed, he could not install the tanks expeditiously. Mr. Lynch anticipated the project could be accomplished in ten days.

[9] 32. A typical irresponsible statement appears on page 10 of the testimony as follows: "The bringing of white help from the mainland early in January was a decided mistake." It is clearly evident that additional help was needed and with all island labor employed on defense projects, including more men than the plantations could freely spare, the importation of labor was the only alternative. The Navy contractors also imported labor. Over 500 additional projects, many of them large multiple units, (for example: Over 80 buildings in one evacuation camp constitute one project) were undertaken since December 7, 1941 and the local labor was then already sorely overtaxed. Many tournapulls were purchased and on the San Francisco docks awaiting shipment to Honolulu, so operators were hired accordingly. Mr. Hoffman's objections to importing skilled help including tournapull operators indicate his complete inability to grasp even the most elementary principles of supply, i. e., importing labor when the local supply is exhausted. This must seriously reduce the weight even the most optimistic person could give to his observations (on page 4 of testimony) on mass production or big organization work.

33. On page 10 of his testimony, he again evidences his mental confusion by his statement in one instance mentioning handling and development of his labor crews, "with a certain pride that I look back and see that in 25 years of construction experience I have never had a faster concrete or wood framing crew anywhere." Then four sentences later "while the native help wasn't nearly as competent as normal help on the mainland." The inconsistency is too great for possible reconciliation.

34. A year ago this office contemplated stocking-up on basis construction materials by placing large orders on the mainland; however, lack of funds necessitated reducing the quantity of materials actually ordered. Much equipment has been ordered and only since May 1, 1942, has delivery been made in substantial quantities. Mr. Hoffman obviously is unaware that purchases of material even for large projects cannot be made unless appropriations are available for such purpose.

35. The work at Bellows Field was initially confined to construction of many mobilization buildings. Later, construction of the runways focused attention on that item. The tunnel for the gasoline tanks was under the supervision of Mr. Cherry. Mr. Hoffman apparently was supplied with sufficient, adequate help so that the mobilization buildings and the excavation and placing of base course for the runways was accomplished without difficulty. However, once he was confronted with the problem of installing the tanks in the tunnel, his inability to handle the project became evident. The sequence of work, with the relatively simple projects occupying the spotlight until the last months of 1941 were contributing factors in preventing the knowledge reaching this office, of his inability to properly handle the projects in the Fifth Field Area.

36. The foregoing facts are presented to refute the allegations made. This office does not contend that the ultimate in efficiency has been maintained or that

there has been at all times a steady flow of equipment, men and materials to all projects; shortages of all three items have existed in spite of every effort. [10] Constant effort has been made and will continue to be made to improve the functioning of the organization. Allegations equivalent to sabotage, if from a responsible source, merit serious consideration. This office submits that these allegations are unfounded and are the product of an irresponsible, discredited individual who is evidently motivated by a desire to avenge his fancied wrongs. In conclusion, it is suggested for handling similar cases in the future, it would seem preferable that character investigations of claimants be made by proper authorities before such matters are submitted for consideration. This might eliminate any case where a discredited individual, released from his employment, impeached in the eyes of his associates by his own lack of truth and veracity and possibly suffering from mental aberrations could bring to highest local authorities a rambling account of half truths intermingled with falsehoods and create further interruption to important work by rendering it necessary to prepare a reply.

A. K. B. LYMAN,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 57

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES,
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER,
APO 958, 14 September 1944.

Memorandum to: Major General Walter H. Frank,
Army Pearl Harbor Board
Courts Martial Building, 70-B
HUSAFPOA, APO 958

1. The attached memorandum, prepared in the Office of the Signal Officer, Central Pacific Base Command, contains all the information presently available concerning the arrival of temporary and permanent air warning radar equipment at the Hawaiian Islands prior to 7 December 1941.

2. Search for records to obtain additional information is continuing and will be furnished if, or as soon as, it becomes available.

A. R. Marcy,
A. R. MARCY,
Colonel, Signal Corps.,
Actg. Signal Officer.

- 1 Incl:
Memo to Engineers dtd 12
Sept 44, subj: AWS Equip-
ment, w/5 Incls.

12 SEPTEMBER 1944.

Memo to: Major Hollensworth, Engineers.
Subject: AWS Equipment.

1. In reference to our informal conversation concerning the receipt of an release of AWS equipment to the Engineers before December 7, 1941, the following information is forwarded:

a. Receipt of AWS Fixed Station Detector Equipment by Signal Corps in Hawaii. (Following information taken from stock record cards of the AWS)

(1) Power Units:

(a) Five each received 3 June 1941, on DV-3

(b) Four each received 20 August 1941, on DV-31-42

(2) Detector Stations and Component Parts:

(a) Two each SCR-271 (Serial #1 & #2) received 3 June 1941, on DV-4. Components consisted of: Operating Equipment Assembly, per SCL; Secret Drawing ES-D-6682-C less items 1-6 inclusive, 16-19 inclusive, 21, 22, 24, 25 and SCL Secret Drawing ES-D6683 less items 2, 5, and 6, except item 3 is per SCL Drawing ES-O7324. Conduit and Conduit Fittings, per SCL Secret Drawing ES-D7129. Grounding Equipment, per SCL Secret Drawing ES-D7181. Wiring Supplies, per Bill of Material #2. Fuses (12 per set).

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- (b) One each SCR-271A (Serial #1) received 3 June 1941, on DV-5. Component parts consisted of: Operating Equipment Assembly, per SCL Secret Drawing ES-D-7335-A less items 1-6 inclusive, 16-19 inclusive, 21, 23, 26, 27 & SCL Secret Drawing ES-D-7336 less items 2, 5, & 6. Feed line Chute Assembly, Part #2, per SCL Secret Drawing ES-D7334, Azimuth Indicator M-216, per Signal Corps Laboratories Model Conduit and Conduit Fittings, per SCL Secret Drawings ES-D7327 and ES-D7129, less items 9, 10, & 11. Grounding Equipment, per SCL Secret Drawings ES-D7131. Wiring Supplies, per attached Bill of Material number 1. Fuses (12 per set).
- (3) Tower and Buildings, 36 ft. (for Mt. Kaala and Haleakala)
- (a) Two each received, 29 August 1941, on DV-50-42
- (4) Tower, 100 ft., Transmitter Building (for Kokee)
- (a) Tower received 29 August 1941, on DV-50-42
- (b) Transmitter Building received 29 August 1941, on DV-50-42
- (5) Tanks, gasoline or fuel storage and so forth:
- (a) Six each received 7 July 1941, on DV-1-42.
- (6) Communications:
- (a) No definite information available at this time.
- b. Receipt of AWS Mobile Equipment by Signal Corps in Hawaii.
- (1) Six mobile detector sets were shipped by rail from New Jersey 22 July 1941, and arrived in Hawaii sometime during the first part of August. Temporary locations for these sets on Oahu was proposed the 14 August 1941, and approved on the 15th. (see Inclosure d and e)
- c. AWS Equipment Released to Engineers.
- (1) Definite information on the release of AWS equipment to the Engineers is not available at this time. The following information which has some bearing on the subject is listed below:
- (a) *Kokee, Kauai*: Tower, gasoline tanks, and building material shipped to Port Allen the 17 September 1941. (see Inclosure #a)
- (b) *Haleakala, Maui*: Necessary metal buildings and towers have been shipped to Haleakala, Maui (This statement was made in a letter dated September 23, 1941). (see Inclosure #b).
- (c) *Mt Kaala, Oahu*: No work could be done on the Kaala Detector installation until the cableway was completed. On 21 February 1942, the estimated completion time of the Mt. Kaala cableway was five weeks. (see Inclosure #c).
- d. Communications equipment was installed by Signal Corps personnel. This was dependent upon the completion of the necessary buildings.
2. Search continues for additional information which will be forwarded when located. Inclosures concerning part 1a will be forwarded 13 September.

ALLEN W. SMITH,
Colonel, Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.

5 Inclosures:

Incl A, Radio dated 17 Sept 1941, To: Govt WD, Maccasland, US Engineers Waimea, From: US Engr, Office, Alexander Yound Bldg.

Incl B, Memo dated 21 Feb 1942, To: Col. Powell, From: Mr. Duncan.

Incl C, (1) Memo dtd 8 Sept 1941 Eng 676.3 To: Dist Engr., From: R. J. Fleming, Maj., GSC (2) Ltr dtd 23 Sept 1941 To: Dept Engr, HHD Ft. Shafter. From: Dist. Engr. (3) Ltr dtd 23 Sept 1941 File #ND 676.3, AWS Mobile (9/8/41) Subj: Mobile Station, Kauai & Maui.

Incl D, R/S pages 1, 2, & 3. Subj: Proposed Installation of six mobile RDF Units on the Island of Oahu.

Incl E, Ltr. dtd 23 July 1941 File: FM (SCL) Proj 12-8, Subj: Shipment of Equipment. To: CO, HSD Ft. Shafter. From: SCL, Fort Monmouth.

Inclosure A

[Telegram—Official Business—Government Rates]

Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926

From: War Department

Bureau: U. S. Engineer Office, Alexander Young Building, Honolulu, T. H.

SEPTEMBER 17, 1941.

GOVT WD
MACCASLAND
U. S. ENGINEERS
WAIMEA, KAUAI

Following items being shipped to Port Allen via I I steamer leaving Honolulu September seventeenth colon for U S E D three boxes stationery one box alidade and one carton tripod for alidade period for AWS Kokee fourteen pieces steel thirty bundles steel one crate hand winch twelve boxes parts weighing twenty thousand pounds and two each four thousand gallon gasoline tanks.

WYMAN.

Certified to be US Govt. official business:

[Hand written:] Phoned to Ft. Shafter 4:45 p. m.—9-17-41.

Wm. R.

W. P. McCrone,

W. P. McCrone,

Capt., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

From File: ENGR 676.3 Aircraft Warning Service Stations.

Inclosure B

21 FEB. 1942.

Col. POWELL: The construction foreman at Mt. Kaala informed me yesterday that it would be about five weeks before the aerial tramway job will have been completed.

The cable tower at the top has yet to be installed. As it now stands, the top anchorage now consists of a wooden "A" frame and a dead man.

DUNCAN.

Lt. BELL: To note and file.

AW.

Noted: 4 To Sgt. R for file.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Station Locations (OaHU).

Inclosure C

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT ENGINEER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 September 1941.

In reply
refer to:
Engr. 676.3

Memorandum to District Engineer:

1. In accordance with conversation, Colonel Powell-Major Robinson, and Major Fleming, on the Aircraft Warning Service, it is requested that you arrange to obtain from the Signal Officer the necessary metal building and towers for installation at Kokee and Haleakala. As you know, the installation at Kokee will consist of the metal detector building and a 100-foot tower and at Haleakala, will consist of the combined metal building and 35-foot tower.

2. It is my understanding that these metal buildings are now on hand at the Signal Corps yard at Fort Shafter. This site can be verified by having someone check the buildings on hand in the yard. If the buildings are now complete, shipment of them to Haleakala and Kokee and their erection at the site should be expedited.

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3. It is also requested that erection of the power house at these two stations be expedited. It is understood that your office has designed and is furnishing all materials for these power houses. Their completion should be expedited in order to enable early installation of the equipment.

4. Also, in the discussion referred to, it was decided that the Signal Corps would furnish an employee at Kokee and at Haleakala to assist in the erection of the buildings and to see that they are properly screened and shielded as required. It is also tentatively agreed that the District Engineer would sub-allot funds to the Department Signal Officer to cover the cost of this employee's transportation and time while engaged on this work. In view of the need of this Signal Corps employee's assistance during the erection of the building, it is requested that you notify this office before the actual erection starts in order that arrangements can be made to send him to the site.

5. The Department Commander is extremely desirous that these stations be placed in operation without delay.

ROBERT J. FLEMING, Jr.

Major, G. S. C.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Miscellaneous AWS.

A True Copy:

Address Reply to
DISTRICT ENGINEER
U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE
P. O. Box 2240
Honolulu, T. H.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., September 23, 1941.

5-A

Refer to File No:

ND 676.3 AWS Kokee

X ND 676.3 AWS Haleakala

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service Stations

To: Department Engineer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In answer to your memorandum of September 8 regarding the installation of the Aircraft Warning Service buildings at Kokee, Kauai and Haleakala, Maui, and the necessary funds for furnishing Signal Corps employees to assist in erection of these buildings, the following information is submitted for your convenience:

a. The necessary metal buildings and towers have been shipped to Kokee and Haleakala.

b. The necessary steel for the power houses at these stations is now being fabricated and upon completion the erection will be expedited.

c. Bill for the Signal Corps employees' time and transportation while engaged in this work will be submitted to the District Engineer and payment will be made directly from this office instead of suballotting the necessary funds to the Department Signal Officer as mentioned in memorandum referred to above.

d. The actual erection of the metal buildings and station towers at these stations will be started as follows: Haleakala, as soon as Signal Corps employees arrive; Kokee, approximately October 1, 1941.

2. You will be notified, as soon as can be determined, the exact date that erection of buildings and tower will be started. Arrangements have been made at these stations for the accommodation of the Signal Corps employees.

3. It is requested that this office be informed the day before the employees are to leave for Maui and Kauai.

Theodore Wyman, Jr.

THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,

Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,

District Engineer.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Miscellaneous AWS.

Address Reply to
DISTRICT ENGINEER
U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE
P. O. Box 2240
Honolulu, T. H.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., September 23, 1941.

Refer to File No.

ND 676.3 AWS Mobile (9/8/41)

X ND 652

Subject: Mobile Stations, Kauai and Maui

To: Department Engineer,

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,

Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Your memorandum of September 8 regarding the mobile stations at Haleakala, Maui and Kokee, Kauai has been received and the following information is submitted for your guidance:

a. The barracks at Haleakala are approximately 90% complete. The garage and truck shelter, one of which is necessary to house the mobile unit, is now being designed.

b. The barracks at Kokee are approximately 10% complete. The garage and truck shelter at this station are also being designed.

2. Work on these islands is being expedited and as soon as it is possible for the mobile units to be sent to these stations you will be notified.

Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Miscellaneous AWS.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

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[1]

Inclosure D

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Proposed Installation of Six Mobile RDF Units on Island of Oahu	
1st Ind Sig O 14 Aug 41	G-3	1. It is proposed to install the six mobile RDF units recently received by this Department in temporary alert positions until the permanent sites have been completed. This temporary installation is expected to accomplish the following: a. Provide complete RDF coverage around the island of Oahu with multiple coverage south, southwest, and west of Pearl Harbor. b. Provide bona fide RDF intelligence to the Information Center at Fort Shafter in lieu of the "canned" messages now in use. c. Provide facilities for the training of RDF personnel on actual RDF equipment and under simulated War conditions. d. Develop accuracy and speed to reduce the time lag between RDF unit and plotting table.	
		2. The following is a list of proposed station sites, together with the reasons prompting their recommendation: a. PUU PALAILAI—coverage to the west and south—convenient to a suitable road net, C&FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities. b. WAIANAE (KANEILLIO PT)—Coverage to the west—convenient to a suitable road net, C and FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities. c. KAWAILOA—coverage to north and northwest—convenient to a suitable road net, C and FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities. d. KAAWA—coverage to the east and northeast—convenient to road net, C and FC—will require field mess, however, site chosen is on a Military Reservation. e. KOKO HEAD—coverage to the east and southeast—convenient to road net, C and FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities.	

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Station Locations (Oahu).

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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[2]

No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Proposed Installation of Six Mobile RDF Units on Island of Oahu	
1st Ind Con Sig O 14 Aug 41	G-3	1. FORT SHAFER—coverage to the south and south-west. It is desired to utilize this set to train antenna riggers, van drivers, etc., consequently it will be shifted from its alert position from time to time. The sector covered by this set is also covered by two other stations, consequently it is considered the best set on which to train the rigging personnel thus keeping all other stations at alert status.	
		3. All sites chosen are on Military Reservations and have been located close to other Army installations. It is proposed to use the existing cable system for communication inasmuch as no AWS communication equipment has been received by this Dept to date.	
		4. This office is considering the use of a mobile station on the Haleakala Road on the island of Maui. The temporary occupation of the CCC camp on Haleakala will become feasible upon receipt of the AWS communications equipment by this Dept. This station would cover the gap created by the mountains on Molokai and western Maui.	
		5. The erection of temporary stations on Makapuu Point and Diamond Head have been carefully considered, however, the problem of suitable roads to the station sites precludes their use at this time. The use of these positions would require widening the turns on the Makapuu road and enlarging the tunnel into Diamond Head and improving the road up to the rim. Adequate coverage can be obtained from a position on Koko Head which is conveniently situated with respect to roads, communications, and utilities.	
		3 Incls. #1-Map showing station sites, #2-Map showing area covered, #3-Memo C/S to Sig O 12 Aug 41.	C. A. P.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Station Locations (Oahu).

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT**INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP**

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No. of Ind. From and Date	To	Subject: Proposed Installation of Six Mobile RDF Units on Island of Oahu	
2d Ind. G-3 15 Aug 41	Sig O	Installations proposed in 1st R/S Indorsement have been approved by Department Commander. Incls. n/o	W. C. P. Walter C. Phillips, Lieut. Colonel, G. S. C., Asst. Chief of Staff.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Station Locations (Oahu).
File.
C/S to Sig O
8/12/41

Confirming all instructions of DC 6 AWS sets to be installed at Makapuu Head,
Koko Head and Diamond Head for training at once.
Incl 3

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS, Station Locations (Oahu).

[copy]

MEMO C/S to Sig O 8/12/41

Confirming all instructions of DC 6 AWS sets to be installed at Makapuu Head,
Koko Head and Diamond Head for training at once.

PHILIP HAYES,
Col., G. S. C.,
C/S

Incl. #3
COPY

Inclosure E

[IMMEDIATE ACTION—SECRET]

By Authority of Chief Signal Officer
Date 7/23/41 Initials CF

Address Reply To
Director
Signal Corps
Laboratories
Refer to FM (SCL) Proj. 12-8

Addresses:
Mail: RED BANK, N. J.
Express and Freight
LITTLE SILVER, N. J.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
SIGNAL CORPS LABORATORIES,
Fort Monmouth, July 23, 1941.

Subject: Shipment of Equipment.

To: Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Signal Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following shipment left these laboratories as indicated below:

Quantity	Consignee	Method	Date of Departure
Six (6) Radio Sets SCR-270-B, Serial Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.	Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Signal Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H. Marked: "For AWS. Hold for Instructions from Department Signal Officer."	Rail to Port of Embarkation, San Francisco, California.	July 22, 1941.

2. An officer courier and armed enlisted guards accompanied this shipment to
Port of Embarkation, San Francisco, California.

3. For your information this shipment consists of the following units:

	L	H	W
Six (6) Operating Trucks K-30, 21,595 lbs. each	25'	10'7"	8'3"
Six (6) Power Trucks K-31, 24,945 lbs. each	25'	10'7"	8'3"
Six (6) Stake Body Trucks K-33, 10,125 lbs. each	26'8"	8'10"	8'4"
Six (6) Antenna Trailers K-22-B, 14,275 lbs. each	80'4"	9'10"	8'
Six (6) Prime Movers K-32, 10,420 lbs. each	10'2"	10'	8'
Total thirty (30) units: 488,360 lbs.			

For the Director:

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 876.3 AWS Unit Equipment SCR 270 Section 1.

Leon Fields,
LEON FIELDS,
Captain, Signal Corps,
Adjutant.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 58

[SECRET]

REPORT
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AWS
IN HAWAII

Prepared by Signal Office Central Pacific Base Command 31 August 1944

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[3] SECTION I—INITIAL PHASE (15 DECEMBER 1939 TO 28 MAY 1941)

1. Original War Department Directive

The plan of the War Department to establish Aircraft Warning Service in the Hawaiian Islands was first indicated in a letter dated December 15, 1939, by the Secretary of War to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department. This letter outlined the basic principles involved, and suggested the following eight aircraft detector station locations, based on a map study made by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer:

Detector Stations No.	Located on	Geographical Designation	Elevation in feet
1.....	Niihau.....	Kaao.....	1015
2.....	Kauai.....	Wekiu.....	3255
3.....	Oahu.....	Puu Kauweweole.....	1000
4.....	Oahu.....	Tantalus.....	2015
5.....	Kahoolawe.....	Puu Moiwai.....	1161
6.....	Maui.....	Kaihuakala.....	2400
7.....	Hawaii.....	Puu Ohohia.....	5535
8.....	Hawaii.....	Kane Nulo.....	3203

The letter further directed that a plan for the establishment of an AWS in the Hawaiian Department be submitted to the War Department not later than 1 May 1940. Inclosure #1 to this report shows the original War Department directive.

2. Appointment of a Board of Officers for AWS Planning

a. On receipt of the above letter from the WD the C/S, Hawaiian Department, directed a board of officers be formed. (See Inclosure #2.) In a letter dated 15 January 1940 Headquarters Hawaiian Department formed the Board of Officers. It consisted of the following members:

Colonel G. L. Van Deusen, Signal Corps, President

Lt. Colonel John H. Lindt, OAC Member

Lt. Colonel William E. Lynd, (Major), A. C. 18th Pursuit Group, Member

Capt. R. J. Fleming, Jr., C. E., Asst. Dept Engr, Member

Recorder, without vote, a Signal Corps Officer on duty at Dept. Hq. to be designated by the Dept. Signal Officer

b. The board was directed to prepare a plan for an Aircraft Warning Service for the Hawaiian Department and to be submitted to Headquarters Hawaiian Department not later than 1 April 1940. (See Inclosure #3.)

[4] 3. Activities of Original AWS Board

a. The AWS Board held its first meeting 18 January 1940. Details of the activities of the board between that date and 19 March 1940 are contained in the Preliminary Board Report which was submitted 15 March 1940 by the Signal Officer to the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department. (See Inclosure #4.)

b. The final report of the Board of Officers together with the letter of transmittal to the War Department, dated 17 April 1940 is shown in Inclosure #5.

The installation of one *fixed* and seven *mobile* stations was recommended to the WD as follows:

Group Priority	Priority Within Group	Island	Location	Type
I.....	1.....	Oahu.....	Mt Kaala.....	Fixed SCR-271.
	2.....	Kauai.....	Vicinity of Kokee.....	Mobile SCR-270.
	3.....	Maui.....	Haleakala.....	Mobile SCR-270.
	4.....	Oahu.....	Hickam Field.....	Intel. Ctr.
	5.....	Oahu.....	Nuuuanu Pali.....	Mobile SCR-270.
	6.....	Oahu.....	Manawahua.....	Mobile SCR-270.
	7.....	Hawaii.....	Mauna Loa.....	Mobile SCR-270.
II.....	1.....	Kauai.....	Note: A.....	Mobile.
	2.....	Maui.....	Note: A.....	Mobile.

NOTE: A. To be used as an auxiliary station in another location while the Group I station on the same island is operating, and as a substitute in the event of failure of the Group "I" station.

c. The project as outlined in the report mentioned in (b) above was approved by the War Department in the 4th Indorsement dated 27 June 1940 to the above mentioned letter with the following exceptions:

(1) Consideration be given to the establishment of the Information Center at Aliamanu rather than Hickam Field.

(2) Station at Kokee Kauai approved as a *fixed* instead of a mobile station.

(3) Station at Haleakala, Maui approved as a *fixed* instead of a mobile station. The War Department advised that \$1,400,975 was included in the FY 1941 appropriation for the establishment of an Aircraft Warning Service in the Hawaiian Department. Approximately \$580,000 of this amount was immediately available for expenditure for engineer construction and other purposes in the Hawaiian Islands.

[5] 4. *Hawaiian Department Action Upon Receipt of WD Approval* (See Inclosure #6).

a. The Adjutant General's Office Hawaiian Department notification of War Department approval to the Signal Office, 9 July 1940. The Signal Office notified the C/S, 10 July 1940, that the plan recommended by the Department Commander had been approved by WD with minor changes. The Department Engineer was next notified of the project approval and in an indorsement dated 13 July 1940 he indicated:

(1) District Engineer was ready to proceed as soon as the funds were received.

(2) Surveys were being initiated on the Kaala cableway and station by troop labor of the Third Engineers.

(3) Selection of location of information center is necessary before estimating cost of the center can start.

In a letter dated 13 July 1940, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Department Engineer informed the Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C. the action taken on the Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Islands. In the 1st Indorsement to this letter, the Chief of Engineers indicates funds in the amount of \$50,000 to initiate construction of Aircraft Warning Service were transmitted to the Hawaiian Department by letter of 24 July 1940.

5. *AWS Plan for HD. (Result of Board Report and WD Decision).*

The Aircraft Warning Service will consist of a net of eight stations three of which are fixed stations and five mobile. North and west limits on the net are determined by the stations on the island of Kauai and the South and East limits of the net by the stations on Hawaii.

3142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Type	Station Location	Purpose
Fixed (271).....	Kokee, Kauai.....	Primary station.
Fixed (271).....	Mt Kaala, Oahu.....	Primary station.
Fixed (271).....	Haleakala, Maui.....	Primary station.
Mobile (270).....	Puu Manawahua, Oahu.....	Relieve Kaala station of the necessity of continual search.
Mobile (270).....	Nuuanu Pali, Oahu.....	Coverage of dead space between Kaala and Haleakala stations.
Mobile (270).....	Mauna Loa, Hawaii.....	Extends coverage in the South and East direction.

The remaining two mobile stations have not been assigned a primary location. They will be stationed on Kauai and Maui to relieve the fixed stations on these islands from continually searching in a portion of their fields. The Information Center will be located at Allamanu. (See Incl #7.)

[1] SECTION II—DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN IN THE INITIAL PHASE

THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS, #1 AND #2 LIST INCLOSURES CHRONOLOGICALLY WHILE THE INCLOSURES IN THEMSELVES DO NOT FORM A STORY, THEY CONTAIN PERTINENT INFORMATION CLOSELY RELATED TO THE COMPLETION OF THE HD AWS PROGRAM AND ARE LISTED BELOW AS REFERENCES.

1. AWS Construction

a. Information received in HD for AWS Construction

- (1) Incl #8. 9 February 1940. Information on fixed detectors, SCR 271.
- (2) Incl #9. 5 August 1940. Information on design and construction of AWS buildings.
- (3) Incl #30. 27 August 1940. Instruction books for SCR 270 & CR 271 & SCR 268 have been forwarded to CG, HD.
- (4) Incl #10. 14 February 1941. Drawings for Oahu, Maui, Kauai & Hawaii.
- (5) Incl #11. 17 February 1941. Approved drawings for mobile Station shelters.
- (6) Incl #12. 19 August 1941. Instructions for the erection of towers and buildings used in AWS installations.
- (7) Incl #13. 8 September 1941. Instruction of erection of 36 foot tower and transmitter building.
- (8) Incl #14. 4 November 1941. Drawings for fixed detector equipment AWS.

b. Funds

- (1) Incl #15. 20 July 1940. Funds to be forwarded to District Engr to permit the initiation of Field Surveys for AWS sites.
- (2) Incl #16. 23 July 1940. Estimate of Engr cost for AWS construction.
- (3) Incl #17. 24 July 1940. District Engr receives \$50,000.00 to initiate AWS construction.

[2] (4) Incl #18. 18 December 1940. Requesting funds in the amount of \$27,500.00 be made available to the Engrs. by the QM for the immediate construction of mobile shelters for SCR 270's—no funds at present available for the completion for this project.

(5) Incl #19. 8 January 1941. Funds in the amount of \$130,000.00 is allotted. Money will be suballotted to Dist. Engr. \$70,000.00 is being withheld for the information center pending approval of this project by the WD.

(6) Incl #20. 5 February 1941. Net cost estimate for AWS installations.

(7) Incl #21. 8 February 1941. Funds for AWS.

(8) Incl #22. 17 July 1941. Funds in the amount of \$46,000.00 are on hand for the construction of mobilization buildings, radio shelters.

c. Construction

(1) Incl #23. 24 October 1940. Separation of detector bldg & radio communication bldg.

(2) Incl #24. 7 November 1940. Construction of Aircraft Warning Station.

(3) Incl #25. 28 November 1940. Misc. information on AWS construction regarding Col. Wymans trip to mainland.

(4) Incl #26. 26 February 1941. Housing of 9th Sig Serv Co.

(5) Incl #27. 11 April 1941. QM construction of AWS shelters.

(6) Incl #28. 1 May 1941. Change: Engrs to construct AWS shelters.

(7) Incl #29. 23 July 1941. Early completion of AWS Kokee & Haleakala. *d. Arrival of Equipment*

(1) Incl #30. 27 August 1940. Estimated arrival of detector equipment: "Much before next June (1941)" by CSO.

(2) Incl #31. 6 February 1941. Informal letter from Col Van Deusen telling Col. Powell that detector sets (both fixed & mobile) probably will arrive the fall of 1941. This is [3] due to the higher priority assigned other defense areas.

(3) Incl #32. 17 February 1941. A letter from the Secretary of War informed the Secretary of Navy that detector equipment would be available in HD by 1 June 1941 and that it could be installed in the various stations immediately.

(4) Incl #33. 20 May 1941. HD receipt of several packages (marked for AWS) containing conduit, radio equipment & accessories.

(5) Incl #34. 2 June 1941. Action has been taken to secure additional long range detectors.

(6) Incl #35. 13 June 1941. Request for information on date portable detectors can be expected—supplies the information: *Three fixed units now here.* Answered, mobile detectors will be ready for shipment to HD during 19 July 1941. Towers and buildings for two SCR 271 & one SCR 271A have been shipped (19 July 1941).

(7) Incl #36. 21 July 1941. Information received that six fixed and six mobile detector sets will be shipped to HD from mainland by end of July 1941.

(8) Incl #37. 13 August 1941. AWS equipment is ready for shipment from states.

(9) Incl #38. 16 August 1941. 2nd Ind. "Items (fixed detectors) referred to in basic communications were delivered to Signal Property Officer, AWS, Ft. Shafter on 15 June 1941. (Note: This shipment did not include towers and buildings. See Incl #35).

2. Status of AWS Equipment (Monthly Reports)

a. In a radio dated 28 August 1941 the CSO requested monthly radio reports on the status of installation of Signal AWS equipment in the HD. These monthly reports were to cover the percentaged completion of the following items: Power, Detector, communication-radio, telephone. The following sheet lists these monthly reports in tabular form:

Percent Complete

Location	Project numbers	Overall	Power				Detector				Comm-radio				Telephone			
			30 Sep 41		1 Nov 41		2 Dec 41		30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	
			30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	30 Sep 41	1 Nov 41	2 Dec 41	
Kokee, Kauai	R-1113	0	0	5	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10		
Haleakala, W. Slope	R-1123	0	0	10	10	0	10	10	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Kokee, Road	R-1133	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Haleakala, Maui	R-1143	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	00		
Information Center (Permanent)	R-1149	90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	00		
Information Center (Temporary)																		
Mt. Kaala, Oahu	R-1155	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Manawahua, Oahu	R-1157	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

(See Incl #39 & #40.)

[4]

[5] 3. *Signal Communication Project Submitted to the War Department.*

a. *Initial discussion regarding signal communications.* On 30 July 1940 the Signal Officer HD advised the Chief Signal Officer of the signal communication requirements included in the Original Board Report, and raised the question as to whether or not the necessary radio equipment was to be procured locally. The Chief Signal Officer advised on 10 September 1940 that the radio equipment would be procured by that office, but that a complete project should be submitted to insure that all of the equipment would be furnished. (see incl 41)

b. *Project for Signal Communications.* On 17 October 1940 the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, furnished the Chief Signal Officer with additional details of the Signal requirements. (see incl. 42). In a reply dated 17 January 1941 the Chief Signal Officer indicated that the radio transmitters requested could be furnished, but that funds were not available to procure certain receivers and loud-speakers requested by HD. The detailed requirements at each of the sites were further outlined in the 2nd Ind. of the Signal Officer, HD to the Chief Signal Officer on 31 May 1941. (Note: Although dated 31 May, this indorsement was not mailed until about 26 June 1941. (see incl. 42). Following is a list of items included in this project and an indication of the action taken by the Chief Signal Officer in his reply 3rd ind dated 27 September 1941:

ITEM	ACTION BY oosigo
Wire Comm.—Mt. Kaala, Oahu	Approved by separate correspondence
“ “ Kokee, Kauai	Approved
“ “ Nuuanu Pali, Oahu	Disapproved (site abandoned)
“ “ Haleakala, Maui	Approved
“ “ AWS Info Center, Oahu	Disapproved
“ “ Teletype	Disapproved
“ “ Manawahua, Oahu	Approved (no requirements)
Radio Comm.	Approved

The Chief Signal Officer disapproved the AWS Information Center and Teletype requirements because he had not been informed of War Department approval of Information Center. In reply on 17 October 1941 the Signal Officer, HD, informed the Chief Signal Officer that the Information Center was already under construction at Fort Shafter and quoted the correspondence wherein the Adjutant General has been so informed. There was no further exchange of correspondence on this point.

c. Additional information on the subject of Signal Communications is included in inclosures #43, #44 and #45.

[6] 4. *Mt. Kaala* was approved as a fixed station by 4th Ind. of WD 27 June 40 to HD ltr 17 April 1940 (see Incl #5).

a. *Negotiation with Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, T. H.*

(1) The CG Schofield Barracks was notified in letter, dated 17 July 1940, that the HD was installing, with WD approval, a radio aircraft detection station on Mt. Kaala. Further it would be necessary to install a cableway to the summit of Mt. Kaala. The route of the cableway would start near the firebreak trail making it necessary to permanently withdraw a portion of the artillery range in order to insure the cableway would not be damaged. (See Incl #46).

(2) In a 1st Ind., dated 7 August 1940, the CG Schofield Barracks, pointed out that 90% of the artillery fire is concentrated in the very area that is being requested withdrawn. The range, thus reduced for firing, would be of little value as an artillery range. The training value of the range is so great that the CG recommended that every effort be made to find a route for the cableway that would not curtail the range. (See Incl #46).

(3) The HD reply, 2nd Ind. dated 17 August 1940 and a letter dated 20 November 1940, informed CG, Schofield Barracks, that after the study of additional aerial photographs the proposed location of the lower tower terminus of the cableway had been moved west of the firebreak trail. (See Incl #46).

b. *Communication.* In a letter, dated 7 September 1940, the HD submitted to the CSO a signal project for the installation of a 11 pair-19 gauge subterranean cable to the AWS Station on Mt. Kaala. (See Incl #47).

c. *Action in HD*

(1) Preliminary survey of access road completed by 12 December 1941. (See Incl #48).

(2) Work on access road to lower terminus of cableway to start (approx.) 1 February 1941. (See Incl #49).

(3) Additional information on proposed communication building for Mt. Kaala, 31 January 1941. (See Incl #50).

ALICE ANSLEY, who resides at 938 East Edgemore Road, Los Angeles, Calif.

(4) Proposed plan of buildings for Mt. Kaala are approved, 6 March 1941. (See Incl #51).

[7] (5) Survey of access road started 4 March 1941. (See Incl #52.)

(6) Cableway equipment awarded to Interstate Equipment Corps. for a two cableway system for \$57,755.00. Completion time is a 100 calendar days. 28 April 1941 (See Incl #54).

(7) Priority of Kaala cableway changed to "I-C." 26 June 1941. (See Incl #55).

(8) 21 February 1942. Aerial Tramway will be finished in about five weeks. (See Incl #56).

d. *Kaala Abandoned As a Radar Site.* About the time the cableway was completed, the usefulness of high sites for radar purposes was questioned. This was caused mainly by the poor results obtained at the Haleakala site. Construction at Kaala was therefore given a low priority and eventually was abandoned entirely for radar. The site, however, has proven very successful for VHF Fighter Control purposes.

5. *Kokee, Kauai*

a. *Negotiations with T. H.*

(1) In a letter, dated 18 July 1940, General Herron, Commanding, informed the Acting Governor of Hawaii that Congress had authorized the construction of certain military installations on the Island of Kauai as a part of the nation wide defensive program. The CG further pointed out that the site on Kauai was located in the land section of Honopu, Na Pali Kona Forest Reserve. Permission was requested to enter this reserve for the purpose of executing the necessary instrumental surveys. Further cooperation was requested by the HD in transferring the necessary territorial land to the WD. (See Incl #57).

(2) The Board of Commissioners of Agriculture and Forestry, in a letter dated 23 July 1940, granted the Army permission to make surveys for the location of the site. Mr. F. H. Locey, President of the Board, indicated this question of "turning over territorial land" to the WD would be taken up at a board meeting within a week. (See Incl #57).

[8] (3) In his acknowledging letter, dated 5 February 1941, General Herron stated that due to discrepancies between the survey and the Kauai triangulation system it would be necessary to make additional field survey in order to get an accurate description of the land desired for the site. In addition due the extensive National Defense Program it is necessary that this site be initiated without further delay. Therefore, the Army requested permission to enter the land to initiate construction of the proposed project and that upon completion of the field survey covering the boundary, the land be transferred to the control of the War Department for military purposes. (See Incl #58).

(4) The Honorable J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii granted permission 21 February 1941 for the Army to enter the government land within Na Pali Kona Forest Reserve, Island of Kauai to initiate construction of projects planned for National Defense; on completion of description and survey of the land desired for Military purposes, and executive order transferring it to the United States government will be issued. (See Incl #59).

b. *Action In HD*

(1) Reconnaissance: 26 September (See Incl #60).

(2) Plot plan station X (Detector Site).

(a) Approved: 20 March 1941 (See Incl #61).

(3) Plot plan Base Camp.

(a) Approved: 20 March 1941 (See Incl #61).

(4) Construction:

(a) 2 July 1941. Due to the shortage of local carpenters, it was necessary to employ Japanese (American Citizens) carpenters for the construction of AWS camps at Kokee. (See Incl #62.)

(b) On 30 September 1941, the District Engineer transmitted fabrication drawings for this AWS Powerhouse building for radio at station X to the Field Area at Kauai. (See Incl #63).

(c) On 22 November 1941, Signal Corps men were shipped to Kauai to install the communication cable. This project was completed 11 December 1941 (see Incl #64.)

[9] (d) 2 December 1941. Status of construction. The following is report submitted by Lt. Ralph Caceres on his trip to Kauai 3 December 1941. (See Incl #65).

1. Operating building not complete at station X.
2. Set 2 power units at station X.
3. Set 1 power unit at Base camp. The approved power units to be furnished by the Engineers were 2 diesels units for Radio Communication building at the base camp (not completed.)
4. Distribution cable is not present for lighting system. #2 cond. park way needed to make set work.
5. 100 foot tower is up.
6. Heaters are at Honolulu.
7. Water trailer at Maui.

(e) Interview with Captain Ralph Caceres on the status of construction during his trip to Kauai 3 December 1941—Capt. Carceres and Sgt. Richardson went over to Kauai:

1. Buildings are not installed—Concrete floors poured for main operating building but not for the power building.
2. Tower and turntable were up.
3. Mr. Jones in charge. Delay in putting up because of no tower plans.
4. Barracks completion—No windows.
5. The three LeRoi's were there on December 3rd.
6. The Diesels (International Generators) for base camp obtained, sometime after December 19.

7. On December 3, cable crew were installing cable between unit and base camp. M/Sgt Cleary installed cable. Cable installed by 11 December 1941 (See Incl #64).

[10] 8. Radio station on air—Mr. Nicols went over at that time—before Radar on air first part of January.

9. On 22 January full complement of 42 men.
10. February 1, 1942 mess going. Previously messing at CCC Camp.
11. February 19, 1942 Carceres and two men went over to Kauai.
12. Barracks about 40% complete.
13. Water system, non existent.
14. No water tank. No concrete construction.
15. No heating system.
16. Radar transmitter not up.
17. Power plant not up.

18. Transmitter building erected between 19 December 41, and 22 January 1942 under Lt. Caceres' supervision.

(f) 19 December 1941. Lt. Caceres sent to Kokee for period of 14 days for duty in connection with AWS (See Incl #66).

(g) 28 December 1941. Status of AWS on Kauai, (See Incl #67).

1. Operations bldg. will be completed in one or two days.
2. Radio communications building in three or four days.
3. Area Engineer instructed to equip building.
4. Diesel plants will not be delivered until February 1942. It will be necessary to use local procurement.

(5) Equipment Status: July 1941. Equipment on hand at Signal Corps area for Kokee. (See Incl #68).

- (a) 3 ea Power units.
- (b) 2 ea Gasoline storage tanks, 4,000 gallons.
- [11] (c) 1 ea SCR-271-A less tower, building and control motors.

(d) Tower and building were shipped from Ft. Monmouth during the week of 15 July 1941 (See Incl #40 & #70).

(1) Tower Installations

(a) 20 November 1943. (See Incl #69). Request for tower and details of tower foundation from CSO.

(b) (See Incl #70). Building and towers for two SCR-271 and 1 SCR-271-A will be shipped from Ft. Monmouth, week of 15 July 1941.

(c) 6 August 1941. Construction of AWS tower foundation can commence as soon as plans are received. (See Incl #70).

(d) 17 September 1941. (See Incl #72 & #98). Tower and building material shipped to Port Allen, Kauai.

6. Haleakala. The Haleakala Station was approved by the WD as a fixed detector in the fourth indorsement to the HD letter dated 17 April 1940. (See Incl #5).

a. Negotiations with the National Park Service.

(1) On receiving notification of the WD recommendations the HD sent a letter (see Incl #73) dated 18 July 1940, to Mr. Edward G. Wingate, Superintendent of the Hawaii National Park, informing him that Congress had authorized the construction of certain military installations on the island of Maui as a part of the nation wide defensive program. Further the site of the installation on Maui was to be located at the highest point of Haleakala in the National Park. The CG pointed out that the HD intended to request:

(a) Transfer to the jurisdiction of the WD of an area at the highest point of Haleakala (probably an additional area farther down the mountain near the existing road).

(b) Transfer of a right of way for a motor road from the end of the existing road to this highest point.

[12] (c) Permission to make necessary instrumental surveys of the proposed site in Haleakala National Park.

(2) Mr. Wingate in reply (See Incl #73) to General Herron on 20 July 1940 stated:

(a) Approval for the use of National Park land must come from the Department of Interior rather than Superintendent Hawaii National Park.

(b) The CG's request is being forwarded to the Director of the National Park Service.

(c) Permission is granted to make the necessary instrumental surveys, with the understanding that the natural features of the park will not be disturbed.

(3) In a letter dated 17 October 1940 Edward G. Wingate, Superintendent Hawaii National Park, requested the following information in order to properly evaluate the WD's request for transfer of National Park land:

(a) Use that the National Park land will be put.

(b) Exact location.

(c) Approximate acreage.

(d) Proposed structures.

(e) Number and location for other sites planned for island of Hawaii and Maui.

Mr. Wingate points out as in the case of the bombing range withdrawal, the Department of Interior feels that there must be available other sites outside of the park which would serve the defense needs equally well. (See Incl #74).

(4) In a letter dated 12 November 1940, Mr. Wingate, Superintendent HNPS, request that the CG consider another site on Haleakala just outside the park boundary and only 5 or 6 feet lower than the Red Hill site—location of the proposed site. (See Incl #75).

[13] (5) The CG answer (letter dated 3 January 1941) to Mr. Wingate informed him that the question of sites had been thoroughly studied with his desires in mind. The results of the study, however, indicate that to locate the station on Kokelekole rather than on Red Hill would result in a very greatly decreased field of coverage for this important installation, and therefore it was deemed advisable to use Red Hill. Not only was the site on top of Haleakala Red Hill reconsidered, but also the camp site further down the mountain. After a thorough study of all possible camp sites it was decided that the best location would be one quarter mile inside the park boundary on the east of the road up the mountain. (See Incl #75.)

(6) Therefore, the HD is requesting the WD to open negotiations with the Department of Interior for permission to extend the existing road on Haleakala to Red Hill and for the withdrawal of a small area at Red Hill and an area about 40 acres for a camp site near the point where the road up the mountain crosses the park boundary. (See Incl #75.)

(7) In radio (See Incl #76) dated 10 March 1941, Mr. Wingate informed the CG that the D of I approved the use of the proposed Haleakala installation and issued a Special Use Permit. The Army would:

(a) Expand the present CCC facilities as required for the accommodation of some 40 men and two officers.

(b) Equipment shed, and Officers quarters to be constructed adjacent to present CCC location.

(c) These buildings were to remain for Park use when the Army purposes have been served.

(d) Preliminary building plans to be prepared by Army with cooperation superintendent Hawaii NP and forwarded through him for approval by Director of National Park Service.

(e) Red Hill installations to be under similar special use permit and plans approvals for building handled similar to that for camp.

(f) Plans accompanying General Herron's letter, dated 3 January 1941, are approved. (See Incl #75.)

[14] (8) General Short, in letter dated 27 March 1941, submitted the formal request complete with plans, maps, to the Superintendent HNP. This formal request is for permission to install certain military equipment on Red Hill in the Haleakala section of the Hawaii National Park. It is requested that the necessary action with National Park Service and the Department of Interior for the issuance of a Special Use Permit permitting these installations on Red Hill. (See Incl #77.)

(9) In a radio the Superintendent, HNP notified the CG that the plans were approved and the special use permit covering the Red Hill location will be issued soon. (See Incl #77.)

(10) The D of I issued a special use permit effective 9 April 1941 for detector site at Red Hill on Haleakala. (See Incl #78.)

(11) The formal request for the permission to construct and operate a base camp within the Haleakala Section of the HNP was submitted to the Superintendent HNP by the CG HD in letter dated 26 April 1941. This request is for an area of approximately six acres. The request is complete with plans and maps. (See Incl #80.)

(12) In letter dated 16 May 1941, Mr. Wingate, Superintendent HNP, notified General Short that the CCC camp had been abandoned for the use of the Army. (See Incl. #81.)

(13) In letter dated 27 May 1941, General Short acknowledged Mr. Wingate's permission to use CCC camp and informed him that the WD had notified the HD of the approval of the D of I and the issuance of a "special use permit" would be forthcoming. (See Incl #81.)

(14) The D of I issued a special use permit effective 17 May 1941 for the use of the camp site specified by CG in Incl. #80. This special use permit specified certain requirements to be satisfied by the Army in compliance thereof. (See Incl #82.)

b. Negotiations with WD regarding transfer of land, National Park Service.

(1) On notification that Mr. Wingate was forwarding the HD requests to the Directors of the National Park Service, the HD prepared a letter the 27th July 1940 to TAG informing WD that the Superintendent of Hawaii National Parks was referring the question of securing sites in Haleakala, to the Department of Interior. (See Incl #84.)

[15] (2) The HD recommended that the WD open negotiations with the Department of Interior for securing the National Park land (at Heleakala, Maui and Mauna Loa, Hawaii to be used as detector sites). The WD in a radio-gram dated 14 September 1940, informed the HD that the transfer of land at Haleakala and Maui and Mauna Loa for AWS stations had been discussed with the Department of Interior. (See Incl #84.)

(3) In a 4th indorsement (See Incl #84 dated 16 September 1940 to the HD letter 27 July 1940 (mentioned above)) the AG advises that careful consideration must be given the Department of Interior Policy in the study of the site in National Park for these AWS stations, and for the other installations (See Incl #2 to this letter). In a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of War, the Interior Department policy is stated:

(a) The Department of Interior desires to cooperate in this matter.

(b) The DI is opposed to the permanent transfer of any additional land from Hawaii National Park for military purposes, unless the exigencies of military strategy make it necessary for national defense.

(c) It is also opposed to granting authority for using any part of the park temporarily therefor, unless it has been determined, after careful studies have been made that suitable land for such purposes cannot be obtained outside of the park boundaries in a manner and time reasonably necessary to meet the problems of national defense.

(d) The temporary use of any part of Hawaii National Park by the WD would be approved by the D. I. only after the submission of plans indicating how much land is to be used and the types of roads, structures, etc., which it is proposed to construct thereon. Such plans would receive prompt consideration.

(e) Should the WD request authority to use any portion of Hawaii National Park temporarily for national defense purposes, the D. I. will

require that, when it is no longer needed, it will be placed in the same condition as when authority for such use was authorized.

[16] (4) In Par #3 of the 2nd R/S Ind., (See Incl #84) the Engineers pointed out:

- (a) The preliminary board took all possible sites into consideration.
 - (b) Effectiveness of AWS depends upon the height at which the station is located; the summit of Haleakala is the only feasible site in Maui.
 - (c) The upper terminus of the truck trail on Mauna Loa is the only feasible site on Hawaii.
 - (d) Protracted negotiations with D. I. for fixed station site will delay the start of construction until fiscal year is over.
 - (e) The money for the installation of these AWS stations is all fiscal year 1941 money, and it must be spent by June 30, 1941.
- (5) Based on the above reasons HD drafted another letter (See Incl #85) dated 9 October 1940 to TAG, Washington D. C. This correspondence pointed out the establishment of a mobile AW station on Haleakala is recommended for the following reasons:

- (a) Best site on rim of Haleakala Crater can only be determined by field test.
 - (b) Limited rainfall makes local water supply impracticable.
 - (c) Operating personnel should not be quartered at the summit of Haleakala.
 - (d) The National Park Service road leading to the summit of Haleakala can be improved at reasonable cost.
- (6) In the 2nd Indorsement to this letter (See Incl #85) the OCSigO advised that:

- (a) Fixed station would be the most satisfactory.
 - (b) Decision on location of communication building should be delayed until source of water is settled.
- [17] (c) No Signal Corps funds are applicable for any additional barracks and quarters for AWS, these barracks and quarters necessary for the detachments meaning the two stations on Maui must be included under the housing project of the HD;
- (d) Delivery of first SCR-270 to the HD cannot be expected before middle of May, 1941.
 - (e) Funds for the AWS, HD expire 30 June 1941. Time does not permit service test of equipment before sites are selected.
- (7) In the fourth Indorsement (See Incl. #85) A. G. O. renders WD decision:
- (a) Permanent station with quarters for the operating personnel in the communication building.
 - (b) Requested HD reconsider recommendation and indicate by radio (See Incl #86) whether mobile station is still recommended.
- (8) Action taken by HHD on receipt of WD decision for decision.
- (a) In a Memo dated 4 December 1940 (See Incl #104) to District Engineer, the Department Engineer submitted the results of a discussion based on the HD Signal Officer's (Colonel C. A. Powell) trip to Maui, General Herron made the following decision:

1. Haleakala station will be fixed type. Building on summit will consist of standard detector building, and antenna tower, standard power house, and the erection of communication buildings.
2. Communications building at summit will have only accommodations for a small caretaking detachment of five men.
3. Installation will be located on Red Hill.
4. Base camp will be located farther down the slopes of Haleakala, possibly outside the park boundaries.
5. Main communications buildings for the fixed station will be located at the Base camp and remotely controlled from detector site.
6. Consideration will be given to locating Base camp outside of National Park so that it would only be necessary to withdraw a "dumbbell shaped" plot from at the summit of Red Hill.

[18] (9) The WD was notified of HD decision by Radio 1977-7th (See Incl #86).

(10) In a 5th Indorsement (See Incl #84) to TAG, dated 3 January 1941, to a HD letter 27 July the CG informs the WD on the status of negotiations with MP's re to Haleakala and Mauna Loa sites.

(a) General Herron, Commanding, points out that the D. I. policy is, "This department is opposed to the permanent transfer of any additional land from Hawaii National Park for military purposes unless the exigencies of Military strategy make it necessary for national defense." The General further stated, "In my opinion the particular land described herein is demanded by the exigencies of military strategy for national defense. The early completion of the AWS in this department is a matter of the deepest concern, not only to the Army but to the Navy. In this, Admiral Richardson personally concurred."

(11) As an answer (See Incl #89) to this 5th indorsement the WD radio dated 3 March 1941, stated that informal discussion with the officials NPS indicates D of I is opposed to permanent transfer of any additional land in Hawaii National Park but will grant special use permit for Red Hill installation as recommended by the HD. Proposed road location appears satisfactory. The proposed telephone line is satisfactory. Park service is opposed to use of forty acre tract for camp site; suggest use of CCC spur camp in same general locality. There are some facilities at CCC camp now and a special use permit would be granted including permit to construct additional buildings and facilities with understanding that such installations will remain for park use when WD need no longer exists. Building on Red Hill to be held to a minimum. All building plans will be submitted to Superintendent Hawaii National Park to be forwarded by him to the D of I.

(12) In radio reply to the WD telegram, General Short's answer contained the following pertinent facts:

(a) Fifth Indorsement (Incl #84) represented best thought of officers making study.

[19] (b) Your radio, Inclosure #89, AGMO, 3 March 1941 transmitted in the clear does not appear to appreciate the seriousness of the situation.

(c) "I have personally reviewed the Haleakala situation and find that the officers responsible for this project had already thoroughly considered all the questions raised in your radiogram."

(d) AWS detector equipment is expected in June 1941 (see par. 2b).

(e) Haleakala is second most important station in the system and construction should not be delayed any further. If building plans must be submitted to D of I for its detailed examination, the completion of the Haleakala station, which is vital both to the Army and the Navy in the present situation, will be unduly delayed.

(f) *The seriousness of the situation requires that all administrative obstacles be removed; this applies not only to the Haleakala installation but also to the entire project.*

(g) It is recommended that this project be decentralized and that CG be authorized to make final decision on design and layouts and such other details as may be required to expedite completion.

(13) In a reply (see Inclosure #89) to the HD radio the WD authorizes the CG to make final decision on design and layout and other details of constructions within the limitations of funds now available for AWS project in the HD and subject to the approval by the D of I for the Haleakala site. The radio further stated the D of I positively refuses the occupancy of forty acre tract and demands that preliminary building plans be submitted. In letter (see Inclosure #89) dated 31 March 1941 the CG points out the CCC camp is inadequate that it would cost the government more to rebuild it to satisfy the Army's requirements than to build a new camp. Secondly, the D of I mainly objected to the withdrawal from MP jurisdiction of a forty acre tract of land. Thirdly, Mr. Wingate, superintendent HNP, would recommend the use of a forty acre plot by a temporary use permit. With this in mind the HD department recommended that the WD reopen informal negotiations to find out if the Department of Interior would approve the temporary use of a forty acre plot.

(14) In a letter (see Inclosure #90) dated 6 March 1941, to General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Short, Commanding for HD, points out the following pertinent facts in regard to AWS situation:

(a) Due to the present international situation the need for AWS is urgent.

(b) The Navy is vitally interested in the AWS project for the HD and are very concerned with the present inadequate warning service.

[20] (c) The Secretary of War advised the Secretary of Navy that the AWS equipment would be received in the HD some time in June and the stations operating shortly afterwards (see Inclosure #32).

(d) Admiral Kimmel has been assured that personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within thirty days after receipt of the equipment.

(e) Due to previous radiograms the WD does not appear aware of the seriousness of the situation.

(f) The fixed station on Haleakala is one of two most important stations in the warning net.

(g) The restrictions imposed by the D of I will delay the final completion of this station.

(h) "I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission cannot be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting details plans for consideration by the National Park Service."

(i) Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service.

(15) General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, answering letter (see Inclosure #90) states:

(a) The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service station in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in these cases where facilities are to be established in lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior.

(b) "I have given these matters my personal attention and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941 outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time."

c. Action Taken in HD

(1) Reconnaissance completed:

- (a) Camp site: 9 & 10 December 1941 (see Inclosure #93)
- (b) Detector Site: 9 & 10 December 1941 (see Inclosure #93)

(2) Type of Building For Detector Site:

- (a) HD approval: By the 27 March 1941 (see Inclosure #77)
- (b) WD approval: Not required (see Inclosure #89)
- (c) D of I approval: 11 April 1941 (see Inclosures #77 & #91)

[21] (3) Type of Buildings for Base Camp:

- (a) HD approval: By the 26 April 1941 (see Inclosure #80)
- (b) WD approval: Not required (see Inclosure #89)
- (c) D of I approval: 17 May 1941 (see Inclosure #82)

(4) Plot Plan for AWS Station Bldg:

- (a) HD approval: 17 March 1941 (see Inclosure #94 and #95)
- (b) WD approval: 18 April 1941 (see Inclosure #95)
- (c) D of I approval: 8 May 1941 (see Inclosure #78)
- (d) Detector Camp Completed: Unknown

(5) Plot Plan for AWS Base Camp:

- (a) HD approval: 9 May 1941 (see Inclosure #95)
- (b) WD approval: not required (see Inclosure #89)
- (c) D of I approval: 17 May 1941 (see Inclosure #80)
- (d) Base Camp Completed: Unknown

(6) Equipment Arrives in HD for Red Hill on Haleakala, Maui

- (a) Electrical equipment: 15 June 1941 (see Inclosure #35)
- (b) Towers and Buildings: Unknown

(7) Equipment Shipped to Maui from Oahu:

- (a) Electrical Equipment: Unknown
- (b) Towers and Buildings: By the 23 September 1941 (see Incl. #98)

(8) Erection of Equipment (start):

- (a) Electrical Equipment: Unknown
- (b) Towers and Buildings: Unknown

(9) Erection of Equipment (finish)

- (a) Electrical Equipment: 15 January 1942 (approx.)
- (b) Towers and Buildings: 6 December 1941 (see Inclosure #106)

(10) Bombproof: Completed: 25 April 1942. (see Inclosure #96)

(11) Station in Operation: 15 January 1942 (approx.) This station operating about middle of January 1942.

(12) Miscellaneous Information on AWS Station Red Hill :

(a) Inclosure #83, #97. Discussion of the Water System for AWS Camp at Haleakala.

(b) Inclosure #60, #99, #105. Lt. Krancus made a trip to Maui in December 1941. The following is believed to be Lt. Krancus's report on the status of AWS at Maui. See Inclosure #105. This inclosure falls in the files just ahead of a letter dated 26 December 1941.

1. All equipment at the detector site, Red Hill, is set; wiring may start immediately.

2. The power shelter at the detector is not completed.

3. The dam (see Inclosure #83 & #97) is built; some of the water storage tanks are up and primed today, but the pipe line is only partially in for the Haleakala water supply. It is necessary for the Engineers to haul the water supply 30 miles at present.

4. The temperature runs very cold here there is a block of ice on the water barrel. At present there is no heater in use.

[22] 5. The base camp lacks power units; they are not available.

6. The splinter proof shelters is adequate.

(c) Inclosure #106. Installation of AWS equipment may start on Haleakala station. Status of equipment (26 December 1941) : Power house lacks windows, water pipeline requires approximately 10 days for completion.

(d) Inclosure #107. Bombproof at the Base Camp.

7. Information Center

a. *The Selection of the Fort Shafter Site.* The original project for an AWS in the Hawaiian Department submitted on 17 April 1940 (see Inclosure #5) called for the establishment of an Information Center on Hickam Field. The War Department did not approve of this location and in their 4th Indorsement, dated 27 June 1940, of the above mentioned letter suggested that the Information Center be placed at the Department Command Post at Aliamanu. A supplementary report of the AWS Board of Officers, dated 25 July 1940, recommended the establishment of the AWS Information Center at Aliamanu, and that the exact location and details of construction be determined by the Anti-bombardment Defense Board. The Department Commander approved of this location on 31 July 1940. (see Inclosure #108). The Anti-bombardment Defense Board, however, objected to the location at Aliamanu. This caused further discussion (see Inclosure #109) with the result that a location at Fort Shafter was agreed upon by all concerned and approved by the Department Commander, 26 October 1940. This decision was not, however, immediately transmitted to the War Department for approval. It is evident from Inclosures #110, #113, #114, relating to the establishment of communications at Aliamanu that the War Department assumed that the AWS Bombproof would be at that location. On 11 January 1941, the War Department was informed of the decision to locate the AWS bombproof at Fort Shafter. (see Inclosure #113). In this connection reference is made to Inclosure #19, in which the Division Engineer at San Francisco advised the District Engineer, Honolulu, that funds in the amount of \$70,000 were being withheld, pending War Department approval of the AWS Information Center. Constructional details of the AWS bombproof were discussed by the Signal Officer, Department Engineer & District Engineer (see Inclosures #111, #112, #114). Consideration was given to submitting a formal plan to the War Department covering the AWS bombproof but it was concluded (see Inclosure #115) that in view of the authority given to the Department Commander, in War Department radiogram of 12 March 1941 (see Inclosure #89) that such action would be unnecessary. In this connection reference is made to Section II, par. 4b of this report concerning the disapproval by the Chief Signal Officer on 27 September 1941 of funds for Signal Communications for the AWS bombproof at Fort Shafter for the reason that the installation of the bombproof had not been approved by the War Department.

b. *Agreement Reached on a Combined Air Defense Command Post—Fort Shafter.* In accordance with the above mentioned discussion (see Inclosure #111, #112, #114) the District Engineer prepared plans for an AWS Information Center (see Inclosure #116). These plans were not approved by the D. C. in view of the fact that the instructions had been received from the War Department to combine the bombproof structures of the AWS C. P., the Hawaiian Air Force and C. P. of the Antiaircraft Groupment. Details of this entire situation are given in the [23] memorandum shown as Inclosure #118. On 21 June 1941 the Department Commander officially notified the District Engineer to

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proceed to prepare plans for a combined Command Post. (See Inclosures #119 & #121). The final plans were submitted to the Department Commander, 14 August 1941 (See 3rd Indorsement, Inclosure #119).

c. *Information Center Equipment.* Plans for the Information Center were forwarded on 27 August 1941, by the Department Signal Officer to the Chief Signal Officer so that the necessary specialized equipment could be procured. (See Inclosures #122 & #123). On 13 December 1941 the Chief Signal Officer advised that the Mobile Information Center equipment at Drew Field, Florida was being shipped to Hawaii, (See Inclosure #124). Because of shipping difficulties this equipment did not arrive in Hawaii until 28 March 1943 (See Inclosure #127). The voluminous exchange of radiograms on this subject between the Department Signal Officer and the Chief Signal Officer and others is shown in Inclosures #124, #125, #126, #127). The transfer from the temporary Information Center (Construction described in Section V, par. 3 of this report) to the permanent Information Center was made on April 1, 1942.

8. *Nuuanu Pali, Oahu* was originally approved by WD as a mobile station in 4th Indorsement to HD letter dated 17 April 1940 (See Inclosure #5). In a later HD decision this site was abandoned and replaced by a mobile set at Makapuu, Oahu (See Inclosures #142 & #144).

9. *Manawahua, Oahu.* This mobile station was approved by WD in the 4th Indorsement to HD letter dated 17 April 1940 (See Inclosure #5). With the new allotment of detectors to HD (6 Fixed and 6 mobile see Inclosure #134) Manawahua detector station was changed to a fixed station (See Inclosure #142 & #144).

10. *Mauna Loa, Hawaii*

a. Original plans (See Inclosure #5) called for a mobile detector at the upper terminus of the 'ruck trail on the southern slopes of Mauna Loa. Action was instigated by the HD to secure land in the NP for both Haleakala and Mauna Loa sites (See Inclosures #73, #74, #75, #128, #129, & #130).

b. Additional information is contained in Inclosures #131, #132, & #133.

c. Mauna Loa site was replaced by a mobile detector at Kahuku Ranch Hawaii (See Inclosures #142 & #144.)

11. *Kauai Mobile Station.* The original plan (Inclosure #5) and the subsequent revised plan (Inclosures #142 & #144) called for a mobile stand-by detector to relieve the fixed detector from continually searching in its area. Because of the more urgent need for mobile detectors elsewhere in the Department a set was never installed at this location.

12. *Maui Mobile Station.* Same as paragraph 11 "Kauai Mobile Station."

[1] SECTION III—SECOND PHASE, 28 MAY 1941 TO DECEMBER 1941

1. *Priority & Delivery Schedule of Detectors for the Haw'n Department.*

a. In a letter 28 May 1941, received 12 June 1941, the WD indicated the Priority & Delivery Schedule for SCR-270 and SCR-271's for the HD. The schedule indicated that the HD was to receive a total of 6 fixed (271) and 6 mobile (270) Radar Sets. This was different from the previous planned schedule of detector sets. The WD had approved the installation of three fixed (271) and five mobile (270) detector sets for the HD (see Inclosure #5).

b. The letter of 28 May 1941 mentioned above indicated that the HD was scheduled to receive radar equipment in accordance with the following approximate time table:

March 1941-----	3 fixed sets (271)	6 Mobile sets (270)
June 1941-----	2 fixed sets (271)	
July 1941-----	1 fixed set (271)	
Total -----	6 fixed sets (271)	6 mobile sets (270)

c. The WD further advised that if it had not already been done, a reconnaissance should be conducted to determine detector sites. The necessary land should be acquired and the sites prepared for the detectors schedule for delivery

so that stations may be established without delay on receipt of equipment. (see Inclosure #134).

2. Board Changes (see Inclosure #136).

In a letter dated 10 June 1941 the Board of Officers was reorganized. The Board then consisted of the following members:

Lt. Col. Carroll A. Powell, (05742), Sig. C., President
Lt. Col. Wm. H. Murphy, (06835), Sig. C., Member
Lt. Col. Albert P. Hegenberger, (01081), Member
Major Isaac H. Ritchie, (012322), C. A. C. Member
Major Robert J. Fleming Jr., (017095), CE., Asst. Dept Engr., Member
Capt. Kenneth P. Bergquist, (019863), AC, Member

Recorder, without vote, a Sig C Officer on Duty at Dept. Hq. to be designated by Signal Officer.

3. Action Taken in HD on the New Detector Allotment Schedule (see Incl. #137)

a. On receipt of the above letter (Inclosure #134), the Board of Officers' Committee for selecting detector sites prepared a list of sites for the consideration of the Board of Officers at their next meeting.

b. Lt. Col. Powell, President of the Board of Officers, called a meeting of the board for 17 June 1941. This Board Meeting made a map study of the locations and decided on a time for a ground and aerial reconnaissance of the proposed sites.

[2] c. After completing the reconnaissance the Board decided the following sites were acceptable:

- (1) The site, 1½ mi. west of Paho Village, Hawaii.
- (2) The site, at Kilanea Point, Kauai.
- (3) The site at Opana Triangulation Station, Oahu.
- (4) The site at Makapuu Point, Oahu.

4. Preliminary Report Submitted to the WD on the Revised AWS Projects for HD

a. In a letter dated 8 July 1941, received in HD 21 July 1941, the WD indicated the basic information that was to be included in the report submitted to WD on the revised AWS project for the 6 fixed and 6 mobile aircraft detector sets (See Inclosure #135).

b. On receipt of this letter the Signal Officer, in a 1st R/S Indorsement dated 19 August 1941, requested the DEO to supply the DSO with the engineer's portion of the information requested by the WD. (See Inclosure #138.)

c. Based on Engineer's and SigO's data, a radiogram dated 13 September 1941, was drafted to the WD submitting, in advance, the sites selected and the cost estimates for the revised AWS project. (See Inclosure #139).

d. The SigO, HD, submitted the cost estimate for the Signal portion of the revised AWS project of the CSO in a radiogram dated 16 September 1941. (See Incl #140). In a radio reply, dated 22 September 1941, the CSO pointed out that the items contained in the radiogram of the 16th must have WD approval before they could be included in budget estimates. The CSO further recommended that the HD submit a letter showing complete justification for the additional detector sites and their cost estimates. (See Incl #141).

e. In a letter dated 16 September 1941 (See Incl #140), the District Engr. HD, submitted the cost estimate for the Engineer portion of the revised AWS project to the C of E. In 1st Ind. to the letter, dated 3 October 1941, the C of E recommended that the sum of \$315,200.00 from the funds available to the CSO be allotted to the C of E so that the AWS installation in the HD would proceed without delay. The CSO, in the 2d Ind. recommended that the HD submit a report on the new AWS project for the WD approval. On receipt of such approval the CSO could allot funds to the C of E to the extent available under the current appropriations. TAG in the 3d Ind. authorized the sub-allotment of necessary funds to initiate such action as may be necessary to expedite construction of the additional AWS detector stations.

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f. In a letter, dated 29 September 1941, (See Inclosure #141) the Commanding General, HD, submitted the following list of detector sites for the revised AWS project:

Type	Location	Status
Fixed (271).....	Mount Kaala, Oahu.....	Unchanged.
Fixed (271).....	Haleakala, Maui.....	Unchanged.
Fixed (271).....	Kokee, Kauai.....	Unchanged.
Fixed (271).....	Pahoa, Hawaii.....	Additional Set.
Fixed (271).....	Opana, Oahu.....	Additional Set.
Fixed (271).....	Manawahua, Oahu.....	Additional Set.
Mobile (270).....	Kokee, Kauai ¹	{ Unchanged. To be used to relieve fixed station from continually searching its area.
Mobile (270).....	Haleakala, Maui ¹	
Mobile (270).....	Makapuu, Oahu.....	To replace previously approved location at Nuuanu Pali, Oahu.
Mobile (270).....	Kahuku Ranch, Hawaii.....	To replace previously approved location at Mauna Loa, Hawaii.
Two Mobile (270).....	Oahu.....	To be used as Mobile reserve on the island of Oahu in the event of failure of fixed station.
Information Center.....	Fort Shafter.....	No change.

¹ NOTE.—The above stations are not located at the fixed detector site but only use the fixed detector's Base Camp.

[3] g. The inclusion of the above listed additional detectors sets in the HD AWS plan necessitates the use of additional funds. The net cost estimates is summarized as follows:

Engr's Phase.....	\$315,233.00
SigC's Phase.....	218,400.00
Total Net Cost estimate.....	533,633.00

5. Revised HD AWS Project

a. The HD submitted a report, 8 October 1941, to the WD titled, "Survey of the Air Warning requirements for the HD". This report reviewed the complete AWS picture; listed the recommended changes due to additional detectors allotted to HD by the WD; summarized each detector site, touched on the Signal Communications and the information Center; and listed the additional funds required to complete this revised AWS program. (see Inclosure #142).

[4] b. The "Revised Project Covering Installation Aircraft Warning Equipment" was submitted to WD in a HD letter dated 19 December 1941. This letter, (see Inclosure #144), covered the description of the Signal portion of the revised HD AWS project. In par. 1, 2d Ind. to this letter the OCSigO mentioned that the Aircraft Warning Project for Hawaii had been approved by the Secretary of War, 28 December 1941. See Inclosure #146 for the Secretary of War's letter approving the HD revised AWS project.

c. Approval of Detector Sites.

(1) In a radio (see Inclosure #145) sent 10 November 1941, the HD explained that due to the disposition of personnel and equipment the District Engineer is advantageously situated to commence immediate development of the following sites:

- (a) Kilauea Point
- (b) Opana, Oahu
- (c) Makapuu Point, Oahu
- (c) Pahoa Village, Hawaii
- (e) Kahuku Ranch, Hawaii

The radio referred the WD to previous HD letters, 29 September 1941 and a 1st Ind. to TAG letter 8 July 1941 (Inclosures #141 & 142 respectively) submitting these sites for approval. The HD requested that the WD radio "Immediate Radio Approval" of these sites. A search of the Signal, Engineers, and AG (HD) has as yet revealed no answer to this radiogram.

(2) In a letter (see Inclosure #146) dated 28 December 1941 the Secretary of War granted authority to CSO to sub-allot funds and take such other action necessary for the construction and installation of the AWS detector stations, Filter Centers, and Information Centers within the HD as determined by the Commanding General, HD, to be required. This constituted approval of AWS Project (see Inclosure #144) submitted by C. G. to WD.

(3) In radio dated 30 December 1941, the HD requesting additional detectors as "Recent experience demonstrated number AWS detect stations on island of

Oahu inadequate for continuous early warning". The HD further recommended that these additional radios (3 SCR-271 as indicated by inclosure #2 to this letter, Incl #146) and that the three radio sets, SCR-271, still due the department be expedited. In radio reply dated 9 January 1942, the CSO informed the HD that five more sets of this type would be shipped in January and February 1942. One radio set SCR-271-A was being prepared for immediate shipment to Hawaii result of HD radiogram 1468. The CSO further requested that the HD expedite the preparation of and forward at an early date the projects for other locations of these sets. (see Inclosure #146, see Inclosure #150 for information on shipping these sets).

6. *Safeguarding AWS Stations.*

a. A memorandum dated 14 December 1941, to Col. Wyman indicated that the C. G. desired to splinterproof all the vital AWS station buildings. This would include the installation of splinterproof protection around the detector house of the fixed stations and also protection of the trucks housing the equipment of the mobile stations (see Inclosure #147 & 148).

[5] b. On 20 December 1941, the DC directed that immediate action be taken to camouflage all the AWS stations. In the 2d R/S Ind. 19 January 1942, the Engineer indicated to G-4 that AWS were being camouflaged and the dummy stations would be constructed as soon as antennas are completed (See Inclosure #149).

c. Additional information is listed in inclosure 151 regarding the expediting of the AWS project.

SECTION IV—DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN IN THE SECOND PHASE

1. Additional correspondence regarding project (second phase)

a. 30 December 1941, *Reconnainance* for the establishment of sites for the additional detectors (see Inclosure #153).

b. Funds.

(1) Inclosure #154. Funds in the amount of \$7,785.00 are required to install commercial power service at Kokee, Kilauea, Point, Haleakala, Pahoa Village, and Kahuku Ranch (see Inclosure #154).

(2) Authorization to CG, HD to incur all the necessary obligations to meet the urgent requirements for AWS HD (see Inclosure #155).

c. Status of Construction on AWS projects (see Inclosure #156 & #158)

d. Project numbers assigned to the additional AWS sites (see Inclosure #157)

e. Shipment of Equipment for additional sites (see Inclosure #159)

2. *Pahoa, Hawaii* was approved by a letter dated 28 December 1941, from the Secretary of War to the CSO as a fixed station (see Inclosures #144 & #146)

a. Topographical survey: 15 September 1941 (see Inclosure #160 & #161)

3. *Opana, Oahu* was approved by a letter dated 28 December 1941, from the Secretary of War to the CSO as a fixed station (see Inclosures #144 & #146).

During 7 December 1941, there was a mobile detector operating at this site (see Section V, par. 2 for further discussion).

4. *Manawahua, Oahu.* This station was originally approved as a mobile detector station (see discussion under Section II, par. 10 and Inclosure #5). With the new allotment of detectors (see Inclosure #134) the HD decided on a fixed station in place of the mobile station. The HD requested early approval of this fixed station (25 November 1941) so that the Engineers could start work on the minimum requirements of the site immediately (see Inclosure #164).

a. Proposed AWS installation: Approved 27 November 1941, (see Inclosure #163)

5. *Makapuu, Oahu* was approved by a letter from the Secretary of War to the CSO date 28 December 1941 (see Inclosures #144 & #146) as a mobile detector. This was to replace the previously planned mobile site at Nuuanu Pali (see Section II, par. 9.)

[1] SECTION V—INSTALLATION AND USE OF FIRST SIX SCR-270B MOBILE UNITS

1. *General.* The first six SCR-270B Mobile Units for the Hawaiian Department were shipped from the Signal Corps Laboratories, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, July 23, 1941 (see Inclosures #36 & #165). These sets arrived in the Hawaiian Department during the first part of August, 1941 (see Inclosure #166).

2. *Original Station Locations.* On August 15, 1941 the Department Commander approved the use of these stations at the Puu Palalalai, Waianae, Kawalloa, Kaawa, Koko Head, and Fort Shafter (see Inclosure #166). Mobile sets were

installed at these locations with the exception of Puu Palaili. The set scheduled for this location was used at Schofield Barracks for training purposes until the latter part of November 1941, when it was installed at Opana, Oahu. The set was placed at Opana principally as a result of a radiogram, dated 30 October 1941, from Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, who was on temporary duty on the mainland to the acting Dept. Signal Officer Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy advising that tests be made at proposed locations. (See Inclosure #167.) During this early period the sets were used about five hours per day, six days per week (see Inclosure #168). A request was submitted by the Signal Officer on 23 August 1941, to the Engineers Officer to expedite the completion of the mobile barracks facilities. (See Inclosure #169.)

3. *Establishment of a Temporary Information Center.* The desirability of establishing a temporary Information Center for training and possible tactical purposes was realized during the early part of 1941. On May 21, 1941, a request for funds for this purpose was submitted to the Chief Signal Officer. The funds were allotted on 25 May 1941. (See Inclosure #170.) The photographs shown on Incl #171 show the status of the construction of the temporary Information Center at Bldg. #307, Fort Shafter during August 1941. In connection with the establishment of this Information Center the Department Commander dispatched a letter on 5 August 1941, to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, requesting Navy liaison officer be assigned to the Aircraft Warning Facilities. These appointments were subsequently made by the Navy Officials (see Inclosure #172). The possibility of the use of ground observers in connection with AWS was considered at various times, but was considered impractical. Correspondence pertaining to this subject is shown in Inclosure #173.

4. *Test of Mobile Detectors Prior to December 7, 1941*

a. On the morning of 27 September 1941, a simulated raid was made on the Island of Oahu by a flight of carrier based Navy planes. This flight was first picked up at their point of orbit, supposedly near their carrier, at an azimuth of 224° and a range of 85 miles. The raid, made up of two separate waves of flights, started at 0558 and 0610½. The bogey was intercepted by the defending air force at 0616 at the azimuth 225° and a range of 26 miles. The raiding force was theoretically destroyed before an attack on Pearl Harbor could be realized. [2] The returning planes were tracked out to their carrier at 0735 where they disappeared from the radar screen. The plots of this simulated raid were made by the mobile detector at Koko Head and Waiānae sites. The records of this trial raid are shown in the charts under Inclosure #175.

b. Inclosure #176, 3 November 1941. A discussion of the unusual ranges (greater than 150 miles) being obtained off of various mountains on the other islands by the several of the Mobile detectors on Oahu, was sent to the CSO for his information.

c. Inclosure #177, 4 November 1941. Discussion of the arrival of a trans-pacific flight of B-17 bombers the morning of 22 October 1941. Comparative plots were obtained from the detector at Kaawa (50 ft. elevation) and the detector at Koko Head (675 ft. elevation).

5. *AWS Activities on 7 December 1941*

a. *Operational Order.* On 27 November 1941 the acting Dept. Signal Officer received instructions from the Asst. Chief of Staff G-3 to start operating the detector stations from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn. This order was transmitted immediately to the Commanding Officer Aircraft Warning Company. The detector stations were operating in accordance with the above schedule on 7 December 1941, (see Inclosure #178).

B. *Detector Operation on 7 December 1941.* Reference is made to Inclosure #179, which covers the official report of Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy who made a personal investigation concerning the detection of the Japanese attack.

c. *Reports to the Chief Signal Officer.* Reference is made to Inclosure #181 covering the official report of the Dept. Signal Officer to the Chief Signal Officer concerning the detection of the Japanese attack 7 December 1941.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 59

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2,
Washington, 15 August 1944.

Memorandum for Major Claussen, Pearl Harbor Board:

Subject: Pearl Harbor Disaster.

Inclosed is the additional material from the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Hans Wilhelm Rohl, requested by telephone today.

L. R. Forney,
L. R. FORNEY,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief, Group III, Policy Staff.

4 Incls.

Incl 1. FBI rpt. 9-8-42

Incl 2. FBI rpt 12-19-41

Incl 3. FBI rpt 7-12-41

Incl. 4. Photo cpy tlr to Stephen Early frm Enright 7-8-42

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
July 8, 1940.

STEPHEN EARLY, ESQ.,

Office of the President, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. EARLY: I fully realize what a hideous offense it is to make a charge against a person if the charge is false, or, if one would inculcate for personal gain, or, solely, to harass the accused that is why I am writing you, so that an investigation, (should you see fit to make one), can be made with the least danger of causing the accused an injury, if he be innocent. (If a leopard ever change his spots.)

This person that I herewith accuse, is now a rich general contractor in Los Angeles County; twenty-three years ago he and I worked together on the south bank of the Bear River; fifty-five miles north of Sacramento, California. We became very confidential, I knew him, then, to be an under cover agent of the Imperial German Government.

Shortly after our Government (U. S. A.) entered the first World's War, the accused made a dash for Mexico so full of goose pimples that he looked like a boy with the measles; so wet with cold sweat: as some one held a sprinkling pot over him full of ice water. For years I forgot about the accused.

Now comes a fellow workman who was on the same job twenty-three years ago. This workman went to France: Com. M. 110th Inf.; this veteran knows more about the accused than I do. The veteran comes to me propelled by the fact that the accused now has large contracts in the harbor of our Western Metropolis.

The veteran joins in with me in making this accusation.

To get to the man that I knew twenty-three years ago, one would have to have power, to tear off three different veneers: Fraternal, Social and Financial.

May I tell you that I was born in Virginia City, Nevada, fifty-nine years ago.

I place my life and my honor at the service of country.

Respectfully and sincerely

WILLIAM HENRY ENRIGHT.

Postal address.

7232 Amherst St.

San Diego, California.

BILL ROHL

OF

ROHL & CONNELLY

General Contractors, Los Angeles, Calif.

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ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, EXHIBIT No. 60

[CONFIDENTIAL]

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Op-16-B-7 (G)

Date: 14 AUGUST 1944.

Memorandum for Army Pearl Harbor Board. Attn. Major Clausen, Room 4743,
Munitions Building.

Subject: ROHL, Hans Wilhelm.

Enclosure:

- (A) Copy ONI card, 2 Oct. 1940, Subject: ROHL, H. W.
- (B) Copy 11ND NIS Rept., 17 Oct. 1940, Subject: ROHL, H. W.
- (C) Copy 11ND NIS Rept., 5 March 1941, same Subject.

1. Enclosures (A), (B), and (C) are forwarded for your information, in accordance with your telephone request.

2. The information forwarded herewith is extremely confidential in character and its security must be preserved, by carefully safeguarding its existence and source, as well as the names of any informants mentioned therein. In no case, if the report covers an investigation of an individual, shall the report be shown to the subject, nor shall copies be made of it, nor shall the Office of Naval Intelligence be mentioned in connection with any action on the basis of such report.

Wallace S. Wharton,
WALLACE S. WHARTON,
Captain, U. S. N. R.

BY HAND

Copy of ONI Card, 2 October 1940:

ROHL, H. W.

ONI

Information from _____, Los Angeles, Calif. that subject has obtained all important contracts to construct San Pedro breakwater; that the subject keeps a yacht which was constructed in Germany and maintains a full German crew aboard; that subject and his crew are well informed concerning Naval activities; that subject is "a hard-boiled character" and informant believes he and his crew would stop at nothing to accomplish purpose. Conduct appropriate investigation.

ND-11-12

2 October 1940.

[Stamped:] Office of Naval Intelligence. Received in B-3 2:30 pm. Oct. 29, 1940. FGC.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
INVESTIGATION REPORT

Date: OCTOBER 17, 1940.

Confidential

Subject: ROHL, H. W.

Report made at: Los Angeles

Report made by: Waldo W. Drake Lt. Comdr. I-V(S) USNR

Period covered: October 14, 1940 Status of case:

Origin of case: ONI card October 2, 1940

Character of investigation: Personal interview with contacts of subject.

Enclosures: ONI card, October 2, 1940 Copy to O.N.I.; 12ND

Source File No.: #20975 ND11/A8-2/QQ ONI File No.:

Synopsis: Careful investigation reveals that subject, and Master of the pleasure yacht "VEGA", Captain Otto MATTHIES are both loyal citizens.

Comment and recommendations:

- Reporting officer has known subject and MATTHIES since 1926.
2. The vessel is manned by 9 U. S. Citizens and 1 Norwegian national, a sailor named Harold HARTVIGSEN.
3. Subject and his wife are persons of refinement. At the present time the vessel is only used to carry owner's family and week-end guests to Santa Catalina Isd.
4. Informant is a dissatisfied ex-employee.

NNI-119

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

INVESTIGATION REPORT

(13)

BIO/ND11/EF30/A8-2
Serial LA/bl/573

Confidential

SUBJECT: *ROHL*, Hans Wilhelm, President, *ROHL & CONNALLY Co.*, Los Angeles, California.

Report made at: Los Angeles, California. Date: March 5, 1941.

Report made by: Lieut. A. A. Thomas, USNR.

Period covered: March 4, 1941. Status of Case: Closed

Origin of Case: Originated from C. A. *EMERICK*, Customs Agent in Charge, Los Angeles, California.

Source File No.: ND11/EF30/A8-5. Copy to: ONI (2) FBI-LA (1)

SYNOPSIS:

Subject, German born and resident of U. S. for 25 years, is part owner in firm known as Hawaiian Constructors engaged in confidential construction work for U. S. Army in Hawaii. Also owner of yacht "VEGA" having radio telephone Station KLVC under FCC license. Part of Subject's business in wife's name.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Comment: Inspector *DUNN* believes subject to have been dishonest in his actions and that his actions indicate possible subversive activity.

Recommendation: In View of the fact that three other agencies of the U. S. are investigating subject it is recommended that this office desist from further action.

Approved:

/s/ B. L. Canaga,
B. L. CANAGA,
Captain, USN, (Ret.)

Confidential

MARCH 5, 1941.

SUBJECT: *ROHL*, Hans Wilhelm, President, *ROHL-CONNALLY CO.*, business address: 8159 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, Residence Address, 4351 Alhambra Ave., Los Angeles, California.

1. This investigation is predicated upon information supplied to this office by C. A. *EMERICK*, Customs Agent in Charge, to the effect that subject is an alien, and is engaged in National Defense projects in violation of H. R. 9822.

2. Investigating office called on Mr. P. B. *DUNN*, Immigrant Inspector, Bureau of Immigration, Federal Building, Los Angeles, whose active file disclosed the following:—

Subject is not a citizen of the U. S., but filed Form 2214, which is a certificate of arrival, date at present unavailable. Since subject has obtained government work, pressure has been brought to bear to expedite the obtaining of citizenship papers.

Subject is owner of yacht "VEGA", Flagship of the Coast Patrol, which is under the jurisdiction of the Sheriff's Office, Los Angeles County. Said yacht has a radio telephone, Station KLVC, necessitating an FCC license. FCC license requires a sworn statement to the effect that owner is a U. S. citizen.

Much of subject's business is in part ownership of wife. As U. S. laws forbid an alien to own more than 25% of stock of a business, it is presumed that subject is using this means to violate law. Subject is 40% owner of firm known as

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Hawaiian Constructors, said firm is engaged in very secret construction work for the U. S. Army in construction of antiaircraft bases, underground storage and tunnels, etc., in the defenses of Hawaii.

Subject is 54 years old and has lived in the U. S. for some 25 years.

3. Inspector *DUNN* advises that investigation of subject is now proceeding and that copies of this investigation will be forwarded to DIO, 11ND, San Diego, California. He also advised that the Bureau of Internal Revenue, U. S. Customs Office, is also conducting an investigation.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Comment: Inspector *DUNN*, who is conducting investigation for Immigration Department, feels that subject has been dishonest in his actions and that appearances at this stage of the investigation indicate a possibility of subversive activity. He states subject could very easily engage in subversive activities should he so desire, and that subject's deliberate hiding of non-citizenship status is suspicious.

Recommendation: In view of the fact that three other agencies of the U. S. are investigating subject, it is recommended that this office desist from further action.

5. INVESTIGATION LEADS:

None.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 61

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

MAIN SUBJECT:

Corps of Engineers Operations in Canada
(Canol Project)

To:

From: M/A Canada #2026

BRIEF SUMMARY:

Enclosed are copies of letters addressed to American Minister by Dept. of External Affairs, Canada which are more or less self-explanatory and serve to indicate the manner in which the U. S. Army Canol Project in Canada is being conducted by Col. Wyman; Canadian Govt. may see fit to request recall of Col. Wyman; by Disposition Form dated 11-10-42 to Operations Division.

Classifier: 26

Typist: 26

CLASSIFICATION NUMBER:

MID 611. Canada

Date of Communication: 9-26-42

Date of Basic Document: (2-21-42)

Routed to: file

Date of Classifying: 11-21-42

CROSS REFERENCE NUMBERS:

201. Wyman, Theodore (Col)

025.

321.19 G-2, Operations Division

No. 2026 JSG: D

SEPTEMBER 26, 1942.

Subject: Corps of Engineers Operations in Canada (Canol Project)

To: Chief, MIS, G-2, War Department, Washington.

1. Enclosed are copies of letters addressed to the American Minister, Mr. Moffat, by the Department of External Affairs, Canada. These letters are more or less self-explanatory and service to indicate the manner in which the United States Army Canol Project in Canada is being conducted by its representative, Colonel Theodore Wyman, C. E.

2. Unofficially Canadian Offices have reported more than once of the high-handed manner in which Colonel Wyman has conducted himself in Canada. And, during the visit of Mr. Moffat and the undersigned to the Canadian Northwest different people including high officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police spoke disparagingly of this officer. This is indeed unfortunate. Unless something is done to correct this situation it is the opinion of this office that the Canadian Government may see fit to request the recall of Colonel Wyman.

3. The contents of the enclosures were communicated to the State Department by Mr. Moffat.

4. This communication is forwarded in the belief that it is a serious concern of the War Department and of particular interest to your office.

JOHN S. GULLET,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Military Attache.

Encls. (2)
Ltr. 9/22/42
Ltr. 9/17/42

[Stamped:] Record Section Copy [hand written:] without inclosures.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 62

(Exhibit 62 is a book entitled "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew, published by Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, New York (1944). This book is not being reprinted in these proceedings.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 63

[1]

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE

BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL L. T. GEROW,

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR PLANS DIVISION

BEFORE

MILITARY COMMISSION.

DECEMBER 18, 1941

DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT WAR PLAN

1. Joint Action of the Army and the Navy state the governing policies for joint action of the Army and Navy. These policies serve as basic guides in the preparation of war plans.

2. A war plan is prepared to meet a specific situation requiring the use of all or part of the Army and Navy of the United States. The plan in current use is known as Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5. Broadly considered, it consists of the following documents;

a. Report of the United States—British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1).

b. Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22).

c. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans—Rainbow No. 5.

d. Navy War Plan and subordinate plans based thereon.

3. The Joint Board in April, 1941, developed the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 based on a. and b. above. The work incident to the preparation thereof was done by The Joint Planning Committee. The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy in May, 1941.

4. Based on this joint plan the Army War Plans Division prepared Army Strategic Plan, which consists of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and Concentration Plan—Rainbow No. 5. A copy of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on August 21, 1941. Receipt was acknowledged on September 3, 1941. A revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by The Joint Board on November 19, 1941, and a copy of The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Revision No. 1, was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941. Receipt therefor has not as yet been received.

5. The missions assigned the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under the Army Strategic Plan are as follows:

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a. Joint—Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in the coastal zone.

b. Army—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and the destruction of Axis sea communication by offensive action against the enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

c. Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

6. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken under specific situations, categories of defense are established. Army Strategical Plan—Rainbow No. 5 placed the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier in Category D. This category assumes the possibility, but not the probability of a major attack.

[3]

WAR PLANS, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

1. War Plans, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier consist of the following documents:

a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

b. Joint Defense plan, Hawaiian Theater, Naval Operations Annex.

c. Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Operations Orders, and plans subordinate thereto.

d. Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. These plans are based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange prepared for a situation involving a war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan. The Joint Mission, the Navy Mission, and the Category of Defense under the Orange Plan is the same as that under the Army Strategical Plan—Rainbow No. 5. The Army Mission under the latter plan has been somewhat broadened. Under all plans in existence the War Department's concept of the most probable form of attack which an enemy would adopt against Oahu was a surprise attack consisting of raids and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces and action by local sympathizers.

3. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Commandant 14th Naval District) and the Army Operating Defense Plans were forwarded to the War Department for review at time of issue, and published revisions thereto have been furnished from time to time. Such plans are not formally approved by the War Department and are not commented upon unless it appears that they are not in consonance with the Basic Army Plan as to concept, mission, and means assigned. Plans in force in the Hawaiian Department on December 7 were in process of revision based on the Army Strategical Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and recent changes and additions made in the means provided the Hawaiian Department.

4. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, which was revised March 28, 1941, prescribes the joint security measures to be taken for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. The following extracts from this plan are quoted in order to indicate the joint agreement in force on December 7, 1941:

"I. GENERAL.

"1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND-JCD-13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renouncement in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

"II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

"2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

"a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

"b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. [5] This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

"c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

"d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission."

5. A defense project of an overseas department includes:

First, a statement of the mission to be carried out by the Department Commander as defined by the War Department; second, a brief estimate of the situation outlining the most probable threats against the successful execution of this mission and indicating the course of action and the means necessary to carry out the mission; and, third, a concise statement of the requirements in troops, in defensive installations, construction other than housing, and the supplies and equipment considered necessary to carry out the mission. This summary includes priorities for accomplishment of the requirements enumerated and consolidated estimates of cost. The defense project is revised annually and is submitted to the War Department for approval.

6. The Hawaiian Defense Project, 1940, was approved by the War Department on September 17, 1941. The project contains revisions up to September 29, 1941. The following extracts from this document indicate the mission, the category of defense, and the possible and probable war situations as understood by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

"Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

"(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.

"(b) Sabotage.

[6] "(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.

"(d) Air raids carrier based.

"(e) Surface ship raids.

"(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet."

* * * * *

"Basis for Planning.

"Missions and Conditions.

"(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:

"The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D.

"The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange.

"(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

"(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

"(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

"(3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Departments point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will [7]

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make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the 'cut-off from the Mainland situation'.

"(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

"(c) *Conclusion.*

"To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort."

ALERTS

1. Following is the chronological record of alerts held by the Army, sometimes in conjunction with the Navy, since July 17, 1940. (Some entries included to indicate awareness of situation.)

June 17, 1940

Radiogram War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department. "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

June 17, 1940

Radiogram from C. G., Hawaiian Department to War Department answering the above:

"All antiaircraft observation and security detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in defense of any essential installations. No excitement. Navy in-shore and off-shore patrols in operation."

June 24, 1940

[8] Letter General Herron to Chief of Staff: (Reference to alert ordered above)

"I have just come in from seeing the dawn patrols take the air and the anti-aircraft standing to their guns at dawn . . . I have been gratified by the precision with which the planes get off each morning at 4:30 a. m. . . ."

June 27, 1940

Letter prepared from Chief of Staff to General Herron, but not sent on account of secrecy. Explain reasons for the above alert, which were:

"Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources lead to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific Raid against Oahu following the departure of the United States fleet from Hawaii. . . ."

"Whether the information or discussions were correct, I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were by discouraging any overt act."

"In any event, it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions. The world is so troubled and changing so rapidly that I think it wise for you to keep the command definitely on its toes until I give you the all clear signal."

July 16, 1940

Radiogram from Chief of Staff to C. G., Hawaiian Department: (Gives authority to relax alert)

"You are authorized at your discretion, to relax alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness; second, aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice."

August 28, 1940

Letter Chief of Staff to General Herron, asking reactions as to continued alert:

[9] "As to the alert, I want your frank reaction. Is it imposing too heavy

a tax to continue on the present basis . . . ? It is a very difficult business and I am deeply concerned that we do not exhaust the morale of the command by heavy requirements during what is supposed to be a period of peace, yet a failure would be catastrophic."

September 6, 1940

Reply to General Herron reference burden imposed by alert. "My absolute frank and honest opinion is that the alert as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that the maneuvers being held will build up materially and easily the effectiveness of the alert."

"The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolute secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much."

July 7, 1941

Radio sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department:

"For your information deduction from important information from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army, and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of the Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned."

July 25, 1941

Joint dispatch sent by Chief of Staff and Chief of [10] Naval Operations by naval radio:

"Appropriate addresses please deliver copies to Commanding Generals of Philippines, Hawaiian, and Caribbean Defense Commands and also to General Chaney in London. You are herewith advised that on July 26 the United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan. It is expected that these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through the medium of a licensing system for certain matériel. . . . Japanese funds and assets in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not expected that Japanese merchant ships in ports of the United States will be shifted at this time. United States flag merchant ships will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by the Japanese. Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means but, you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities. Action is being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. Except from immediate Army and Navy subordinates, the contents of this dispatch are to be kept secret."

October 18, 1941

Radiogram sent by War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent."

November 24, 1941

Radiogram from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet: "There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a

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surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has [11] seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 15) inform senior Army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch."

November 26, 1941

Extract of secret cablegram sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines X X X before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns."

November 27, 1941

Secret first priority message to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities can not, repeat can not, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

November 28, 1941

Radlogram C. G., Hawaiian Department to Chief of Staff: "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad 472, the 27th."

[12]

December 7, 1941

Radio to C. G., Hawaiian Department, from Chief of Staff (left Message Center at 12:17 P. M.): "Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P. M., Eastern Standard Time, today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform Naval authorities of this communication."

Means Provided for Defense

1. Troops.

Units with strength thereof actually present in the Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, are shown in Tab "A".

2. Airplanes.

See Tab "B".

3. Antiaircraft Materiel.

The status of antiaircraft materiel in Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, was as shown in Tab "C". Existing shortages had not been met because of nonavailability of equipment.

4. Seacoast Defense.

See Tab "D".

5. Aircraft Warning Service.

(a) The approved project provides for 6 mobile detector sets and 6 fixed sets to be located as shown on the attached map. All of these sets have a rated range of 120 miles, but under favorable conditions efficient service has been obtained in excess of the rated range.

(b) The six (6) mobile sets and three (3) fixed sets were on hand in the Hawaiian Department December 7, 1941. The remaining three fixed sets had not been shipped from the mainland.

(c) The three (3) fixed sets on hand were scheduled for installation at the sites given below. Construction had started, but had not been completed.

Mt. Kaala, Oahu
Kokee, Kauai
Haleakala, Maui

[13] (d) The six (6) mobile sets were scheduled for the locations shown on the attached map. Their actual location on December 7, 1941, is not known to the War Department.

6. Considered broadly, defense projects which have been under construction for some time and for which funds have been provided are as follows:

Bunkers for dispersed airplanes
Development of airfields
Bombproofing of vital installations
Bombproof ammunition storage
Command and Fire Control Cable System
Storage for gasoline and oil defense reserves (Splinter-proof)
Military roads, trails and railroads
Modernization of seacoast artillery
8" Railway battery positions

7. All reasonable requests by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department for funds and the supply of equipment & materiel have been met within the means available.

Brief of Chronological Record of Correspondence Between the War Department and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Matters of Importance since December 7, 1941

DECEMBER 7, 1941

Serial No.	Time	From	To	
1	12:17 P. M.	TAG.....	HHD.....	Radiogram: Alert.
2	3:34 P. M.	HHD.....	TAG.....	Radiogram: Japanese Bombers Attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, Wheeler Field. Extensive Damages.
[14] 3	5:00 P. M.	HHD.....	TAG.....	Radiogram: Report of Casualties.
4	6:30 P. M.	HHD.....	TAG.....	Radiogram: Report of Second Attack at 11:00 A. M.
5	7:30 P. M.	TAG.....	HHD.....	Radiogram: Authority to Incur Necessary Obligations.

DECEMBER 8, 1941

1	2:40 P. M.	C/S.....	HHD.....	Radiogram: Rush Report of Operations. Readiness for Further Attack? Priorities for Assistance?
2	2:38 P. M.	HHD.....	TAG.....	Radiogram: Request for Shipment Ammunition.
3		TAG.....	HHD.....	Cable: Prepare to Carry Out Tasks Assigned by Rainbow 5 Pertaining to Germany and Italy.

DECEMBER 9, 1941

1	11:30 P. M.	HHD.....	C/S.....	Radiogram: Report of Operations. Request for Troops, Ammunition and Matériel.
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DECEMBER 10, 1941

2	7:48 P. M.	HHD.....	TAG.....	Radiogram: Request for Ammunition.
3		HHD.....	TAG.....	Radiogram: Request for 2 Additional Infantry Regiments.

DECEMBER 11, 1941

1	10:55 A. M.	TAG.....	HHD.....	Radiogram: War with Germany and Italy.
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Brief of Chronological Record of Correspondence Between the War Department and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Matters of Importance since December 7, 1941

DECEMBER 12, 1941

Serial No.	Time	From	To	
1	1:55 P. M.	TAG.	HHD.	Radiogram: Authority to Evacuate Dependents to Mainland.
2	5:35 P. M.	HHD.	TAG.	Radiogram: Martial Law in Effect. Situation Quiet.

DECEMBER 13, 1941

1	1:05 P. M.	TAG.	HHD.	Radiogram: Listing Units, Airplanes, Bombs, Equipment, and Ammunition being Dispatched Hawaii.
[16] 2	9:16 P. M.	HHD.	TAG.	Radiogram: Plan of Defense Canton and Christmas.

DECEMBER 14, 1941

1	10:22 P. M.	TAG.	HHD.	Radiogram: Are you Planning to Garrison Outlying Islands?
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DECEMBER 15, 1941

1	3:45 P. M.	HHD.	C-2.	Radiogram: Summary of Enemy Activity Hawaii 8 Dec. to 12 Dec.
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DECEMBER 16, 1941

1	5:20 P. M.	HHD.	TAG.	Radiogram: Report of Sub Attack Kahului Maui.
2	8:55 P. M.	HHD.	TAG.	Radiogram: Disposition for Defenses of Airfields Outlying Islands.
3		HHD.	TAG.	Letter: Report Battle Oahu.

DECEMBER 18, 1941

2	3:27 P. M.	Pomona.	TAG.	Radiogram: Unit of Command Vested in Navy Effective this Date.
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L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

5 Incls:

- Incl. 1—Troops, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab A).
- Incl. 2—Airplanes, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab B).
- Incl. 3—AA Org & Equip Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab C).
- Incl. 4—Seacoast Def Org, Haw Dept (Tab D).
- Incl. 5—Map, AWS, Haw Dept.

[16] *A. Major Units in Hawaii, December 7, 1941*

1. Department Headquarters and Headquarters Troops
 - 34th Engrs. (C)
 - 804th Engr. Bn (How) at Canton
 - How Pack Train
 - Co. A, 1st Chem. Bn.
 - Aircraft Warning Co.
2. Hawaiian Air Force
 - 5th Bomb Group
 - 23d Bomb Sq.
 - 31st Bomb Sq.
 - 72d Bomb Sq.
 - 4th Rec. Sq.
 - 11th Bomb Group
 - 28th Bomb Sq.
 - 42d Bomb Sq.
 - 50th Rec. Sq.

2. Hawaiian Air Force—Continued
 58th Bomb Sq. (Lt)
 18th Pursuit Group (I)
 6th Pursuit Sq. (I)
 19th Pursuit Sq. (I)
 78th Pursuit Sq. (I)
 44th Pursuit Sq. (I)
 72d Pursuit Sq. (I)
 73d Pursuit Sq. (I)
 15th Pursuit Group (F)
 45th Pursuit Sq. (F)
 16th Pursuit Sq. (F)
 47th Pursuit Sq. (F)
 86th Observation Squadron
 Air Corps Services
3. Harbor Defense Troops
 15th CA (HD)
 16th CA (HD)
 41st CA (Ry)
 55th CA (155 mm) (TD)
- [17] 4. Antiaircraft Units
 64th CA (AA) SM
 97th CA (AA) SM
 98th CA (AA) SM
 251st CA (AA) M
5. Beach and Land Defense
 24th Division
 25th Division
 11th Tank Co (L)
- Total Strength—2,149 Officers
 48 WO
 166 ANC
 40,494 EM
-
- 42,857 Total

[18] B. Airplanes—Hawaii

Number on December 7, 1941

Modern

Type:	No.	
B-17D-----	12	} Pursuit and Bombardment
A-20A-----	12	
P-40B-----	86	
P-40C-----	13	

123

C-47B-----	12	} Observation Transporation
C-49-----	3	
C-33-----	2	

OA-4A/OA8/OA9----- 5 Observation Amphibian

BT2B1/2BR/2CR----- 4 Basic Trainer

AT6----- 4 Advanced Trainer

Non-modern

B12A-----	6	} Medium Bomber
B-18-----	33	
A-12-----	9	} Light Bomber
P-26A-----	9	
P-26B-----	7	} Light Bomber
P-36A-----	46	

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[19]

C. Antiaircraft

Organization and armament, Hawaiian Department, Dec. 7, 1941

	Authorized		37mm (AA)	Cal. .50 MGs
	Mobile 3" AA	Fixed 3" AA		
64th CA (AA).....	24	-----	30	1 40
251st CA (AA).....	12	-----	30	1 28
97th CA (AA).....	24	-----	30	1 40
98th CA (AA).....	24	12	30	1 16
Harbor Defense Units.....	-----	14	-----	-----
Total.....	72	26	120	1 124
On Hand.....	60	26	20	113
Shortage.....	12	0	100	1 233

¹ Figures include cal. .50 MGs in MG batteries and for local protection of AA gun batteries, fixed and mobile.

² Maintenance allowance not included.

³ + 222 for local defense of S. C. Btry airfields.

[20]

Seacoast

Caliber	No. Guns	No. Btrys	Location
16"	2 (BC).....	1	Weaver.
16"	2 (BC).....	1	Barrette.
14"	2 (DC).....	1	De Russy.
12"	2 (BC).....	1	Kam.
12"	#2 (DC).....	1	Kam.
12"	#4 (M).....	1	Ruger.
12"	#4 (M).....	1	Ruger.
12"	# (M).....	1	Kam.
8"	2 (BC).....	1	Ruger.
8"	4 (Rwy).....	1	Kaneche Bay.
8"	4 (Rwy).....	1	Puuiki.
8"	4 (Rwy).....	1	Browns Camp.
8"	#4 (Rwy).....	1	Walance.
8"	#4 (Rwy).....	1	Alt. Maili.
8"	#4 (Rwy).....	1	Kahuku.
8"	#4 (Rwy).....	1	Alt. Malahoa.
6"	#2 (DC).....	1	DeRussy.
6"	#2 (DC).....	1	Kam. 9
3"	#2 (BC).....	1	Armstrong.
3"	#2 (BC).....	1	Kam.
155 mm	4.....	1	Kam.
155 mm	4.....	1	Barbers Pt.
155 mm	4.....	1	Sand Is.
155 mm	4.....	1	Ruger.
155 mm	4.....	1	Ashley.
155 mm	4.....	1	Kawailoa.
155 mm	#4.....	1	Weaver.
155 mm	#4.....	1	Ewa Beach.
155 mm	#4.....	1	Brown's Camp.
155 mm	#4.....	1	Kahuku.
155 mm	#4.....	1	Koko Head.
155 mm	#4.....	1	Punch Bowl.
155 mm	4.....	1	Kaneohe Bay.
155 mm	4.....	1	Kaneohe Bay.
155 mm	4.....	1	#not manned initially.

(The remaining portion of Exhibit No. 63 is a map of the Territory of Hawaii relating to "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department" and will be found reproduced as Item No. 63, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 64

JOHN WEINER, Investigator for House Military Affairs Committee.

It was expected that at the February 15 hearings of the Committee there would be testimony indicating that during the Spring of 1942 in Hawaii Colonel

Wyman and three other Army officers participated in an evening of drinking in a hotel barroom. Wyman became quite intoxicated and stated:

"There are probably a good many things which I have done during my life that are not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is to sell out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl did to his German friends. I should never have trusted him and what I should do now is take this service revolver, go out and shoot him and then blow my own brains out."

It is said that Weiner has an affidavit from a Capt. Guiter who was attached to the General Staff at Washington in July 1943 embodying Wyman's remarks.

The day after the carousal Capt. Guiter and the other officers reported the incident to the G-2 office at Honolulu. Nothing was heard for about six weeks when the officers were called in and statements taken. Nothing further was heard of it.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 65

WCM mer 2401

Off Br—WCM—Ph 78270

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington 25, D. C., 8 July 1944.

In reply refer to: AGPO-A—A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)

Via Air Mail

Special Delivery

Subject: Orders.

To: Each officer named.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper, as follows:

<i>Name</i>	<i>Station</i>
Lt. Gen. George Grunert, O1534, USA. President.	Hq, 2d Service Command, Governors Island, New York.
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, O212769, USA. Member.	WD Manpower Board, V Section, Columbus, Ohio.
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, O2871, USA. Member.	4001st AAF Base Unit, Patterson Field, Ohio.
Col. Charles W. West, O12774, JAGD.	USMA, West Point, N. Y.

Recorded, without vote.

2. Such military and civilian personnel may be assigned to assist the Board as the Board shall request.

3. The Board will convene at Washington, D. C., at the call of the senior member and will hold sessions at such time or times and at such place or places as it may deem advisable. The Board is empowered to prescribe its own procedure and is authorized to employ a civilian reporter or reporters.

4. The members of the Board assigned to command positions will retain command while performing duties with the Board.

5. During the period of operations of the Board, approximately sixty (60) days, the members are authorized to perform such travel, including repeated travel, within the continental United States as may be directed by the President of the Board. For travel outside the continental United States, the President of the Board will request The Adjutant General to issue such orders as may be required.

6. Military and civilian personnel will render the Board all necessary information and assistance.

7. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03, 212/50425. The provisions of War Department Circular No. 60, cs, and War Department Circular No. 260, cs, apply.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[SEAL]

J. A. ULIO.
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

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ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 66

WCM mer 2401
Off Br-WCM-Ph 78270

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington 25, D. C., 11 July 1944.

CORRECTED COPY

In reply
refer to: AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jun 44)

Subject: Amendment of Orders.

To: Lieutenant General George Grunert, United States Army,
Headquarters Eastern Defense Command,
Governors Island, New York.

So much of classified letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44), 8 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as pertains to Lieutenant General George Grunert, O1534, United States Army, and reads: "Hq. 2d Service Command, Governors Island, New York", is hereby amended to read: "Hq. Eastern Defense Command, Governors Island, New York".

By order of the Secretary of War:

[SEAL]

(S) J. A. Ullo,
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 67

WCM mys 2401
Officers' Br.
Ph. 78270

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington 25, D. C., 22 August 1944.

In reply
refer to: AGPO-A 248.7 (2 Aug 44)

Subject: Amendment of Orders.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

1. Classified letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A-210.31 (24 Jun 44), 8 July 1944, subject: "Orders", which appointed the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as amended by classified letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", pertaining to Lieutenant General George Grunert, O1534, United States Army, is hereby further amended to authorize the President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board to request The Adjutant General to issue such invitational orders to civilian witnesses as may be required, in accordance with paragraph 3 b, Army Regulations 35-4120, 30 July 1943.

2. Announcement is made of the detail of Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., O205520, Air Corps, to the Army Pearl Harbor Board established by above mentioned letter orders effective 15 August 1944, and to designate him as Executive Officer of that Board without vote.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[SEAL]

J. F. RUTH,
Adjutant General.

Distribution:

5—Col. Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Rm. 4741, Munitions Bldg.
AC of S, G-1, Col. Goodwin, Rm. 2C931, The Pentagon.
C Statistics Br, GS, Rm. 3D885, The Pentagon.
Off Br Rec Sec, Rm. 1505, Munitions Bldg. w/d
AC of S, OPD, WDGS, Rm. 3B860, The Pentagon.
Col. Burger, Rm. 1052, Munitions Bldg. w/d
CG, AAF, Rm. 5D1082, The Pentagon.
Room 2422, Munitions Bldg.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 68

WCM mer 2401
Off Br-WCM-Ph 78270

WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington 25, D. C., 22 July 1944.

In reply
refer to: AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 Jul 44)

Subject: Supplemental Orders.
To: Each Officer Mentioned.

1. The Board appointed by letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44), 8 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as amended by letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", pertaining to each of the following-named officers, will consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944:

Lt. Gen. George Grunert, O1534, USA.
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, O212709, USA.
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, O2871, USA.
Col. Charles W. West, O12774, JAGD.

2. Major Henry C. Clausen, O907613, JAGD, is appointed as Assistant Recorder without vote on the above referred to Board.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[SEAL]

W. C. McWILLIAM,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.
Memo 12 July 44.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 69

JULY 12, 1944.

Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General.

Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects.

1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the memorandum dated July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., to Mr. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved.

2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will be referred to such board for investigation and such other action as may be proper under the directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major Clausen will be

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detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity to coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof with the activities of the Pearl Harbor board in the present case.

(Signed) Robert P. Patterson,
ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
Acting Secretary of War.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 70

[1] OFFICE MEMORANDUM—UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Date: AUGUST 25, 1944.

To: Lieutenant General George Grunert, U. S. Army.
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Subject: Confidential—By Special Messenger.

I will take this means of replying to your letter of August 21, 1944, in which you request a review of the files of this Bureau for the purpose of furnishing to you a résumé of the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii immediately prior to December 7, 1941. It should be pointed out at the outset that it was the policy of this Bureau to make available to the War and Navy Departments all information in its possession bearing upon matters within the jurisdiction of the War and Navy Departments or reflecting upon the internal security of Hawaii. It can be safely stated that any information the FBI possessed in these categories was furnished to the War and Navy Departments.

JURISDICTION

On June 26, 1939, the President of the United States issued a confidential directive to the heads of the various Government departments which stated in part as follows:

"It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities. No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage or sabotage except by the three agencies mentioned above."

As a result of this Presidential directive, the directors of the three agencies named by the President in order to coordinate their respective activities subscribed to a "delimitation of jurisdiction agreement". The original agreement was dated June 5, 1940, and was subsequently revised and reissued on February 9, 1942. The agreement of June 5, 1940, which was, of course, in effect on December 7, 1941, is quoted as follows:

"I. It is agreed that in conformity with the directive contained in the President's memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, responsibility for investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversive activities will be delimited as indicated hereafter. Responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the responsible agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

[2] "II. FBI will assume responsibility for all investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians in the United States and in its territories with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and the Philippine Islands.

"FBI will keep MID and ONI informed of important developments such as—

"(a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.

"(b) Developments affecting vital utilities.

"(c) Developments affecting critical points of transportation or communication systems.

"(d) Cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

"FBI will act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements.

"III. FBI will assume responsibility for investigation of all cases in these categories directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigation of a designated group or set of circumstances.

"FBI to keep MID and ONI informed of important developments.

"IV. MID will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Military Establishments, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. It will also assume responsibility for the investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama and the Philippine Islands.

"MID will inform FBI and ONI of important developments.

"V. ONI will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval Establishment, including civilians under naval employ or control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa.

"ONI to inform FBI and MID of important developments.

[3] "VI. FBI will assume responsibility for ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat 'Fifth Column' activities (overt acts of all sorts in cooperation with the armed forces of an enemy). FBI will transmit to MID, ONI and the State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms."

On May 15, 1941, Brigadier General Sherman Miles of G-2, Captain Alan G. Kirk, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence and myself affixed our signatures to a memorandum entitled "Definition of Jurisdiction". This memorandum, in part, is as follows:

"Acting under the authority of a Presidential directive issued on June 26, 1939, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence and the Division of Naval Intelligence have worked closely together in establishing and maintaining a complete coverage of the field of espionage, sabotage, counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the Neutrality Act. The Military Intelligence Division exercises investigational jurisdiction in this field in matters relating to enlisted and civilian personnel of the War Department and in cases arising on military reservations and complete investigational jurisdiction in the Panama Canal Zone. Naval Intelligence assumes the responsibility for carrying out the investigative operations in all cases involving officers and enlisted men of the Navy, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve, and the civilian personnel under the employ or control of the Naval Establishment and the outlying islands of the Fourteenth Naval District, such as Palmyra, Johnston and Wake, and civilian jurisdiction in the Alaskan Peninsula, Aleutian Islands and the Pribilof Islands. The Federal Bureau of Investigation assumes the primary responsibility for all cases within the United States, Puerto Rico, Hawaiian Islands, Virgin Islands and Alaska, not specifically involving personnel of the War and Navy Departments. Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise joint coverage in the handling of Japanese counterespionage."

In furtherance of the statement contained in this memorandum that Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation exercised joint coverage in the handling of Japanese espionage, the minutes of a conference between representatives of the War, Justice, Treasury and Navy Departments on April 2, 1941, as furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by Captain A. G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence, on April 7, 1941, reflect that "it was reaffirmed that the FBI and ONI would carry out as promptly as possible the steps presently being taken to insure complete coverage of the alternate Japanese system".

[4] In further clarification of the jurisdiction in Hawaii with respect to Japanese matters, permit me to quote in full a memorandum addressed to me by Assistant Director Hugh H. Clegg of the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated July 19, 1940.

"I talked today with Captain Nixon and Captain Phillips, who, it is understood, will later succeed Captain Nixon when he goes to sea, both of ONI. We discussed the handling of Japanese espionage matters and the counterespionage work which should be undertaken. Both Nixon and Phillips indicated they had for years been

focusing their attention on the Japanese problem, since Japan for a number of years appeared the most likely enemy. A war with Japan would be quite largely a Naval problem. Naturally, they were concerned.

"They have developed a number of informants. They have quite a large volume of information. It appears that Anderson has recently told Nixon to send their information to the FBI. At least, he asked if this had been done. Nixon has informed him that it had not. They pointed out the problems involved and the contacts that had already been established. This at least has delayed the information already in the Navy Department's files being sent to the Bureau. Nixon pointed out the difficulties in getting Japanese translators; he pointed out the handicaps under which the Bureau will be working without the vast amount of background knowledge, a great deal of which has not been placed in writing, and the difficulties involved in assimilating the store of information which is a matter of record in the Navy Department. He pointed also to the large increase in work of the Bureau in proportion to the increase in Special Agents.

"I pointed out the difficulties involved, since we were contacting transportation companies, including railroads and airplane travel companies, and finding that they had similar contacts which they had not canceled, and that it would obviously be irritating to various contacts to have to report to two or several governmental agencies; that I felt definitely there should be an understanding in the fixing of responsibility instead of leaving it in a nebulous state as at present. Nixon stated that at present, under the agreement, the work belonged to the FBI except where the Naval establishments were directly affected, but it could be told that Nixon personally and, I believe, Phillips, were desirous of retaining a large share of jurisdiction over Japanese espionage.

"They stated they would join in a recommendation as follows:

[5] "(1) The full responsibility for all intelligence work relating to Japan and Japanese in the United States and in the Territory of Hawaii would be assumed by ONI.

"(2) In the event any case investigated by them reached a point where they believed prosecution was desirable, they would submit all facts and information to the FBI with the request that the information be examined and such investigations as were necessary from a standpoint of getting legal evidence be conducted by the FBI with a view of presenting the facts to the U. S. Attorney for prosecution; that such investigations conducted by the FBI would be made only in cases wherein prosecution was desired and upon the specific request of ONI.

"(3) Any information in possession of the FBI or which the FBI receives in the future concerning Japanese or intelligence work relating to Japan or Japanese would be transmitted to ONI; all information presently in the possession of ONI, with the exception of the names of certain confidential informants of ONI, will be furnished to the FBI; and in the future, information in these categories as it is received will be furnished by ONI to the FBI. The purpose of the FBI receiving any of this information would be, not for investigative purposes, but so that the Bureau's files may be completed and the information assimilated so that if, in the future, a time comes when the FBI is to assume jurisdiction over such matters, the proper background and available records would be on hand.

"The above enumerates the gist of the attitude of Captain Nixon and Captain Phillips. They were personally entirely agreeable to it. It was obvious that they could not speak for Admiral Anderson and had no authority to commit ONI to this program."

In a conference in Washington, D. C., in July of 1941, I informed Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Honolulu Office that I had advised Admiral Walter Anderson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Colonel McCabe, Director of the Military Intelligence Division, that I would not assume the full responsibility for investigation of matters pertaining to Japanese espionage because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not prepared to take over the full responsibility. I acquainted Mr. Shivers with the fact that I had informed Admiral Anderson and Colonel McCabe that the Naval Intelligence would have to assume and continue primary responsibility for Japanese espionage investigations until the Federal Bureau of Investigation could prepare to take over that phase of the work in full. I also informed Special Agent in Charge Shivers that the Office of Naval Intelligence had specialized in Japanese espionage for many years; that the FBI knew nothing of Japanese espionage and Japanese [6] intelligence matters prior to 1939; that it was not equipped with translators, interpreters and informants and could not undertake the full responsibility for Japanese espionage until it had been able to equip itself to do so. Admiral Walter Anderson also informed Special Agent in Charge Shivers of the Honolulu Office of

substantially the same facts on the battleship West Virginia at Honolulu soon after he took command of the battle force at Pearl Harbor, which was some time previous to July of 1941.

Further evidence of the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not assume sole and primary responsibility for Japanese espionage activity in the United States and its territories, including the Hawaiian Islands, and did not consider itself so responsible, is to be found in a letter dated December 14, 1940, addressed to the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu, Hawaii, by me which letter was written in response to an inquiry made of me by the Special Agent in Charge concerning the division of investigative jurisdiction of Japanese matters in Hawaii between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This letter, in part, states: "Further, the Bureau does not consider it advisable or desirable at this particular time for your office to assume the responsibility for the supervision of all Japanese espionage investigations in the Territory of Hawaii."

In another letter dated June 24, 1941, addressed to the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Office, the subject of jurisdiction in Japanese espionage cases was further discussed, and he was further informed: "The Bureau is not yet prepared to handle the investigation of Japanese activity exclusively on the mainland, and consequently the Bureau cannot authorize the assumption by your office of exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to Japanese activities in the Hawaiian Islands."

The delimitation agreement which gave the Office of Naval Intelligence equal and concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in investigations involving Japanese intelligence was known to the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Military Intelligence in Honolulu. The Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu has discussed the delimitation agreement with Captain I. H. Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, all of whom have been associated with the Office of Military Intelligence since the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an office there in August, 1939. The Special Agent in Charge informed all of these officers that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not equipped to take over the exclusive investigation of Japanese espionage matters because of a lack of translators, language students and informants among the Japanese populace. The Special Agent in Charge further informed these gentlemen that the Office of Naval Intelligence had agreed to carry on the Japanese work primarily until such time as the Federal Bureau of Investigation was able to take it over.

[7] These conversations have taken place from time to time at the Weekly Intelligence Conferences which the Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu and the above named individuals held.

I am attaching for your information a copy of the delimitation agreement which was finally drafted to incorporate all existing memoranda and understandings. You will note that on page four under the caption "ONI will be responsible for:" is the provision "2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories enumerated in Paragraph I." (i. e. espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage) Likewise, under the caption "FBI will be responsible for:" you will notice that paragraph four provides "Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field." It appears evident from the last quoted sentence that the Office of Naval Intelligence was clearly recognized as having the primary responsibility for Japanese coverage even as of February 9, 1942.

Following the Presidential directive referred to previously, weekly conferences were held at Hawaii between the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Office of this Bureau and the officers in charge of the local offices of G-2 and ONI. These conferences, which were quite informal, offered an excellent medium of coordination, and it was the practice of those present to freely discuss all recent developments regardless of whether the matter under discussion might be strictly within the investigative jurisdiction of any particular agency present. In this regard, it should be noted that daily liaison was maintained, particularly with Colonel George W. Bicknell whose offices were located immediately adjacent to the offices occupied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Special Agent in Charge Shivers and Colonel Bicknell were on intimate personal terms and their contacts throughout the day were frequent. It was in accordance with my instructions that all reports of an intelligence nature with respect to Hawaii were furnished

to appropriate representatives of the War Department, both at Washington, D. C. and Honolulu. Four times yearly a review was made of all intelligence activities and trends entitled "Quarterly Intelligence Summary". This was likewise furnished to the War Department at Washington, D. C. The last such report furnished immediately prior to December 7, 1941, was one dated November 15, 1941. I am attaching hereto for your information a copy of a portion of that report (pages 928-942) which I think is pertinent to the matter under consideration.

HONOLULU FIELD OFFICE

The Honolulu Field Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was originally opened in April of 1931. This office was closed in May of 1934, and was again reopened in August of 1937. The office was again closed April 30, 1938, due to the insufficiency of funds to continue its operation.

[8] Up to this time, the personnel of the Honolulu Office consisted merely of the Agent in Charge and one stenographer. The office was reopened again with Mr. R. L. Shivers as Special Agent in Charge in August of 1939. After this office was opened, three Agents, including Mr. Shivers, and one stenographer were assigned to this Field Division, this force being shortly thereafter augmented with the addition of two stenographers.

In June of 1940, six additional Agents and two additional stenographers were assigned to the Honolulu Office, making a total Agent force of nine, and a stenographic force of five. One Agent was designated as Resident Agent at Hilo, Hawaii. The force was steadily increased so that in June of 1941 the investigative personnel including the Agent in Charge, numbered fourteen.

On December 7, 1941, there was a total of sixteen Special Agents, including the Agent in Charge, and nine clerical employees assigned to the office.

JAPANESE CONSULAR AGENTS

As a result of a survey conducted by the Honolulu Field Office, the results of which were, of course, made available to the War and Navy Departments, both at Hawaii and in Washington, it was ascertained that there were over 200 Japanese Consular Agents present in the Hawaiian Islands at one time, the number of which varied greatly due to immigration, appointments, resignations and deaths. The activities of the Japanese Consular Agents in the Hawaiian Islands were the subject of considerable concern to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division submitted the following letter dated September 3, 1940:

"There is being transmitted herewith a list of Japanese acting as consular agents within the Territory of Hawaii for the local Japanese Consul. It is observed in the Act governing the registration of agents of foreign principals and of foreign governments that these are exempted from its provisions—

'... any member of the staff of or person employed by a duly accredited diplomatic or consular officer of a foreign government who is so recognized by the Department of State of the United States, other than a public relations counsel or publicity agent, whose status and the character of whose duties as such member or employee are of record in the Department of State of the United States.'

"It is requested that it be ascertained of the Department of State whether or not the names, status, and character of duties of the aforementioned consular agents are of record in the Department of State. If not, it is desired to know whether such consular agents can be considered to fall within the scope of the Act. If it is determined that [9] "these consular agents are not subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, as such, would their status be changed in any respect so that they would come within the purview of this Act, provided they are engaged in disseminating propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese Government?

"It has been learned from a confidential source that one of the consular agents telephoned to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and asked a representative of the Consulate if he should register under the terms of the Allen Registration Act. The member of the Consulate staff advised the Consular agent that he was not subject to the terms of this act and should not register because he was a diplomatic officer under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Foreign Office.

"These consular agents are scattered throughout the Hawaiian Islands and the Bureau can readily see that they constitute a source of information over wide

areas, which if used for espionage purposes would be in a position to furnish the consulate invaluable information on fleet movements, army posts, and all general information that would be of value to the Japanese Government.

"In the event it is determined that any or all of these consular agents are subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, this office desires to conduct an immediate investigation for the purpose of ascertaining their activities looking toward a prosecution of those consular agents who have violated the terms of the Registration Act by not having registered as prescribed.

"While this office is not aware of the full extent of the duties of the consular agents, it is believed that they are required to look after the interests of the Japanese populace in their respective communities, to keep alive the Japanese spirit, and to do the bidding of the Japanese consulate. They are undoubtedly looked upon by the Japanese populace as representatives of the Japanese consulate and the Japanese Government and the Emperor of Japan and for that reason wield considerable influence in determining the actions and molding the thought of the Japanese populace in Hawaii, especially among the alien element."

This matter was taken up with the State Department which advised that none of these consuls were notified pursuant to Section 233, Title 22, United States Code, which requires all agents of foreign governments to be notified to the Secretary of State. A letter was addressed to Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, dated September 28, 1940, which read as follows:

[10] There is enclosed a list of Japanese acting as consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii for the Japanese Consul at Honolulu.

"Will you please inform me whether the names, status, and character of the duties of these individuals as consular agents, are of record in your department.

"Can you also advise me whether these consular agents come within the purview of the Registration Act. If it is your opinion that they do not come within the purview of this act, would their status be changed in any respect if they are engaged in the dissemination of propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese Government?

"Since these individuals may come to the attention of the Honolulu Field Division of this Bureau from time to time, and that Division may desire to conduct some investigation into their activities, will you also please advise me whether these individuals are subject to diplomatic immunity?"

Under date of October 14, 1940, this Bureau received a letter from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., which read as follows:

"I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 28, 1940 enclosing a list of Japanese acting as consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii for the Japanese Consul at Honolulu.

"In reply to your inquiry, I have to inform you that none of the individuals named is on record in the Department of State as a member of the diplomatic or consular service of a foreign government, nor is any of them registered with the Secretary of State pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 8, 1938, as amended, requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals.

"If the individuals named are agents of, receive compensation from, or are under the direction of the Japanese Consul, the Japanese Government, or any other foreign principal as that term is defined in the first section of the Act of June 8, 1938, as amended, and are engaged in activities not within the exceptions to the provisions of the Act, they would be considered subject to the requirement of registration.

"The individuals named are not considered entitled to diplomatic immunity, and the Department has no objection to such investigation of their activities as the Federal Bureau of Investigation may desire to make."

[11] After the above fact had been determined with regard to a number of these consular agents, and it was felt that all Consular agents were acting in similar capacities, the matter of prosecution of them was presented to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, first in the case of Yoshio Koike on March 31, 1941. This memorandum is as follows:

"I am in receipt of information from the Honolulu Field Division that it is in possession of a certificate of appointment of Yoshio Koike as a Consular Agent in January of 1936. This individual is not now acting in that capacity.

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"There is enclosed a photostatic copy of this certificate. A free translation of this certificate is as follows:

THE JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL AT HONOLULU

YOSHIO KOIKE is authorized to be an agent to receive the various requests and applications of the residents of the Onomea District for the next two years.

JANUARY, 1938.

Imperial Consul General at Honolulu

The seal is said to be that of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu.

"The Honolulu Office believes that all Consular Agents in Hawaii and the mainland of the United States have similar certificates. These Consular Agents are required to follow certain set of rules which are as follows:

1. Notice to Agents:

Term of office is two years, starting in January 1938 and ending December, 1939.

2. Any change of residence or leave for Japan:

The Consulate is to be immediately notified. For failure to do so the appointment will be revoked and another appointed.

3. The scope of the agent's activities is restricted to his residential district and if any agent changes his residence to another district the appointment will be revoked.

4. The agent will cooperate.'

[12] "It is the understanding of the Honolulu Field Division that these Agents are not paid any salary by the Japanese Government but are remunerated by fees charged the person requiring their services.

"I am advised by a representative of the State Department that Yoshio Koike was not notified to the Secretary of State as a Consular Agent or as an agent of Japan at the time he was issued this certificate.

"Since it appears that many of these Japanese Consular Agents may not be notified to the Secretary of State, is it your opinion that these individuals who occupy a position similar to that occupied by Yoshio Koike and engaged in the same activities are violating Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign governments to be notified to the Secretary of State? Or do these individuals come within the exception to this statute which states that diplomatic or Consular officers or attaches do not have to be notified? If these individuals do not have to be notified under Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, do they have to register as agents of foreign principals under Section 233 a to g, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign principals to be registered with the Secretary of State? It would appear that they do not come within the exceptions of this statute which state that the term 'agent of a foreign principal' does not mean:

'(1) A duly accredited diplomatic or Consular officer of a foreign government who is so recognized by the Department of State of the United States; or

'(2) Any official of a foreign government recognized by the United States as a government, other than a public relations counsel or publicity agent, or a citizen of the United States whose status and the character of whose duties as such official are of record in the Department of State of the United States.'

"This is particularly true since the State Department advises that Yoshio Koike was never notified to the Secretary of State as an agent of Japan, or as a Consular Agent."

The Consular Agents' cases were again presented to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice on April 7, 1941, in the case Itsuo Hamada in the following memorandum:

"There is enclosed a copy of the report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Honolulu, T. H., dated March 10, 1941.

[13] "I am informed by the Honolulu Field Division that there are approximately 234 individuals in Honolulu who are acting as Consular Agents in a capacity similar to that of Itsuo Hamada. Will you please advise me whether the information as developed with regard to Itsuo Hamada will justify the prosecution of this individual for violation of Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign Governments to be notified to the Secretary of State, or if his activities are such as will justify prosecution of this individual for violation of Section 233 a to g, Title 22, U. S. Code, requiring agents of foreign principals to be registered with the Secretary of State.

"A prompt reply to this memorandum will be appreciated inasmuch as it will serve to determine what investigation should be made in the cases of the other 234 Consular Agents in the Hawaiian Islands."

The reports concerning the activities of Itsuo Hamada and Yoshio Koike, as well as the reports concerning the activities of their fellow consuls, were made available to the War Department in Hawaii and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.

On June 2, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation received the following radiogram from the Honolulu Field Division:

"JAPANESE CONSULAR AGENTS TERRITORY OF HAWAII. DEPARTMENT HAS REQUESTED OPINION OF U. S. D. A. HERE REGARDING PROSECUTION UNDER REGISTRATION ACT OF TWO HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR CONSULAR AGENTS. U. S. D. A. WIRED DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDING IMMEDIATE PROSECUTION AND ADVISING THAT THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER OF THE U S ARMY HAWAIIAN ISLANDS WAS OPPOSED TO SUCH ACTION AT THIS TIME ON GROUNDS IT MIGHT RESULT IN UNFAVORABLE ACTION ON PART OF JAPANESE COMMUNITIES ALTHOUGH SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH ANY PLANS OF THE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE ISLANDS."

On June 23, 1941, the Bureau was advised by the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division in a letter as follows:

"Reference is made to the radiogram sent to the Bureau dated June 2, 1941, stating that the Attorney General's Office of the Department had requested an opinion from the United States Attorney at Honolulu regarding prosecution under the Registration Act of the 234 Japanese Consular Agents in Hawaii.

"As stated in the aforementioned wire, Mr. ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr., the Acting United States Attorney here, wired the Department recommending immediate prosecution but advised at the same time that Lieutenant General WALTER SHORT, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, was opposed to such action at this time on the grounds that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese community, although such action would not interfere with any plans of the Hawaiian Department for the defense of the islands.

[14] "The United States Attorney is in receipt of a further communication from the Department requesting to be advised if there has been any change in the opinion of General SHORT concerning this matter and requesting to be advised of the practical effect of his opposition.

"Acting U. S. Attorney ANGUS TAYLOR has informed me that he has communicated with General SHORT through Lieutenant Colonel H. W. MARSTON, who is in charge of the Military Intelligence Office for the Hawaiian Department, and has been informed that the General has not changed his opinion in this matter and will actively oppose the prosecution of these individuals by recommending to the War Department, if necessary, that the matter be taken up with the Attorney General with a view of preventing the arrest and prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents at this time.

"As I understand it, the primary objective of General SHORT is that since the Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1939, he does not believe it would be considered fair play if the Government should at this time arrest the 234 Japanese Consular Agents who have been acting as such since the enactment of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands.

"I am informed by the United States Attorney that he will present the opinion of General SHORT to the Department and will again reiterate his recommendation that the Department authorize prosecution against the Consular Agents."

On July 1, 1941, the following memorandum was sent to the Department of Justice by me:

"I am in receipt of a communication from the Special agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division in which he advises that although the Acting United States Attorney in Honolulu has approved the prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents, Lieutenant General Walter Short, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, has opposed this action on the ground that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese community.

"I am informed that the primary objection of General Short is that since the Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1939, he does not believe it would be considered fair play if the Government should at this time arrest the 234 Japanese Consular Agents who have been acting as such since the enactment

of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands.

[15] "This is furnished you for your information. Of course, the investigations to date have been based on the proposition that these individuals are acting as agents of a foreign government who have not been notified to the Secretary of State, which statute is Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, this statute being enacted in 1917."

On July 14, 1941, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, in response to inquiry previously made of it by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, advised as follows:

"Reference is made to your memorandum dated July 1, 1941, in the above entitled matter.

"For your information, the Department of State has advised the Department that these individuals are not considered to have the status of diplomatic or consular officers or attaches and the Department of State perceives no objection to the contemplated prosecution of these individuals for violation of Section 233 of Title 22 of the United States Code.

"Although the Criminal Division is now prepared to authorize the prosecution of certain of these Japanese Consular Agents, it seems that the objection of Lieutenant General Walter Short, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, must be given consideration. Accordingly, the Criminal Division has advised the Secretary of War of the facts and its recommendation that prosecution in a certain number of these cases be instituted without further delay."

On August 4, 1941, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice forwarded copies of a letter dated July 25, 1941, with its enclosure from the Secretary of War concerning these Consular Agents. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised that the Criminal Division was not "prepared at this time to authorize the prosecution of these Agents, but still has the matter under consideration." The enclosures forwarded by the Criminal Division are as follows:

"Upon receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941, on the subject of the prosecution of certain unregistered Japanese Consular Agents in the Territory of Hawaii I dispatched a secret radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to radio his recommendations stating clearly his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecutions.

"A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto.

"I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be issued to these unregistered Japanese Consular Agents, through their accredited Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period of thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution for violation of our laws.

[16] "I believe that such a warning will effect the desired registration and contribute materially toward the Commanding General's campaign to secure the loyalty of the Japanese population of the Territory."

The paraphrased copy of the radiogram is as follows:

"Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 9:58, July 22, 1941

"Hawaii, filed July 21, 1941.

"We are at present engaged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object is to encourage loyalty of the Japanese population of Hawaii on promise of fair treatment. The present outlook of results of this campaign on entire population is very favorable. Success of the campaign would promote unity and greatly reduce proportions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 referred to in your radio of July 19, 1941 has been in effect here since August 1939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey of situation, considering available facts and opinions FBI and other Federal agencies I believe not over ten per cent of the unregistered consular agents in Hawaii are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that prosecution at this time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population.

"In my opinion fair play demands that warning be given to consular agents to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few

individuals. It is impractical to place total Japanese population of one hundred sixty thousand in concentration camps."

"SHORT"

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, from April 7, 1941, by various memoranda had requested the Criminal Division for opinions as to prosecution with regard to various other consular agents. The Criminal Division was followed on numerous occasions in an attempt to prosecute these individuals without success, due primarily to the fact that the War Department had interposed objections to prosecution as set out above.

In August, 1941, the Criminal Division, in nearly all cases of this type, was asked to advise if it was its intention to institute prosecution of these various individuals, and in September replies were received from the Criminal Division that a decision as to the authorization of prosecution was still under consideration by the Department of Justice, the United States Attorney at Honolulu, and other interested agencies.

[17] From the very beginning of the investigation of these individuals of Japanese nationality, it was thought that they might be engaged in activities dangerous to the internal security of the island, for on one occasion, that of Reverend Unji Hirayama, Japanese Consular Agent on the Island of Maui, a confidential informant had advised that this individual had been requested by a member of the Japanese Consulate to keep this member of the Consulate informed as to the movements of the United States fleet in the vicinity of Maui. This information was from an unimpeachable source which could not be used in evidence.

On October 3, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation directed a letter to the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division, advising him to conduct immediate, thorough investigations of all of the Japanese Consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii to determine if they were engaged in espionage, subversive, or propaganda activities in an effort to develop information of this character which would overcome the objections of the War Department to prosecution. On receipt of this letter, the Special Agent in Charge immediately assigned five Special Agents exclusively to the further investigation of these Japanese Consular agents for the purpose of carrying out the foregoing instructions. All reports submitted were furnished to ONI and G-2, both in Honolulu and Washington, D. C.

When the United States Attorney at Honolulu informed Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers, on or about June 20, 1941, that he had been instructed by the Department of Justice to furnish his opinion as to the prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents, he conferred with the Special Agent in Charge, who furnished him with the facts and reports developed to that time concerning the activities of these agents. The Special Agent in Charge at that time informed Captain I. H. Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, Honolulu, Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston, War Department, G-2, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, at a conference with these individuals that the United States Attorney had been requested to submit his opinion concerning the prosecution of the Consular agents. The Special Agent in Charge asked these Naval and Military authorities their opinion on prosecution, and, speaking individually for themselves, each person present, including the Special Agent in Charge, was of the opinion that the Consular agents should be prosecuted.

Captain Mayfield of Naval Intelligence and Colonel Marston of Army Intelligence stated that while that was their personal opinions they could not speak for their respective Commanders, who were at that time Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Navy, and General Walter C. Short for the Army. The Special Agent in Charge stated to these representatives that it was a criminal prosecution which should be determined solely by the United States Attorney and he assumed that the Commandant of the Navy Yard and the Commanding General of the Army would regard it as a criminal prosecution with which they would not attempt to interfere.

The day following this conference Captain I. H. Mayfield informed the United States Attorney that Admiral Claude C. Bloch looked upon the matter as purely a criminal proceeding over which he had no jurisdiction and with which he would not attempt to interfere, but that it was his personal opinion the Consular Agents should be prosecuted. Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston reported to the United States Attorney the following day that Lieutenant General Walter C. Short was opposed to prosecuting the Consular agents for the reasons here-

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inbefore set out, and if necessary to prevent it, would communicate with the War Department in Washington.

[18]

TELEPHONE COVERAGE

In order to be properly advised of all attempted espionage activity, this Bureau, deeming that war with Japan and Axis powers was imminent, felt it desirable to monitor all long distance telephone conversations between Hawaii and Japan.

Under instructions of the Attorney General, the FBI cannot install telephone taps except with the personal authorization of the Attorney General. In order to accomplish this purpose a memorandum was submitted to the Attorney General on September 2, 1941, for authority to install a technical surveillance which would insure this coverage. This authority was not granted by the Attorney General until October 22, 1941.

It is believed that if an earlier coverage had been effected, much information of value might have been obtained for the results thereof, after this installation, were extremely satisfactory. For instance, the Honolulu Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as a result of this surveillance, received information that at about 5:00 p. m. on Friday, December 5, 1941, Motokazi Mori of Honolulu talked by telephone to an unidentified relative in Japan.

A transcript of this telephone call is as follows, and the parentheses including the letters "J" and "H" preceding each recorded conversation indicate "J" for Japan and "H" for Honolulu:

(J) Hello, is this Mori?

(H) Hello, this is Mori.

(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all.

(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?

(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.

(J) Are they large planes?

(H) Yes, they are quite big.

(J) Are they flying from morning till night?

(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.

(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?

(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of [19] this year and the ending part of last year.

(J) Is that so?

(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.

(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?

(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.

(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?

(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.

(J) That's fine.

(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) Has there been any increase in ---?--- of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.

(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.

(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?

(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and

plumbers. Students at the high schools and university have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

[20] J. Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seems to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

(J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H). No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

[21] (J) Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't (know if) all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now. (J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

[22] (J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamune"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

[23] (H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) off phone.

It is noted that this telephone conversation lasted approximately eighteen minutes and appeared to have some hidden meaning, in view of the language used, the topics discussed, in themselves being of a character which would not ordinarily warrant the expense incurred on this particular occasion.

The Japanese translator of our Honolulu Office completed the translation of this telephone conversation at about 2:00 p. m. on December 6, 1941. Copies of the full text of the conversation, after being translated, were furnished to representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence. These translations were submitted to Captain I. H. Mayfield and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell of the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, Hawaii. The Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Office telephoned the Office of Naval Intelligence at about 2:00 p. m., December 6, for Captain I. H. Mayfield, who was not in. The Special Agent in Charge then talked to Lieutenant Denzel Carr, Japanese expert in the Office of Naval Intelligence, informing him that a call had just been translated which appeared to the Special Agent in Charge to be very important.

Lieutenant Carr was furnished with the substance of the Mori conversation over the telephone and was requested to get in touch with Captain Mayfield immediately as the Special Agent in Charge believed he would want to take up the contents of the call with his superiors. The Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu had been advised several days before December 6 by Captain Mayfield of the Naval Intelligence Office that the Navy was in possession of secret information through which they would be able to know when Japan would move and the direction this move would take. Captain Mayfield informed the Special Agent in Charge, "If I suddenly call you some night and say I am moving to the West,

you will know that Japan is going into the Malaya; and if I say I am moving over on the North side, you will know Japan is going to move against Russia." Captain Mayfield stated that the Navy had secret information as to how this knowledge and information would be furnished by Japan, indicating that it was some code message in Japanese broadcasts. Not knowing the full import [24] of the manner in which Japanese movements would be indicated and not having been furnished with the full information by Captain Mayfield, the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu felt that strange portions of the Mori conversation might be the key which would indicate Japanese movements.

The Special Agent in Charge also contacted Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell of the Army about 5:00 p. m. at his home in Aiea Heights, informing him that a very important message had been intercepted between Japan and Honolulu, and requesting him to come to the office immediately to get a copy of the message as it was believed he would want to take it up with his superior officers.

The Special Agent in Charge and Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Honolulu Office, who had been conducting Japanese surveys and investigations in Honolulu, pointed out to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell on December 6, 1941, what appeared to be significant statements in this conversation, and stated particularly the belief that the references to flowers indicated some purpose of being able to locate the Island, and the fact that it appeared highly unreasonable that anyone in Japan spending the money to talk to Honolulu for eighteen minutes would discuss flowers, the weather and the climate, also pointing out the significance of the inquiry about when and at what times the patrol planes went out and came in.

Captain Mayfield stated he was sure there was some hidden message which would be of value if they could only decode it, but that there was nothing in the message in line with previous information indicating Japanese movements.

It appears, and seems probable now, that the flowers hibiscus and poinsettia, mentioned in the conversation, may have referred to battleships and cruisers, as there were no cruisers in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

[25]

CABLE COVERAGE

As far as it is known to this Bureau no governmental agency tapped cable wires in or out of Hawaii. The only cable facilities available were those of the Commercial Pacific Cable Company. This company declined to make available to any of the intelligence agencies the content of any messages sent to or from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and Japan. The Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu never received prior to December 7, 1941, copies of any messages sent by cable. The commercial companies by which ordinary wires were sent to and from Japan, such as the RCA Communications Company, the Mackay Radio Company, and the Globe Wireless Company, all transmitted their messages by radio.

The managers of these companies all refused to make available the content of messages to and from Japan, sent or received by the Japanese Consul. They likewise refused to furnish this information to the other intelligence agencies. However, in November of 1941, the Office of Naval Intelligence, through Captain I. H. Mayfield and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant of the Honolulu Navy Yard, did arrange with Mr. George Saranoff, President of RCA, while he was in Honolulu, to have the local manager furnish ONI with all telegrams to and from Japan, sent or received by the Japanese Consul, effective as of December 1, 1941. On February 12, 1942, the Honolulu Office first learned that ONI had obtained the messages from December 1 to 4 on December 5, 1941. At no time prior to December 7, 1941, did the FBI receive copies of these messages.

While it is not definitely known, this Bureau received indications at least that the Army Signal Corps was engaging in intercept activity, monitoring short-wave messages going to and from Honolulu, including those sent by RCA, Globe Wireless, and Mackay Radio Company. The FBI's belief is based on conversations held by FBI officials with representatives of the Army and the Navy. Two instances substantiating this belief are as follows:

1. On January 16, 1941, my assistant, Mr. E. A. Tamm, submitted a memorandum to me advising that he had been talking to Captain Nixon and Colonel Lester, at which time he referred to the Japanese intercept stations for Japanese messages in the Hawaiian Islands. These individuals had assured him that this Bureau was receiving the results of all matters of interest to the FBI

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which were obtained through these intercepts. At that time there was some discussion of adopting some type of code symbols which would indicate whether the information furnished this Bureau was obtained through an intercepted communication or otherwise. No agreement was reached with regard thereto at that time. Mr. Tamm advised that this discussion with Colonel Lester and Captain Nixon dealt with intercepts concerning strictly ship movements and not commercial messages.

[26] 2. The FBI was advised by reliable sources in Hawaii that the Army was intercepting messages, but that this was an Army secret and that intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decoding. Advice was further received from a reliable source in Hawaii by the FBI that the Army and Navy were operating intercept stations in the City of Honolulu for the purpose of intercepting radio traffic between the Orient and the United States, particularly Japan. Information was received also indicating that the intercept stations operated by the Navy were primarily for the purpose of intercepting radio messages relating to Japanese fleet movements and that this activity did not include amateur radio bands.

The Federal Communications Commission had operated stations at Honolulu for at least a year prior to December 7, 1941. The scope of their activity was not known to the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu. At no time prior to December 7, 1941, did the FBI Field Office in Honolulu ever receive any intercepted messages from ONI, G-2, or the Federal Communications Commission.

On April 28, 1941, the Honolulu Field Division in a letter entitled "Weekly Conferences, FBI, ONI and G-2" advised the following:

"The question of Army and Navy jurisdiction in the matter of radio censorship was discussed and the method and manner of monitoring radio broadcasts from Tokyo direct to the Hawaiian Islands was discussed. These programs are being recorded by the Federal Communications Commission Monitoring Station at Honolulu and arrangements will be made through Colonel Bicknell of G-2 to obtain the use of these records for transcription and translation, copies of the translations to be made available to the FBI and ONI.

"Captain Mayfield stated that he has outlined the intended setup in the censorship of radio which will be necessary in the event the United States is embroiled in the present conflict. Captain Mayfield has already requested a large increase in personnel to handle this work and it is particularly noted that at the time of this conference some of the officers requested had already been assigned to the office of ONI at Honolulu for this purpose and it appeared that the Navy is proceeding at this time with the completion of the personnel and the complete censorship of radio."

[27] A similar letter dated May 5, 1941, contains the following:

"The question of Japanese broadcasts over JZK from Tokyo was brought up and it was brought out that the Federal Communications Commission is monitoring that particular broadcast. The broadcast is for a period of 15 minutes in English and then for about an hour in Japanese. It is a broadcast from Tokyo specifically to the Japanese residing in Hawaii. The FCC makes transcriptions of the English and Japanese broadcasts and furnishes the Japanese transcription to Washington for translation. It was decided that the agencies represented should make an effort to get the FCC to permit us to transcribe and translate these broadcasts. It was agreed that the FBI would transcribe the English broadcasts and that ONI would transcribe and translate the Japanese broadcasts. A sufficient number of copies will be furnished to FCC to forward to its headquarters in Washington, and sufficient copies will be furnished ONI, G-2, and the FBI for the respective offices use and transmission to Washington."

The above-mentioned monitoring was confined solely to news flashes and news broadcasts directed at the Hawaiian Islands by the radio in Tokyo.

For about a period of two weeks thereafter the FBI in Honolulu did transcribe the English broadcasts by having a stenographer listen to the records furnished by FCC and type up the content. Thereafter the Office of Naval Intelligence took over the whole project in order to release the FBI employee for other more important work.

EVIDENCE OF MATERIAL WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED IF BUREAU HAD ACCESS TO TELEGRAPH COMMUNICATIONS

The telegram file of the Japanese Consul was found at the Consulate when the police guard was established about noon of December 7, 1941. This telegram file was not complete, but it has been translated and decoded.

On December 20, 1941, the Mackay Radio Company at Honolulu, on the direction of the Military Governor of Honolulu, turned over to the Federal [28] Bureau of Investigation all telegrams sent to and received from Japan during the month of November, 1941. Since the attack, all messages sent via Globe Wireless Company to and from Japan for the period from December 1 to December 7, 1941, were furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

From these messages it is apparent that the Consulate at Honolulu was very active in keeping the Japanese Government advised concerning the military, diplomatic and naval activities of the United States. Illustrations of the type of material which was sent and could have been obtained had the proper coverage been afforded are set out below. It will be recalled that Nagao Kita, mentioned in the succeeding messages, is Consul General of the Japanese Government at Honolulu.

NR 66

21 MARCH 1941

From: KITA

To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO

According to despatches from Auckland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cummins, Tucker arrived at Auckland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland and the destroyer Clark, Cassin, Cunningham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sidney—both groups on a friendly visit X The first group departed from Auckland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor X It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane X Today's newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by 'outsiders' (gaihu) until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was reported.

NR 96

21 APRIL 1941

From: KITA

To: GAIMUDALJIN TOKIO

President Roosevelt's eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt together with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed for Manila on the 21st X The local newspapers said that both men said that any statement as to destination or mission must first come from Washington X Perhaps is Chungking.

NR 104

29 APRIL 1941

From: KITA

To: GAIMUDALJIN TOKIO

[29] The American Army transport Washington with 2500 troops and 24,300 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 26th via Panama and San Francisco X After unloading 2000 troops 12 student pilots and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th it is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

NR 115

14 MAY 1941.

From: KITA.

To: GAIMADAINJIN TOKIO.

With respect to message No 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reenforcing the local airforce 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut General Emmons departed San Fran at 1559 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

NR 134

7 JUNE 1941.

From: KITA.

To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO.

Inf: AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON.

1. On the fourth received word from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy no extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.

2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units of the fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods X The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.

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NR 140

13 JUNE 1941.

From: KITA.

To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO.

Inf (have forwarded by mail to San Francisco and Manila).

Ref San Francisco Msg #92

SS Pres Pierce with about nine hundred Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the eleventh and sailed the twelfth.

[30] NO. 147

27 JUNE 1941.

From: KITA.

To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKYO.

Chungking Burma Road—Trucks.

NO. 149

26 JUNE 1941.

From: KITA.

To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKYO.

Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

From: KITA.

12-8-41

To: FM TOKYO. #363.

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.

364

12-4-41

From KITA.

To: FM TOKYO.

Pm/3rd one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X approximately 1100 tons one stack one four inch gun FWD and AFT X fueled?

Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British consulate.

#365

12-4-41

From: KITA.

To: FM TOKYO

USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th.

[31] #368

6 DEC. 41.

From: KITA.

To: F. M. TOKYO.

Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

No. 369

6 DEC. 1941.

From: KITA.

To: WASHINGTON-TOKYO.

On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and one sweeper entered port.

Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

BB-9

CL-3

DD-17

am-8

Ships in dock:

CL-4

DD-2

(CA AND CV ALL ———)

PS-OV CANNOT BE FOUND IN THE FLEET (?)."

I have been advised that the symbols used in the quoted messages are those used by the Navy in referring to units of its fleet and are as follows:

- [32] BB—Battle Ships.
- CL—Light Cruisers.
- DD—Destroyers.
- AM—Mine Sweepers.
- CA—Heavy Cruisers.
- CV—Aircraft Carriers.

I regret that my absence from the city on the dates mentioned in your letter will make it impossible for me to discuss these matters with you personally. However, I hope that the foregoing will adequately serve the needs of your inquiry at this time. In the event you desire any elaboration on any of the points covered in this letter, I will be glad to have Assistant Director D. M. Ladd appear before you to discuss them with you.

Enclosures

[1]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FEBRUARY 9, 1942.

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division
The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President's Memorandum of June 28, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, and the supplemental interpretation and agreements thereunder. It is now agreed that responsibility for investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage, (hereinafter referred to as "these categories") will be delimited as indicated hereafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the reporting agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the categories involving civilians in the United States and its territories with the exception of the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoas, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands and the Territory of Alaska other than that specifically described in Paragraph III.

[2] 2. Investigation of all cases directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigations of designated group or set of circumstances.

3. The coordination of civilian organizations furnishing information regarding subversive movements.

4. Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

5. Keep MID and ONI advised of important developments, such as:

(a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.

(b) Cases of actual and strongly presumptive espionage and sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

(c) Developments affecting vital utilities.

(d) Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communication systems.

(for c and d above, no protective coverage is contemplated)

6. Ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat Fifth Column Activities (overt acts of all sorts in groups of armed forces of enemies); and transmitting to MID, ONI and

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State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

[3] 7. Keeping ONI and MID informed of any other important developments.

III. MID will be responsible for:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the military establishment including civilian employ, military reserve and military control.

2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Philippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands adjacent including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to Kvichak Bay.

3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments.

[4] IV. ONI will be responsible for:

1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval establishment, including civilians under Naval employ or control, and all civilians in Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake, and Midway Islands.

2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories enumerated in Paragraph I.

ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore, and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

3. Informing FBI and MID of any important developments.

V. The ultimate test of cooperation and coordination of the Intelligence agencies is the manner in which they function under conditions of national emergency or actual warfare. There should be no doubt as to the identity of the agency or official who is primarily responsible for carrying on intelligence operations under the broad conditions for which the governing principles are listed hereinafter.

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

VI. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the Military Commander assumes responsibility for Intelligence coverage. He has authority to coordinate intelligence activities of the participating agencies within the limits of their available personnel and facilities by the assignment of missions, the designation [5] of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies to which he does not belong, nor to issue instructions to such agencies beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

VII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. The subscribing agencies will render such aid and assistance to the Military Commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. All pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to him shall be furnished by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. The headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the Military Commander.

VIII. It is assumed that the Military Commander will not hesitate to call upon any governmental agency outside the three subscribing agencies to this agreement for any assistance, cooperation, or activity.

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTEREST, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

IX. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theatres of operation. When a Military Commander of such a potential theatre is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the Military Commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

[6] 1. Agents of the FBI, of ONI, and of MID will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs II, III, and IV.

2. In addition thereto the Military Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the

benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.

3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

[7] X. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the Commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that his service is authorized to augment the coverage. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agency, the Military Commander should obtain the necessary authority from the War Department.

XI. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the Military Commander, whenever either of the other two services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended through the director of each service.

XII. The above provisions contemplate that the War Department will be the agency administering martial law. When appropriate, the same principles will govern the Navy Department.

PERIODS OF NORMAL CONDITIONS

XIII. Under these conditions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division will operate in accord with the provisions of paragraphs II, III and IV.

XIV. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this delimitation agreement. Such amendments or modifications when agreed upon by the heads of the [8] subscribing agencies shall be issued in the form of a revised delimitation agreement and not as separate instructions.

RAYMOND E. LEE

Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, War Department.

T. S. WILKINSON,

Director, Office of Naval Intelligence.

J. EDGAR HOOVER

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

JAPANESE ACTIVITIES HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

The information set forth below will supplement the information contained in the Bulletin dated May 15, 1941, pages 891 through 897.

The predominant racial group in the Territory of Hawaii is the Japanese, who constitute 37.3 per cent of the population, or 157,905 persons, to which must be added the residents of the Korean race who are in fact Japanese nationals although usually anti-Japanese in sympathy and action. This group composes 1.6 per cent of the people in Hawaii, or 6,851 persons. The Japanese races therefore total 164,756 persons or 38.9 per cent of the total population of Hawaii, 423,330 persons. These figures are based on a report compiled from the returns of the Sixteenth Decennial Census of the United States by the Bureau of Census.

Data obtained through the registration of aliens in compliance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940 reveal that there are 41,346 aliens of the Japanese race, or Japanese nationals, residing in Hawaii.

The alien Japanese are disposed to organize almost every conceivable purpose, a psychological characteristic apparently brought with them from Japan, and it can be safely assumed that every Japanese alien resident in Hawaii belongs to one or more purely Japanese organizations. An effort has been made to separate these innocuous groups from organizations which are potentially in a position to engage in acts which might be inimical to the best interests of the United States. A study of these organizations existing in the Territory of Hawaii has brought out that their influence or authority flows in five distinct channels which are interlocked through the duplication of activity, the plurality of positions held by many individual Japanese such as a Buddhist priest being also principal of a Japanese Language School and a Consular Agent or an officer or member of an organization appearing in another category. These five major channels of influence have been previously mentioned in the Bulletin dated May 15, 1941.

It has been determined that each of these channels is at least strongly influenced, if not directly controlled, by groups of similar type and purpose within Japan. The consular organization is obviously controlled by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the religious sects and organizations supervised by the headquarters of each individual sect in Japan, which is, in turn, under Japanese Governmental supervision. A large number of the groups organized for social purposes are the so-called prefectural societies, comparable to American state societies, which are in direct contact with the home prefecture of their members. The educational organization has, at least, a liaison connection with the Japanese Imperial Educational Association which has seen fit to confer honors upon local Japanese educators. The business houses are tied to Japan by reason of their being branches of Japanese firms in many instances and in all cases importers of Japanese goods. The Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce was until lately a branch of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Tokyo, Japan, and the Hilo, Hawaii, Japanese Chamber an associate but not a member as evidenced by the directory of the organization within Japan. The Overseas Japanese Central Society, as a liaison agency for all Japanese residing in countries foreign to Japan, is connected with all Japanese organizations in the United States, particularly with organizations of a civic type and in their contact with Japan.

CONSULAR ORGANIZATION

The center of the consular organization, as well as alien Japanese activity, in the Territory of Hawaii is belived to be in the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu. This Consul General, Nago Kita, has a staff of nine persons, including a Vice-Consul, Chancellor, two Secretaries and five Clerks. In addition to these the Consul General is in constant contact with six prominent local Japanese who have been termed his "Advisory Council."

It has been learned that the Japanese Consulate when desiring that certain instructions or news be disseminated among the Japanese in Hawaii communicates with the more prominent Japanese societies, they being the United Japanese Society of Honolulu, the Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the Hilo Japanese Chamber of Commerce, and the Hilo Japanese Society, as well as the Japanese Press, which follows the directions of the Consulate.

The largest and most ramified group under the direction of the Consul General is that of the "Consular Agents" or "Toritsuginin." There are presently 219 of these agents so situated geographically as to form a comprehensive information system for the Japanese Consulate. These men are in all instances alien Japanese, well educated and above the average in intelligence. Some investigation has been conducted concerning these Consular Agents and it has been determined that one is the holder of the Eight Court Rank, Senior Grade of Imperial Japan, and that at least one other is a Reserve Officer in the Japanese Army. Further, information has been received indicating that many of them are non-quota aliens engaged as Buddhist priests and principals or teachers in the Japanese Language Schools.

These Consular Agents are distributed among the islands according to the following table:

Hawaii	72
Maul	48
Kauai	46
Oahu	48
Molokai	4
Lanai	2
Total	219

It will be noted from the above that all of the islands are well supplied with Japanese Agents, and it is interesting to note in connection with the denials of many of these Consular Agents that they are under the control of Consul General, that there are none located in the city of Honolulu proper where the Consulate is situated.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The largest and most far-reaching Japanese organizations are the various religious sects of which the Japanese are adherents. Each community in the Hawaiian Islands, no matter how small, in which there are Japanese residents has one or more Buddhist temples or "Fukyojo" (preaching places).

The immigrant Japanese are primarily agricultural laborers and being simple folk they are readily influenced by the priests because of the respect in which they hold these men. Further, in view of the large total congregations of these churches and the fact that services are held in the Japanese Language and in accordance with Japanese customs, the Buddhist and Shinto sects are in an excellent position to disseminate Japanese propaganda. The Shinto shrines are especially important in this regard as they are primarily concerned with ancestor worship, the worship of the Imperial Family of Japan and the teaching of the Japanese spirit "Kudo." It will be further noted that many of the Buddhist priests, as well as Shinto priests, cannot be considered as aliens who desire permanent residence in the United States for they entered as non-quota aliens usually indicating that they plan to stay approximately five years.

The Hompa Hongwanji is the largest and most influential Buddhist sect in the Territory of Hawaii as well as in Japan where its membership is said to comprise seventy-five per cent of the Buddhists due to the fact that the Abbott, or head, is related to the Japanese Imperial Family. This sect in Hawaii is directed by Hompa Hongwanji Betsuin (Branch Temple) at Honolulu, under the leadership of Bishop Bikyo Kuchiba, who was sent to Hawaii to take charge of this organization by the headquarters of the sect in Japan. The sect also has a large number of priests who entered as non-quota aliens and who have lived in the Islands only a short time.

There are 22,399 Japanese following the Buddhist faith who belong to the Hompa Hongwanji sect, which has 38 temples, 57 priests and 25 schools in the Territory of Hawaii.

Information has been received that there are 39 known Shinto shrines in the Territory of Hawaii which follow a variety of Shinto sects. However, many of the Shinto sect have sub-sects or groups within them which meet at regular intervals, utilizing the services of the priest of the main shrine. Therefore, it is possible for one shrine to house many deities and to enshrine many individuals. The congregations of these Shinto sects are not organized as in the case of the Buddhist and Christian sects and it has been impossible to determine the number of adherents to Shintoism in Hawaii. However, it is believed there are at least 40,000 persons visiting Shinto shrines.

PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

The Buddhist and Shinto sects, the Japanese Language Schools and the civic and commercial societies tend to act as Japanese propaganda agencies due to the inherent nature of their work in the Japanese communities and the fact that their business is usually carried on in the Japanese Language.

(1) *Overseas Radio Broadcasts*

The Japanese radio stations in Japan continue to direct programs to the United States through the Hawaiian Islands particularly over Station JZK. However, on September 1, 1941, the frequency of this station was changed from 17795 kilocycles to 15160 kilocycles, and the designation of the station was changed from JZK to JLU4. Upon the changing of frequency, the Japanese press in the Hawaiian Islands commented that the reception was none too good and that apparently the Japanese were far behind the United States in their radio technique. The press further criticized the programs as being banal and of little interest. The broadcasts of this radio station prior to approximately October 1, 1941, were in general anti-American in their expressions. However, subsequent to that date they appeared to be more friendly to the United States or at least not openly anti-American.

(2) *Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu*

The Japanese Consulate at Honolulu continued to receive from time to time cases of newspapers and magazines such as the "Tokyo Gasette" until the act freezing the assets of Japan was placed in effect. No information has been received indicating that the Consulate has exhibited any of the motion picture films in its possession produced and distributed by the Kokusai Bunka Shintokai (Society for International Cultural Relations) of Tokyo, Japan.

(3) *Overseas Japanese Central Society*

The Overseas Japanese Central Society (Kaigai Doho Tyuokai) has not made any headway in organizing branches in the Territory of Hawaii, but it does appear that this society acts for the local Japanese organizations in their corre-

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spondence with both the Japanese Government and Japanese business houses or quasi-governmental institutions. According to newspaper comments, the Overseas Japanese Central Society was also active in the evacuation of Hawaiian-born Japanese or Japanese who are residents of Hawaii from Japan following the freezing action.

(4) Tours

Since the order freezing assets of Japanese went into effect, the organization of tours to Japan ceased abruptly. The Japanese press, in commenting on these tours, indicated that a number of Japanese were in effect stranded in Japan and that two tour parties had broken up while in that country.

JAPANESE LANGUAGE PRESS

There are nineteen newspapers and magazines printed in the Japanese language in the territory of Hawaii, of which only two are of any outstanding importance, these being the Nippu Jiji and the Hawaii Hochi, published daily at Honolulu. Nine of these papers are published at Honolulu, these being as follows:

THE HAWAII HOCHI
THE NIPPU JIJI
THE HAWAII SHIMPO
THE JITSUGYO-NO-HAWAII
THE DOBO—a monthly magazine
THE RAKUEN JIHO—a monthly magazine
THE KYODAN JIHO—a monthly magazine
THE SHOGYO JIHO—a monthly commercial magazine
HAWAIIAN JAPANESE CIVIC ASSOCIATION COURIER—a monthly magazine
HAWAII SUNDAY NEWS—a weekly
PLANTATION CHRONICLE—a monthly magazine

On the Island of Hawaii there are three publications. These are as follows:

THE HAWAII MAINICHI and
THE KWAZAN—daily newspapers
THE KONA ECHO—published weekly.

Published on the Island of Maui there are three newspapers, as follows:

THE MAUI SHINBUN and
THE MAUI RECORD—both published bi-weekly
THE SHIN-JI-DAI—published monthly

On the Island of Kauai there are two newspapers, as follows:

THE KAUAI SHIMPO and
YOEN JIHO—both published weekly

All of these newspapers from time to time carry pro-Japanese editorials and news articles and in most instances are bilingual and printed for the Japanese residents of this Territory.

JAPANESE

PROPAGANDISTS

AND

AGENCIES

WALKER MATHESON

This will supplement information appearing on page 907 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

Walker Matheson is a native New Yorker. His father was for years connected with the Chicago Tribune of Chicago, Illinois. It is reported that he was at one time editor of the Living Age and that he has a rather unsavory reputation among newspapermen in New York City.

From a confidential informant information was received that an organization known as World Reviews, Inc. publishes the Living Age and also operates a news service known as the Negro News Syndicate. Irving Harvey Williams, a British subject, who is registered as an alien under the Alien Registration law, is President of World Reviews, Inc.

According to this informant, The Living Age magazine published at 25 West 45th Street, New York City, is controlled, subsidized and operated by and for the benefit of the Japanese government. This magazine formerly was published at 420 Madison Avenue, New York City. It publishes an annual yearbook known as "The World Over", which was started in 1933. There have been three issues to date.

The Negro News Syndicate is a news service which has a mailing list consisting of sixty newspapers in the United States, including one in Washington, D. C. According to informant, it is presently in the process of being incorporated and the papers of incorporation have been prepared, although they have not as yet been filed with the proper state office in New York. This syndicate is likewise controlled and subsidized by the Japanese government for the purpose of playing up the color question.

It is reported that the setup as to both publications originated in the spring of 1938 with Walker Matheson whose father was a newspaperman in Tokyo, Japan, and who at that time was living in New York City with Joseph Hilton Smyth. According to the information received, Matheson approached Smyth and stated that there was a magazine available on Park Row, New York City, which magazine could be operated by them with the financial backing of a party who Matheson knew would be interested in financing the magazine. According to informant, as a result of this approach by Matheson, the magazine was taken over, the deal consummated, and the Japanese government reportedly put up the necessary money. The amount involved was a trifle over \$10,000.00. It is reported that the annual loss since 1938 of the Living Age is approximately \$10,000.00 which deficit has been underwritten from the same Japanese source.

The publishing name of the Living Age is World Reviews, Incorporated. When the magazine was first taken over, a private tip sheet was distributed weekly entitled "The Foreign Observer", but this has since been discontinued.

Reportedly, the Japanese go-between who handled the financing is K. Fukushima, formerly of New York and now in San Francisco or vicinity. It is believed he is probably connected with the Japanese Consul in San Francisco, and attends the annual meeting in Tokyo in connection with the budget for foreign relief work.

All salaries and expenses of both the Living Age and the Negro News Syndicate are paid in cash which the Bureau's informant is of the opinion is secured from a branch bank in or near Radio Center, New York City.

Since the transfer of Fukushima to San Francisco, his place has been taken by one Honda who holds a position in the Japanese Consulate in Radio City similar to that of a Vice Consul. It is reported that Honda frequents a Japanese restaurant on Fifty-sixth Street just off Fifth Avenue, and also frequents the Nippon Club, Columbus Circle.

Since 1938 Matheson and Smyth have had a disagreement with regard to the editorial policy, which disagreement resulted in Smyth's securing a release from the management of the magazine and is presently only participating to the extent of advising or consulting in a strictly editorial capacity.

Lamar Middleton is the present editor of the Living Age. He is an ex-newspaperman and author. He is apparently strictly an editor and is not connected in any way with the Japanese connection, according to the informant, having only been in charge of the magazine since January of 1941.

According to the informant, the circulation of the Living Age is approximately 3,000, most of this not being a paid circulation. There are no advertisements and no apparent source of revenue.

Joseph Hilton Smyth has published many articles and books and is considered to be one of the best foreign editors in the United States, according to the informant.

According to information received, the losses for the magazine have been paid by Williams and Matheson; at least, that is what the records are apt to show. Williams apparently has borrowed his money to pay these expenses, but it is not known how Matheson gets his money.

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HISAKUTU K. WATANABE

This will supplement information appearing on pages 9 to 11 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

According to an article appearing in the July 20, 1940, issue of the China Weekly Review, Watanabe gets \$325 per month for propagandizing in San Francisco and surrounding areas.

Investigation concerning this individual reflects that he resides at 1792 Post Street, San Francisco, California, and his occupation is given as importer of Japanese liquor. It is stated that he has a reputation for being pro-Japanese and a very heavy drinker. He is 40 years of age and married. It is stated that although he makes remarks favorable to the United States when he is talking in English, whenever he speaks in Japanese he is very pro-Japanese. He is reportedly very active in Japanese government affairs in this country.

ALEXANDER CAIRNS

This will supplement information appearing on page 903 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

Reverend Alexander Cairns is and has been since 1932 the Pastor of the Ampere Parkway Community Church (Presbyterian). Prior to that time he was employed as writer and lecturer for himself. He has delivered numerous addresses in and around Newark, New Jersey on "My Life in Japan" and "The War in China". He reportedly was paid \$25 for each address so given by the Japanese Legation in New York City.

He has published a circular on his repertoire of addresses which includes one concerning Japan with a notation which reads, "The American mind is poisoned with hatred of the Japanese people, a hatred which is both unreasonable and regrettable; 90% of the people in Japan can no more be blamed for the war in China than for the earthquakes in Tokyo."

A check of this individual's bank account reflects that he has only a very mediocre income and that there have been no very large deposits or withdrawals. A recent check of his bank account has indicated that the highest balance in the month of April, 1941 and subsequent months was \$130.72. His deposits indicate that he apparently has not been receiving a large income from his lecture work, as very few checks from organizations have been deposited.

The 1934-1935 edition of Who's Who in America reflects that Cairns was born in Belfast, Ireland, September 7, 1871, a son of James and Mary Jane Cairns. He was brought to the United States in 1873, has a Ph. D. from Adrian College in Michigan, received in 1897; a B. D. Degree received in 1899 and an M. A. Degree received in 1909, also receiving an L. L. D. Degree in 1926. He married Mary Annie Obee on August 12, 1897. He was ordained as a minister in 1897 and was a teacher from 1897 to 1901 in Japan; a pastor in the United States from 1901 to 1906; a lecturer from 1907 to 1920; pastor of the High Street Presbyterian Church, Newark, New Jersey from 1920 to 1925; a lecturer since 1926, a columnist from 1927 to 1929; and pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Bloomfield, New Jersey from 1933 to the present time. Also reflected was the fact that Cairns has lectured in the United States and throughout Canada on the following subjects: "The Man Worth While", "Diplomacy and Destiny", "Washington, the Warrior", "The Golden Age", "Lincoln, the Liberator", "The Martyrs of Intolerance" and "The Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs". Cairns is listed as belonging to the following organizations: Linnaean Society, Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Masons and Institute Forum.

On interview Cairns advised that his present occupation is that of lecturer and pastor and that he has been more or less engaged in these two occupations all his life. Due to the fact that he has been a missionary and a teacher in Japan from 1897 to 1901 and has been somewhat interested in missionary work in that country since that time, he feels qualified to speak about the Japanese people and also feels it is an interesting subject to some groups before which he has spoken. Because of his speeches he deemed it advisable to register with the Secretary of State, particularly since he received \$25 each for the lectures given him upon Japan from a group of Japanese businessmen in New York City.

He advised that due to the international situation and the fact that it would be improper to continue making speeches at the present time he notified the State Department in July of 1940 that he had ceased making speeches concerning

Japan as well as receiving any money from the Japanese. Since that time he has had no connection with any Japanese and has received no money from them.

The State Department records reflects that his registration statement was revoked in July of 1940. Investigation verifies the fact that Cairns has ceased making Japanese propaganda speeches. No further investigation is being conducted concerning this individual.

EXHIBIT A TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD TOP SECRET TRANSCRIPT

[SECRET]

[1] SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS

By authority A. C. of S., G-2

Date 20 Aug. 43 (R. S. B.)

Original summary forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 20 August 1943. Returned on 26 August with paper clips attached, pencil notes, and parts crossed out by General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

26 August 1943

Memorandum for the Record:

The attached memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, and Tab A, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, were given to me by General Strong at approximately 2:00 P. M., 26 August 1943, with instructions to revise Tab A as directed. Tab B, the Summary of European Documents, although prepared in the same manner as Tab A, that is, containing estimates by G-2, staff studies, memoranda and other entries of evaluated intelligence was not returned to General Strong. It is to be inferred that it will be forwarded to the President as compiled and that Tab A is to contain only raw unevaluated Military Attache reports. The Chief, Far Eastern Unit, was instructed to revise Tab A as quickly as possible as directed in Col. Sexton's memorandum.

At about 2:45 P. M., 26 August 1943, General Strong directed me to include Military Observers' reports with Military Attache reports in Tab A.

R. S. BRATTON,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Group.

1 Encl.

Memo for Gen. Strong from Sec., Gen. Staff, 26 Aug. 1943.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, August 26, 1943.

Memorandum for General Strong:

The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain *only* MA reports.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

(Signed) W. T. Sexton,
W. T. SEXTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

[1] JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

Explanatory Notes

The yearly summaries which follow are based on information contained in intelligence documents consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, et cetera. The references in the left margin of the summaries are to the Far Eastern file and G-2 file of intelligence documents which accompany these summaries. For example, G-2 13 refers to the document so marked in the G-2 file; FE 1 to the first document in the Far Eastern file. Efforts have been made to show in the summaries the origin of the statements in the text but in some instances this has

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not been practicable as the same information may have come from several sources. It is therefore suggested that when the source is desired, the marginal references be compared with the tables of contents of the intelligence documents. Such a procedure will furnish a ready index to the source of the text of the summaries.

The following abbreviations have sometimes been used:

Chief, FE----- Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department General Staff.
G-2----- The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Military Intelligence Division), War Department General Staff (unless some other G-2 is specified.)
MA----- Military Attache or Assistant Military Attache.
MO----- Military Observer.
ONI----- Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
WPD----- War Plans Division, War Department General Staff.

When use is made of such expressions as "Tokyo reported," "Manila reported," reference is made to reports from the G-2 representative stationed at such places. In Manila it would be G-2 on the staff of the Commanding General, Philippine Department; in Singapore or Bangkok, the MO; in Tokyo, Chungking, Hongkong, or Peking, the MA.

[2]

1937

- FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were building up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instruments
FE 3 used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reservists Association, with a large well disciplined membership scattered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year expansion program providing for (a) Increase of the Air Corps and Anti-aircraft Defenses; FE 4
(b) Increase of the Military Force in Manchukuo; (c) Improvement of Military Training Facilities; (d) Replenishment of War Materials; (e) Organization of Industry in the Interest of National Defense.
FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet, during the early months of the year, references were made to the so-called "Continental Policy" and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on expansion came from army leaders, there was indication of concurrence by the
FE 2 Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private gathering said: "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. Our duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations for overseas development."
FE 17 In early July the so-called China Incident began and what at first
FE 19 appeared to be a local incident in North China developed into a major
FE 23 conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese Republic. Following
FE 25 the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the Army and the
FE 27 movement eventually took on the proportions of a general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army by reconstituting similar
FE 30 units disbanded in 1925.
FE 32 The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged. Special volunteer officers, reservists of all ranks and grades, called into active service, were to serve until relieved from active service. For members of non-mobilized units at home stations, including conscript reserve privates, where the term would normally expire in 1938 the term was extended to 1939.
FE 31 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meeting physical requirements. The Military Attache, in Tokyo, estimated Japan
FE 37 had 950,000 troops under arms as of 25 October. The Imperial Head-
FE 42 quarters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only on two previous occasions was this headquarters established, namely, in 1894, just prior to the Sino- [3] Japanese War, and in 1904 following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.
FE 24 Appropriations for the Army during 1937-38 totalled Yen 2,464,078,117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,700 or 45 percent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted to Yen 5,483,-

- FE 322 364,279. Defense appropriations, both Army and Navy, represented 71.86 percent of the total budget, compared with 47.24 percent during 1936-37.
- FE 21 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building program for 1937-38. The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favorably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for 500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Squadron strength increased from 53 to 59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400 with 238 trained during the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased but the number of available planes increased by only 34 to 1223 planes of all types on 1 July. Several new airplane companies were formed and
- FE 14 plans were made for increasing production facilities with the industry, generally, showing fresh growth and new life.
- FE 26 Legislation of a war-time character enacted by an extraordinary session of the Diet meeting 3 September, included the "Munitions Industry
- FE 18 Mobilization Law" and "Military Secrets Protection Law". The Cabinet
- FE 40 Planning Board was reorganized to plan for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance with the need of the national defense program.
- FE 23 An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly
- FE 27 stated by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister, that peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with but should a situation develop like that in Spain, Japan might change her policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British and American nationals. The
- FE 23 attitude toward Great Britain was decidedly unfriendly, although Russia
- FE 35 was constantly referred to as the immediate and potential enemy.
- FE 33 The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5 October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat "Panay" brought
- FE 43 an official expression of regret with offer of restitution. The public and the press expressed hope that the United States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.
- FE 39 The seriousness of the Far Eastern situation was summarized in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Assistant Chief of [4] Staff, G-2, War Department, dated 4 November. The memorandum reads in part as follows:
- "There is a possibility, fantastic as it may seem, that Japan contemplates military action against Great Britain in the Orient at a time when she is involved in Europe, with the idea of seizing Hongkong and Singapore and ultimately acquiring the Dutch oil fields and control of trade routes to the Orient.
- "It is not improbable that this country will be compelled to apply the Neutrality Act and ultimately become involved."

[5]

1938

- FE 44 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling" toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs of East Asia".
- FE 58 Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not understand Japan", or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand", and in
- FE 59 so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan" really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.
- FE 59 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure", and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United States as long as they understand each other".
- FE 60 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese nationalist group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed to the American people that the way for the United States to get "peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "... respect the position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; ... make absolutely no political activity or economic operations having political significance without the understanding of Japan; ... guide other Powers to take the same attitude".

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- FE 64 The enactment of the (
- FE 66a the foundation for total
- FE 67 mobilization of Japan's (
- FE 69 was originally passed wi
- FE 70 be invoked for the "Chi
- FE 79 stitution and enabled the (
- FE 88 Ordinances, to mobilize an
- of the Empire exclusivel
- FE 64 Japanese Army Division
- a mobilization of the en
- the China incident was r
- situation were difficult to
- FE 67 the Japanese War Ministr
- sized that "Japan is facin
- is at stake" and that "onl
- system can the ambition
- FE 87 November the MA in Tok
- General Mobilization Lav
- through the piecemeal ap
- when propaganda or mili
- FE 61 With the enlargement of
- mobilized strength of the
- March the MA in China
- FE 47 troops were under arms.
- FE 79 conscription system, to inc
- FE 62 to begin to utilize the ma
- poses were reported dur
- FE 46 January that the new law
- conscrip
- tion training, was necessa
- FE 62 of soldiers in the varied w
- effective 3 April, provided
- Formosans, Ainu, and So
- volunteer for the Army, s
- Under this new program
- 1938.
- FE 47 Under the leadership of Ge
- FE 79 nese educational system pu
- and military training.
- FE 63 In commenting on the c
- defenses, the MA in Tokyc
- not greatly worried over t
- they were "drawing plans
- and were "taking advanta
- train personnel on a nati
- FE 68 preparations." Japanese j
- near large cities and of d
- in Japanese villages, were
- FE 65 Tokyo reported on 19 Aj
- FE 66 1938-39 totalled Yen 3,823,
- FE 24 the fiscal year 1937-38) o
- propriations for the "China In
- of Yen 1,422,712,777 durin
- FE 322 propriations amounted to
- tional budget, compared w
- FE 68 In the spring of 1938 th
- "spiritual mobilization" pr
- the fullest possible suppo
- reported on 14 May that '
- that could be desired *
- FE 76 have set to fight a serious
- General Araki, Minister of
- Japan possessed the perf
- the center of the world. (
- to unite the cultures of th
- the "Imperial Principle".

FE 75 Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July the number of Army planes were estimated to be 1,455 with 305 additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first line army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during the spring of 1937 and continues at present". Japanese aircraft production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots numbered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months.

FE 68 Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the
FE 72 Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous
FE 73 reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially singled
FE 74 out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways in transporting
FE 77 material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's apparent intention
FE 78 of occupying Hainan Island.
FE 85
FE 86
FE 77

The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that "foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek regime" and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic measures to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding 'Chiang Kai-shek'".

FE 68 While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other
FE 72 pressure against French, English, and American interests in Japanese-
FE 85 occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid to China, Ger-
FE 68 many tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such acts as the
recognition of "Manchoukuo" on 12 May, the ban on German exports
FE 72 of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of German military
FE 77 advisers from China in July.

FE 73 [8] Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of
FE 78 continued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and recurrent
FE 79 border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July
FE 82 and August.

FE 80 During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September, the
FE 81 MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled newspaper
in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai indicated
that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy even to the
point of war.

FE 85 After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic
sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to take
action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12 October that
FE 86 such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are willing to go
to war to back them up". Japan answered this League of Nations
action by severing all relations with that organization on 2 November,
but the Japanese retained their Mandated Islands.

FE 87 Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating
to the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments,
probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was "out-
moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference with
Japan's aims."

FE 61 The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having over-
FE 77 run over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the end of 1938.
FE 86 Japan began to consolidate her military and economic gains in North
FE 60 and Central China, and the semi-official North China Development
FE 72 Company and the Central China Development Company emphasized
FE 76 the expansion of communication and transportation facilities, and the
FE 73 production of iron, steel, coal, and synthetic oil to strengthen the
Japanese military machine.

[9]

1939

FE 92 The territorial expansion of Japan was advanced early in the year
by the occupation of Hainan Island. On 28 February Tokyo inter-
preted the significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-

- China and related to this aggression the strategical implications involved: "The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the French that it is universally assigned a political motive of reaction, in spite of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a potential naval base right in the front-yard of China, but it also provides a close-in base leading into China and French territory." Concurrently, the Military Attache evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to "recent manifestations of Japanese foreign policy": "These developments [i. e., United States sale of planes to France and proposed fortification of Guam], along with parallel diplomatic action by the United States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian states including Japan." FE 92
- subsequent statement from the Military Attache in China on 7 March 1941 reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move directed toward French Indo-China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in China. FE 94
- On 8 March Tokyo dispatched further evidence of Japanese offensive measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war-footing. Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the Protection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing the provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1939. FE 95
- The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the 1939-40 budget passed by the Diet. On 10 April Tokyo reported the sum for defense amounted to ¥6,432,155,345, which was 73.9 percent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were improved and modernized, large sums being allocated to artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships. FE 103
- The Combat Estimate of Japan, revised by G-2 as of 31 March 1941 with minor changes in April, May, and July, showed that Japanese armed strength had increased very considerably during the preceding years. Comparisons of figures from 1936 and 1939 Combat Estimates follow: FE 322
- FE 101
- FE 7

[10]	Items	1936	1939
	Military manpower.....	10,250,600	10,700,000
	Army, active service.....	250,000	1,500,000
	(Army Air Corps active service).....	(12,880)	(1,500,000)
	Army Air Corps, Reserves.....	20,599	(1,500,000)
	Navy, active service.....	100,833	1,500,000
	(Navy, Air Service).....	(11,993)	(1,500,000)
	Navy, Reserves.....	54,089	(1,500,000)
	Army airplanes.....	1,285	(1,500,000)
	Naval airplanes.....	947	(1,500,000)
	Capital ships (including building).....	9	(1,500,000)
	Aircraft carriers.....	6	(1,500,000)
	Principal combatant ships.....	200	(1,500,000)

- FE 101 The following concluding paragraphs in the 1939 Combat Estimate show the efficiency of Japan's Armed Forces and the strength of its strategical position:
- "The Japanese sailors are well trained. The efficiency of the personnel of the Japanese Navy is equal to that of the British or American Navies. The morale is excellent. The Japanese Navy is modern, balanced, and ready for prompt service. The Combined Fleet works on a schedule of employment that is certain, with the quality of personnel, to produce a highly efficient organization, and the one will operate smoothly and effectively in time of war.
- "Naval aviation has developed from fair to good, and is being rapidly expanded with modern planes and equipment.

Geographical

"Prior to July, 1937 Japan was essentially a militarily strong island empire whose principal islands more or less paralleled the east coast of the Asiatic Mainland from Kamchatka to a point opposite Hongkong. To the eastward her mandated islands dotted the Pacific north of the Equator between the Philippines and Hawaii. On the continent of Asia lay the Japanese territory of Korea and the Japanese controlled and dominated state of Manchoukuo.

[11] "In March, 1939, after some 20 months of war with China, Japan had added to the territory under her military control over 500,000 square miles of eastern China, including the principal ports, centers of trade and industry, railways and inland waterways, and also the principal Chinese islands southward to include Hainan. Voluntary relinquishment by Japan of the dominant influence so acquired appears highly improbable. In consequence, she now has ready access to important raw materials in China; blocks all sea approaches north of Haiphong to the southeastern coast of Asia, flanks all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power.

Conclusions

"The Japanese Army, though the bulk of it is widely extended over eastern China at the ends of long lines of communications, is well organized, trained and equipped. It has been eminently successful during some 20 months of active offensive operations, and its morale is high. By assuming the defensive in China, Japan can concentrate and operate with an effective army of about 1,000,000 men either in the Japanese archipelago or elsewhere in eastern Asia against any new opponent.

"Japan's Navy, standing next in strength to those of Great Britain and the United States, is modern, well balanced, and ready at war strength for active operations. It is relatively strong in battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. It would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the Western Pacific Area.

"Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.

"So long as the sea routes between Japan and eastern Asia are under the control of the Japanese Navy it would be extremely difficult for any power or combination of powers to defeat the Japanese Army in Japan or in the eastern part of the Asiatic Mainland."

FE 102 On 1 April the Military Attache in Tokyo reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese Army, as established by new combat regulations of 1939 and by observation of current military operations in China. The report stated that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army and were spending large sums on aviation, motorization and mechanization, and on increasing the strength of the division artillery. They were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of organization and tactical operation. Observation of the Japanese Army indicated that it was not a spectacular force but one rugged and capable, and that, "fired with its devotion to duty and patriotism, it would prove a dangerous foe on a battlefield of its own choosing."

FE 104 [12] Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish the nation upon a more secure war-footing. Articles 2 and 6 of the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide 1) governmental limitation of dividends, and 2) governmental regulations of wages in factories employing more than 50 workers and of a maximum working day of 12 hours.

FE 105 In April, the Military Attache in Japan, reviewing the trend in military aviation toward expansion, stated that since the beginning of the war in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps had increased 60 per cent. Production had increased 125 per

FE 106

- cent, and new construction by 40 per cent.
- FE 111 Tokyo on 7 June reported which extended the term years and 4 months to 1 of reservists to include the
- FE 112 On 9 June the Military disputes occurring toward the Japanese and British cessions at Tientsin and ill feeling between the acute, particularly in Tientsin
- FE 115 On 1 July, Tokyo reported year, had increased to 1 against 1093; and pilot
- FE 75
- FE 117 The Military Attache to the anti-British camp Japanese credo is to drive the time for an anti-American extremists and conservative dominance in Asia
- FE 123 Tokyo reported on 12 September by the announcement of Commerce and Navigation United States Government of foreign policy and was against the authoritarian adopted a "wait-and-see" tary Attache, from explicit British because of approval
- FE 123 [13] On the same the future course of Japanese to the outbreak of present conditions, it can safely directed toward a settlement, and an avoidance, until a settlement of the
- FE 129 The Military Attache memorandum containing in relation to the European immediate policy will be and toward taking advantage secure as many plums as watching carefully * that Japan is waiting for British and French protection. * * * Leap forward, the Japanese Navy easily lopped off this rich pick
- FE 132 On 1 November the sailing Japanese-American could realize that the United attainment of their 'Man outcome, we may expect may take against Japan
- FE 133 Tokyo reported on 6 December sador Grew of 19 October toward Japanese aspirations on the part of the United would result in "a refusal ing toward such more serious imminence of Japanese sure was thus estimated a world war through pangs Germany, Japan, and possible under some circumstances States as a belligerent in

FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported on 20 November by the Military Attache in Japan. Included among citations of threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a successful conclusion "without over-much regard for public opinion" * * * and that although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans, "this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States should be a strong one."

FE 188 [14] The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze River. With reference to this move, the Military Attache in Japan, in his report of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which "they were not likely to be evicted except by force of arms or circumstance."

1040

FE 139 [15] As the year began the serious of the Far Eastern situation was summarized on 8 January by the Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, G-2, in a confidential lecture delivered to the faculty and students of the Army War College. The concluding remarks were:

"As to ourselves and our interests in the Far East, the future is not a bright one if we cling to the ideal involved in the renouncement of war as an instrument of national policy.

"Regardless of agreements made or to be made between our State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office, the armed forces of Japan have effectively slammed shut the 'Open Door'. It is unlikely that they can be talked into reopening it.

"Our economic stake in the Orient has gone the way of the whole edifice of diplomatic pretense which, for years, has concealed reality in the Far East.

"This stake, by some standards, such as those of national integrity and prestige, is an important one. By other and possibly more practical or business-like standards it is inconsequential, and may well be written off the books.

"The decision as to whether it is worth fighting over is, of course, not one to be made by the members of our profession.

"To one whose task it has been to follow the course of events in the Orient, however, it appears that some clear thinking on the part of the American people, leading to a decision on the question is in order.

"If the decision be that the stake is not worth salvaging, then our Government should cease making futile protests and gestures—futile because they are neither addressed to the group controlling Japan's destiny nor couched in the only language this group understands—that of the sword.

"If the decision be otherwise, we must prepare at once to go the whole way in carrying armed force to Asia, in which case our most dangerous frontier today is not in Europe, as many people would have us believe.

"It lies in the Western Pacific."

FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the road toward accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard American opinion and pressure with impunity."

FE 142 [16] In commenting to the Far Eastern Section, G-2, on 18 January on the feasibility of establishing an unofficial American air corps in Free China, Major E. C. Whitehead, Air Corps, stated: "Chennault (now Major-General Chennault) has a high opinion of Japan's ability to conduct air war."

3210 CONGRESSIONAL INVE

- FE 143 Following the expiration of the loan on 26 January, the Japanese were in a "state of delirium" and the abrogation of the trade treaty toward an eventual attack on the Indies.
- FE 144
- FE 146 The Japanese interpellation made to the Chinese Government was a determination to continue the Japanese war policy in Occupied China.
- FE 147 On 30 March the Chinese Government, a current estimate emphasized that Japan's "peace" was only a "peace" in exchange for the exchange of such materials as the scarcity of these materials. It directed the Japanese to consider the application of the loan and its position weighed. Clearly, if the Japanese, the possible loss of the loan to Japanese aggression remaining liberal sentiment in the arms of Germany, the jingo element in the American Government, its fury, regardless of the American Powers. The only result would be to bow before the Western Pacific, or according to G-2, in forwarding the statement in part: "At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the positive economic head. It is well known that the Japanese markets and sources are avoiding this weapon only to effect further destruction. No discernible difference in Japan's course to American power is in the background."
- FE 149
- FE 150 The American non-resistance policy was interpreted as a determination to try to bring about a settlement on 10 April that the Japanese, England and France with the United States China policy in return for the European war.
- FE 151 Tokyo reported on 2 April that the attack on Holland were for the maintenance of the Japanese position so presented as to invite the way for intervention.
- FE 153 The increase in the Japanese war effort for by plans to reorganize the Japanese to improve armaments, to continue the Japanese efforts for the years following the end of the Japanese war, the decrease in the "China" policy, the Japanese campaigns were not excluded from the national budget war.
- FE 322
- FE 152 After the German invasion of Poland, the Japanese concern over the German situation was a major factor in the Japanese naval force in the Pacific Islands.
- FE 154 G-2 informed the Chief of the Japanese naval force in the Pacific Islands.

FE 155 On 31 May, G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese Navy might step forward with its "Southward Advance" as a panacea for Japan's economic ills. Pointing out that the American position with respect to the Pacific area had reached a critical stage, this report stated in part: "Our relations with Japan have deteriorated to such an extent that conciliatory gestures made at this time might well be interpreted by the Japanese as a sign of weakness and fear on our part, whereas threatening acts and gestures, whether or not we are prepared to follow them through to logical conclusions, may push Japan into the camp of the totalitarian aggressors of Europe. No discernible diplomacy has been exercised successfully to mould Japan's course in accordance with our desires. The need appears urgent, therefore, for the formulation and announcement of a national decision [18] as to advantageous and realizable objectives sought by us in the Far East, to the end that the armed services may proceed intelligently to prepare plans in conformity with those objectives."

This G-2 report of 31 May to the Chief of Staff outlined the Pacific situation in part as follows:

1. The Mandated Islands of Japan form a strategic barrier across Pacific sea lanes which menaces American defense and communications lines and cuts the United States off from the rubber and tin supplies of East Asia.

2. The French position in the Far East has deteriorated to such an extent that France has little chance to counter Japanese moves.

3. Japan sees in the present situation a "golden opportunity" to move against England's possessions at Hongkong and southward.

4. Japanese pressure was being exerted on the Netherlands Indies to gain economic concessions.

5. Thailand's policy is reported to be controlled by Army and Navy officers with pro-Japanese leanings.

FE 156 Tokyo reported concentrations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan on 7 June, while a report dated 10 June stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine tools had created "quite a furore" in Japan and that agitation for "positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.

FE 158 The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian seaboard."

FE 159 On 19 June G-2 forwarded to the Chief of Staff details of a Japanese ultimatum to Great Britain which required that the Hongkong and Burma borders be closed and that British troops be withdrawn from Shanghai if a Japanese declaration of war was to be averted.

FE 160 G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff on 20 June that the Japanese attitude toward the United States was stiffening and that the fall of the Yonai Cabinet is indicated, resulting in an Army-dominated regime or even in a military oligarchy. A concentration of Japanese war vessels was directed toward French Indo-China.

FE 161 The increasingly stiff Japanese attitude toward the United States was again reported by G-2 to the Chief of Staff on 26 June, mentioning a Japanese public relations official in New York as saying: "Japan [19] will play ball with Germany to the utter disregard of where this may lead as far as America is concerned". Manila cabled on 28 June that the main Japanese fleet was moving southward, and that landing maneuvers were being held near Palau.

FE 163 Tokyo estimated that Japan had a minimum of 4,040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1,510 additional planes contracted for and not delivered, on 1 July. The personnel of the Japanese Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service was estimated to total 4,565 officers, 1,350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men on 1 July. Army and Navy pilots numbered 5,950. Further improvement in military aviation was expected with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy bombardment.

FE 169

3212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- FE 164 On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan "the issue is at present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East, and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on accomplishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both Hongkong and the French Indo-China border.
- FE 165 G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff on 20 July that diplomatic relations "between Japan and the United States have deteriorated to an extent that neither threats nor offers of appeasement from Washington would be effective"
- "Resignation of the Yonai Cabinet under Army pressure; and organization of a totalitarian group under Prince Konoye signify a departure of the track for closer alignment with the Axis powers against Britain"
- "To sum up, it is clear that the day has passed when official statements of disapproval from Washington will deter Japan from further aggressive moves. Neither will the negative restraint implied by the American fleet at Hawaii halt ardent Japanese nationalists who are to capitalize upon the present 'golden opportunity' to expand the Japanese Empire"
- "It is improbable that Japan will take any positive action against Great Britain at Hongkong or at Singapore until she knows the outcome of the present phase of British-German hostilities. It is predicted with reasonable certainty, however, that the foreign policy . . . will from the outset be more aggressive with respect to India, Burma, French Indo-China, and the Dutch East Indies, and with respect to foreign interests and concessions in China."
- FE 166 [20] Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were reorganized, effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army for national defense, training, and administration.
- FE 172 In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shake-up in the Japanese foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of China."
- FE 174 On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture elsewhere. If the European war seems to point to a long-drawn-out struggle, the Japanese will eventually decide to seize the desired territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for dealing against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression with armed force. The Japanese believed time would be on their side, however, they felt it would be years before America's naval and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major operations in the Far East while the German menace still existed. The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move across French Indo-China with or without acquiescence, to hasten the conclusion of the China War.
- FE 175 G-2, Manila, reported on 1 October: "It is the opinion of this office that the Japanese are in deadly earnest in all their activities and aspirations." The United States lacked sufficient "visible evidence of power in the Far East, and war with Japan would come unless corrective action were taken at once."
- FE 177 Tokyo reported on 5 October that the Tripartite Pact was signed after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan has decided to change her traditional policy "at least quiet relations" with the United States to pursue a course to satisfy her national "ambition." The statement of Prince Konoye, in which he flatly declared that the question of peace or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and

United States respect and understand the stand of each other" expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from their present ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from Japan, China and the Philippine Islands during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-American relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggression.

FE 178
FE 179
Manila

G-2

FE 180
FE 181
FE 182

On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a non-aggression [21] pact could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her southern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations.

FE 184 Details of a new 10-Year Plan to weld Japan, China, and "Manchukuo" into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted from Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed.

FE 185 G-2, Manila, reported on 20 November that Japanese troops on the islands of Hainan and Formosa were undergoing training in extensive landing operations. Stating that Japan would not attack if we were strong enough to afford reasonable chance of failure, Manila recommended that several divisions of the Philippine Army be mobilized at once and that essential war materials be shipped to the Philippines. Large-scale troop reinforcements from the United States were not believed immediately necessary.

FE 186 Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that Japan's next move would probably be into French Indo-China. The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plans with regard to the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via Lingayen Gulf".

FE 188 Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements" and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.

G-2 13 On 27 December G-2 reported to Mr. John J. McCloy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, that by 1 September, 1941 the Japanese Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service would have an estimated 200 combat squadrons, averaging about 12 planes per squadron. These Japanese air combat units would include approximately 50 squadrons of heavy bombers and 80 squadrons of medium and light bombers.

[22]

1941

JANUARY

FE 190 In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity, the Tokyo MA called attention to the progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases for operations against Malaya and Singapore. G-2 interpreted the concurrent southward movement of part of the Japanese fleet to be a form of pressure on the French in the French-Thai dispute. The Chief, FE, transmitted to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch a report from the American Ambassador at Tokyo that the Japanese were rumored to be planning a mass attack on Pearl Harbor.

FE 193 A Manila intelligence report of 18 January to G-2 said in part: "Steps should now be taken by the War Department to designate the Department Commander as Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Far East, with appropriate temporary grade. Several divisions of the Philippine Army should be ordered mobilized and mustered into the Federal Service at once, so that they may become integrated in the combat team, and so that their organization, equipment, and training can become perfected prior to the need for their use. This is a front line. The covering force is too small to permit

of a long-range mobilization have an expeditionary force of 10 divisions, 2 brigades, 1 regiment artillery, 1 regiment various types. An analysis indicates that Japan is not now in a position to effect a campaign under favorable conditions prove fatal."

FE 197 Japan was reported by Spratly Islands southwest parachute troops arrived China.

G-2 19 G-2, estimating Alaska situation:

G-2 19 "In the first phase of a reasonably be expected to peninsula and other under pressure to southeastern Alaska directly upon the outbreak reinforced with aviation, aircraft : : : :

[23] "In any case, in and surprise attacks again as against Alaska."

FE 206 Tokyo reported on the Security Act and said that many sources of information

FE 202 was promoting border trans serving the peace" between

FE 203 commented on Japan's willingness to tolerate no interference in inclusion of the Netherlands many Japanese divisions all of which indicated Japan under certain conditions in Indies.

FE 215 G-2 transmitted to War position of the Japanese near Formosa (between 4 vessels) could be used to be an attempt to threaten might be preparation for Hainan. On 12 March Chinese

FE 217 landing operations for war and the Philippines Headquarters

FE 212 generally believed Japan Indies depended upon the England. Intense military

FE 216 reported by Manila. A

FE 220 indicated unpreparedness

FE 251 Military Observer at Sir

FE 221 forces in Malaya with a flank attacks and in sight the Japanese were recon

FE 224 Tokyo pointed out that Non-Aggression Pact obligated her to prepare for basic differences of opinion

FE 227 recommended "the immediate

- Service of at least five divisions of the Philippines Army. The Advisability of immediate action cannot be overstressed." The German Ambassador at Tokyo asked that Japanese shipping lines help evacuate German nationals from the Philippine Islands. According to the Singapore MO, [24] the British estimated that the Japanese could move six divisions simultaneously against Malaya, of which two would assail the northern border and the others would land at Kota Bharu, Kuantan and Mersing.

May

- FE 226 G-2 informed the Under Secretary of War of the phenomenal increase in Japanese purchases of oil drilling and processing equipment immediately before the Export Control Act went into effect in February. Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan and French Indo-China were greater than normal for the China Incident and "may be there in readiness for a move against Singapore or East Indies." A report from Chungking on field operations warned that the Japanese would probably attempt an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a free hand for southward expansion should the United States become involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941-42 the Tokyo MA contrasted it with the budget for the preceding year, and pointed out that the China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.
- FE 228 Convinced that war with Japan was inevitable, G-2 prepared and issued a *Handbook on Japanese Military Forces* (TM 30-480, 273 pp., 14 May). A warning not to underrate the fighting ability of the enemy was sounded on page 218 as follows:
- "Tactics are without meaning unless studied in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This manual has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its accouterments, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its tactics; but it is an army which excels in durability and performance. In the same way that its infantry 'straggles' 30 miles a day and arrives at its destination on time with surprisingly few casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are practicable and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from the Japanese soldier. Furthermore the Japanese Army which fought with bows and arrows in 1870 is thoroughly capable of learning from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare. While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its own choosing."
- G-2 64 [25] On 24 May G-2 prepared for WPD an estimate of the current situation which named the isolation or containing of the Philippines and an attack of Malaya, British Borneo and the Netherlands Indies as possible courses of Japanese action.
- FE 235 G-2 prepared an *Economic Estimate of Japan* (61 pp. 27 May, 1941) which in assessing Japan's economic war potential stated (pp. 59-61): "Japan's present policy is to extend political control over a vast region. Raw materials in this area are to be conscripted and markets opened and held by force. The wider this territory becomes the larger become the requirements for materials to extend such an economy. Germany in Europe is a current example of Japan in Asia. Japan realizes now that only by military occupation can her bloc economy succeed.
- "With each success of Germany, Japan widens her sphere and lays more grandiose schemes. Existing world economic spheres belonging

to competing powers s
forced to consolidate the
and their head-on collis
order is a growing shif
basic raw materials by t

"The countries most s
either to appease or fi
that the United States i
or run the risk of push
Netherlands East Indies
Australia, New Zealand
apore. This in turn wo
inevitable. Anglo-Amer
in Europe and the Near

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to grease the wheels of
of regional hegemony.
impunity either to ext
With opportunistic des
stopped only by a strong

"The essential fact re
to support either her m
procure them she must l
able trade balance is n
exhaustion of all asset
change to balance the
the near future (some s
stoppage in the inflow
which are vital to the
wage war will be serious

FE 238 [26] G-2 Manila v
simultaneously at Man
FE 236 the dangers of a defens
in a memorandum of 28

"Much attention is be
naval base; consequent
Japanese aggression.
as Singapore is too far
chances of offensive ac
line of communications.

"The Philippines are i
proximity permits offe
across the southern sea

"A defensive attitude
the south and east, and
for Japan to see it as
them to look to their h
tude. This attitude ide
an interior base—the ac
be armed and equipped
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is not halted by Philipp
of the U. S. Fleet. That
If an important part of
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"If forced to retire to
have to fight a major
East; meanwhile China
bases for offensive act
urged that this commar
that the Philippine Arn
vided to reasonably s
blitzkrieg. Our antiair
troop strength not impo

FE 237 On 29 May Chungkin
2000 Navy planes and 2

JUNE

- FE 253 Tokyo reported that the Japanese Government was facing great difficulty in preserving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong and direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of trade negotiations at Batavia. On 4 June Tokyo also wrote that in May certain Japanese officers attached to northern units were receiving inoculations against yellow fever.
- FE 239
- FE 242 Hongkong reported that on 14 June twenty-seven Japanese transports conveyed by twenty-one destroyers were off the China coast travelling [27] southward, and expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. Manila on 24 June stated: "The removal of the U. S. Fleet from the Pacific will unleash Japan." Manila also forwarded a British report that 25,000 Japanese troops had received parachute training in China and Japan and that 1500 of these were stationed near Canton. On 25 June Hongkong further reported that three convoys, totalling about 50 transports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA, Mexico, FE 243 forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
- FE 255 On 27 June Chungking cabled the opinion that the Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results of border incidents revealed the potential of the Russians, and that the sudden German offensive against Russia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward the United States.
- FE 250

JULY

- FE 256 On 1 July Manila relayed a British Intelligence report that partial mobilization of all forces was under way in Japan.
- FE 271 On 12 July Hongkong reported 19 Japanese transports moving southward from Formosa. On the same day Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond question". Tokyo believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evident that large scale mobilization underway covered by unusual secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but unable determine number or whether any being sent south."
- FE 266
- FE 265
- FE 270
- FE 274 The Chief of Staff was informed by G-2 on 15 July that on 12 July the Japanese delivered a virtual ultimatum to Vichy, with a 20 July deadline, in which they demanded the use of eight air and two naval bases in southern French Indo China.
- FE 279
- FE 273 The Singapore Observer on 16 July summarized the military situation together with notes on naval and air defense potential, and concluded that "The defense of Malaya requires six brigades. . . . The question of the defense of Singapore, however, is largely controlled by circumstances in other theaters of the present war. . . ." Singapore also estimated that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would be forcible seizure of additional bases. The Chinese G-2 was reported to anticipate an early invasion of French Indo-China, and to believe that areas newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases. Some Japanese ships calling at
- FE 287
- FE 279
- FE 272
- FE 258 [28] Manila were commandeered by the Tokyo Government and
- FE 262 forced to abandon schedules.
- FE 280 London reported belief that the Japanese had completed all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases. Manila reported the "new Japanese Cabinet, in our opinion, war-minded and capable of taking action." In a strategical estimate for the Chief of Staff on
- FE 281
- G-2 94 18 July G-2 reported Japan to have 1,064,000 tons of naval shipping and 6,200,000 tons of merchant shipping, and estimated that Japan had ground strength of 62 infantry divisions, probably to be increased to 64 by 1 July 1943. A summary of aircraft production potential on the

3218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR

- G-2 95 same date indicated "a maximum annual production of 7000 engines. These totals would gradually diminish of hostilities with a major power. However, continue the Axis might alleviate this condition." On the intelligence, G-2 recommended to the Chief of Staff a complete embargo be instituted by the U. S. A.
- FE 285
- FE 285a On 26 July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single demobilization for China War now under way under a secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the of Japanese credits as the first step toward a final mobilization. Additional manpower mobilization was reported. The FE 286 their vessels to defer entering any American Pacific FE 278 to the Canal, any British port on the Indian Ocean FE 284 port, certain ports of East Africa, or any Australian Netherlands Indies, or Philippine ports.

AUGUST

- FE 287 The occupation of southern French Indo-China was
FE 305 drastic shipping control measures were instituted Cabinet. Tokyo reported five main forces, composed (54 divisions) located overseas. Japan demanded the FE 306 Thai naval and air bases. Bangkok commented: "A Japanese Bangkok Mobilization move is anticipated due to FE 288 Chungking forwarded British estimates that Japanese exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun companies, each consisting of 150 tanks, with an equal number. In addition the MA at Chungking forwarded the FE 307 that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was forty and twenty independent brigades (approximately fifty with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven organized from reserves already trained and sixteen training. These figures include corps, army and sea artillery was believed to be available for only eight [29] Technical equipment was believed to be insufficient potential strength was estimated by the Russians divisions.
- FE 290 Estimates were forwarded from London that no Japanese were mobilized during June and July, and FE 302 estimates, forwarded from Chungking, placed Japanese 49 divisions, with 54 available by the end of August would be complete.
- G-2 107 The Chief of Staff was informed that G-2 believed Government, with the sanction of the Emperor, had course of expansion southward for reasons of economic security, and that the "co-prosperity sphere" would "regardless of other developments in the world situation these policies, it was believed that Japan intended military pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for an attack on Siberia, but to be made at her convenience. It was believed that Japan would resort to every means to keep the United States out of the war, but the following sounded:
- "The great danger in the situation lies in the fact that Japanese military and naval authorities are in complete control of their Government. We have seen an extraordinary example of discipline and self-control in the military . . . We can, unfortunately, expect no such restraint on the part of the Japanese military. We think they will at least follow for a time the policies of the Government."
- "The exercise of increasingly strong 'power' of the United States is clearly indicated."
- FE-300 Chungking reported Japanese plans to take over concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai.
- FE-291 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft

- FE-292 at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual production for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be 2,700 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939 the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half, and capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then in sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of employees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41.
- FE-292

September

- FE-311 Tokyo MA reported on the organization and high quality of the [30] Japanese military signal communications system, and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to our own in every respect".
- FE-316 Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters in a move to improve arrangements for the defense of Japan Proper.
- FE-317 Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobilization Law (revised), and a tense political atmosphere were reported by Tokyo to indicate that the day for a final decision on "immutable" policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for total war. Two hundred and forty Japanese planes were reported in French Indo-China. Economic, diplomatic and military pressure was being brought to bear on Thailand by the Japanese.
- FE-310 The crisis in Japan was described by G-2 on 23 September for the Chief of Staff, with the repeated recommendation that "The exercise of increasingly strong 'power diplomacy' by the United States is clearly indicated." The Singapore MO forwarded a British Far Eastern estimate that seasonal weather conditions precluded an attack on Singapore before spring. Manila wrote that Japanese morale was high, almost bordering on fanaticism, and while added emphasis was being placed on military training in schools, older students were being required to abandon some of their classes for industrial work. A
- FE-314 G-2 summary of Japan's national defense budget showed 63.14 per cent of the total National Budget was to be used for war purposes in the fiscal year 1941-42.
- G-2 124
- FE-318 G-2 prepared for the Chief of Staff a *Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation* for 3 September-1 December 1941. Although in summary it was thought that "her most likely, but by no means certain, course is inaction", the courses of action thought to be open to Japan included an occupation of Thailand in disregard of American opinion, the seizure or isolation of Hongkong and the Philippines and an attack upon Singapore or an attack upon Burma and the Burma Road. As for the most probable action, it was believed that—
- FE-315 "Japan, beset with uncertainties, will probably 'buy' time by entering into negotiations with the United States. A cabinet upset in Japan, a not unlikely event, will change the whole picture. The present [third Konoe] cabinet, however, will initiate no additional aggression on the part of Japan until all diplomatic means of relieving pressure have been explored and exhausted. This does not preclude independent action on the part of Japan's armies in the field . . ."
- FE-322 The following is an extract from the combat estimate of the same document:
- G-2 116 "Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air [31] force of 55,000 and a trained and partially trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.
- "The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto and Manchoukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China—Thailand border in the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus 15 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new units included in the above estimate.
- "Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some

of these have been replaced by Manchurian and puppet troops. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war in Manchoukuo have been increased from 8 to 19 divisions including 4 tank regiments and 4 cavalry regiments about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese Army is an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified for their various duties in peace and war. The staff has been trained during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men are somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, extremely well disciplined, courageous and aggressive to the point of fanaticism. The Japanese have been consistently successful in tactical point of view and only combat with a modern army will determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to other armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically loyal to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical spirit which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent.

"The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made great progress since 1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy air forces combined is approximately 3,743 combat planes. The Army squadrons and the Navy has 124 squadrons. Plane design has been of formidable opposition has left them undisputed. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the proficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Recent acquisition of new planes and technical advisors has contributed to their proficiency.

"The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in the world, however, is inferior to that of any of the modern armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity for a large number of new divisions which can be organized, even partially trained manpower is ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in general there is a shortage of organizational equipment such as other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and artillery.

"Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 20,000 officers exclusive of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. The navy strength comprises over a million tons already under construction. The navy is divided into two main fleets, the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Force. The Combined Fleet consists of the North, Central and South Divisions. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

"The Japanese naval personnel is well trained—better trained than that of the British and American navies. The fleet is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. The navy is strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a serious opponent to the navy of any power or those of any powers attempting offensive operations in the west.

October

G-2 129 On 2 October, G-2 prepared a report for the Chief of Staff. The crisis in Tokyo, described Konoe's desire to maintain peace and advocated forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, and the possibility of increasing military and economic pressure.

FE 327 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of Japanese ships in the Pearl River.

FE 331 Commenting on heavy troop movements into Fukuoka, Tokyo concluded on 20 October that "If the rumored increase in the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain, it will be to the intention behind it."

FE 332 Tokyo reported that General Tojo, on becoming Prime Minister, his status as an officer on the active list, an unprecedented move, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because of army criticism of its policy towards French Indochina. Conversations in Washington, and policy vis-a-vis America.

FE 329 The Chief of Staff was further advised by G-2 that the person selected by General Tojo may be expected to have a strong background, will be otherwise anti-foreign and highly nationalist.

- FE 335 Chunking reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November. London
- FE 334 cabled "Japanese troops in Indo-China will be strengthened as follows: 38,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." A general southward movement of
- FE 336 Japanese shipping in the Western Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with intelligence that aircraft carriers and 60 flying boats, fighters and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.
- FE 328 The China MA cabled that "Increased Nazi activity in Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near future."
- FE 339 [33] By radio on 29 October Manila reported that the "C in C combined naval and air forces" had been ordered to Takao, Formosa, where it was believed an expeditionary force was being organized.
- FE 340 On 30 October Chungking radioed that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and steadily increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through Yunnan toward the Burma
- FE 341 Road. Thailand was reported ready to capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the ravages of war.

November

- FE 343 The G-2 *Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation* prepared for WPD on 2 November stated the probabilities of an attack on Thailand, the containing or isolation of the Philippines and Hongkong, the seizure of the Netherlands Indies, and a possible direct attack upon Singapore.
- FE 347 G-2 on 10 November, concurred in a British opinion that Japan
- FE 348 no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with the
- FE 346 United States, and Kurusu's trip was reported by G-2, Manila, to be for the purpose of determining if America's stand was a bluff. The
- FE 358 Japanese Consul-General at Batavia recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus avoiding violence. The Singapore
- FE 345 British, however, were reported by the U. S. MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April because of the prevailing northeast
- FE 347 monsoon over Malaya. British opinion in Tokyo, relayed by the London MA, was that Japan would find it too difficult to attack Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack the Netherlands Indies.
- G-2 147 On 15 November G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese were equipped to carry on chemical warfare, and had done so upon occasion in China and "in the opinion of G-2, they will undoubtedly use gas whenever and wherever it seems necessary or profitable for them to do so."
- FE 352 On 16 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200 planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military planes, including trainers.
- FE 354 Conclusions reached in a summary of British Intelligence as of 18 November, were that (a) failure of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese decision whether to risk probable war; (b) Japan would probably not attack Siberia at that time; (c) unless agreement was reached in Washington, the war in China would continue; (d) Japan probably did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; (e) the occupation of Thailand, best possibility for the [34] moment, would pave the way for an attack upon Malaya later, yet minimize the risk of a general war.
- FE 356a Based on all the information available, including that from the State Department and the most secret sources, and after consultation among G-2, WPD, and the Navy, a message was dispatched on 24 November from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet (Manila) and Pacific Fleet (Pearl Harbor) and the naval commandants at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Balboa with the request that senior army officers in their respective areas also be informed. This message stated, among other

FE 361c instructed them to memorize a prescribed emergency key word. They were further instructed to destroy all codes and ciphers except three cipher systems which could be readily destroyed and, when it became necessary to destroy these, to rely solely upon the memorized key. A copy of the message to Peiping was sent to the American Military Observer in Hongkong for his information.

G-2 159 A supplementary estimate by G-2 of the military situation on 5 December raised the Japanese active army air force figure to 65,000. The trained and partially trained army reserves were estimated increased to 4,750,000. Personnel figures for the naval air forces were raised to 35,000 men. Figures for combined army and navy [36] plane strength were raised to 5,353 combat planes, of which the Army had 2,362 (136 squadrons) and the Navy 2,991 (159 squadrons). This estimate concluded that:

"Japan, because of her geographic location including her bases on Formosa and Hainan, flanks all sea approaches to the southeastern coast of Asia north of Saigon; lies athwart all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power. The Formosa base is the key to this position; neutralization of Formosa would imperil all her troops and installations south of Japan proper. However, Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time assume the tactical offensive. Japan's greatest weakness lies in the vital necessity of keeping open the water lines of communication to her forces in central and south China and Indo-China over routes that are vulnerable to underwater and air attack from hostile bases in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and China."

FE 361d On 5 December G-2 instructed G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer immediately with a naval officer on duty at Pearl Harbor, who had learned from most secret sources that weather broadcasts from Tokyo would include information regarding Japan's intention to break diplomatic relations with certain designated powers including the United States.

FE 362 On 6 December G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese had 125,000 troops and 450 planes in French Indo-China, 50,000 troops and 200 planes on Hainan and 40,000 troops and 400 planes on Formosa.

FE 363 On the day before the attack on Pearl Harbor a Japanese convoy with naval escort appeared off Cambodia Point in the Gulf of Siam.

FE 366 Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands Far East Command had ordered the execution of mobilization Plan A-2 upon learning of Japanese naval movements out of Palau.

FE 366a On the morning of 7 December, G-2 learned that the Japanese Ambassador had received instructions to deliver to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock in the afternoon a statement which rejected an American proposal of 26 November and which asserted that it was impossible to reach any agreement through further negotiations. Based on this information the Chief of Staff after consultation with G-2 and WPD, wrote a first priority radiogram which was dispatched about 12:17 p. m. to the Commanding Generals of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, and Fourth Army. The message read as follows:

[37] "Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on the alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication stop".

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¹ Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

TOP SECRET

EXHIBIT B TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

TOP SECRET TRANSCRIPT

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).

To: Honolulu.

September 24, 1941.

J-19.

#83.

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible.

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

23280 Trans. 10-9-41 (S)

3236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 14, 1941.

Purple.

#943 (Part 1 of 2)^a (To be handled in Government Code).

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite proposition. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.
ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

^a For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516.

From: Washington (Nomura).

To: Tokyo.

October 14, 1941.

Purple.

#943 (Part 2 of 2).^a

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should many offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace. England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists. MOORE^c reports that Secretary HULL and Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 11. KIPLINGER^d reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.

ARMY 5854 23516 SECRET Trans. 10-15-41 (7)

^a Part 1 of 2 not available.

^b Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.

^c American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.

^d A Washington newspaper correspondent.

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).

To: Washington.

October 16, 1941.

Purple (CA).

#671.

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declined to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revocation of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation will inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the U.

States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you.

(Separate wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA).

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among conferees here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#736.

(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

3238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Hongkong.
November 14, 1941.
Purple.

Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code).

(Strictly secret outside the Department)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. If the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire finds herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers in China, though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, if it becomes necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we will place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in effect (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought these decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from the cabinet before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing of Japanese assets. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is direct to Nansu,* Hokudai,* Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai* will transmit to Kalgan and Tientsin. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

25322

JD 6801 Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)

* Kana spelling.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

SIS 25644

JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 16, 1941.
Purple (Ca) (Urgent).
#

For your Honor's own information

1. I have read your #1090,* and you may be sure that you have all my sympathy for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs in a slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, correct. I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer

the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.^b Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,^c and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24878 JD-1: 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

^a See JD-6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

^b S. I. S. #24380 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

^c S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#113.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,^a and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

^a Probably means Mamala Bay.

From: Honolulu (Kita).

To: Tokyo.

November 18, 1941.

J-19.

#222.

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219^a on that day.

Area A^b—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C^c—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D^d.

3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

^a Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.

^b Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

^c East Loch.

^d Middle Loch.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(J19).

Circular #2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

3240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTI

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMOI

(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHI NO KAZE HARI

This signal will be given in the mic
and each sentence will be repeated
all code papers, etc. This is as yet
Forward as urgent intelligence.

(Voice broadcasts.)

SIS 25432

JD-1:6875 SECRET Navy Tran

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(J19).

Circular #2354.

When diplomatic relations are bec
at the beginning and end of our ger

(1 If it is Japan-U. S. relation

(2) Japan Russia relations "

(3) Japan British relations; "

The above will be repeated five t
and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mex

SIS 25392

JD-1: 6850 SECRET Navy Tran

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

19 November 1941.

(Purple-CA).

#798.

Re my #797*

The condition outlined by them na
have been made more definite" we
the question of the three-power tre
will withdraw her troops from Sou
will go back to conditions prior to
for the U. S. to bring up rather comp

On the other hand, the internal sit
be difficult for us to handle it if we v
merely on assurances that conditions
It would be necessary to have a pr
B** proposal. With the situation as
that you play your hand for the a
of the proposal in your message, th

The Ambassador did not arrange
posal contained in your message for
existing within the nation, but this
negotiations. The Ambassador, ther
tions, (after reading our #797*, #
our B** proposal of the Imperial G
be made.

If the U. S. consent to this canno
be broken off; therefore, with the al
efforts.

We note what you say in your #11
tiations consent can be given only v
office. We would emphasize this.

S. I. S. #25040

JD-1: 6658 (F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6657.

**JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6328.

***JD-1: 6660.

****JD-1: 6661.

*****Not yet available

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

November 22, 1941.

Purple CA (Urgent).

#812.

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736^a. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

^a See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

November 26, 1941.

Purple.

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<i>Japanese</i>	<i>English</i>
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)	Nyuu Yooku (New York)
Musabetsu Taigun Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)	Shikago (Chicago)
Shina Mondai (The China question)	Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Soori (Premier)	Ito Kun (Mr. Ito)
Gaimudaijin (Foreign Minister)	Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Rikugun (The Army)	Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun (The Navy)	Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo (Japan-American negotiations)	Endan (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo (President)	Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)
Haru (Hull)	Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)
Kokunaijoosei (Internal situation)	Shoobai (Trade)
Jooho Suru (To yield)	Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu (Not to yield)	Yama Wo Urenu (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisel Kyuuten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)	Kodomo Gaumareru (The child is born)

For your information, telephone address follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya
Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793.
The Minister's residence: Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence: Ginza
ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent).
#1180 (Part 1 of 2).

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, then consider our "B" proposal in toto. remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are ruptured, if indeed they may not alterations are complete. We might suggest on we have grave misgivings, we might propose wire you that for the sake of posterity I will cooperate for the maintenance of wire us what you think of this, we will with all we have in us), and that you thereby not only clearing the atmosphere the possibility that England and the Netherlands Indies under their pressure order to forestall this, I think we should nations, including French Indo-China, know, last September President Roosevelt Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent).
#1180 (Part 2 of 2).

We suppose that the rupture of the mean war between Japan and the United States, the military occupation of Netherlands and the United States. Then we would be inevitable. Now, the question is we bound by the third article of the treaty that you must remember that the Sino-Japanese end of this world war before it could proceed.

In this telegram we are expressing the express, so will Your Excellency please the Minister of the Navy, if only to him instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 26, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent).
#1190 (Part 2 of 2).*

To be handled in Government Code.

The United States is using the excuse various competent countries. In view of we are continuing these negotiations of expected moves, should we, during the course enter into our scheduled operations, the

for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

25480 Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

* S. I. S. #25444. (Part 1 of 2.)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST). (Telephone Code)**

Trans-Pacific Telephone.

To Kumaicho Yamamoto* from Kurusu:

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they *will not yield**** I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail".

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i. e. progress ?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

JD-1: 6843 (M) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT)

*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

**See JD-1: 6841 (S. I. S. #25844), of this date.

***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The interceptor read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "It is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

November 28, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

#844.

Re your #1189.*

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This

3244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARB

is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are negotiations and that, although the opinions of your Government to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of Japan. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since at this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #118 under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (8)

- * S. I. S. #25441, #25442.
- * S. I. S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.

From: Tokyo.
To: Honolulu.
29 November 1941.
(J19).
#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements will you also report even when there are no movements.

SIS 25823
JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
29 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#857.

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along

The United States government has (always?) taken position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made the basis of discussion, but instead has made no ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. made the basis of our negotiations during these seven points we would request careful self-reflection on the States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that it anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

SIS 25496

JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-)

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).
Telephone Code.

Transpacific Radio Telephone (Note—Following is a pre version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night

KURUSU. "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in reality is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going

the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

YAMAMOTO. "Yes. I see."

KURUSU. "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y. "Is that so?"

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause.)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tanl."

Y. "We are being careful."

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech.)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y. "No particular—one or two words faded out—."

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y. "yes."

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K. "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause.)

"Actually, the real problem we are up against is the effects of the happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y. "Well then—Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)
25497

From: Tokyo.

To: Berlin.

November 30, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

#985 (Part 1 of 3).*

Re my Circular #2387.^b

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

25552

JD 6943 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

* Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S. I. S. #25553.

^b Not available.

^c See S. I. S. #25554 and 25555.

3246 CONGRESSIONAL INVEST

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#985 (Part 3 of 3).

4. If, when you tell them this, the attitude toward the Soviet, say that the Russians in our statement of southward we do not mean to relax. Russia joins hands tighter with England. Hostilities, we are ready to turn now, it is to our advantage to stress. We prefer to refrain from any direct message.

5. This message is important for all circumstances be held in the most secret. Therefore, will you please impress this secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Germany, he will transmit a suitable message to the Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as possible, Germans and Italians, please let me know. Will you please send this message.

25553 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be held in the most secret outside the Department).

1. Japan-American negotiations have been in progress for a year. Over a period of half a year the Imperial Government has made the cornerstone of its national policy regarding the situation in the Pacific. In the adjustment of relations with the United States, she has based her policy on that alliance. With the intent of participating in the war, she boldly assumed negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in defending the Empire's existence and continuing the negotiations carried on the question of the evacuation of Japanese from Indo-China, were completely in opposition.

Judging from the course of the negotiations, it came to loggerheads when the United States logical tendency of managing international relations upon this tradition between the United States and England. The United States in all this was brought about by a new order by Japan, Germany, that is to say, the aims of the Tripartite Alliance. Japan was in alliance with Germany. Of friendly relations between Japan and Germany. From this point of view, the divorce of the Imperial Government was brought out at the last meeting of negotiations of the last few days it is clear that the Imperial Government is not in the United States. It became clear, inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#986 (Part 2 of 2).

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
#1227.

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727

JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)

3248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARB

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
Circular #2436.

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying code the Naval Attaché's office there and make use of chemicals for this purpose. The attaché should have been advised by regarding this.

25545

JD-1: 6939 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.
To: London.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
Circular #2443.

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and disposal. In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word language and as soon as you have carried out the instruction HASSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine code No. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

25787

JD-1: 7001 (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)

From: Tokyo.
To: Hsinking.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
#898.

-----In the event that Manchuria participates in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause war in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same as and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will have special rights. Their business will be stopped (the telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). That the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchou and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchou the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Granted not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AF)
SIS 2583

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#865.

Re my #857*.

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

SIS-25605

JD-1:1 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.
**JD-1: 6710.
***Not available.

COMPLETED TRANSLATION

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232 (Part 1 of 2).
Re my #1231.

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instructions of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233*. Thereupon we said: "Since haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th. The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

25659-B

* Not available.
* Original translation incomplete from this point on. Trans 12/3/41

From: Washington, (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232 (Part 2 of 2).

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued:

3250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here."

Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1244^a.

25660 Trans. 12-8-41 (7)

ARMY

^a Not available.

(CORRECTED TRANSLATIONS)

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Washington.

December 2, 1941.

Purple.

#867. (Strictly Secret).

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna".

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860^a is no longer recognized.)

#25640 Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41.

^a S. I. S. #25550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

From: Tokyo (Togo).

To: Honolulu.

December 2, 1941.

J-19.

#123 (Secret outside the department).

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

NOTE.—This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007 27065 SECRET (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

3 December 1941.

(Purple).

#1223.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785

JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Berlin.

To: Tokyo.

December 4, 1941.

Purple. (CA).

#1410.

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington.

To: Tokyo.

5 December 1941.

(Purple).

#1208.

Re your #867*

From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

25836

JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*(Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (SIS #25640): Directs Washington to destroy all copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.

From: Tokyo.

To: Washington.

December 6, 1941.

Purple

#901

Re my #844*.

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans 12/6/41 (S)

* See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

3252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941.
Purple (Urgent).
#1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President in his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us—(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)—

ARMY 25846 7176 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14)
Separate telegram
MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1:7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 2 of 14).

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours towards the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of

French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14).

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 4 of 14).

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

3254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 5 of 14).

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 28th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 6 of 14).

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 4, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 7 of 14).

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

7143 SECRET

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 8 of 14).

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 9 of 14).

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1 : 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 10 of 14).

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country—(45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the —es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

3256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 11 of 14).

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 12 of 14).

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 13 of 14).

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as."

**Probably "China, can but."

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
7 December 1941.
(Purple-Eng).
#902 Part 14 of 14.

(Note. In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
December 6, 1941.
PA-K2.
#128.

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123* the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

(Japanese)

ARMY 7381 26158 SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (5)

* Not available.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941.
Purple (Urgent—Very Important).
#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.*

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

* JD-1: 7143—text of Japanese reply.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941.
Purple (Extremely Urgent).
#910.

After deciphering part 14 of my #902* and also #907*, #908* and #909*, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner all secret documents.

25854 Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

- * S. I. S. #25843—text of reply.
- * S. I. S. #25850.
- * S. I. S. #25853.
- * S. I. S. #25858.

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From: Budapest.

To: Tokyo.

December 7, 1941.

LA.

#104.

Re my #103 *.

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

ARMY 25866 7184 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)

* Relayed to Berlin.

NOTE.—The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board is printed as a part of Joint Committee Exhibit No. 157. Appendix No. 1 is printed following the Report.)

[i]

APPENDIX No. 2

WAR DEPARTMENT, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

CROSS-REFERENCE INDEX TO TESTIMONY BEFORE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

This Cross-Reference Index has the following features:

1. Titles and sub-titles are listed alphabetically.
2. Main titles are shown in full capital type; sub-titles are preceded by a hyphen and are in regular type; secondary sub-titles are preceded by two hyphens; a few sub-titles are preceded by a triple hyphen; e. g.,

MARSHALL

-Communications with Short

-Message 7 December

--Washington Signal Office handling

3. The references to the record are by name of witness and page number, thus STIMSON 4072, means the testimony of Secretary of War Stimson on page 4072 of the transcript of the testimony.

4. The Index proper is paged with arabic numerals. The cross-reference key to this Index is paged with Roman numerals, and appears on pages *ii* thru *xix*. The cross-reference key is designed to give the arabic page numbers of the Index on which the titles and sub-titles will be found.

5. Related subject matter is frequently found listed under two or more titles or sub-titles. For example, references concerning aircraft available in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, will be found under the following headings:

ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

-Planes available, daily reports p. 23

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

-Only 3 U. S. fliers got in air p. 26

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE

-Army planes available p. 31

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE

-Navy fighter planes available p. 33

RECONNAISSANCE

-By Army

-Insufficient planes p. 67

[4] **RECONNAISSANCE**

-By Army

-Planes available p. 68

RECONNAISSANCE

-Distant by Navy p. 68

-Navy planes available p. 70

6. In using the Index, the following steps are suggested:

(a) *Select all relevant main titles on page iv* which could possibly cover the subject sought; for example, take the subject of the 27 November message from the War Department to General Short. Relevant main titles, found in the list on page *iv*, are:

ALERTS IN HAWAII

ALERT NO. 1

3260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION
ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
MARSHALL
NAVY
RECONNAISSANCE
SHORT

(b) Select all relevant sub-titles on pages *v* through *xi*; e. g., in the example suggested in (a) above, if it is desired to find out all matters bearing on the 27 November message and its results, each of the main titles listed will be found to have several relevant sub-titles, like

ALERTS IN HAWAII
-Laxity alleged, late November p. 11
-No Army-Navy cooperation on p. 12
ALERT NO. 1
-Decision by Short p. 13
-Differences from Alerts 2 and 3 p. 14
-Not a mistake p. 14
-Planes ready in 4 hours, under p. 15
ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION
-Conference 27 November Martin, Short, Kimmel and Mollison
ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
-"War Warning" Message, 27 November p. 23
MARSHALL
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[iii] SHORT
-Message, WD, 27 November p. 79

(c) Turn to the appropriate arabic numbered page or pages of the Index, given after each relevant title and sub-title. Then refer to the Record page number or numbers listed under the main titles and sub-titles of this cross-reference Index, for the testimony thereon. Page 90 at the end of this volume contains a TABLE FOR FINDING VOLUMES FROM PAGE REFERENCES.

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LIST OF MAIN TITLES

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ALERTS IN HAWAII
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ARMY MISSION IN HAWAII
ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS
ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION
ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
CANOL PROJECT
G-2 KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS
HOFFMAN, ROBERT
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JAPANESE IN HAWAII
KIMMEL
KUHN, OTTO

MARSHALL, GENERAL GEORGE C.
 MARTIAL LAW
 NAVY
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 ORANGE PLAN
 RAINBOW PLAN
 RECONNAISSANCE
 ROHL, HANS WILHELM
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 WAR COUNCIL
 WYMAN, COL. THEODORE

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CROSS-REFERENCE KEY

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NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII

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ROHL, HANS WILHELM See also **WYMAN, COL. THEODORE**

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[*avii*] SHORT (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS, COOPERATION, and EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS; JAPAN; KIMMEL; MARSHALL; and related titles and sub-titles.)

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- Message, TAG, 7 July p. 78
- Messages from WD, none from Jul - 16 October p. 79
- Message, WD, 16 October p. 79
- Message, WD to, No. 266, 18 October p. 79
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 - Staff sections notified of p. 80
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 - Informed of p. 80
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TENNEY COMMITTEE, California State Legislature
WAR COUNCIL

WYMAN, COL. THEODORE (See also CANOL PROJECT: HAWAIIAN
DEFENSE PROJECTS; ROHL, HANS WILHELM; AIRCRAFT WARN-
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[1]

APPENDIX No. 3

AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE (See also HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS; RECONNAISSANCE; and related titles.)

-An Army function.....	Kimmel 1743 Kimmel 1745 Short 367-368
-Attempt to expedite by Short.....	Davidson 4150 Fleming 1271 Fleming 1330-1331 Short 503 Wyman 3420 Wyman 3536 Wyman 3576
--Contra.....	Davidson 4142 Phillips 1246 Perlter 3713 Wyman 3574
-Considered most important project.....	Hannum 2064-2065 Kimmel 1768 McMorris 2880 Short 326 Stimson 4065
--Contra.....	Fleming 1330-1331 Powell 3911
-Construction by District Engineer.....	Phillips 1244 Short 500-501 Wyman 3572
-Continuous operation not reported to Navy.....	Bellinger 1638 Bloch 1503 Short 484
-Contract, Wyman arranged.....	Hayes 273
-Degree completed 7 December.....	Burton 883 Lockard 1030 Marston 3129 Rafter 787-789 Reybold 587-589 Reybold 624-625 Robins 709-710 Tillman 2149-2151 Wong 3680 Wyman 3438 Wyman 3440-3441
[2]-Delays, causes of.....	AFF-Wyman 3867 AFF-Wyman 3871 AAF-Wyman 3873 Bartlett 2510 Bergquist 1190 Bergquist 1218 Burton 884 Colton 678 DeLany 1716-1717 Fleming 1261-1262 Fleming 1268-1270 Fleming 1273-1274 Fleming 1275-1276 Hayes 270-271 Marston 3128 Marston 3130 Marston 3133

AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Delays, causes of	Marston 3143 Phillips 1144 Powell 3886 Powell 3893 Powell 3901 Powell 3905 Reybold 571-573 Reybold 623 Robins 711 Robins 728 Schley 654 Short 497 Short 509 Tillman 2136-2137 Tillman 2151-2152 Wyman 3431-3432 Wyman 3440 Wyman 3573
--Arrival of equipment.....	Davidson 4127 Short 485
--Diversion of equipment.....	Colton 679 Colton 682-685
--Not by Washington.....	Fleming 1341 Powell 3892
---Contra.....	Hannum 2058-2059 Marston 3132 Marston 3135 Perlitter 3703 Short 4433 Wyman 3436-3437 Wyman 3441-3443 Wyman 3519
[3] --Not contractors.....	Martin 1890 Phillips 1153 Wyman 3445
--Not lack of personnel.....	Davidson 4142 Fleming 1317-1318
---Contra.....	Elliott 1011 Marston 3130
--Personnel difficulties.....	Hunt 774 Kestly 3669 Perlitter 3711 Wyman 3415-3417
-Difficulties of permanent erection and location....	Bergquist 1194 Bergquist 1220 Fleming 1257 Fleming 1260-1261 Fleming 1266-1267 Marston 3155 Mollison 813 Powell 3887 Reybold 582 Reybold 605 Reybold 619 Short 297 Short 498 Tillman 2136
-Effort to get functioning.....	Bergquist 1192-1193 Bergquist 1195-1196 Bergquist 1198 Bergquist 1201 Bergquist 1204 Davidson 4133

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Effort to get functioning.....	DeLany 1716 Reybold 593 Reybold 603 Short 356 Stimson 4064 Stimson 4073 Taylor 1076 Tillman 2149 Wyman 3428 Wyman 3431 Wyman 3444
-Equipment present, except cables.....	Short 497-498 Short 511 Wyman 3439
[4] -Fixed, equipment delivered October 1941..	Fleming 1259
-Funds allotted.....	Short 464
-Haleakala Job Order 41.0.....	Rafter 782
-Higher command, not AWS-minded.....	Bellinger 1640 Bergquist 1193 Taylor 1084 Tindal 4498 Tindal 4500
-Highest priority.....	Short 505
-- <i>Contra</i>	Tillman 2137-2138 Wyman 3427 Wyman 3428-3429 Wyman 3567
-Information Center	Davidson 4141
--In general.....	Bergquist 1191 Colton 685-689 DeLany 1716 Kimmel 1790-1791 Lockard 1025 Lockard 1026-1028 Martin 1824 McDonald 4156 Perlitter 3714 Rudolph 1235 Taylor 1073-1075 Taylor 1077-1079 Taylor 1084 Taylor 1093 Tyler 1095-1098 Bergquist 1201
--Communications with stations, not good.	
--Development of.....	Bergquist 1210-1214 Davidson 4127 McDonald 4153 Tindal 4491 Wyman 3433
--Functioning.....	Colton 693 McDonald 4158-4159 Powell 3900 Short 491 Tindal 4497
[5] -Naval liaison requested.....	Bergquist 1192-1193 Bergquist 1213-1214 Davidson 4131 Powell 3906 Short 493 Taylor 1089

AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Interceptor Command.....	Bergquist 1186-1187 Bergquist 1205 Bergquist 1214 Bergquist 1216 Burgin 2603 Burgin 2604-2605 Burgin 2634 Hayes 273 Martin 1823 Phillips 1146 Powell 3910 Short 371 Short 381 Short 400 Short 489-490 Short 525 Tindal 4428
--Activated 17 December.....	Davidson 4136 Martin 1825 Powell 3907 Short 495
-- <i>Contra</i>	Powell 3907
--Air Force cooperation.....	Burgin 2643 Short 495
--Jealousy, Signal and Air Corps.....	Bergquist 1217
--Navy should know from Lt. Burr.....	Burgin 2634-2635 Short 495
--"No definite organization".....	Short 495
-Job Order for Mt. Kaala Road.....	Kestly 3666 Rafter 781 Wyman 3554
-Job Orders, summary.....	Rafter 781-789
-Job Order 23.1.....	Reybold 570
-Kokee Job Orders 23.0, 23.1.....	Rafter 782
[6] -Missing equipment.....	Powell 3910 Short 509-511
-Mobile equipment, all arrived (Jul 41).....	Fleming 1260 Powell 3886 Short 499 Short 509-510
-Mobile stations used as soon as received.....	Davidson 4146 Lockard 1016 Mollison 814 Short 298
-- <i>Contra</i>	Bergquist 1202 Powell 3886
-Navy assistance, Commander Taylor.....	Bergquist 1192 Davidson 4145 DeLany 1715 Kimmel 1785-1786 Phillips 1156 Powell 3907 Powell 3911 Short 484 Taylor 1072
-Navy assisted.....	Kimmel 1785
-- <i>Contra</i>	Powell 3906 Powell 3909
-Navy liaison officer, Lt. Burr.....	Bergquist 1192-1193 Bloch 1503-A Burr 3067-3068 Donegan 1933-1934 Kimmel 1786-1788 Murray 3095 Phillips 1241-1242 Short 484

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Navy notified of delay after 5 August.....	Short 507
-No trained control officers or operators.....	Bellinger 1638
	Bergquist 1192
	Bergquist 1197.
	Colton 696
	Davidson 4126
	Davidson 4132
	Elliott 996
	Lockard 1016
	Phillips 1154
	Powell 3898
	Pye 1078
[1] Short 487	Short 508
	Taylor 1082
	Taylor 1088
	Taylor 1091
	Tindal 4498
-No training scheduled, 7 December.....	Short 311
-Not dependent on height.....	Fleming 1264
	Fleming 1319-1320
	Marston 3131
	Marston 3133
--Contra.....	Kimmel 1809-1810
	Layton 3065
	McMorris 2892-2893
	Powell 3891
	Tindal 4493
-Not increased after 27 November.....	Short 469-470
-Number of stations, changed.....	Short 495
-Only on Oahu.....	Davidson 4133
	Gerow 4273
	Hayes 270
-Only real Army reconnaissance.....	Kimmel 1764
	Kimmel 1809
	Martin 1823
	Pye 1067
	Short 469
	Short 4438
	Stimson 4070
-Operating 7 December.....	Bergquist 1212-1213
	Bergquist 1218
	Elliott 995
	Elliott 998-1000
	Kimmel 1791-1792
	Lockard 1015
	Lockard 1022-1023
	McDonald 4153
	Phillips 1152
	Powell 3899
	Reybold 625
	Short 453-455
	Tindal 4494
	Tyler 1098
[8] --Detected planes.....	Colton 694-695
	Davidson 4130-4131
	Elliott 1001-1006
	Lockard 1024
	Lockard 1026
	McDonald 4154
	McDonald 4162
	Powell 3903
	Short 439-440
	Taylor 1085

AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Operating 7 December—Continued

--Detected planes—Continued

--Disputed.....

Mollison 815

Mollison 826

--Lt. Tyler on duty during attack.....

Bergquist 1199-1200

Davidson 4145

Lockard 1025

McDonald 4154-4156

McDonald 4157

Short 312

Short 518

Tyler 1096

Tyler 1099-1102

--Merely training.....

Davidson 4130-4131

Kimmel 1790

Martin 1824

Phillips 1152

Phillips 1154

Short 516

Short 4442

--Purpose, Anti-sabotage.....

Davidson 4134

Elliott 1008

-Operation before 7 December.....

Colton 688

Davidson 4128

Davidson 4146

Kimmel 1789-1790

Lynch 2364

McDonald 4160

McDonald 4163

Powell 3885

Powell 3896

Powell 3908

Short 516

Short 4443

Stimson 4066-4067

Tindal 4492

West 3123

--Contra.....

Phillips 1143

[9] -Operation, in general.....

Bellinger 1639

Bergquist 1187

DeLany 1715

Elliott 1006-1007

Elliott 1009

Elliott 1012-1014

Lockard 1017-1021

Lockard 1031-1032

Marston 3151

McDonald 4161

Powell 3889

Powell 3904

Stimson 4068

Tindal 4500

West 3123

-QM received for shipment in July.....

Powell 3886

Short 509-510

-Range, effective.....

Burgin 2660

Layton 3065-3066

Marston 3151

--200 miles, permanent stations.....

Powell 3888

--75 miles, for mobile stations.....

Short 440

Short 440

--130 miles.....

Short 516

Bergquist 1190

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AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Range, effective—Continued

--150-200 miles.....	Kimmel 1789 Kimmel 1791 Kimmel 1810 Powell 3889 Powell 3905
--120-140 miles.....	Burgin 2658 Fleming 1258
-Refer to letter, S/N to S/W, 24 January.....	Short 368
-Report, 24 November.....	Davidson 4137 Kimmel 1786
-Signal Corps, technical responsibility.....	Bergquist 1187 Bergquist 1202-1203 Burgin 2644 Davidson 4127 Martin 1824 Phillips 1245-1249 Powell 3885 Powell 3908 Short 492
[10]	Short 516-518 Wyman 3436 Wyman 3572 Wyman 3577
-Stations contemplated.....	Bergquist 1187 Colton 672-677 Powell 3895 Powell 3915 Wyman 3436
-Tactical plan.....	Reybold 622-624
-Twenty-four hour use not required by situation..	Short 508 Short 514 Short 4442
--Contra.....	Bergquist 1192-1193 Bergquist 1198 Bergquist 1204 Powell 3912-3913
-Use ordered by Short.....	Davidson 4129 Davidson 4133 Kimmel 1789-1790 McDonald 4161 Short 297
--4 to 7 A. M.	Bergquist 1198-1199 Davidson 4150 Gerow 4274 Lockard 1031 Phillips 1154-1155 Powell 3910 Short 469-470 Short 514-515 Short 4442 Taylor 1085
-WD interest in.....	Hayes 257 Hayes 274
-Wyman not responsible for material. See also, WYMAN, COL. THEODORE.....	Short 488 Wyman 3419 Wyman 3428-3429

[11] ALERTS IN HAWAII (See also ALERT NO. 1 and HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—SOP, 5 November and WAR DEPARTMENT.)

-In general.....	Brooks 982
	Brooks 989
	Burgin 2662-2663
	Farthing 841-842
	Farthing 845
	Gerow 4304
	Hain 3322
	Hayes 251-255
	Herrin 216
	Herrin 219
	McCarthy 1924
	Mollison 801-802
	Mollison 822
	Murray 3099
	Murray 3101
	Pratt 1968
	Pratt 1970-1972
	Pratt 1985
	Rudolph 1222
	Rudolph 1226
	Wells 2729-2930
	Wilson 925-930
-Alarmed public.....	Herron 225
	J. Midkiff 2840
--Contra.....	Capron 2025
	Dillingham 2772
	Dingeman 3195
	Murray 3096-3097
	Petrie 2720
	Throckmorton 1398
-Ammunition issued.....	Wells 2728
	Burgin 2609
	Dingeman 3195
	Hain 3318
	Herron 225
	Murray 3100
-By Army, no effect on Navy.....	Short 409
-Laxity alleged in late November.....	McKee 2424
-Morale, affected.....	Marshall 53
	McCarthy 1924
	Wilson 1366-1367
--Contra.....	Hain 3321-3322
	Murray 3101
	Short 435
-Never ordered by WD.....	Gerow 4238
	Short 408
[12] --Contra.....	Hain 3317
-No Army-Navy cooperation on.....	Hain 3319
	Herron 217
--Contra, when Navy "lost" Jap ships.....	Farthing 842
-Number of.....	Dingeman 3198
	Hain 3317
	Marshall 52
	J. Midkiff 2835
	Murray 3100
	Short 283

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[13] ALERT NO. 1. (See also HAWAIIAN
DEFENSE—SOP 5 Nov.; JAPANESE IN HAWAII;
JAPAN—Caution not to provoke; and related titles.)

-In general.....	Bloch 1497 Bloch 1511 Bloch 1530 Brooks 990 Davidson 4149 DeLany 1709-1710 Kogan 1677 Mollison 818-821 Murray 3085 Murray 3089 Murray 3092 Phillips 1110
-Considered satisfactory.....	Fielder 2960 Kimmel 1781 Marshall 44 Marshall 53 Mollison 803-804 Mollison 809 Phillips 1112 Phillips 1128 Phillips 1131 Phillips 1142 Short 523 Walsh 1384-1385 Wilson 929 Wilson 1350 Wilson 1356 Wilson 1362
-Decision by Short.....	Burgin 2623 Coll 3173 Donegan 1944 Fielder 2960 Martin 1827 Mollison 793-794 Pratt 1976-1977 Short 282 Short 520 Throckmorton 1393 Throckmorton 1403 Truman 1450 Walker 971 White 1994 Wilson 1357
-Navy not consulted.....	Dingeman 3194A Short 395
-Plan to "slide" to No. 3.....	Burgin 2617
[14] -Reasons for.....	Flood 2854 Hayes 267 Lawton 2681 Martin 1830 Martin 1835 Martin 1847 Martin 1855 Phillips 1114 Phillips 1117 Phillips 1132 Phillips 1134 Phillips 1138 Phillips 1148 Short 286 Short 297

ALERT NO. 1—Continued

-Decision by Short—Continued

--Reasons for-----

Short 304
 Short 307
 Short 434-435
 Short 437
 Short 431-432
 Short 446
 Short 450
 Short 461
 Short 470-471
 Short 479
 Short 483
 Short 520-521
 Short 527-528
 Throckmorton 1394
 Throckmorton 1398
 White 1996

-Differences from Alerts 2 and 3-----

Burgin 2614
 Burgin 2655
 Dillingham 2772
 Donegan 1952-1954
 J. Midkiff 2841
 Mollison 818-821
 Powell 3912-3913
 Tindal 4489
 Weddington 3015

-Not a mistake-----

Donegan 1956
 Martin 1831
 Martin 1833
 Martin 1836
 Martin 1856
 F. Midkiff 3819
 Murray 3090
 Phillips 1117-1118
 Phillips 1126

[15]

--Contra-----

Allen 3113
 Allen 3119
 Bergquist 1205
 Burgin 2618
 Burgin 2621
 Burgin 2652
 Burgin 2655
 Farthing 839
 Fielder 2987
 Hayes 250
 Hayes 268
 Hayes 263
 Herron 226
 King 2700
 Martin 1827-1828
 Martin 1849
 Mollison 797
 Mollison 805-806
 Murray 3096
 Murray 3097
 Phillips 1127
 Phillips 1128
 Phillips 1148
 Phillips 1152
 Powell 3912-3913
 Pratt 1977
 Pye 1046-1048
 Rudolph 1221-1230

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ALERT NO. 1—Continued

-Not a mistake—Continued

-Contra.....

Rudolph 1226
Rudolph 1229
Rudolph 1239
Short 4440
Short 476
Throckmorton 1395
Throckmorton 1399
Throckmorton 1402
Wells 2731
West 3121
Wilson 926-928
Wilson 1361
Wilson 1363
Wilson 1381

-Planes ready in 4 hours, under.....

Mollison 796-797
Phillips 1127
Short 459
Short 515
Tindal 4489

-“Sabotage-minded”.....

Allen 3119
Burgin 2649
Burr 3072
Davidson 4134-4135
Davidson 4143
DeLany 1714
Dingeman 3195
Felder 2997
Flood 2849
Kimmel 1776
Locey 2797
Martin 1829
Martin 1845
Moody 3199
Poindexter 3161

[16]

-War Department never objected.....

Coll 3173
Hill 2938
Kimmel 1782
Lawton 2693
Martin 1833
Murray 3099
Short 437
Short 453-455
Short 471
Short 533
Stimson 4062
McKee 81

-WPD not informed of.....

[17] ARMY MISSION IN HAWAII. (See also
NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE;
RECONNAISSANCE; and related titles.)

Bellinger 1581
Burgin 2616
Donegan 1960
Gerow 4227
Hain 3325
Herron 207
Kimmel 1744
Lawton 2666
Marshall 17
Marshall 18
Martin 1843
McKee 64
McKee 72
Murray 3078-3079
Phillips 1110
Phillips 1149
Short 352
Wilson 1361

ARMY MISSION IN HAWAII—Continued

-Air fields defense.....	Flood 2854 McKee 71
-CG free from WD control.....	Hayes 249 Herron 222 McKee 85-87
-WPD not concerned with.....	
[18] ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS (See also ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION; ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; and related titles.)	
-Joint Air Operations Agreement, 21 March.....	Arnold 161-162 Arnold 165 Bellinger 1578-1579 Bellinger 1587 Bellinger 1607 Bloch 1474 Gerow 4233 Gerow 4324 Lawton 2670 Martin 1817 Martin 1822-1823 Martin 1902 Short 371-373 Short 4436-4437 Short 4441 Throckmorton 1391
--No call for Army help 7 December.....	Martin 1818
--Never fully complied with.....	Lawton 2676 Martin 1818
-Joint coastal Frontier Defense Plan.....	Bellinger 1605 Bloch 1473 Bloch 1478-1479 DeLany 1696-1697 DeLany 1713 DeLany 1720 Donegan 1935 Gerow 4318 Hain 3325 Hayes 245 Kimmel 1736 Kimmel 1738 Kimmel 1744 Kimmel 1746 Kimmel 1748 Lawton 2665-2666 Marshall 26 Martin 1817 McKee 58 McMorris 2891 Short 365-366 Short 382-383 Short 387 Throckmorton 1392
--Washington consent needed to put in effect.....	Kimmel 1755-1756 Kimmel 1759
---Contra.....	Gerow 4283 Kimmel 1757-1759 Short 4439

[19] ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION (See also
ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS; ARMY-NAVY
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; and related
titles.)

-In general.....	Lawton 2695 McKee 83 Short 355 Short 363 Short 391-392
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3284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION—Continued

-Anti-aircraft defense not perfectly coordinated (See also HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Anti-aircraft.)	Short 366 Short 393-394
-Army-Navy Maneuvers.....	Bellinger 1585 Davdison 4137 Dingeman 3192 Donegan 1939 Martin 1818-1819 Short 292
-Before Short.....	Herron 207-211
-Conferences between Short and Kimmel.....	Bloch 1510 Bloch 1513 DeLany 1698 DeLany 1702 Dillingham 2782 Hayes 259 Hayes 260-262 Herron 235 Hill 2942 Kimmel 1765 Kimmel 1766 Kimmel 1768 Kimmel 1769-1771 Kimmel 1780 Kimmel 1783 Lawton 2694-2695 Layton 3058 McMorris 2867 Mollison 790-794 Short 298 Short 301 Short 359-360 Short 394-395 Truman 1446 Truman 1446-1448 Truman 1451 Wells 2732
-Conference 27 November, Kingman, Martin, Mollison, Bloch	Bloch 1507 Bloch 1509
[20] -Conference 27 November, Martin, Short, Kimmel, Mollison	Martin 1825 McMorris 2872
-Confidence in Navy.....	Brooks 992 Moody 3200 Phillips 1132 Short 362-363 Short 406
--Not justified.....	McMorris 2887 Short 390 Short 409
-Defense projects, liaison.....	Dingeman 3194 Fleming 1257
-Directed by letter, WD, 7 February.....	Short 368
-Joint headquarters.....	Phillips 1242
-Joint headquarters construction.....	DeLany 1700
-Navy confidence in Army.....	Bloch 1482 Kimmel 1783-1784
-Navy jealous.....	Herron 212
-Navy never checked on.....	Bloch 1481
-No joint staff meetings.....	Phillips 1240
-Not on alerts.....	Herron 217
-Operations office liaison, complete.....	Throckmorton 1409-1410 Lawton 2668
--Contra.....	

ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION—Continued

-Very good	Capron 2030
	DeLany 1708
	DeLany 1732
	Hayes 244
	Hayes 260
	Herron 210
	Kimmel 1739
	Kimmel 1783
	Kimmel 1811
	Marshall 27
	Taylor 3257
--Contra	Burgin 2625
	Martin 1904-1905
	Pratt 1985

[21] ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (See also ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS; ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION; and related titles.)

-In general	Gerow 4265
	Marshall 36
	Phillips 1132
-Air Force knowledge of Jap concentrations	Arnold 184
	Mollison 805
-Army, full disclosure to Navy	Bellinger 1636
	Kimmel 1765-1766
	Phillips 1241
--Navy liaison officers	Burr 3069
	Murray 3095
	Truman 1449
-Army measures after 27 November	DeLany 1698-1699
	Short 399
-“Complete reciprocity”	Bellinger 1636
	Herron 221-222
	Kimmel 1771-1772
	Kimmel 1783-1784
--Contra	Bloch 1502
	Bloch 1519
	Burgin 2616-2617
	Martin 1907
	Rocheft 1649
	Rocheft 1657
	Short 299
	Short 358
-Confidence in the Navy	Mollison 796
	Short 406
	Short 410
-F. B. I.	Bicknell 1438-1439
	Fielder 2945
	Fielder 2956
	Shivers 3203
	Shivers 3219
	Taylor 3252
	Taylor 3253
-Fleet activities 27 November-7 December (See also NAVY—Naval Intelligence.)	DeLany 1701
	DeLany 1704
	Mollison 805
	Rocheft 1652-1655
	Rocheft 1661
	Rocheft 1665-1672
	Short 451
	Short 474-475

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3286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION—

Continued

-G-2-ONI (See also NAVY MISSION IN HA-	Allen 3111
WAI—Naval Intelligence.	Bicknell 1438
	Dingeman 3193
	DeLany 1701
	Fielder 2945
	Fielder 3000
	Layton 3028-3029
	Layton 3063
	Short 474
--A-2-ONI (See also NAVY—Naval Intel-	Bellinger 1631
ligence, Activities Limited.)	
	Farthing 846
	Layton 3030
	Mollison 796
	Mollison 804
-Information re Jap ships-----	Bloch 1497-1499
	DeLany 1710
	Farthing 844-845
	Pye 1047-1058
	Short 291
	Short 407-408
	Short 452-455
-Navy, aircraft identification course-----	Rudolph 1236
-Navy information failed to reach field commanders--	Burgin 2616
	Burgin 2646
	Wilson 1352
-Navy, little confidence in Army-----	Herron 220
	Short 405
-Navy message 24 November not given Short-----	DeLany 1723
	Short 414
-Navy notified AWS delay-----	Bloch 1503
	Short 507
[23] -Navy not specific re reconnaissance	Fielder 2990
	Hayes 247
	Herron 218
	Lawton 2668
	Lawton 2672
	Short 377
	Short 379
	Short 384
-Navy, 3 December message re burning codes (See	Lawton 2684
also NAVY.)	Short 424
	Rochefort 1657
-5 December message, G-2-----	Short 525
-No information to Short re task force in Marshall	Short 361
Islands	
-Planes available, daily reports-----	Bellinger 1607
	Herron 222
	Kimmel 1765
-Procedure-----	Bloch 1500
	Burr 3069
	DeLany 1718
	Donegan 1933
	Gerow 4263
	Layton 3030
	Layton 3037
	Layton 3057
	Phillips 1248-1249
	Short 415
--None established-----	Burgin 2616
	Dingeman 3192
	Gerow 4323
	Lawton 2671-2672
	Phillips 1248

ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION—

Continued

-Re Interceptor Command	Short 495
-“War Warning” message, 27 November	Bellinger 1596
	Bellinger 1638
	Bellinger 1597
	Bloch 1503C-1505
	Burr 3070-3071
	DeLany 1698
	DeLany 1723
	Gerow 4262
	Gerow 4301
	Kimmel 1775-1776
	Kimmel 1779
	Layton 3041-3042
[24] -“War Warning” message, 27 November	Layton 3058-3059
(Continued)	Martin 1826
	Martin 1838-1840
	Martin 1906
	McMorris 2886
	Mollison 795
	Murray 3087
	Phillips 1115
	Pye 1040-1041
	Pye 1049
	Pye 1067
	Throckmorton 1393
	Short 416
	Short 469
	Stimson 4074
	Wilson 1349
	White 1997
[25] ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR (See also	
JAPAN—Attack a surprise; HAWAIIAN DE-	
FENSE; JAPAN—Attacking force origin; and related	
titles.)	
-In general	Allen 3112
	Allen 3114
	Burgin 2610
	Burgin 2633
	Burgin 2656
	Flood 2852
	Kay 3931-3937
	Locey 2797
	McCarthy 1926-1928
	F. Midkiff 2821
	F. Midkiff 2828
	Murray 3103
	Powell 3897
	Pye 1045
	Tindal 4490
	Weddington 3016
	Weddington 3019
-Action by ground troops, harbor troops, and	Burgin 2606
civilian elements.	Brooks 987
	Coll 3172
	Murray 3083
	Short 316-317
	Weddington 3013
	West 3121
-Arrival of new B-17s	Martin 1896
	Weddington 3017-3018
-Description by Bloch	Bloch 1494-1496
-Description by Capron	Capron 2027-2028
-Description by Cooper	Cooper 2130-2133
-Description by Farthing	Farthing 837
	Farthing 848
-Description by Klatt	Klatt 1460-1467

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ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR—Continued

-Description by Kogan.....	Kogan 1674-1676
-Description by Mollison.....	Mollison 828-831
-Description by Phillips.....	Phillips 1138
[29] -Description by Short (See also JAPAN- Attack a surprise.)	Pye 1045 Short 313-314 Short 456-457 Short 482 Short 536-538 Short 540
-Description by Walker.....	Walker 969-970
-Description by Welch.....	Welch 2010-2014
-Description by Wilson.....	Wilson 914-922
-Description of Jap planes by Martin.....	Martin 1911
-Enemy planes shot down.....	Flood 2853 Martin 1901 McMorris 2884 Short 317-318 Welch 2012
-Enemy planes, number used, 160-180.....	Kay 3938 Martin 1868 Short 318 Short 453-455
-Only 3 U. S. fliers got in air.....	Arnold 180 Mollison 800-801 Mollison 816 Weddington 3023
-Possibility of damaging Jap carriers.....	Kimmel 1800 Martin 1841 McMorris 2877 McMorris 2878 McMorris 2883 McMorris 2892 Pye 1068-1069
-Possibility of stopping planes.....	Burgin 2631 Burgin 2655 Burgin 2656 Fielder 2988 Kimmel 1800 Kimmel 1805 Mollison 829 Murray 3090 Welch 2013
[27] -Psychological blunder.....	Pye 1058-1060
-Result, if planes dispersed.....	Davidson 4144 Flood 2864 Herron 225 Martin 1837 Mollison 797 Mollison 807 Phillips 1118 Short 481 Weddington 3014-3015
-Result same if during 1940 alert.....	Herron 234 Short 476 Short 317
-Salvage operations.....	Short 314-315
-Statistics on repair work after 7 December.....	White 2001
-Sunday best for.....	Kimmel 1812
-W. D. and N. D. knew precise hour of attack.....	Short 4424 Kingman 555
[28] CANOL PROJECT (See also WYMAN, COL. THEODORE.)	Lewis 1164 Lewis 1178-1179 Lynch 2369 Record 4033-4035 Reybold 611

CANOL PROJECT--Continued

-Wyman, administration improper.....	Hannum 2069 Hunt 753 Wyman 3520 Hunt 752-753 Hunt 753
-Wyman, treatment of personnel.....	
-Wyman, wife as employee.....	
[29] G-2 KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN (See also JAPAN; ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; ARMY- NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; and related titles.)	
-In general.....	Coll 3182 Miles 92-93 Murray 3102 Richards 743-744 Stimson 4079-4080
-Aircraft carriers about 1 December.....	Miles 123-124
-Aircraft carriers on 27 October.....	Miles 111
-Attack force composition.....	Layton 3045 Miles 132
-Channeled through Chief of Staff.....	Miles 109
-Coordinated with ONI.....	Miles 116-117
-Dissemination procedure.....	Miles 124-126
-Embassy chief source.....	Miles 98
-Interpretation supplied.....	Miles 110-111
-Jaluit task force, no notice to HD (See also JAPAN-Jaluit Task Force).	Miles 129 Stimson 4072
-Jap papers burned, 5 December	
--Reported in staff meeting.....	Phillips 1242-1243 Short 525
--Short didn't know.....	Layton 3031 Miles 99
-Limited.....	Miles 94
-Limited personnel.....	Osmun 135-136 Osmun 137
-Mandated Island knowledge.....	Fielder 2944 Miles 102 Miles 104-106
-No situation estimate received.....	Miles 109
-Personnel untrained.....	Osmun 137
-Supplied to H. D.....	G-2 EST 3684 Miles 110 Osmun 141
[50] HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER DE- FENSE PLAN (See ARMY-NAVY AGREE- MENTS.)	
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; JAPAN; SHORT; MARSHALL; and related titles.)	
-Air Corps, infantry training.....	Davidson 4138-4139 Farthing 836 Marshall 29-32 Martin 1862-1865 Mollison 806 Short 479
-Aircraft, B-17, total U. S.....	Arnold 180 Farthing 834
-Air Defense Plan, 20 August.....	Hain 3344-3355 Martin 1893
--Sent to WD, 20 August.....	Short 412-414
-Antiaircraft.....	Bloch 1519 Bloch 1535 Burgin 2603 Burgin 2605 Burgin 2610 Burgin 2613 Burgin 2614

3290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

-Antiaircraft.....	Burgin 2615 Burgin 2626 Burgin 2632 Burgin 2635-2636 Davidson 4141 DeLany 1699 DeLany 1708 Farthing 834 Farthing 841 Hayes 266 Kimmel 1764 Kimmel 1768 Klatt 1455-1459 Marston 3127 Marston 3152 McMorris 2879 Midkiff, J. 2834 Short 366 West 3122
-Would have been ineffective.....	Burgin 2604 Burgin 2624 Short 456
[31] -Ammunition supply, 7 December.....	Burgin 2604 Burgin 2605 Burgin 2608 Burgin 2613 Burgin 2633 Burgin 2638 Dillingham 2784 Murray 3075 Murray 3080 Murray 3082 Murray 3091 Short 313 Weddington 3026-3027 Wilson 1353-1354
-Army planes available (See also RECONNAIS- SANCE—By Army—Insufficient planes).	Arnold 155 Arnold 175 Burgin 2662-2663 Davidson 4188 DeLany 1708 Martin 1859 Martin 1897-1898 Martin 1910 Short 314 Short 455 Weddington 3014 Weddington 3023 Welch 2009 Welch 2014 Martin 1860 Mollison 806
--Cannibalism.....	Arnold 184 Bloch 1519 Hayes 257
-Hawaii 2d priority.....	Martin 1873
-Changes by Short.....	Martin 1869-1887
-CPX February 1941 proved air attack possible...	Marston 3152
-Correspondence, Arnold and Martin.....	Murray 3081 Poindexter 3164
-Delay of equipment.....	Short 369
-Second priority.....	Arnold 178

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

[32] -Difficulty protecting planes	Fielder 2959 Martin 1827-1829 Short 290 Short 457 Short 477 Short 480-481 Weddington 3014-3015
-Equipment available	Burgin 2605 Burgin 2613 Burgin 2631 Kay 3940 Lawton 2675 Murray 3077 Phillips 1149 Short 354 Short 478 West 3121
-Earliest date prepared	Marshall 8
-Estimate of situation, process	Burgin 2662 Fielder 2988 Fielder 2996-2997 Phillips 1121-1125 Phillips 1127-1128
- --Violated	Hain 3324-3339
-Field Order No. 1	Pratt 1970 Throckmorton 1404-1407
-G-2 funds available	Richards 731 Richards 733 Richards 738 Richards 736
-Good (See also—Weakness of, infra, this title.)	Martin 1874-1875 McMorris 2884 Midkiff, F. 2804 Midkiff, F. 2818 Midkiff, J. 2841 Midkiff, J. 2843 Walker 966
-Greatest danger, Jap population (See also JAPA-NESE IN HAWAII.)	Phillips 1134
[33] -Hawaii best prepared U. S. Base	Arnold 179 Arnold 183 Marshall 14 Marston 3128 McKee 87
- --Contra	DeLany 1730
-Fully prepared	Capron 2016 Short 389
-Herron, CG, 1937-1941	Herron 207-208
-International situation, limited knowledge	Bicknell 1437-1438 Fielder 2982 Layton 3031 Short 458
-Known to Japan	Coll 3182 Farthing 848 Fielder 2970 Fielder 2977 Grew 4221 Herron 233 King 2706 McMorris 2880 McMorris 2882 Mollison 831 Shivers 3211 Shivers 3214

3292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

-Local Joint Planning Committee.....	Phillips 1250 Short 396-397
-M-Day.....	Bloch 1479 Capron 2023 Coll 3183 DeLany 1713-1714 Donegan 1936 Kay 3941 Kay 3950 Kimmel 1758-1859 Midkiff, F. 2805 Wells 2726
-Navy fighter planes available.....	Bellinger 1622 Martin 1867
-Navy strong.....	Felder 2989 Martin 1858
[34] -No air raid shelters before 7 December...	Burgin 2603 Flood 2851 Locey 2791 McCarthy 1923
-No slit trenches dug before 7 December.....	Burgin 2603 Farthing 833 Farthing 841 Howard 1916 Short 530 Short 4417
-No unity of command.....	Arnold 161 Arnold 185 Bellinger 1607 Bellinger 1609-1611 Bloch 1496 DeLany 1711-1713 Gerow 4318 Kimmel 1759-1760 Martin 1908-1909 McKee 82 Pye 1056 Rudolph 1222 Short 302 Short 372 Short 453
-Unity essential.....	Dillingham 2783 Marshall 27 Martin 1904-1905
-Unity of command after 17 December.....	Short 534
-Pearl Harbor considered torpedo-proof.....	Kimmel 1806
-Personnel shortage.....	Bloch 1519 Burgin 2636 Donegan 1937 Hain 3353 Marshall 23-24 Martin 1827-1828 Martin 1861 Short 354 Short 481 Short 4415 Throckmorton 1404 Walker 966 Weddington 3023
-Plan, in case of surprise attack.....	Short 389
[35] - Plan, in general.....	Burgin 2626 Farthing 833-836 Felder 2987 Hayes 258

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

-Report prepared by Bergquist	Bergquist 1209
	Bergquist 1219
-SOP 5 November (See also RAINBOW PLAN)	Bergquist 1216
	Bloch 1503-A
	Brooks 977-978
	Brooks 979-980
	Brooks 984
	Burgin 2601
	Davidson 4139
	Donegan 1947
	Earle 3642
	Marshall 29
	Marshall 31
	Marshall 47
	Marshall 53
	Martin 1879
	Mollison 797
	Mollison 820
	Powell 3910
	Short 282
	Short 333
	Short 400
	Short 431
	Short 460
	Short 489
	Short 507
	Short 520
	Short 526
	Short 529
	Throckmorton 1398
	Walker 967-968
	Walsh 1383
	Wilson 913
	Wilson 1357
--Artillery, alternate missions	Murray 3078-3079
	Walker 966-967
--Criticized	Burgin 2639
	Davidson 4136
	Flood 2856-2857
	Gerow 4278
	Herron 226-229
	Lawton 2683
	Martin 1892
--Navy informed	Phillips 1242
--Planes alerted	Mollison 800
[36] --Preparation of	Phillips 1110
	Phillips 1146-1147
--Sent to War Department	Short 431
--Norec ord	Hain 3316
-Staff conferences weekly	Short 519
	Short 524
-Staff officers fully informed	Short 522
-Supervision by War Department	See also, infra—WD did not supervise HD closely
	Gerow 4278
	Gerow 4281
	Herron 222-223
	Hill 2938
	Hill 2939
	Gerow 4304

3294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

-Weakness of (see also—Good, supra, this title;
see also under JAPAN—S/N ltr to S/W 24 Jan.)--

Arnold 159
Bellinger 1607
Bergin 2638
Bergin 2640
Coll 3174
DeLany 1699
DeLany 1727
Dillingham 2778
Donegan 1938
Gerow 4364
Hill 2935
Hill 2936
Kay 3940
Kay 3942-3946
Kimmel 1765
Kimmel 1768
Lawton 2673
Marston 3128
Midkiff, F. 2829
Murray 3076
Murray 3090
Murray 3092
Poindexter 3158
Poindexter 3164
Short 463
Weddington 3026
Wilson 1357
Wilson 1358-1359
Wilson 1373

[37]

--No preparation for air attack-----

Bloch 1486
Bloch 1491
Burgin 2603
Burgin 2656
Burgin 2657
King 2707
Petrie 2710
Short 4444
Walker 968
Weddington 3013
Gerow 4254-4256
Gerow 4281-4282
Gerow 4285-4286
Gerow 4288
Gerow 4325
Gerow 4333
Hayes 249
Herron 222
Short 458
Short 4432
Short 4436-4437
Stimson 4074
Stimson 4085
Herron 223
Herron 239

-WD did not supervise HD closely-----

--Inspection by Marshall-----

-WD "ideas," lack of confidence in-----

[38] HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS (See
also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; WYMAN,
COL. THEODORE; SHORT; and related titles.)

-In general-----

Kingman 567
McKee 57-58
McKee 64
Fleming 1332
Fleming 1339
Memo 3927-3928
Short 324
Wyman 3455

-Airfields, built without WD approval-----

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

-Airfield delays.....	AAF-Wyman 3881-3883 Martin 1889 Weddington 3020 3021 Wyman 3511
-Airfield protection, WD denied.....	Martin 1848 Short 323
-Airfields progress as of 7 December (See also— Ferrying routes, <i>infra</i> , this title.)	Flood 2861 Hannum 2049 Hannum 2066 Lynch 2365-2366
-Ammunition storage magazines.....	Schley 663
-Assistance requested by Short.....	Schley 656 Short 326-327
--Not from Chief of Engineers.....	Schley 656
-Considered unnecessary.....	Dillingham 2785
-Construction spurt after 7 December.....	AAF-Wyman 3874 Benson 3737 Bragdon 3845 Short 536 Wyman 3435
-Contract, District Engineer can abrogate.....	Nurse 4008 Nurse 4010 Reybold 629
-Contract negotiation.....	Bragdon 3842-3843 Burton 878 Butterfield 4116-4117 Chun 3259 Clark 3627 Claterbos 4097, 4099 Combs 2431 Combs 2450 Connolly 2190 Connolly 2195 Gesler 948 Gesler 957 Gesler 958-960 Grafe 2290 Grafe 2295-2299 Hannum 2032-2036 Hunt 764 Kingman 544 Kingman 559 Kingman 567 Martin 2330-2331 Reybold 631-632 Robins 701 Robins 703-704 Robins 722 Robins 725 Rohl 2242-2250 Schley 637 Schley 640-645 Shirley 2356-2359 Wyman 3378 Wyman 3392 Wyman 3488 Wyman 3495
-Contract, 20 December 1940.....	Burton 882 Connolly 2161-2166 Connolly 2170-2171 Gesler 932 Gesler 952 Gesler 961-963 Hannum 2054-2055 Parker 3797

[39]

3296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

-Contract, 20 December 1940	Rafter 780 Reybold 582-583 Robins 698 Robins 713 Robins 722 Robinson 3807 Robinson 3815 Rohl 2277-2280 Schley 639 Schley 655 Shirley 2355 Woolley 3765-3767 Wyman 3482 Wyman 3489
[40] --Inefficiency of contractors	Clarke 3629 Hunt 751 Hunt 761 King 2531-2533 Sisson 3269 Sisson 3275 Sisson 3280 Wyman 3423
--"Profit" plus fixed fee	Benson 3734 Hunt 747 Hunt 751 Sisson 3281
-Contractors, no complaints against	Marston 3148 Lynch 2371-2372 Reybold 600 Reybold 606 Wyman 3575
--Contra	Lumsden 3246 Wyman 3581-3582
-Contractors, responsibility for checking	Bragdon 3834-3835 Gesler 951 Kingman 560 Lorence 1682-1687 Lorence 1693 Lumsden 3247 Reybold 576 Reybold 579-581 Reybold 599-600 Reybold 602 Robins 700 Robins 705 Robins 713 Robins 715 Row 2093 Schley 646-650 Schley 657 Schley 664 Schley 667 Wyman 3397 Wyman 3579
--Espionage Act	AFF Wyman 3868 AFF Wyman 3855 Reybold 577-578 Schley 650 Wyman 3507
--Letter, TAG, 12 December	Reybold 578-579
[41] -Contractors sent "scrub" team	Clarke 3626 Kingman 557-558 Sisson 3269-3270 Sisson 3279 Sisson 3280 Woolley 3768 Wyman 3549

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

-Contractor, social contact with Army officers	Claterbos 4103 Reybold 597-598 Wyman 3360 Wyman 3365 Wyman 3383 Wyman 3398
-Delays, reasons for	Anderson 2482 Anderson 2486-2487 Anderson 2489-2490 Ballard 2577 Bartlett 2494-2499 Bartlett 2511-2515 Bragdon 3837-3839 Bragdon 3845 Capron 2023 Fleming 1337 Hannum 2061-2064 Hunt 770-771 King 2527-2529 King 2539-2543 King 2547-2554 King 2556 King 2564-2565 Lumsden 3228-3229 Lumsden 3236 Lynch 2368 Marston 3138 Marston 3141 Marston 3146 Marston 3149 Moody 3186 Perlter 3700 Perlter 3709 Perlter 2718 Robinson 3621 Rohl 2280 Row 2123-2124 Row 2126-2129 Schley 651 Short 326-327 Short 512-513 Sisson 3271 Weddington 3024-3025 Wickiser 2458-2565 Wickiser 2471-2472
[42]	Wyman 3460 Wyman 3500 Wyman 3568 Wyman 3571
--Fixed-fee contract not cause	Hunt 769 Perlter 3706 Wickiser 2469
--Lack of money	Haines 3651-3660 Lynch 2366-2367
--Not intentional	Lynch 2371 McKee 2422 Willman 2152 Wyman 3425
--Contra	Bartlett 2496-2498
--Priorities	Bragdon 3847-3848 Colton 678 Colton 681 Fleming 1336 Hunt 772 Marston 3135 Marston 3136

3298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

-Delays, reasons for—Continued

Priorities.....	Marston 3152 Powell 3901 Reybold 616 Schley 652 Short 328 Short 504-505 Sisson 3285 Wyman 3426-3428 Wyman 3566
--Shipping delays.....	Capron 2017 McKee 2420 Perlter 3711 Reybold 632 White 1992 Wyman 3426 Wyman 3499 Wyman 3559
Wyman 3426	
--Contra.....	Hannum 2080
--Weather conditions.....	Reybold 628
--Wyman.....	Combs 2443
[43] -Deputy Chief of Staff big help.....	Short 506
-Discussion with aliens.....	Gesler 950 Robins 715 Schley 658-659 Bragdon 3835 Fleming 1255 Lumsden 3230 Schley 661-662 Short 500 Short 503 Robinson 3589 Wyman 3387 Wyman 3569
-District Engineer responsibility.....	Short 329
--Engineers, funds used	Bragdon 3834 Reybold 592 Wyman 3516
-Engineers, chain of command.....	Dillingham 2753 Kestly 3667 McKee 2419 Nurse 3999 Nurse 4006 Parker 3779-3783 Parker 3788-3789 Robinson 3807-3808 Robinson 3616 Wyman 3431 Wyman 3544
-Equipment available in Hawaii.....	Schley 663 Short 502 Fielder 3004 Robins 726 Short 331 Wyman 3404 Wyman 3408 Wyman 3463 Wyman 3474 Wyman 3545
-Extensions granted.....	Capron 2050 McKee 2415-2417 McKee 2421 Wyman 3391 Wyman 3493
-Ferrying routes.....	
-Flat contract basis possible.....	

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

[44]	-Hawaiian Contractors.....	AFF-Wyman 3866 Clarke 3625 Connolly 2180 Connolly 2181-2185 Connolly 2191 Dillingham 2751-2752 Dillingham 2757-2758 Fleming 1304 King 2536-2540 Lumsden 3237 Lumsden 3239 Lumsden 3243 McKee 2403-2407 Wyman 3388 Wyman 3494 Wyman 3501
	--Difficulties dealing with.....	Fleming 1340 King 2557-2558 King 2561-2565 Lorence 1694 Wyman 3499 Wyman 3513-3514 Wyman 3557
	--Not cause of delay.....	Fleming 1340 Wong 3671 Wyman 3543-3544 Wyman 3425
	-Inspection, none from Washington.....	Fleming 1314
	-Job Order 2.1.....	Rafter 781
	-Navy liaison on.....	Fleming 1257
	-Navy projects.....	Hunt 773
	-Open to all contractors, claimed Wyman.....	Clarke 3626 Hunt 762 Benson 3722-3723 Claterbos 4098 McKee 2418 Schley 642 Wyman 3481
	--Contra.....	Marston 3150 Short 502 Wyman 3577
	-Progress reports to Short.....	Clarke 3628 Gesler 942 Gesler 955 Kestly 3668 Kestly 3670 Robins 728 Robinson 3590 Robinson 3602 Short 505 Sisson 3267 Weddington 3018 Weddington 3023 Wyman 3557 Wyman 3570 Wyman 3473 Wyman 3490-3492 Wyman 3518
[45]	-Progress unsatisfactory.....	Fleming 1330-1333 Hayes 269 Marston 3150 Short 324
	-Short, attempt to expedite.....	

3300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

-Underground gasoline tanks.....	AFF-Wyman 3881 Burton 884 Fleming 1342 Hayes 270 Hannum 2063 Lynch 2366-2367 Marston 3135 Marston 3140 Marston 3141 Marston 3149 J. Midkiff 2844 Mollison 816 Perlitter 3699 Perlitter 3703 Perlitter 3708 Rafter 779 Rafter 784 Reybold 591 Schley 654 Weddington 3018 Weddington 3024 Wyman 3449-3454 Wyman 3551 Wyman 3455 Wyman 3458 Wyman 3459
[46] HOFFMAN, ROBERT (See also WYMAN, COL. THEODORE; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJ- ECTS; and related titles.)	
-Allegations answered.....	Ferguson 4401 AFF Wyman 3877 Butterfield 4123 Lewis 1170-1174 Lewis 1179 Lumsden 3247 Row 2117-2118
-Knowledge of Wyman.....	Lynch 2368 Lynch 2373-2374 Row 2119-2122
-Reliability of.....	
[47] INFORMATION CENTER (Sec AWS.) INTERCEPTOR COMMAND (See AWS.) JAPAN (See also ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; G-2 KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN; and related titles.)	
-Air force considered good.....	Kimmel 1805-1807 Martin 1903 Arnold 185 Bergquist 1203 Bloch 1518 Bryden 908 DeLany 1724 Dillingham 2771 Dillingham 2774 Donegan 1941 Fielder 2960 Fielder 2989 Hayes 268 Kimmel 1771 Lawton 2677 Marshall 9 Martin 1827 Martin 1830 Martin 1837 McMorris 2870 Midkiff, F. 2808 Midkiff, F. 2824
-Attack a surprise.....	

JAPAN—Continued

-Attack a surprise.....	Pye 1069-1070 Rudolph 1233-1234 Short 462 Short 288 Short 536 Short 538 Walker 970 Walsh 1386 Wilson 922 Wilson 1355 Wilson 1360
-- <i>Contra</i>	Stimson 4072
--To Secretary Knox.....	Pye 1070 Short 4417
-Attacking force origin.....	Bellinger 1631 DeLany 1701 Ferguson 4392 Kimmel 1796-1797 Layton 3033-3036 Layton 3043-3052 McMorris 2874 McMorris 2875 McMorris 2889 Miles 123 Miles 129 O'Dell 4514 Rochefort 1656
[48]	Gerow 4316-4317 Layton 3060 Stimson 4081 Short 449 Marshall 10-12
-Attack, joint U. S.-British-Dutch action in event of.	Bloch 1513 Murray 3087 Rochefort 1657 Shivers 3203
-Burning papers.....	Bicknell 1413-1418 Fielder 2986 Phillips 1242-1243
--Staff announcement.....	Bellinger 1596 Bloch 1503-B Capron 2021 Coll 3179 Coll 3180 Fielder 2996 Gerow 4326 Grew 4200 Hill 2937 Kimmel 1756 Marshall 54 Poindexter 3163 Short 279 Short 293-294 Short 421 Short 428 Short 449 Short 472 Wilson 920 Wilson 1347
-Caution not to provoke.....	Burgin 2642 Capron 2021-2022 DeLany 1723 Gerow 4247 Gerow 4253
-Commission of first overt act by.....	

3302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

JAPAN—Continued

Commission of first overt act by.....	Gerow 4318 Hull 4474 McMorris 2869 Mollison 792 Phillips 1111 Phillips 1150 Short 280-281 Marshall 37
[49] -Crisis with.....	Arnold 151 Arnold 156 Arnold 172 Bellinger 1597 Bergquist 1204 Brooks 979-981 Davidson 4143 Dillingham 2771 Dillingham 2784 Donegan 1940 Gerow 4266 Gerow 4294-4296 Gerow 4326 Grew 4199 Grew 4210 Grew 4215 Grew 4222 G-2 Est. 3684 G-2 Est. 3689 Hayes 248 Hayes 256 Locey 2798 Lockard 1033 Marshall 7-8 Marshall 9-13 J. Midkiff 2843 Martin 1853 Mollison 792 Phillips 1111 Pratt 1984 Rudolph 1226 Rudolph 1232 Stimson 4045 Stimson 4049-4050 Throckmorton 1394 Walsh 1386 Welch 2019 White 1993 Wilson 919-923 Wilson 1347 Wilson 1363 Wilson 1369
--Known to Short.....	Fleming 1330-1331 Short 4414
--Newspapers.....	Allen 3106 Allen 3110 Bellinger 1641-1642 Brooks 983 Burgin 2623 Coll 3168 Coll 3175 Fielder 2975 Fielder 2990
[50] --Newspapers.....	Kogan 1674 Murray 3097 Robsion 4364 Short 467 Stimson 4059 Throckmorton 1399

JAPAN—Continued

-Crisis with—Continued

--Newspapers

White 1994

Wilson 1371

Wilson 1373

Wilson 1379

-Juliut Task Force.....

Bellinger 1631

DeLany 1701

DeLany 1724

Farthing 844

Short 4400

Fielder 3000

Herron 230

Kimmel 1769

Kimmel 1796-1797

Kimmel 1774

Layton 3032-3033

McMorris 2871

McMorris 2885

Miles 111

Miles 123

Miles 129

Rocheft 1654-1656

Rocheft 1660

Stimson 4053-4072

Stimson 4086-4087

-Japanese submarine in harbor.....

Coll 3178

Earle 3643

Fielder 2979

Fielder 2984

Layton 3037-3039

Layton 3053

Shivers 3210

Shivers 3212

Shivers 3215

Shivers 3216

Shivers 3224

Short 310

Short 536-537

-G-2 alert for disloyalty.....

Martin 1854

-Mandated Islands closed to U. S.....

Bloch 1503

Bloch 1528-1529

DeLany 1702

Hull 4469-4474

Kimmel 1808

[51]

Layton 3054-3055

Miles 102

Miles 104

Pye 1064

R-4466

-Mandated Islands photographic mission—November 1941.

Arnold 152

Gerow 4259

Kimmel 1808

Miles 112

Stimson 4053

Stimson 4086-4087

Truman 1446

-Messages intercepted.....

Bicknell 1422

Bicknell 1427

Fielder 2967-2971

Fielder 3007

Robsion 4363

--Phone call, Dr. Mori to Tokyo.....

Bicknell 1417-1420

Exhibit 21

Fielder 2960

Klatt 1468

Shivers 3204-3207

---Short informed of.....

Bicknell 1420

Fielder 2993-2995

3304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

JAPAN—Continued

-Naval concentrations.....	DeLany 1724 Ferguson 4398 Graves 4348 Kimmel 1769-1770 Layton 3039-3040 Layton 3061 Miles 111 Miles 123 Miles 129 Miles 132 O'Dell 4505 Rochefort 1652-1654 Rochefort 1660-1666 Short 451-452 Stimson 4053 Stimson 4080 Stimson 4072
-Navy strength.....	Martin 1858A Martin 1903
-No declaration of war expected (See exhibit "Joint Air Operations Agreement".) [52]	DeLany 1714 DeLany 1724 Kay 3951 McMorris 2869 Short 457 Stimson 4051 White 2006 Wilson 922
- <i>Contra</i>	Herron 237
-Not considered strong enough for attack.....	Fielder 2989 McMorris 2880 White 1998 Wilson 1365
-Probable attack on Russia.....	Fielder 2974 G-2 Est. 3685-3686 G-2 Est. 3694 Gerow 4230 Short 279 Gerow 4264
-Probability of attack by.....	Allen 3108 Arnold 154 Arnold 157 Arnold 166 Arnold 175 Arnold 181 Bellinger 1590-1591 Bloch 1486 Bloch 1503-B Bloch 1517 Brooks 979-981 Bryden 908 Burgin 2599 Burgin 2614 Burgin 2638 Burgin 2647 Burgin 2650 Burgin 2656 Coll 3166 Davidson 4150 DeLany 1724 Dillingham 2780-2781 Dillingham 2785 Donegan 1962-1963 Elliott 1004 Farthing 841 Fielder 2983

JAPAN—Continued

-Probability of attack by

[53]

G-2 Est. 3688
 Grew 4213
 Gerow 4229
 Gerow 4250-4252
 Gerow 4305
 Gerow 4332
 Graves 4348
 Hayes 259
 Herron 214
 Herron 230-231
 Herron 239
 Kay 3950
 Kimmel 1756-1757
 Kimmel 1771
 Kimmel 1773-1774
 Kimmel 1776
 Kimmel 1777-1778
 Kimmel 1781
 Kimmel 1792
 King 2700
 Layton 3064-3065
 Lockard 1033
 Marshall 7
 Marshall 9
 Marshall 50
 Martin 1899
 McMorris 2872
 McMorris 2885
 McMorris 2887
 Midkiff, P. 2804-2805
 Midkiff, P. 2827
 Midkiff, J. 2837
 Miles 103
 Miles 105
 Miles 106-107
 Miles 118
 Mollison 792
 Mollison 794
 Mollison 803
 Petrie 2712
 Petrie 2719
 Phillips 1111
 Phillips 1115
 Phillips 1117
 Phillips 1128-1129
 Phillips 1132
 Phillips 1135
 Phillips 1150
 Phillips 1158-1159
 Poindexter 3160
 Poindexter 3157
 Poindexter 3159
 Powell 3891
 Rochefort 1652-1654
 Rudolph 1221
 Rudolph 1233-1234
 Short 284-285
 Short 356-358
 Short 418
 Short 427
 Short 429-430
 Short 432
 Short 469
 Short 485-486
 Short 531-532

[54]

3306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

JAPAN—Continued

-Probability of attack by	Short 4417 Short 4433 Short 4440 Stimson 4051 Stimson 4082 Taylor 1076 Walker 970 White 1998 White 2011 White 2007 Wilson 1355 Wilson 1361
--Air attack probable	Bergquist 1203-1204 DeLany 1727-1728 Hayes 268 Hill 2935 King 2701 Marshall 17 Martin 1837 Midkiff, F. 2824 Miles 103 Miles 105 Murray 3083 Murray 3091 Stimson 4066 Stimson 4072
--Australian intelligence report.....	O'Dell 4513
--Discussed often.....	Donegan 1961 Ferguson 4396
--Grew memo.....	Grew 4203 Kimmel 1778 Short 451
--Nothing done to avoid surprise attack.....	Kimmel 1779 Martin 1823 McMorris 2890-2891 Short 4444 Welch 2009
--Plan, in case of surprise.....	Short 389
--Predicted by G-2.....	Bicknell 1413-1418
--Predicted by Grew, 27 January 1941.....	Kimmel 1778 Short 451
[55] --Predicted in Joint Air Operations Agreement	Arnold 182 Bellinger 1579 Martin 1823 Martin 1830 Short 4441
--Rumors.....	Ferguson 4389-4391 Kogan 1677
--S/N ltr, 24 January.....	DeLany 1726 Donegan 1938 Hayes 259 Kimmel 1767 Kimmel 1803-1804 McMorris 2879 Short 368 Short 369 Short 461-462 Stimson 4064 Stimson 4066
--Copy to Short.....	Short 368-369
--Submarine danger.....	Kimmel 1757 Kimmel 1802 Layton 3041 McMorris 2870 Pye 1040-1043

JAPAN—Continued

-Probability of attack by—Continued

--Surprise invasion impossible..... Marshall 17

Midkiff, F. 2825

Wilson 1351

Wilson 1354

-Ships ceased use of ports 2 months before..... Fielder 2974

Walsh 1387

-Ultimatum, 26 November..... Ferguson 4396

Gerow 4320

Gerow 4330

Grew 4207-4208

Grew 4215

Hull 4479-4480

Kimmel 1812

Short 4427

Stimson 4079

[56] -War considered imminent..... Coll 3168

Fielder 2986

Fielder 2988

Ferguson 4388

Gerow 4229

Gerow 4237

Gerow 4329

Graves 4348

G-2 Est. 3684

Hull 4483

Kay 3940

Martin 1854

McMorris 2868

McMorris 2886

Midkiff J. 2836

Murray 3091

O'Dell 4514

Short 467-468

Short 531

Short 4413

Short 4418

Short 4427

Stimson 4050

Stimson 4053

Stimson 4061

-- *Contra*..... Davidson 4143-4144

Davidson 4150-4151

Donegan 1938

Layton 3062

Midkiff F. 2807

Petrie 2714

[57] ' JAPANESE IN HAWAII (See also ALERT

NO. 1; JAPAN—caution not to provoke;
and related titles.)

Midkiff F. 2810

Midkiff F. 2813

Petrie 2718

Wells 2736

Wells 2742

White 2004-2005

-Alien registration..... Fielder 2991

Short 401-405

Taylor 3254

-Espionage..... Fielder 2966

Fielder 2978

Fielder 2986

Fielder 3008

Kay 3941

King 2706

McMorris 2884

Pratt 1973

Shivers 3206-3207

Shivers 3209

3308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

JAPANESE IN HAWAII—Continued

-Espionage.....	Shivers 3218 Shivers 3223 Short 4420 Taylor 3151 Wells 2739
--None before 7 December.....	Pratt 1974-1976
-G-2, Alert for disloyalty.....	Fielder 2952 Fielder 2980 Martin 1854
-Jamming radios, 7 December.....	Fielder 3006-3007 Martin 1911-1912 Powell 3901
-Loyalty expected.....	Allen 3118 Dillingham 2769 Dillingham 2770 Dillingham 2775 Fielder 2948 Hayes 262 Herron 224 Meurlott 3921 Pratt 1987 Wells 2733 Wells 2735 Wilson 1364
[58] -Contra.....	Farthing 838 Hayes 255 Hill 2940 King 2702 Locey 2793-2794 Martin 1829 Midkiff F. 2809 Moody 3200 Pratt 1973 Pratt 1981-1983 Wells 2741 White 1990 White 1999-2000
-“Most Probable Danger”.....	Dingeman 3196 Fielder 2949 Fielder 2953 Fielder 2957 Martin 1834 Martin 1836-1837 McMorris 2890 Midkiff F. 2812 Phillips 1134
-Not arrogant, merely uneasy.....	Short 433 Short 457
-Number of.....	Burgin 2647 Fielder 2947 King 2704 Lawton 2687 Marshall 50 Meurlott 3920 Petrie 2715 Petrie 2717 Phillips 1111 Phillips 1133 Poindexter 3162 Short 289 Wells 2727

JAPANESE IN HAWAII—Continued

-Sabotage by, none before 7 December.....	Anderson 2488 Dillingham 2771 Herron 225 Kay 3941 Lynch 2371 Martin 1829, 1832 Wells 2740 91 White 19
-Contra.....	Wilson 926
[59] -Sabotage by, not expected.....	Herron 225 Hill 2937 Meurlott 3922 Midkiff F. 2826 Midkiff J. 2839 Petrie 2750
-Contra.....	Burgin 2611 Burgin 2648 Fielder 2952 Fielder 2956 Fielder 2958 Fielder 2962-2964 Fielder 3009 Flood 2855 Hain 3315 Hain 3340 Hain 3342 Kay 3949 Lawton 2682 Lawton 2684 Lawton 2688 Locey 2796 Marshall 50 Martin 1830 Martin 1900 McMorris 2870 Mollison 809 Poindexter 3159 Poindexter 3161 Poindexter 3162 Pratt 1974 Scanlon 4166 Scanlon 4181 Short 289 Short 527 Welch 2009 White 1996
[60] KIMMEL	
-CINCPAC, 1 February '1941 (See also ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION,- Conferences Short and Kimmel.)	Kimmel 1735
-Duties.....	Kimmel 1736-1738 Kimmel 1739-1745 Kimmel 1747 Kimmel 1789
KUHN, OTTO	Bicknell 1422-1423 Fielder 2964 Pratt 1973 Shivers 3206-3207 Shivers 3218

3310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

LOCAL JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE (See HAWAIIAN DEFENSE.)

[61] MARSHALL, GENERAL GEORGE C. (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ALERT NO. 1; JAPAN,-Attack a surprise; JAPAN,-Probability of Attack; and related titles.)

-Authority to sign "Marshall"-----	Bryden 905 Marshall 40 Gerow 4335 Marshall 36 Stimson 4061 Gerow 4243
-Away on 27 November-----	
-Chief of Staff	
--Initials on document-----	Bryden 904 Marshall 39
-Communications with Short (See also SHORT,- Msgs, WD and TAG.)	
--All in WD files-----	Marshall 19
--Ltr 5 March-----	Marshall 19-20
--Ltr 15 March-----	Marshall 21-25
--Ltr 14 April-----	Marshall 26-27
--Ltr 5 May-----	Marshall 27-28
--Message 7 December (See also SHORT,- Msg WD, 7 Dec.)	
--Washington Signal Office handling----	French 187-206
--Message re AWS "eyes alone" May 1941----	Fleming 1271
--Personal letters-----	Marshall 20
--Letters, not "specific directives"-----	Marshall 33
--Ltr 7 February-----	Marshall 13 Short 354
--Ltr 19 February-----	Short 321-323
--Letter received 29 May-----	Marshall 28
--Letter 10 October-----	Marshall 29
--Letter, 14 October-----	Marshall 31-32
[62] --Letter 28 October-----	Marshall 30
--Message, WD, 27 November (See also under SHORT, -Msg. WD, 27 Nov.)	Bryden 900-905 Scanlon 4183 Short 417
--Participation in-----	Bryden 903 Marshall 40-42 Stimson 4069
--Reply to 27 November message-----	Gerow 4280 Gerow 4289-4291 Gerow 4287-4288 Marshall 38 Short 286-287 Short 380 Short 419-420 Short 4432 Short 4438 Stimson 4061-4062 Stimson 4084
MARTIAL LAW-----	Dillingham 2777 Taylor 3254
--Delared 8 December-----	Fielder 2946 Short 318-320

[63] NAVY (See also ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS; ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION; ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; KIMMEL; NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII; RECONNAISSANCE; and related titles.)

-Agreements with Army (See ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS.)

-Base Defense Air Force----- Bellinger 1576-1585

Bellinger 1589

Bellinger 1590-1591

Bellinger 1593-1596

Bellinger 1603-1604

Bellinger 1625-1628

Bellinger 1640

Bloch 1476

Bloch 1521-1523

-CINCPAC not restricted on Fleet use----- McMorris 2881

-Condition No. 1----- Bloch 1497

Bloch 1530

Pye 1066-1067

-Daily reports by----- Bellinger 1607

Herron 222

Kimmel 1765

-Defensive deployments, not Navy term----- Bloch 1512

-Contra, used by Adm. DeLany----- DeLany 1725

-Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (See ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS.)

-Ltr, S/N to S/W, 24 January 1941. (See under JAPAN.)

-Ltr, January 25, Richardson to S/N (See under Kimmel 1802-1803

JAPAN, -Probability of attack by.)

-Ltr, 14 October, 2-CL-41----- Bloch 1480

Kimmel 1747

Kimmel 1749-1750

-Message 16 October, new Jap cabinet (See also SHORT, -Msg WD 16 October.)

Bellinger 1596

Bloch 1503-A

DeLany 1723

Gerow 4230-4231

Gerow 4264

Hain 3305

Short 279

Short 344

Short 412

[64]

-Message 27 November (See ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, -War Warning Message 27 Nov.)

-Message, ONI, 1 December, Jap carriers----- Kimmel 1769

-Messages, 3, 4 and 6 December (See also under ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.)

Bloch 1513-1514

-Messages to CINCPAC-----

McKee 80

-Naval Intelligence (See also ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, -G-2-ONI.)

Fielder 2966

DeLany 1701-1703

Layton 3061

Layton 3063

Rochefort 1651

Rochefort 1655-1660

Rochefort 1664

Shivers 3214

--Activities limited (See also JAPAN, -Fleet Movements; ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, -G-2-ONI.)

Fielder 3000

Layton 3031-3032

Layton 3051

McMorris 2885

Rochefort 1650-1652

Rochefort 1655-1656

Rochefort 1658-1664

3312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAVY—Continued

-Naval plane program, 1940.....	Bellinger 1581 Bloch 1536
[65] -Navy message 24 November.....	Bellinger 1597 Bloch 1503-B and -C DeLany 1723 Fielder 2996 Gerow 4258 Herron 238-240 McKee 80 Short 414
-Navy message 6 December re Jap papers.....	Bloch 1513-1515 Herron 235-240
[66] NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII.....	McKee 64 McKee 72 McMorris 2885 McKee 70
-Hawaiian Defense SOP.....	Bloch 1470-1473
-Kimmel and Bloch, relations between.....	McKee 60
ORANGE PLAN—obsolete.....	Bloch 1474
RAINBOW PLAN (See also HAWAIIAN DE- FENSE- -SOP 5 November.)	Bloch 1479-1480 Bloch 1512 Gerow 4325 McKee 58-59 McKee 61-63 McKee 67-68 McKee 76 McKee 84 Mollison 792 O'Dell 4512 Phillips 1158 Short 280-281
[67] RECONNAISSANCE (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ALERTS IN HA- WAI; ALERT NO. 1; HAWAIIAN DE- FENSE; NAVY; SHORT; and related titles.)	
-Army never asked Navy.....	Phillips 1241
-By Army.....	Burgin 2600 Hain 3331 Hayes 246 Kimmel 1744-1745 Kimmel 1809 Marshall 47 Marshall 48-49 Martin 1817 Martin 1844 Mollison 812 Pye 1054 Pye 1067 Short 280-281 Short 367-368 Short 374 Short 375-376 Short 469 Short 486
--Incidental to training.....	Herron 213-214 Martin 1821 Martin 1842 Martin 1851-1852 Rudolph 1224 Short 486
--Insignificant.....	Burgin 2599 Herron 212 Herron 233 Lawton 2666 Lawton 2674 Mollison 823

RECONNAISSANCE—Continued

By Army—Continued

--Insufficient planes (See also HAWAIIAN DEFENSE, -Planes available)	Davidson 4138 DeLany 1705 Hain 3334 Martin 1873 Martin 1874-1875 Martin 1875-1877 Short 281 Short 324 Short 377-378 Short 383-385 Stimson 4068-4069
[68] --Contra	Martin 1851
--Not ordered by Short	Gerow 4274 Phillips 1141 Short 4436-4437 Stimson 4063 Wilson 1349
--Ordered by War Department	Gerow 4250-4252 Gerow 4271 Gerow 4275 Martin 1842 Phillips 1111 Stimson 4063
--Planes available	Gerow 4272 Kimmel 1761 Martin 1894 Mollison 812
--Sunday, day off	Short 473
-By Army, where Navy failed, duty of Short	McKee 88-89 Lawton 2667 Short 374
--Contra	Kimmel 1805
-Distant by Army, GHQ AC, duty	Kimmel 1738-1743
-Distant by Navy	Bellinger 1602-1063 Bellinger 1608 Bellinger 1623-1625 Bellinger 1634 Bloch 1484 Bloch 1487 Bloch 1524 Bloch 1525-1527 Bloch 1532-1534 Burgin 2650 DeLany 1704-1707 DeLany 1721 Gerow 4323 Hayes 245 Herron 211 Herron 218 Herron 220 Kimmel 1738 Kimmel 1741 Kimmel 1743 Kimmel 1745 Kimmel 1753-1754 Lawton 2667 Marshall 47 Martin 1817 Miles 124 Mollison 810-811 Mollison 818-820 Mollison 825-826 Pye 1038-1040 Pye 1054-1055

[69]

3314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

RECONNAISSANCE—Continued

-Distant by Navy-----	Pye 1062 Pye 1067 Rudolph 1232 Rudolph 1233-1234 Short 281-282 Short 373 Short 378-379 Short 380 Short 383 Short 393-394 Stimson 4071 White 2005 Wilson 1352
-Complaints by Martin-----	Martin 1846-1847
-G-3 never asked Navy-----	Donegan 1951 Lawton 2674
-Lack of confidence in-----	Lawton 2678 Martin 1856 Midkiff F. 2831 Rudolph 1232
-Navy never requested Army planes for-----	Short 303
-Navy patrols-----	Bellinger 1599-1600 Bloch 1483-1484 Bloch 1524-1525 Burgin 2645 DeLany 1725 Hayes 247 Kimmel 1763 Martin 1820-1821 Midkiff F. 2807 Short 357-360
---Patrols best reconnaissance-----	Short 384
---Reconnaissance merely incidental-----	Kimmel 1773 Lawton 2673 Lawton 2677 McMorris 2885
[70] -Navy, planes available-----	Bellinger 1598 Bellinger 1602-1603 Bellinger 1612-1619 Kimmel 1761 Kimmel 1794-1795 Kimmel 1810-1811 Lawton 2676 Short 456
---Insufficient-----	Bloch 1493-1494 DeLany 1705 Herron 221 Kimmel 1738-1739 Kimmel 1751-1752 Kimmel 1763 Kimmel 1806 Martin 1873 Mollison 824 Moody 3199 Short 375
-None, 7 December-----	Bellinger 1630-1631
-Not cover vs. air raids-----	Lawton 2673 Lawton 2677 Martin 1822
-Route used unknown-----	Burgin 2600 Burgin 2672 Martin 1822 Martin 1856-1857 Mollison 811 Short 375 Short 475 Lawton 2672

RECONNAISSANCE—Continued

-Distant by Navy—Co tinued	
—Short not informed as to.....	Short 359-360
	Short 375-376
	Short 475
— <i>Contra</i>	Bloch 1489-1490
	Martin 1847
	Short 4438
	Kimmel 1772
—Short's reliance on.....	Burgin 2600
	Donegan 1950
	Fielder 2989-2990
	Moody 3199
	Short 356-360
	White 2001
— <i>Contra</i>	Short 375
[71] —Sunday, day off.....	Brooks 993
	Mollison 811
—Task forces, all Short knew about.....	Short 384
	Short 4438
-Distant considered unnecessary.....	Lawton 2674
	Short 4439
-Joint Air Operations Agreement (See also	Bellinger 1582
ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS).	Gerow 4321
	Short 387-389
-Letter, Herron to Marshall, 15 October 1940, re	Herron 214
Navy.	
-None 7 December.....	Short 453-455
	Short 472-473
-Not discussed by Short and Kimmel 27 November	Mollison 793
conference.	
-Not well coordinated.....	Arnold 186
	Midkiff F. 2831
-Recommended by WPD.....	Miles 107
[72] ROHL, HANS WILHELM (See also WY-	Burton 854
MAN, COL. THEODORE).	Fleming 1287-1288
	Fleming 1291
	Fleming 1297
	Hayes 272
	Kingman 561-562
	Lorence 1679-1682
	Marshall 51
	Schley 647
	Schley 656
	Short 513
	Robins 700
-Did not delay defense work.....	Bicknell 1435
	Rohl 2275
— <i>Contra</i>	Combs 2446-2447
	King 2533-2534
-False rumor of death.....	Pine 2392
-Furnished equipment for Canol Project.....	Reybold 611
	Robins 719
-Hawaiian Contractors, dominant figure in.....	Burton 885
	Lewis 1182-1184
	Robinson 3591
	Woolley 3771-3772
	Wyman 3527
-Investigation of.....	Bicknell 1430
	Fielder 3000
-Knew nothing about AWS.....	Rohl 2268
-Plack, Werner, friendship with.....	Combs 2429
	Flannery 2516-2522
	Lewis 1167-1168
	Lewis 1175-1177
	Pine 2387-2390
	Wyman 3583

3316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

ROHL, HANS WILHELM—Continued

-Reliability of-----	Combs 2448 Connolly 2185-2186 Fleming 1326 Gesler 944 Horne 2507 Reybold 577 Reybold 607 Robins 704 Robins 714 Row 2152 Stilphen 1557-1558 Stilphen 1561 Wyman 3511 Wyman 3527 Wyman 3561
[73] --Alleged drinking-----	Anstey 4023 Bicknell 1433-1434 Burton 869-870 Clarke 3635 Claterbos 4101 Fielder 3002 Fleming 1296 Harrington 3959 Harrington 3964 Harrington 3970 Hunt 767 King 2526 King 2544 King 2555 Marston 3145 Mourlott 3925 Pine 2393-2394 Robinson 3592 Schlesinger 3288-3289 Schlesinger 3297 Short, A. T. 3648 Wyman 3532 Zucca 2595
--Questionable-----	Bartlett 2500-2508 Combs 2442 Combs 2446 Combs 2449 Dillingham 2760-2761 F. B. I. 4028-4030 Hunt 749 Hunt 771 King 2525-2528 Lewis 1184 Pine 3992 Pratt 1979 Robinson 3594
-Rohl and Wyman (See under WYMAN.)	
-Rohl citizenship-----	Barber 3972-3974 Barber 3983 Bicknell 1433 Butterfield 4104-4115 Butterfield 4119 Burton 855-860 Burton 879 Carmichael 4017-4018 Claterbos 4098 Combs 2428 Combs 2439-2442
[74]	

ROHL, HANS WILHELM—Continued

-Rohl, citizenship-----	Combs 2453
	Connolly 2160
	Connolly 2167-2171
	Connolly 2176
	Connolly 2179
	Connolly 2181
	Connolly 2188
	Connolly 2192-2193
	Dillon 4187
	Furbush 4339-4345
	Gesler 934-941
	Gesler 953-954
	Gesler 955
	Grafe 2305-2306
	Grafe 2310
	Grafe 2312
	Grafe 2315-2316
	Grafe 2320
	Hannum 2036
	Hannum 2054
	Horne 2202-2204
	Hunt 767
	Kingman 545-553
	Kingman 560-566
	Lewis 1169-1170
	Lewis 1181
	Lorence 1682
	Lorence 1688-1691
	Martin 2325-2330
	Martin 2335-2336
	Martin 2340
	Martin 2343
	Martin 2345-2346
	Martin 2347-2350
	Pine 2377-2381
	Pine 3992
	Pine 3996
	Reybold 576
	Robins 702-703
	Robins 706-708
	Robins 724
	Rohl 2225-2226
	Rohl 2235
	Rohl 2240
	Rohl 2263
	Rohl 2273-2274
	Row 2107-2108
	Row 2111-2113
	Shoemaker 4367-4383
	Stilphen 1542-1555
	Stilphen 1561-1568
	Stilphen 1572-1574
	Wyman 3503-3507
	Wyman 3533
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General George C. Marshall (Vol. 1, APHB; Vols. 1 and 16, RC).	Discussions re Japanese relations. WD and Navy messages & responses thereto through 28 Nov 1941. Interpretation of & action taken in WD Wash as result of response by CG, HD, to 27 Nov. radio.	Vol. 1; 7-13, 52-54. Vol. 1; 33-44. Vol. 1; 44-50.	Vol. 1; 2-3. Vol. 16; 1794, 1796, 1803-1805. Vol. 1; 2-3. Vol. 16; 1796-1801. Vol. 16; 1796-1801.
Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles (Vol. 2, APHB; Vol. 1, RC).	Methods of obtaining G-2 information. Functioning of G-2. Message 7 Dec 1941.	Vol. 2; 92-102; 106-107; 111-112; 116. Vol. 2; 109-111; 117; 124-129. Vol. 2; 123-124; 132. Vol. 3; 190-206.	Vol. 1; 1. Vol. 1; 1. Vol. 1; 1. Vol. 1; 4.
Col. Edward F. French (Vol. 3, APHB; Vol. 1, RC).	Duties.	Vol. 3; 207; 223.	Vol. 1; 4.
General Chas. D. Herron (Ret.) (Vol. 3, APHB; Vol. 1, RC).	Cooperation between Army and Navy. Army & joint Army-Navy maneuvers and training.	Vol. 3; 209-214; 218; 220; 222; 235-236. Vol. 3; 214-217; 219; 223; 232.	Vol. 1; 4. Vol. 1; 4. Vol. 1; 4.
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Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger (Vol. 15 APHB; Vol. 8 RC).	Identifying data.....	Vol. 15; 1576.	Vol. 8; 887.
	Unity of Command.....	Vol. 15; 1579; 1591; 1609; 1610-1611.	Vol. 8; 915.
	Army-Navy Cooperation.	Vol. 15; 1579; 1586; 1589; 1592; 1607; 1610; 1621-1622; 1623; 1636.	Vol. 8; 891-892; 899; 900; 923; 931; 932; 947.
	Pearl Harbor, Army Mission at.	Vol. 15; 1581.	Vol. 8; 923.
	Air attack at Oahu, Probability of.	Vol. 15; 1590.	Vol. 8; 903; 810; 927; 943; 945; 949.
	Messages 27 Nov 1941...	Vol. 15; 1597; 1638.	Vol. 8; 907; 920; 944
	Airplane Strength.....	Vol. 15; 1598; 1607; 1612; 1614-1616; 1619; 1622-1623; 1629; 1630-1631.	Vol. 8; 898-899; 893; 895; 987; 919-920; 947-949.
	Reconnaissance, Naval	Vol. 15; 1599-1603; 1605; 1610-1618; 1626; 1630-1631; 1634; 1636; 1641.	Vol. 8; 893; 896; 906; 937-938.
	Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.	Vol. 15; 1605.....	Vol. 8; 899; 901.
	Personnel and Equipment, Insufficiency of.	Vol. 15; 1608.....	Vol. 8; 905-906; 917; 934; 892 893; 897.
	Events of 7 December ..	Vol. 15; 1620; 1630-1631; 1636; 1637.	Vol. 8; 895; 901; 913-914; 919; 924; 936-937; 938-941.
	Maneuvers	Vol. 15; 1637; 1638.....	Vol. 8; 899; 944.
	AWS	Vol. 15; 1638-1639.....	Vol. 8; 920.
	International Situation.....	Vol. 15; 1641.....	Vol. 8; 904.
Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin (Vol. 17 APHB; Vols. 3 and 14, RC).	Identifying data.....	Vol. 17; 1817; 1852.....	Vol. 3; 320.
	Maneuvers	Vol. 17; 1818-1819.....	Vol. 14; 1656; 1651-1652.
	Army and Navy Cooperation.	Vol. 17; 1818; 1867; 1904; 1907-1909.	Vol. 3; 339-340.
	Distant Reconnaissance.	Vol. 17; 1820-1821; 1845; 1856-1857 1874.	Vol. 14; 1655-1656.
	Insufficiency of Air Patrol.	Vol. 17; 1822; 1845-1847.....	Vol. 14; 1655.
	Shortage of Personnel & Eqt.	Vol. 17; 1822; 1827; 1848; 1860-1861; 1869; 1897.	Vol. 3; 331; 338. Vol. 14; 1650.
	AWS	Vol. 17; 1823-1824; 1890; 1911.	Vol. 3; 336; 339.
	WD Message 27 November.	Vol. 17; 1826; 1833; 1842.....	Vol. 3; 326-327; 346-347.
	Air Attack Unexpected.	Vol. 17; 1827-1837; 1841; 1898-1900.	Vol. 3; 349.
	Alerts	Vol. 17; 1827; 1831; 1833; 1856; 1866.	Vol. 3; 325; 328; 330; 334-335; 342; 343.
	Concentration of Plans	Vol. 17; 1828.....	Vol. 14; 1650. Vol. 3; 348.
	Sabotage.....	Vol. 17; 1829; 1831-1832; 1900; 1912.	Vol. 3; 346; 350; 324-325; 328.
	International Crisis.....	Vol. 17; 1853.....	Vol. 3; 347.
	Airplane Strength.....	Vol. 17; 1859; 1910.....	Vol. 3; 332; Vol. 14; 1654.
Col. Walter C. Phillips (Vol. 10 APHB; Vol. 8 RC).	Correspondence with General Arnold.	Vol. 17; 1869; 1870-1871; 1874-1887.	Vol. 3; 328-330.
	Extensive Training Program.	Vol. 17; 1860-1864; 1865.....	Vol. 3; 330; 334; 342; 343.
	Identifying Information	Vol. 10; 1107-1109.....	Vol. 3; 212.
	Alerts	Vol. 10; 1110; 1114; 1118; 1127; 1158.	Vol. 3; 215; 220; 221; 243; 284.
	Sabotage.....	Vol. 10; 1111; 1116; 1147.....	Vol. 3; 215.
	WD Message 27 Nov. 1941 to CGHD.	Vol. 10; 1111 1112; 1117; 1120; 1150.	Vol. 3; 214-215; 286.
	Army and Navy Cooperation.	Vol. 10; 1113; 1132; 1240; 1241; 1248-1250.	Vol. 3; 223; 229; 243; 246; 284.
	Navy Message 27 Nov. 1941.	Vol. 10; 1115.....	Vol. 3; 212-214.
	Tactical Considerations.	Vol. 10; 1121-1126.....	Vol. 3; 241-242.
	Attack Possible but not probable.	Vol. 10; 1128; 1149.....	Vol. 3; 215; 236.
	Events of 7 December...	Vol. 10; 1138; 1152.....	Vol. 3; 216-217; 234; 237-238; 284-285; 340-341.
	AWS.....	Vol. 10; 1139-1140; 1143; 1149; 1152; 1155-1156; 1244; 1246; 1249.	Vol. 3; 232; 234-235.
	Reconnaissance.....	Vol. 10; 1141.....	Vol. 3; 228.
	Lt. Burr.....	Vol. 10; 1241-1242.....	Vol. 3; 243.
	Local Joint Planning Comm.	Vol. 10; 1250.....	Vol. 8; 222.

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Witness	Identical or similar subject matter	(Cross references)	
		APHB	RC
Col. Walter C. Phillips—Continued	Witness was C of S, HD from 5 Nov. 1941 after serving as G-3 from July of that year. Had rotated through various staff sections as grooming for C of S appointment.	Vol. 10; 1107; 1108.....	Vol. 3; 212.
	Alert No. 3 was ordered immediately upon attack.	Vol. 10; 1118.....	Vol. 3; 216.
	Witness as senior Army member of Local Joint Planning Committee did not function actively and did not deem it necessary to modify the joint plan after the messages of Nov. 27 and 28 were received.	Vol. 10; 1250.....	Vol. 3; 222.
	No consultation with Navy took place between 27 Nov. and 7 Dec.	Vol. 10; 1241.....	Vol. 3; 223; 229.
	Lt. Burr was Navy Liaison Officer on duty with HD, G-3 and Lt. Col. Damion was HD Liaison Officer on duty with Navy. (Refutes Adm. Bloch's testimony that he knew nothing regarding Army's alerts system.)	Vol. 10; 1241; 1242.....	Vol. 3; 243.
Col. Kenneth Bergquist.	Identifying data.....	Vol. 10; 1186-1187.....	Vol. 3; 377.
	AWS.....	Vol. 10; 1187-1194-1215.....	Vol. 3; 377-380; 383.
	Personnel and Equipment.....	Vol. 10; 1197-1198; 1192-1193.....	Vol. 3; 382.
Col. Kendall J. Fielder. (Vol. 26 APHB; Vols. 1, 3 and 14, RC).	Events of 7 December.....	Vol. 10; 1198-1200.....	Vol. 3; 383; 386.
	Army and Navy Cooperation.....	Vol. 10; 1213-1214; 1217.....	Vol. 3; 380.
	Duties and Identifying information.....	Vol. 26; 2943-2944; 2940; 3001.....	Vol. 3; 287.
	Corporation.....	Vol. 26; 2945; 2956; 2963-2964; 2966; 2971; 2982; 2985; 2988; 2990; 2999.	Vol. 14; 1670.
			Vol. 3; 288-289; 291-292; 296-299.
			Vol. 14; 1670-1671; 1673-1676.
	Occurrences 7 Dec.....	Vol. 26; 2946; 2949; 2955; 2967; 2976-2977; 2979; 2999; 3006; 3008-3010.	Vol. 1; Appendix.
	Information re Japanese.....	Vol. 26; 2947-2955; 2959-2964; 2966; 2972-2978; 2980-2982; 2984; 2986; 2989-2991; 2993; 2997-2998; 3000; 3008.	Vol. 1; Appendix.
			Vol. 3; 311; 287-295; 297; 299.
			Vol. 14; 1670-1675; 1677-1680.
	Sabotage.....	Vol. 26; 2958-2960; 2962-2965; 2967; 3009-3010.	Vol. 1; appendix.
			Vol. 3; 291; 293; 295; 297.
	Messages.....	Vol. 26; 2959-2960; 2962; 2974-2975; 2982; 2996-2999.	Vol. 14; 1682.
			Vol. 3; 311-313; 287-288; 290; 296-298; 300.
	Alerts.....	Vol. 26; 2960; 2967-2968; 2997; 3009-3010.	Vol. 14; 1681-1682.
	Events occurring after 7 December.....	Vol. 26; 2964-2965; 2971; 2999.	Vol. 1; appendix.
	Japanese Communications.....	Vol. 26; 2967-2971; 2993-2995; 3007.	Vol. 3; 311; 313; 297; 300.
	Occurrences before 7 Dec.....	Vol. 26; 2973; 2975; 2981; 2986; 2988; 2991-2992; 3005-3007.	Vol. 3; 289; 291.
			Vol. 14; 1673.
	Possibility of Attack.....	Vol. 26; 2963-2964; 2967; 2993; 2996-2998; 3004; 3009-3010.	Vol. 1; Appendix.
			Vol. 3; 288; 292.
			Vol. 1; Appendix.
			Vol. 3; 311-313; 287-288; 290-291; 293; 294-300.
			Vol. 1; Appendix.
			Vol. 3; 311; 287; 294-295; 298.

Witness	Identical or similar subject matter	(Cross references)	
		APHB	RC
Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray. (Vol. 27 APHB; Vol. 3 RC).	Identifying data.....	Vol. 27; 3075; 3076-3079	Vol. 3; 259-260.
	Ammunition, Infantry and Artillery.	Vol. 27; 3075-3076; 3080-3083; 3090-3091; 3192-3193.	Vol. 3; 261; 262-263.
	Events of 7 December 1941.	Vol. 27; 3083.....	Vol. 3; 260-263.
	Messages of 27 Nov. 1941.	Vol. 27; 3084-3086; 3087; 3093-3096.	Vol. 3; 264-265.
	Attack, Imminency of.	Vol. 27; 3088; 3089; 3091.....	Vol. 3; 263; 264.
Maj. Gen. Henry T. Burgin. (Vol. 24 APHB; Vol. 3 RC).	Alerts.....	Vol. 27; 3079; 3085; 3086; 3087; 3089; 3092; 3096-3097; 3099; 3100.	Vol. 3; 262; 264.
	Identifying Data	Vol. 24; 2598; 2600.....	Vol. 3; 268.
	Reconnaissance, Naval..	Vol. 24; 2600; 2645-2646; 2649-2650.	Vol. 3; 270-271; 279.
	Events of 7 Dec.....	Vol. 24; 2601; 2606.....	Vol. 3; 269; 273-275.
	Ammunition	Vol. 24; 2604; 2606-2609; 2611-2612; 2623; 2633; 2636.	Vol. 3; 275-276; 281.
Maj. Gen. Durward S. Wilson (Vol. 12 APHB; Vol. 3 RC).	Anti-Aircraft Guns.....	Vol. 24; 2605; 2609-2610; 2632.	Vol. 3; 273-275; 280.
	Sabotage.....	Vol. 24; 2608; 2611; 2614; 2648-2649.	Vol. 3; 268.
	Equipment and Personnel, shortage.	Vol. 24; 2612-2613; 2631; 2636; 2640.	Vol. 3; 268.
	HECP.....	Vol. 24; 2616; 2625.....	Vol. 3; 271-272; 273; 281.
	Alerts.....	Vol. 24; 2617-2618; 2622-2623; 2639; 2655.	Vol. 3; 269; 270; 273.
Maj. Gen. Durward S. Wilson (Vol. 12 APHB; Vol. 3 RC).	W. D. Message of 27 Nov.	Vol. 24; 2617-2622; 2642-2643; 2646-2647.	Vol. 3; 270; 278.
	International situation..	Vol. 24; 2623.....	Vol. 3; 270.
	Army-Navy Cooperation.	Vol. 24; 2625; 2626-2627.....	Vol. 3; 273; 281-282-283.
	Position of Mobile Batteries.	Vol. 24; 2628.....	Vol. 3; 280.
	Air Attack, Expectation of.	Vol. 24; 2637-2638; 2647; 2656	Vol. 3; 279.
Maj. Gen. Durward S. Wilson (Vol. 12 APHB; Vol. 3 RC).	Witness was CG, 24th Infantry Division since organization 1 Oct 1941. Division was one-third under strength. 299th Infantry Regiment belonging to 24th Division was detached from witness' command. Division was directly under HD command.	Vol. 12; 1346.....	Vol. 3; 248.
	On 27 Nov. his G-2, Col. Haynes, brought him oral message from department headquarters that negotiations with Japan were off—U. S. to sit tight and await Japanese action. Further details not communicated. No conference held.	Vol. 12; 1346; 1349; 1357.....	Vol. 3; 249.
	Air attack unexpected. No attempt made by Japanese to land troops.	Vol. 12; 1355; 1361; 1364; 1365; 1369; 1370.	Vol. 3; 251.
	Gen. Short in May 1941 commenced construction of fortifications and program of strenuous maneuvers which continued to 7 Dec. Construction effected from salvaged material because money was not available.	Vol. 12; 1356; 1357; 1369.....	Vol. 3; 258-259.
	Identifying data.....	Vol. 12 1346.....	Vol. 3; 247.
Maj. Gen. Durward S. Wilson (Vol. 12 APHB; Vol. 3 RC).	Alerts	Vol. 12; 1350; 1355; 1360; 1362; 1366-1369; 1380.	Vol. 3; 249-250.
	Messages of 27 November 1941.	Vol. 12; 1347-1350.....	Vol. 3; 249.
	Events of 7 Dec. 1941..	Vol. 12; 1353-1355; 1365.....	Vol. 3; 251-252.
	Initiative of Gen. Short.	Vol. 12; 1351; 1356-1357.....	Vol. 3; 258-259.

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Witness	Identical or similar subject matter	(Cross references)	
		APHB	RC
Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany (Vol. 15 APHB; Vol. 7 RC; Vol. 13 RC).	Identifying data.....	Vol. 15; 1695.....	Vol. 7; 812-813.
	Army and Navy cooperation.	Vol. 15; 1696; 1698; 1701; 1704; 1707; 1708; 1715; 1732.	Vol. 7; 821; 830; 832.
	Joint coastal defense plan.	Vol. 15; 1696; 1713.....	Vol. 7; 821.
	Messages 27 November 1941.	Vol. 15; 1698; 1723.....	Vol. 7; 822.
	Personnel and equipment, inadequacy of.	Vol. 15; 1700; 1705; 1716-1717; 1721; 1729.	Vol. 7; 818-819; 835-836; 838.
	Reconnaissance, distant by Navy.	Vol. 15; 1705-1706; 1721; 1725; 1728.	Vol. 7; 824; 835-836.
	Alerts.....	Vol. 15; 1709.....	Vol. 13; 1538-1541.
	AWS.....	Vol. 15; 1715-1717.....	Vol. 7; 821.
	Air or surface attack unexpected.	Vol. 15; 1724-1725; 1727.....	Vol. 7; 826; 830; 832.
	Pearl Harbor as a naval base.	Vol. 15; 1729-1730.....	Vol. 7; 818; 820; 822.
	Identifying data.....	Vol. 12; 1413.....	Vol. 7; 818-819; 833-834; 838-839.
	Jap consulate burned papers.	Vol. 12; 1413-1415; 1717.....	Vol. 3; 814.
	Was assistant G-2 in charge of counter intelligence, HD, October 1940 to April 1943.	Vol. 12; 1413.....	Vol. 3; 816; 318-319.
	At about 1700, Friday, 4 Dec witness was informed by FBI that Japanese Consul was burning official documents. This intelligence was communicated by witness to the staff conference at 0900, Saturday, 5 Dec. The conference made comment.	Vol. 12; 1413; 1417.....	Vol. 3; 314.
Col. George W. Bicknell (Vol. 12 APHB; Vol. 3 RC).	Identifying data.....	Vol. 12; 1413; 1417.....	Vol. 3; 315; 317.
	Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.	Vol. 17; 1929-1930.....	Vol. 1; 2-3.
Col. William E. Donegan (Vol. 17, APHB; Vol. 1 RC).	Identifying data.....	Vol. 17; 1935.....	Vol. 1; 3.
	Army and Navy Cooperation.	Vol. 17; 1939; 1961.....	Vol. 1; 26.
Gen. Jacob H. Rudolph (Vol. 10 APHB; Vol. 2 RC).	Identifying data.....	Vol. 10; 1221.....	Vol. 2; 198.
	Alerts.....	Vol. 10; 1222; 1226-1227; 1239.....	Vol. 2; 199.
	Air attack not expected.	Vol. 10; 1232.....	Vol. 2; 200; 201.
	Sabotage.....	Vol. 10; 1229.....	Vol. 2; 201.
	International Situation.	Vol. 10; 1228-1229.....	Vol. 2; 200.
	Commanded 18th Bombardment Wing from Nov 1940 to 7 Dec 1941.	Vol. 10; 1221.....	Vol. 2; 198.
	No attack suspected. Not warned of alarming international situation.	Vol. 10; 1225; 1228.....	Vol. 2; 200.
	Identifying information.	Vol. 14; 1095.....	Vol. 3; 368.
	Events of 7 December 1941 (AWS).	Vol. 14; 1097-1102.....	Vol. 3; 368-373; 375.
	Inexperienced as pursuit officer.	Vol. 14; 1097; 1100-1101.....	Vol. 3; 374.
Lt. Col. Kermit A. Tyler (Vol. 14 APHB; Vol. 3, RC).	Duties and identifying information.	Vol. 24; 2723-2724.....	Vol. 11; 1311.
	Cooperation of Army and Navy and civilian population.	Vol. 24; 2723-2727; 2729-2732; 2741-2743.	Vol. 11; 1311-1312; 1318-1324; 1327-1329.
	Information re Japanese and possibility of attack.	Vol. 24; 2727-2728; 2731; 2733-2742.	Vol. 11; 1312-1313; 1315-1318; 1323-1326.
	Alerts.....	Vol. 24; 2728; 2731.....	Vol. 11; 1325.
	Duties and identifying information.	Vol. 28; 3153-3154; 3163-3164.....	Vol. 11; 1340.
Major General B. H. Wells (Vol. 24 APHB; Vol. 11 RC).	Cooperation of Army and Navy and civilian population.	Vol. 28; 3159-3163; 3165.....	Vol. 11; 1341; 1344; 1348-1351; 1355.
	Information re Japanese and possibility of attack.	Vol. 28; 3157-3162.....	Vol. 11; 1341-1348; 1351-1354; 1356.
	Alerts.....		
Governor Joseph B. Poindexter (Vol. 28 APHB; Vol. 11 RC).	Duties and identifying information.		
	Cooperation of Army and Navy and civilian population.		

Witness	Identical or similar subject matter	(Cross references)	
		APHB	RC
Frank D. Midkiff (Vol. 25 APHB; Vol. 13 RC).	Duties and identifying information. Cooperation of Army and Navy and civilian population. Information re Japanese and possibility of attack.	Vol. 25; 2803-2804; 2808-2809 Vol. 25; 2804-2808; 2814; 2818-2819; 2826-2827; 2830-2831. Vol. 25; 2807-2818; 2824-2829	Vol. 13; 1595; 1603. Vol. 13; 1603. Vol. 13; 1603.
John H. Midkiff (Vol. 25 APHB; Vol. 13 RC).	Duties and identifying information. Defense of Island	Vol. 25; 2833 Vol. 25; 2834-2835; 2844-2845	Vol. 13; 1597. Vol. 13; 1597.
Lt. Col. Melbourne H. West (Vol. 27 APHB; Vol. 4 RC).	Duties and identifying information. Defense preparations. Alerts	Vol. 27; 3120-3121 Vol. 27; 3121-3123 Vol. 27; 3122	Vol. 4; 496. Vol. 4; 497-498. Vol. 4; 497-499.
Col. Leonard D. Weddington. (Vol. 27 APHB; Vol. 10 RC).	Duties and identifying information. Preparations for defense. Occurrences 7 December 1941. Aircraft	Vol. 27; 3012 Vol. 27; 3013-3014; 3017-3024; 3026-3027. Vol. 27; 3013-3020; 3022-3023; 3027. Vol. 27; 3014-3017; 3019; 3023-3024.	Vol. 10; 1213. Vol. 10; 1215; 1217-1219. Vol. 10; 1213-1214; 1216-1219. Vol. 10; 1214-1218.

APPENDIX No. 5

This appendix consists of comparisons of the Records of the Roberts Commission and the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to any conflicts between the two Records.

Witness	Statements RC	Statements APHB	Conflicts and discrepancies
Major General Walter Campbell Short. (Vols. 2 and 14, RC—, Vols. 4 and 5, APHB)	In response to question "The only thing that the Joint Agreement between you seems to cover is distant reconnaissance?", General Short responded, "Yes. That was very definitely placed upon the Army even to the point of controlling the planes, which is the only logical way because otherwise if two people are made responsible they may be making reconnaissance in the same sector and another sector may be forgotten." (Vol. 2; 56.) "Up to time of attack, small amount of this wire (for fencing air fields against sabotage or uprisings) * * * had been received * * *". (Vol. 2; 45.) "The first of the three inch guns to fire down there was at 8:30, and all of the three inch guns were in action by 10:00 o'clock". (Vol. 2; 81) "* * * by 8:50 all of the pursuit that was serviceable were in the air. * * * By 11:40 all the bombers that were still serviceable were in the air—and sent out on distance reconnaissance." (Vol. 2; 85). "They made a search * * * starting * * * at 11:27 they sent—first at 11:40, at 1300, and 1350, and then the first search they made under Navy control was at 1520 * * *". (Vol. 14; 1635). "* * * the 24th Division * * * were out firing on enemy planes as early as 8:11. They moved to battle positions about 8:30, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon all troops in this group were in battle positions and had one day firing. * * * the 25th Division also started moving into its battle position at 8:30 and by 4 in the afternoon was in its battle position with one day of firing." (Vol. 2; 88). "My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the Island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. The Navy had assumed full responsibility for the distant reconnaissance". (Vol. 2; 107.)	"* * * long-distance reconnaissance was definitely a function of the Navy * * *". (Vol. 4; 281) "* * * wherein all the long range reconnaissance of both the Army and Navy functioned under one plan so that there would not be any duplication of reconnaissance and there would be an undivided responsibility. So that the Navy definitely had the responsibility." (Vol. 4; 282.) No fencing received by 7 Dec. (Vol. 4; 290.) "We had not gotten the material at the time of the attack (for the fence)". (Vol. 5; 477.) "The first three inch guns to get into action at 8:15, and between 8:15 and 10:00 they were all put in readiness". (Vol. 4; 314) "* * * by 7:50 all the pursuit that was in condition to get into the air was put into the air." (Vol. 4; 317). "The pursuit planes were actually in the air by 8:50 * * * taking a little longer for the bombers * * * they were actually in the by 11:27". (Vol. 5; 459). "* * * Gen. Martin * * * at 11:27 sent planes out on his own mission * * *". (Vol. 4; 373). "The 24th Division turned out at 8:10 and returned the fire of the enemy planes and at 8:30 they were moving out to their battle positions. The 25th Division was also moving out to their battle positions by 8:30. By 4 o'clock the 24th Division were all in battle positions and the 25th by 5 o'clock." (Vol. 4; 316). Distant reconnaissance meant "anything beyond the 20 mile zone". (Vol. 4; 373) "The close-in reconnaissance going out 20 miles". (Vol. 5; 473).	Conflict in responsibility for reconnaissance. Slight discrepancy in whether fencing received. Slight discrepancy in time. Some slight confusion on questions of time. Some slight discrepancy in question of time. Discrepancy in extent of inshore patrol.

Witness	Statements RC	Statements APHB	Conflicts and discrepancies
Major General Walter Campbell Short—Continued	"So we made a comprehensive study and had asked to have probably 184 B-17s so that we could make a 360-degree patrol for a thousand miles." (Vol. 2; 147.) Didn't see Navy message of 27 Nov. "this is a war warning". (Vol. 2; 143.) No Naval Officers at AWS at the interceptor command station on morning of 7 Dec 1941. "There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that . . . Total of 30 officers at interceptor command station including the normal quota of three Naval Officers. (Vol. 2; 69-70) Did not know the Naval Officer concerned with cooperating in a technical sense. "It might have been Capt. DeLany but I think it was more likely the officer doing corresponding work under Adm. Bloch, but, I do not know". (Vol. 14; 1628)	"We had asked . . . we made a study and showed them it was necessary to have 187 B-17s for a proper reconnaissance in case the Navy was ever pulled out . . .". (Vol. 4; 324.) "If I feel sure that I have seen that message, although we couldn't find a copy of it in our headquarters, when we looked for it, for the Roberts Commission Report. That was during the period when I was down there at Kimmel's headquarters every day for three or four days and in all probability he either read it to me, or I read it right there, because it is familiar to me, but we couldn't find a copy". (Vol. 4; 415-416.) Whether a Naval man was actually detailed as part of the Information Center witness could not say definitely. "I know the request had been made, that it was contemplated, and I thought it had been carried out." (Vol. 5; 493)	Slight discrepancy in number of B-17s requested. Confusion as to whether had or had not seen Navy message of 27 Nov. Confusion as to whether or not Navy man detailed to interceptor command post by Navy.
Major George S. Welch (Then Lt.) (Vol. 4 RC. Vol. 18 APHB).	In testifying as to the enemy planes brought down witness declared "I was given credit for 5, but I did not see the other one." (Vol. 4; 426). In response to the question whether there were any machine guns, witness responded "No, sir," and later in response to the question "Was there any installation of anti-aircraft guns ready for action then?" witness responded "No, Sir, there were none ready. There were pits dug, but no guns in them." (Vol. 4; 427).	In speaking of the number of Jap planes shot down witness declared "I claimed 4 definitely." (Vol. 18; 2012). " . . . the men had machine guns out, .30 caliber ground guns and they shot back at this man, this Jap." (Vol. 18; 2011).	Some confusion in testimony concerning the number of planes brought down by witness. The question as to whether there were or were not machine guns.
1st Sgt Lowell V. Klatt (Vol. 4, RC —. Vol. 13, APHB)	" . . . we would see them cut loose with their machine guns, and numerous places there was splinters flying and things like that. And at that, why, I figured it was something important, so I told my detail to get their packs, get the trucks down, and be ready to take off. And while I was doing that Lt. Saltzman gave the word that we were on the alert, to go to our battalion command post and set up communications." (Vol. 4; 465)	Witness testified that Lt. Saltzman notified witness before the bombing to "get my stuff and hit the field." (Vol. 13; 1460)	Slight discrepancy as to time witness received order.

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Witness	Statements RC	Statements A PHB	Conflicts and discrepancies
1st. Sgt. Lowell V. Klatt—Continued	In response to question, did both planes crash or just one, witness replied "No, Sir; only the second one, the one that swung to the left. We didn't get a chance to fire at the first one to amount to anything because he pulled away from us pretty fast, but the other one pulled—swung right around broadside to us." (Vol. 4; 467)	"The communications officer, Lt. Saltzman, and I were fortunate enough to knock both of the down with BAR fire." (Vol. 13; 1461)	Slight discrepancy in number of planes brought down by witness.
Colonel Walter C. Phillips. (Vol. 3 RC. Vol. 10 APHB)	Witness states he did not believe the Navy furnished him a copy of telegram sent by Navy operations on 27 Nov. (Vol. 3; 212) "• • • hostilities or attack from without, any such thing wasn't visualized by us at that time • • • we didn't visualize anything from without at that time, Sir". (Vol. 3; 215; cf. 236) Witness stated that Alert No. 1 was sufficient to carry out the directive of 27 Nov. (Vol. 3; 221)	"That message was received by the General, and I believe it was read to us all, I am not positive about that though". (Vol. 10; 1115) Witness stated that all higher commanders and staff were "all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibility" or imminence of war, "the Navy as well as the Army". (Vol. 10; 1116) "I was fully aware of the possibility of such a thing. (Vol. 10; 1117; see also 1128) Witness admits that under Alert No. 3, fighters could have gotten into the air in from 5 to 7 minutes meeting the attack and rendering it less devastating. Witness admits he failed to recommend the most effective steps to meet the worst attack the enemy could bring against him. In mitigation, witness stated that subsequent message from W.D. G-2 directed to anti-sabotage measures con fired action taken. (Vol. 10; 1125-1128) Witness admitted not following Leavenworth teaching. (Vol. 10; 1128) Witness testified in the event of sabotage or attack the question of fire is a greater hazard, consequently, the more dispersed the planes are the less chance there is of fire spreading.	Witness evasive. C of 8 normally gets communications before CO. Did he know contents or not? Flat contradiction. Did he expect attack or not? Conflict as to witness' belief in sufficiency of Alert No. 1.
Major General Howard C. Davidson, commanding Tenth Air Force. (Vols. 2 and 14, RC— Vol. 36 APHB)	Witness testified that dispersal of airplanes adds to the risk of sabotage. (Vol. 2; 196)		Direct conflict on advisability of "bunching" airplanes.

APPENDIX No. 6

Table of important dates

Date	Event	Record page reference
11 February 1922.....	Washington Treaty with Japan.....	4469
1925.....	Rohl married Mrs. Hubert.....	3995
1927.....	Rohl bought yacht PANDORA.....	3995
1932.....	Rohl-Connolly firm formed.....	3995
21 January 1938.....	VEGA arrived in Honolulu from Balboa.....	4115, 4119, 4120
1940.....	Maid at Biltmore Hotel saw Rohl and Wyman intoxicated.....	4024
20 February 1940.....	Ltr District Director, Los Angeles District, to District Director, Honolulu.....	4110, 4111
April 1940.....	Admiral Bloch arrived in Pearl Harbor.....	1470, 1529
May 1940.....	Army alerted, Navy not alerted.....	212
May 1940.....	Tabulations decentralization begun.....	3845
1 May 1940.....	Increases in limit of authority of Dist. & Div. Engrs.....	3873
1 May 1940.....	General Miles entered upon assignment as acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.....	91
1 June 1940.....	Message Herron to C of S re conditions due to Alert.....	3321
13 June 1940.....	Military Appropriations Act for \$125,000 for Military Intelligence was signed.....	732
15 June 1940.....	Army went on all-out alert for six weeks.....	214
17 June 1940.....	Message from Washington directing all-out alert.....	213
17 June 1940.....	Alert.....	1, 925
17 June 1940.....	Message from W. D. (Adams) to go to Alert.....	3, 317
17 June 1940.....	Herron's message "H-17th, Secret.".....	3318
17 June 1940.....	WD order for HD Alert.....	4304
19 June 1940.....	Wire from WD to ease up on alert.....	215
19 June 1940.....	Message CG, HD from WD (Adams).....	3318, 3319
19 June 1940.....	Message to C of S from Herron.....	3319
20 June 1940.....	Herron replied to wire of 19 June from WD.....	215
21 June 1940.....	Herron wired C of S re alert; no Navy alert.....	216
21 June 1940.....	Message from Herron to C of S that Navy not on Alert.....	3320
22 June 1940.....	Strong signed message for Marshall to Herron to keep on alert.....	216, 3320
27 June 1940.....	Appropriation of \$135,000 for Military Intelligence by Second Deficiency Appropriations Act.....	732
27 June 1940.....	WD approved sites for radar at Kaala, Kokee and Haleakala.....	3895
28 June 1940.....	Act of Congress.....	4109-4110.
2 or 7 July 1940.....	Act of Congress.....	3840.
8 July 1940.....	Message Herron to C of S re conditions due to Alert.....	3321.
8 July 1940.....	Ltr Enright to Stephen Early wherein suggestion made that Rohl was agent of the Imperial German Government (Exhibit 59).....	4028-4030.
10 July 1940.....	Message C of S to Herron re wear and tear on equipment due to Alert.....	3321-3322
13 July 1940.....	Money available for construction of permanent radar installations.....	3896.
15 July 1940.....	Message Herron to C of S re alert.....	3322
16 July 1940.....	Message C of S to CG, HD, re alert.....	3322-3323
24 July 1940.....	Chief of Engrs gave Dist. Engr. \$50,000 toward construction cost of permanent radar installations.....	3896
25 July 1940.....	\$6,060 allotted to Hawaiian Department for Military Intelligence.....	733
1 August 1940.....	Mobile SCR-270s arrived.....	3897-3898
4 August 1940.....	Alert of 17 June 1940 ended.....	1924
5 August 1940.....	Ltr. Chief of Engrs. to Chief, Signal Office, re furnishing designs of AWS structures at earliest possible date.....	3441
5 September 1940.....	Joint Board 314 contemplated storage tanks for 250,000 barrels for the Army and 100,000 for the Navy, (on basis of estimated cost of \$2.00 per barrel in commercial tanks of 25,000 barrel capacity).....	3458
8 October 1940.....	Appropriations Act for \$100,000 for Military Intelligence.....	732
15 October 1940.....	Ltr. Herron to Marshall outer Navy patrol.....	213-214
16 October 1940.....	Memo or message from CNO.....	3305
16 October 1940.....	Ltr. Arnold to Martin re new equipment being sent to Hawaiian Islands not later than 1 July 1941.....	1869
November 1940.....	Wyman contacted Grafe about work in Hawaii.....	2289
2 November 1940.....	Field Order No. 1 (Mission Orders); Operations Orders HD.....	3324-3339
2 November 1940.....	General Martin went on duty in Hawaii.....	1852
4 November 1940.....	Ltr. to Hannum from Gesler re cost-plus-fixed-fee contract.....	3389-3390
6 November 1940.....	Ltr. Hannum to Wyman re W-414-ENG-602.....	2033
6 November 1940.....	Letter to Wyman from Hannum re cost-plus-fixed-fee contract.....	3391-3392
15 November 1940.....	Allotment to HD increased by \$1,500 for Military Intelligence.....	735

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Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
20 November 1940.....	Air Corps stations work assigned to Corps of Engrs.....	661
December 1940.....	Jap naval vessels first appeared in Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas, Layton informed Richardson and Kimmel.....	3040
December 1940.....	Engineers took over work for Air Corps.....	3844
December 1940-1941.....	Engrs. did Air Corps construction only & QMC did rest of military construction.....	3844
6 December 1940 to 15 February 1942.....	Gerow's tour as (Acting) Asst O of S, War Plans Division.....	4225
9 December 1940.....	Finance ltr 226 from Office Chief Engrs. authorizing Sec'y War to expend for national defense with or without advertising, (Exhibit 55.).....	3840, 3843, 3846, 3860, 3875
9 December 1940.....	Increases in limit of authority of Dist. & Div. Engrs.....	2873
12 December 1940.....	Date of resignation as director signed by Rohl.....	2334
14 December 1940.....	Wyman registered in \$35.00 a day Palace Hotel suite.....	2436
14 December 1940.....	Approval of cost-plus-fixed-fee form of construction contract submitted by Wyman.....	640
15 December 1940.....	Wyman went to California to conduct interviews for contract.....	3392
16 December 1940.....	First knowledge Connolly had of Hawaiian contract by telephone call from Rohl.....	878
17 December 1940.....	Letter from Martin to Arnold requesting modern equipment.....	1869
18 December 1940.....	Ltr. to Asst. Sec'y. War. from Gesler, Office Chief of Engrs. requesting authority for cost-plus-fixed-fee form of contract.....	641
19 December 1940.....	Connolly left Washington.....	2163
20 December 1940.....	W-414-ENG-602 with Hawaiian Constructors for defense projects in Hawaii; Grafe signed above contract; contract approved by Under Sec'y War.....	575, 581, 641-642, 698-699, 2032, 2164, 2355
20 December 1940.....	Articles of Agreement.....	3481
21 December 1940.....	Basic contract entered into between Hawaiian Constructors consisting of Rohl-Connolly Co., Gunther & Shirley Co., W. E. Callahan Co., and W. D. Contract recommended and negotiated by Wyman.....	854, 882
26 December 1940.....	Gesler sent memo to Schley, Chief of Engrs. and copy of contract dated December 20 between U. S. and the Hawaiian Constructors.....	642
28 December 1940.....	Gesler sent memorandum to Commissioner Knudson requesting clearance for award of contract M-414-902.....	642
28 December 1940.....	Approved by Chief of Engrs. placed on contract.....	962
28 December 1940.....	Directive raising the estimate of cost of barrels from \$2.00 to \$4.00 reduced the quota (Army) for Hawaii to 100,000 barrels and authorized preliminary surveys to be made.....	3458
28 December 1940.....	Ltr. Gesler to Under Sec'y War transmitting contract.....	642
30 December 1940.....	Commissioner Knudson cleared contract M-414-902.....	642
3 January 1941.....	5th Ind., Subject: Transfer to WD of Haleakala & Maunaloa Eltes, T. H. Directed to TAG.....	3429
3 January 1941.....	Contract W-414-ENG-602 approved Under Sec'y War.....	582
3 January 1941.....	Contract M-414-902 approved by Under Sec'y War.....	642
3 January 1941.....	Approval of contract.....	3415
3 January 1941.....	Approval of general project by Sec'y War.....	3136
3 January 1941.....	Approval of Hawaiian Constructors' contract.....	3872
Early 1941.....	Semi-monthly Engineer reports required on military projects.....	3836
6 January 1941.....	Final approval of Hawaiian Constructors Contract No. 602.....	3432
6 January 1941.....	Letter to Hawaiian Constructors from Div Engr granting authority to Hawaiian Constructors to purchase equipment needed for this project.....	3434
7 January 1941.....	Report on Plessanton Hotel addressed to CG, HD.....	3240
11 January 1941.....	Letter of Admiral Richardson to Sec'y Navy regarding deficiencies of Pearl Harbor.....	1802
14 January 1941.....	Suite at Palace Hotel rented by Wyman at \$41 a day.....	2437
15 January 1941.....	Rohl made application for final citizenship papers.....	547
17-18 January 1941.....	Connolly appeared before the Navy Board regarding building of naval bases and Bermuda installations.....	877
22 January 1941.....	Ltr. to Rohl from Wyman advising Rohl to proceed to Hawaii.....	2056-2067, 223, 2379, 2529-2530, 4107-4108, 4114
22 January 1941.....	Connolly appeared before Naval Board again.....	878
22 January 1941.....	Wyman ltr re Rohl naturalization.....	4105
22 January 1941.....	Wyman ltr to Hawaiian Constructors re initiating work under Contract No. 602.....	3867
24 January 1941.....	Ltr. from Sec'y Navy to Sec'y War re cooperative defensive measures.....	250, 308, 4064-4066, 4062, 4091
24 January 1941.....	Probability of combined air and submarine attack.....	1727
25 January 1941.....	Letter of Richardson to Sec'y Navy in which Kimmel concurred re efficiencies of Pearl Harbor.....	1803
27 January 1941.....	Report of Ambassador Grew by telegram to Sec'y of Navy re planned Jap attack on Pearl Harbor.....	1778, 4203
31 January 1941.....	Vice-Admiral Pye appointed Commander Battle Force U. S. Pacific Fleet.....	1035
1 February 1941.....	Admiral Kimmel took over office of CINCPAC.....	1735
1 February 1941.....	Shoemaker memo re Rohl citizenship and Wyman.....	4370

Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
3 February 1941.....	Letter from Arnold to Martin promising modern equipment as soon as possible.	1870
4 February 1941.....	N. J. Dept. Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Ltr. to Dist. Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Los Angeles.	4106-4107
4 February 1941.....	Letter from T. B. Schumacher of Immigration and Naturalization Service asking Rohl naturalization be expedited.	2379
5 February 1941.....	Hawaiian Constructors initiated construction under Contract No. 602.	3866
5 February 1941.....	Butterfield memo on Rohl.	4106
5 February 1941.....	General Short arrived in Pearl Harbor.	321
6 February 1941.....	Hawaiian Constructors received notice to proceed with construction of Mt. Kaala cableway.	3439
7 February 1941.....	Ltr Sec'y War to Sec'y Navy.	4064, 4082, 4091
7 February 1941.....	Ltr. from Marshall to Short re duties and army deficiencies.	13-17, 259, 354
7 February 1941.....	Ltr. Sec'y War in reply to letter of 24 January 1941 from Sec'y Navy.	368
7 February 1941.....	General Herron left Pearl Harbor.	321
7 and 8 February 1941.....	General Short took command.	351, 277
14 February 1941.....	Memo by Wyman to Dept. Engr. requesting approval of certain preliminary sketches and plans.	3432, 3572
14 February 1941.....	Report of C of S from Col. Lathe B. Row, IGD.	3233
15 February 1941.....	Ltr. by Admiral Kimmel.	1748
15 February 1941.....	Interview Sec'y War, Chief of Signal Corps, & Asst. Sec'y War for Air (Mr. Lovett) re types of radar & radio equipment to be manufactured.	4064
17 February 1941.....	Wilson left Schofield Barracks.	931
19 February 1941.....	\$10,000 limitation on Dist. Engrs. contractual authority discontinued.	3873
19 February 1941.....	Increases in limit of authority of Dist. & Div. Engrs.	3873
19 February 1941.....	Report of Inspection of Station X dated 19 Feb 1941 from the files of Ft. Shafter, IGD.	3228
19 February 1941.....	Short wrote letter to C of S outlining the things he thought should be done.	21, 321-323
20 February 1941.....	Wyman interviewed by Naturalization official re Rohl citizenship.	3974
20 February 1941.....	P. 9, FBI report dated 28 Apr 1943 read wherein it is noted that Wyman was interviewed on 20 Feb 1941 at which time Wyman declared he first became acquainted with Rohl in Calif. and that his relations with him were purely business.	4018-4019, 4021
20 February 1941.....	Ltr District Director (Naturalization Service), Los Angeles District, to Dist. Director, Honolulu, re Rohl.	4187
22 February 1941.....	Tyler arrived in Hawaii.	1095
22 February 1941.....	Layton gave his opinion at that time of the defenses and aviation stationed in the Marshals.	3040
24 February 1941.....	Job Order on Wheeler Field.	662
24 February 1941.....	Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.	3421
28 February 1941.....	Truman arrived in Hawaii.	1445
Feb or Mar 1941?.....	Wyman relieved and Lyman became District Engineer.	3736
March 1941.....	\$5,000 made available to Dist. Engr. for survey re 100,000 barrel fuel storage for Army and survey made.	3458
1 March 1941.....	CINCPAC, Direction to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with CG, Hawaiian Air Force.	1578
1 March 1941.....	Truman assigned as Aide to Short.	1445
1 March 1941.....	District Director of the Los Angeles District, Wm. A. Carmichael, alleged Rohl had been falsely representing himself as an American citizen for years.	2345
1 March 1941.....	Ltr Inspector in charge Los Angeles to Inspector in charge San Pedro, Calif. re Rohl's naturalization.	4111
1 March 1941.....	Ltr U. S. Naturalization Examiner, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Honolulu, to District Director.	4112-4114, 4193-4194
3 March 1941.....	Wire WD to CG, HD showing objection of the Dept. of the Interior to the transfer of land for AWS project.	3429
4 March 1941.....	Wire from CG, HD to TAG protesting decision of Dept. of Interior.	3429
5 March 1941.....	Letter from Marshall to Short re situation Hawaiian Department defense against air attack and contemplated West Coast exercise in spring.	19-20
6 March 1941.....	Approval of AWS station Mt. Kaala.	3434
6 March 1941.....	Kaala job layout plan approved by CG.	3554
6 March 1941.....	Letter from Short to Marshall re AWS.	26
6 March 1941.....	Construction of Mt. Kaala cableway started.	3666
7 March 1941.....	Letter from F. H. Crockett of Immigration & Naturalization Service, Laredo, Texas.	2378
7 March 1941.....	Radio sent by Wyman to the Div. Engr. urging completion of work on Mt. Kaala.	3439
10 March 1941.....	WD priority set for delivery of SCR 270, 271, and 271-A.	672
10 March 1941.....	Rohl filed naturalization petition in U. S. District Court for Southern District of Calif.	855, 2223
11 March 1941.....	Butterfield notes re Rohl.	4111-4112
11 March 1941.....	Construction started on access road five days after approval.	3554

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Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
12 March 1941	Wire to CG, HD from WD authorizing final decision on design, layout and details of construction for AWS project in Hawaii.	3430
15 March 1941	Ltr. from Marshall to CG, HD re approval for use of desired land.	3430
15 March 1941	Short ltr. to Marshall in reply to Marshall 5 March ltr.	21-25
16 March 1941	Von der Osten came to this country with complete plans of 20 December 1940 contract.	2442-2443
17 March 1941	Approval of AWS station Haleakala on Maui.	3434
17 March 1941	Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.	3421
18 March 1941	Von der Osten killed in New York City.	3800
20 March 1941	Approval of AWS station Kokee on Kauai.	3434
20 March 1941	Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.	1473
20 March 1941	Layout for station at Kokee, Kauai approved.	3440
21 March 1941	Plans between Short & Bloch approved by C of S.	281-282
21 March 1941	Cooperation plan between Army & Navy consummated. Joint Air Operations Agreement.	322, 1474, 371, 4440
22 March 1941	Supplemental agreement to contract of 3 Jan. 1941.	3483-3484
28 March 1941	Ltr. Marshall to Short re relieving congestion by construction of additional fields and dispersal of aircraft.	26
28 March 1941	Joint Air Operations Agreement.	2671
31 March 1941	Div. Engr. advertised cable work on Mt. Kaala.	3439
31 March 1941	Addendum No. 1 to Joint Air Operations Agreement signed by Martin and Bellinger.	387, 1578, 1822, 182
April 1941	Project for defense of Kaneche Bay area approved by Joint Board.	66
1 April 1941	Major Meurlott called to active duty.	3918
3 April 1941	Visit of representative of Office of Chief of Air Corps to select the site for underground fuel storage.	3137
3 April 1941	CG forwarded to TAG recommendation for locations at 2 sites.	3459
5 April 1941	Dist. Engr. was advised that negotiations had been opened for steel priorities.	3137
5 April 1941	Chief of Engrs. notified the Dist. Engr. by ltr. that priority for steel for tanks could not be obtained until the contract for tanks had been let.	3459
6 April 1941	Short talked before the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day re civilian defense.	333 & 468
9 April 1941	Location of AWS structure at Fort Shafter fixed.	3433
9 April 1941	Chief of Engrs. directed the Dist. Engr. to prepare a definite project report for total storage capacity of between 125,000 and 133,000 barrels.	3459
11 April 1941	Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.	1583
14 April 1941	Ltr. Short to Marshall re agreements Army and Navy etc.	26-27
18 April 1941	Memo from Wyman to CO, HD submitting general plan and sections for AWS Information Center.	3433
20 April 1941	Memorandum from Wyman to Hawaiian Constructors re AWS.	3419-3420
21 April 1941	Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.	3421
21 April 1941	Dist. Engr. submitted revised detail cost estimates increasing costs from \$505,000 to \$890,804 in connection with W-414-eng-602.	583
21 April 1941	Letter from Chief of Engrs. to Dist. Engr. to submit recommendations regarding protection at both sites.	3459
21 April 1941	Circular Ltr Chief of Engrs. to Div. & Dist. Engrs. re employment of aliens on defense projects.	3858-3859
22 April 1941	Authority to proceed with leasing land parcels radioed to Hawaii.	28
30 April 1941	Contract for cableway signed with Interstate Equipment Company.	3421
May 1941	Approval for access road to Kokee, Kauai.	3440
May 1941	Woolley paid \$65,000 for 20% interest in Hawaiian Constructors.	2751, 3759, 3760
5 May 1941	Ltr. from Marshall to Short replying to Short 14 April ltr.	27-28
5 May 1941	Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.	3422
5 May 1941	Supplemental agreement to the basic contract.	3484-3486
6 May 1941	Wyman received Circular Ltr dtd 21 April 1941 from Chief of Engrs. re employment of aliens on defense projects.	3857
7 May 1941	Wyman ltr to Hawaiian Constructors re aliens employed on national defense projects.	3855-3856, 3879
12 May 1941	Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.	3422
12 May 1941	Received foundation plans for metal buildings and detector for AWS installations.	3442
12 May 1941	HD maneuvers referred to in letter of 3 November 1941 from Martin to Arnold.	1880
12 May 1941	Bids opened on Island airports.	3627
13 May 1941	Office of Chief of Engrs. South Pacific Division received A-1-f rating on contract M-414-eng-784.	3427
14 May 1941	Message No. 115 from Kita, local consul to Tokyo, to Gaimudaijin.	2968
14 May 1941	Hawaiian Constructors ltr to Dist. Engr. re aliens employed on defense projects.	3857, 3879
15 May 1941	Request made for \$240,000 for airfield fencing etc. (See 11 July 1941 and 12 August 1941).	290
19 May 1941	Directions received to increase storage capacity from 100,000 barrels to 250,000 barrels.	3137
21 May 1941	Priorities and Delivery Schedule re SCR-270-A and 271 sets approved.	682, 679

Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
22 May 1941	Started HD maneuvers.	1210
22 May 1941	Supplemental Agreement No. 3.	3486
22 May 1941	Examination of Rohl by Immigration Inspector Ellis.	4116-4118
24 May 1941	Allotment of \$385,804 additional funds requested for W-414-eng-602.	583
26 May 1941	All components for SGR 271 turned over by Signal Corps to QMC for shipment.	510
26 May 1941	Addendum #2 added to Job Order Wheeler Field.	662
26 May 1941	Components on one 271-A turned over by Signal Corps to QMC for shipment.	675
27 May 1941	Close of Rohl citizenship investigation.	3973
28 May 1941	Three additional fixed stations for Hawaii authorized by War Department.	676
28 May 1941	Ltr. to Chief Signal Officer Subject: "Aircraft Warning Service for the United States Overseas Department and Bases".	679-680
28 May 1941	Ltr. U. S. Dept. Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Section, Los Angeles, to District Director, Los Angeles.	3118-3120
29 May 1941	Marshall received letter from Short re certain maneuvers.	28
29 May 1941	Letter from Short to Bloch.	3342
29 May 1941	Letter AG to CG, HD stating that the National Park Service had approved building designs.	3430
June 1941	Rochefort ordered to combat intelligence at Pearl Harbor.	1644
June 1941	Authorization for use of land belonging to the National Park Service for AWS given.	3436
June 1941	Wyman first learned that Rohl an alien.	3504
June 1941	Kimmel came to Washington.	1749
2 June 1941	Hawaiian Constructors ltr to Dist. Engr. re Rohl.	3853-3854, 3859, 3878
2 June 1941	Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.	3423
3 June 1941	3 SCR-271 Radars received.	3886
4 June 1941	Letter CG, HD, to TAG re difficulties in procurement and transportation from the mainland.	3426
5 June 1941	Letter from HD re training air corps personnel for ground defense mission.	1881
7 June 1941	Short ltr. to Marshall.	4418
10 June 1941	WD directed that the 1st Aircraft Warning Company be prepared to furnish long-range warning service and to embark for overseas point by this date.	683
10 June 1941	Chief Signal Officer requested additional data regarding costs from the Dist. Engr. which were submitted 8 July 1941.	583
10 June 1941	Message Short to TAG re AWS materials not received.	326-327, 369, 488
11 June 1941	Telegram received from HD to TAG re priorities.	602-603
11 June 1941	1st Ind. from Wyman to CG, HD, re construction work to commence at early date.	3431
13 June 1941	Priority rating received for underground storage tanks.	3137
14 June 1941	Job Order No. 41 to proceed on Mt. Haleakala, Maui.	3680
15 June 1941	AWS materials scheduled to arrive in Hawaii.	3419
17 June 1941	Chief of Engrs. replied to TAG re priorities by 2nd Indorsement.	603
17 June 1941	Office of Chief of Engrs. obtained priority rating obtained priority rating of A-1-c from the Army & Navy Munitions Board.	3427
17 June 1941	Dist. Engr. notified that funds had been authorized for underground storage and directed to commit the contract authorization before 1 July.	3137, 3459.
18 June 1941	Date of Job Order 23.1.	570
19 June 1941	Supplemental Agreement No. 4.	3487
19 June 1941	Ltr. Short to Bloch re AWS operation in near future.	484
19 June 1941	Short ltr. to Kimmel AWS mentioned by Grunert.	507
21 June 1941	Dist. Engr. received notice that proposed Army storage increased from 100,000 to 250,000 barrels.	3459
23 June 1941	Date that work on AWS, utilities, and fence Kokee Road under Job Order 23.1 was to begin.	570
24 June 1941	Dist. Engr. forwarded definite project report on war reserve aviation gasoline storage.	3459, 3709
24 June 1941	Construction on access road to Kokee, Kauai started.	3440
25 June 1941	Job Order indicated this as commencement date of Haleakala road.	3678
26 June 1941	TAG reply to Short message of 10 June 1941 re AWS.	327
26 June 1941	Components of 2 SCR 271's turned over to QMC for shipment.	675
30 June 1941	WD originally agreed to furnish materials for AWS so that it could be completed by this date.	270, 326, 464
July 1941	McKee, assigned War Plans Division, handled matters pertaining to Hawaiian Defense Project.	57
1 July 1941	Funds had to be utilized for underground storage.	3137
1 July 1941	Addendum #5 to Job Order Wheeler Field.	663
1 July 1941	Memo Medley to Brown re Rohl citizenship.	4371
3 July 1941	Ltr CG, HD, to TAG about difficulties in procurement and transportation from the mainland.	3426
3 July 1941	Marshall ltr. that civilian evacuation camp not a necessary project.	4418
7 July 1941	Message TAG to CG, HD, discussing Japanese situation.	33-34
7 July 1941	Message C of S to CG, HD, re Japanese situation.	78-79
7 July 1941	Work on Haleakala road started.	3437
7 July 1941	WD message warning of attack.	4055

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Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
8 July 1941.....	WD authorized general changes in program, & addition of 3 fixed stations Paho, Hawaii; Opana, Oahu; Manawahua, Oahu.	584
8 July 1941.....	Dist. Engr. submitted additional data re costs requested by Signal Officer.	583
8 July 1941.....	Message TAG to CG, HD.	2973-2974
8 July 1941.....	Message from Kita to foreign minister in Tokyo.	2990
9 July 1941.....	Report by Col. H. S. Burwell, Air Corps, Special Inspector, re sabotage.	3340-3342
11 July 1941.....	\$102,000 authorized of May 15 request for \$240,000 for fence around airfields.	290
11 July 1941.....	Preference rating for aircraft detector equipment changed from A-1-B.	678
11 July 1941.....	Short's letter re civilian defense.	4418
14 July 1941.....	SOP, HD.	29
14 July 1941.....	HD tentative SOP referred to in letter of 25 Sept 1944 from Arnold to Martin.	1879
14 July 1941.....	Job No. 46, Mobile AWS station Mauna Loa cancelled by Hq, HD.	3436
16 July 1941.....	\$8,320 allotted HD for Military Intelligence.	737
17 July 1941.....	Memo for CG, AAF, from the Secretary GS, requesting study air situation in Hawaii.	3344
17 July 1941.....	Letter from George A. Sisson dated Honolulu, T. H., re Wyman.	557-558
18 July 1941.....	Wickiser signed his contract for participation with the Territory Airport Constructors.	2457
22 July 1941.....	Five SCR 270s delivered to QMC for shipment.	510
23 July 1941.....	Letter Wyman to Hawaiian Constructors re expediting AWS.	3420
23 July 1941.....	Div. Engr. relayed to Chief of Engr. request of Dist. Engr. to be permitted to proceed with excavation work.	3137, 3459
25 July 1941.....	Letter Martin to Arnold regarding operation of long range bombardment, etc.	1874-1877
25 July 1941.....	WD message warning of attack.	4055
26 July 1941.....	Dist. Engr. was instructed not to start work on storage tanks as the plans were being materially changed.	3460
26 July 1941.....	About this time notice came out re freezing Japanese assets so alert must have been about this date and not in September.	253
26 July 1941.....	Representative from Div. Engr. in San Francisco to Dist. Engr. stating that the Chief of Engrs. advises excavation should not be started until proposed installation approved by Chief of Engrs.	3137-3138
28 July 1941.....	Letter CG, HD, to TAG about difficulties in procurement and transportation from the mainland.	3426
28 July 1941.....	Ltr. from Short to TAG re fortification and camouflage projects.	3651-3652
August 1941.....	Mobile sets received on Islands for AWS.	3445
7 August 1941.....	Gen. Burgin arrived in Hawaii.	2664
August 1941.....	CG, HD, approved request for 180 B-17's.	153-154
8 August 1941.....	Ltr. George Pain to the President re sabotage.	2953
8 August 1941.....	Ltr. Short to Kimmel aircraft warning service facilities rapidly approaching completion.	507, 1785
7 August 1941.....	Radio received from the Div. Engr. advising that work was not to be started since plans are being materially changed. (Oil storage tanks.)	3138
12 August 1941.....	\$91,000 of request of May 15 for \$240,000 authorized for fencing airfields.	290
12 August 1941.....	Ltr. Arnold to Martin (information on Army air force and six charts showing the successive build-up to the 84 group program).	1875
12 August 1941.....	Radiogram TAG to Short, reply to the 28th of July.	3653
12 August 1941.....	Ltr TAG to Chief of Bureau of Yards & Docks of Navy requesting that the plans be reviewed and concurrence of fund recommendations be given by the Bureau of Yards & Docks of the Navy.	3138
12 August 1941.....	Inclosure B to Annex VII, HECP.	2671
13 August 1941.....	Ltr from TAG to Short in reply to 28 July 1941.	3653-3654
14 August 1941.....	Addendum #6 to Job Order Wheeler Field.	663
15 August 1941.....	Wyman rec'd ltr from Hawaiian Constructors re Rohl.	3900
15 August 1941.....	Ltr Hawaiian Constructors to Dist. Engr. re Rohl.	3900-3951
15 August 1941.....	Ltr Wyman to Chief of Engrs. re expediting Rohl's naturalization.	3862-3904, 3909
15 August 1941.....	Ltr Martin to Arnold re secret plan for reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian defense by air.	1874-1875
15 August 1941.....	Ltr Grafe to Rohl re Rohl's citizenship.	2312-2313
15 August 1941.....	Ltr Grafe to Wyman accompanying Grafe-Rohl letter.	2317-2318
18 August 1941.....	Concurrence rec'd through TAG, re storage tanks.	3138
20 August 1941.....	Martin report to CG, HD under the title of "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii".	3344-3354
20 August 1941.....	Directive published containing 1 Aug 41 authorization that all Hawaiian contracts could be A-1-c.	3428
20 August 1941.....	Plan for Air Defense of Oahu submitted to WD by CG, Hawaiian Air Forces, Gen. Martin, through CG, Hawaiian Dept.	411
21 August 1941.....	Copy Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 sent CG, HD.	50

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Date	Event	Record page reference
25 August 1941.....	Ltr prepared re Infantry training of Air Force personnel.....	1883
28 August 1941.....	Ltr Kingman to Schofield (Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization), re expediting Rohl's naturalization.....	3865-3866
28 August 1941.....	Ltr from Gen. Kingman and Mr. Schofield.....	2057
28 August 1941.....	Gen. Kingman signed letter requesting action on Rohl's citizenship papers.....	545-548, 856-857
29 August 1941.....	Ltr from David H. Cannon to Secy. of Commerce.....	2229
30 August 1941.....	Job order called for completion of AWS on 30 Aug. in lieu of 30 June.....	270
5 December 1941.....	First possible date that Army would have been prepared for the Japanese according to Marshall's statement to Secretary of State.....	8
September 1941.....	State Department with six-hour advance notice told Hayes that they were going to freeze assets of Japs. Went on Alert #3.....	252
2 September 1941.....	Message from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, transmitting American intelligence.....	2969
2 September 1941.....	Report of IG covering organization of office of District Engineer in Honolulu.....	3415-3417
3 September 1941.....	Receipt of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, which was sent 21 August 1941, acknowledged.....	59
3 September 1941.....	TAG requested the Chief of Engineers to revise the plans for storage tanks.....	3460
4 September 1941.....	Stilphen ltr of 28 August read to Martin by Gen. Robins.....	2343-2344
3 September 1941.....	Chief of Eng. requested plans for storage tanks be revised to conform to established policy worked out by the Chief of Eng. for other locations with reference to the protection, concealment & dispersion.....	3138
5 September 1941.....	Memo re Stilphen attempt to expedite Rohl citizenship.....	4372
6 September 1941.....	Construction of cableway actually began.....	3439
6 September 1941.....	Memo re notice to Stilphen of hearing set 15 Sept. re Rohl citizenship.....	4373
8 September 1941.....	Ltr from Hq HD to Dist. Eng. advising that the necessary metal buildings and towers for installation at Haleakala were on hand at Signal Corps yard at Fort Shafter.....	3437
10 September 1941.....	Complete plans submitted for putting aircraft maintenance underground.....	323
11 September 1941.....	Received some small details for transmitter buildings for AWS installations.....	3442
15 September 1941.....	Rohl naturalized.....	3973, 4374
15 September 1941.....	Rohl's knowledge of contracts for Hawaiian installations prior thereto.....	4099
15 September 1941.....	Rohl received citizenship papers.....	767, 2263
15 September 1941.....	Hearing of Rohl's case.....	855
18 September 1941.....	Requested AWS estimates of cost and report were forwarded by Dist. Engr. to Gen. Reybold, Chief of Eng.....	584
19 September 1941.....	Final decision as to location and method of construction of small tanks along the edge of Bellows Field.....	3450, 3452-3454
23 September 1941.....	Estimated date of completion of Kokee Road, etc. under Job Order 23.1.....	570
23 September 1941.....	Dist. Eng. was directed to proceed with construction at Site B but not to start work at Site A pending arrival in Honolulu of the Eng. Advisory Committee.....	3460
23 September 1941.....	Reply of District Eng. to Hq HD, advising that bldgs. and towers had been shipped to the site and that erection would soon begin.....	3437
25 September 1941.....	Ltr from Arnold to Martin re Hawaiian Dept. SOP 14 Jul 41.....	1879-1880
25 September 1941.....	Ltr Martin to Arnold replying to Arnold's letter of 12 Aug. 1941.....	1875-1877
25 September 1941.....	Rohl left for Honolulu.....	2263
25 September 1941.....	Radiogram Short to TAG #403, requesting \$125,000 for field fortifications materials.....	3656-3657
26 September 1941.....	WD AGO 2nd ind. to CG HD, re denial of application for \$125,000 for field fortifications materials.....	3658
27 September 1941.....	Dist. Eng. notified that installation of eight 40,000-barrel storage tanks had been approved and that negotiations for procuring these eight tanks had begun.....	3460
29 September 1941.....	Radiogram #173 from TAG to CG HD, re application for \$125,000 for field fortifications materials denied.....	3657
30 September 1941.....	Date of completion of AWS changed to this date from 30 August.....	270
October 1941.....	Jap Ships stopped coming into Hawaii.....	1386-7
October 1941.....	Memo from Operations Department, General Staff, discussing Japanese probabilities.....	34
October 1941.....	15-day maneuver.....	3099
1 October 1941.....	24th Inf. Div. organized, Gen. Wilson taking command at Schofield Barracks.....	1346
1 October 1941.....	Reybold appointed Chief of Eng.....	569
3 October 1941.....	Requested estimates of cost and report sent by Dist. Eng. 18 Sep 41, forwarded by Chief of Engrs. Chief Signal Officer to TAG.....	584
5 October 1941.....	AWS structure finally approved by CG, HD.....	3433
6 October 1941.....	Meeting Stimson & Hull.....	4047
6 October 1941 to 7 December 1941.....	Series of conference re Japan.....	4326
7 October 1941.....	Ltr. Arnold to Martin saying need for equipment had been taken up.....	1877-1878
7 October 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Knox.....	4047

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Date	Event	Record page reference
9 October 1941.....	Report of Board of Petroleum Consultants under which work was authorized for construction of storage tanks.	3140
9 October 1941.....	Dist. Eng. forwarded report of the Advisory Committee and concurred in its recommendations.	3460
10 October 1941.....	Ltr. Marshall to Short re SOP, HD, dtd. 14 July 41.....	28-29
10 October 1941.....	Rohl returned to Los Angeles.....	2281
10 October 1941.....	Ltr. Schofield to Stilphen.....	4373
14 October 1941.....	Ltr. Short to Marshall replying to Marshall's of October 10 regarding air units in SOP.	31-32
14 or 15 October 1941.....	Cinc ltr 2CL-41 revised.....	1480
Middle of October 1941.....	Hayes ceased as C of S.....	242
16 October 1941.....	WD message warning of attack.....	4055
16 October 1941.....	Navy message.....	4230
16 October 1941.....	Navy predicted Jap-USSR War.....	4264
16 October 1941.....	Message from WD to Short relative to Japan.....	279
16 October 1941.....	Navy message regard to fall of Matsuoka Cabinet.....	1503-A-B
16 October 1941.....	WD message through CINCUS.....	344
17 October 1941.....	G-2 HD estimate of international (Jap) situation.....	3684-3689
17 October 1941.....	G-2 estimate of International situation.....	3684-3689
18 October 1941.....	Radiogram 266 from TAG to Short mentioned by Russell.....	412-413
18 October 1941.....	Msg WD to Short, estimate.....	4257-4258, 4264
20 October 1941.....	18 October message (266) sent to Short.....	413
20 October 1941.....	WD Radiogram signed Adams to CG, HD, re estimate of Jap situation.	3307
20 October 1941.....	WD message warning of attack.....	4055
20 October 1941.....	Gerow message to Hawaiian Dept.....	4231
21 October 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Knox.....	4047
23 October 1941.....	Communication from the office of the Chief of Eng. to Div. Engr. at San Francisco entitled AWS foundation drawings.	3441-3442
23 October 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Knox.....	4047
24 October 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Knox.....	4047
24 October 1941.....	Navy message to Kimmel.....	4258
25 October 1941.....	G-2 estimate of international (Jap) situation.....	3689-3695
27 October 1941.....	Brink reported to G-2, WD, two aircraft carriers operating in Mandated Islands of which Kaga was one.	111
27 October 1941.....	Plans for putting aircraft underground, returned, disapproved.....	323
28 October 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Hull.....	4047
28 October 1941.....	Radio Short to TAG requesting funds for field fortifications and camouflage.	3659
28 October 1941.....	Ltr. Marshall to Short replying to Short's of 14 October.....	30-31
30 October 1941.....	Approval to go ahead on war reserve aviation gasoline storage construction.	3709
30 October 1941.....	Communication from Div. Engr. at San Francisco to Dist. Engr. Honolulu transmitting aircraft warning service foundation drawings.	3442
31 October 1941.....	Report of Joint Army and Navy Board covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area.	1581
31 October 1941.....	Excavation on AWS project finished.....	3433
31 October 1941.....	Authority received to start construction on underground storage tanks.	3140
31 October 1941.....	Dist. Eng. directed to proceed with work on storage tanks in accordance with recommendation of Advisory Committee.	3460
25 November 1941.....	Summary in regard to task force in the Marshalls. Latter part of November Jap Force dropped out of Marshalls.	1660, 1653, 1654
November 1941.....	Photographic mission to Mandated Islands.....	112
1 November 1941.....	Material arrived which was scheduled to arrive 30 June for aircraft warning service.	509
3 November 1941.....	Message Grew to Secretary of State.....	4203
3 November 1941.....	Ltr Martin to Arnold regarding Infantry training of air corps troops.	1880-1886
3 November 1941.....	Grew telegram to Secy of State re guarding against Japs, #1736.	99
4 November 1941.....	Reply from WD (Adams) to CG HD.....	3659-3660
4 November 1941.....	Telephone call Stimson and Hull.....	4047
5 November 1941.....	Col. Phillips became Chief of Staff for Short.....	1108
5 November 1941.....	Gen Hayes officially left Hawaii.....	242
4 November 1941.....	SOP.....	283, 488, 507, 818-820, 1145, 1216, 1222, 1503, 3642, 3643, 4136, 4143, 2683, 3907, 3908, 4310
5 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry.....	4049
6 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry.....	4049
7 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry.....	4049-4050
8 November 1941.....	5 November SOP published by AG HD.....	3316
10 November 1941.....	Telephone call Stimson and Hull.....	4047
10 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry.....	4050
11 November 1941.....	Authority from WD received to go ahead on closing northern ferrying route.	330

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Date	Event	Record page reference
14 November 1941.....	Memo. Powell to Colton re operation of radio sets	687-689
14 November 1941.....	Message Fielder to WD	2972-2973
14 November 1941.....	Memo to Colton, Chief Materiel Branch, from Powell, Dept. Signal Officer, re test SCR-270.	3896
14 November 1941.....	Signal Corps memo to Secy. of War re performance of SCR-270.	4067
16-28 November 1941.....	Six messages sent to Short: four told him not to disturb Japanese and three cautioned about sabotage.	53, 119
16 November 1941.....	Navy message from CNO	2995
17 November 1941.....	Memo. George to Arnold re vulnerability of Wake and Midway	152
17 November 1941.....	Message Grew re planned Jap attack on Pearl Harbor	98-101, 4205
18 November 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Knox	4047
18 November 1941.....	IG prepared first drafts of criticism of District Engineer Office. Ltr to Dist. Engr. from Hawaiian Constructors re "Vega"	4457, 4457
18 November 1941.....	"Report of Investigation Allegations charging slow-down on defense construction work performed by USED" addressed to CG, HD, made by O'Rourke, IGID.	3400-3401
18 November 1941.....	Further revision of Joint Army and Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5 approved Joint Board.	3236
19 November 1941.....	Construction of storage tanks and pipe line began, with completion date of 1 June 1942	59
21 November 1941.....	Last shipment of cableway component left factory of Interstate Equipment Company, Elizabeth, N. J.	3460
21 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry	3440
23 November 1941.....	Dist. Eng. wired Div. Eng. requesting immediate shipment of the channel anchors and bars.	4050
24 November 1941.....	Conference consisting of Col. Murphy (Acting Signal Officer, Hawaiian Dept.) Lt Comdr. Coe (Pat Wing 2), Maj. Tindal (8th Bombardment Wing), Capt. Bergquist (14th Pursuit Wing), Lt. White (Signal Corps), Lt. Harville (53rd Coast Artillery), Lt Thomas (86th Observation Squadron), Comdr. Taylor and Col. Tetley.	3460
24 November 1941.....	Message from CNO to Cincpac	1074, 1192
24 November 1941.....	Ltr. Chief of Eng. subject "Conduct of Work under CPFF contracts."	2896, 3041, 3070
24 November 1941.....	Communication of 30 October 1941 from Division Engr. (San Francisco) to District Engineer (Honolulu), received by Wyman.	3524, 3583
24 November 1941.....	Wyman received floor plan for transmitter building with sketch of 100-foot tower and relative position of detector and transmitter building.	3442
24 November 1941.....	Lt. Taylor submitted report to the responsible Army Chief in connection with radar.	3442
24 November 1941.....	Directive from Chief of Eng. outlining relationship between contractors and CE.	1786
24 November 1941.....	Message re surprise movement on Philippines and Guam possible.	2545, 2561
24 November 1941.....	Short rec'd. 24 Nov. Navy Msg.	239, 1723, 414
24 November 1941.....	WD message warning of attack	1503 B-C.
24 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry	4302
24 November 1941.....	Telephone call Stimson and Hull	4055, 4056
24 November 1941.....	Capt. Layton delivered Navy message by direction of Kimmel to Short.	4050
25 November 1941.....	Meeting President, Stimson, Hull, Knox, Stark and Marshall.	4047
25 November 1941.....	Telephone call Stimson and Hull	4047
25 November 1941.....	Meeting Stimson, Hull and Knox	4047
25 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry	4050, 4051
25 November 1941.....	Secy. of State's statements re U. S. Jap relations.	4082, 4091
25 November 1941.....	Jap deadline to U. S.	4427
25 November 1941.....	War and Navy Departments know that Japan had set a deadline which was later extended to 29 November for the signing of an agreement after which they would take hostile steps against the U. S.	1812
25 November 1941.....	Ltr. to Hawaiian Constructors from Wyman re charter of "Vega". Ltr of Div Eng forwarding to Dist Eng copy of an indorsement for the Chief of Eng to the Navy stating that four tanks would be shipped by 30 November and steel for other five by 15 January 1942.	3401, 3402
25 November 1941.....	Japanese force in Jaluits.	3460-1
25-30 November 1941.....	Jap task force in Marshalls.	129, 1058
26 November 1941.....	Msg. WD to Short re photo mission	2651, 141, 361
26 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry	4258-4259
26 November 1941.....	2 telephone calls, Stimson and Hull	4051-4052
26 November 1941.....	Secy of State delivered statement of policy to Jap Ambassador.	4047, 4061
26 November 1941.....	Memo Secy of State to Jap Ambassador	4079
26 November 1941.....	Marshall went to North Carolina for maneuvers	4207
26 November 1941.....	State Department handed to Japs memo which G-2 WD considered ultimatum to Japs.	36
26 November 1941.....	Brigade SOP charging each unit with responsibility for its own security against air and ground forces.	451
26 November 1941.....	Hull ultimatum to Japan	2601
26 November 1941.....		4320, 4396, 4427

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Date	Event	Record page reference
27 November 1941.....	Memo to President signed by Stark and Marshall re Far Eastern Situation.	9-12
27 November 1941.....	Marshall returned that evening from North Carolina.....	36
27 November 1941.....	Gen. Farthing took command as Base Commander at Hickam Field.	833
27 November 1941.....	G-2 WD message, #473, to G-2 HD.....	35, 115, 117, 111, 2962, 3315, 4182, 4260, 4263
27 November 1941.....	Alert No. 1 ordered.....	1994, 2727-8, 2617, 3079, 3085, 1229, 2998, 1385, 395
27 November 1941.....	Message #472 from Marshall to Short.....	36-37, 81, 87, 113, 154, 164, 169, 280-281, 344, 377, 792-793, 903, 1048-9, 1112, 1347-8, 1395, 1505, 1832-1833, 1780, 1839, 1942-43, 1975-76, 1994, 2020-2021, 2959, 2996, 3070, 3088, 3307-8, 2617-21, 3197, 4059, 4061, 4062, 4070, 4071, 4074, 4077, 4083, 4084, 4091, 4092, 4183, 4250, 4259, 4233
27 November 1941.....	Navy message to Cincpac.....	416, 469, 795, 1114-15, 1349, 1503C-1505, 2622, 4302
27 November 1941.....	Army conference at which Navy dispatch of 27 Nov. was discussed.	1941
28 November 1941.....	Navy conference at which Navy dispatch of 27th was discussed.	1508, 1777
27 November 1941.....	AWS.	518
27 November 1941.....	War Plans Memo for TAG.....	4296
27 November 1941.....	War Plans Memo for President.....	4296
27 November 1941.....	War Plans Memo 454-13 re Far East Situation.....	4295
27 November 1941.....	Gerow memo to CofS on Far Eastern Situation.....	4234, 4054
27 November 1941.....	2 telephone calls, Stimson & Hull.....	4047, 4061
27 November 1941.....	Meeting Stimson & Knox.....	4047
27 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry.....	4052-4054
27 November 1941.....	Reply of Short to Marshall's message #472 reports alert sabotage, liaison with Navy.	38, 422, 3309
27 November 1941.....	Conference Short, Kimmel and Bloch re pursuit plane reinforcement of Wake and Midway.	394
28 November 1941.....	Short-Kimmel-Bloch conference. Martin and Mollison also present.	394, 790, 1507, 1698, 1975, 2020-2021, 1944
27-30 November 1941.....	Japanese force in Jaluit.....	1700, 1769
28 November 1941.....	Mag. G-2, WD, to all commands.....	4260
28 November 1941.....	Meeting President, Stimson, Hull, Knox, Stark and Marshall.....	4047
28 November 1941.....	Telephone call, Stimson and Hull.....	4047
28 November 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Knox.....	4047
28 November 1941.....	Stimson diary entry.....	4079-4081
28 November 1941.....	Message A-2, Army Air Force, to Air AG.....	4168, 4172
28 November 1941.....	War Plans rec'd Short's reply to 27 Nov. message.....	4286
28 November 1941.....	Message G-2, WD (Adams) to CG, HD (#482).....	422, 2998, 3310-3311, 4176
28 November 1941.....	Copy of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 sent to CG, HD.	59
28 November 1941.....	Rohi returned to Honolulu.....	2281
28 November 1941.....	District Engineer was notified that channel anchors and bars shipped 26 November.	3461
28 November 1941.....	Message signed by TAG apparently prepared in the Office of the Air Force dealing with protection against sabotage of planes.	41
28 November 1941.....	Message #482 Signed by TAG to CG, HD.....	170-171, 293-294, 422
28 November 1941.....	Marshall left Washington again, going back to North Carolina.....	37

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Date	Event	Record page reference
28 November 1941.....	Short's reply to TAG message #482.....	177, 294-295, 422
29 November 1941.....	Extension of Jap deadline.....	4427
29 November 1941.....	Radiogram to TAG from Short in reply to #482.....	3311-3312
29 November 1941.....	Short sent Officer Courier to Schofield Barracks who orally delivered message that information had been received from WD that negotiations with Japs had reached a deadlock and were awaiting Japanese action.....	1347
30 November 1941.....	Meeting Stimson and Knox.....	4047
30 November 1941.....	Information Center 72% completed.....	588
30 November 1941.....	Date of completion of Job Order 23.1 changed to 31 Dec. 1941.....	570
30 November 1941.....	Road to Haleakala completed.....	3437
Early December 1941.....	Brit., U. S. & Dutch conferences at Melbourne.....	4504
December 1941.....	Rohl asked Benson to buy 20% interest in Hawaiian Contractors.....	3728
1-2-5 December 1941.....	Jap failure to suggest settlement.....	4059
1 December 1941.....	Navy Intelligence Bulletin stating carrier group in Marshalls but not in DeLany's files on 7 Dec.....	1703
1 December 1941.....	Kimmel received report from Navy Dept. placing Jap carriers for the major part in home waters.....	1769
1 December 1941.....	Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situation by the Office of the Chief of Naval Relations, signed by T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence.....	301
1 December 1941.....	Short and Kimmel received radiograms from WD and Navy Department respectively re relief of Marines on Wake Island and Midway.....	301
1 December 1941.....	Conference between Kimmel and Short; re WD & CNO message of.....	301, 394
1 December 1941.....	(Continued) same date.....	1513
1 December 1941.....	Tentative date of Japanese Far Eastern attack.....	3058
2 December 1941.....	Meeting Stimson, Welles, Knox and President.....	4047
2 December 1941.....	Stimson diary entry.....	4081
2 December 1941.....	Kimmel to Short's Hq. with proposed eight-page ltr. to Navy Department setting forth his views on relief of Marines.....	301, 394, 1513
2 December 1941.....	Mollison says attack expected by Japan against Malaya.....	795
2 December 1941.....	Short sent radio to WD relative to relief of outlying garrisons.....	302
3 December 1941.....	Dutch Admiral knew of Jap carriers in Marshall Islands.....	4398
3 December 1941.....	Powell and Davidson returned from mainland.....	489, 3908
3-4 December 1941.....	Gen. Davidson returned to Honolulu.....	4126, 4136
3 December 1941.....	Rohl returned to Pearl Harbor.....	3510
3 December 1941.....	Transcript of intercepted telephone message with notations.....	1426, 1467
3 December 1941.....	Conference Short and Kimmel re radiogram in answer to relief of Marines on Wake and Midway.....	284, 302, 394
3 December 1941.....	Navy Dept. message to Cincpac re Japanese officials instructed to burn ciphers, codes, etc.....	424, 1513-14
3 December 1941.....	Messages from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, Nos. 363, 364.....	2969
3 December 1941.....	Mr. Shivers intercepted phone of Jap Consulate saying that the Japs had been instructed to burn papers.....	3204
3 December 1941.....	Message from WD "Intensify antisabotage precautions".....	2684
3 December 1941.....	Message from Navy Dept. to CINCPAC that Japanese Consulates were destroying codes and burning documents.....	1514
4 December 1941.....	Expanded final AWS program approved.....	3432
4 December 1941.....	Fleming and Col. Phyphffer conference.....	302
4 December 1941.....	Message, RCA No. 365, Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.....	2970
4 December 1941.....	Secy of War approved revised AWS.....	584
4 December 1941.....	Navy Dept. message to Cincpac re destruction of their confidential documents.....	425, 1513-14
4 December 1941.....	Col. Claterbos arrived in Honolulu by clipper.....	4077, 4099, 4101
4 December 1941.....	British Admiral believed war imminent.....	4396
5 December 1941.....	Cable to Short by U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne.....	4505-4506
5 December 1941.....	Lt. Col. Bicknell informed staff at meeting 6 Dec that Japs were burning papers on 5 Dec.....	525, 1414
5 December 1941.....	B-24's arrived from mainland no ammunition. Message in regard to plan for photographic mission of B-24's.....	304-305
5 December 1941.....	Date of preparedness changed from September 1941 to this date at Council Meetings.....	8
5 December 1941.....	Telephone Conversation to Dr. and Mrs. Mori intercepted.....	3205, 1417-18
5 December 1941.....	Claterbos-Wyman conversation.....	4101
5 December 1941.....	Order to photograph Truk.....	4046
5 December 1941.....	U. S., Brit., Dutch Joint Action Agreement known to U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne.....	4506, 4507
6 December 1941.....	Message No. 368 to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.....	2970
6 December 1941.....	Transmitter detector on Haleakala was completed.....	3438
6 December 1941.....	Bellinger received message from Marine Air Corps re 21 airplanes available in this Command.....	1623
6 December 1941.....	Col. Fielder saw intercepted telephone message of Dr. Mori.....	2961
6 December 1941.....	Navy Dept. sent message to Cincpac out there authorizing them to destroy confidential papers under conditions of emergency.....	239, 425, 1513-1514
6 December 1941.....	Two groups of planes left Hamilton Field no ammunition, guns not bore-sighted.....	307
6 December 1941.....	Intercepted phone message between Jap at Oahu and Japanese official reported to Short.....	46-, 2961

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Date	Event	Record page reference
6 December 1941	Staff meeting informed Japs burning papers.	1242, 1413
6 December 1941	Japs burning papers at consulate.	2985-86
6 December 1941	Wyman spent evening at home.	3384
6 December 1941	Jap task force seen off French Indo-China.	3061
7 December 1941	Message CofS to HD.	3313, 4306, 4424
7 December 1941	Message for Japanese Consul, Honolulu from Togo.	2971
7 December 1941	WD thought Short operating under Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and Plans pertinent thereto—consisting of Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, The Naval Operations Annex, Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.	69
7 December 1941	Message to overseas department from Chief of Staff—Message filed 6:48 AM—Honolulu time.	198
	Message received 7:33 AM—Honolulu time.	198, 308-310
	Message delivered to Signal Center, Honolulu 11:45 Honolulu time.	202
	Message decoded 2:58.	308-310
7 December 1941	Description of attack by Mr. Kay.	3932-3939
7 December 1941	Meeting of Stimson, Hull and Knox.	4047
7 December 1941	Stimson Diary entry.	4081
7 December 1941	Attack on Pearl Harbor, Tec 4 McDonald in Information Center.	4153
7 December 1941	WD knew precise hour of Jap attack.	4427
7 December 1941	2 squadrons of fighter planes, one at Haleia and one at Bellows Field loaded with ammunition on morning of Dec. 7.	4490
7 December 1941	Interceptor Center operated immediately both before and after attack.	4491-4492
7 December 1941	Col. Tindal at Information Center.	4492
7 December 1941	Fighter airplanes went "up as individuals".	4496
7 December 1941	No Navy representative, but one bomber representative at Information Center.	4497
7 December 1941	Information Center not functioning at its best efficiency due to lack of knowledge.	4487-4498
7 December 1941	USED took over Hawaiian Contractors plant.	3726
7 December 1941	7:55 attack on Pearl Harbor.	308-310, 2852
7 December 1941	Statement from Joint Action of the Army and Navy.	1752
7 December 1941	Radiogram from TAG to CG HD authorizing expenditure of funds.	3660
7 December 1941	Two man submarine in Pearl Harbor 6:45.	310
7 December 1941	Document the Pacific Fleet in Command organization of Navy as of 7 Dec. 1941.	1740-1745
7 December 1941	Conference between Short and Governor of Pearl Harbor.	318
7 December 1941	Air raid instructions issued.	529
7 December 1941	Radio from Chief of Staff.	3691-3692
7 December 1941	About 9 or 9 30 on the morning of the 7th the 21st Inf. had moved into the backyard of John Midkiff.	2840
7 December 1941	Regarding defense prior to 7 Dec. 1941.	2626-2627
7 December 1941	After attack, No. 2 Alert immediately followed by directive to go on No. 3 Alert.	3079
8 December 1941	Martial law declared.	319
8 December 1941	Ordered District Engineer to take over all engineering supplies and ordered all contractors to work under him and take over all labor.	320
8 December 1941	M-Day bill put into effect.	335-319
8 December 1941	Meeting held by General Short about 40 people there including Mr. Locey re food situation.	2790
8 December 1941	War declared on Japan.	4380
8-10 December 1941	Inventory taken of food on island.	337
9 December 1941	CG, HD, signed Colton Acting in regard to receipt of message of 7 Dec.	3314
9 December 1941	Reply of Short to 9 Dec. message from Chief Signal Officer, Washington.	3314-3315
9 December 1941	Mr. Tillman placed in charge of Plant Control Section.	2139
9 December 1941	Actions and orders issued pertaining to chemical air attack. Distribution of Claxon horns for air raid warning system. Practiced air raid for Honolulu. Exchange of old gas masks for new.	529
9 or 10 December 1941	Report Capron to Short re ammunition.	2028
10 December 1941	Orders for practice air raid issued.	531
10 December 1941	Secy. Knox arrived in Hawaii.	1070
10 or 11 December 1941	War with Germany.	4380
12 December 1941	Letter from TAG subject Countersubversive System addressed to CG, All Corps Areas and Chief of Engineers.	578
12 December 1941	Communication to Division Engr. San Francisco from the Office of the Chief of Engr. forwarding additional drawings and erection diagrams for aircraft warning service construction.	3442
13 December 1941	Fin. Dept. issued 2 ltrs re property accountability.	4458
13 December 1941	Adm. Pye took over command of Pacific Fleet.	1045
15 December 1941	Gerow memo re conf in Marshall's Office, 7 Dec.	4307-4309
16 December 1941	Short ceased command.	351
16 December 1941	All construction work for Army turned over to Chief of Engineers.	662

Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
17 December 1941	Kimmel relieved of command	1735
17 December 1941	Job Order 23.1 Revised entitled AWS base camp and field station.	570
17 December 1941	Interceptor Command activated	525, 3907
17 December 1941	Short ceased command	277
17 December 1941	Admiral Pye took charge	534
17 December 1941	Supplementary Appropriation Act signed, increasing by \$239,000 for Military Intelligence.	737
18 December 1941	Col. Collins made Chief of Staff, Phillips relieved	1247
20 December 1941	Hawaiian Constructors contract became effective	3752
22 December 1941	Ltr civilians of Honolulu to President	342
22 December 1941	Plans and specifications for the 40,000 barrel tanks were received by the District Engineer.	3461
22 December 1941	Receipt of detailed plans for the tanks	3140
22 December 1941	Ltr to President re Short's plans for emergency	2803-2805
22 December 1941	Ltr to President	2726
23 December 1941	Ltr Governor of Hawaii to Short	338-341
24 December 1941	Received the first set of drawings which could really be fully used for proceeding with the erection of the detector and transmitter building.	3443, 3445
25 December 1941	Air Ferry Route completed	331
28 December 1941	Air ferry route completed by Wyman which was to be completed 15 January 1942.	2049
31 December 1941	Ltr Powell to Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C. re operation of radios, etc., on 7 December.	694
31 December 1941	Date of completion of AWS base camp and field station under Job Order 23.1 revised.	570
31 December 1941	Benson bought 20% interest in Hawaiian Constructors	3734, 3741, 3860
January 1942	Arrival of Rohl-Connolly equipment on the "Ludington"	3808, 3813
1 January 1942	Statement of Kuhn of conspiracy with Jap Consul at Honolulu	3798
1 January 1942	Contract W 414-eng-2753 for rental of 16 yr old tractor from Woolley, (\$2,515 rent for \$200. tractor.)	4003
3 January 1942	Wyman telegram	4458
6 January 1942	Col. Nurse began service under Col. Wyman	3997
8 January 1942	Martin received orders to leave Hawaii	1833
9 January 1942	Ltr Rohl to District Engineer stating amount desired for equipment.	3818, 3829
12 January 1942	Truman returned to mainland with Short	1445
13 or 14 January 1942	Martin left Hawaii	1833
15 January 1942	Dist. Engrs. took the Pleasanton Hotel and	
15 January 1942	Scheduled date of completion of air ferry route which was completed 28 Dec 41.	2049
27 January 1942	Editorial from Honolulu Advertiser	3166
February 1942	Grafe left Hawaii	3757
February 1942	Rohl transported cases of whiskey Los Angeles to Honolulu	4100
12 February 1942	Newspaper clipping Honolulu Advertiser "Fraudulent Pay Claim Charged."	3240
14 February 1942	Ltr Wyman to Reybold; Hannum had not seen it regarding situation in District Engineer's office.	2038-40
14 February 1942	Report of Colonel Row	2046, 2094-2099
14 February 1942	Report from Army Officer to Commanding General to the effect that Wyman should be relieved as District Engineer for inefficiency.	608, 716
16 February 1942	King arrived in Hawaii	2528
17 February 1942	Cir. Ltr. No. 1222 on property accounting	4459
19 February 1942	"Vega" departed from West Coast to Hawaii	3403
22 February 1942	Emmons took over all construction	4459
27 February 1942	Ltr. Lyman to Reybold re situation in District Engineer's office	2042-2044
28 February 1942	Wyman relieved as District Engineer	608
28 February 1942	Truman's duties as Aide ended	1445
February or March 1942	Ltr. Secy. of War, asking HD or IG to conduct investigations into the delays of construction.	2129
1 March 1942	Lyman took over construction	4461
4 March 1942	Inspection re property accounting	4460
March 1942	Wyman left Hawaii	2460, 3512, 3638
9 March 1942	"Vega" arrived in Hawaii	3403
11 March 1942	Ltr. Rohl on behalf of Hawaiian Constructors requesting District Engineer to purchase certain equipment from Rohl-Connolly Company.	757, 3414
12 March 1942	Mr. Parker, who had appraised equipment at \$131,411.03 was asked to report to Wyman's Operations Officer.	757-758
12 March 1942	Ltr of Mr. Parker about purchase of equipment	3596-a
12 March 1942	Appraisal of equipment by Mr. Parker	3616, 3804, 3806
12 March 1942	End of use of Rohl-Connolly equipment	3813
13 March 1942	Wyman directed Hawaiian Constructors to purchase equipment for government at price named by Rohl.	758, 3616
13 March 1942	Approval of purchase based on Gentry and Roblee estimates, by Wyman.	3805, 3826, 3830
14 March 1942	Report of Inspection of 4 March	4460
14 March 1942	Wyman \$147,611 equipment purchase from Hawaiian Contracting Company.	3999

3354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
15 March 1942	Wyman relieved.	3826, 3616
15 March 1942	Wyman left Hawaii.	4461
16 March 1942	Ltr. Reybold to Lyman in reply to ltr. 27 Feb. 42 re re-assignment of Wyman.	2068
2 April 1942	Ltr Lt. Col. Nurse, CE, re Rohl citizenship status.	3238
4 April 1942	Ltr. Lyman to Hawaiian Constructors informing them the "Vega" no longer needed.	3405
13 April 1942	Ltr. Dillingham to Wyman in which acknowledgement made of latter's letter of 17 March.	3408-3409
14 April 1942	Conference Marston with representatives of Air Force, Engineers and Navy settling final installation plan for storage tanks.	3140
21 April 1942	Testimony of Robert Hoffman taken by Col. Row, IGD.	3877
26 April 1942	Ltr re Inspector's report 14 March.	4460
28 April 1942	Appropriations Act of \$1,343,000 signed.	740
29 April 1942	Statement of Robert Hoffman.	2121
1 May 1942	Formal cancellation of Job #46 (Mobile AWS Station at Mauna Loa) which was actually cancelled 14 July 1941.	3436
May 1942	Col. Robinson left Hawaii.	3822
May 1942	Benson paid for 20% interest in Hawaiian Contractors.	3741, 3742.
23 May 1942	Report of investigation re irregularities in office of 14th Field Area USED Pearl City, T. H.	3242
May or June 1942	Rohl left Hawaii.	3757
Spring 1942	Rohl made trip to continent.	3757, 3758
Spring 1942	Rohl complained of having bad heart.	3759
Summer 1942	Rohl returned to the continent permanently.	3759
1 July 1942	Other Rohl-Connolly equipment accepted by District Engineer valued at \$20,511 subsequent to this date.	3829
9 July 1942	"Vega" accepted by Coast Guard for duty, ltr 28 July 1942.	3406
22 July 1942	Meurlott memo re Rohl.	3925, 3001-2
28 July 1942	Ltr. Lt. Com. C. W. Thomas to Div. Engr. re situation of "Vega."	3406
2 August 1942	Alleged improper conduct of a government employee by misappropriation of meal tickets to CG HD conducted by Lt. Col. O'Rourke, IGD.	3243
22 September 1942	Ltr. to Chief Military Intelligence Service WD from John S. Gullett marked Exhibit 61 concerning Col. Wyman and U. S. Army Canal project with two inclosures 22 Sep 1942 and 17 Sep 1942.	4033-4035
October 1942	Report of FBI re Wyman.	2122-2123
November 1942	Rohl got German passport.	3996
November 1942	Rohl went back to Continent.	3738
January 1943	Woolley came out of Hawaiian Constructors contract.	3765
7 January 1943	Report on the Pleasanton Hotel matter.	3240
13 January 1943	Col. Nurse's report to Gen. Kramer.	4001
31 January 1943	Hawaiian Constructors' contract terminated.	3738, 3765
1 March 1943	Ltr. Robert McKee, El Paso, Texas, to Hon R. E. Thomason, M. C., enclosing newspaper clippings regarding Wyman and Rohl.	748
11 March 1943	FBI report re Capt. Ulrich Von Der Oeden.	3033
28 April 1943	Report of Edw. A. Furbish re Rohl citizenship files.	3973
5 May 1943	Ltr. to the CG, 8th Service Command, signed by Brig. Gen. Madison Pearson, G. S. C.	3521
9 July 1943	Ltr to Col. Millard Pierson, Dept. IG, from J. E. Thornton of FBI.	3239
15 September 1943 to 15 September 1944.	Japs apprehended and dual citizens born.	3921-3922
18 September 1943	Affidavit of Rea B. Wickiser.	3582
1 January 1944	Hawaiian Contracting Company, Ltd., suspended dividend of 1/2% monthly paid 1942-1943.	3916-3917
February 1944	Lease land at Mokuleia Airfield from Dillingham (Mokuleia Ranch & Land Co., Ltd.).	3881
7 March 1944	Don C. Bird, FBI agent, investigated Col. Claterbos' information re Wyman.	4096
24 March 1944	Ltr Dist. Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Honolulu, to Dist. Director.	4115
13 June 1944	Public Law 339, 78th Congress, directing investigation.	4038-4039, 4089
2 August 1944	Ltr. Gen. Grunert to Congressman Robinson.	4362
2 August 1944	Orders for Gen. Bragdon in connection with Army Pearl Harbor Board.	2904-2905
3 August 1944	Army Pearl Harbor Board memo to Secy. of War.	4041
14 August 1944	Memo for Army Pearl Harbor Board from Div. of Naval Intelligence with following inclosures introduced into evidence & marked Exhibit 60: ONI card, dated 2 Oct. 1940, subject "Hans Wilhelm Rohl." Report 11th Naval Dist. NIS 17 Oct. 1940 (Rohl investigation concerning crew on Rohl yacht) NIS report dated 5 March 1941, subject "Rohl."	4030-4033

Table of important dates—Continued

Date	Event	Record page reference
15 August 1944.....	Ltr to Majer Clausen by Col. R. L. Forney, Gen. Staff Corps, Military Intelligence, Washington, with inclosures marked Exhibit 59 and received in evidence. Exhibit 59 indicates that as of Dec 1940 there was a file in FBI to the effect that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was possibly an agent of the German Gov't. and guilty of subversive activities, which information could have been obtained by any one desiring to investigate the loyalty of Rohl. Also a suspicion directed against Hans Wilhelm Rohl of subversive activities as early as July 1940.	4027-4028
21 August 1944.....	List of MID Personnel & expenses, 1921-1942.....	4355-4361
31 August 1944.....	Report Signal Office, Central Pacific Base Command, on establishment of AWS (Exhibit 58).	3915
4 September 1944.....	Maj. Powell's orders in connection with Army Pearl Harbor Board.	2923
9 September 1944.....	Ltr Robert Hoffman to Army Pearl Harbor Board.....	4121-4123
12 September 1944.....	Exhibit 51—summary of information concerning Jap task force.....	3662
13 September 1944.....	1st Ind. to ltr of 7 September 1944, from Gen. Grunert.....	3643
14 September 1944.....	Memo Col. Marcy to Gen Frank. (Exhibit 57.).....	3914
15 September 1944.....	Memo Maj. Lozier to Maj. Clausen final estimate cost \$97,688.-861. Fee rec'd by Hawaiian Constructors \$1,060,000.	3797
16 September 1944.....	Affidavit by Wyman, (Exhibit 56.).....	3852-3878
16 September 1944.....	Memo to Army Pearl Harbor Board from Engineer, Hq Central Pacific Base Command.	3881-3882
18 September 1944.....	Ltr H. P. Benson to Army Pearl Harbor Board.....	3916, 3917
21 September 1944.....	Affidavit of Graves that Australia knew Japs headed for U. S. possession.	4404, 4413
26 September 1944.....	Gen. Grunert phone call to Sen. Ferguson.....	4403

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
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS—ILLUSTRATIONS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD


(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parentheses following the description)

ITEM NO.	DESCRIPTION
1.	Map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Communications Installations as of 7 July 1941. (Exhibit No. 1.)
2.	Map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Police Districts, Railroad Bridges, and Highway Bridges. (Exhibit No. 1.)
3.	Map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Electric Installations and Generating Plants. (Exhibit No. 1.)
4.	Map of the Hawaiian Islands bearing notations from Radar Detector Station Records. (Exhibit No. 3-A.)
5.	Map showing record of Opana Radar Detector Station, 7 December 1941. (Exhibit No. 3-B.)
6.	Photostatic copy of a Carlton Hotel, Washington, D. C., registration card dated 17 December 1940 for Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. (Exhibit No. 6.)
7.	Photostatic copy of a guest invoice of the Carlton Hotel for the period December 17 to 20, 1940. (Exhibit No. 6.)
8-9.	Carlton Hotel ledger sheet for Paul F. Grafe for the period November 12, 1939, to May 29, 1942. (Exhibit No. 6.)
10-13.	Folder of Hotel Biltmore, Los Angeles, records relating to H. W. Rohl. (Exhibit No. 12.)
14-23.	Bank statements from Seventh and Figueroa Branch, Bank of America, Los Angeles, relating to Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. (Exhibit No. 12.)
24-25.	Signature cards of Bank of America in name of Theodore Wyman, Jr. (Exhibit No. 12.)
26-31.	Folder of Daily Records of Long Distance Calls, The Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, for period July 15 to December 21, 1940. (Exhibit No. 12.)
32-47.	Telephone toll tickets, Los Angeles, California, relating to H. W. Rohl. (Exhibit No. 14.)
48.	Radar plotting sheet of 7 December 1941, of Opana station. (Exhibit No. 15.)
49-52.	Copy of a map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort Kamehameha, 7 December 1941. (Exhibit No. 22.)
53.	Photostat of a captured Japanese map taken from the chart board of a Japanese dive bomber. (Exhibit No. 23.)
54-56.	Captured Japanese maps. (Exhibit Nos. 24, 25, and 26.)
57.	Map No. 1 taken from a Japanese submarine. (Exhibit No. 48.)
58.	Map No. 2 taken from a Japanese submarine. (Exhibit No. 49.)
59.	Map reflecting the track of Japanese aircraft carriers: November 1941-April 1942. (Exhibit No. 51.)
60-61.	Photostatic copies of an envelope addressed "C. W. Smith, Esq.", a scene of Waikiki, and the reverse side of the indicated envelope. (Exhibit No. 53.)
62.	Chart relating to "Status of Construction" Hickam Field, T. H., for period August 31, 1941. (Exhibit No. 56.)
63.	Map of the Territory of Hawaii relating to "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department." (Exhibit No. 63.)

ITEM NO. 1



ITEM NO. 2



3



STAD



ITEM NO. 4

ITEM NO. 5

SECRET

no det. for search early stage in no
7 Dec 41 - H. M. G. L.
to C. G. L.

SECRET

ITEM NO. 6

1-WYMAN LT COL THEODORE		Nº 13595	
		CARLTON HOTEL WASHINGTON, D. C.	
Name <u>H. Col. Theodore Wyman Jr</u>			
Street <u>Honolulu</u>			
City <u>Pf.</u>			
MONEY, JEWELS AND OTHER VALUABLE PACKAGES MUST BE PLACED IN THE SAFE IN THE OFFICE AND RECEIPT OBTAINED, OTHERWISE THE MANAGEMENT WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LOSS.			
ARRIVED <u>12/17/60</u>	DEPARTED	ROOM <u>816-B</u>	CLERK <u>Jan 1/1971</u>
REMARKS		DATE <u>11/6</u>	ACCOUNT NO. <u>70423</u>
		<u>127</u>	<u>D</u>

79716 O-46 APHB



ITEM NO. 7

Guest Account

lton Hotel

WASHINGTON

Nº 70423

UNDAY	CHANGED		
	DATE	TO ROOM	NEW RATE
redited	Balance Due	Room No.	
	* 2.00	* 016*	
	* 3.00	E 016*	
	* 7.50	= 020*	
	* 12.00	= 020*	
	* 16.50	= 020*	

ITEM NO. 8

his Blod

BALANCE	PROOF
719 82*	0 00
728 32*	719 82
8 50*	728 32
0 00*	8 50

ITEM NO. 9

NAME		PROOF	
4	817	0	000
13	817	674	817
0	000	253	350
16	664	0	000
17	664	528	664

ITEM NO. 10

3 A			
ACCOUNT RATING			
SCF-			
	CREDITS	BALANCE	
		500 00	☆
	500 00	00	☆
		500 00	☆
☆	200 00	00	☆
	00 00	00	☆
	00 00	00	☆
	00 00	00	☆
		8 79	☆
		1013 80	☆

ITEM NO. 11

3 B RECOUNT RATINGS			
	CREDITS	BALANCE	
		520 10	☆☆
		1071 52	☆☆
		1592 47	☆☆☆
		1706 86	☆
	1706 86	0 00	☆☆

ITEM NO. 12

A			
ACCOUNT RATING			
	CREDITS	BALANCE	
	AL FRWD	1507 59	☆
		2306 73	☆
	1507 59	799 14	☆
		1940 25	☆
		2683 28	☆
	743 03	1940 25	☆
☆	1940 25	0 00	☆

ITEM NO. 13


A			
ACCOUNT			
RATING			
1			
CREDIT	BALANCE		
	125 69	★	
125 69	00	★	
	23 26	★	
23 26	00	★	
	20 92	★	1937
20 92	00	★	
	33 00	★	

ITEM NO. 14

STATEMENT		
SEVENTH		
LOS A		
OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
	25	519.01
519.01	28	514.01
514.01	29	503.01
503.01	10	483.01
483.01	15	1,190.56
1,190.56	30	1,109.81
1,109.81	40	1,174.32
1,174.32	50	981.32


ITEM NO. 15

STATEMENT		
SEVENTH		
		
LOS ANGELES		
OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
1,276.52	5/10	1,276.52
1,101.42	5/10	1,101.42
1,028.60	6/10	1,028.60
797.22	7/10	797.22



ITEM NO. 16

STATE		
DEPARTMENT		
FUND		
ACCOUNT		
DATE		
SIGNATURE		
OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
1,120.88	8/20/73	1,120.73
880.25	8/20/73	820.73
809.77	8/20/73	809.77
773.09	8/20/73	773.09
757.32	8/20/73	757.32
669.18	8/20/73	669.18
672.50	8/20/73	672.50



ITEM NO. 18

STATEMENT
SEVENTH AND
Bank
NATIONAL
LOS ANGELES

31

OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
	31 01	263.43
263.43	7 01	238.43
238.43	7 01	378.02
378.02	10 01	582.87
582.87		

ITEM NO. 19

STATE		
SEVENTH		
LOS ANGELES		
OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
	1901	901.12
901.	10	741.70
741.	10	706.70
706.	5	485.41
485.	6	250.20

ITEM NO. 19

STATE		
SEVENTH		
LOS ANGELES		
OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
901.12	30	901.12
741.70	10	741.70
706.70	10	706.70
485.41	50	485.41
250.12	60	250.12

ITEM NO. 20

STATEMENT		
REVENUE		
LOS ANGELES		
OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
948.42	31	948.42
933.42	1	933.42
800.42	2	800.42
767.95	3	767.95
729.62	3	729.62
707.37	4	707.37
603.26	5	603.26

ITEM NO. 21

STATE SEVEN 33 412		
OLD BALANCE	DATE	NEW BALANCE
030	11	404.12
492	11	404.12
569	31	404.12
419	31	404.12
404	41	404.12

ITEM NO. 22

DATE		NEW BALANCE
1952	12	550.00
1953	1	550.00
1954	1	550.00
1955	1	550.00
1956	1	550.00
1957	1	550.00
1958	1	550.00
1959	1	550.00
1960	1	550.00
1961	1	550.00
1962	1	550.00
1963	1	550.00
1964	1	550.00
1965	1	550.00
1966	1	550.00
1967	1	550.00
1968	1	550.00
1969	1	550.00
1970	1	550.00
1971	1	550.00
1972	1	550.00
1973	1	550.00
1974	1	550.00
1975	1	550.00
1976	1	550.00
1977	1	550.00
1978	1	550.00
1979	1	550.00
1980	1	550.00
1981	1	550.00
1982	1	550.00
1983	1	550.00
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1985	1	550.00
1986	1	550.00
1987	1	550.00
1988	1	550.00
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2016	1	550.00
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2019	1	550.00
2020	1	550.00
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2023	1	550.00
2024	1	550.00
2025	1	550.00
2026	1	550.00
2027	1	550.00
2028	1	550.00
2029	1	550.00
2030	1	550.00
2031	1	550.00
2032	1	550.00
2033	1	550.00
2034	1	550.00
2035	1	550.00
2036	1	550.00
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2060	1	550.00
2061	1	550.00
2062	1	550.00
2063	1	550.00
2064	1	550.00
2065	1	550.00
2066	1	550.00
2067	1	550.00
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2089	1	550.00
2090	1	550.00
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2092	1	550.00
2093	1	550.00
2094	1	550.00
2095	1	550.00
2096	1	550.00
2097	1	550.00
2098	1	550.00
2099	1	550.00
2100	1	550.00

ITEM NO. 23

STATE		DATE	NEW BALANCE
500	15		795.53-
750	45		750.53-
500	50		608.53-
500	70		589.53-
500	90		538.57-
530	95		527.57-
507	100		635.06-

THEMAN, THEODORE JR.

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS TERRITORY OF

HAWAII

The undersigned depositor agrees with Bank of America that this account is to be carried by said bank as a COMMERCIAL account and all funds which the undersigned depositor has or may have on deposit therein with said bank shall be governed by its By-Laws, all interest accumulations thereon, and all regulations passed or hereafter to be passed by its Board of Directors pursuant to said By-Laws relating thereto including interest, service charges, etc.

Sign
Here

Theodore Wyman Jr

Telephone

Address 275 Lexington Avenue StBusiness or U.S. Army Birthplace Somerville N. J.Occupation Major Father's Maiden Name Ella ShelvingEndor to Introduced by Capt. change U.S. Engineers OfficeOpened by Ward Date 8-17-35 Amount 600-Anct. 1, - 30 - 39 Avg. 144- Reason C.C. for balance



THEODORE Theodore Jr.

Camp Claiborne, Louisiana

The undersigned depositor agrees with Bank of America that this account is to be carried

by said bank as a COMMERCIAL account and all funds which the undersigned depositor has or may have on deposit therein with said bank shall be governed by its By Laws, all future amendments thereof, all regulations passed or hereafter to be passed by its Board of Directors pursuant to said By-Laws, and by all rules and practices of said bank relating thereto including interest, service charges, etc. as stated,

Sign
Here as Mr.

Address U.S. Engineer Office - S. S. Engineering Department

Business or Occupation Engineer Birthplace Porter N.Y.

Father's Name Theodore Jr. Father's Maiden Name Ella Murkin

Introduced by Self Bank Reference 15-42

Opened by Self Date 1-15-42 Amount 1743.67

Acct. Aver. Reason

Clot.



ITEM NO. 26

ILLS				
9	DATE 7-15 1940			
	COMPANY CHARGE	TAX	SERVICE CHARGE	GUEST TOTAL
	10		10	20
	15		10	25
	10		10	20
	10		10	20
	10		10	20
	10		10	20



ITEM NO. 26

9

ALLS

DATE 7-15 1940

COMPANY CHARGE	TAX	SERVICE CHARGE	GUEST TOTAL	HOUSE
10		10	20	
15		10	25	
10		10	20	
10		10	20	
10		10	20	
10		10	20	

ITEM NO. 27

LS	
DATE <u>Aug - 1st</u> 19 <u>40</u>	
1	COMPANY CHARGE TAX SERVICE CHARGE GUEST TOTAL HOUSE
	10 10 20
	10 10 20
	10 10 20
	34 10 20
	15 10 25
	53 10 45

ITEM NO. 28

CALLS				
DATE 8 - 1				
ID 40				
	COMPANY CHARGE	TAX	SERVICE CHARGE	GUEST TOTAL
3	10		10	20
1	20		10	30
1	40		10	50
1	25		10	35
1	3.55		40	395

ITEM NO. 29

ITEM NO. 30

17

CALLS

DATE Oct 30 40

	COMPANY CHARGE	TAX	SERVICE CHARGE	GUEST TOTAL	HOUSE
1	10		10	20	
	15		10	25	
1	9 75		100	10 75	
	155		20	1 75	
	120		20	140	

ITEM NO. 31

ALLS

DATE Dec. 21 1940

✓	COMPANY CHARGE	TAX	SERVICE CHARGE	GUEST TOTAL	HOUSE
	15		10	25	✓
	10		-	-	(10)
	10		10	20	
	20		10	30	
	10		10	20	
	10		10	20	

APR 26 1941

cut by 4-29p

wd 4-31p

P.M.

39537

39537

39537

DATE	MAY 22-40	FROM	K 223
CITY	LOS ANGELES, CALIF.	STATE	
NO.	GRA 4489		
FROM	Rod	SPEC. INST.	Tec + overseer
TO	Honolulu Cable T		
TELEPHONE	6773		
NAME	Col Theodore Wynne		
ADDRESS HERE			
FILED TIME		OFFICE	9:30 PM '37
MAIL CENTER		MAIL	CLERK
RECEIVED VIA		REPORT	16.15
FIRM WHITE		CLASS	4800
ALL WHITE			
passed to SF over new. 4240			


79716 O-46 AP

ITEM NO. 33

OCT 31 1941		✓ K228- copy 2	
Los Angeles, Calif			
GRA 4489			
Rohle			
T.C. Overland			
TO			
Honolulu, Oahu T.H.			
67731			
Theodore Wymann			
Dist Eng - "H.S."			
Young Bldg (ofc)			
412 P.		244 172	
		8 P	
SF			
		2400-240	
Jg			

79716 O-46 APHB

ITEM NO. 3



OCT 31-41 ✓ A-223
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

GRA 4489
R. L. L. S. P. C. J. M. T.
McCormack



Hans Luther Ockert
Cal. Theodora
Wymore-Dist. Eng.

5	5	5
5	5	5

5F
1500-100
passed to SF. 1156

79716 O-46 APHE

ITEM NO. 35



79716 O-46 APHB

Forward
 Packed to Overseas
 Apr 25th g.
 in few unable to
 locate 304 p.
 324 in few. 304 p.
 342 in few. 304 p.
 4145 903 p. in few
 Report found it. 4145
 5-17 p. in few
 unable to locate
 5-17 p. 503 p.
 5-17 p. 503 p. in few

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.
6449
7772 2477
for personal
Circular 6449
6772
7772
for personal



ITEM NO. 37

Hatched in egg
 MAR 18 1911
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
 (L.A.) 12 39p
 12590 in about
 6000 (L.A.) 1252p
 6000 in 7-00p (L.A.)
 7-00p (L.A.) 7/12
 Hatched in egg
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
 8-21p

[illegible]


79716 O-46 APHB

ITEM NO. 38



79716 O-46 APHB


ITEM NO. 46



JAN 11 1941		T		T-4	
PLACE		FROM		✓	
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.		DATE			
TH 4489		TO			
FROM		SPEC. INST.			
(overman)					
PLACE		TO		TO	
CALLE		78894		78894	
RECEIVED		FROM		FROM	
		Lester L. Brown		Lester L. Brown	
RECEIVED		Lester L. Brown		Lester L. Brown	
PLACE		TO		TO	
742		R		736389	
TALL CENTER		R		PV	
TIME, VIA		REPORT		REPORT	
REPORT		REPORT		REPORT	
N.Y. DATE		N.Y. DATE		N.Y. DATE	
2400		2400		2400	
4-150		4-150		4-150	


79716 O-46 APHB

ITEM NO. 47




NAME	FROM	DATE
TEL. NO.		
ADDRESS		
	APPROX. DATE	
NAME	TO	STATE
INITIAL	TEL. NO.	
	PERSON	
RECEIVED		
LOCATION		
ALCOHOL	OPERATION	
TELE. CENTER	WIRE	BLANK
TELE. NO.	REPORT	RECEIVED
TELE. NO.	REPORT	RECEIVED
TELE. NO.	REPORT	RECEIVED

79716 O-46 APHB




ITEM NO. 49




79716 O-46 APHB

ITEM NO. 50




79716 O-46 APHB

ITEM NO. 51




79716 O-46 APHB

ITEM NO. 52






79716 O-46 APHB

ITEM NO. 53





ITEM NO. 55








ITEM NO. 57









H 174 Surf Riding, Waikiki

Part of Exhibit No. 53 - In evidence

ITEM NO. 61

